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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 01 DEC1969. Other requests shall be referred toDepartment of the Army, Attn: PublicAffairs Office, Washington, DC 20310.

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IH11

CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OIPICE OF TM ADJUTANT MrENRAL

WASIHINGTON, D.C. 20210

AGDA (M) (18 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694230 15 April 1970

SUBJECTs 'Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry•. Division, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

SSEE DISTRIBUTION 1 r..

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordancewith paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions shouldbe reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days

of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided t6 insure appropriatebenefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations andmay be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETAgY OF THE ARMY:

1 InclKENNETH Go WICIGIM1 Inca Major General, USAThe Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:Commanding Generals

US Continental Army CommandUS Army Combat Developments CommandUS Army Materiel Comnand "-

Coammandant sUS. Army War CollegeUS Army Command and General Staff College r

US Army Air Defense School f / ? T7

US Army Armor School IF.US Army Aviation SchoolUS Army Chemical SchoolUS Army Civil Affairs SchoolUS Army Combat Surveillance SchoolUS Army Electronic Warfare SchoolUS Army Engineer School Regraded uncassified When separatedUS Amy Yield Artillery School from dassifiled Inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

A. CONFIDENTIALU A, IU., , " -A..nr. ft 'L

Headquarters, 1st Iniantry DivisicnAPO 96345

AVII3T'MHD 1 December 1969

SUkTWr: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending31 October 1969, FUS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U

SEE DI3TMI3fMCI

1. (C) Operation:_ Sigiificant Activities.

a. Intx o nwia.

(1) The 1at Infantry Divisicn, during the reorting period, o-tinued in the perfonnarce of its general missions:

ta) In ucnjwy-ticn with GVN (G ewent of Vietnaw forows, theidentificatian and destruction of local Cumanist forces and the Can-mmiLst infrastructure (VCI) in order to pzovid a secure envircmentto further GN authority over the area and pecple.

W(b) Destrzcticun of main fo~rce NVA (North Vietnamese Aruy) runits,eTApu n and base CaMPs.

(c) Assistance in the training and irrprovenmt of GVN form.

(d) OYemtdi of the Tactical Area of Interest (TAM).

(a) Area pprtiu(oxmtruictic aInd destructicn).

(2) Within the overall frawmaik of these general u'ssicns, the I,principal missicns for the zrepiting period have been to:

(a) Target aainst Base Arne 355 and 356 in the Trez.id andAihelin areas, and 13ase Area 359F in the Catdr I's Plitt and War Zone D.

(b) Detect Wai destroy andI fccres rodi Saigoni thro*l theIron TriAi1e - Pb Orlg - It An - Tan Uye Zone.

(c) Witbin the TVOI, ocoordiunate the seomrity of key bridges and

FOR OT(V'F1Y 0 11MIUM AT: 3ar TUNWMu

,k ".osure CONFIDENTIAL NdafUf n U M U "M

CONFIDENTIAL

AVI~--MHD1 December 1969

SAWE=r QOperaticrnal Iiprq Of 1st Infantry DiViSi~fl for- PeriodEnding 31 October 1969, 1U3 CsrEDR-65 (R2) (U)

ins~tallations, and respcnd to Ocmrvnist/NVA attacks agai~nst Alliedinstallations,- ca"s and headquarters.

(d) sumort the Governznnt of Vietnan Tevo1uticflarY Develq~iTmft]Progran by1 cndacting niilitaiv operaticns within the TPDI in coordina-tion with and in supprtote5t 1J Divisicri, Capital M4ilitary

District and respective provinces.

(e) Maidntain secuirity of major lines of coamniuicatianS withrinthe TACT (dw'N' 13 - Rt iron; Thwv 314 r-nd 15 - 1t Lead; Thy 7B,, 2A andJA - Rt Zinc; and the Saigon Tlr-paw;)

(W In, coordinaticri with the 25th Infantry Enivisaicn, and the 5th

and 25th AIMN DivisicriS, ocn&yt attriticai oxjrbtimsL againt CmwflnistSub-FP3gion 1 (S4-i).

(g) Ccntiiiue i1Tplt~entatiOfl Of "Vietnamizaticti" through C~erataicswith the 5th ArwJ Uivisicti and other GVN military 5oo.s nth'TOunder the Dong Tien or "Progress Together" Progralm.

(3) Mae t cnad guid.ance, operience factors and tie dvinginji

tactical enviramrent, the following cperaticmnAl trLnds ue, prevalentduring the reporting period.

(a) Increased ariliesis on nicfit coeriatis.

(h) M'aintaining conrtact.

(c) Small unit wv.ratiams.

(d) "Pile-on" tactics.

(e) Vi11age/bmilet. seal and search cqperaticus.]

(f) Rallier/PW interrogatici and exqiloitaticii.

(J) Increased oentralizaticfl of divisictial amssets.

(h) joint us/ApwPV/F operations at battaliai, aoppaWi and platoonilevel.

b. Persc'zncl and administraticfl

2

Incl CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUJ3JCar Ozeratiomla Wport of 1st Infantv Mivisimn for Periodig 31 Octdoer 1969, T(B oR-)65 (R2) (U)

(I) Personnel strength:

Authorized 1 Aug 69 1082 192 16022 17296

Authorized 31 Oct 69 1077 192 16008 17277

Assigned 1 Aug 69 U46 186 16829 18161

Assigned 31 Oct 69 1150 183 16097 17430

(2) Enlisted gains, qualification and status:

(a) epllaoennts reoeived: 3811 ](b) OQtstandi~ng requisitions: Sr Enl Grades: 00E40 (2), 05C40

(1), 11B40 (27), 1iC40 (12), lIM40 (1), llnS0 (1), lIE40 (3), r1E5 (2),11.F40 (5), 12B40 (2), 12C40 (2), 12Z50 (1), 13B40 (3), 31G50 (3),31Z50 (1),, 55Z50 (1), 63Z50 (6), 67N40 (2), 67Z50 (1), 71H40 (1),71H50 (2), 74D40 (1), 76Q40 (1) , 76S40 (1), 76Z50 (2), 82C40 (1) ,93F40 (1), 96B50 (1); E6 and below: (Aug 204, Sep 451, Oct 326) &e toshortfall total: 981.

(c) credits: None

(d) Qualifications: None

(3) Offioer gains, qualificatians and status:

(a) IRelaoments recived: 489

(b) O.tstmdi• .l•i •istir's: 0

(c) Credits: Anmle replacments were reoeived for losses; however,a shortage of taptains still exists in caobat anrs, particularly Infan-try.-

(d) (Palificaticns and status: .Lieutenant fill is being receivedfor requested captain requirments in cmbat ans.

(4) Enlisted lossest Administrative losses during the periodinclude reassignmt within Mi. , rotaticn aid ETS, and board actions:

(a) Reassignmets within iWN: 458

3Incl

CONIDETIA

CONFIDENTIAL

r&VL W4. -V41& I5 -VCGMUVJ. 1707

SUBJECT: Ox-raticnal 1L-ort of ]st Infantry Division for Period_ nding 31 Octcber 1969, !.S aFDR-65 (We) (U)

(b) IRtaticn and FqS: 3598

(5) Officers and warrant officers losses: There were 417 lossesduring the quarter due to reassignments within Vietnam, rotaticns and• EITS.

(6) Lcsses due to casualties ~oere &,, tollcws:

1,ug OFF '7O EllMG

XIA 2 0 31 33WIA 27 3 276 306KLI 0 0 0 0NBD 1 2 5 8DOI1 5 1 37 43

KIA 2 0 37 39I1,A 13 3 280 296D4A 0 0 0 0•ID 0 0 10 10NBM 3 0 17 20

Oct

S0 0 13 13WA 9 0 96 10514.A 0 0 0 0NBD 0 0 5 5NBM 1 1 35 37

(7) Maintenanoe of Morale: p-dards and decorations

Medal of Honor 0Distinguished Service Cross 1Distinquished Service Medal 1Silver Star 179soldier's Medal 22Bronze Star Medal - Valor 921Bronze Star !131dal - Merit 2521Arw Ccmvndaticni Medal - Valor 506Any Ccmiendation Medal - Merit 3327Iegon of Merit 7Distinguished Flying Croas - Valor 65

4

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liI

CONFIDENTIAL

Wt*3-I~tID1 December 1969RLEJECT: Cperaticnal report of lot Infantry Division for Period

Eniding 31 nctd:)er 1969, W3S WOR-65 (R2) (LA

Distinguished F'lying Cross - Achitrxment 20Air Medal - Valor 130Purple Heart 805Air Madal - Achiewaaet j398Certific~ate of Achievement 30

(8) Personnel mn&ement:

(a) Infusion: Dirdrmj the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69, the 1st InfantryDivisiai was not involved in any infusian progrmi.

(b Evaluation: Wae to the reduictioni of troqp strength in RM4,replacements in the last quarter were uvwtly those holding 11 seriePDVOS. This has greatly reduoed the input of al In support PMS. Util-

ization and cross training in conjunction with AR 611-201 and APJ 600-2004shou.ld be accxmplished to alleviate the anticipated shortages in supportmos.

c. cperaticrs.

(1) Genral:

(a) '1¶e 1st Infantry Division conztinued its particivaticn in opera-tici Tomi Thang ("Ccmplete Victory") , Phase III, vtlidci beg ano 17 Feb69 and ended at the close of this reporting period. All organic unitsandi those under the ctoeraticnal control WPM2I of the divisicr -.=einvolved. General cbJectives were to muirtaiz the offenive-orientedprotective "uabmbrea" in the northern and eastern portlics of the Ilivisiai,TA0)I, omxbct a vigorcus pa9.tficatiosn and securityj c~aqign in the oen-tral and scuthern TAM,, are izrplea~nt prograw to upgrad~e local ARMand WVN military units.

Mb Specific cbjectives include denying e&y bass area utiliza-tion, interdicting Carmumist,4P1 infiltratici activities,, dis~piwxviy logistical cperaticms, eqxming 5th ARMA Mzvisicn. units to exte-sive field cperatins , mid winning suport for the GM~ from the localpopulatia'a. Battlefield qperaticzs have oxeisted of both unilateral

prhras av beenanductad~ wingthe Sagn hinorhe effotBe ves to poie~ltr

security for the civilian populaticn.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL*% r. 'l.%r f....L'. ". -. ,--'r.,

SLUU.EJX' C~,eraticxial Repcwt of 1st Infantry flivision for PeriodEnding 31 Octcer 1969, RCS CSFORý-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Force disposition:

(a) D[xring the reporting neriod, four significant boundary d-angesresulted in nojor adjustnents in division force disposition. On 8 Aug69, GVN forces assumed responsibility for northern Gia Dinh Province(Thu Duc District) in the southern portion of the TXIOI, amd the 1st InfantryDivision tock over the Phu Hoa area. In October, the 3d Brigade, 82dAdrborne Division, tmporarily assumed control of the Phu Hoa - IronTriangle - Phu Loi area, also in the scuthern porticn of the T1I20. Thesechanges, coupled Aith the increasing cc•bat activity of the 7th Reginrmt,5th "J Division, enableathe ist Infantry Division to slcwly increaseits force density in the north.

(b) From 12 Aug to 22 Sep 69, the 1st Infantry Division asstmedtmporary responsibility for convoy security along Route 13, 17 km northof its old AO. Finally, on 7 Sep 69, the division's 0O was expandedto the north and northwest of the Michelin Ra*ber Plantation. Thus, bythe end of the reporting period, the division had taken advuntage of thereduced enem activity in the scuthern and central TAQI to increase theamount of key territory under direct GUN control. At the sane time, ithad noved its forces north and brodened its umbrella over the pcpulatedareas of Binh Ducng Province.

(c) Until 12 Aug 69, the 1st .Brigade swplxyed one mledlidzed bat-talicn in the Michelin Plantation and one infantry battalion in thenorthern Trapezoid. On 12 Aug 69, the brigade epanded its AD south topermit the 3d Brigade to move its center of activity north along Route13. In conjunction with this AD -reorganization, the 1st Brigade relin-quished its redianized battalion to the 3d Brigade, but pidced up twoUS and two PIMN (Dong Tien) infantry battalions operating in the Trape-zoid. M'ien the 3d Brigade's additional northern responsibilities wereterminated, the nechanized battalion was returned to the lst Brigade.In turn, one US and one APVN infantry battalion were turned back to the3d Brigade. 7hus, during the latter half of the reporting period, the-st Brigade eaplced one infantry battalion in the dichelin Plantation,and one medianized battalion, and one US and aie A1JN infantry battalionin the Trapezoid. As in the pnrviwus period, the 1st Brigade axicIctoffensive operaticns in these areas to detect and destroy Camunist/IVA forces and cadies, extensive abush cpetations to interdict enemyinfiltration and logistical operations, and cubined Dong Timn operationswith the 8th ARMN Pagivent.

(d) Initially, the 2d Brigade was operating in the populated, .iouth-ern portion of the TA01 with four battalions .(three infantry and onemechanized). In August and Septarber two of these battalions (one

* infantry and one nedianized) were transferred north. currently, the

6

CONFIDENTIAL

M-o =IM

CONFIDENTIALS= A•--.M..D1. Ducumber 1•96

SUIJEC'T: Operational Report of Ist Infantry Division for PeriodEnding 31 Octcber 1969, PiM CSFOR-65 (02) (WQ

2d Brigade secures the southern portion of the TAOI wit two infantrybattalions whose operations are closely cocrdinated with the 3d 3rigade, 82dAlhuiorne, and .the %%h Rvn *Rjiw•t. In additicn, the Brigade maintainsa forward attack base in the Catdier's Yitt (FMB "Florida") to keep theeW off balance. In general, the objectives of the 2d Brigade havebeen support of the intensified racification orogram through pcpulationS~~and resources control operations in coordination with local MM-'•/GM]forces, the interdiction of eneny infiltration and logistical coeraticns,

Sand the neutralization of local VC1.

(e) In early August, the 3d Brigaide employed six battalions (threeUS and 2 AM. Dcng Tien infantry battalions and one armored cavalrysquadxm) in the vicinity of Route 13 (north -nd south of Lai Xie),in Die-n and Chanh IAu, and in tie Trapezoid. Then, from 12 Aug to 22Sep 69, the brimade Employed three battalions (one infantry and onemechanized battalion, and one armred cavalry squac'xon) along Highwar13 from Lai Me to approximately 16 km north of Clion Thanh. Followingthds cperation, the 3d Brigade's center of activity returned to Laine. For the remiainder of the reporting period, the brigade epl

three infantry battalicns (Iwo W and cne ARVN Dcng Tien battalici)northwest of Lai Khe, and one infantry and one mechanized battalion inthe Song Be Corridor against the Dong Nai Pagt. During these opera-ticns the missions of the brigade have been to detect and destroyCcmmnist/NVA forces and caches, interdict enery infiltration and logis-tical operations , conduct couoined "Dcng Tien" cperations with the 8thARMN regt and secure convoys along Route 13.

(f) From 7 Aug to 20 Sep 69, one mewdcanized infantry battalion, onearmxred cavalry troop and one artiller, battery ere CFCCN to the lstCavalry Division (Air Mcbile) and operated around tie Quan Loi - MnLoc area.

(g) From 7 Sep to 10 Oct 69, two trocps from the U1th ArmoredCavalry Regiment (E/2-11 and F/2-11) were CPCII to the 2d Brigade,iUt Wafaitry Divisi(ci. These units rinabwd at n In -Ia~e Cacp whilebeing equipped with t~ie new Sheridan tadk, and participated only inlocal security operations.

(h) One battalion (U-5(.) of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division,was OO(XN to the 2d Brigade, Ist Infantry Division, frm 10 Sep to 1Oct 69. The battalion conducted grcpnd reximaissanoe, night abush,and search and seal operations duln.rq that period. By the i-nd ofSeptarber, the rest of the airborne brigade had arrived and assumedresponsibility for the Phu Hoa - Iron Triangle - Phu Lbi area, in con-junction with cne battalion of the 7th ARVN Pagt. The brigade isschedule& to leave Vietnam sometime in Noeber 1969.

7

CONFIDENTIAL

4- CONFIDENTIALAVM1-¶T'4tD I December 1969SW'UJELT oPeraticnal 'ýPCort Of 1st In1fantry Division for Perciod

Ending 31 Octch'er 1969, RCS c1,OR-65 (IZ2) (U)

Mi an~ 21 Sep -69, the divi3'cr armored cavalry squadron (1st Squad-rcn, 4th Cavalry IRb~ent) mwas placed unde-r direct divisional controland given its cown A0 west of R~en Cat.

0j) IDiring the reportingl period thie division was assisted by tile531st, 571st and 593d tr, Navy Piver Eivisions (Patrol Boat Riverine)and the 24th South Vietnanese River Assault Group (RK;) . These navalforces have worked extensively with 1st Infantry Division elmenets tointer'dict ernay traffic mi the Saigon, and Thi Tinh Rivers.

Wk Inciceure 3 provides a detailed descripticn of force disposi-tiai by battalicm-size units.

(3) Operation Toan Thang, Phase IIIE.

(a) The concentraticIn Of divisional air and artillery assets insuxwrt of extensive- sn-all unit operationis along historical eneny infil-trationi routes and base areas has prevented the enary fxanmaking anysignificant penetraticii into the populated southern portions of the

TAI Faced by mo~re effective AIml and G=4 military, forc~," and Cxxi-

tinucius Pressure from thet 1st InfantrY Divisicn, eim Units have rmnkinedin rui~te areas and have Continued to operate in increasingly smallergrclupS to avoid detecticn. Thle divisicn h1as maintained its rnetwouic ofinterlodcing fire su~ort bases (ESB) and furt1ber centra].i Zed its otharsupport assets in order tq emlov thEn nMre effectively _and efficiently

A ~~At the sane tine, small unit ground reconnasec an ih Ybshave corntinued to be eaphasized. Units of the 5th ARW DiVIioin andlocal tegional P-nd pcpular forces (1Wi/M~ have been s-ucossfully _nccur-Ziged to participate Jn the-se smiall scale operation~s reisulting in an evenstronger Allied force deraitv in critical areas.

(b) Under this pro~tective cover, the Pacification catpaign hasprcceed-'l rapidly in the PcPulated regions of the Central and southernTAI. Increased security has Meat an increase in both ecmcnai c grcwthand respect for the governvent of South VietnaM At the sawe tine,the 1st Inf Mtry Division, -5th AFUN Division and Binh Daong Provincefocoes have increased their efforts against the d&dndling vcE networkand Ca,=rnist local force units throgh systeriatc seal and seardi cper-aticris, Centralization and ocoordination of intelligence danta, rapidPW and rallier explaitaticn, and the extwcsive use of Wtbile resouirce Con-trol. Teame.

(c) KnaýYm SQTa units withlinthe Division TADI have despertelytried to avoid contact and have often devoted their cntire efforts tofo-od, equipuent and personnel resupply. Resupply has- beccare theirmajor mission. in order to ocaserve existing force levels,, the eneW

8

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAM-JT-M•D 1 Deceber 1969SM-M-"2 - pati•L-A&Wl A•-t of ]st Infantry Division tor Period Ending

31 October 1969, XS CSFOR-65 (Ra)(U)

has abtained frao large-scale atta,"s against Allied installatiom. Cobatoperationsa have gmensally bew limsited to onal1 unit saper attacks andstand-oft attacks by mortar and rodoet fire.

(d) he one aW hi<$i-point oocarred the 11-14 Aug 69. This took theform of nuerous attacks by fire against Allied bases and atteqpts to in-terdict the line of ocmamw catias between La Khe and An W:o. ThL high-point was followed by a period of increased eneay contacts rarking the NVAbut~m Mffensive. DwO to te enemy's limited-ability to sim.tan extonWoperations and his deeire to avoid severe losses, these attacks grad.11ydwindled. Since that time, .the discovery of numerous arms caches by lstInfantry and 5th AMtU Division units plus' the continucus interrption ofernnV resp.ly and replwaonet activities has made it increasingly difficultfor the eneW to concbct even normal non-cubat cperations.

(e) At this time, intelligence reports indicate that another Camunisthigh point may occwr in Nomarber 1969. Hwever, due to logistical problems,it is doubtful that the enme. can lawnch any significant attacks in the 1stInfantry Division's TACM for some time.

(f) In June 69, the lst Infantry Division established a "floatingboundary" system along its Saigo river boundary with the 254.4 TnfantryDivision. goe boary was divided into segmnts aproximately 1,000 metarsOn either side of the river. With sufficient advance not loe, each sideould request permission to .perate in these segments. The- system has allowedunits from mne division to oerate extensively on both sides of the riverwhen units of the other division are elsewhere. Becanse of the system'sucess, CG, II Field Force Vietnam ordered the 1st Infantry Division to

establish similar floating boundaries with the adjacent 1st CavalryDivision (1AM), and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. This was cirpleted by1 Sep 69.

(4) Operation "Strangle,"

(a) Operaticn Strangle began on 21 Jul 69 in western Binh Dwong Provincewith the objective of neutralizing ernmy forces of Sub-Regicn 1 (SR-i)operating in the Iron Triangle and the Trapezoid. Participating units in-cluded the 2-28, 1-28 and 2-16 Infantry Battalicns, the 2-2 mechanizedInfantry Battalion, 1-4 Cavalry, B/2-34 Armor (the division tank cmpany),elements of the 8th ARM regt, and US and Vietnamese naval forces. Theirmain missions were .interdicting replacemnt and resupply routes, anddestrying. emy base carps. Aided by eatensive RPae plow operations in theTrapezoid and divisional air assets, the attrition of enemy units hasproceeded successfully. Intelligence reports now indicate that for thefirst time the enatw has been forced to inport food and military suppliesacross the Saigon River from the west and southwest. When the operationended on 21 Sep 69, 414 enemy had been eliminated (365 KIA, 35 Pi and 14ralliers).

9

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Ir I ! 1 1 I l l l I IlI / 1I I I 1 I II ! IIH l }•

CONFIDENTIALAV0B-T-MHD 1 December 1969SIBWTJ: Operational Report of ist infantry DiAi•bI i for Pe.io di.A g

31 October 1969, RCS CSMOR-65 (%2) (U)

(b) SR-1 itself is a larger area which also extends deeply into theAO of the adjacent 25th Inf Div. Thus since early ,•ust, t le ost InfantryDivision mnd II Field Force Vietnam hie sponsored aseries lof :GR-lconferences designed to facilitate the exchange of intelligence informaticnbetween concerned WM1F (Fre World Military Assistance Forces) and GVNforc*s. To date, eight such conferences have been held mad attended byrere33ntatives of II !ield Force Vietnam, the 1st and 25th InfantryDivisions, the 5th and 25th ARMN Divisions, and US-AIV Saigon River navalforces, Thus, though Operation Strangle has offici& ly ended, its ocncptand objectives have now been expanded and applied to the entire eneav sub-region.

(5) Operation "Danger Fozward*"' Phase I.

(a) Operation Danger Forward (Phase I) began on 21 Sep 69 with all istInfantry Divisicn elements and CPCON units of 1-505th .irborne InfantryBattalion. This operaticn will continue during the autumn and winter of1969 with the three-fold mission of conducting offensive operations toneutralize Comunist forces in the division's TAIe upgrading and encourag-ing more efficient eapl1cment of APW/gN forces, and maintaining overwatchof the pacification program throughout the area concerned. The 1st and 3dBrigades with the 8th ARVN Regiment will operate against SR-I in northernBinh Duang Province and against the Dang Nai Regiment, east of Route 13.The 2d Brigade, together with the 7th ARM Regiment, will operate againstthe K-1 Battalion, Dang Nai Regiment, and the 2d Quyet Thang Battalion.

(b) Concept and techniques: The overall mission of Operation DangerForward is to target and to destroy specific eneny units. Forces and patternzof operation will be tailored to infLL maximum damage on enerty forces.Divisio forces will not be unifonrly dispersed throughout the 'mOR; forcedesity will be varied to focus on the ma..n enemy concentrations. 1hroughcontinucus intelligence analyses of activities and dispcsitions., the IstInfantry Division will responsively adjust its cperations to exploit enemyvulneraiW.ities at various levels of activity. Danger Forward cansists offive types of cperaticns: Strike Danger, Dominate Danger, Destroy Danger,Sky Sweep, and Hawk Hunter. The tedaniques of these types differ in tenrof mission, size of maneuver eleants, and use of airlift.

(c) Strike Danger: In areas of enemy trocp amxentraticns, divisianforces ccnrict Strike Danger cperaticns to destroy these forces. Themission is to destroy main force units, not to control a specific geograhica5area. These operaticns are dcaracterized by campay-size maneuver forcesoperating within the 105mm fire fan of a mobile artillery position. Threecapanies conduct ground reconnaissance anl. anbush operations from thisposition, which is secured by the fourth cmcpaqy whir may conductgrcund reconnaissance and arbushes. Each amapany qcera#es for approadatelythree days in the field and secures the artillery positicn for aie d.

10

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVM-'ýMHD 1 December 1969SuaErt Operaticnal neport of Ist Infeitry Division for Period Ending

31 Octcber 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (W2) (U)

Strike Danger provides a high offensive and mebile reco&naissance capabilitywhile affording maxinum security for the infantry elements. '1he Dcng Tierprogram during Strike Danger aims at upgrading the offensive capability ofARMN battalions and ccapanies. Through combined operaticms, A•N unitsgain experience in ombating main force units and in effp.toyin fire s.upprt.Although these operations do not include pacification as a primary mission,Strike Danger carplixents pacLficatioa by denying eney access to populatedareas.

(d) Dcainate Danger: Wnoe main force units are de3trc•ed or dispersed,the division then conducts Domixate Danger operaticns to eliminate enfWremiants. 7he mission in this type of operation is to exercise control overa specific geographical area and dxy it.s use to the enemy. A corpaey orocxpanies operate from a mobile artillery position, The omapany (-)conducts platoon-size patrols in the vicinity of the artillery position.The other companies of the battalion operate from patrol bases each withinthe 10.%m fix; fan of the artillery position. The positions of these patrol

bases will be changed often. The ccmpanies operate apprcximately on a 21day cycle: for example, 18 days in ground reconnaissance operations andthree days on stand-down at a base camp.. This tedmique provides the greatestamunt of area domination with a given force and requires a high proportionof forces committed to terrain control missions. The Dong Tien program.for this phase includes ccmtined cps with RF/PF as well as ARM units. Up-grading PF/PF assumes in•ortance in increasing the secmrity caability ofthese forcs with respect to the populated areas around which Doidnate Danger.peraticns are being conducted. Together with l a paccifi-tion projects, these efforts are designed to prevent Imhnuist/NVA elamntsfran acquiring support from local hamlets and villages.

(e) Destroy Danger: As RF/PF begin to assure responsibility forsecuring the populated areas, the division ccnducts Destrcy Danger cperaticrMs.The mission of forces involved in this phase is to find , through aggressivemobile patrolling, and elininate the remnants of enemy that may remain orinfiltrate after Dominate Danger cperatins1 . This techrdque is characterizedby nmerm-s platoon, and squad-size patrols operating without any fixed basesbut within a 155ram fan. .2hese forces nmy be airlifted into pcsition andoperate on approximately a 12 day cycle: for example, 10 days of patrollingand two days stand-dacn at a base cmp. These cperaticns should be euplcyedin situations whe•re the enemy lacks a significant offensive capability. TheDang Tien program capitalizes upon the ARVN,•I/-PF ability to discover enenycadce sites and to eliminate the eneny infrastructure. Pacification focuseson upgrading hamlets and preventing scattered (MwuList elements fram dis-rupting hamlet security.

(f) S'y seep: When RF/PF asstr--. the major responsibility for securingpopulated areas, the division cona'cts Sky Sweep operations. A2though theeneny retains the capability of engaging in limited attacks and iu-acts ofterrorism, ARVN/I*'-PF have the resources and the popular stuport to .insure

IICONF IDENTIAL

A .CONFIDENTIALSU.13JCf: Gerational Peport of Ist Infantry Division for Period Ending

31 Cctc4xr .J69, I"S CSFOR-65 (`2) (U)

ovwrall security of the arta. The mission of these operatians is toprovide additional a&sets on an "as needed" basis in order to bolster.ARV•./GVM confidence in their own capabilities. The division provi(es air-lift an' - tli trocp wnits to assist ARVN/RF-:,F in their efforts. In thesecperata . , platoon-size elements may operate with one-half lift ccnpanies.One platoon is moved by heliccpter while the other checks out target locationsand makes a show of force in the area. Responsibilitv for pacification istransferred to AKVIN/GVN authorities, with UW forces assuming an overwatchrole.

(g) Hawk Hunter- When PIF/PF assume r"sponsibility for security of anarea, relieving ARVN for enplcyrxnt in less stabilized areas, the divisionccnducts Hak Hunter cperaticrs. The mission is to show continued USinterest in an area with econcmy of force operations. In these operations,squad-size elements conduct rultiple insertions with short term reconnaissancemissions in coordination with RF/PF. Dong Tien is conducted throug-h theprovision of airlift and MIT to increase RF/PF capabilities.

(h) All five of the above operations may be in action simultaneously indifferent locations of the TAOI. Furthermore, ir is envisioned that, asthe enemy oves out of ist Infantry Division VAIR, the division will expandits area of operaticn to the north to maintain contact with eneny units.During this "roll up" to the north, responsibility for the stabilized areaswill be transferred to AmV4/1GV.K forces.

(i) Division cavalry squadron: In all of the techniques of DangerForward, the cavalry squadron plays a major role. It is the division's groundmcbile strike force. Because of its mobility, firepcwer and shock action,the squadron can ccnduct offensive operations against main force units,reinforce the contacts of other maneuver elmnts of the divisicn, arnd con-duct eccncmy of force operations. The cavalry squadron will normallyoperate under division control throughout the division TADR.

(j) As of 31 Oct 69, the cumulative results of US/ARVN Danger Forwardoperations were 598 enemy KIA, 47 PWs and 41 ralliers.

(6) Cperation "Thunder Run":(a) Due to an increase in enemy activity in northern Binh Long Province,

0'eration Thunder Fun was initiated on 12 Aug 69. While the 1st Cavalr.,Vivi-sicn (AM countered a northern eneny threat, the 1st Infantry Division assumedan additional 17 km section of Route 13 nared AO "Red Ball". The temporaryPD encarpassed an area approximately 10 km east azid west of Route 13, themain supply route (MIR) to 1st Cav Div elements based at Quan Imi, An Locand Loc Ninh.

(b) Immediately, elements of the 2-2 Inf (Mech) and the 1-4 Cavalryprovided route and convoy security frcm Lai Khe to a point approximately 38 km

12

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CONFIDENTIALAVD&-T4IID 1 December 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of Ist Infantry Divisicn for Period Ending

31 Octcber 1969, r-S CitOR-65 (W2) (i)

north. The main act~ics ooC~rred bove Chon Thanh (XT765615) and FSBThunder III (XT772656) in AO Red Ball. Here units of the 2-2 Mechoutpcoted the road while daily ccnvcys rolled back and forth escorted by

ele~tsof the 1-4 cavalry. For over one nonth these units guarded theroad and destroyed repeated battaliun-size awbushes of the NVA 101stRegiment.

(c) On 121530 Aug 69, the K-8 Battalion, 101st Pegiment, atterpted toambush the Devil aun convoy at XT766745. Thunder III was nrrtared, roadcul~verts at both ends of the ambush were blowin, and a section of the .convoy was taken under fire by =ocket propelled grenades (IVG) as well asautomatic and small arem (;M/SA) fire. C/2-2 iech cutposted along the

zrme plcaa cuts which extend 200-300 meters on either side of the road piledon the ambush force before any damage to the convoy cculd be done. WhileC/2-2 and convoy escort forces fron the 1-4 Cav and 11th ACR poured directfire on the ene, artillery and air strikes were eaplayed. A subsequentsweep of the area revealed 54 enemy dead; in addition, two rW, severalAK-47, 1TG and TPG rounds, and a quantity of ammunition and documents werecaptured. There were two US KIA and eight WIA (two KIA and 4ho WIA werefrom the 11th MI).

(d) From 12 to 16 Aug 69, Ist Infantry Division elements constructed FSBRrtnman (XT763738) appricimately eight km north of Thunder III along PbuteV. Occupied by C/2-2 Mech, B/1-28 Inf and B/1-5 Arty (105), EBm Hartman

was the division's northern highway outpost for the following critical weeks.

(e) 7w6 days later, the K9 Battalion, 101st Pegt, initiated a similarccno arbush at 1130, vic XT766678, 1.5 km north of Thunder III. Initiallythe convoy was stopped and several vehicles daaged ii, IPG and nM/SA fire.However, once elements of B/2-2 Mech and 1-4 Cay arrived, fire superioritywas gained, and air strikes, artillery ad heliccpter gunships were directedon the autush site. Successive sweeps of the area by C/B/Recxn/2-2VMwd and B/1-28 Inf produced me Chieu Hoi, one SIG rifle, four AK-47,and several grenades, mrG rounds and AK-47 magazines. The enemW left 20dead, while US convoy forces suffered one KIA and three WIA.

(f) On 20 Aug 69, a reinforced erer platoon attcnpted a third anbushagainst a Highway 13 convoy vic XT765729. Elements of C/2-2 Medh, togetherwith a quick reaction force c'pcsed of the ecrcn Platccn/2-2 Medi and B/2-34 Armor (-) rapidly "piled-on" the ambsh site. Artillery and. USAF Fighter-barrbers (TAC Air) were immediately directed against the enesv force. Therewere two US WIA, seven enemy KIA, and two pN WW; three AK-47s, 15 AK-47magazines, two 1G 3=unherS and five 1wG rounds, one light mad&ngun, two

fCHIOM4 handgrenades, five sets of web gear, miscellaneous SA aminiticn, andtwo documents were Captured. The ciomw was untcuched.

(g) On 6 Sep 69, elements of the K-9 battalion laundied the 101stregiment's final arbush attempt against a "Thunder r.oad" 'convcy. About150-200 enemy soldiers participated in the attack; the ambush was positioned

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALA%•.•.•D !D-,ceinber 1969

StWECT: Oeational i'P~rt r;1st Infantry Division fo Periodmcb.inr9631 October 1969, TO5 CSFOPR-65 (r1) (I)

vic Xr763680, the sme location of the previous K-9 wibush on 14 iag Ce.At 1055 the Devil Convoy received mortar fire follcwcd by a ground attadcat 1100 from the western side of the road. The security eP t.:nt, B/1-4 Cc-v,returned fire and was immediately supported by artilcery, heiicopter gun-ships, and TAC Air. As the ccnvcy moved safely out of the ccnt:tct area at1115, A/W-2 and C/2-2 Mech, moved into the ambush site. Though s-poradiccontact ccntinued until 1730, it was the initial quick, U.S. reacticn thattrapped the eneny before he could withdraq. U.S. losses were one KIA andseven WIA; encsy losses included 55 .KTA, four rW, three Chieu Hois, threelight machine t3uns, eight AK-47s and three MK-47 magazines, 1,000 Sn'. rounds,11 B40 rounes and nine B40 rocket boosters, 45 grenadas, four anti-tankgrenades, 18 canteens, 10 iet of wEb gear, 10 helmets, 10 pondics, 10lbs rice and four flashlig:

(h) At 221200 Sep 69, AO TWA Ball was terminated, the area wasreturned to the ist Cavalry Division (AK and the 2-2 Inf .Jdti returned tothe ist Bde at Dau Tieng. For approtimately 41 days the task force basedat Thunder III and FSM Hartman had secured the daily Convys to and franQuan Lci and kept a vital supply route open despite the best efforts ofat least one full NVA regiment.

(i) At the same time that Operation Thunder ram ended, the 1-16 InfMech, A/1-4 Cay, and C/2-33 Arty returned to Ist Infantry Divisioncontrol. The enmy autumn offensive had ended.

(7) Enemy initiated &,ctivity: During the rorting period, the en'nyhas lam--xhed several stand-off attacks by mortar a-d rocket fire and twounsuccessful sapper attacks. These limited operations, while causing littlephysical damage, had two purpcses. First, they gave the Cc-r'w1dst forces aslight psychological boost and seccnd they tended to divert Allied supportassets fran other encivy cbjectives. But any advantages accrued from theseceraticws was fleeting. Ofter. these attempts have only warned the 1stInfantry Division of possible enemy mvent and attanoted small-scalecperaticns in the TAMI. The most significant attacks are listed below.

(a) On 112120 Aug 69, as the kick-off to the enrmy autumn offensive,Iai Ehe Basecau received 15 rounds of 107mra rocket fire. Nine US werewc2Rd, and six heliccpters and three trucks were lightly damaged. Unfortu-nately, five civilians in Lai Rhe village were killed and 11 more wounded.

(b) On the evening follaming the death of Ho Chi finih on 4 Sep 69, theCjamgists launched a brief series of attacks throughout the division TWŽI.At 2028, Lai Ehe Basecap received bwenty 107anm rockets resulting in fourUS WIA. After midnight, at approximately 0100, attacks were laumdied againstDiu Tieng Base{.-mpa, S Thunder III and Chon Thanh. Twenty 82rM mortar shellsand tio 107im rockets hit Den Tieng, danaging 10 helicoters but causing noaisalties. The r =Vcpad at Chon ¶hanh received mortar, SA/I, and 50cal. fire, follofed by a small ground probe. At the s'me time, Thunder III,

14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

StB3=: Cperatictal ftort of lot Infeatty Divisioni for PeriodEndizq 31 Octdbe~r 1969, ME CSFOiR-65 (TQ)(U

four )a north, was attacked by sapers svppmted by IIPG and SA fire.Then at dc~t 0145, WO a6 CMm (XT42204 and *Xr769138) near Phu141, reCeived M-79 and MG fire. At about the saie tine,, FM Gal~a(U!M3418) was struck 'by twen~ty 82W mwntar shGlls. Finally, at 0200,

NEP tMas XII (XM65436) toCk eligt 60m1~ m~ortar shells and 20 ainuteslatre, five 8&= mortar shells struckc Ben Cat. AIUthou the attadcks werewidepRead and cooctdinated, the crily sericus effor-t was against FSB Thunder III- Here elaMnts of A/2-2 Mac and B/2-34 Armoxr decisively revelledthe OXW~ asaults; tie Cai~MiASts were thrown backc leaving 23 dead andcrne PW. Ih the nornfrag, a sweep located 49 M'G roxids , 200 grenads, andseveral AX47,, bangalore to~rpedoes and 1'G L-amchers.

(c) Oil 9 Sep 69, 0130, a small-sc~ale s&A:er attackc was launchied againstMSB Jim (Xr802392) defended by elamuts of the Reconr Platooni and B/2-2

b~di. fiece battle emmifd .for'about 30 rfdnutes. Atc~ eea ~Meuach. lyv~taedtepd~tr tA surris Alttdch severapl sad.

There were six US WIA.

(d)c The night of 10-11 Sep 69 marked the end of an iMJV proolaixied"tzce'an sm~¶azll ea*W stand-off attacks were automatically expected in thedivisieft 1o. As aritidipsatd,, rocket and mortar attacks were directedagainst Wa M~el, Dam Tieng and Phu "o Base CarM,. M~u Tieng was lit theharbest with 10 107 and 10 122 rockets,, and 35 82=rn vortar shells. But theattacks,, mamted with great effort,, only resulted in 11 US WIA, one AMN andame Cilvian WIA, end four vehicles dmoqed.

(e) Th last signific:Mt stand-off attack occwrrod cxi the evening of22 Oct 69. At 21258, Dma Tieng %eceived 3D-40 ro~mes of 8im~ mortar fire.OnlY eight =48r~ fall irside the base perineter resulting in four USWIA and *cm helicxcpter sli4htly damage&

(8) The Ttqmezid.

Wa 7ibe T1aezoid is a vast jungle aree. lyiuig between the midcie-inPluitaticn an the norti and the ocei ftraidadble Irmr Triangle on tlye south.Lhe amea, over 100 square cms, is bardered cxi the wast and ezat by the Sai-

9M T~ hi Tiiti Pvers. Onom a lively earmy strcnhold, the tapezo~ddis now anzt~ing but a have for Ccswiurist and NVA soldiers. (cnstantW,#/iFM patrolling and extensve Rmie plow cqertiaas have cocrinthad to

m Uwte level of waw activity tbere dunng the reporting period.

(b) Th conly large scale contact in the Trapezoid coccurried oni themornng of 24 Aug 69, -when B/2-2 Mad-i stirred up, a iornet' s nest duriLnga 1Pare plow securit~y oparaticn at X75370365. The medianizad force engagedan est~zreted eaemy ampa defendling a bunker azplex. While artillexy,,heliop~ter gunships and TAC Air sx~~orted the conitact, two platoons Of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDB-T-MDI (SUT3•JUXT: Operaticnal Report of Ist Infantr, Division for Period

Diding 31 Octdcer 1969, PU! CiFOR-65 (P2) (U)

D/2-28 were inserted inito the area. At 1556 vic Xr575365, J'/2--28 Inf (-)moved in from the east and regained contact. Again supported by artillery,cjunsrnirs and TAC Air, the fireficht lasted until 1735. lher-e were sixW3 W.:,, and ane armored personnel carrier (TPC) and trio Raw- plcs damaged.A searc- of the area located 28 enemy dead and indicated 11 wore possibleki1led.

(c) For the remainder of the period, cperaticis in the Trapezoidhave been diaracterized by small scale oontacts. On tbie morning of 26Aug G9, at 1042 vic X'T593375, B/2-2 Mech spotted and engaged one enevysoldier. A closer search of the area revecled an WVA battalion nPŽ-±icaldetachment which quickly surrendered. Total results were one en-ery XIA,nine PW, fcur "XK47, four SKS rifles and one 9;-n pisLol. US units have also

e,_n bolstered by PMJN forces qerating in the Trapezoid. Tne 4'tRVN 'Ivevcproved oarticularlv adept at locating encpy caides and base ccnios, whileincreasing the overall Allieyd force densitl in the area. They Pre aLsobecaiang more proficient at cobat operations, cspecially night ambusnes.For exanple, on 012000 Sep 69, the Peccrnaissarice Compary, 1-8 PRVN Pegt,engaged an estimated enea•, platoon, vic :W533394. After a short, cne-sided fight, a search of the area located 10 enery KIA, one PW and severalweapons. On the nicght of 24 Oct 69, an -.'/2-28 Inf ad-)ush was pcsitionednear a trail network in a small rubber grove, vic Xr544397. On the fol-lowing morning, at 0700, they sichtec eight ener moving south dcn thetrail. The arbushers detonated their claymore mines and followed up withSA/X74 fire. rhe Comiunists returned fire but were too late to be effective.The action resulted in one US wIP, six ernEy MIA and two P, (WIA), and sev-eral weapons captured. Contacts like these ere continuous, ,7qile seen-ingly minor, such actions have gradually squeezed the eney ,out of hisforer jungle .haven.

(9) The seal and search of rhuu 11oa Dng.

(a) fte 2d Brigade conductw! the village seal of Thu Hoa Dong(XT715190) on 15-26 Sep 69, using forces from the brigade, the 7ti AWNRegt, and GVi forces of Phu Hoa District and I3inh Duong Province. Te 2dBrigade devised an imaginative deception plan to maosk the real cbjcctiveand to tran VC elewents within the target village. The seal was thelargest& such oreration conducted in the history of pacification in theist Infantry Division T1DI. On the night of 15 Sep 69, ten US/AP-vcompanies converged rapidly on the vi'llage by PAG/PIBR boats, foot marches,and trucks. Tne seal was completed at 160053 Sop aend maintained for elevendras. One ARM. and three US battalicrs maintained the cordon, conductednight mbushcs inside and outside the village, and perforned ground reccn-naissanco and area searches outside the seal area. Under t/he supervisiaiof the Phu Hoa District Chief, the village was thoroughly and maffiodicdlly

16

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVD-Mt M1 December 1969

SUBJECT:or.'! ca --tof Lt i-nfa-nMtry jALv.iLiai for Period

WEding 31 Octder 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (P2) (U)

searched by five IF pai•es, national policem'en, an armed prcpan•mdatean, and US troops. PSYCP were conducted daily throughout the operationeploying aerial broadcasts, leaflet drops, ground speaker teats, andfao-.to-face camnications. Band, movies, MD1 P, DEN\CAP, raffles, andfood were used to preclide the villages from adcpting an antagonisticattituea during the screening and seardchng. The seal was terminated cn260700 SW as a cxmplete success. Final results mmere 23 Ommunists KIA,"ti-io Carmnist I.A possible, 17 W, 16 ralliers, 32 individual weapans,six crme-served weapars, 1785 small arms rouCns, 72 artyA/wrtar rounds,1121 kilcs rice, and various military supplies and equipnent. The sealcperation render-0e the (bammist units in the area ineffective, irprave•the security status of the village, and gave respect and valuable trainingto tie participating GM units.

(b) Tte Phu Hoa Dong seal. and search was only one of nany US/MIRJ/Fomrined cperatians in support of the pacificaticn campaign. Using thecombired .Arvwwir, intelligence-gathering capabilities, and suportingforces of three Allied elements, the efforts to neutralize WI and pro-vide better local security in the populated areas of the 1st Infantry Divi-sicn TADI have continued to grow more efficient and more productive.

(10) Riverine cperations: Continued dcminaticn of the Saigon Piverhas been critical in limiting enemy activity and preventing him fran mass-ing men, material and equipment of any significant size in the divisionTMDI. From Auqust to Octcber 1969, there were three types of riverineforces operating on the Saigon and Thi Tinh Pivers. First was the Viet-namese river Assault Group (R•C), which transported Allied troops alngthe river. Second were the US Navy Pliverit Divisicns. Operating speead,well-ar-ed patrol ships, they patrol and atbush the river by night andccnduct reconnaissance of the river's banks and estuaries by day. Oftenrespanding to radar sightings and contacts by Ist Infantry Division units,they have severely restricted enemy movement on the river by night. From1 Aug to 31 Oct 69, PBR have accounted for 152 erney !MI. Last are the"Ski Boats" of the 1st Engineer Battalion. Since September these lav-draft, fiber glass boats have ccrstantly participated in river seardces,sweeps and ambushes with the 2-18 Inf and 2-2 rbdt. 7heir transportcapability has contributed ruch to the success of these units in lcatingand eliinating smanl ener units. T-ith riverine assets, the 1st InfantryDivision has developed the "Squid" operation, a nw7 tedcnique hidch may bedescribed as waterborne Eagle-Fliqhtitng. The main principles involved arelisted be-w:

(a) Normally, a minitrem of tWo PBR or four ski boats are utilized.Depending on the load, 'the average speed is 15 to 20 knots for PBR and18-25 Inots for ski boats.

17

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALS Agr•'?-T-D 1 Iecemiber 1969SU&=: Operational Wport of lot Infantry Division for Peiod

Ending 31 Ockdcer 1969, KS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Nzma11y, the river craft un in a trail formation when insert-ing troopst the line turns towards the shorx sizuiltaaouqly to allow maxlmumfirepower to be wployed if necessary. This also allows the maximum nuaberof troops to get whore in a minimum vat of tine.

(c) ThI n-uter of troos -per boat depenas an the nunber and type ofboats. Usually arw mrife platoo is eupoye in this type of opraionIf PUR are utilized and the unit only reos•ivee two to work with, I0--12 menare placed on eachl with four boats, five to six perscinel are aplked perboat. With ski boats, nrver methan six mn per boat can be used. Thus,at least four ski boats are ecssazy to transport one platoon.

(d) Prooecbrs are basically the sume. The major differences axe inthe firepoer and draft of the two types of boats. The draft of thePBR is arprcxivately three feet; this limits its use in some of the shallowStXS"W . Te ski boats, on the other hapd, have a draft of 12 to 18 indes

-and are cqable of navigating mazr of the smaln streas and canals. Oncethe troops are inserted,, the boats sta close to sqtoze,, ready to support by'fire if necessary. In areas that have extensive undrqGwth aldv theriver and strean line, a light fire team or a hunter killer team is requestedto suport the "Squid" operatian. At a minimum, a helicopter LCH is utilizedto provide the air cover and observation, especially ahead of the fleet ,.7.enmovig o narrow cwnas. Artillery fires are planned in the area of opera-ticn. The selection of tie area is based on intelligence rports and pre-viws sightings. The planned artillery consists of at least oe ocirsomtrationwhidc the platoon leader or vlatocn sergeant is able to shift. At times,an InR is utilized to spot insertici areas from the air; smoke is used tomark the area and the boats move to the designated spot.. Extractions aresimilar to air extractics where persi•nel move to a pre designated pick-uppoint. If cnly two PBR are available, Ine boat kill provide securitywhile the other lovds; the loaded boat then covers the other element as itis loaded. For ski boats, or if f=r PBR are utilized, two boats are loamdedSt a tine while the other tw provide security. If necessary, air assetsare requested to aover the extraction. However, this is not alwaJs neededand a large number of "Squid" cperaticns have been cndAuted without thebenefit of air supor.

(e) The amomt of time a unit spends in one area deends an the intel-ligenoe and terrain. However, generally platois do not operate in an areaover two hours. Normally, the distance fran the strem or river bank tothe AO does not exceed 1000 meters. Usually the distance varies from 10to 500 meters.

(11) Operation *NJiht Danger": Ni~ht Danger, actually an cperationalcmcept, was crnceived and inplemnted in Octcber 1969. 7he objective of

18

CONFIDENTIAL

A CONFIDENTIALAV3-/T-1f M 1 Decem~ber 1969

A&% A~v4u4fzr PteLjodEnidng 31 Octoer 1969,, Fa CSkVA-65 (IQ) (U)

the progra is to inroease the, pz"M2r on eni nigt-time cperatiais,,especially resupply and infiltratiai, activities. To do this, the divisionhas centrilized its targert actluisiticn and target destructicn assets sothat the Difvision COmaWidr is able to make a more efficient and discrziri-nating Use Of his X189urces. Thm result has been a greater ability toanalyze and correlate intelligence infozmtiwc arnd folio;W thniiugh with aquicker, neffurd zeq~se.

(a) One key elemnt to the progran ha been the jLst Infantry DivisIon '8Target Det~ruction Section (TDG). Located. in the Dlivision Tactical Qper-aticuis C~nte MM l'0, the IES is a nowe organization drawn frcu the rescurcesOf the Div Arty S2j, the Division Rire Sqport Elmo*t (MS) , the MilitaryIntelligence Detachmet and the Sez~or platoon. The section receives allintelligens r~port8 OCxing into the U= aid maintains camumicati=i withdivision radar team and ail sensor intoding stations servicing the divi-si.cn TAMt. In additicon, the TDS has 000=2micaticuis with all artilleryImits in and adjauit to the TAM) thrcu* the facilities of the MS. inoperatiu the TES receives and analyzes intelligence, detervines possible

tagtand assists the G3 cperaticns of ficer in r.... ..... dJng appropriateresponses. This has meant both a quicker response to fleeting targets anda moeefficient use of division assets. As of the end of the reportingPeriod, the D had assisted in apLrCndzVtely 115 amai kills.,

Mb To date, the most effectivs diviLsicui night asset - and ti0 oneYre-xwstnded most frequently by- ths MS~ - is Nighthawk. The Ist InfantryDivisicn Nigthawk program began on 2 Aug 69. The -LijithWk force cxmsistsof three Nighthawk hicxpters (UilH,, each equiR.pd with tvo TYS-4 Star-light socpes,, two Sheridan seardaiihts,- and two mini-mi) , two PAH15/UIJ~C gunships and one LUN1 slick. Tim Nighthaw team Wcilc with one Night-hawk airoaft 'and one "OihiP or -slick as a chase ship. zadi Nighthawktenm is designed and missictied to search out and destroy ezniv' foroes inthe ZM- during the hamr of darkness. FrT= 2 ;Mg to 31 Oct 69 there were58 1bY N~igtha'Ac teams resulting in 132 Camnuisttmv =(I (BC)

(fo i~Q mfonuticn on Nighthawk, see Incl. 13, 1st Inf Div Cir 525-8,,"Utilization of N±4hthak Aircraft"). Nigit Danger contacts are quick andabri~t. With Nighfliw*k, the VR (visual reconnaissane or damage wisea~t)Of the cuitat is impediate.

(c) In the early M0Zning h0=r of 22 Sep 69, the 571st PBR wmeepatrolling the banks of the Saigon Fiver beliow Ben Chmu. At appriosiately0015 Vic Xr5593 50 , their observed and emgaged 25-30 enrV c-ross~ing the river.'Thez. was no retuzn fire and the action was- over in minutes. A sweardiOf ths wetar located 25 eneW deadl, 14 badqpadc and ae Ax47 The follcw-2ing nightt this evet was rqxekted about two kmn up the river. 7he pBIR andone platooui./2-28 Inf erigfted 15-20 enecV. There was no return fire and17 mor sy dead. 11l badkpadcs and one AX47 wmr located.

19

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAV113-MV4iL 1 December 3969SUxiECZ: Operational Pe-,ýrt of ]st Infanitry Divisiai for Period,

Iiiding 31 Octcber 1969, M33 C3EOR-65 (R2) (U

(d) Wb 13 Oct 69, 1945, the L1JW (Long Range Reoanrnaissancx! Patrol)Teaa #1 reported heavy enemy movement in the northern Micnelin area.Imnumdcately, 70~r salvcs fran three artillery batteries Ait the target area

followed by fiv-1 TAC Air strikes. A subsequnt se:51a-1 located 18 enaWT

(0) Cki the night of 16-17 Oct 69, strong readouts were noted fran an~cw sensor field placed on~ the Raorb~ack. Thie informaticn was relayedfrom the monitoring staticn on ZNui Ba Den (thie Black Virgin Moumntain) in.the 25th Infantr.1 Division A-0 to the 1st Infantry Division TDG. 1-s thesensor readings changed intensit!, a pattern of mcI;n was established

aLsE chtnailk aircraft were quickly directed cnto the target areas (vicXi571555, X0'5355754? X490607 and XT48575). The results were 21 ienemlI(IA over a three-hour period.

(f) On~ 172145 Oct 69, radar located an estimated 20 eneuy soldiers

in stationary positicns just east of Dau Tieng Base Canrp MX508468). A

Nicjit:-kk teami, qudd~ly dispatdWEd to the areai' agedd the en bef obethey could move. Thirteen enanW dead were counted'.

(g) A series of sensor activaticns and radar si~itings along the Saigcnriver on the nigt of 23 Oct 69 were followedlo up by River Patrol Boats

(12) Caches: From August to Octdber the Ist Infantry Divisicn, ablyAM ~assisted !)) the 7th and Sta ARM iPgizuents, proved itself p~articularly

adept at scouring the division A0 for hiddmen eia supplies. The eneny'sinactivity was partially dale to the suooe s of th~ese hunts. It should bepointed out that only one sign=ificant ric cadhe was .tjsc~ove-red (at. 12523-02.C/2-28 led by Kit Carson Scouat unearthed four tons of rice). Most of tneother fLnds involved small wants of food, midlitary equilmiwt or do0ments.Mot notable vere the large rnmber of sizeable axma and nunitions cachesfouxd. The most significan are listed belcm:

(a) Oni 291310 Aug 69, B/2-28 Inf vic XT562375 located the fol1owing,salmt tin the~a Tr~apeod: 5 /4; si T bloca k ms; for -iciyc1les 210~a lossat, Wn thec greneaides 75 x 1/4 -tm vine1T o s; fonmtbiycs 15 210 h cles ,,

nie;14 bangaloze toroedoes; 23 SKS riflas; ame TDK47; nine QAU mortarzumcbs; five rifle grenadas; nine cases of ;W grenads; 7,400 rcumds ofSA amoumition; six MG Malns with boosters; six PPG rckcets:~ and 70 lbsof ric.

4

(b) Oni 24 Sep, 1-16 Inf )1e~h began extersive cperatIc in the UaqrSong Be Corrictr. Although there were no siagnificant eIw contacts, then=dkanzed battalion was able to locate umnmer caches believed to belengt& the Dcoig Nai !;kgt. Itit uinpotaft was the series of fin& made b

20

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALSAVIT-i'.-t'4Ib 1 Dcember 1969

bUaWI-X, ujxerataonal -kVort o0- ist Lntantry Uivision for veridiEndin 31 October 1DG), XSCSI 21P-65 (R2) (U)

PVI-16 aided bcy a xoqerative rallier.

(c) on 21 Sep 69, vic XEJ71463, ;V1-16 was Iged by the rallier toan arms cache containing the follcwing itiem: two 82m' mortars, 24 lightmacdine guns; cne 100-round UoG drum; t:,'ty-:ix 57mn rounds; sevm 82nMrounds; sixteen 60nm rounds; eight l)s TT; ei(jat M6? rcrids; three gasn-sks; 440 rounds rJX47 aiuniticn; seven Chi.Coin claymores; aad 128 75•nRR round-.

(d) On 7 Oct G9, the rallier led A/1-16 to another hidden nunitionsdurp) vic XT869456 ccnt,?ining: 661 izs TNT; 140 lbs C-4; 24 cans with prcss-type detonators; and five cans of tine fuses.

(e) The following day the company was led to another cachie vicXT804492 consisting of 512 lbs TNT; seven K'G rounds; five FG boosters;and two 82nin mortar sights.

(f) On 25-;6 Sep 69, the 7th Ccmpany, 2-8 A1-JN, discovered two largearms caches in the Trapezoid (vic X7648335 and XT645339). 'Te first oneoxntained two 12.7 heavy machine guns, three S&Q3 rifles, one light machine

gun, 1,000 rounds AK47 mamanition, fifteen 60nn mortar rounds and 15rifle grenades; the seomnd oache revealed three rPG, 109 PPG rounds,tnirty-three 82nm mortar rounds, fifteen 30 lb AT mines, 8000 rounds, 50caliber ammunition, 60 PRPG fuses, 4000 rounds 7.62 arutniticn and 15 ChiCcaclaymorcs.

(g) On 13-14 Oct 69, L/1-2 Inf located a large bunker cmplex believedto be an NVA hospital in tie northeastern corner of the Michelin Plantationvic Xr592566. A thorough search of the area yielded 3,000 penicillin bottles,1,,x large penicillin bottles, 40 bottles of glucose, four bottles of vitamin6, me roll of medical tane, one bottle of iodine, 30 bottles of sterilewater, and 10 operating ta-les.

(h) On 25 Oct 69, C/2-28 Inf unearthed a cache in the Trapezoid (vicXt499411) containing 10 light machine guns, 300 hand '/renme-s, one heavymachine gun (with mount and extra !,arrel), 22 S-,S rifles, one ChiCom radio,one hundred 1/4 lb blocks of TNT, seven carbires and five AK'j7.

•i) nThe largest anms depot was found on 26 Oct 69 vic XI648379. Therespcnsible unit was again A/1-16 Inf which was ncx operating in thie Trape-zoid. The cache ccntained six 7.62m. Soviet rifles (model #189 N 30),seven Th•apscn machine guns, 97 SI(S rifles, five sub-machine guns, one7.62nrta heavy machine gun (with extra barrel), two Soviet 7.G2r=n lightmachine guns 15odel OPM (-%ith three spare barrels), thee WS M-1 caftines.one M-1 rifle, 25 Soviet 7.62mm cari)i:Ans (2jdel- cU, 7.62 i* &n)gun mount, one ground nma~ut for a 51 cal. mad-ine gun qit-h ineels, 114 iRx'

21

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL1 Deoembor 1969

Stperaticnal Isozt of 1st Infantry Division for Period&ding 31 Ocbc±,er 1.969, 14M C~FpOR45 (p?2) (U)

ramf, fivw electric detonaton, 1000 ft of tim fuse, 20 gal can nalf-"* f ei. with O•icm grade pchr , ane 7.62m machine gun shield, n1in

70 ci-mi artillery roun,. two 751M m rounds, two Wrt~ar sights, twload7e .'.6 m dru-type magazinem, nine trai-typ, 7.62n,, mwti.w gun maga-zi•nm, cm 010 sd "aVmtY-fi.M 5"7M IR rzounds, 30 nadin gm mmazine,1955 rcdM 51 cml. aumiution, tWelve 6*u nwtar fuses, two mortar dvages,Wo witre ottes, four cleaning rods for 7.62mm weqcns, "nc one 82ua

imirtar bore brush.

(13) 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Rwgunt.

(a) The dcvisim antrred cavalry scupadron, the 1-4 Cay, had normallybeen OM to on" or more of the division's thr n"•-t brigades. Butan 21 Sep 69, the 1.4 Car was placed under divisional w~ntrol and was sentto the entral and southern partials of the division AO. Utilizing the

SI netwrm k south of Lai Khe, it has acted as a quick reaction force ableto rGeinfom US j, JRI , or PF/PF infantry contacts, or initiate rapidlyexecuted Cperatis against elusive Ocmmmist units through its =in nmbilityand fireoqer. Diring October, it has gradually exanded its area ofq(erations and Omti•mlly devoted its efforts to the neutralization ofall 0mlist elewents in the division's scuthemn AO. Coordnation with the2d US Bde, the 7th ATM R1gt, the 5th AM LDiv and Binh Dxmig Provincehas been contim s.

(b) On 1 Oct 69, the 1-4 Cav, in coceration with the 749th PWormtanV,A d a highly summessful operaticn against the Ccrnst C65 Local fto•e

CcOMMy. Hiding in a base area north of Binh Hoa Village ()V8120,, theeneay unit had been detected by the 1W orany oc aner several weekspricr. Aided by the 1-4 Cav, he was more than willing to conduct a surpriseattack against thleir suspected base camp (vic X)829215). In tae ensuingceratic , the. RF Ccap&n and om cavalry troc pushed thrCogh the bassarea uhile another trom_ cut off the em retxeat. 'd* actions weresuported by a D Troop, 1-4 Cay, Hunter-Killer Tem and the "Lighthorse"helioopter group. The final results were-six rear, dead, nine PW, andfive AK47, one 60rm mortar, fift(en 89m mortar rounds, and eight IRG roundscap1ared (all eneWm were identified as reabers of the C65). Umere werethree US wounded slightly'by ImG and booby trap fragtmets. No casualtieswere sufferad by the 1W trocps and no vehicles were dmu-aed in the acti&n.

(14) MAPF SuOrt There were 1,253 sorties of TAC Air in supportof Ist Infantry Division cperations during the reportinq period. In addi-tion, 16 6-52 strikesAe-%re callcd in suort of cperaticrs. eight weretargeted in the Trapezoid, four in the Lcng Igjuen Secret Zane, two inthe Razback, Me in the Song Be 'Corridor and onr in the Iron Triangle.

22CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

• vLuL-,'! . 1 Deoember 1969mw=: Operaticnal Rqxort of lst Infantry Division for Period

Eding 31 Octdcr 1969, RCS CSEOR-65 (PM) (U)

(15) Me total cumulative results for Operation Toan 'rhang, PhaseII whc ea n 17 Fb69 n ne on 31 Ot69,, o s InfantryDivision assigned and MOO0N units are:

(a) US: 386 KIA, 2320 WIA, 2041 WIA (evac); 67 A2AV/APC, zvsngenierators, three 2 1/2-ton tankers, two Zippos (APC with f lameiuhro ),72 helicopters, one 0-16 Bird Dog, 46 Pome plows, 76 tanks, beflvw 2 1/2-ton trucks, two "Dusters" (40m SP), five 3/4-ton trucks, five 1/4-tontrucks, two 10-tcn trucks, two 5-tcn trucks, one 4.2" mortar, one AVLMb(armored bridge layer), one VR (M-88 tank recovery vehicle), five bull-dozers, and four M-548 'Camels" (tracked cargo carriers) damaged; oneZippo, ton tanks, one 5-ton truck, 48 ACAV/APC, six Paamt plcws, 21 heli-copters, four 1 1/4-tcn trucks, one 1-tcn truc•, two bucket loaders, one"Low Boy" (low bed trailer), and une 155atir howitzer destroyed.

E) Eney: 3213 KIA (BC), 403 KIA (pass), 293 cmptured, 87 ralliers,and 2216 detaineesi 1756 individual weapons, 347 cra-aerved weapos,371,911 SA rcunds, 313 Anti-Tank mines, 15,017 anti-persamel nines, 4742grenades, 2340 MG roundc, two 105m, rounds, 1834 mortar rounds, 7653bunkers, 80.4 tons of rice., 78 zockets, 4216 lbs of explosives, 371 RRrcunds., one 1000 lb bamb, two radics, one pair of binoculars, and nine70nm rounds captured or destroed.

(16) Statistical Gimary:

(a) Monthbly tot.als*

US IA CcmuniELStAKIA 71 Ralliers Total En Elim

uut 29 469 35 19 523September 37 526 39 20 585October 13 375 23 8 406

*Does not include lst Infantry Division units whil. OPOMI to another

(b) tnhly ratico:

Kill Patio Eliminaticn _ratio

August 16.2 18.1Septeber 14.2 15.8Octc er 28.8 31.2

(17) Land clearing operations:

23

CONFIDENTIAL

CONKIDENTIALSVDBJE-T- I December 1969SLUJECT: t -aticnal 1-eport of 13t Infantv D~ivision for pariod

liing 31 October 1969, ICS CS1'R-65 (W2) (U)

(a) The division ftmx plows began the quarter at NIP Wilderness I,vic XV798285, and cut 625 acres frcmi 7 to 17 Atxj 69. On 18 Aug the plo) smoved to ilderness II, vic Xr703324, where they cut 265 acres in five days."i'ving to X=804233, they cut 380 acres before returning to Lai Kne- on 312aug. A week's standdchcm was follalod on 8 Sep with 115 acres cut atWi'780313. On 11 Sep at X'1900440, 60 acres were cut. Fromt 13 to 19 Sep,the plows cut 425 accx-i vic XW756300. Following a standdown, the plowscut 310 acres at XT699458 frcn 2 to 8 Oct. From 11 to 13 Oct, 185 acreswere cut at XT847275. From 14 to 18 Oct the- placs operated near FSB Son(XG681486).

(b) The four M498A3 tanks that were providing_ security for the R1me

plows have been turned in.

(c) The 984th Land Clearing Coapany began land clearing cperaticns in0- 7-:r- zoid at NEP Mons VIII, vic Xr5646, and cut 2890 acres betken 1and 12 Aug 69. On 13 Aug the plows moved to a new NDP, Mons IX, atXr571405 and cut 221 acres. On 30 Aug the plows moved to XT635345 and cut3258 acres beteen 31 Aug and 14 Sep. At this time the 984th LOC moved outof the Ist Infantry Division .A and remained out until 28 Oct. The plowsthen returned to koms XIII (=574386) and cut 525 acres. By the end ofthis reporting period a total of 8884 acres were cleared.

(18) Convoy gperations: A Combined Transportation CoordinationCnter was established on 19 Sep 69 for canvoy coordination. All ARU,1st Cav Div (AM) ; 25th Inf Div, 1st Logistical Coamrand (Higiqay Traffic0ontrol), and 1st Infantry Division elements who were involved in overlandresupply cperaticns through the area of the 1st Infantiy and 5th AWNDivisions, coordinated with the Center. This procedure has enhanced thesecurity as well as reduced delays in cnvoy cperaticns.

(19) Operation Dung Tien: Since the end of July 1969, the Drng Tien("Progress Together") program has onmtinud to grow and expand in the lstInfantry Division. The major goals have remained the same: to increasethe quantity and quality of orbined and coordinated joint operations; tomaterially advance the division'3s three major missioLs (support of pacifi-cation, imroveent of !A1VN/GW4 military units, and intensification ofsmall scale ombat operaticns); and to significantly increase the efficiencyof cziti¢1a&. combat and ocmbat support elements, particularly Pmy aviationassets. The overall nurpcse of Dong Tien is to further thie "Vietnamization"of the war by improving the effectiveness of all Souti Vietnamese militaryunits. The division progrmn must prepare AMN and V744 units to assume,at some future date, the responsibilities curretly held by the 1st InfantryDivision. The program is also designed to increase the ability of ARNunits to use US Pmmr aviation support effectively by having them continu-ousJy use these assets in the field. At the same time, .more intensiveoonbined operations oontinu to reduce the nuniber of ermW in the TAMI,

24

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVM--'r-4iD I Deceinher 1969I Sb•Ti•%.rti-c-oa, mixAur uf ist- infantry livisicn for verioctE~Dxng 31Octd:er 1969, RM CSFCR-65 (Ia) (u)

zm.ing the task of changing territorial responsibilities scmwvhat easier.ihe C•j V of D Tie h b g ly ebodie in the "DngerFxorward" und "Night Danger" program of the let Infantry Division. Divisionassets, especially Army aviation assets, are now wore centralized and sup-port both US, ARYN and GMN forces in the TAI . The Danger Forward ocxepthas envisioned a steady "drive to the north" where the gradual inprovmientof PSDF and !.'/PF forces enables ARM units to cmx yct more extensive fieldoperations in the northern rd northeastern TPI0. Then,, as AR'M4 forcesbcne more cxabat proficient, 1st Infantry Division units will move northleaving their former A0 to the 5th ARVN Divisicn. The D[ng Tien programhas been inplemented in many ways. There have been constant liaison andcxodination visits among the Ist Infantry Division, 5th ARV Divisimiand Binh Duang Province. Ftr exarple, the 1st Infantry Division Aofl3, G1has visited his 5th rumN Division counterpart several tine to discussproblems 0xmKln to their jobs. In addition, maneuver units of the divisiunnow operate much more closely ,vith IIPAF units. Their intelligence gather-ing capabilities have made such small scale cmbined operations signficantand have giMi t1e units added confidence and eperience. But, howevervaluable these efforts, the heart of the lat Infantry Division's Dong Tienprogram is the association of deignated us infantry battalions with desig-nated ARVN infantry battaliam. The programs undertaken and sane of themethods involved are described below:

(a) In the 1st and 3d Brigades the Dcng Tien program has taken the formof physically colocating one 8th ARVN Regiment battalion with one US infan-try battalion at the sawi fire support base. These operations were briefly

vred in the preceding report (see para lc(4) (h) 2 - 4, let InfantryDivision OPL, 1 lW - 31 Jul 69). During the currm t Sapozting 9eriod,the 1-28 Inf has continued to work with the 4/8 XWN infantry battalionat FSB Gela. 1hen, on 2 Sep 69, the 4/8 was replaced b the 2/8 AIV Inf.Dong Tien ccmbined operations were: cotinued between the 1-28 and 2/8at FEM Gala, FSB Son (XT681486), and, as of 31 Oct 69, FSM rpollo (XT637507).The 2-28 Inf acmtinued similar operations with the 1/8 at EM3 Mahone II(XT521429) (renaped FSB Kien) until 14 Sejt 69. At that date the 3/8 wasreplaced by the 3/8 ARYN. All sponsored units were frao the fth MV Mgt,5th MW Division.

(b) hU most striking problen in each AWN battalion proved to be theinaqierience of small unit leadsrs, and the dependence of the staff andsubordinate c kIers on the battalion coamander for learship. Without

tesup~port,, resupjply and oommumicaticxis assets auvailable to us units, theARMN forces were accustomed to caulcting only battalion-size field oper-aticois. Now, with the cooperaticn of the AMgV battalion commmaers,decentralized operation in the Trapezoid and the jungles northeast of LaiM e ware begun. Operating from either joint or colocated tactical operationscenters (TOC), the US and AMI battalion commanders planned daily operations-in a joint A0. For the first time, sufficient assets were available tosuport M1M azrany and platoon-size operations. To assist the ARMn units,either the dual aipany or the cross-attadced platoon aowcpt was utilized.

25

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SLR=:C~ p~tc a p11ort of Ist Igantzy Divis ion for Merio04mxa 31 Octcbr 1969,, PO CSMO-65 (J12) (U)

In tis tocmur, cm ts = aMy and owe AM~ =~&VW woA1 shar a Jointo*hame iiu*i=1 ac. micma And qpata fr=. a joint corpan (P. In the

latter, th AMa ozmuW wcaiJ4 wsdiainge ae of its Platoon for a U9 pla-t~ow. LBs cawmicaticea ware thius always ,available. In this way, theAMI luiits hdft bown a sed -to lB. mathods of operation and hare inrtorvedthe. qUatlity Of their mPAsh unit leadrship tuugh practical exp~erience.In addtim,, they have b~ae~ fait.lar with an operational area whichUM neV hame to inst full. reponsibility fcc in the future.

(c) Fru Aa .ut to Octobier 1969 , the 2d Brigade has conducted exta'-sive [wq Tien operations with the 7th AYVN Pagt in th cen~tral and scu.th~nipctoruc of the TAM.* From, July to, Septa~w, the 1-18 and 4/7 infantrybattalions cord=Wa a oantintvm series of ocatined operations using thedual oampany 'onucept, The 1troo battalion Ioc were never caxbined,, and the

real work was don -at th ocap~any levl. Normally , the ccmpan owcamndatshai a joint (P and deci ion we=e made together, For nligt anbushinq,,acjuw were cross-attached to foan secticn patrols of on US anid me ARWJNmqwd,, 7ho.e operaticm~ served to familiarize the 4/7 with the axea north-eant of Phu lai and develcp AM~~ wuall unit leades . Curft*I1Y t1he ARV4/7 ig oACnc)ingj rd=cenmial and ambush operations fr=i NE Venable Heights(1Xr9O2l76) in cojunction with the UB 2-18.

(d) in the suheaatlatnl portion of the TAMC1, the 2-18 Inf attarptedtD bmilait the oolocateil battalion concept at EMB M~rtain (XT7O3 145)withithe 3/7 A~M battalion in Iiijust and September 1969. Unfortunately#th 3/7 wMs (P0) to the Phu Hon District Chief at the tims and was requiredto 1Tslnt.n two of its couraniec at Phu Hoa 1Dig village. As a result,, theAIM bMttaliQM acai~wder spent, nly trio or thr~een~t at ESB ~kaifl.There wi -m .xcdapg of liaison teamw between lbrtain and Phu Hloe DOng andmoreal joint operatiouns were ompl~eted with the one iTMXv ocaparw that didsta gt Mortain. Botsh uits participated in the seal wan search of PhuHom Dwq (15-26. Sop 69). after which the Ist Infantry Division turned ovierthe Phu W.% 10 to the 3d. Brigade, 82d iAirbcrns Di~vision'. and the 3/7 Wasmoyd cut of Blinh Dmn -Province.

(e) 7he 2/7 ARVN battalicon operated extensively with the 1-26 MEinfattybattalio from 12 to 23 Sep 69. and with the 1-18 Inf frtm 24 Sop

69 to- the prmient. In Sep~~x the 2/7 and 1-26 were oolccated at EMBNwmve ni (wECO43l). Daily field operaticzis vire codcte frcmHM=W*y In and M j1za ()X?862392) whidi was seaired by one 2/7 PZMN

v -ka# one mechaniized qqparW from the 2-2 Inf . and cane US arti. 11exybatt.uy. Them d=al omapan crzonp t was inplamened with joint oatpany CP.2* maAi objective w~s to prepare the 2/7 to assume responsibility forM Jim ard the surrMdiMgPO. This was acarzplished by 1 Oct 69. Duri~ng

or ctdmsr 1.969, the -2/7, SUported by W -artillery at Jim and Nonnandy III,

26

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALSAV•x-T-rjlD 1 December 1969SUBJECT: Operational Rot of ist Intatry DiVLsiLI for Period

Ening 31 October 1969, rK CS •FOR-65 (P2) (1')

and in coordination wi.th the 1-18 also at Jorn"andy III, has coinductedextopsive wall unit operatiacs in its o.n AO. This was the first IAMMunit to occy and take complete respcrsibility of a FSB in a criticalsection of the 1st Infantry Division TADI.

(f)�M t r tie aspices of the 2d Brigade and the "th MN Praginint,a Ccobined Strike Force (CSF) was organized at Phu Vimn &se Ctrj., (;U843146)in August 1969. Here, a joint US/Ai.M staff trainel cne ME and one ARVNompany in advanced field tecmniques. After about caie wosk of tzaininr;,the CSF acted as a 60-minute quick reaction fcrce ready, to wowe anywherein the divisicn TA•E. Althoigh the conceot worked well writh the 7thARVN .Reccnnaissance O.mpany, inherent lxgistical problems were omplicatedby the inexperience of successive AITM units. Thus it was decided totznminate the CSF cn 14 Sep 69. The eer•iment pointed out that suchadvanced tactics worked best only with e-voerienced IdIMI units.

(g) Artillery Dong Tien cperaticns comenced cr, 8 Jul 69 between the2d Battaliicn, 33d Artillery, and elenents of the 51st Artillery, 5t-iARVN Division. After a two-week training progran at Lai Khe which stressedairlift and airmbisle cperaticns, radar registraticn, c-w drill, and USartillery direct support procedures, A Battery, 51st Arty, was moved byrotary wing aircraft to FSB fahcne I- (Kien). Since then, it has contin-ually suported the combined operations of the 2-28 and 8th 1Lgiment DcngTien infantry battalicns. In addition to enhancing the indirect fire sut•-port comrage in the Trapezoid, the artillery Dong Ti.-n program has devel-caed an integrated fire coordination syte for use as additicnal AmVWcombat support units are brcouht into areas previosly secured by US forc :s.

(h) In July and August 1969, a short but significant series of DcngTien operaticrA waa ccnducted between the 2-18 US infantry battalion andthe 34th ARMN PRnger Dattalicn. in the Thu Duc District (in the scutheasternportion of the TAOI). From 15 Jul tc; "I Pg69, the PMN unit operatedjointly with the 2-18 in order to learn the successful tactics and opera-ticnal tedniques eployed in that area. On 7 Aug 69, the 1-wu .- ic AO wasompletely taken over by the 34th Rangers, .tsnaitting the 2-18 to mo-Jenorth.

(i) Since the start of the Dong Tien program, the perform e ofinvolWed AWJN units has steadily risen. To date, the increased perfon-encehas been rt- iQd by ince- , . From 1 Jul 69 to the presant,392 ema y have been eliminated by the 7th and 8th AJY_ M~ giIsnts. This isbut one eza•ure of the program's success and shews that the strong effortsput into Dung Tien by Ist Infantry Divisicn traits have been extremelypro&=tve.

27

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVMI-T1-?IISAV-T-CD ati 1 December 1969SUBJECT: Or--iOnal IReport of 1st Infantry Division for Period

Ending 31 October 1969, W-S CSFOR-65 (p2) (1J)

d. Training.

(1) Rplacament training.

(a) There were 9,081 relacenents trained by the division schoolduring the reporting period.

(b) Since the sdcool opened on 15 February 1969, there have been14,636 replace.nnts trained.

(2) Sniper training.

(a) Daring tle reporting period, the following 18-day sniper classes

mma c :-xzIucted:.Class No. Start/End Date No. Snipr Graduated

5 16 Aug - 3 Sep 126 9 Sep - 27 Sep 167 29 Oct - 16 Nov (20 in class)

(b) 1st Infantry Division mnipers eliminated 27 Ommrnist/m.7% duringthe tu-•e inoth period.

(c) Total body count to date: 57 KIA.

(d) As of 31 Oct 69, the 1st infantry Division had 48 snipers Cieployedin the field.

(3) Division l•bile Training Team (1L4T).

(a) 'The followhing training was conducted by the ML1 during thisperiod:

Month Students Hours of Instruction Mat Hours

?ngust 4571 157 11,124September 5657 272 17,317October 6216 308 23,600

(b) A nmbile training team ccmposed of to NCO and one ex-sapperrallier/Kit Carson Scout demnrstrated the capabilities of and defenseSagainst sapper attacks. The team presented this instruction at all 1stInfantry Division base camps, fire support bases, and bridge installaticris.

28

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALM~m./T~~4lnI Thrnemhr 1069

SUBJELMt Operational 1aport, of 1st Infantry Divisicn for Perioda 31 OcWt:e 1969, REF CBER-65 (Y2) (U)

(4) Kit Carman Soout training. 7here were 32 Swuits trained by the

Division Training Cmand &uinq the reprdig period.

(5) T. Schools:

Ccaue ocatio No. at Sucents

10 PW id Nh Trang 16AARIS 'Awq Tau 22AH-iG rung T•u 3CH-6A IP/SIP Wn Tau 1JEST Papublic of Philippines 9

-P Ing Binh 36-a•io-Visual Ung Binh 8Generato:r To Ling Binh 54NCR 500 I1ng Binh 2

** Ine., re: The lst Infantry Division's area of operaticis startsaslxrimately 10 ku north of Saigon. ThW division TAX includes the majorportion of Binh D=Vg, southern Binh Ing, western krig Khanh, nort-nGia Dinh aid norwr Bier Hoa Pivrnz . This area, apprntmztely 70km east to wt and 55 ka north to south, includes the major Camciistinfiltration reiss to Saigon. The Saigon River an the west and the DangNat River an the east provid natural higivays for both friendly and enatyforces. EwDet for the large Michlin ubber Plantaticn in the nort/wt,the northern section of the division's TNA• is mostly jungle terrain withscatt settlis alaog wateawqs and major roads. I•et of the pox-lation lives in the meitral and scutheer portions of the TA. The iso-lation of the ensty from this wvnable zone is omsidered critical to thoverall war effort. The following section is an outline of the EnmV Orderof Battle.

(1) The strengths of enwi forow operating in t1e lst Infantry Divi-sicn TAM) are estimated as follows:

-.Main Force Military Pensamel 2945Local F'orce and Guerrilla Persczm~il 1043Total Estimated Caybat Streigth 3988LogistiCal Spyort Personnel 900Total Strength (�timated4 4888

(2) 1h Jmun ratd of i;.zi.tr .,m e to have been inadequate tomaintain ene strength in the divisiou TA[. YKjn infiltraticn into theare &= ecreaed durng Ahust, Setwber and Octcbe 1969. cact *rrentfi-fizus for infiltration into the Ist Infantry Division TRDI are not known.

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5 [CONFIDENTIALAVWkS-T-L iV 1 Dscember 196-SWJUECT: 0peratictial Report ok 1st Infantry Divisict for Period

Ending 31 October 1969, ECS CSFOR-65' (W2) (U)

(3) Specific reinforrmnents available fran outside the division TAOIare from t'e 1st, 5th, 7th and 9th DIivisicns. All units within the divisionTA)I can bq expected to have artillery units in support.

(4) The acpted locations of confirnd enemy units within the divisionTAOI and along its periphery are:

Cczbat

Unit SMgLEffectivmerss Current Probable Lo~cation

SR-1

101 Peet 70U CA/ Trapezoid/Micnelin area258 Regt 600 CAB Ho 3o/Boi Loi areaQuyet Thang I & 20(Irqina)cC/E Filhol/Phu Hoa area

II Bns8th Arty 200 CIE Ho Bo Woods/scuthem

Trapezoid9th Arty Bn 130 C/E Southern rrapezoid

Dong Nai Regt 800-900 C/B Scng Be Corridor/Catchier' s blitt

69 Arty Cumd

96 .rty Reagt 800 C/BK33P xty Bn 200 C/E N of Phuoc VinhK34 Arty Bn 200 C/E N of Tay Ninh CityK35 Arty Bn 200 C/E ILng NguyenA4idcelin area

74 Arty Regt 800 C/E Disrersed in Catcher'sMitt, southern WarZone D, Bien Hoa Pro-vince area

Local Force kiits

C61 Ben Cat Co 40 C/E Dispersed along Thi -ithPiver

C62 dImu Thmnh Co 40 C/A SE of Chanh IuuC63 Lai Thieu Co 40 C/t An 9cn/lai Thieu areaC64 Dau Tieng Co 100 C/A MidielinA/orthern Trap-

e-oid areac65 Phu oxng City Plat 12 MCA 1 Sa', Son area

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CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJE: CPeraticnal Paport of Ist Infantz.y Division for Period1cding 31 October 1969, 1(M CSFOR-65 (R2) (u)

i• acbat-it unit •S th Effectiveness .urrmt Probable Locaticn

C301 Tan ue co 180 C/E N• Catdcer's nittCl0 O o (U 00 5 Ncn-C/E Phu Hoa areaC25 Cu ci Co 20 C/E Phu la area81st near service Gp 100-200 N/A War Zone C, large portion

of SR-5, U-1 and BaBien Province

83d Pwar Service 09 500-700 N/A Michelin, Traezoid,Sairnj river Corridor

(5) The aco~ted locations of oonfirued ermy units considered avail-able as reinforoments are:

Combatun~it StpghEffactiveness O0irrent Prcbable Location

let NVA Division 3250 C/995 w 1100 CS/ xT3280-101•Pagt 500-800 C/E V15 Base area, War ze C5th Cumunist Division 4500m A Pegt 1100 Cle Northexn Phuoc Long

Province174 regt 1000 C/9 W7 of Duc Phucng275 Fegt 1100 C/,E NE of Song Be7th MA Division 4500 C/'141 1WE 000 CAE XD6511165 Pagt 1200 CA XEU9016209 R9et 1000 C/ XU66089th Communist Division 4300 CA/271 Waq 1100 EL Fsibook272 regt 1100 C/E d,'ar Z•one C88 Pagt 1000 C/10 ,estern Tay Ainh Prcince

(6) Dung Nal Pagrnmt: The Dong Nai pariient (UMIR has been idmnti-fied several tiUes during the last three montms.

(a) Ch 2 Aug 69, at XT883168, a rallier from Cl/K4 Battalion, rqcrtedthat he was a bo&ygad for Ut Thanh, the political officer of the K4 Bat-tali&n. 'Xie rallier also r•orted that, at the end of June, the Cl ompany,K4 Battalion, left Ba Tao (vic Xr8450) and moved to Suoi Loi (vic X78030)with the rission of tperating near Vie C!,3h laim ame.a on 5 Aug docmmtstaken frcm a MIA ar vic W2878488 identified the x2 Battalion, mm Tihedocument revealed that as of 30 Jul 69, the K2 Battalion had 109 nmdivided into a battalion helrters, a signal platoon, a recon platoon,and four campanies (desigaoe C%, C6, C7 and CS) . The Wiasion of theX2 Wat1alionwas to cnduct concentrated attacks in oordination with K1,

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CONFIDENTIALSAVD-IT-H4D I December 1969

SLUECT!: Cperaticnal 1Reort of Ist Infantry Divisicn for PeriodEnding 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (P2) (U)

X(3 and K4 Battalions, on eneny positions believed to be in the Binh DuangProvincial Capital Area. On 19 Aug, the Phu Chath RF Ccmpany received arallier vic W861230 Vio identified the (22 RecP n Cap my, MNR, andreported that the C3/K3 Battalion, UNR, would oxnzlct qperatiozw in theLdi Thieu area. he also reorted that the IUNR would mrwe south into theLai Thieu area, and locate the Ki Battalion, MNR, in the Tan Uyen area,tbx K2 Battalion and bo cumpanies of the K3 Battalion, in the Lai Thieuarea, and the K4 Battalion in the 01anh Luu - Hoa " area. Pt XT919334,on 26 Aug, a PW, identified as a meuber of Cl Company, Kl rattaicn, M1R,claimed that he was on a rice-gathering nission when captured. Heidentified a base camp located at YT152344 for the last 1 1/2 years,reported the strength of C1 at 70 m,, and explained that the N1 Battalicn.goes to Binh My to procure rice. on 31 Aug, a NW captured vic X19l4434identified the C6/K2 Battalion, MR. The NW reported the strength of theX2 Battalion at 120 Men, its location vic XT895415, and that the K2obtained rice from Phuoc Hoa.

(b) On 3 Sep at XT893136, a rallier identified himself as a mmberof the 1sn Co/At/r. His mission was to reoa a route from the PhuChanh area to Thu Duc in order to allow the X2 Battalicm, •tR, to Womsoath safely, On 7 Sep, vic XT786305, a IOU received SA graond fire andwent down. A contact emsued with a total of five enemy KIA and five P.4ftuAd in a hunke. These Pq identified the K4 Battaicn,, ENR,, and rprethat their missica was to) set up, a fonard CP for the K4 Battalion.-

(c) A M captbred on 10 Oct at &l816395, was identified as the MD ofHO Co'any, K4 Battalion, ENR. He reported that the K4 Battcalicn has astrength of 230 men and was dispersed east of Higaay 13 and north ofMOW 301. On 14 Oct (hoa Uianh District received a rallier who wasidentified as a mwiber of C4 Recon Ca.panA/IWR. The rallier reported abase caup located at An LiMh (=874533). lie also reported that theunit's mission wna to recon all targets of the INR mnd that te suportcoomdnes wezm to h3ui'A bw asu s vic Mb355 - xr8557. On 27 Oct at&968286, elements of the 4/7 AR Infaftzy Battalion led by a rallier"enaged an unknown nuaber of NVA in a platocn-size base catp, with SA fime2he NVA retmx& fite with SM/G, then withdrw to the north and norteast.The results of the contact. ware six NVA KIA and domvemts catuzed wbichidentified the reom platoon of the X1 BatRtaliun, M

(7) 101 Begimmit: From Augumt to October 1969, the 101 Regimentwas idencifLed in n friendly initiated contacts, but the we2.mltwas not involved in a& large scal offensives.

(a) In August a major relowtion of the 101 B#gzt tcxk plame. TheK1l Zettalicii and Ragimnta1 HQQ re1ocate4 to the Liong "Vmef Secret Zone;the K2 Battalion relocated to the Boi Idi Woods; and the K3 Battalia tothe Trawid. lagimenital strength of the 101 was r. iadnmately 700 nrm.

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CONFIDENTIALAV03-T-MM 1 December 1969StBJECD, Cperational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period

Eding 31 October 1969, PIS CSPCFr65 (R2) (L)

Significant activity on 5 Aug resulted in 35 KIA and four PW who werelater identified -a members of the !01 Rwdrent. Cn 6 Aug, a N a -,.-after a contact resulting in 10 KIA, identified elemiuts of the 101 Regiment.

(b) In Setemaber, various elements of the 101 Reginmt again changedtheir locations. The K1 Battalion was located east of the Michelin, theK2 Battalion in the B3 Loi Woods and the K3 Battalion with the RegimentalHQ in the Trapezoid. Though the 101 regt continued to avoid contact duringSeptwber, it was identified in several friendly initiated contacts. Cn 1Sep, the 8th ARVN Regt killed 18 eneny and captured one PW, kho identifiedthe K1 Battalion, 101 Regiment, and reported that his unit was on a foodresupply mission. On 22 Sep, PBR killed 25 enemy swimming in the SaigonRiver, who were later identified as membem of the 101 Regiment. Docmentstaken off a KIA stated that the K3 Battalion, 101 Regiment, was to onductcombat cperations while the rest of the. regiment would be engaged in trans-partixn9g 10 metric tons of supplies.

(c) In October, the regiment again changed its locatians. The K1Battalion, whidc was believed to be involved in transport i'1 munitionsrelocated to an area northeast and east of the Michelin. The K2 Battalion,believed to be acting as a security force for SR-I W2, relocated to theTrapezoid area. The K3 Battalion relocated to the area east of theMichelin and is the only battalion believed to have a combat mission. On13 Oct, 18 enmaw were killed and documents identified elaients of the 101egime-nt.

(8) Ci0 Cu Chi Local Force Company. Although Cl0 was contacted onlyonce in the months of August, Septerber, and October 1969, it was identifiedby PW and ralliers taken in the Phu Hoa Dong Village Seal 16-25 Sep. Asa result of the seal, the unit is held with a strength of less than fivemen, possibly armed with 1 B40. There has been no cctitact with the unitsince the seal, but indicaticzns point to the possibility that the remainderof C10 has combined with the C25 Cu Chi Local Force Co. The unit is he!(in the Phu Hoa area near Phu My Village (vic XT711183). As an independentelem-mt, the unit is considered noncumbat effective at the present time.

(9) C25 Cu Chi Local Force Company. C25 was contacted in the Phu HoaDong Village Seal 16-25 Stp. Two PW taken in the seal stated that C25 wnasdivided into two elements: C25A and C258; each element has a strength of10 men. The unit is held in the vicinity of Phu My (V) near Phu Hoa fcng(vic X&711183). In a contact on 20 Oct 69, vic XT694178, the 3-82 Pbn Bdecaptured documents from six KIA which identified the C25A and C25B units.These dooaments were dated from drch to Octcber 1969, and gave a list ofpersonalities in C25A and C25B. There are recent indications that C25 maybe plmaning future attadcs on tavns in the Phu Hoa area an.d Phu Hoa DongVillage.

(10) C61 Ben Cat Locadl Force Unit. (a) Fran August through October1969, C61 and related Ben Cat elements yield 20 ralliers and two EW. This

33

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Ly

CONFIDENTIALMu c -- -' -~ebe r 196

SUBJECt : Operational Peport of ist Infantiy Division for PeriodEnding 31 Octcker 1969, TrS CSFOR-65 (2) (U)

represents about cne out of every 6-7 onmy that normally operate in theAO of the Ben Cat District Ocmrdttee. Such a large percentage of ralliersmay be explained by effective Allied operations in the area, and by severehardships due to the lack of food and supplies. The C61 and related unitsyielded three ralliers during August. on 18 Aug, a female rallier fromthe Finance Secticn of the Ben Cat District Camiittee said the C61, C5, ardthe Finance Section were located at X%683366. She ed Allied elements toa location where a large amount of material was cpturud and 57 bunkerswere destroyed. The ralliers said C61 and other ccmmunist elcments werebuilding new base cane vic x1'648393. On 25 Aug, a rallier, an assistantsquad leadei, reported a large weapons cache at Xr647393. On 30 ;ag,another rallier from the C5 reported that his unit was located rear XT715-367, but might move to XT648389. The C4 mortar platocn oonducted severalmortar attacs against Ben Cat during the mcnth.

(b) In Septarber, there were five ralliers from Ben Cat units. On22 Sep, one rallier frcm the C3 Chot Lai }Oie reported that his base campwas located vic WC716337. Three members of Ben Cat Luiits who rallied on24 and 25 Sep near Than An Village were on rice resupply minssicns. Theyreported that the C61 base camp had been overrun by Allied forces and thatthe unit was dispersed throughaot its A0 in 3-4 nmn calls. Several docu-Sments captured during Septenber indicated the Ben Cat units wculd increasetheir mining activities.

(c) During October, there were 11 ralliers and two PW from variousBen Cat units. The most iLportant of these was a PW captured on 10 Oct,who was a member of the Ben Cat District Committee. He reported the locationof C61, C5 and the Ben Cat District Comnittee at XT695360, XT686374 andXr695383. The other PW and ralliers generally reported a similar picture,of the status of the C61 and related elements. In this period before therice harvest, most of the Cam•unists are near starvation and have resortadto eating roots and leaves in order to survive. Morale is extremcly lcw,as the large number of ralliers indicates. Allied sweeps throughout thLC61 AD have forced some elements north, to vic XT6742, and west to Thi TLihvic XT6439. The strength of most units 'has been reduced. The C61, forexample, now has only about 40 men, half of whom are believed to be in-capacitated from disease or starvation. As a result of Allied ep)loitatic.of ralliers, several substantial cadces were discovered in the area, andseveral base camps were overrun.

(11) C62 Local Force Caqminy. The C62 has been identified only onceduring the last three months. On 21 Sep 69, two ralliers at XT860230reported that C62 was located vic XT84631°. The strength of C62 is be-tween 40-50 mnm who are working in coordination with two companies of theK4 Battalion, Dong Nai 1agimnt, in the Ch(nh Luu - Hoa Loi area.

(12) C63 Local Force Company. The C63 has not been contacted sinceAugust. On 10 Aug, at Lai Thieu District (r866055), five ralliers were

34

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I I I I I • I i i I I ~ mllfi n N I NII ~ mmiimii~ im lml~ml m l4

CONFIDENTIALofD-TUi 1 Deebr1969

S'JBJEC!I: Operational Report Of1St Infantry Divisicon for PeriodEnding 31 Octdber 1969, WS (SFOR-65 (I<2) (U)

reeved: Ork.1 fentr1e Ccým- lisi con sol ldier, cn si'tn pla-toon leac'.r,one platrxE leader and twJo soldiers. On 11 Aug, at t~he Lai Thieu District,a :-allier identified himself as a squad leader of C63. He surrmndered one82mm !mortar, one 6nmn mortar, two 1340s, two 1(54s, one .38 cal pistol, two

4.45 cal. pistols, one PRC-25 and a quantity of doomn3its. On 13 Aug, atLai Thileu District, a PW identified as a platoon leadr of C63 stated thatC63 lost contact with Lai Thieu District HQ two months earlier. Since then,C63 has remained out of contact. He stated that the K2 and K(3 Bns, DongNai. Regiment, withdrew fran Lai Thieu District approximately two imnthsago. while in Lai Thieu District, K(2 Battal-ion suffered 20-30 KIA and K3Battalion lost 60-70 men. Both the K(2 Battalion and X(3 Battaliai are havingdifficulties with foodl supplies.

(2.3) The C64 Dau Tieng District Unit. The C64 local Force Canpany, withthe exception of a very kmledgeable rallier, avoided identifiable cxntactduring August 1969. The unit is believed to have condcted movrtar attacks Cn.tthe ý,au Tieng area, but no definite identification of the C64 doing so wasmade. On 7 Aug, a rallier whio was an administrative chief of the Dau Tie-rgDistrict Caunittee, reported that the District HQ section and several sub-ordinate units were located vic Xr538566; the Cl Mobile Platoon vic )aT546-446; the C2 Platoon vic- XT506523; the B5 Heavy Weapons Platoon vic XT505524;and the B4 Female Mortar Platoon vic )XE506424. In Septembier, the C64 avoicledall idientifiable contact. Several agent reports located the unit south ofits nrmnal AO in the Thanh An village area. In October, there &xtnreeralliers; frau the unit. On 7 Oct, a female rallier fran the B4 Fenrzlenmotar platoon indicated that the B4 had just received 10 ne lmenbezs. onU Oct, a rallier, who claimed to be a fonw-r 0X) of C64, reported thatthere were 80 memnbers of the unit near X~r600490. A 15 Oct female rall-ierfrcm the B4 unit reported that her unit had recently aoquired 10 new nv~rbers,but scue were soon to be sent to Carixodia for an unspecified type of train-ing while the rest waited vic XV488517.

(14) C65 local Force ccrqaiy: The c65 has been identified several tinesin the last three mcnths. On 2 Sep 69, at X2814204, a rallier claimi~ng tobe a medic, reported that SR-5 had assigned 12 NVA soldiers to the C65.This was only a txnporary ntmve, since they woui~d return to SR-S as soon asC65 co.uld recruit 1--al personnel. on 4 Oct,, the 1-4 Cay and the 794 FFCo conducted an operation against a C65 base carip. results were: six en~mT!KIA and nine PV7, of the C65 local Force OCapany. On 7 Oct at Phu COxng,a rallier ret~orted that he was a squad leader in C65, and that in May theunit had received 12 NVA replacanmts. On 8 Oct at Ch~au Thanh District, arallier reported that there were only eight men left in 065. He also leddistrict forces to a weapcri cache vic Xr8222.

(1.5) 0301 Tan Uyen Iocal Pbrce Caqpany. The C301 was idetified by arallier to the Bien Hoa Sd3b-Gectcrc n 3 Oft 69. The rallier zrported thatthe Tan Uyen local Force Ccapary was operating with guerrillas in Binh 14r

35

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVIM-'-4ID 1 December 1969

-• U*raU.xOval ttpomri of Jst JJImantry Division fo rerioaEnding 31 OCtcber 1969, RIS CS(FR-65 (V2) (U)

Binh 0o, Tan Djen, and Khanh Van Villages, with a total stre thof 100mn. On 17 Oct, vic Xr964235, the 464 WV Co wbushed 15 Oumunists result-Ing in five ermy KIA and one WIA. Vhe PW reported that he was fran C301local Force Ccapany, which had a strenth of 150 mm and a dission cf trans-porting a uniticn across the Song Be River. It is possible that the C302and C303 Tan Uyen TI(xml Foce Ompaies, which hvmn't been identified sinceDeomber 1968, may have corbined with C301 and are cperatina in the Tcn

(16) qhar Servioa Grou 83:

(a) .Aaxust 1969: rear Service Gr(cp (16G) 83 cxotinued supply cpera-tians during A1gust, with tihe heamiest activity centered alcnq the Saiganriver near Ben Chua Hamlet (vic XT5536). on 6 Aug, a rallier identifiedhimself as a forced laborer fcr R5G 83. The scurce rallied at XT551365during a seal cf Ben Chua. IW cdetainees picked up at X1554363 on 24 Aui-,also identified themeves -s forced laborers wcdkinc; for PSG 83. A PWcaptured cn 25 Aug at XI585371, identified his unit rs B3 PFatc-, ISG 83.The last location of the unit kncicto the source was vic X575364, cn 24Aug. Doouents identifying PSG 83 or its subordinate elonts were fcandas follows: On 1 Aug at XT564463; on 14 Aug at Xr658493 and XT594433; on15 Aug at X_592432; on 24 g at XT636387; W on 25 Aug at )U585371.

(b) September 1969: RSG 83 continued' operations during Septeber alcngthe Sa3.gM TVer oa r= with the rimary miion of siplying wy unitsin SR-i, partiaxlarly in the Tracid %nd Boi Lot Woods areas. Activity washeaviest along the river near Ben Chua Ha•let (vic Xr5536) . A PIN c=-tured on21 Sep, icdntified hirself as a platoo leader of the C125 rransportaticacOparq, .SG 83. 7he PW had been wcunW on. 19 Sep by a gunhip aW. waspicked up at Xr587387 durimg a sweep. he scrce ripcrted that his unitbase camp was located vic Xr5739 in the Hau Nho Rubber Plant-ti-n area. Hewas en rcute to Ben Cua for rice when wcu& , and. sdLseietly was a'p-tured. A rallier on, 27 Sep, Ben Chua Hamlet, reported that he was a mmberof B3 Platocnt Cl Ompany, R5G 83, ad had helped trmsicrt rice frcm XC54535itc; r545364. His last rice idssim was on 30 Aug. On cr abcut 1 Sep, histmit's base cmp was owerrum by Alliod forcs, and he renaind with the ThatAn Village QGerrillas (vic XC546384) umtil he decded to rally. Doc zentsaentifying •1aaents of M G 83 were fomm as follows: On 6 Sep, at XT545350;

cn 11 Sep at Xr542377; on 27 Sep in a base camp at X589393; on 29 Sep ina base camp at XM587373.

(c) octbex 1969: 1SG 83 continued spply operatials during Octcber,trying tc finc new food sources W. supply routes to help alleviate thecrit cal food shortage being suffered by eneri units in SR-I. On 21 Oct,a rallier identifie, his unit as the 3d Platoon, (212 Traro_ 'irtatim Cwt-party, RSG 83. The source rallied to PF at Suoi Can outpcst aW- reortedthat the TD of his unit was in the Dot Li area vic XT5234, (Raf: 1st Cay DivWNTSW #299). A 7A cqtured ci 23 Oct by 2-14/25th US Infantry Divisicnat X'643301, identified his uimt as (2, WSG 83. He stated that his unit was

36

CONFIDENTIAL

4 i _- . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..

CONFIDENTIALA''r4¶!D 1 Dicember 1969S1UJEL 11 'rt~za Wrt of 1st Infantry Division~ for Period

EmiL.(- 31 Ocftder 1969, MS CSEOR-65 (IQ2) (U)

located soutki~t of Bung (ong vic XT~655315 (ref: 25th Inf Div 1171"(1 #297).Docments iderifing e1lents of 1ISG 83 were found as follows: an 8 Octat Xr5574431 con 12 Oct at XT6Ol499; an 16 Oct at XT615484; ai 16 Oct atXT6103201 cn 20 Oct at XTl562355; cri 21 Oct at XI'813496; czn 27 Oct at XI'655-313; cwi 28 Oct at Xr62l33O; and~ m~u 30 Oct at XQi6353ý,4.

(d) Other ISG identified during the nirnth: TUG 131, 82 and 85 - docu-nmts fou~nd 8 Oct at X1'557443; rSG 81 - docazients found 8 Oct at X1958357;ISG 82 - docunents found 20 Oct at XT562355; W~G 82 - docarntis found24 Oct at Xr6343201 and FSG 50 - dcbamnts fiind 26 Oct at %7574355.

(17) 96th "irti11ery Ikginent: '1¶e strength of the 96th Arty IItgt isapprcodzatoly 1300 me xxi~ it oontinues to cperate in W.ar Zone C. Each ofits three ibms has a strength of T~prcxirw-tely 200 mm~. -1b r-:cigiý ise~xctnd to oantinua to rodcet Tay Ninh, Lai Mhe, D~ Tieng axe~' Phiroc Vinh.

Wa Dmxirin the reporting Period, the 96th Arty Plegintent relocated itsX34 Battalicn in July or Auaut to the Tay Ninh area. The~ K34's miissicn,whiefn had1 been tc ro&het LIz The, was asstued by the K35 T3attalicn. 1hisleft the K35 Battalicin with the dual missicn of wno-C.9Lng , bcoth 1oi Tienand. Lai Me.

(b) The K33 Battalimn, wtidi is believed to be located north of PhwrcVinh, ccia~tunues1 to have the missicn of rocketing that US base cap.

(c) Presently, E34 Battalici may be giving artillery supprt to unitsin Tay Ninh Prcvinoe, ad the R35 Dii way be giving artillery support to Sli-1.

(iS) 8th Artillery Ba~taldon:

(a) Since August 1969, thereý have been indcaiticma that the Sth ArtyBr. Wa have split into two uniits, MA cad 8B. Oni 26 P4q cqptired doazrntsSpz~gested that SR-1 iflW hve formed -m artilliery reginmt, onisist~ing ofthe D)8, 1)9 -MId 1)10 battalicM. On 27 Aug,, ocntact resulted in 15 enem FaA.Capured doomwnts identified the 8th Trty Battalion.

ObnQ 4 SspV, therm was an indimticmn that the 8th Arty Battalicn wnyhaw -been divVWe.' A Pf stated that the 8A aind 8B uinuts haL been fonied,that 88 wc-mW Terata in th Ben Cat and Dau T"an Districts, and that BAwould op~erate in the Ho 13oALtacb1 arma

(c) On 4 and 22 Oct, there %mereidctc fran a FW and cboawitsthat a 10th rt~y-Battelicri had been activiated. It is believed that the10th Arty Battalicn Us a possible AM for the 6B Artillery unit wtdiawill c.weata in the sc~uthern T qx=Lie' area. It is also believed thatthe 8A urit will, c,; r ate in the No 13o Mot/Itacia area.

(19) 9th Artillery Battalicu: 7h 9th Arty Dii xemneain relativelyquiet fruu 1hgjt to Setrtber 1969, but was identified several times&Uh the d"t of Octcber. Docments crptuzed af ter a contact resulting

37

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CONFIDENTIALAVDD-T-141 1 December 1969SLEC: Operational Pwort of 1st Infantry DiVisiCII fnr Pp~r4 rv

Ending 31 Octctew 1969,, !PS CSEO1*-65 (I*) (U)

in 14 610W KIA on 28 Oct, idantified the Of, C8 and 09 rxzranii, 9thArty Battalion. It is believed that the 9th ArtY Battalion, with astrength of 130 nm, will remain in the lcwer Tr~ezaid area and continueits mission of rcckettinq Ca Ch~i and providing artillery support for SJR-1forces. The 9th Arty Battalion may be lcw on wrwiticn, forcing it toraiiain relatively inactive until it receives sup.plies and rep1aomets.

f. Logistiw:s

(1) On 1 Septýie 1969,, additional euphasis was placed on propertyac~untailitY and acquiring anthorization for prqperty on-hand in excessquantities. major attordinate coummnders were directed to perfcmn quarter-ly supply inspections of all their assigned and attached units. R~ecrtsof these inslpection~s wgere forwarded to the ACods, G3, for reviAi. Inaddition, the Suply Logistics Assistance Team (SUMr began perforntngsenliannUal inspections Uf all prc~erty books in the division. Deficienciesfbund in these Inppecticns require a reply indicating acticrns taken toIcorrect these errors. The SIZGf has continued to conduct inspections asa part of the Annual Goaral inspecticuis.

(2) For sevieral weeks during Octd),er h natr iiintsean excess material tbmi-in plan. xThe 1-26 Infantry wDivasie on tuentin

- - excess material on a no-cpeticn-asked' basis to the 1st Suply and- ~Tranport Battalion yard in Di An. This was successful and on 31 Oct 69,

it becaiv a policy throngh-wt the let Infantry Division to accept excessmaterial turned in on this basis each Thursday to Ist, SOr yards at Lai"The, ri An Or Dan Tieng. No prcperty book credit is given. AoccMpazn'ingtedmical inspections and log book dooaets are deired$, but not reqjuired9Uniits mee organic transportation to deliver the itemsn.

(3 eieyO ae yheliop~ter is under stud. By 31 Oct 69, -eachi infantrY battalion had been issued one hundred, 3-gallon bags withwichid water Cmn be safely drc:Fd to the gramd. D/1-4 Cam was issued

30 water bags.

(4) Exploding mines have been a con~stant dangter to armored personnelIcarrers.In order to protect creu fraa eXplading imnes under the surfaceof APC, belly armor kits are being installed on M113 arnxred personnelcarriers. As of 31 Oct 69,, eight kits had beena installed. NWi Mll3s arebeing issued with kits installed and additional kits are being :hwtal Iedon lcw mileage veicles first.

(5) In order to keep the mitaneOf aitbat Vehicles at a higlevel, the 1-16 Znf (Ksh) has begun sti*IMn the pcesibility of havingtheir quarterly preventive mitnceservice &ne while they are ina fieldI location, instead of bringing their vehicles back to a base cmip.So far the unit has aocimplse the task satisfactocrily on two vehicles.

38

CONFIDENTIAL

-0111 I OF

CONFIDENTIALiVS-LB DW I Deeember 1969SfI-RM T.: C.rarc',Ucsal Aeort of ist Infantry Division foDr Period

Ending 31 October 1969. T(a CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

(6) A purchase account has been cpened to obtain supplies for thehealth and welfare of male and female P%1

g. organization: Several organizational duuxjs took pLae withinthe 1st Infantry Division during the reporting period.

(1) The Hiqh Gear (Ground Sensor) Platoon, 1st MIlitaxy IntelligenceDetachment, was attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, effective15 Aug 69, as directed by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 9793,29 Aug 69,

(2) on 6 Oct 69, the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, was d•.tached frcmthe 2d Brigade, 1st InWantzy Divisicn, as provided for in 1st InfantryDivision General Order NUmber 12022, 7 Oct 69. ]st Infantry aivisionGeneral Order Number 12023, 7 Oct 69, directed the attachdmnt of the 2dBattalicn, 16th Infantry, to the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry rivisicn.

(3) The lst Battalion, 26th Infantry, was detached fram the istBrigade, 1st Infantry Division, by 1st Infantry Division General OrderNumber 12024, dated 7 Oct 69, and attached to the 3d Brigade, 1st InfantryDivision, by 1st Infantry Division General Order Umber 12025, 7 Oct 69.

(4) As directed by ist Infantry Division General Order Number 12024,dated 7 Oct 69, the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry was detached from the 3dBrigade, Ist Infantry Division, and attached to the Ist Brigade, istInfantry Division, by Ist Infantry Division General Order Number 12025,7 Oct 69.

(5) Co B, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, was detached from the Ist Battalion,16th Infantry Mech and attached to the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Mech,20 Oct 69 by Ist Infantry Division General Order Number 13861 and 13862,respectively.

(6) As of 12 Oct 69, action on all requested MTOE changes was suspended

by USARV.

h. Pacification campaign: I(1) Pacification objectives: During the reporting period significant

gains were made toward the attainment of the pacification objectives in

the Ist Infantry Division TAOR. The goals of the 1969 Accelerated Pacific-

ation Campaign (APC), Phase II, were to have at least 90%. of the populationliving in A, B and C hamlets and 507. living in A and B hamlets by 31 Oct69 (as determined by the Hamlet Evaluation System or HES Rating). At thebeginning of August, 967. lived in A, B and C hamlets and 407. lived in A and

B hamlets. These percentages continued to improve during September and by

31 October 69, 98% of the population was living in A, B and C hamlets

and 757. in A and B hamlets.

39

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALa _1 December 1969

SUB3ECr, CPerationa1 Peport. of lot Infantry Division for PeriodEnding 31 Octcter 1969. JMS CSPOR-65 (R2)(U)

(2) Dispoition of initss During the r •pcrting period, thebattalions of the 2d Briga~e hove been rqxcsiticned to the north,leaving the secrity of the villags and hamilets in Di An, Lai Thieu and0Mmui Thwh to local forces. Southern Phu Hoa District, formerly in the2d Brigade AO, was taken over by the 3-82d AAio BrLgade on 1 Oct 69.

(3) Territorial scurity:

(a) Dow activity during the past three mntha ha been limitedto harassing actions, and terrorist and prcpaganda activities. Sixteenpersons were assaosinated. Cne of the prime targets of the enevy attackshas been the Pecples Self Defense Forces (PSrI); six of thcoe peoplekilled were PSOP fters.

(b) The general dcrease in enam activity has resulted in a generalv t of territorial security. Although several hamlets suffered

a security regression de to isolated mining, bcubing, or terrorist in-cidmts, the overall HES semity status continued to inprove despite theseregmessions.

(c) The 1S rating is composed of a security portion and a deveacp tporticoi the ocabinatiom of the two gives the overall HE rating for thehamlet. It is possible for a hamlet to have an overall "CI rating andstill be rated "D? in security. For exuiple, all four hmlets in thevillage of Phu Hoa Dong were rated "C" in August 1969. In September, asuccssful seal operaticn was =xacted, uring vftch 56 ensW wen -either killds, cpbtu•d, or kAn~ed to rally. But, becatme of this in-cased activityW, the security rating of tbwo Phu Hoa Dong HMlets drcpedto a "D" * Hoyever, in Octdber the HES security ratings of these hamletsrose and now reflects their apWroved securitv status. The im ratingswill ontinue to fluctuate in relation to enmy activity In-the area.

(4) Status of WF/PF and PSI?:

(a) There are 29 Ir ocepanies and 118 PF platoons operating in theIst Infmtry Division T . Currently all of these forcs are anred withthe N,), rifle. mie focs have the missicn of providing local securityto the paorlace. Becase the local security of hamlets and village iscritical to the pacLfkcatda effort,, the effectiveness of each WF/PF unitis also critical. Persmml visits have been made to each District IQ todetermine the true status each flF carpany and PF platoon. Miese visitshave determined that root PP ccepanies wre rated marginal or adequate bythe district senior advisors. loiad district has one FY cmpany which israted good or exccllm t and this ompany is usually the rmdy PteawionForce for the district. But em this aopany is still tied to its cwound

: at night. semeJuneior leaders are often weak and ineffective, eachacpalny'• s perfozm= ce is dqxndut on the bility and aggressiveness of theccupany oasoanier. This ladc of dqth seriously linits the effectiveness

40

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJFCT: Cperational Rept of Ist Infantry Division for PeriodEnhding 31 OctdMe 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U

of these units. There are one or two cxnpanies rated inadequate, and thisrating was based primarily on the poor performance of the ccuoxy oarmander.

(b) Many PF platoons are cmaidered to be equal to the best RF units.Currently, there are 10 PF platoons in training and, by the end of Dcem-t-ber, they will have bee-n assigned to various districts. Plans for thefuture also include the use of one RF oqany in eaca district as a quidc-reaction mcbile force, cepable of operating 4way fram its base for severaldays.

(c) In an effort to train and upgrade Rp/PF units, the ist InfantryDivision has conducted a series of cmbined US - A/PF operations. DuringOce alone there were 19 ombined cperaticas. They enable ten RF co-p-nies and nine PF platoons to operate away from their xmpounde giving-- em valuable field eperience and increased confidence in +heir militaryabilities.

(d) The Peoples Self-Defense Fcrce (PSDF) continued to grow. Atthe close of Octdber, there were apprcciaiately 32,000 people organizedinto units; 20,000 were trained and 5,600 were amed. AlthouIg 60% ofthe PSrF have been trained, they have received only limited instructionin military and political subjects. Weep• S training has consisted ofonly short instructicn periods follawed by firing 20-30 rounds an therange for familIarization. During the reporting period there have beenseveral PSDP rallies held for the purpose of instilling more vitalityinto the PSt Prcgram. Although the PSE are radivntary militia usedstrictly for hamlet self-defense, if aeplayed properly as a supplaeent, to PFA•F units, they can make valuable contributions to the security ofthe local jpulaticn.

(5) RIture prdblem ares: During October a pxromal was ma bythe Bin Wiong P=vin Chief to mMv the hamlet of Ben Chua (Thanh AnVillage) in T: TaM District to the north near Ben Trah Hamlet. Once1in a more secure area, it would then be possible to inprove Ben Chua's

0iw ME rating. But this violates the GM policy of "taking the govern-mEnt to the people." Oppositi•n has already been voi•ed by the IIIC3V6s OI Refugee Caridttee; such an cperation wold add mom than1,500 People to the relief rolls. Also, same progress has been made inupgrading the faur hamlets in Thanh An Village over the past three:U-ths. MkrGee, the effort involved in such a momnent would be gzatand the mow itself would be an admissicm to the people that the govern-mn~t, cumnot protect them.

(6) Statistical sumary: The follcwig is a statistcal sunuaryof the padficatian of hamlets within the TAMI dwing the reportingperiA

41CONFIDENTIAL

l III

CONFIDENTIALA T 1 Dpabr 1969.---.-,,-w••.,%,,u,. of lut !fantry Diviaim for Period

Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFVR-65 (M2) (U)

(a) As of32IAV691

District A-B C D-E VC Total

Lai UAWsi 29,071 8,081 37,152- au Tat 83,545 29,292 112,837Ben Cat 7,405 19,391 26,796Tri Tam 4,707 4,661 1,382 3,441 14,191Phu Giao 612 6,329 6,941T-hu Hoa 24,691 24,691

1tn "wm 23,932 ,300 1,240D2 m 29,668 10,215 39,883Total 168,940 104,968 1,382 3,441 278,731

Pouato in A, B n 98.3%.Pcpation in A and B = 60.3%.

(b) As of 30 Sep 69t

District A-B C D-E V Total

Lai Thieu 20,771 17,212 37,983Chan T 19,919 20,918 112,837Ben Cat 14,080 12,716 26,796Tri Tan 9,372 1,190 1,428 2,652 14,642Miu Hoa 24,691 24,691Phu GMao 612 5,659 6,271Tan Uyren 12,776 3,628 16,404D An 30,041 I0,407 40,448Total 197,571 96,421 1,428 2,652 280j072

Pc~platinU in A,. B and C = 98.6%.Pqxulaticn in A and B = 64.1%.

(c) As of 31Oct 69:

District A-B CD-E VCTotal.-

Lai Thieu 36,604 1,023 37,627Chau Tha!h 101,850 12,066 113,916Ben Cat 11,777 15,019 26,796Tri Tam 9,372 1,190 1,418 2,652 14,632Phu Ha 7,611 16,341 23,952Phu Giao 612 ý,659 6,271Tan Uyen 13,421 2,983 16,404Di An 30-,041 10,407 40,448Total 211,288 64,688 1,418 2,652 280,946

42

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVM-1T•-MD ' December 1969SmU3FSUBJECT Oeraticral Iport of Ist Infantrv rdvisicn for Period

.Eding 31 Octdoer 1969, vTO CSFOR-65 (P2) (W)

Pqpulaticn in A, T3 and C-w 98.5%..Poulaticn in A aid - 75,4%.

i. Psydiological qceratiýMs (MPMIP).

(1) Psychological rcaticns during the reporting period were aimed

at fiv6 vain target gzOUS2

(a) civilians

(b) Pamiies of local CamM sts (VC).

(c) Ccmamist (VC) g~rri11ls and VCI.

Cd) Tocal crce units.

(e) NA

(2) -r Aungust to Ocibr±ber 1969, a total of 14,875,180 leafletsWere disseminated and 889 :42 hcurs of loudspeaker broadcast were emPkOYedin suppxrt of the divisien. The following is a breakcbxm,, by unit, ofduppot cparaticns:

tkiit Leaf lets Broadcast Tim

lst Bde 3,,366,,400 200:00 brs2d Bde 5,735,380 427:32 hrS3d Bde 5g,773,,400 262: 10 hrsToal 14#875,,180 889:42 brS

(3) turincg the reportanig period total vmithiv zcdissians inicreasedfrom 729 in Augus~t,, 2153 in septr~rber to 2711 in Ocb±er. The nibefof arial broadosst hcurs Was. also inc~reased frrv 32 in Auaust, 68 inSeptarber to 164 in Orberh. Darixo this saie period, the v.eroint of!ralliera who heard broadcasts end aw leaflets increased frczn 52% inAugust,, 60%- in Sepst~e~r to 91% lif October.

(4) ihe recent reormgaizaticn of the DV!(- sectiax in the div;isicnbas resulted in~ a time aowrate dwelpenqmt of prcpaganda material tar-gaetd against specific ewW~ -units. Working in close Coordinaticn. withG2 and. G3 perscmels, mnW vulnerability has been nire acoa~tely deter-minsd and vie: reswpcwiMi PSYCP -sttkot for tactical cperaticns has beenpossible. Airborne and ground kilsu&pea broadcast system have beenUsed daily, 41 -- porating s~ikhdi ths as -'0iieu Hoi " "Family Arpea1"and ."Fewr of Allied Pwr'' in 'the field, raf liers axe encoraged tom*k perscaml Mpeals to their former omadra~es to surrender. A's Al1liedforces nitinue to indreas ther presslke on. the Ow and Ins logistical

43

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVLB-T-NMD 1 December 1969SUBJEC'T: Operational Report of. 1st Infantry DfIvision for Period

Eding 31 October 1969, PM CSFOR-65 (P2) (U)

system, CcmuMist morale will continue to fall and individual ereny so]-diers will becam increasingly vulnerable to such appeals.

j. Civic acticn/civil affairs:

(1) During the past three months, 2,168 man days (10 hours per day)were devoted to civil affairs/civic action activities. Surplus or sal-vage military supplies donated for civic action projects were valued at1,000,000 $VN. Voluntary contributicns totaled 531,000 $VN, and1,500,000 $VN were used from the AIK Civic AIctioW/SYOP Fund for civicacticn projects. Generally, resources and mnrtaxy support were used aneducational and social welfare projects while the remaining funds andresurcs were used on economic develpment and transportation improve-merits.

(2) hirtye.s cl s*ools, 18 hospitals (dispensaries), and 14 crphan-ages were assisted during the reporting period.

(3) Completed construction projects included nine dwellings rebuilt,20 kilowters of roa upgraded, three pagodas repaired, six dispensariesbuilt or repaired, 10 sdcools built, four bridges constructed and 10fences erected.

(4) There were 60 English classes attended by 3,600 students, 60WF7PF medics completed a 6-week first-aid trainina progran, and 3,000school children were taken on trips to the Saigon Zoo. There were 425MMCAP conclucted, during which 33,123 patients were treabrI.

(5) Commodities distributed. for self-heir cprstc n ?rojectsincluded 48,000 lbs of cement, 900 sheets of tin, 24'000 bd ft of lImber75 gallcns of nadnt, 20,000 school kits, 75,000 lbs of food and 17,C00lbs of clothing.

(6) A tynical civic action operaticn was the progran to support theseal of Phu Hoa Dom Villa (16-26 Sep 69). For 11 days the vilayerswere generally cmfined to -ne of the four hamlets. During that '-eriod,the 2d Bricae S5 sppervsed the serving of 2,200 nomn meals per day forUn-ee days, 1,550 kilos of rice for three ncoo meals, and 500 gallnsof water per day. Items distribubed included 72 gallcns of odd=rxr dil,16 bags of flour, four-baq of meal, 475 shool kits, 3,200 bars of soap2,152 dental kits, aWca 50 natri'tikios. E rtainumn for the vil-laners included 15 hours of. films, 16 -hours of band music, two hoursof magician shows, three trips to the Saigon Zoo (for 136 children),and a lotery in whidch nine pig were given way. Building materiahsgiven to the Phu Hoa District Chief to re rair hams dwnaged in the figit-ing included 351 sheets of tin, 101 sheets of plywocx, 93 pieces of

44CONFIDENTIAL

>• = I

CONFIDENTIAL1 I •eembr 1969

StD3EC: Oporaticmal arxrt of ]at Inf&X Divisim for PeriodyLtng 3• 1 o 3.969, .- CSP0R.65 (2)

jut=,, and rm shmets of plastic roofiin. These activitie Ccntri-butem qeatly to the favorable attitum of the viflam &uring thegoal.

45

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1 Deame"r 191569

SU•JaWTi Operational Report of 1st Infantry Divisio for PeriodWing 31 October 1969, rCS CXOIR-65 (P2) NP,

2. (C) LESSON LEAFNEDI Commander's 0bservations, Evaluations andRecommendations.

a. Personnel: position va.cances for prcmotion.

(1) OBSEPVATION: Promoticns amnr the lcwer enlisted personnel haveinproved considerably, but are still limited.

(2) EVALUTICIN: The required overstrencth of personnel ir gradesE-3 and E-4 precludes catinual position vacancies ("canulative vacancies")required for promotion allccaticrs.

(3) PBOOtMENDATICN: Perscnnel required &3 ovcrstrencth to perfolmunit missions should rot be cnsicre- when determinin- cmwlativevacancies.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Intelligence in search ame seal operations.

(a) COSEMVAT(I: Thorcvri intelligence cperaticn planning prior tothe establishment of a village seal is essential to the rapid gathering,disseminaticn and exloitaticn of intelligence.

(b) EVALUMCraN: The fact that village seal qoerations normally erejoint efforts onsisting of US, R•MN, A/PF and National Police (NW)elwmts, emphasizes the need for close cccperaticn to insure timelinessand minimize duplicaticn of effort. The desirability of deplying a verylarge, ccbined interrcrafcia effort at the beginning of a village sealshould rot be minimized since the greatest nmfrer of personnel axe usu-ally detained at the beginning of a seal. Lack of adequate rescurcescauses cnfusicn, o ratrses the value of sWx* effect, reduces thetimeliness of infoxmation and unneoessarily inocnveniences and alienatesthose innocent civilians detained.

(c) TEMEDATICN: Because of the large nutber of perscnnel detainedduring a village seal, pooling of interrogation rescurmes and locatingthem in the vicinity of the camw. and ccntrol element is desiratle.Care rust also be taken that infcrmtim is distributed concurrently toall participating elaaft. A joint intelligence center should be orqmi-ized to maintain a log of all individtals detained in the fore of analphabetical card file, coduct rapid initial interrogation to gain infor-maticn of imediate tactical value and categorize detainees as PW•, rallier,civil defendant or im ent- civilian, and tc caduct in-dpth or folloi-upinterrogation. A CX/A screeninq against blacklists is necessaxy dringthis step.

46

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAV M-ý DM 1 December 1969AVIDSDEt4: Operational -rt of lot Infantrn Divisicn for Period

Rnding 31 Oftcher 1969, CS C(PFTR-65 (02) (U)

(2) the of Vw (interrogai pri kr of war) tems during villageseals.

(a) OBSERVATOC: PW and rallie s have knoledge that mnust be emploited*• immediately in order to be rueful.

(b) EVALWMCN: PI and US IMr teams should operate together andbrek wth the search units fram centralozed locations. e estof liatof one clearit offie can willy faciletate the tollection and dissert-S~nation of captured data.

(c) 4EX D ICN: r M ARM 11W teat should b c erate a cwaetralineroato facility and be ready to send out mdbiie nPW teams to unitsuimled in the seal.

(3) IPW team at FSr.

(a) E8SEVVAT7CN: Ralliers and PW are interrogated of quitcly ainocupletely as possible.

(b) en AledIt : Intelliviice ennmy units is acredies.before the enerw unit has a chance to mome. The presence of an JPWteai at ite rSP t will meed uW the interrogation process.

(c) RECDEDATICN: Pr,? tea should be kept at M• whmeew xx;slZle to speed up the exploitation of ceti tA~es of tactical intialli-qenCB.

(4) Fploitation of ralleers.

(a) lleEr t ThON: Reallier explofhtatio in the form of c s O at Is nfollowbed fy detailed, syinematic toarche of aeas pointed out by rafliershas enabled 1st Infantr tvisirn units to uncovir amy large caches.

(b) EVLMON. The key. to suo ful eml. 1tation of ralLiers isdetailed interroqaia contc e prior to arr atteupt, to mme ,idth therallier into the area of his reore cahs. other informato isavailable fran ralliers in addlition to the location of forces and supsplycaches, Infamation as to future plans of the unit as welL as srntand disposition of form can be effectively exloited after being sub-stantiated. Paliers are often disoient•d initially pon arrival ata unit's location. An aerial VR, cmducted with an interpreter andinterrogator have oved effective in orienting the rallier On the ground.

(c) SOOMs I(: Units should insure that sufficient tine is

47

CONFIDENTIAL

5 CONFIDENTIALAVtB-T-!4RD .1 Decemnber 19069SLEJECT: OPeratialal Rqxrt of 1st Infantry D~ivisicn for period

Ending 31 Octd:)er 1969, Peg3 3ET'P'-65 (N2) (u)

spent interog;2tincg and orientina the rallier before attxi~tirvg to exploithis infornaticn. The 4-dditional time sn~ent will reduce the possibilityof the rallier beocczing disorientpd and lost.

(5) DBclinmt, of raliliers.

(a) ~sEVATa~I:Theene is ft~ f'liar only with the terrain

in the imnediate vicinity of base cmW , caches, or routes of ingjress andegress.

(b) EVALUMTIC': Falliers emplayed as guid5es to lead US pernainel tnbase cacs or cachec; often beoamie ca~pleteiv dis.oriented in heavy jungle.

(c) 1E=1DTmrIcN4: Commkanders should try to orient 'ralliers in rela-ticzi to a main trail, stream or other terrain feature.

(6) Sensor fields.

(a) CBSEPM'~ICt4: During tM. reporting period the Ist infantry t'ivi-sion continued mni torng sensors. A~reas of cireptest. interest were Juncwnenery surply and infiltration routes.

(b) EVALUATIa4: The sensorT have provided valuable infontation indetecting eneny inveamts --z well as enhancingy base came security. Also,they have provided a better and nre profitable artiflerv coverage ofspecific areas within the TOI-.

(c) T&ODYMMICN! it is rcowmieded that the division utilizemore sensors in the future. Their errploynent gives good coverage ofsnecific areas of the AD and assists ccmmanders: when eonciy of force iscritical. Alst-, senso-r fields used in onjuncticn xwith radar devicesprovide mutual support as wefl. as A ocn~firmticn ef enemy nrvannts.Radar sightings yield a direction of nrv-unt which is inportant inWtectig astablisbed trends and for destr-,ing the e&ivy.

(7) Prj= aviaticn intelligence reparting proocl-ures.

(a) OBSEPZICN- The results of Nightlviak and Lighthorse operaticnsare reported to the suppcated unit ns cont-acts of pcssiblen intelli~cienvalue occur. These reports are then relayed to ACofS, G2.

(b~) EVAUMPICN~: Pesults of Nigthaik and Lichthorse cperaticnsreported by the pilots while they are still flying -nd im~ediz.tely afterthe contact are of ten si-tchy and ladcing in essential datail. Facts andfigures tend to be inaccurate until the pilots have had a chance to digest

48

CONFIDENTIAL

Ills

CONFIDENTIAL

AV!B-'-rilD1 December 1969SUBJECr: Operational -eport of Lst Infantry Divlsicn for PeriodEnding 31 Octcber 1969, rC C5FOR 65 (12) (U)

,nd recxnstruct exactly what occurred.

(c) WOE2DM MNtICN: The battalion 32 sbould debrief the pilotsand crai after they have landed. The results of these briefinas willthen be forwarded to G2 Air for update of the inflight spot reports.

m c. Operations.

(1) Squid cperations.

(a) OBSVATICN: An inncmaticn in operational tedhniu was deveelpedduring the rupcrting pericd. The Squid, a waterborne Eagle Flight, wasalcyed to provide reccnnaissance and limited area search of river andstrean banks.

(b) EVALUATICN: In August 1969, the 2-18 Int acquired four 18' skiboats with 25 HP tbcar mtors capable cf safely transpcrting six t6 eightfully equipped men. These wre er1loed to transport a platocn an the

-waterw-s in Phu Hoa District, allacing th-n frequent anid limited searchsand recons of arens otherwise inaccessible except by air. The techniqueproved very successful in that it pernitted the unit to cover a large areain a short span of time.

(c) (tMt U5ITI Consideration should be given to the future use

of ski boats cn nquirl cperations in suitable cperaticnal areas.

(2) Perioxds of enery movement.

(a) C8SEMMIrMI• • Eneri nrvemnt in the lst Infantry Divisicn TIORis no longar limited to those h-urs of darkness normally associated with

rmbush cperaticrs. It has been found that mall groups of eney rmove nc stoften between 0630 - 0830 and 1700 - 2000. Enaagerunts with sudc smallgt-oups have ccurred as e.lrly as 1600.

(b) EVALUATION: This new pattern )f enwwy nmvzment has occurrod

for two reasns. US/GVN forces have habitually oonducted amrbushes dur-ing periods of darkness only, anO withdrov such ambushes at firstlight. Also, lack of focd has caused the enery, to beccme less cautiousin his effo-ts to resupply his forces.

(c) DATI•*DM"1N aSmbtsh fcrces rust adjust to the ne patternof mivwment. Ambush patrols should depart well before darkness. in over-watch position with cbservation of the embush site may be -ccupied dhrincrdaylight hcurs. After dark, the ambush patrol then occuies the anbushsite. The ambush patrol remains in r'siticn until 0830. If contacts andsightings dintinisl, notioeably after usincg this technique over a period of

49

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1 December 1969

SUBJECT: Cperatirnal ,aexprt of ]st infantrv Divisicrn for PericdEnding 31 October 1969, rCS CSFDR-65 (P2) (U;

tim, ambush patrols can again adjust their timing.

(3) •wWv attacks durig aerial resuply.

(a) CBSEVATIC4 She enemy harass or mortar an element receivingaerial resuppiy, generally wlen the aircraft is caning in for the secondsortie.

(b) EVILUI(VNI The eney observes the route used by the first sor-tie in and cut of the resupply LZ and knows that US personnel may bunchup in the nrocess of distributing supplies from the first sortie. Hecan fire on the troops and aircraft more effectively after the aircraft•c=pletes the first sortie.

(c) MIMUMIND : If possible, platoons shculd be resuppliedseparately to nrevent bunching u and to shorten the time at the resupplyIA. 7he cruumnder of the element being resupplied should have the resW,-ply aircraft use a different route in and cut of the resupply IZ foreach sortie.

(4) Eney base catp utilizatimn.

(a) CBSERVATCN: Bquipment, docummts and other evidence cf reoocu-paticn have been fiumd in enemy base cmqs reoently destroyed by 9/GVNforces. Information from a rallier ind,-•ates that he was instructed byhis ccrmander to leave the base cam &d., ng the time Ur/GV forces per-ated in the area, and then return mAd rebuild it upon the departure oftE forces.

(b) EVALAICINN: Lhe enemy has learned from experience that once anarea has been seardced mid friendly forces &-oart that area (base cmips,etc.), LWOW4 forces seldom return to the site. To t, lze advantaqe ofthis tactic, stal-behind ambushes in base cmp0s have proved effective.QCn=Mtraticns of artillery are also used on destroyed base camps. 1hesame tactic has proved successful in rCN sites recently vacated b7y uzunits.

W(c) MCE MTI( N: OCsideratirn should be given to 1-mving a baseosp area after the first search, remaining way for several dvs, andthen returning to the base camps unexr~ectedly for apother search.

(5) Iating eanery caches.

(a) CBSERVMION: American infantry units frequently miss valuablecrpcrtLnities to cut inte the eneaw's sm•vly systbm simply because they&o not recognize the signs and locatiais of these hidden storag areas.

50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALA TM 1 December 1969

Ending 31 Oc•dber 1969, 'TV CSFOR-65 (W2) (W)

(b) ZEI IN: There has been a ortinuing dependency on ralliersto Mower their former cadce sites and bunker c=rpleess. If the Eericanilfantxyinan will take his iime and make a mare thom3gh search, bei.rcsaeful to read all signs, he will tuna up more significant finds. Allold and destroyed bunkers must be checked sirm the enery usps these asstoraqe areas. Use of baubw probes and minb sweepers has revealedseveral hidden cahes in the walls of otherwise eMty eamplaceents.

(c) FECOKMBCIaN: US patrolling elements should carry devicessuch as baboo, poles to check for hidden bunkers, tumnel passages andcaches. Ths eflpl(Wnt of mine detectors should also be omsiderad bythe caTezmder.

(6) Eamplmt of Nighthawk gunships.

(a) CBSSE&M N: With the pability of dieervimr• and ernagnr

night targets, Ni**hawk has prcved itself to be extremely effective.Alftyo flcwn at critical altitudes and airspeeds, the relative safetyof the qoeraticn is enhanced by flying and detecting targets while om-pletely blacked out. This contr:-_sts cMeatlv with Firefly, whidc dependson _hite-light searzlicjhts to spot targets for the Light Fire Team.

(b) EMAIcN: 1he Firefly has two major disadvantages wifdh havebeen eliminated in the Nighthak cperaticn. First, the Firefly haslimited target engagement cpabilitv, and second, during the search phaseof the cperaticn, white light rust be used whidch gives cay the Firefly'slocatim.

(c) MOqDH I : Nighthalk aircraft should xcntinue to be utilizedin place of the Firefly for nieht VR and combat operations (see also Incl13, 1st Inf Div Cir 525-8, "utilization of ,ighthawk").

(7) "Liqbthase" helicopter team.

(a) CMEIM CN: The Li9W)trSe heliccpter team has been operatingsince the first part of September 1969 (see Incl 13, ]st Inf Div Cir 525-7,"utilization of Lighthorse").

(b) LVAEWMI(: Liqhthcrse has proved itself to be an effectivesmall scale air cavalry cperati•cn. By placing Lighthorse aviation assets(PCMX to a brigade, the ground nder is able to provide a certain degreeof air mobility to his organic ground elaemnts.

(c) R tIC=M IN: The Lighthozse ccnc~t ShomId be c-n-Umic1 cn aregular basis. Sudc a divisicn-allccated task fora= is extremly effec-tive in suporting small unit cperatiais.

51

CONFIDENTIAL

A CONFIDENTIAL

AVE-T-49U . LuAuet-bl: 17yU7

StB1E: Q~raticuaa1 rport of 1st Infantry D~ivisimt for Period?aadim~ 31 Octcber 1969, JCS CSFOfl-65 (1Q) (U)

(8) Qm~nad and omatro1 aircraft.

(a) CBIMMI: 7he ideal situaticia is to have a IJ~lD C&C heli-crpter ocntaining the battalicn oammdwier, the S3 and the artillery LNOcve a oc1*act area. Ina naa instances these assets are not available.'flu sami t.&*k, hctnver, can be accirpliahe by the battalion cxmvskandrI

(b) EVAUJATIGI: Artillery, TAC Air, Anitv aviaticn, ground units,resupply and medical evacuaticza mant be cz~ordnated. Theu battalicra oi-nuider's assts include a tUR equpaiped with cne PW ~lcn aU W radio.Ccmumicaticns are xntrollead as folkis t WAC Air and Pxnv aviaticin ameocntarolled using a tmen WHF f requency. Artillery is aordinat~ed (butnot adjwbeod) uininq the battalial omwuad rat. The artillery ino in tke7MV then provides cuidanoe to his forward cftervems acoxrdingly. 7heTMC 4 bmdiately puts a radio cu the frequency of the -myp~ In omltaCt.

ThspeXi~tiW the battailimi to mziitcr both resupply and mtedical evacum-ticia requirat By having an S 4 rm~resentative in the TOC theserecquiremts can be quickly fulfilled. The ocmwany in orntact sizrplysidxdta its reuemst fr dispatch of neeWe suppcrt cuer the battaliain an-rmand not. C=~o dispatdied, the ships are ociatrolled. ci the battalictaa~n/3ng nert. FpRtsM are rie1dared and additicnal assets are requstadf rom the TOC. The 7W doe not transmit cii the ocianyW frequency. Thissystem redecm traffic mi the battalicn 0imanad net, permits full andc1ceely oxrdinated usne of all asserts,, ancl allows the battalion omvenderto 0amtrol his grwud eIlemnts.

(C) IUB 9fOIMI amD U equliped with FM' wad UFIF shculd beprovided and the above s~ystem erplayed when a tRIl! C&C aircraft is riotavailable.

(9) Use of PS"( aircraft.

(a) CaSE!MTG: Dmbriv the reporting period a 500 watt speaker

system for IM aircraft has been deeped and given to each bnigads foruse In srgjpon' of br~pUapw. QenstI.

(b) MVAUMM6 -it ha bemi foaxd. that d to the lack of sufficientaircraft, divisicn G 5 P9YGP support is not always sufficient to meet therequired quick reactimn needs. Meu brigad tUN spesker system which hasthis capaility can be utilized to ful fill these requirevents. The sys-tem can also be used in~ support, of planned PSC zats~icns can a regularbasis. Giving each brigade ccntrol of their own speaker a~sots greatlyexpands the flexibility of thie PSYM1 --ffcrt.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SLU1JECI: Operaticnall Report of 1st Infantry Divisicn for PeriodEndi 31 Octker 1969, iES CFOr-65 (R2) (U)

(c) M0X10'EN ICN: Bricatces should Nl)t and wheiever possible usethe TM speaker system to fulfill quick reaction PSYOP missions.

(10) Light observation h-licopter tactics.

(a) M;WEI6TICN- Riring the past sixty days three OH-6A socut air-craft have hbem shot down.

(b) FV7JUATIM.T Slcw airspeed is the pri"-ery cause of ccnoentrated

enEy fire an scout aircraft.

(c) RE(CO•1EDPICN- ICH scmut pilots recognize thce Fact that asairsneed is decreased, their aircraf- a-xe nore vulnerable to ground fire.This necessitates a. varying -attern of search Wnd a fluctuaticn of air-speed to meet missicn. requiremmits. Surigestul miniinum airspeed is fifty-five knots.

(11) Padar guided anti-aircraft ieuons.

(a) CBSE•ATICN: On n mmrous cccasicns auring the period, Ui]tshave neard a buzzing sound ovr their FM radios that might hav beenenery radar guided anti-aircraft wez apns tracking their location.

(b) EVALUVICN: 4'ihe divisional aircraft have experienced noactual hits in conjuncticn with these phonanena, the possibility of radarguided air defense e,,apcns cannot be discounted.

(c) FMCM12DVTCN: Pilots should be instructed cn repcrting proa>dures and evasive tactics used when they encmoter this sitLziticn. Initialoriantation for all flight personnel must include these instmi/cticns.

(12) Trip flares in the defense.

(a) CBSEMmI CN: It has been found that when trip flares are em)lod"1l beycnd the defensive wire (100-150 meters), the reccmuassanoe unitof the enmy_ force often trips a flare, providing several hcms warningof an impending attack. This in itself often ozmfuses the eneny and forceshim to change his attack plans. -The emplacement of trip fla•.!s and thefire support plan (rEETRS) in particular should be closely =dordinated.

(b) 180::LTýtN: Trip flares used in the ftfense by fire supncrtbases and nicht defensive pcsitins shcu]d be emplaoed beycnd the outerwairs.

(13) Bodby tramed axeas.

53

CONFIDENTIAL

• i l l i p ~ l idi l • IH ~ i l I H U I I i il ilN i li i lI

CONFIDENTIAL1 December 1969

SLE=: Operationaa nepIr.rt of 1st Infantry Division for PericdEnding 31 Octrber 1969, rTS CSPOR-65 (12) (U)

(a) BSETAMrION: e eneWy quite often emplacas his bocby tras in A1areas of he-vy vegtation where they are extremly hard to &-toct.

(b) EVAIUWC7IN US perseonel, when mewing tnfrough a heavily vere-tated area that is booby trq•ed, quite often take csualties fram bocbytr"s they fail to detect.

(c) tCEM49•V1I: Clayncres, bangalore torpedoes, and artilleryfire can be Used to clear paths thru an area which the commander sus-pects of b3d bcd trapIed. n the 1-4 Cay, camister rounds frantank camcn have also proved extrenely effective.

(14) Deoq~lci plans for seal cperaticns.

(a) VWIC!: A careful plan of decepticn imsures the success ofthe seal by ke•ing the enemy off balm=e.

(b) EV 2UIC-: Although the ena' may be aware of the intensive rGw-ARM-US planning efforts and ny sicnificant danges in Allied f cro density,an imaginative depticn plan may prevet the enej frmn takinry protectivemeaures or fleeing from the target area. Such decepticn plans are limitedonly by the iva.lnaticn of the commander ani his staff; in ay case, dec'p-ticn ireasures shcolA make use of existing yatterns of activity to make theplan credible to the enemy.

(C) I LWMCN-h Czmancb planning a seal operaticn should e•.lcya a Frex=sve deoepticn plan. This may includa fake orders or trans-udssiogc, tamorarv troop oncnntratirns in areas aiay frcm the projectedseal and uing aordinatimc with lzcl villae acvnces as late cs ps-uible.

(15) Conduct of village seals at nLict,

(a) (OSERVAMICN-, Special ne•thods are necessary to keep the sealeffective at night when visibility is limited.

(b) F•WPWICN: In ord•r to increase the effectiveness of the seal,ni$ht il3udnatiai Ad nidht viesd devices are needed to detect ena'rwvumit. Perimeter trc-Cp rust be vigilant at night an- be prepazed todefend both sides of the perLjter.

(cc) 1 UMP NtI uontiniuo night ilbuidnaticn fram flare sipsand artxtl]y units shcud be planmed for an used. Padar and inf,-xeddwi me are moe ef fective when used an tcvers and Lin conjun- L- c withtrained sniper$. Qurwders should hmm sufficient forces to -- nduct cb&-ULdt racxmaimance, to alkw a porticn of the force to rest aurixr theday, and to raxftt hii4ht wbubmes aitsicb of the pperimeter. Carafully

54

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVIM-T-DMD 1 Vsreember 1969SULJECT: Cperational Rport of Ist Infantry Division for Period

aEnding 31 Octdber 1969, 1FM CMF-64 (ra) (U)

spaced 3-4 man positions should be ready to defend both Aides of theperimeter. It should be noted that Intense night illwinaticn ofteninterferes with night scanning devices.

(16) Mine sieeping.

(a) CBSERVATIWN: Mines are generally located on the sale sectionof road time after time.

(b) EVAUMBTIN: Most mines are not being located with mine detec-tors, but are found visually. Even when found visually, detectors fre-quently fail to show a reading over the mine

(c) REOMNDAICN: Since most mines are found visually, the sameperscounel should be used on the same road section each day to increasefamiliarity with the area and enhance the detection of any change. Inaddition, the sweep team should carefully remove all foreign matter fromthe road. Old pieces of board, batboo, straw, etc., are used both asmine mar:ers and to conceal slapstick detnators.

(17) Ski boat loding.

(a) COSERVMI(N: Ski boat loading should be kept to a minimum.

(b) EVAUM ICN: Ski boats (Kenner Mk Barges) are ccnstnicted witha very shalcw side board and bcw section. The more persainel and equip-ment loaded into thes- boats, the lcmer they sit in the water, making iteasier for water to aome over the side boards. With a large percentageof the weight in the front, the bow tends to plcw into waves and ta~ean water instead of riding over the waves.

(c) RCDEMMNA : Not more than nine men, perferably eight, andtheir equipment should be put in these boats at any one time. All per-scnml and equipm~nt should stay as far to the rear as possible.

(18) Cutting landing zones.

(a) VBSERVATICN: LZ cutting operations raqTnre special preparation.

(b) EVAUJATICN: In the lst Infantry Divisicn it was often neces-sary for the LZ team to be inserted by means of a ladder fran a hoveringCidnook. To efficiently cut 5-ship LZ it often required more tlhan oneday. The effectiveness of bengalore torpedoes in brush clearing to 3)sthe larger trees to the chain saws or dewolitic. should be erphasized.

55

CONFIDENTIAL

k CONFIDENTIAL

~~~ De tcember 1969SU3JEcr: 0Qeraticnal 1P4c)ot of 1st Infantry Division' for Period

En~ding 31 Octcter 1969, FIC CSFR~-65 (R2) (U)

(c MfUMMOrIC: All engineer pJlatocre should be trained on.the assault Lmider. A minhimul of 12 chain saws use required per tealibecamee of the high dealine rate. Troops shoul~d be given aded txaiid~ngcn the proper use of chain sawe. Two Chinooks are required far initialinserticiM on~e to carry personnel,, tle second for the 1Z kit. Sufficientquantity and variety of deoltion~s should be available so & resupplycan be ef fected after the leafer of the 1Z temwi aalyzes the LZ an taliLz,his dew rupply request to fit the situattion. A Chinook should be avail-able to fly tho dmio resupply two hour after the request is received.Closeecrdnia is essential between the security and the LZ teufor

cinuzu lffidiency and safety. A dwain am nm~anic: is absoluitely neci-

(a Sary.tPe lwshv poe to be very effective offen-

large areas In orddrition teno thei effetive nessinuncoveitgal dndesetralnd manten anse of big bthe Rmpows areas L:a'rge ofies ofainenls forceas tdse us frin land clearing operation~s. r c sur

to ) aoozzPlih hee taslof s c ctt n hig usped effect'ively for learingzlargces oot areas , inorw o sn i denyteseythe4n ba tae to~ his free

j pcmmwiieth and- uitrAnied oforcise aso are asffcin. t akve, en kzierin ofrenilavsc stoeue forc larnd cutti-ýng operationste km la xe begi c eutin awahaodteforces wit thtcaelexpsn and destrying bsertfoc cinpcstand &-thZedareaion clre isomtirq ft-Ae entre l are f ctrct is fslaew ~ as i oPen t

A~dditkioal cuts axe made, either secitioring off the vnm~t area or rel ;zithe size of the unct area byJ widenINg the initial cut around the isolatedarea. As the isolated area Is reduced in size %zmy ferces have the clioiceof attaepin to bireak t rcugh the foroes, outpctirxg the perimetier of thecut or rualning lin the area to be destroyed.

(C) s- Pam ~r plain shoulid be uoed in cil cli witha mechanized fbi~ Such fcore pirovidel'a i ef fec4v* imC~tion f m-ceaid take best advantage of hig goad1&g Ie c~llazud by fte plcls

Infanry fl canprovde s i~ b having personal xmopmiying eadikuz plow, but a =b~ile force isrequre to react to clontacte mas duingmitting ciperaticmln.

56CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL I Pk~,A nliAr J01

SUJLECT: OpmtAW4•l Report of 1st Infantry Division for PeriodEKding 31 October 1969, PeS CSFOR-65 (R2) (u)

d. Organization.

(1) Medical "Wo Te'ams."

(a) OBSERVATICN: There exists a definite need for a fast, cxmpetent,sustained and mobile medical treatment unit in xcombat divis~ions.

(b) EVAIA•2ICN: 7he 1st Medical Battalion has developed a "Go Teem."nTis team consists of one medical corps officer and four enlisted medicalpersonnel. This team has pre-padked medical equipment and can be dispatchdto any point within the 1st Infantry Division AO with 10 minutes notice.The team can supplement or completely take over a battalion aid station,thus providing the highly nmbile, competent medical care reguired to meetany arergency.

(C) IaE*Mf•IICN: This conqt of "Go Teams" should be consideredfor use throughout Vietnam.

(2) Mobile denta1 teams.

(a) OBSEVATICN: Unlike medical care which is available at all divi-sion fire supprt bases, dental care is only available at division base

(b) ERWtUATICN: 7he 257th Medical Detadcment (Dental) in ccnjunctionwith the ist Medical Battalion has formed a Mobile Dental Team. Tis team,wsisting of one dental wips officer and one enlisted dental tedmician,travels frcm one divisicn fire support base to another. This team haspre-packed equipment airlifted by medical evacuation helicopters. This1o0ncet is in accarxance with the ist Medical Battalion principle ofbringing treatment to the patient instead of the patient to the treatment.

(C) 1WOCfMWICN: This conct of a Mobile Dental Team should beccmsidered for use tnhugbout Vietnam.

(3) Military police strength.

(a) COSEVATIQCN: the 178 enlisted personnel authorized by MO-E19-27G is not suffidcent to provide effective police service when adivision is operating from more than one base canp.

Mb) EAL IC: The Ist Infantry Division NP Ompany is currently 48men overftronth, a level that hfs been maintained or exceeded since itsarrival in RVN in order to meet operational oumitments.

57

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CONFIDENTIAL

AV[X-T-4ID 1 December 1969SUBJECT: Cperaticnal Pq:ort of 1,st Infantry Division for Period

&iding 31 October 1969. F(S CSFD1R-65 (R2) (U)

(c) RW~t*MIC1: Future TME actions should includ an cptitrial.pwrovsion for cvie additional ailitaxy police platoon when the division2militaiy police ocqxany is required to operate in widely dispersed basecamps for extendd periods of time. Additionally, proviisions should beinclud1ed for a proportionate increase in personnel necessary for logisti-cal and admiinistrative support.I

(1) XKi-706 (63.100) anrored car.

(a) CBSERMiATICN; Upon issuance of the )XK-706 armored car, trainingjrequireti~ents have increased coznsiderably. In the 1st W( Cczpatv, IstInfantry Di.vision, the MP company cxminnder (an armir officer) has given

his rcen a considerable amunmt of czn-thiejob instruction.I(b) EVAWATICt: W~hen thie anmKred cars werke initially issued to the

1st Military Police Ccpaqmm, persczrml were no~t adaquately trained inthe cperaticn~and maintenance of the vehicle. Fuwthernore, the main armar-mant, tw~in moun~ted M4-73 maddineguns, were novel weqx= to rilitary police-reen. La*k Of knowledge ocncerning the functional capabilities of boththe weapos systemi and the vehicle itself has resulted in clutch burriuts,trwnmission damuge, uniinitiated discharge of the weapons due to solenidarc, solenoid burnot due to oil on the electrical wtmectors and controlbcac malfunction du to a faulty electrical harness built into the vehicleitself , At he i~matrtemey difficult to resolve ea~se problem due toi% lack of repi~ar parts,, bmedga and applicable tedmkcal ve~nuals.

(c) MMOMDO IW:s An adequate trainig progrm shoid be establishedon A=V level for both cpei~ation and mitnneinstruction foir allusers of this vehicle and any other type equipment similarly placed intothe logistics bank.

(2) Ski boat operators.

(a) 1 EM VATICK: ski boats are designed to carry a 2000 p~rnd Ioceat high speeds. Without qpeed,, nam-Pverability is poor and control isdifficult*

(b) EVAWIrICi: Muing river patrol vidssicnsu, it is necessary tocarry heevy loarls at relatively slat Apes. As a result, the boats aredifficult to hmdleand this dificulty is amplified in roiugh water.D=riM a 1800 turn 41here a b~oat r=~ back on its cmn wake, an inoperi-enced cpar~tor can easily cause the loss of a boat. Difficulties havealso been, encountered th~en meeting or being passed by oter boats. The~

58

CONFIDENTIAL

I A -CONFIDENTIAL

1 Doc-ember 1969StJBJECT. Operational Report of 1st Intantry Division for Period

Ending 31 Oc-tber 1969, RCS CSMOR-65 (M2r (U)

wakes from these boats in a narrow river are erough to swamp a sawmoving heavily loaded Ski boat.

(c) I f¶EMPICON: All oprators should reoeive thorough trainingin Ski boats and their operation before they operate in a hostile environ-nent. The necessity of operating at lcw speeds with heavy 1oacd shouldbe foreseen and Jntegrated into training program.

f. Iogistics.

(1) Logistical support for forward attack bases.

(a) OBSERMAIOCN: 7e move to FAB presents some prcblem in restpplysince all elements, the cmpanies in the field as well as the artillerybattery and the battalion CP, have to be resupplied by air.

(b) EVAUMICN: This problem was solved by establishing a forwardlogistics base at the closest existing SB, consisting of a field mesrand elemenats of the support platoon. Supplies were trucked to the FSEand then airlifted to the field elements cn the first and fourth daysof eadi cofpany operational cycle. One hot real per day was preparedat the FSB amd flowm to the FAB3 for the battalion cP and artillery bat-tery. Virtually no problems were encountered with this system, and it isfelt that maximm use of limited air assets was obtained through the sched-uling system used.

(c) MEODH ICN: Small forward logistic operatiDns centers haveprove4 effective and their use is recommended where the situation perirts.

(2) logistical support for village seal operations.

(a) CBSEMVTICtN: Village seals present special logistics problems.

(b) EVALUTICN: Potential prcblem must be recognized and detailedplanning acomnplished before the seal operaticn begins.

(c) I•MMMENATION: lbad networks should be used whenever possiblema air resupply kept to a minimum. Participating Vietnamese units

should be encouraged to solve logistical problem with their own assets.Iocal district forces not used at night by the seal forces should beencouraged to return to their normal operational ompounds for resuply;this also enables them to fulfill their regular role of local security.When possible, participating Vietnamese units should be encouraged tosupplemmt, their rations through purchases at local markets.

59

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DAVDB-T-eM 1 Dcember 1969SUBJEC9" Operational r•qrt of lst Infantry Divisi-n for Period

Ftiding 31 October 1969, RCS MUSFOT-65 (PZ2) UJ)

(3) Upgrading main suly rcutes.

(a) CBSEtVdLCN: Highway upgrading and maintenance is a oontinuomsprcblem.

(b) EAA•ATICN; The use of 5" minus rock to fill the pot holes andwashouts on highw+ris has proved satisfactory. Extansive utilization ofroad graiers to ocntinually shape thie rrad swrface is the key to ]r-pi"the road pessable.

(c) N . Aequate rock supples are a primary concern.Ditding and grading shcL be aoocaplished with at least -wo gracdersworking in an edhelkn formation. The graders should limit work within a500 meter strip and move to the next successive sectin upon ozmpleticn.After ugrade has been acomplishee, daily road patrolling is ne.cessaxryto revent the road from dteriorating.

(4) Maintenance of FSB.

(a) OBSERVATN: = rading the more permanent FSB shoal6 be conpletadbefore the cnisocn season begins.

(b) EVALUATICN: Egineer effort, after the mcnsocn season has begm,;l- greatly handicapW b the elements.

(c) 1 2MITIG: The more permanent FSB should be upgraded (cul-verts, ditches and roads) prior to the nonsoon season. on -i programnedbasis. ich e effort can be saved by ca tructing drainage struc-tures mid interio road prior to the monsoon and then allocating suffi-cient engineer reources to maintain them.

(5) Destruction of perimee vegetation at iSB.

(a) mCBSM•-A1 . It is "ecessary to clear vegetation from perimeterwire for nmdvta seaw'ity.

(b) .VAUMIC1: Dwifig the rainy season, grcwth of grass and bshesbetmen and in concertim and tsmglefoot is rapid. Cpen areas between beltscan be bacblad with a doie ard areas in tanglafoot can be cut. Grwthinside cmwertin must be burned or the wire mved prior to cutting.

(c) IS14MWIC(: Badcb]aing with a bull dozer is relativelyquick and effective for a mnwth. 0ati is good for abouit two nrimes asa nre. rmval of omcertina is wistef mAd time consuming in relationto the paence of the grass-c:tting eperation.. An effective exedientmasure is the appIicaticn of diesel fuel with hand =V,, water-type fixe

60

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVM--MID1 December 1969

AW]E: Oea Iem 1 .Rq t o~f 1st Infantry rivisicti for PeriodFradixg 31 OCtd~er 1969, 1CS CSFMJ-65 (R2) (U)

etnishers, soaking the area thorroughly and then setting it aflam.Nhatever aatio remains is killed in a few daws and the operation

is repeated! to remove any wtburnisd portions. This as also the mosteffective method~ of retarding new growth. A more lasting soluitionx isthe applicaticri of a high potency, 1cng residual vegetatkio killer fol-11cwed by a bumngM of the duad grass and brush.

(6) Back~f iling &-v-1'bi culverts.

(A) C!3SWAIQ: When backfi1Lng around double culverts, the culverts-te -Jten pushed: cut of aligntient.

(b) RXXIMM1ICtN: Drive U-shaped pickets alon~g the sides of theculverts at an angle so that pressure is put cn the lirez of the cuilvert.Wiring acos the culvert froit pickeet to picket will hold the culvert inplace.

(7) Stabilizing backf-ill.

(a) ' 1 E1 'VTI(CI: Badcfill ovrer culverts during the rainy seasonf isfrequently izrpossible to stabilize and the road beomes deely wtuted a,,J

(b) EWJt(N: The soil is saturated,, adeuate onapacttacu cnrmct- I,achileved and ~it* bearing c~acity of the soil is easily exceeded.

Mc MMUMIC: Tw mefthds have been used to solve this prcblem. MM81 matting laid crosswise to the roa&W can be used to distributethe weight eroi4 for the soil to carry the icad. The seccnd method isto mix ocnnt in the sail to increase the soil's bea~ring stmithf.

(8) Z'Venagnt of f lying tine.

(a) (flSVMMO: A program for managinq and alL',cating flying hcxrswas forwd neoessary to eliminate problems encountered with regard toaircraft nuintenance and pilot flying hours.

(b) EVAaUATIC?: The~ flying hour progran, established cn 15 Sep 69,has hel.d to a mininuxn instances of aircraft stacking up for PE- mr.p iiott overf lying their 140-hour maxinum for a ccxrisecutive 30-day period.

(c) MUDAMWMN: A simiLlar flying hour progrm be rsod in othercc~ybat units.

g. Cnmanicaticrns: Icng radio transmissions.

61

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVW-T 1 Decemb.:r 1969S•'XI TCT: Oprat el Rome t of Ut Intity U,•UVi3.8 far Prl

Maidng 31 Ocober 1969, M CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(1) rip: mI I M : la 1u1A i~n u~ Cations security eqe4zuuntTA'WC a-e, lowg tramoumiscme n ',s r&dio oet M'-524 often result ina km of the latter pcition of the Rammu ae anwd ,.dd.g ,i.e culy isWard by tbh reosiving statim.

S(2) COn (i g twmdsis, the secrty quent att• traLttig nWA reasiving statim do not ravrin in sydmizatic.

Sthe Jat-tO podticn of the USIon t; not received.

(3) Wsoon 1t: U m dng long trarudssicos uing theoU•-524 fth. a K!-8i kiay U Wom Llttw aW cd tatev every minute tore-wsynchrcmize its U se SGrý w Iint.

h. Materiel.

(1) use of assault tradorw.

(b)erew traffc. Secticn of failed ZQad~s that becam 1z~assbdle

and zne roaft twit *,-eqized itm~difte cpsning were covrered with asaultturamy, FMK 560-92,,1388. Vddcles that crossed the tradcwqy, did so

tome w a.Uf t r retrieve, served its int dpu•xse.

(c) I IR fl-(C1, Contrary to the t ACTV evaluatioc of trdckwwbeing not suitae for we in Vietma, tradmW contlnues to parformitieded pe and shmW zmin in the Amny ryste.

(2) X4--706 (V-4l0) Par, I car.

Ca) toM?(M X 21706 antred , car wasM isw~d with a vexyUitad PIUy'JL.

(b) EVAUMt:M~ At uet repair parts for the V-100 armoredcar -are lndted to a W maul M. •4 pmrts that are related to oO*rvahicls• is• u v Vieo ik 1e wefultm of the veicle ishi"3 cUcecALWV&d -in *vlie of the ina~imrac of. th rqpial parmts system.

(c) I I ' MUMM: Owtain prereuisites'sIxid be established in-clu&L an. a&WM* rqeir parte "ysteman i to acceptanc of aWnew

eis. 0, Wxq other II1 *A, there. ek~mW also be both tCaineduser perscrmel and trained repair specialists avilable before acoeptance.

(3) Powe boat repair.

62

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVUB V 1 Deeiber 1969SUN=: Oqeational aort, of 1st Infantry Diviuia• for Period

fndbi 31 (-boer 1969, =1E VR'-65 (R2) (U)

(a) i1WATX(t4k PatddM holes in pwa boats with patdim andrivets i.s nsatisfaotoy.

(b) EVAU=CMI Vattead of attadcng the ole patdc to the boatwitn rivets# a fuel call repair kit in Used. "Tii kit otmists of a fiber-

g &ssshet and plastic ep;• o Two: woats of this material and one ooftof paint will effectively seal the holea

(c) I00OLMMM: The above methiod •cu •d be akp4 as a regularreair proquere.

(4) PPS-5 radar sets.

(a) OBSERMMTICIN: Sme PPS-5 radar sets are shcwi excessive wearon the mtama drive gear trains.

(b) EVALtTiG: One case is that some units are lifting the Rr unitinto the radar taoers by means of a rope tied to the antam drive. Thialies an excessive true to the antema drive casing strain an thegear trais,

(c) 1MIMfsTIC: ¶he holds on the frcnt of the Rr unit must beused for all .

(5) P-.!53 mine detctors.

(a) CESEIWICK: Msair parts for the P-135 mine detector, especi-ally the short handles and the reoeiver-tranmaitter wiring harnes, arein short supply.

(b) EVCAL TIN: "Te are generally 10 to 20 detetors deadliredand waiting these parta at any given time. These item niust be madavailable in order to keep enough detectors in ceation to enable thedivisicn to fulfill its mine sweep omditzats.

Wc RMWOMEM(M, All measurws shou]ld be taken, 'lncluO ngRed Ball a•-d ER HM r sts, to cbtain these parts.

(6) Hard munts for helicopter qmnsips.

(a •S = s: urrg the post year ther6- hve been rmercwincidents where cr.e dcefs and gunners have accidently fired theirwepn duin sufi mw~xrws on on~tact missions.

63

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVC9-T-MMI 1 D9cember 1969SUtBECT: Operaticnal Report of 1st Infantry Divl.sicn for Period

Ending 31 October 1969, F(S CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) EVAUiCri: Bungee Cords supportirg the I. ' Jo not offerthe stability required for the weight of the weapcr and flight maneuverused in firing passes.

(c) 1E80M42DATICN: Hard mounts should be installed in all Ui-1Cgunships in order to provide a firm firing platform and to restricttraverse, elevatimn and deflecticn of the madcine gun to meet safetyrequiralents (hard mouts have been installed on all 1st Inf Div L11-1aircraft).

(7) Water in helicopter static systems.

(a) 0SEVATEiCN: Darirng the nonsoon season, excessive amoumts ofwater become t.ap'ped in the pilot static tube system resulting in errog-oas readings of the altimeter, vertical seed and airspeed indicators.

(b) DWUMATICN: The pilot tube has a cover which prevents waterfrom entering, but the static ports are open. High winds .0- excessiverainfall causes water to be forced into the static ports.

(c) RWMMTICN: Masking tape should be used on the static portsto protect the system from water entry. This tape is rwmed as paxt ofthe pre-f light inspection.

(8) Oxygen and acetylene equipmient.

(a) CBSERMM4TICN: When a welder is finished with his ocygen andacetylene equipent, he should shut the pressure off at the bottle insteadof at the gauges. If the latter is done, the gauge seals often rpture,creating a safety hazard frum escaping gases.

(b) 0DRMV•Y\C(I: Secticn leaders should make frequent checks toinsure that the pressure is shut off at the bottle ana- that all gauge- arerenoved and properly stored at the end of the working day.

(9) M109 SP howitzer.

(a) CSRVATICN. It is difficult to line up the threads and reanv.%i a tube un the H109.

(b) EVALMAEN: 'While attempting to r~m~re the tube from a M109 SP.

a great deal of difficulty was encountered in getting the threads toline up so the tube would slide out of its mmmt. An attempt was madeto turn the tube by mw=n of a sling. This was unsucm-ssful, and thefoliowinr" prooedum was then used which allowed the tabe to be xanmueý

64

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVt8-'III eceomber 19698UB ,=1 ommt•onal, RWeort or Ist =nrantry wvisicn for Period

EndLia 31 October 1969, R1 CSM)R-65 (R2) (U)

within a 20-minAte period. A five-ton wrec held the tbbe at theenter of .Nlane, with a sling. A truck was chained to the muzzle brake

and an eight-foot lg 4x4 board was passed through the muzzle nbrdke. 7board was used as a wrmdih md the tube rotated a few degrees. The truckwas then backed Wl slowly in an atteat to renvve the tube. If the tubedid not move, the truck moved fctward to loosm the chain mnd the tubewas rotated a few mere degrees. This process continued util the threadalined u and tube was removed.

(c) RIMOM1WICt: 'hat a method similar to that described abovebe ated and publicized w a field expedient.

(10) Eleav.ting and traversing hanidheels on the M102 howitzers.

(a) OBW IMC: The elevating and traversing handfels on earlymodel 1102 howitzers are nude of mwjnesuim alloy mnd are easily brdcen.

(b) EMLMI: A mrre durable han4Ahl is nw in the system. Eachunit should have the nim hwam l on order.

(c) M9OMt1'ICKq: tbtil new hvd ihls are receivtd, any serviceand evaluation section can repnir a broken haheel by use of a thinmetal strap and small metal scr-a.

(11) ievel vian-Is and micrcmeter scales.

(a) (CBSEMXC1: level vials and micrometer scales on howitzersrequire frequent replacement when personnel use solvent to clean the firecontrol sight mounts.

(b) EMhLLM 'I: Solvent removes the paint and is an unauthorizedcleanin agent.

(C) 180XXMRIGCN: A siMple cleaning by a dry clot, is entirelysufficient and would insure that level vials remain legible.

(12) Water truck pumps.

(a) - 11 IW0•: Water truck pumps have fiberboard vanes that%var out within one month.

(b) EWAUMICN: Replacing the fiberboard vanes with aluminumvanes solves the problem. The aluminum vanes last -proximately sixroonths.

(c) IMMOM ICN, Aluimdi vanes should be standardized on water

65

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVEE-T-Mf 1 Decenber 1969SU CaT: Operaticnal Tlort of ist Infantry Division for Periodftbinr 31 Ocoe 1969,, TCS MOR-65 (M2) (U)

tru pmus.

(Wý -Rebuilt gaierators.

(�.OSVA[NI: Some rebuilt generators are beinq r _ceived in anwmerviceable ccnliticn.

(b) EV7V=TICN. Forv 5kw generators were received with fe-uity rrq-netos, several 5kw mi1dOIM1 cvenerators ha& pressure safety lines hockedup badkmzrs, aiO, two 51aw engines had bhd rods.

(c) IM XATIN: Rebuild agencies should place more enphasis onquality contrl.

(14) stmrar ligjhtweight avionics equignmt (,;E).

(a) CBW¥YATIIN: SIM installed in the OC6A continw their highfailure rate.

(b) EVPUMCTI(N: The ;mcblemn h;s been brought to the attention ofavicnics personnel at .ll echelons. The 1st Infantry Divisicn presentlyhas no repair c~pebility for SLTE equipment and nust evacuate it to AvicnicsElectrtnic's (AVEL) Central.

(c) MEOZ DAMTICN: COntin•-tc emphasis by aprcpriate agencies

should be maintained umtil this f-ilure rate is reduced.

(15) Mineboam.

(a) OBSE7VATMCN: Chain-type mineh-rm used to protect key bridgesare not chrable.

(b) EVALMITCN:, Scme ininebcair are ompsed of many tinbers heldtogether by individual lerqths of steel cable. When ane timber or cablelink breaks the crmplete bccm is useless. If a cable is extened acrossthe cr-splete river gap -nd each Unter joined to it iwepencently, thefailure of ane tiber would not cause a complete bcom failure. Theindivic'ual timber c~m be repaired easily.

(c) ROMMDATION: The crntinmcus ctble system used at the P1huOrng Bridge to support the mir-mbrn should be a'cpte& for all minebocnin Vietnam.

(16) irUinebomx mintew-rce.

66

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SAVCB 1 1 December 1969SU.JSMT: Operatimal Pqot of lst Infratry Division for Period

Faiing 31 Ckoer 1969, RMS CSMOM-65 (R2) (M)

(a) CBRSTItN mineboam have a cdain link fence attaed,the river debris which collects on the fence causes additicnal strews.Ax a result, the tiaezs often break ee fn t cable = ctos.

(b) EVAUL NICN: A chain link fence is attadced to te mlneboc= at PhuOAxtg Bride for the pSrpose of staping sttmrged mines fran floating uderthe boarn. These dian link femms fu-ctic well, but tend to atep alltrash floating dow~trewi. If this debris is alloged to collwct on thechain link fence, the form of te water wculd eventually break the bout.

(c) MMM ICN: Mtineboam perscmel should check minebocu withdcain link fences attadced mid cle.mn thrm as debris collects.

S....i. Doctrine:(1) Airbcrne Perscrml Detact.

(a) OBSERIMO: There is a equie for t establisent ofoctrinal conepts ccncM nf•ig the use of the Aizborne Persaml Detector.

(b) MUWA IN-: These conopts mmt afdews the limited resourcethat me available to a ormanr. In aditirn,- me definitive qui&atm

is rquied r~eriz~theinterpretaticm of deteqttbr sensings and themeaning as it relates to the type of acticn a camrnder should take.The battlefield e ircrnont has a profcund effect upm the detector'so Uties. Tzxerefoe more definitive gui&axc is requred cecrningthese effects. Became the mruer of variAbles that affectbbe qwpratiof this instnuent are stn mvexam and became the Inntatici bydifferent individuals of the effects of these variables are equallySi ,rowF the ccmmders can hAv nothing but doubt mnorning itso~abilities.

(c) 34MM7CN2 Both long and short term st•ues shoald beinitiata to provide further .midano =xe•uxq the use of the ArbornePerscamel Detector.

(2) Herbicides.

(a) CBE$MMTIG: A1 greater variety of herbicides andi qr~jiriatedelivery systems are needed.

(b) EVA~LM CN: In order to give a ccovender the fledbility toue herbicides in supocrt of his tacical cperati•cs, he must have theability to select the ty-ne of effect desired and amtrol the specific areasof •aplcacticn. Neither the herbicides available to him nor the dissead-natimj devices will allow these options withcixt cami mizx risk tc the

67

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDB-41HD1 Decembet: 1969

StIJBJcr: Opra~tiona~l r,3Pcrt of Ist Infantry Vivisicn for PericdiEndling 31 Ocbcber 1969, rS CSFOR~-65 (P2) (M)

friend~ly pcpulace. It is cenerF11y accepted that cdefoliaticn of he avil1vvegetated areas will ixnprove observation frcjn the cir. Hcw-ver,, little

is acoxnplshad tuwarcds improving fields of fire or inroving cbservaticn

for the- solrlier on the ground.I(c) MECMDUMOINt: The piwx'se aid use of herbicides ryecZ t-' be

re--evaluated; such a study w-,ull noint cut acleitional cbjecti.ves as tar-g-ets for future research.

(3) Ski boat SCP.

(a) OBSEMVAICZ: To cqerate Ski boats successf-ul1y, precise f'-mr-tions and cperaticnel1 Pattarns nust be establisW.- and follcwed.

(b) EVU-rTICN-. Ski boa~ts qpeerate in qgros of four at e1ista'nc-eswhere voice3 acntrol is often ijcssi-ble; a-'ntrol of these boats is byrafic and hanc' signals. The boats have varicus patterns for patrcll-ingthe river Wnd searching the banks. T-here a-re maxieuver patterns estdAbLsheOfor ene~y anrtact and emrgencyj situations. Infant .nef are assignedfields of fire and cbservaticn, and aro instructed rn -'cticns to performin hazaixlocs situaticzns. It is the Ixat cnerator' s ze-spcrxibility tobrief rll persaml1 rn their duties and acticrns in ~ear-rgency situations.

(c) IM001I(1q: All boa,,ts shroulr', have written SOP dlealinc-withtheir cperatiLis aWm' irxuvers nc-sted in them; all prx-scnne1 shculc' bebriefed on this informnticn zrxior to the start of a missicn.

68

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL1. Decem~ber 1969

MU=EC: OQeratioiv'1 Pe-yrt of 1st Infzrtrv Divisi on fnr PeriodF6v'ir 31 Octcter 1969, 'tS CSFOR-'65 (P,2) (U)

3. (U) Hbadguarters p rmn fti S~v nomt~nNone. -erm-t fteýXSre nomto

13 Incl C.T. SEBY1-yrflnizaticmla Structur LTC, AGO2-Lint of Kc; Cnmu*30= Adjutant Generp.13-FRcM- Dispositicn '

ocz aw .ato

6 3ad Bela: 90xirabiwal P--5W--

pepwt LccsIe3 Lqmixrad8-Divisicn Chapica1, Secdcun Q-ex-

aticnaj. I xT1-Iasson Iaarned9-1st Avn Bi Or~ermioal n-Tcxt-

Lessco learned

repoft-Lesrms learnr,'U.-l21st Sig Bn Operaticml

12-1st M Co Cperaticnal, rq-rt~-

13-3st lnf Div Circulars

Incis 2, 4,5, 6 and 7 wd HQ, DA

3-Os, n Fpv,, Afl'I: (3 ihnalysisI-Me 3:1 Rls, PM'I: 7th hID

1-M# tSI3i, ATTN: AVHCS-441-OCIv DA2-CnEUSIP.PCs, ~MM: a'cp-ur

69

CONFIDENTIAL

AVPBC-fRH (1 Doe 69) lot IndSUBJICTS Operational Report of lot Infantry Division for Period Mdin

31 October 1969, RCS CSFM-65 (R2) (U)

DLp HQ II P1(mCmw, APO San Francisco 962661 2 DEC 1969

TERIO Comanding General, US AnW Vietna, ATTI: AVHGC(D), APO 96375

Comander-In-Chief, US ArM" Paoificv ATTNi GPO16-DT, APO 96558

TOM Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Developmanti, Dopartamt of theAM$, V&Wdngton, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and conours with the Operational Report -

Lessons learned of the 1st Infantry iDievisn for the period endin 31October 1969.

FMR THE CaNKu:s

ILTl' AGCAsst AG

-70

F2

CONFIDENTIAL

M-,1 Opeirational Report of 1 st Infatn D)ivision f~r P.sciod fctn31 October 1969, RC CSFO-65 (W2) (U)

HUAPQUARISRS, UNITSD STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San kFranciaco 96'75~

TO: Couiander in Chief, Uuited States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,AP 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-LesaonsLearned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquartera,set Infantry Division and comments of indoruing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Officer gains, qualificationa andstatus", page 3, paragraph lb(3)(c); concur. A shortage of infanty catains does exist USARV wide. DA requisition fill projecthons for 3dquarter FY 70 indicate the problem will become even more acute in themonths ahead. The shortfall in this area will continue to be net withbranch and grade substitutions, i.e., with armor captains and infantrylieutenants. Other combat arms captains have been available in suf-ficient quantity to keep the Division at or above TOE authorizations.

b. (U) Reference item concerr4ing "Personnel: Position Vacanciesfor Promotion", page 46, paragraph 2a; concur. Authority to promotepersonnel to grade E4 and E5 without regard to position vacancy has beengranted by Department of the Army. For the past six months USARV has beenauthorized to promote 25% of its promotion allocations to grade F4 and E5without regard to position vacancy criterion as indicated:

JUL 60 Yes NoAUG 69 yes NoSEP 69 yes YesOCT 69 No NoNOV 69 lee YesDA 69 yes No

c. (C) Reference items concerning "Intelligence in search and sealoperations", page 46, paragraph 2b(1) and "Use of IPW teams during villageseals", page 47, paragraph 2b(2); concur. The joint seal operation notonly provides adequate personnel for a timely operation, it is also ameans of implementing the Improvement and Modernization program for RVNAF.These articles are being considered for inclusion in the Jan 70 edition ofthe Combat Intelligence Lessons.

DOWNGRADT3 A 3 YIAA IITIRALS;7/ -1LASS A R!• n TERL&

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALS•vmou-1-6- (I ba 6• 9) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1int Infarntry DivituionC for Period 1_nAMJin31 October 1969, RCS VSOi-65 (R2) (u)

d. (C) Reference iteas concerning "IFW Teamo at ,S'th. page 47, para-graph 2b(3); "Exploitation of ralliere", page 47, paragraph 2b(4); and*Employment of ralliers", page 42, paragraph 2b(5); concu.. To maximize

i the oxploitation of tactical intelligence, speed is ol the essence. Locat--ing IPW teama at FSBs, when possible, allows for quick and complete inter-rogation of rallier. and PWs.. A thorough interrogation provides informationon eneW unit strengths, locations and plans as well as allowing for thopk~'ical orientation of the PW or rallier.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Sensor Fields", page 48, para-graph 2b(6); concur. Upon request by the using unit, ground sensor assetsfor use in RVN are allocated by COMUSMACV based on mission priority andavailability of equipment.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Squid operations", page 49, para-graph 2c(I); concur. At this time a study is being conducted to determineif the Ski Boat should be classified as Standard A equipment.

g. (C) Reference item concerning "Enemy base camp utilization",page 50, paragraph 2c(4); concur. Consideration shohld also be given tothe employment of stay behind forces after completion of search operations.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Use of PSYOP Aircraftu, page 52,paragraph 2c(9); concur. This recommendation is in keeping with the doc-trine contained in FM 33-5.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Light Observation HelicopterTactics', page 53, paragraph 2c(I0); concur. With the exception of theminimum airspeed, the evaluation and reccmendation are valid. The air-speed utilized is dependent on the mission requirements, the enemasituation,9 and the terrain.

J. (C) Reference item concerring "Radar Guided Anti-4ircraft Weapons",* •page 53, paragraph 2c(11); concur, The phenomenon is currently under in-

vestigation by MACV J2. USARV has not published guidance on evasive actionsince the threat has not been defined. Pilots should be instructed toreport occurrences of this phenomenon through intelligence channels.

k. (U) Reference item concerning "Cutting landing zones", page 55,paragraph 2c(18); concur. No action is required by higher headquarters*

1. (U) Reference item concerning Medical NGo TeauB", Page 57, para-graph 2d(I); concur. However, this concept is not new. Appendix 3, FM61-100 provides gui4ance for the establishement of rapid reaction medicalteams.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-INT (1 Dec 69) 2d IndSUBJEGT: Operational Report of lst Infantry Division for Period Ending

31 October 1969, _-CS CSFOR-65 (72 (U)

o. (U) Reference item concerning "Mobile Dental Teams", page 57,paragraph 2d(2); concur. The concept of a eobile Dental Team qs beenimplemented by all medical detachments (dental service).

n. (U) Reference item concerning "Military Police Strength", page57, paragraph 2d(3). Nonconcur with recommendation that future T(actions include an optional provision for one additional military policeplatoon. Any increase iii authorization, either by individual or cellularunit, is accomplished by a MTOE action rather than a TOE action. Due tothe current moratorium on submission of MTOE changes and the aeverelimitation on additional manpower spaces, it appears that provisionaloverstrength of the MP Company from divisional assets is the best meansavailable to meet increased operational commntments which are of an-certain duration.

o. (U) Reference item concerning "XM-706 (V-100) Armored Car", page58, paragraph 2e(1); concur. CDC and AMC have recognized the repair partsand design problems and are taking action in these areas. The only TM'spublished for the Z4-706 are the 20P and 34P manuals. The manufacturerhas an operator's manual which is currently in short supply. Action isbeing taken to notify units of address where operator's mmuals may beobtained.

p; (U) Reference item concerning "Logistical support for forwardattack bases", page 59, paragraph 2f(l); concur. The success of the smallforward logistics operations center in solving resupply problems withoutundue stress deems it worthy of being considered in future operationsfaced with similar circumstances.

q. (U) Reference item concerning "Maintenance of FSB", page 60,paragraph 2f(4); concur. Considerable assistance in this effort can beprobided through self-help programs.

r. (U) Reference item concerning "Stabilizing Backfill", page 61,paragraph 2f(7); Concur. However, use of the soil cement procedure isthe preferred method.

s. (U) Reference item concerning "Management of Flying Time", page61, paragraph 2f(8); concur. The management of aircraft and aviatorflying time and scheduled maintenance is the responsibility of the unitcoiander.

t. (U) Reference item concerning "Communications: Long Radio Trans-missions", page 61, paragraph 2g; nonconcur. Keying the transmitter everyminute to re-sychronize the security equipment is not normal operatingprocedure when using the KY-8/RT-524 combination. Loss of synchronizationcould be caused by any number of reasons such as, equipment failures at

73

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC--ST (I Doe 69) 2d IndSUBJECT: Operational Report of 1ot Infantry Divis±on fo' Period EndiI

S3 October 1969, RCS CSF•,4 V(R2 (U)

either end, exceseive heat buildup, an interrupted radio path or .to.o-pher!c dtstuitanc3s. It shoult be remembered that the -or "-t P1 ,'•r t

tment is designed to operate at a receiv.-tranomit ratio of 9. 1.

u. (U) Reference item concerning "Use of Ausau].t Trackw"ay, page62, paragraph 2(1); sufficient data is not provided to allow evaliation.The 1 st Infantry Division should submit a more detailed statement of excep-tion to the ACTIV evaluation if reconsideration is desired.

v. (U) Reference item concerning"]4-706 (V-100) Armored Car",page 62, paragraph 2h(2); concur. Action is currently being taken byUSARV, 1st Log Coad and TAC-4 to alleviate the short*ge of repair partsand mechanics for the XM-706 Armored Car.

w. (U) Reference item concerning "Power boat repair", page 62,paragraph 2h(3): Concur with use of the fuel cell repair kit as a field-Ix for patching holee in metal skin boats. The unit will be notified to

submit an Equipment Improvement Recommar'lption (XIR) to USANFCN~ fortechnical evaluation.

X0 (U) Reference item concerning "Hard Mounts for Helicopter Gz,..ships", page 63, paragraph 2h(6); concur. Sagadi Mounts for UH-1Chelicopters are available in sufficient quantities to met requirements,Units having a need for theas mounts should identify requirements to---3ARV Aviation, AVH&V-LOG.

y. (U) Reference item concerning *Water in Helicopter Static Syrt-,Lpage 64, paragraph 2h(7); concur. Extreme care must be taken diu±ngi!g -flight to insure that the tape is removed.

z. (C) Reference item concerning "Material", page 64, paragraph2H(9); nonconcur. To remove the tube of the M109 SP Howitzer by con-necting a truck to the muzzle brake can damage the tufe. That typs a"Oamount of force is not required to separate the tube from the breachmechanism. A wrecker can be used to support the tube during the sepa-.Sration. A 4x4 inch wooden plank san be placed in the muzzle brake and/ora chai- rench placed around the tube to apply necessary force to rctvtthe tube. That method of applying force will not cause damage to thitube. ,iW degree/j turn of the tube wtll align the threads of the tubeand breach mechanism for separation.

_a. (U) Reference item concerning "Rebuilt Generators", page 66:paragraph 2h(13); concur. 1hen rebuilt generators are received in •aunserviceable condition, let Log Comd contacts the reapovaiible reLvAldagency to inform them of the quality control failure.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DS'r (i Dec 69) 2d IndSUBJECT: Operational Report of I st Infantry Division for Period Ern 'ng

31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

ab. (U) Reference item concerning "Water truck pumps", page 65,paragraph 2h(12); concur. An Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR)should be submitted IAW para 3-74, TM 38-750.

ac. (U) Reference iten concerning "Airborne Personnel Detectors",page 67, paragraph 2i(1); concur. The final draft of USARV Paz 525-2(R),Utilization and Employment of Personnel Detectors, was distributed to thefield in limited quantities on 29 Nov 69. The pamphlet is now being pub-lished in Japan and is expected to be released to the field in Feb 70.

ad. (U) Reference item concerning "Herbicides", page 67, paragraph2-i(2): MACV is presently conducting a study concerning new herbicidesand improved delivery systems; therefore, this item will be forwarded toMACV J3-09 for consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. fVURRAYC PT, L

Cy furn: .IACV J3-09lst INF DIVII FFV

7C 5CONFIDENTIAL

I•

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Infantry Division for PeriodEnding 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

SIQ. US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy, Washington, D. C, 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE C0MMANDER IN CHIEF:

C L. SLi,- fl ICPT, AýZCAsst AG

76

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CONFiRENTIALvASMU"MTWs 4V412 &£UV

Assigned Units

HHC, lot Tht Div 2d Bn (M•ch), 2d int70lst YAint Bn 2d Bn, 28th 1nrlt SH Bn 35th Jt Plat (Scout Dog)121at Big Bn HH, 2d BdolIt SW En lIt Bn, 18th Imt1at Avu Bn 2d Bn, I8thl nflot N(ed n HHO, 3d BdeIat MI Dot lt Bn' (mh)o), 16th 122'

HBC ans! Band, Spt Cod lot Bnu 28th.,.Inflot Atdmi Co lot Bn,. 26tft I266th (w1 Puat 2d Bn, 16th mt2424 Ca1 Dot 41st Tht Flat (Soout Dog)

M3d PID t 61st Int Flat (CombOt Traoker)"4th P1 Ad HB, Div Arty17th M411 g~ist Dot lot Bn, 5th ArtyCo I(Aibziez) 75th luf lot En, 7th kAvtlot Sqdnq th Cav 2d Bn, 33dArty

OC, 1st 13de 8th Bn, 6th ArtylotpBa, 2d In' lst MP Co

269th FA Dot Rdar

Attached Units

Co B, 2dBn, 34th Armor 317th Avn Dot311*th Avn Dot 340th Avn Dot

OPCON Unit.

A Etry, 5th B% 2d Art() lot •at, I Btry, 29th Arty (6 Seat)

mmmu.a •wa maui,inaumll mm n• urnmmus

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CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters, 1st infantry DivisionOffice of the Chemical Officer

APO 96345

AVDB-CM 5 Novewber 1969

SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report ist Infantry Division Period

Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. G AL: (1) During the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October1969, the Ist Infantry Division Chemical Section continued to exerciseoperational control over assigned chemical units, and perform missions insupport of combat operations.

(2) The 242d Chemical Detachment (CE3C) augmented the Division Chemical

Section with personnel necessary to sustain chemical operations. During the

period 1 August 1969 to 20 October 1969, 1 Lt Ralph L. Johnson was detachmentcommander. CPT William J. Patten assumed command on 21 October 1969.

(3) The 266th Chemical Platoon provided chemical support to the lst Infantry

Division. CPT William R. Dias commanded the. platoon during this reporting period.

b. OPERATIONS: (1) Personnel Detection Missions (Bloodhound):

(a) Missions continued to be flown for the Division G-2 oq a daily basisuntil 5 September 1969 Fifty large area surveillance missions were flown.

The average size of targeted areas was 60 square kilometers.

(b) An Airborne Personnel Detector crew was assigned to the division air

cavalry troop on a permanent basis during the report period. The personnel

detector is used to search out specific areas of interest and to locate enemy

activity which can be exploited by the assets of the air cavalry troop. After

a bloodhound mission is completel a hunter killer team searches the area in

which hotspots are detected Io confirm and identify the activity in thatlocation. A total of 102 missions were flown during the reporting period.

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CONFIDENTIALAVD84U 5 November 1969

SUBJeT~ eedr I~ortto OPsrM4.onal fhPOrtl lit* Infantry Division fcr IRsriodEnding 31 October 1969 (u)

(c) On 6 34pteiiter 1969 large area surveillance missions were discontinued.The perslonnel detector and crew were assigned as part Of an aviation battalionlighthoree team (comiposed of Aviation Battalion assets, similar to an Air CavelryTroop) which is further attached to battalion size units for operations. ThePersonnel detector is used to locate hotepot. iihicti ar iindistely erhdb

hunters ilr em Significaht findingsl are exploited iui9diately by groundfoce, eagle flights,, artillery fire o ih ietas oa f6 esrd

detector missions welret flown as part of Orlgthi fi'tea.Attaaf6.pro

(2) Riot Control Agent CS: (a Non-persistent CS: IL Three missionsemploying a total of 79 3-158 CS (lusters were flowi in 111-1 airCradft targetedagainst enemy Positions. One mission expending 19 3P-158 causters iwas targetedagainst en ene. base COUP in a heavy Jungle area. The other two missions wereflown prior to art-illery preaPration for ground forces exploitation. The use ofCS immnit ions under this concept cannot be evaluated because the"e was no observ-able evidance that the use of CS aided in making the enemy move vulnerable tofrie~ndLy fires- The failure rate of =udntions functioning properly was minimal.M(ost of these failures can be' attributed to human error as opposed to uieohanicalrrobles.

*.Manuever units continued to use 14-7 Series CS grenades and 40 mm CScartridges in an atte"OPt to drivel personnel from hardened or covered positions.Scouts with hunter killer teams used M-7 Series CS grena~des on severs, occasionsto further exploit personnol detector findingS.OnoeocsntheVCwr

drivn fom cver On noterOne VC was killed after being flushed from ahardened position,

(b) Persistent CS: A total of 215 drtw (17,200 pounds),, were droppedoM two missions during this reporting Period. Impact bu-sters were used todetonates the5oalndwu These micsions were conducted on post B-52

strkestorestrict enany use Of terrain or hardened positions remaining inthe area after the air strikes end to harrass known snown in the area. Theuse of persistent CS In the division TAOR U&S not used nonre extensivety becauseof our inability to cOItrL downwind drift and the uncertainity concezrIi thepersistency of the agent. In addition the only meane available for its deliveryare helicopters thich are Pormna~ll used on higher priority tasks

:V2

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CONFIDENTIAL$ AVDB--CM 5 Noveiabcer I1(6(iSUtiB.T: Feeder Report to Operational Report ist InfantiryDivision Peri-od

Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

(3) Defoliation: (a) A total of 4 C-,123 aerial defoliation sortieswere flown in the divisions TAOI during the months of August and Septgmber.A total of 4,920 hectares were defoliated by C-123 spray.

(b) The burning of vegetation by the use of diesel fuel continued through-out the reporting period. Approximately 122,000 gallons of diesel fuel wasdispensed by ground spray equipment on the perimeters of three base camps,two fire support bases and along the sides of highway 13 north of LAI KHEba•e camp.

(4) Flame Operation: (a) One hundred and seventeen, 55 gallon fougasseswere explaced at fire support bases during the month of October.

(b) The mechanized flamethrower, M132, is used in support of tacticaloperations. It is generally used tc assist in clearing antipersonnel mine-fields in heavily vegetated areas. In this role it is used to merely burnoff the minefield. It is also used in a perimeter defense role around FSPB'sand NDP's. On one occasion it was used by the 2d Battalion 2d Irfantry tobreak up an attack by NVA forces against a friendly position. The divisionchemical section personnel assisted the lst Squadron 4th Cavalry with thetraining of personnel in the servicing and firing of the mechanized flame-thrower. At the present, the only means of qualifying persomel to operatethis equipment iB by an on the Job training program. It should be noted thateven a majority of Chemical Staff Specialists in the 54 MOS lack the qualifict-ion to operate or service the mechanized flamethrower.

(c) During September an attempt was made to develop a flame system toset a river on fire. The logistics involved was to enormous to achievesuccess. The resupply routes of the VC/NVA crosses the SAIGON River. Thearea in which they cross the rive. is from 30 to 60 meters wide. The exactcrossing sites are unknown until they are detected by radar or visual sight-ings. The concept envisioned, engulfing the VC/NVA in the water with flameas they attempted to cross the river. Various methods were tested. Theseincluded the floating of 5 gallon cans of napalm down the river to dumpingfuel on the water and prepositioning drums of napalm with high explosivecharges along the banks of the river. The Navy PBR boats were used to

conduct this test. The logistical burden precluded testing other expedientsor cofiductiig the actual operation. The desired munition would have been achemical substance deliverable by helicopter that would ignite upon contactwith water and create a mass of flame.

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AVDB-Ch 5 November 1969SUBJL(T: Feeder Report to Operational Report let Infantry Division Period

Lnding 31 October 1969 (U)

(5) Vector control anparatas: In an attempt to essest the PreventiveShedicine personnel 'ith the control of rosouitos and other svall insects, anexpedient fogging device which uses the exhaust system of motor vehicles wasinstalled on a 3/A ton truck at each of the Fire Support Bases and UightDefensive Positions within the division. The fogging solution consisted ofa 6% by volume mixture of mralathion in diesel fuel. This device is used toaugment other insecticide dispersing eouipment.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Observations, Evaluations, and Recomiend-ations:

a. There is a requirement for the establishment of doctrinal conceptsconcerning the use of the Airborne Personnel Detector,. These concepts mustaddress the limited resources that are available to a comrander. In additionnore definitive -guidance is required concerning the interpretation of detectorsensings and the meaning as it relates to the type of action a coriandorshould take. The battlefield environment has a profound effect unon thedetectors capabilities. Therefore vore definitive guidance is requiredconcerning these effects. Because the nurber of variables tt.at effect theoperation of this instrument are so numerous and because the interpretationby different individuals of the effects of tiese variables are just asitmerous, the commanders can have nothing but doubt concerning its capabilit-ies.

b. In order to give a commander the flexibility to use herbicides insupport of his tactical operations, he mvst have the ability to select thetype of effect desired and to control the specific areas of application.ILeither the herbicides available to him nor the dissininating devices willallow these options without causing umdue risk to the friendly populace. Itis generally accepted that defoliation of heavily vegetated areas will improveobservation from the air. However, little is accomplished towards improvingfields of fire or improving observation for the soldier on the ground.

LTv, CmiCDivision Chemical Officer

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DEPAIT•r :NT OF TIC- ARMYH:AI)flJARTiRS IST AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)

IST IR'•-T.Y DIVISIONAFO 96345

AVDB-AVN 5 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 18t Aviation Battalion (Combat) for theperiod ending 31 October 1969, RCS (SPF) (RI) (U)

Cormnding GeneralIst Infantry DivisionATTh: AVDB-T (MD)APO 96345

1. (C) Section 1., Operations: Significant Activities.Ia. In addition to the general aviation support provided to the 1st

Infantry Division during past reporting periods, Ist Aviation Battalionimplemented two new Mroprams. The first was the employment of NightHawk* and second, the fielding of a "Iighthorse" force. The aircraftassets of Comparn B and D Troop, 1/4 Cav remained the same as they werefor the last reporting period. Comparn A acquired an additional UH-IDfrom Company E, 701st Maintenance Battalion.

(I) The Night Hawk concept, as described in the last reportingperiod, was emplemented as a full scale operation starting 27 July 1969.It was' noted during the fiist Night H~awk operations that for securityand radio relay fdr the low fýving Night Hawk, a chase ship would benecessary. The Night Hauk and chase ship flew as a team until the endof August when the second Night Tlawk tean -as assembled. In order tomaintain the same number of day assets in support, of the Division, DTroop, 1/4 Cav was given the mission of providinp the second chase ship.That mission also pjrovided D .Troop with an oPmortunity to provide niphtflying experience for the UH'-1 pilots, as wel as nrovided for a "spacer"aircraft. for schedulinp maintenance flow in the remainder of the U1-1fleet. On 18 September 1969 a third Night Hawk team was assembled.Instead of employing three Night Hawks and three chase ships each night,only two flew each niriht with two chase ships. The third system stayeddown in a reserve status. * ach ship had one nirbt down and two nightsflySi n, every three days, and only two chase shirs flving every nightwere recuired. Or. 30 August the decision was made to fly all threeNight Hawks whenever possible. Aj'ain, in order to conserve day assets,one C model gunship wa-oonverted into a C&C aircraft for the "Light-horse" mission and a procedure vas establishied that allomed two chaseships to cover three Night Hawks. Due to maintenance problers and

•OWNWRAMD AT 3 WAR INTIRVAILSmci 9 CONFIDENTIAL DLSSNE AFTIR 12 YEARL

W- W S200.10

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operational co,',, at'unts, D) Troop, 1/4 Cav was fo-.ced to discontinuepro-vdipr a chase shin late in October. This left the Nilht Hawks withonly one chase shin to cover three Nlght !lawk ships at one time*. Twoguns|,ilrs from Company B were coy',ritted as two of the three chase shipsrequiied. If a Night Hiwk went down the chase/gunship would cal) theij"slick" chase ship to pick up the crew. Also, the gunship could coverthe downed Night Hawk with fire until ick up w.as accomplished. Thischase system has worked quite welJ. although allocated "blade time"has consistently been exceeded. Since Night Hawk accomplished nightsurveillance missions and was able to effectively neutralize tarrets

that it found by itself, fire fly missions were no lonper necessaryand were thus elirin-ated. Results of Night Hawk for the neriod werein excess of 125 KBA and 10 sampans destroyed.

(2) In the early part of September, the tighthorse force wasestablished. Lighthorse consisted of one C&C ax.rrraft, one Bloodhound/SPsyops aircraft, three troop carrying slicks, and a Hunter Killer team.The Lighthorse team is emnloyed under the OFC= of a Brigade for aspecified time period, in addi:ion to nse under Division control forLRRF insertions and extracti~ons. The most successful pr t of Lgthorsehas been the employment of the Hunter Killer team on VRWs to locate theenery and collect intelligence. As a result, the Hunter Killer capa-bility of Liphthorse was expanded in mid October to two teams oreratingat the same time. On many occasions Lighthorse has successfully exploitedsensor readings from its Bloodhound and VR's L) its Hunter Killer teams"to get KBA's, followed by insertion of grotmd troops using the threetroop carriers. Lighthorse missions include VRts of specific areas andpoint targets such as bunkers, suspected enemy base camns, and freouentfirst light VR's of known and susrected enemy trails.

(3) To increase maintenance efficiency, and to stabilize thehours flown b- Company A to a workable level, a flaying hour programwas adopted on 15 Seotember. 3000 hours per month and 92 hours uer dayflown by 19 aircraft was the main proposal of the program. Close recordsare kept to insure that excess blade time on ary one day will be com-ponsated for in the following days. This program has proven itself tobe a valuable management tool for the battalion in the short time it hasbeen in oneration. Over a long period of time it should provide theDivision the maximum a'aount of aircraft hours with the greatest efficien-cy being pained per aircraft hoir.

(4) Testing of the Mortar Aerial Delivery System (MADS) indi-cates this system should be employed primarily for sensor drons and notas a substitute for artillery. ,MDS proved effective on sensor dropsbecause the WP marking round, dropped with the sensor, imracts within20 meters of the sensor increasing accuracy in plotting sensor locations.

(5) The 1st Aviation Battalion conducted Staff Assistance Visitsto the three Brigade Aviation Sections and the Divi sion Artillery AviaticnSection. These visits mere conducted to assist the sections in solving

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obims in the areas of operations, flipht records, safety and mainte-nance. These visits served a two-fold yxirpose in that theyr were. usedby the sections to improve and increase the efficiency level of theiroperations and by the Ist Aviation Battalion to learn of arW problemareas of the sections, check on aircraft utilization and to help main-tain the same aviation standards throuphtout the Division.

b. Battalion Command Structure at the end of the reportin? period:

Incloxiire #J1.

c. The Aviation Battalion provided the Division with daily aviationsupport throughout the AO for the reporting period. Training of newlyassigned pilots in-the LOH continued in Comparn B. kdditionalv, LOHtransition training was conducted by oualified instmctor Dilote inseveral of the Brigade Aviation Sections. Comnand information -was con-ducted weekly by unit com-anders and Character C-uidance was conductedmont*ly by a guest chaplain. 4

d. The Aviation Battalion did not conduct any tactical or adminis-trative move during the reporting period.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evalu-ations and Reconmnendations.

a. Fbrsonnel: None

b. Operations•

(1) Night Hawk:

(a) Observations: The Night Hawk, with a carability forenfaging obserrod targets, has proven itself to be an extremely effectivenight observation omeration. Although flown at critical altitudes andafrspoeds, the telativw safety of the operation is enhanced by flyingand detecting targets while completely blacked out.

(b) Evaluation* The Firefly had two major disadvantageswhich have been eliminated in the Night Hawk operation. First, theFirefly has limited target enpagement capability. and second, during thesearch phase of the operation to locate targets, the white light iqustbe used thus giving away the Firefly's location.

(c) Recomwnndation: That Night Haldk operations continue t6be utilized in plaee of the Firefly for night VR's and combat orerations.

(2) MADS:

(a) Observation: The MADS (Mortar Aerial Delivery System)

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-Vo lza b-: L ceclua a5 a 4 ill. .,I, --tar i "Ow L .'ur±uy 0. c0LTUF 1uV1 Uu'~Jm IJIIUJ1a18I

of an enewy positions with 1B rounds and mrking sensor !oat ions when asensor ad a WP round are drenpod topz-ther frori an orcraft.

(b) Evaluation: Dropping of HE 4.2 in. mortar rounds anenenV p.sitions is better accomplished ising artillery f", -4. Drorr:ogWP rounds and sensors topether fcr the purpose of accurat,ely plottingtheir location has proven to be very efficient

(c) Recommendation: That the MADS be used primarily onsensor drops missions and be discontinued for use as a substitute forartillery fires.

(3) Lighthorse:

(a) Observaulcri: Lighthorse has been operating since thefirst pert of Seoptember.

(b) Evaluation: Lighthorse has nroven itself to be aneffective small scale air cay operation. By placinp Iiphthorse aviationassets OICON to a brigade, the ground commander is provided the re.sourcesto search for and engage hostile elerents using his organic -round sieeents.

(c) Reconrendation: The Lighti.orse concept be continued

as a regular oreration,

(4) Flying Hour M!anage ment:

(a) Observation: A nrorram fo- mam.uinr and allocatingflying hours was found necessary to eliminate problerms encountered byCompany A with regard to aircraft rmintenance and pil " hours.

(b) Evaluation: The flying hour Trogram which was estab-liehed on 15 September has held to -. mininum. instances of aircraftstacking up for ?M's and pilot's overfl-ing their 140 hour maximum for aconsecutive 30 day period.

(c) Recommendation: The flying hour program be continued.

(5) LOH:

(a) Observation. During the past sixty days three CH-6Ascout aircraft have, been shot down.

(b) Evaluation: Slo airspeed is the prinary cause ofconcentrated enemy fire on scout aircraft.

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(c) Rdconuendation: LOH scout pilots recognize the factthat as airspeod is deoreased, their 0.rcraft is more vulnerable topround fir*. This neoessitates a varyniE nttorn of seareh &nd afluctuation of alispeed to meet missin'i requivients, S~ie',es'•d .mmu airspeed f- i1tty-1yfive knot.

c. Training:

(1) F'light Records:

(a) Observation: Flight reqqds are continually receivedwith numerous errors in the addition of flight time, aircraft qualifi-cations, instrument ratings and -Prious other areas.

(b) Evaluation: The new record forns are not cl-,arlyunderstood: by the aviators signing them. In most eases he has neverbeen told the meanings of various sections of DA Form 759 Part 1, and759-1 Part II.

(c) Rlecomrrandation: Aviators should be presented a oneor two hour block of instruction on flight records .so they may have abetter understanding of the dstem.

d. Intelligence:

(I) Radar Guided Anti-Aircrart .eam•i• .*

(a) Cbservation: Pilots have, on nwmrous occasionsduring the period, heard a buzzing sound over tbeir FM radios that couldhave been enemy radar guided anti-aircraft weapons trackint theirlocation.

(b) Evaluation: While divisional aircraft have experiencedno actutl hits in conjunction with this phenomena, the possibility ofradar guided air defense weapons cannot be discounted.

(c) Reacmandation: Pilots should be instructed on report-ing procedures and evasive tactics used when they encounter this situation.Initial orientation for all flight personnel must include these nrocedures.

(2) Reporting:

(a) Ohservdtion- 'The results of Night Hawk and Lighthorseoperations are reported to the supported unit as contacts of possibleintelligence value occur. Thesar reports are then reLayed to Division ri-2,

(b) Evaluation: Results of Night Hawk and lUghthorseoperations reported by the pilots %hila they are still fl-ing. and anne-diately after the contact are often -eketchv and lacking in essential detail.

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Facts and fipures tzrid to bh ir&cciratc until th, 'iots hnve had a chanceto digest and reconstruct exactly ,1vt occirred.

(c) Recomniendation" Tho Battalion S-2 continue to debriefthe m lots and crew after they '-avw landed. The results of tW*,se debriefingnwill then be forvirded to rl-2 Air for undate of the infli ht snot renorts.

(3) AO Maps:

(a) Observation" Pilots havu had nroble-s exactly identi-fying the pround AO in which the,, are working.

(b) Evaluatirn: Pilots need a larpe scale mar with thevarious AO's outlined and frequencies and call signs renciled in.

(c) Recommandation: LUrpe scale nark3d mare sur-lied byS-2, be carried in each aircraet.

e. Logistics:

(I) Wearon Hard Mounts:

(a) Observation! During the rast year there hive beennunmrous incidents where crew chiefs and gunners have. cci rnnetl: firedtheir weanons during sudden mareuvers on contact rissions.

(b) Evaluation: The use o-" Bungee Cords for sunnort of the11-6016 does not offer the stabilitv reouiped for the veiv.ht of the vanonand flight maneuver used in firing nasses,

(c) Recommendation" Hard mounts should be installed in allUH-1C gunshifs in order to provide a firm firing nlatform And to restricttraverse, elevation, and deflection of the machine run to meet safetyreouirements. (Hard mounts .have been inetallcd on all. organic UD-1aircraft).

(2) Water in Pit.ot Static Systems:

(a) Observation! During the monsoon scasen an excess'.veamount of water becomes trapoed in the nitot static tube system resultingin erroneous readings of the altimeter, vertical sped, and airspeedindicators.

(b) Evaluation: The pitot tube has a cover which rTeventswater from entering, but the static ports are oren. High winds and1xcessive rain fall causes water to be forced into the static •orts.

(c) Recommendation: 'Masking tare should be used o0 thestatic pcrts to nrotect the system from water entry. This tare is removedas part of the pre-flight inspection.

90

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f. Orpmaniation: None

g. Other: Sttatistical date for tbj Nuarter.

0 ) Hours Plownt 18.,862

(2) Sorties flown: 33,888

(3) Paiseenpers noved: 32,390

(i) CArgo moved (tons)t 958

1 Incl JAMS R. ALLANLTC, FACanmandin.

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SInlosur 1 to Operational Report of lot Aviation Battalion (Combat)

f• the period ending 31 October 1969, RSC (SOCiR) (RI).

Battalion coend structure at th end of the rerorting reriod,

LTC James R. Allan Cwwnding

MAJ John F. Byrnside Em cutive Oftficer

CPT Neil Stribling COt HHC

MAJ Robert L. Phillips CO, A Co

MAJ Petor B. Torres CO, B Co

MAJ John N. Smith S-3

I

inci I to Incl 9 9-CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTET OF THE ARMYHeadquarters lat Engineer Battalion

lot Infantry DivisionAPO 96345

AVDB-CE-O N ovember -2969

SUBJECTs Operational Report of lot Engineer Battalion for PeriodEnding 31 October 1969, PCR CSFCR-65 (RI)

Commanding Generallet Infantry DivisiunATINih AVDB-T-(MHD)

1. Section 1: 0Defrtii: SiMnfioa t Activities:

a. Organizations

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company provided cammand and staff

supervision for oacbat engineer support to the let Infantry Division. Engineer

equip•nent support is provided by the heavy equipment platoon and consists of: a

20 ton rough terrain crane; graders; five ton dump tbruoks; eheepsfoot, grid, and

steel %heel rollers; 10 ton tractors; and scoop loaders. This equipment is at-

tached to the line companies on a mission basis to provide additional support.

The ecmpanyls equipment was utilized at nweroub Fire Support rases for new con-

struction and general upgrade. The graders were kept in constant use to maintain

Routes 240, QL-13, and LTL-14 during the rainy season.

The AVLB (Armored Vehicle launched Bridge) Section, attached to Headcuart-

era Conpany, consists of four (4) AVLB launchers and six (6) bridges. The AVLB

section ban been deployed an several missions in the vicinity of Thunder I, II,

and III; Dau Teng, tke Michelin rubber plantation, and the Trapezoid.

The Rome Plow seotion is organic to Headquarters Company and consists of

six (6) Rome Plows, as Armored Personnel Carrier, and a complete maintenance sec-

tion. The Rome Plow section in placed in direct support of lt Infantry Division

Incl 1o f3

units to aociamplish area land clearanice in tho Th(M. During the repor pefiod,,

they have cleered approziLtely 2,565 acres.

The Am Plow, began the quart•w at NDW Wilderness I and out 625 aerea

from 7 to 17 August. 0 18 Alugut, tAe plow moved to Wilderness I where they

ouit 265 acres in 5 days. Having to XT$04263,, they out 38D acres befor'e return-

ing to I.i lKo on 31 Augt. A cue week malntmance staaddown us followed cc 8

September with a 115 acre out at XT760313. On 1U September at XIT00440O 60 aores

were cut. FroI 3 to 19 September, the plows out 425 aeres in the vicinity of

17756300. Followng a mlntenanoe standdown, the plow out 320 acres at XT699458,

October 2-8. Foa 11 to 13 0Otober, 185 acre•evre cu at XT847275. Fic 14 Oct-

ober to 18 sober., the plows have been opeating near FSB Son. The f'our 14,8*3

tanks that have beon prowiding seeuit•y for the plow bays been turned in. Four

otcaiat hngineer Vehicles woe obtained at the beginning of October to replace the

tanks. Howver, the CMV'. will not be used as Rome Plow security due to lack of

a cansnter rounds thereby pl•alng the total requirement for security on the unit

that ii being supported.

th3e mte paint secticn providA over 1.2 •flion gallons of potable water

to units in the field. Water point units are presently located at Zzander II (IT-

"785558),1 MB lien (1XT5194/18), M Tennessee (X15"3333)9, FSB Apollo (1T637507), and

FAB Flort& (=118329).

(2) A Ocmpany provided direct combat engineer support to the lot Brigade

inu Da TIeRg. lMch of the first pa of the quaterwas•devoted to the upgrade

of the base cap at Dau Tiong. Inprovments were mde on the defese perimeter,

Interic- rcads, drainage, personnel bunkers, and sanitary and mesa facilities for

let Brigade units.

A daily xine sweep was conducted from Dau Tieng to FSB Mien (XT5194418).

Chi 30 August, a platoon from A Cmcqay.¶as air inserted at XT603392. The

qq

migsicw. was to ulaca a 381O4 M.T6 dry span bridre an LTL-4 so that the 984th

Land Clearing Ccapany could move into a new out *As. The bridge ws air insert-

ed from Di An and the following day returned by airlift. The platoon from A Caop-

any secured the bridge the night of 30 August, disassembled the bridge the follow-

ing morning and was airlifted back to Dau Tieng.

Throughotu the quarter, FSB Kiens, FSB Tennessee, and FSB Gea were support-

ed with drainage Improvment, rinor oenstructionc, and facilitlea upgrade. FSB

Gela was oloed out in September.

Ch 1 October, A Co began a deliberate upgrade of LTL-14 from Dan Tieng to

FSB Tennessee. The opening of the access road to FSB Tennessee was the first

task. With the use of 1700 feet of assault traokwy plus extensive dozer and gra-

der wvok the access road was opened to traffic en 15 October. Upgrade of the rest

of the road ocatinues.

(3) B Caqmy provided direot obnat engineer support to the 2nd Brigade

w•ioh is headquartered at Di An.

During the period aedig October 1969, B Cenpany was engaged in numerous

significant projects.

An efftart was mde to continue the upgrade of NDP's in the 2nd Brigade AO.

Such upgrading has included the haling of latente, drainage tiprowmtj and the

onistruction of bankers, mess bal p and latrines. IMBes and NDFs receiving such

assistance, ino1de M Jim, PS Mortain, FSB Venable Heights, 1-B A11.4merioan II,

Oheyee NDP?, and Pagoda Inn NDP. A new IME INormandy I, was also eonstructed in

July of this period and is aintained on a continuous basis. The censtnizon of

thits new UP duug the rainy seaswn required ceniderable engineew effort and de-

Nuer nimune sweeps were. also supplied to assure the safe and unrestrict-

-d w of -vital roads and MR3's in the Area of Operations. Cmpsny B suppliedi-15

four daily @WOW positioned at FSEI jim w4 one sweep daily frr(a 2-0 flo--ady i31

to cover Routes Zino and Lead from the Song Be Bridge to Zan Uyan and Ben Cat to

Route LTID-16.

Scme wcwk continued an the Division Trining Ccamand School and ranges.

Progress acntinues to be esl due to the lack of mterials, eporadic and heavy

rain fall and the acminitet of higher priority projects.

Ccnstructicn began on the Division Stand-down Center in Di An. This pro-

ject has inoluded the construoticu of sidwalka, an outdoor movie theater, interior

drainmg and a swimming pool ociplex consisting of a concrete pad and buil)ding for

the filter, two showers, a sun deck and a chain link fence around the pool. Also

Included are a roedway to the pool and a privacy fence. All projects are proceed-

iM satisfactorily with work remaining to be done cn the theater, drainage, road-

way., and privacy fence.

(4) 0 Campany provided direct combat engineer support to the 3rd Brigade,

headquartered in2 lei Khe. During the period 1 August to'31 October, mine sweep

operations were predcainant amcng the tasks acociplished by C Company. Sweep part- ]ies worked out of FSBts Mahone (Kien), Mca VnIoI Lorraine,, Sco, Thunder Is no

III, Hartmanp Wilderness I and II, and Bea Oat. In August the 1st Platoon based

at FSB 1M4ahe replaced a blown culvert n 01,3-4 vicinity Ben Cha in support of a

village seal. During this time a squad size demo team supported 1/4th Cavalry op-

orations in the Iron Triangle and along Route 240. The August Monsoons created

washouts and rendered 4L-13 almost impassable. C Company, forming an engineer

task fowces, supported with additional equipment from Battalicn, upgraded and re-

stored 13 kilometers along this important Northorn )R. The 554th Engineer Bat-

talion assumed the remaining work and C Company began upgrade, operations at Thund-

or I, II, III, and FSB Hartmn. September brought about the need for LZ cutting

teems and, after ?amiliarization training with CH-471s for aerial ladder insertion,

9&~

C Comipany cut 6 LMt s west or Thunder III In support of thre 2/2nd Hochanis-

edInfantry Battaliomandin thevicinity ofFSB Lorraineinusupport of the2/16h

Infantry Battalicc. An LZ team vas also utilized to open FSB Scn. Outober brought

about a rc~td project along Route 240. In a move to reestablish overland reautply

to FSB Lorraine and FSB Son,, Route 240 vas upgraded frca BeM C~at to VMI L~riiu..

During this operntica assault trackway was utilised as an entrance road betwoeen

Route 24+0 and "M~ Iorrall.ne. -In a project which still ocartinuee at Thunder II,,

two artillery pads for ý'" seljr-propelled Howitzers are being ocarstruoved and co-

merit soil stabi.Uuatimr in being used to establish a working platform.

()D Company provided general support to the lat Infantry Division,. D

Company retained responsibility for QL-13 from Iai Khe to Thwuder III until Aug-

ust 15. Minseeeep teams have been located at each ffre support baso.

Major base camp acmitruotion was accocpllshed by the 2nd and 3z'd Plate,,ý

in support of the Divisial Eqs area. Cho 161230t prefmbricated metal buldJing was

diwentled# moved# and re-erected on a new pad. Four large dead trees were remov-

ed -from the DTOC area,, an in close prcadminty to critical power lines and exist-

ing buil~~ings which necessitated their removal an a limb by limb basis, each mre

bein rigged and iowered to the groutd. A 121x;4001 service road to the rear of

Divisiar Eqs building was ocopleted and five muserviceable personnel bmkero were

remoed.A chain link fence we comipleted around the WTOO area withx WO service

gatds and a network of sidewalks pouredl connecting the DT00 and an. the staff aee-Iticoise 7his briWg the sideva2ke- poured by D Compan2y in the Divisica area to over

5000 feat. A new personnai bunker was built in the DTOO are to replace one pro-.

viously removed. During thlc- same Period, the 3rd Platocn built a bait scale

X)AGCR FCMMSICWS1 of reinforced oocamfte which was Installed in frout of Divis-

lcm Ups* A Wx2'x28z' septia tank me coartructed of oceroote block idth a rein-

forced concrete floor said Precast reinorced concrete seotiaral coea A 16IZ251

ahcaiezlatrlne facility with ooucrete fl-nor and louvered sides was ocimpieted. The

facility ocnsists of five commodes, five uials, f1we sinks, and five showers. A

twenty foot water tower we ereoted to servic the latrine. In addition, an over-

head cover and standoff wes constructed over the Cmsnding General's taeiler.

Ch 15 Augast 1969, Company D assumed reponsibility for the lst ngineer

Battalion's sdetion of thu LWi Mhe perimeter and all other guard om4tmente, thus

reducing engineer effort by the umit to a platoon minus 81s5 element. in so doing,

it has increased the efficieno of the guard and perimeter defense and permitted

a more effective use of men and equipment. All guard is performed as a primary

duty on a daily basis.

When D Ccapany assumed responsibility for the perimeter, much improvement

of the area was required. Elimination of grass which had grown up between the wire

and ocmpletely obstructed vision was the firez objective. The area was out, where

possible, and other areas soaked with diesel fuel, burned, and then resprayed and

burned when the vegetation ms dead. Much tactical wire required replacing and

nearly all trip flares had to be remounted. The majority of the flares had been

improperly mounted on the final wire, leaving the primary and secondary belts in-

protected. Five triple concertina belts were added in a major drainage ditch.

Twenty five 55 gallon drum fogasse and bunker positions are being inproved. All

such work has been done by personnel assigned as perimeter gmuards.

One provisional platoonv%,y7ng in strength from 15 to 20 men, has con-

tinued effert in the Division Headquarters area. They have prepared the site and

moved four house trailers assigned to the General Staff. A four inch trunk sewer

Ulne with foeders from each trailer ws installed and ccnnected to the previously

oonstruoted septic tank. An additional hundred feet of sidewalk vw poured in the

area. Due to increased weight fram heavy monsoon rains in the earth fill over

the DT0C, the beams began to fail and required installaticn of 260 feet of 6" H

qg

b-anad potsasiter~rdPte supportsA tn prAVant failure.

On 27 September 1969, a landing zono mission was assigned to 3rd Flatoan

which required an air insertion. Initial concept called for a 10m x 200m landing

zone. Subsequent changes called for a clearing 800m in diameter. The projoct re-

quired a full platoon for 3 days and one squad for an additional 5 dayi.

(6) E Company (bridge) provided general support to the lst Infantry Div-

ision. The conpany continued ith bridging operations with one significant bridge

built during the quarter. Riverine missions in support of various Wnfantry batta-

lions were also continued, but changes in the type equipment used, the unit support-

ed, and the areas of operation hqve eacurin4

let Platoon, which constructed the foundation for the destroyed Ben Cat

Panel Bridge at XT763328, oonstructed the replacement bridge co 2 Aug 69. Two

days were devoted to assembling, launching, and decking the net? triple double

bridge, and on 4 Aug 69, the bridge was complete and opened for traffic.

In September and October, the 2nd Platom became involved in focur )4T6

fixed span operatians. All of these fixed spans were placed over critical points

in key routes and use•i for passing convoys into areas of tactical op3raticns. Thefirst fixed span was a 38 foot 4 inch fixed span airlifted from Di An to tho vic-

inity of XT602341 and installed by A Company. The second bridge, a thirty foot

MAT6 fixed span, was hauled from Di An to Iai Khe, airlifted from Lai I e to the

vicinity of XT862409, and installed by 3 Company. Ch 19 October, 2nd Platoon mov-

ed overland to the vicinity of XT70540 and installed a thirty-eight foot 4 inch

fixed span, and on 20 October, installed a forty-five foot fixed span in the same

general location.

R Compeny'a assault trackway outfit was used extensively during this quart-

er. Several rolls of trackway were laid In base oamps, fire support bases, and

secondary roads. The assalt trackway proved to be useful in the rainy season in

9.9

that it gives a poor road the support nooded to cross military treffio.

In September, the lot Inf Div took over responsibility for the socurity of

the Phu Cucag Bridge loctod at XT607135. E Company sent a 5 man tem with moe

bridge reeotian bwit anq 1 Bctcn Whaler to thie location. The tea-ma missioa vs.

to mauinain, and if neaessary, repair the mine beam that protected the bridge from

water borne mines. These men continued to maintajz the mine boom untJl the end of

September when 3rd Brigade, 82d Airborne assumed reeipcosibility for the bridge.

In previous quarters, I Compeny has sUpported various Infantry Battalians

in riverine uperstms. The boats used t these operations, LTR Half Pantaas,

have been adeouate, but have ma shortccdnitgs. In September, E Company received

ton now 21 foot Konnar Ski Barges to improve its riverine capability. These naw

boats are ocastructed of fiberglass, have dual 40 hp outboard ongin3s for propul-

sico, and a center ocntrol with steering wheel, 1hiottie control, gear control, and

oleotric starter. In September, theoe boats, along with 10 men, were ordered to

move to the Phu Cuong Bridge and begin support of the 2/28th Zif Bn in river opera-

tions. T~ft boats remained with the 2/18th Inf Bn and participated in river search-

8s, river swedps, and night ambushei until the end of September.

E Company was assigned a new river mission in support of the 2/28th Inf Bn

in mid-Soptember. Four Ski boats and 10 men departed the Phv %uong Bridge site

and moved up the Saigon River to Dau Tieng. The mission at this location was to

patrol the Saigon River fronting the 2/28th Inf aM of operatica during daylight

hours, and at night to set up ambushes along likely river crossing pLints. On 3

October 69, uwhe the mission supporting the 2/18th Inf Bn was oampletod at Phu

Ouong, the four rumaining Ski barges were sent north t work in supp oert of the

2/2id (Maeh) laf Ba. Those missions have proved to be suoessful and will probably

.ontinue for iace Unea.

/ di

h. Intelligence and Counter Intelligence:

(1) Daily Intelligence reports from let Inf Div H,9 and Hqs, 3rd J3do are

processed by the Bn S-2, and further dissendnated to subordinate units wdthin this

ocrmand. In addition, local base camp oonmanders provide intelligence data for

elements of the battalion at oase oamps soparted from the Battalion Headquarters.

These reports, along with intelligenco documents from II Field Force and higher

headquarters, are utilized for planning local security requi.rements for engineer

operations.

(2) During the period 20 Jul 69 thru 20 Oct 69, the Ist Engineer Batta-

lion Tunnel Rats participated in numerous search and tunnel eyploraticti operations

within the Ist Inf Div VAAOR. Working with the 984th land Clearing Company, the

Tunnol Rats investigated 15 bunkers and tunnels. The Tunnel Rats then conducted

a joint operation with the 1st Ergineer Battalion Rome Plows during which they

provided timely, on-the-spot bunker and tunnel search Leapabilities. The Tunnel

Rats then teamed with elements of the 2/16th Inf to search and destroy four (4)

Viet Cong base camp areas. This was followed by several operations in support

of 2/28th Inf which resulted in ths exploration of several tunnel and bunker com-

plexes. Finally the Tunnel Rats have recently been in support of 2/2nd Mach.

These operations resulted in the exploration and destruction of several base camp

areas, two (2) major tunnel camp1mms and the investigation of two (2) wells

thought to be entrances. In addition, during this quarter, the Tunnel Rate either

destroyed or evacuated: 7 Ubs of documents, 1 ea 81rm mortar and baseplate, '! eaMm mortar rounds, 19 ea 6Onn mortar romnde, 1ea IPG launcher, 3 Ga RPG rounds,

2 ea •hitcm grenades, 1 ea M-6 hand grenade, 8 ea sticks of ChiCcmm 0-4, 3 ea SYS

rifles, 2 ea K•47 rifles, 400 r(snds of AN amm~itica, I ea COhic. claymore mine,

4ea US claymore vines, 250 lbe of rice, a nmber of tools, cooking utensils, med-

ical suppliea, clothing and wobgear.

SI01

Oe dm~ist3'ati4cbs

(1) As nf 20 n h .ta~nA~fua

O~cumanding Qrficor: LTC Rodney E. Ccox

Executive Officer:s M Lawrnoe E. Mulline

Assistant Diviuion Engineers WJ Dennis J. York

S-Is OPT John W. Nelson, III

8-s OPT Carl Collins

S-3: MU Albert PR Cohan

S-4: OPT James C. Patrick

CO, HHC= OPT Robert T. Hz, .o

C00 A Co: OPT Jackie E. Bippes

CO, B Cot CPT Robert M. Amriso

CO, C Co: CPT Barry J. Cantor

CO, D.Co: OPT Anson F. Thorp

C0, 3 Got OPT James H. Glook

ommand Sergeant Maj or: CSM Herbert E. Nau'na

(2) The overall Battalion enlista strength has been above 100% TCE

authorized level throughout this period. All excess personnel have becn properly

utilized.

(3) Personnel ohanges within this poriod were 275 departees processed out

and 207 replacements processed in. There is a continuing shortage of Engines-

Squad Leaders, MOB: 12B40; Cooks, 94B201 and Medics, 91B20.

d. Paoificatico, Although no projects were undertaken during the quarter as

direct pacification projects, daily mine sweeps and upgrade of road nets within

the let Div 4O has Increased civilian comerce and traffic contributing signifi-

cantly to the pacification effort.

e. Civic Action: Cuntributing to the lot Imt Div intensive civic action

effort, the •attelion participated in a number of projects althotxgh none were of

a lzargo scale, The flattalion Surgeon~ had continuod to conduct kHoduape in Xom

Ai-- an- - ML -lu VilAugoun. Two parties have boon given ror the chi.ldren of Xcn

Xmica during the past three months. Equipment has boon dispatched to Lai Khe Vil-

lage from time to time to improve drainage within the village. Two oulvorts were

emplaced in Iai Khe Village and 150 meters of roadway rebuilt.

Two bridges were constructed by E Co. A fifteen foot fixed span was in-

atalled in Di An Village and a twenty foot trestle bridge was coastructed in Ben

Tri. The timber trestle bridge wan It Cmpany's coantribution to the civic aotion

program in that it was built to make a road in the village passable for looal farm

traffic.

In addition, B Company during the last month of the quarter embarked in

civic actio projects in the Di An District. The most important work involved up-

grading road nets, cutting drainage ditches, and hauling rook and laterite to low

places on the road. Planned for Oct 69 is the onstruction of an 18t1x601 building

to be used as a theater. The bizilding will be located in the market place of Di An

Village.

f, frai]ning During this quarter, training within the Batt43-ion was primarily

presented at Cmnany level. Rae Firing was conducted twice monthly with all TO&E

weapcus a PaIliarization training with CHL.47 1 s for aerial insertion of IZ teams

vae ocnduoted for eleents of D and C Ocmpaies. Most personnel were inexperienc-

ed with the ladder in"rU- cn technique. Faniliarizatic, training for aerial ladd-

xer Inseftia ontinues to Insure that each line oqopaW within the Battalion has

Sexpeincoed poencnel for fnture LZ ,iuuionc.

rn early October, four Comnbat h&froer Vehicles worea obtained. A trainingana fanillizaticgi przs we oonduoteA by Hqs Cmpau fbr all , CV crows. In-

s a'u6•ion nolnded operatian, mainteumes, and firing of-the (CZs. binge firing

was Ocufutatd after Iistrootiai.

/03

r• I

During the quarter. tho Battalion sent 12 porsanel to Long Binh to parti-

cipate in two day olassom on generatcr operation and Mintenanoe. Two allocations

-fo PLL Sckool were obtained and 1st Engineer Battalicn personnel attondod.

4 training team from lat Engineer Battalion is presently training the 18th

4RVN Engineer Battalion at Xuan Loo. The team departed Lai Ihe for Xunn Loo on

30 September 1969 mnd began instruction on 2 October 1969. The team consists of

3 Officers and 3 senior NCO's. Classes are being given in demolitions, rigging,

o(noretot, culvert construction, weapons training with M-16'as and boat operatics

with LTR Half Portons. Six weoi'zs will be required to present the instruction to

all units of the 18th ARM Engineer Battaliou.

Instruction has been well received. The unit has been most cooperative

in assisting the instructire with training aids. Attendance has been good. The

students appear interested, ask questions, and sea to grasp the more difficult

subjects. The only problen stems from the fact that classes take twioe the nortal

time due to the necessary traenslatias.

2. Section 2s Lasons •eaMd - COSmndars Observation. Evaluati o, and

a. Personnels

(1) ,Uerat s The effectiveness, productivety, and moralo of the Bat-

talion Headquarters, Staff Sections, and the elements of the Headquarters Company,

has been greatly increased by assigning guard as a principal duty to two platoons

on•e line company.

valu-tion: The increase in working efficiency by personnel assigned

to this unit, plus the stability of working hours has directly affected the quality

and tht amount of work accomplished by the respective sections. This is ovidn'co

by the improvod vaintnanoo posture of the Battalion.

jjg~g~a_"t That tho Lai Eho guard coawnitmont, continue to be

satisfied by the currently uaod method.

/1

*

(1) Q _ti: Engineer operations are advorely offooted by the lack

of aircraft support for ozmmand ana control and ropair parts roeupply.

f g Ourront airoraft allotment to the 1st Engineer Batta-

licn has boon cn an inonmsistent stand-by basis. lt Ingineor Battalion elemonts

are locatod at a majority of tho fire support basos in the l1t Itf Div TAOR (14

out of 17 at prosent) and the line companies are at three separate locations.

Many of those locations are inasoosntblo oxoopt by air. It roquires two full days

of airoraft timo -to visit all the job sites. The dosirable sittation would be for

tho Battalic Ozo4andor, his staff and the line company o~wanders to visit the

enginoeor work sites daily. In addition, an aircraft is requirod to fly Romo Plow

repair parts to that section's field location.

W s That the 1st Engineer Bhttalion be alocated a UH-ID

helloptor for a rdnium of eight (8) hours station time and four (4) hours blanlo

time on a daily basis.

(2) MIM•: Baokflt1 over culverts during the riru soason is froq-

umtly impossible to stablise, become deeply ratted and impassablo.

f a The uitl i* satumtod, adeqiate oompaction oannot be

aohiuod and the bearing capacity of the soil is easily exoeeded.

&g~ tLU•s Two mothods have been used to solve this problem

HUI matting ]aid crosswise to the roadwy can tIo used to distribute the weight

enough for the soal to oarMy the load. The. second method is to mix cement in the

soil to inoroase the soil$$ bearing strength.

(3) M21tgga, When baoklling aroud double culverts, the- ulverts

get pushed aroumd out of algnumnt.

, The baodl"All eten though ploced slowly is knodking the

ulverts out - of aligumet.

1/,6

SaS Drivo U shaped pickets along the sidos of -tho culv-

erts At an angle so that prossuro is put on the lips of the culvert. Wiring across

the culvert from piokot to picket will hold the culvert in place.

(4) b$ The upgrade ok QL-13 was not begun until the oonditicn

of road approaohed being impassable.

Jj~A Ms The use of 5' minus rock to fill the pot holes and wash-

outs in the highmay proved most satisfactory. Extensive utilization of road grad-

ore to oontimnully shape the road surface was the key to keeping the road passable.

io: In similar situaticns, especially during the mon-

soon seascn, adequate rook supplies should be of primary concern. Ditching and

grading should be accomplished with at least two (2) graders working in an echelon

formation. The graders shou•d limit work within a 500 meter strip and move to next

successive section upon cumpletion. After upgrade has been acocoplished, daily

road patrolling is a must to prevent the road condition from deteriorating.

(5) Os Upgrade of the more permanent FSB's was delayed until

their eonditicns wore desperate.

W a Engineer effort after the monsoon season has begun is

greatly handicapped by the elements.

ASat The more permanent FSB's should be upgraded (culvorts,

ditches, and roeds) prior to the monsoon season an a prograd basis. Much oegi-

neor effort can be saved by constructing drainage structures and interior roads

prior to the monsoon and then allocating sufficient engineer resouroes to maintain

then,

(6) bs C Company conducted (5) LZ missions during the month of

September.

------ •gg: During several of these missions it was necessary for the

LZ team to be inserted by means of a ladder from a hovering Chinook. It was also

iNb

su•u tiat to oefjiieuirty outo 5-shp "-a it, often roauiron moro wh=n ae day. The

effectiveness of bangaloro torpedoes in brush clearing to oxpoeo tho largor troes

to the obla saws or demolition should be emphasised.

:R-• " : All engineer platoons be trained on the assault la-

doe. A -inimum of 12 ain. saws required per team because of the high deadline

rate. Troops should be given added training on the proper use of chain Paws. Two

C1Wino~k are required for initial insertion,, one to-'carry porvonnoJ., tho seconad

for the LZ kit. Sauffioeit quantity and variety of demolitions should be available

so a resupply can be effected after the loader of the LZ team analyzes the LZ and

i 3lasL his demo supply request to fit the situatica, A Chinook should be available

to fly the demo resupply 2 hours after the request is received. Olose qoordinaticn

I v"ntial botwecm the security and the LZ team for meain off cienv' and safety,

A chain saw mechranio is a must.

(7) U n Mines are generally located en the same section of road

tine after time.

Sj - Most mines are not being located with mine detoctors.

Even when found visually detectors frequently fail to show a reading when checked

over the mine. Most mines are found viemully.

A -- , &4aq.g: Since most mines are found visually, the sawe person-

nel should be used i the same road section each day to increase faniliarity with

the area and enhance the detection of any change. In additicun, the sweep should

remove from the road all foreign matter. Old pieces of board, benmboo, straw, etc.

are used both as mine markers and to cenceal slapstick detonators.

(8) O, It is necessary to clear vegetation from perimeter

wire for maximum secuity,

=r " : During the rainy season, growth of grass end bushes bet-

w3on and in ocmoertina and tanglefoot is rapid. Open areas between belts can be

/07

backbladed with a dozer and areas in tanglefoot oan be out. Gruvth inalido ouxcti-

tina most be burned or tho wli removed prior to cutting.

,gts Backblading with a bull dozer is relatively qulok and of-

fective for a month. Cutting is good for about two months as a rule. Rnmoval

of coneertina is eastoful and time ocesuming in relation to the perre.-once of the

grass autting operAtion. An effoctive expedient measuro is the application of die-

Sol fuel with hand pump -wtor type fire oxtinguishors, soaking the area thoroughly

end then setting it aflame. Uhatevor vegetation romains is killed end in a fow

days and the operation is reveated removing the portion initially unburned. This

is also the moet effective method of retarding now growth. A moro lasting solu-

t.•c is the applioation of a high potency, long residual vegetation killer follow-

ed by a buning of the dead grass and briuh.

(9) O, Chain type minebooms are riot durable.

fs The mine boom at the Phu Cuong Bridge is oomposod of

=thy timbers hold together by indi•idbal lengths of steel oable. When one timber

or cable link breaks the ocmpleto boom, is useless. If a cable is extended across

tle o aletg river gap and each timber joined to it indopendently, the feilure of

one timber wuald not cause a complete boom faiwreo. The individual timber can be

r~'pairod oeilyv.

, .Ointinuous cables shou3A be used to support all nine

booms*

(1-0) 2WWC ,.M' When nine booms bave chain link fenoo atta•hod to thom

the river debris which oolloets an it =uses additional stress vidih often oauses

the timbers to break awy from thier able, oennect o s.

Ajia' The i• ml boom at Pih Cumg is connected with chain link

Leart C.-,taohed to the mine boon for tae ptwpoeo o stopping submerged mines from

Z--&Mxng wM3@ +;se boom. rThee *win link fanoes function weli, bt i•oy tend t

stop all trash floating down stream. If this debris is allowed to oollect on the

chain J4nk fenoe, the forco of the wator pushing on it eventually breaks the boom.

Ia I s Mine boom pereannel aboild check mine bows with

ohain link fonoe attached am4 oln it as debris colloots.

(31) M .. •g Ski boat loading shouid be kept to a minimum.

&nuJU ; Ski boats are constructed with a very shallow side board

and bow section. The more perscnnel and eoripment loaded into these boats, the

lover they sit in the water, making it easier for wter to oeo over the side

boards. With a large percentage of the weight in the front, the bow tends to plow

into waves and take on water instowd of riding over the waves.

l Not more than 9 men, preferably 8, and their equip-

ment should be put in these boats at.any one time. All personnel and equipment

should stay as far to the rear as possible.

(12) W$ The operation of Ski boats are designed to oarry a 2000

pound load at high speeds. Without speed, manuverability is poor and oontrol is

difficult. During river patrol missions, it is necessary to earry heavy loads at

relatively slov spoods. As a result, the .boats are difficult to handle and this

difficulty is amplified in rough water. During a 180 degree turn where a boat runs

-bak on its own wake, an inexperienoed operc.tor can easily cause the lovs of a boat

difficulty has also been encountered when meeting or being passed by other boats.

The wakes frcn these boats in a narrow river is enough to sweaz a slow moving

hoeavily loaded ski boat.

Reg~j §&tAM All operators should roeceive thorough training in

Ski 1*oats and their operation before they operate in a hostile wtfrcuient,

(13) O: To operate Ski boats sucessfully, precise formations

and operational patterns must be establishad and followed.

:0

Evaluation: Bocts operate in groups of four at distnooes 'horo voicO

oontrol is often impossible; therefore, control of those boats is ty rp-dio and

handsignals. The boats have va.rious patterns for patrolling the laver and search-

ing the banks. There wore also manouvor pattorns act-up for enay contact and

oriorgoncy situarticns. Infantrymen are assigned fields of fire and observ••tion, and

art, instructed on actions to perform in hazardous situations. It is tho borat op-

orators rosponsibility to brief all personnel on their duties and '7otions in omer-

ganoy situations.

A-- Recunndation: All boats should have written SOP's dealiig with

their operations emnd maneuvers posted in them. All personnel should be briefed

on this informticn prior to the start of a missiin.

(14) 0-s-Antion: During this reporting period, the Tunnel Rats have been

callod out on a number of false alarms or bogus missions when, in actuality, thero

'was no need for them.

-va_.l These "W"3.o alarms" are most likely the result of ccon-

--,enders anticipating a need for the .TwInl Rats prior to locating a tbiel.

Several futile missions have resulted from the ground commanders iability to dis-

tinguish authentic tunnel entrances from natural terrain features, f,ults, or mis-

oellaneous holes in the ground.

RecpLldat : It is recommended that in the future supported units

make positive indentifioation and location of tunnels prior to requesting the

Si Tz-mel Rats.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Ma nbn Lack of aircraeft support has prohibited the S-2 from

maklng a YR of the Divisions MSRIs daily in the early morning hours.

StlEt. g$ It is necessary that timely information be gathered dei-

ly on the condition of MSR's as they are vital to the Divisiont s operc.tions.

n1

Froquently reports of interdiction or washouts, usually through one of the mine

sweop parties, are not reoeived until late in the morning resulting in a loss of

time that could be used in the preparation of equipmont and materials to repair

the interdiction. Convoys have backed up at interdiction points because ocnvuy

oozimmnders did not know that they existed,

:godto It is reommended that an aircraft be made available

for IJ hours for a daily first light reconnaissanoe of all. the MSR~s withiz., r-he

Division AO.

a. Logistioss

(1) gk =o: Repair parts for the P-153 mine deteotct, notably the

short handles and the reoeivor-transmittors wiring harness, are in short supply.

Thaere are genorally 10 to 20 detectors aeadlinod and waiting those parts at any

ý,ivai time,

ftJ•ti: These items be made available in order to keep enough

detectors in operation to enable the Battalion to fulifill its mine swoop commit-

monts,

Sa : All measures be taken to include "Red Ball" and MER

requests to obtain these parts.

• • MERTHE COMKtNNEM

w w. z (msII InAdjutant

/1

CONFIDENTIAL~

HWAMiARTFHS, 1?1'ýT -I -. T tsa jT.~

APO San Fr-ancisco 96345j

AVDB-SI-CO 5 !-')v8mber 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 121st Signal Battalion for Pf-,i!odEnding 31 October 1969, PCS CSLFOR-65 (R1) (U)

n~minding Qvperai.1zt. Infantry Division

xr AVDB-T (MID)~' : F 3634~5

(0) SECTION I, Onrationls: Sig~nificant Activities

aý Tie 121st Signal Battalion continued to eiurrort the 1st InfantryeDivision in Operation Than Thang, ?2-iase 111, 1,7 February 1969 toPres ent.

b. The Forward Area Signal Center Platoons continued to sumpr'rt

brigade forward and base canin command posts.

c. Component Unit Diszncslltions anid Corni-andi-7, Officers:

121st Signal Battalion LTC j3hn C. Ixain Iai M~ehU f PT WinfCield T, Per,- Ia !hCornpa-7 A CPT Rc~ W. M1ace Li 1"T-Com~pany B CPT -tp'A Oliva rbu li.~

1st- Platoon SFC James It. Cobk Dau Tieir-2d Platoon ItLT John Ball Di An3d Platoon ILT. Lloyd D. Nanlu= Lai %'hu

Company C CPT Donald L. Mhil-~odeau Pi An

da The foilowir~g multi1-channel conmmun-iýation systans Nwere establishedor discontinued durirg the reporting period:

1) 12 Aug - System 63A83v established between 3rd Brigade HeAdou;3rtersIin L~ai Mhe and the forward command Dost at Chen Thanh.

2) 10 Aug -S~ystcm 63A-73V discontinued between Iai Khie And Be Cat.

3)19 Aug,- System 61A73V establisfied bene-en 1st BPrigade Headr-uart.rzsin Dau.Tieng and the forward ccmmand Dist at Ben Cat.

2) 25 Aug' -: System 63A83V discontinued.

5) 13 Sep - ýYstem- 62472V! established betw~reen 2d Brigade IFeadcruartersat Di An aod the forward command post ~tPhu Poa Dong.

Incl 11 CONFIDENTIAL

I _j

CONFIDENTIAL61" 23 Sep 6yt3tcm 62ki"2V d-, ý4.ntinrued to Phu I% , .ng and re-

established .romi Di. An~ ---, -Spor-, )- se 4ýrl, J Pl

7) 23 Set)- System-. 61A73V (15-S,~iu~

8) 23 Sop - System 6'3A73V established between 3rd 13rigade Head-q-.iarters -~t Lai Khe and the forward command post at Ben Cat,.

9)) 13 Oct - System 61A71V established from Ist Bri(,gade He,,(quartersDzt-,-. Tiong, to the forwavd. cninmnanc post aL~ Firia Support Bazre Tennessee.

2Co ~ner' s Obs!or'rqtiwaý

a - ,ý

1' Ubser,,,tiors: Th-ý manning of MARS sbationi writh qualified~tisfrom the Signal Batta lion draws from limited resources of soldler,-

i nd in critical ccu ictons MSs

2) Evaluation: Usuailly .. div~diduls withip the Sign~al Bp~ttalica who* p~'s. e the necessary ski:'s educ;atio-z- and moLivation to learn MARS

~;c~:Lo~zhave already been -rraine-1l ±or jrtM .c*uiair cibf3.S' ice tui, O rii can rot 're ,:?fectively daroJ..±,ate~d by uxit on t~he

*;~t- -iring., thcii (2E :ignrnent ais iAhSoperators Mofe unillahic 'xacancoi ein their niLtiI- Chi the ot-her hand, there -ire occasionally individuc.lspoi~scssin'g non-cri-.tical MG-S' s -Ait.hin,- thie -ivision who are ;einer-i &acednaco:radio operat-ors and are --nydous to become i'vIS operators. Some will evenocL.Žnd theicr- overseas -louis in order to obtain the job.

3) Recommendations, To locate qualifiedI operators for MARS st-otas.,aýdvertise throughout tho Dnivision. to lo(.-to irteres-so6 individual! wiic' ,exp~rience -~s am~ateur radio qrporrrtorsQ,

b. ;

1) ObservaK',ions, Lotig tv~anctmissions or- -,,le rodio sctv RT-5524 linerusing corffmunicaýtions security equipment+ T/SC EZ!- ofter -esult in C5

of the latter portion of the message - rushi-1g n-i2sa cn2.y i s hez-,-Q '.y tneroceiving station.

2) aiv Cr. lxg ixrrnsr ---s::1.-.:S, the securitr e2,.,ioment a~ thetransrOtting and reoseiving station do aet comain in syrcolyin 1Therefoze,, the l-atter portion of the tvansmissiot i s not roceivod,ý

3) Recornhendation: When making lor~g transmissions using' the RT-52/4with a K'-. key the transmit-ter appro-rm:ý'dnte evrymnulte to re-synchronizethe security eoquipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

e. "_In. ± Nonr

a • None

g. Oa None ,'.. //

.Z�,1 C. LAINLTC, 30Commanding

/''I

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

I st Military Police Company1ot Infantry Division

APO 96345

AVDB-BMP-D 1 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational, cdL;urtk )f t4e lot Milit.kry Flice.Couipany for thePeriod Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSF(R (RI)

gommanding General1st Infantry DivisionATTN: AVDB-T (M41)APO SF 96345

1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities:

a. General: During the period 1 August through 31 October 1969, the1Ist Military Police Company continued in its mission of providing generalmilitary police support for the 1st Infantry Division and all tenant units.The 1st Military Police Company operates from basecamps located in Di An,Lai Khe, and Dau Tieng. During the reporting period, increased emphasiswas placed on resources control operations and on upgrading PW CollectingPoints. Resources control operations were considerably strengthened bythe assignment of ten XM 706, Armored Cars, more commonly known ,as V-100,Armored Cars, and the alloction of air support which provided the re-source control team certain -.ir-mobile capabilities. The addition of theArmored Cars has provided improved security for military police person-nel and increased the Companyts capability in the performance of convoyescort and security missions.

b. Administration: As of 31 October 1969, the administrative struc-ture of the 1st Military Police Company is as follows: LTC Charles P.Gallagher, Provost Marshal; MA John R. Jolley, Assistant Provost Marshal;CPT James N. Lieteau, Aeting Company Commander; ILT Frederick A. Gertz,_Ecort Ouad £Offtcer; and ISG Sterling d. CarrolU, First Dergeant.

CONFIDENTIALIncl 12 115 un SM AM Iu TM

#![ l~~~inmsil *ll~l

CONFIDENTIAL

= AVDB-MP-D 1 November 1969SUIýjzCT: Operational Report of the Ist 14ilitary Pslice Company for the

Period znding 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR 0I,)

"The Platoon Leaders are:

1st Platoon iLT Daniel L. Jackson2nd Platoon CPT Edward B. Elmore3rd Platoon CPT Janes F. Keefe Jr.4th Platoon SFC Richard F. LewisSecurity Platoon iLT Frederick A. Gertz

c. Operations: The Ist Military Police Company is deployed in di-rect support of Division ,'sadquarters, each Brigade, and Division bupportCommand. The Ist Yilitar7 1olice Platoon, located in Dau Tieng, supportsboth base camp and tactical operations within the 1st Brigade's area ofoperation. The 2nd and 4th MP Platoons operate within the confines ofDi An basecamp and in support of the 2nd Brigade in its area of operation.The 3rd Filitary Police Platoon provides military police support for the3rd Brigade and Lai Khe basecamp. The 5th Military Police Platoon, theSecurity Platoon, provides security for Division Headquarters and the

Tactical Operations Center located in Lai Khe basecamp. In the area ofresource control operations, the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Military ?olice Plat-oons checked over 250,000 individuals and in excess of 60,00 vehiclesmoving within the 1st Infantry Division TAOR. These operations resultedin the detention of 30 individuals, the confiscation of contraband on atleast 50 occassiors, and the return of a Vietnamese National who ralliedto support the GVN. In one instonce, a resource control team confiscateda 40 pound bag of marihuana that was undoubtedly destined for sale to U.S.Forces personnel. With the rice harvest scheduled between November andearly January, it is anticipated that military police personnel will par-ticipate in a program to deny diversion of the crop to the enemy.

d. Personnel: On I August 1969, the 1st Military Police Company had7 cormissioned officers, 2 warrant officers and 202 enlisted personnel.On 31 October 1969 the company had 7 commissioned officers, 2 warrantofficers, dnd 222 enlisted personnel. However, there has been a slightturnover of personnel, with 67 gains and 43 losses, resulting in a netgain of 24 personnel. Officer personnel losses- LTC Christopher R.Haydon, ILT Jeremiah E. Dorsey, ILT Tirmothy D. O'Toole, ILT Joseph G.Monroe, aad ILT Mark k. Gray. Officer personnel gains: LTC Charles P.Gallagher, CPT James N. Lieteau, CPT James F. Keefe, and ILT FredterickA. Gertz. There were 0 KIA and I 4IA dur.ing the reporting peri6d. TheCompany was supported by 7 aRVN Military Policemen and 6 National Pol-icemen. There were 40 out of Country R&R's and 4 in country A&R's grantedduring the reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL- -4

5 CONFIDENTIAL

tAVDB-14P-D 1 November 1969SUBJECT: Operatixnal deport of the let Silitary Police CoLpany for the

Period Znding 31 October 1969, RC3 CSFCR (Rl)

e. Awards and Decorations: During the reporting period 10 BronzeStar Necials, three for Valor, 56 Army Co.nendLt1'on Medals, 3 air Medals,and 1 Purple Heart were awarded to members of this unit.

f. Logistics: The issue of 10 XM 706, Ai•aored Cars to the lst Mil-itary Police Company has directly affected both operaticnal and logisti-cal requirements. While the Armored Car has upgraded the Company's cap-ability for providing security for tactical moverents and personl defense,it also has inposed new burdens in terns of logistical support. The ve-hicle is still characterized as an experimental riodel and resultantly wasphased into the systeia without an adequate ?LL; in certain instances,without the applicable Technical Manuals; and in two cases, missing start-ers, which are critical itera and not readily available in Vietnan.. Con-tinuation of a temporary loan on mission essential itejs has assisted thelogistical operation. Equipment such as N151AIC's, gun-jeeps, were aug-nented into the TO&k. Also, night sighting devices were allocated tothe Ccwpany on a loan basis. Utilization of all equipaent has remainedheavy. Self-help engineer projects have increased. During this period,five new bunkers have been constructed; four inadeouate bunkers havebeen removed; a vehicle washing facility has been constructed; and log-istical administrative procedures have been revised to improve propertyaccountability and serviceability factors for all equipment.2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation,

and Recomendations:

a. Personnel:

Observation: Promotions among the lower enlisted personnel hasimproved considerably, but are still limited.

Evaluation: The required overstrength of personnel in grades E-3and E-4 precludes continual position racancies ("cunulative vacancies")required for promotion allocatims.

Recomiendati : That personnel required as overstrengtb to per-form unit mission not be considered when determining cumulative vacancies.

b. Operations: None

c. Training:

Observati.on: UPon iesuance of the X14 706, qrmored Car, training

CONFIDENTIAL

'I-?

CONFIDENTIAL5AVDB4-D4) I November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Military ?olice Company for the

Period i'nding 31 October 1969, RCS CSFJR (RI)

requirements have increased considerc.bly.

E dhen the Armored Cars were initially issued to thelst 14ilitary Police Company, personnel, then in the Company, and alsopersonnel subsequently joining the Company, were not adequately trainedin the operation, and maintenance of the vehicle. Furthermore, the mainarmament, twin mounted M-73 machineguns, were novel weapons to militarypolicemen. Lack of Mnv]edLe concerning the functional capabilities ofboth the weapons system and the vehicle, itself, has resulted in clutchburnout, transmission damage, uninitiated discharge of the weapons dueto solenoid arc, solenoid burnout due to oil on the electrical connect-ors, control box malfunction due to a faulty electrical harness builtinto the vehicle itself, and finally, culmination of the problem in aninability to resolve these problems by maintenance personnel due to lackof repair parts, knowledge, and applicable Technical Manuals.

Recommendation: That an adequate training program be establishedon Army level for both operation and maintenance instruction for all usersof this vehicle and any other' type equipment sinalarly placed into thelogistic bank.

d. Intellioence: None

e. Logistics:

Observation: The XM-706, Armored Car, was issued with a verylimited PLL/ASL.

Evaluation: At present, repair parts for the V-100, Armored Car,are limited to a minimal PLL and parts that are related to other vehiclespresently used in Vietnam. The usefulness of the vehicle is highly de-preciated in view of the inadequacy of the repair parts system.

Recommendation: Certain prerequisites should be established to

include an adequate repair parts system prior to acceptance o0± any equip-ment innovation. Among other requirements, there should also be bothtrained user personnel and trained repair specialists available beforeacceptance of new type equipment.

f. Organization:

Observation: The 178 ealisted personnel authorized by MTOL 1 9-27Gi is not sufficient to provide effective police service when. the DiviLsion

operates from more than one base camp.

CONFIDENTIAL,//7

I PflUflfl�MTIAIvwIg ,w�,. S S9*��

AVDB-14P-D 1 Nc�ventt�r 1969SUBJECT: Operation �e1ort of the 1st I�ilitary Police Company for the

Period �nding 31 October 1969, RCS C$FOR (Ri)

Evaluation: The company is currently 48 r�n overstrength, a levelthat ha8 been maintained or exceeded since its arrival in I�VN in order

Recomn�ndation: Future TQ� actions shaild include an optionalto n�et operational commitments.provision f�r one aAition�l 1"ilit�ry Police Plat on when the Divisionl4 ilitary Police Company is required to oj�'erate in widely dis�rsed base-camps for ext.ended periods of time. Additionally, jovision should beincluded for a proportionate increase in personnel necessary for logis-tical and administrative support.

*.LTh�AUOPT, IAFOActing Courjiander

I

CONFIDENTIAL

ast Inf Div Cir 527-7

DEPARIFJIM OF WhE ARMYHteadquarters, 1st Infantry Division

APO 9634S

CIN1EAR 28 October 1969UMWER 525-7

(Expires 1 October 1970)

MLITARY OPERATIONS

Utilization of Light Horse

1n. PUMPM: This circular prescribes procedures to insure proper utilizationef Lligt lorse.

2. ORGANIZATION, a. Light Horse will be organized as follows:

(1) One CIC ship/Blood Hound (serves dual capacity).

(2) Two hunter-killer tam.

(3) Three lift ships.

b. There will be no organic infantry elements in Light Horse.

3. GENERAL: a, Light Horse will be employed under the OPCON of a brigadefor lamsp-•e1Tfied number of hours.

b. Comanders of brigades will forward proposals for the use of Light Horsedaily to reach this headquarters, ATrN: AVDB-TO, NLT 1400 on the day prior touse. These proposals will be briefed to the Commanding General who will allo-cate Light Horse for the following day.

c. Light Horse will be employed much as Dark Horse is employed. It iscapable of performing a variety of missions and exploiting any situation whichma develop. It is best suited to conduct reconnaissance of a specific area andto identify targets,

d. Light Horse will not be used to cover the movement of ground forces intoim amea, to accomplish logistical tasks, r- for administrative rissions.

0, LMght Horse will not be used to conduct Eagle Flights. Non-divisionalbeliceptes will be used for this purpose.

f. Commanders of brigades having OPCON of Light Horse will establish aritiv cmpany as a ready reaction force (RRF). One plitoon will be on ISmnimute alert; the remainder of the company will be on 30 minute alert.

Incl 13

1st Inf Div Cil 525-7

4. COG4IThENT OF 1HE RRF: When Light Horse hunter-killer teams or Blood Hound

locate A Wltar orj , ro75 )7 d agq emet, the brigade commander or his designated

representative may decide to Insert the RRF platooll. Command and control will

be axercised by a tactical commander designated by the brigade commander.

(AVDI-TD)• FOR MH OMAER:

FFICIAL: A.G. HUMEColonel, GSChief of Staff

LTC, AGC?Adjutant G

DISTRIBMTI

C

JI

IB-

Ist Inf Div Cir Z5-8

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYHeadquarters, 1st Infantry Division

APO 9634S

CIRCJLAR 28 October 1969NU14BER S2S-8

(Expires I October 1970)

4ILITARY OPERATIONS

Utilization of Night Hawk Aircraft

1. PURPOSE: This circular prescribes procedures to insure the proper utiliza-

tion oM"At Hawk aircraft.

2. ORGANIZATION: a. The Nighhl Hawk force consists of the following assets:

(1) Three UH-I'H aircraft,; och eq••"ed with two mini-guns, two search-lights, and two starlight scopes.

(2) One UH-lH control/chase aircraft.

(3) Two AH-lG/UH-IC chase aircraft.

b. Control of all Night Hawk assets will be the responsibility of theNight Hawk force comander (Vulture 6) who will be present in the controlaircraft.

3. GENERAL: a. Night Hawk teams are designed and missioned to search outand Te-T eneiy forces in the Division TAOR during the hours of darkness.Normally each Night Hawk tern (one Night Hawk ship and one chase ship) willbe employed in a battalion AO for a specified nmber of hours. Night Hawkmissions will be forwarded by the V=OC to the 1st Aviation Battalion opera-tions center.

be Commanders of brigades will forward proposals, including time and jus-tification for use of Night Hawk, to reach this headquarters, ATWN: AVDB-TO,NLT 1200 the day of use. Recommended missions will be briefed to the Comnand-ing General for approval. Requests for diversion of preplanned Night Hawk mis-sions wili be submitted to the ACofS, G3. Night Hawk will not be used for anymission not approved by the Commanding General.

c. Information provided by surveillance devices, such as radars and sensorswill be used to target Night Hawk in areas of known night movement.

d. In the event weather conditions exist that preclude the use of the TVS4 (starlight scope), or that significantly increase the hazard of low altitudenight flying, the Night Hawk team leader will so inform the control ship. The

1st Inf Div Cir S2S-8

Night Hawk force comnder will verify the weather conditions and notify DTOCfor possible employment in another area.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. The ACofS, G3 will:

(1) Consolidate mission requests from the brigades.

(2) Present recommendations to the Commanding General for approval.

(3) Notify the brigades of approved missions in the brigade's area ofoperations.

b. Comanders of brigadas will:

(1) Notify the using unit of &pproved missions,

(2) Insare that coordination has bet effected to allow the Night HaR kteom to be employed immediately after receiving their in-flight or groundbriefing.

(3) Insure recovery of aircraft downed in theIr area of responsibility.

S. The battalion com ander, with whom the Night 11mek team is working, willkeep the DTOC informed of Night Hawk activities through the brigade coamnder.

d. The Commanding Officer, Ist Aviation Battalion will insure debriefing ofeach Night Hawk team leader as soon as the night's missions are complete andwill forward information gained to the ACofS, G2.

e. Each Night Hawk teon leader is responsible to report, by radio, to theACoWS, G3 en route to each mi. sion and on completion of each mission. Addition-ally, he will report all intelligence information to the battalion operationscenter which controls the AO in which his team is operating.

(AVDB-TO)

FOR THE COM4ANDER:

OFFICIAL: A.G. HUMEColonel, GSChief of Staff

C.T. SELBY • TA~

A Adjutant Ge• r

DISTRIBUTION:C

/23

44 tTrI t Inf Div Cir 525-9

DWAR7fThIl CF THE ARMYHeadquartere, lot Infantry Division

APO 96-145

CIRMLARINUN= 525-9 29 October 1969

(xpires i October 1970)

Flame Fougasse

1. PU s This circular provides detailed instructions for thepreparation and use of the fltam fougasse.

2ý Af This circular applies to units having perimeter defensereaspnsibilities.

3* GE AL$s The fougasse is a flame field expedient used to cover relativelylarge areas with floew. It is used to preduce casualties among enempersonnel and/or to provide temporary illuination of the battle area, Thefougasse is semidirectional and will project flame generally along the longaxis of the drum in the direction that the exposed end faces.

4, GONMEPT 2E Mn noY a. Fougaxses my be employed at the coaender'sdiscretion to cover likely avenues of a&reach, such as gullies, ravines,and river beds which are masked from the i tree of organic weapons* Fougassesmust be integrated into the detailed defuan t plan, Pougassee, employedfor the Above purpesep sahuld be placed as indicated in Appendix A..

b. Fougasses may be employed as part of the commander's final protectivefires against massed attacking forces. To obtain the best perimeter coverve,they shoald be placed •ith the drums aligned at a 45 anse to the perimeter,from 2 to 3 msters forward of the imter line of concertina wire (see Appendix 8).Fougasses, constructed of 55 gallon driw, should be placed approximately40-50 meters apart across the area of ceoncerno If all the drum aredetonated simultaneously, this will create a solid wall of f1,me

5. POJLTMTRIOQ a. Prepare a hole for a 55 gallon drum inclihed 360frem the horiznotal oriented in the desired direction of fire, The topof the drum should protrude above the ground as shown in Appendix C.

b. Place three blocks of MT or three blocks of C-4 at the bottom-.enter of the hole. The electrical blasting cap will be seated in theexplosive with the wires leading to the rear of the pesitien, A 4•4WP grenade will be placed on top of the TV or C-4., and secured wit-hthree wraps of deteating cord, A j5 pound shaped charge or two claymoresmay be used with equal effectiveness, Do not wrap the claymores orshaped charges with detenatiM cord. Cap the detaonting card separ4telyif claymares or shaped charges are used.

0'

lot an Div Cir 525-9

c. Fill the 55 gallon dtus with 40 g&Ueno of six per cent thickenedfuel mixture. The thickened fuel is prepAred by adding seven and one-halfpounds of K4 or 15 peun.d of MI thickener to 40 gallons c MOGAS. Afterthe drum is filled, t)he bungs should be replaced to keep out moisture anddebris.

d. After the drum and propelling charge have been set, the drum shouldbe tamped with throe feet of earth or at least three layers of sandbags.Tamping is essential to provide directional control of the explosiveand to reduce dangerous back blast.

e, The claymore firing device is an ideal electrical source for firingthe fougasso with less than 100 feet of lead wire. A stronger electrical2ource is required if the lead mire is longer than 100 feet or if there ismore than one blasting cap.

6ý FHAITMANCE: After placement, the fougasse should remain stable for60-90 days. After this period, the forugasse should be detonated asintended and replaced.

7T, SAFT: a. All fougasses are command detonated using electricalfiring devices. Firing leads should remain shunted to prevent staticelectricity, lightning or high frequency radio waves from prematurelydetonating the fougasse. Electrical sources should never be connectedwhen working around the fougasse.

b, Adequate safety considerations must be given to the havards imposedby the explosive charge used to detonate the fougasseo When fougasses arein close proximty to friendly personnel, additional tamping is recommended.As a rule, fougasses should not be positioned closer than 50 feet from thefighting positions.

8. - VI a. FU 5-139, The Engineer Soldier's H{andbook.

b. FN 7-11, Rifle Company, Infantry, Airborne and Mechanized.

c. FN 2D-33, Combat Plano Operatioits0

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UNCLASSIFIED)____

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA ,'Rk& D(gSOCWIy Cl..il- eel w. olW title, body o1 l .bh cU .d detl n . .loIt I n ... . n t1. o..,oll end i.p., Id I.Iet- -d)

I ORIGINA TING ACTIVITY (Coip"ortlt owtdo) k./ 2 vION I stcUm~t I , LCk ,( i. 1O,

HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310 16 GROUP4

3 REPORT TITLE-

-

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Infantry Division

4. OESCRIPTIVE NOTES (2ype of weitrond Inclusiee doses)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, I Aug t9 to 31 Oct 69.S AUTHOR(SI| (Fltet a& .id e 0.1160, llast ".)

CC, 1st Intantry Division

G REPORT OATE 7A. TOTAL NO OF PAGES Tb NO OF REPS

1 December 1969 132Sm. CONTRACT Of GRANT NO 90. ORIGINATOR'S REPOIRT NUMBERIS)

6. PROJECT No. 694230N/A

C. Ob. OTHER REPORT NOIS) (Any oithernnabeT. Ieht "bey be ess1pied@dIe r,,poI')

10 OIS.TIS.UTION STATEMENT

IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES i12. SPONSORING MILITARY AC.TIVITY

N/A OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

IS. ABSTRACT

130

DD ,...1473 UNCLASSIFIEDsecurfr (j•ssification