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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 15 NOV1969. Other requests shall be referred toOffice of the Adjutant General,Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY30 Nov 1981, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr, 29Apr 1982

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CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310

IN REPLY RIKFR TO

AGDA (M) (13 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694175 18 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters) 3d Brigade,I.. 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

b

SEE DISTRIBUTION

O I. Subject report is forwarded f t review and evaluation in accordanceIlk with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should

'L'% be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 daysO of receipt of covering letter.

2, Information contained in this report is provided to insure. appropriatebenefits in the future from lessons lear.ned during curtent operations and

Smay be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDEIR OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

I. IncI 6ý1 InclROBERT Eo'L CSs ~Colonel, /

Acting The Adjutant GeneralDI STRIBUTION:.ommanding Generals

US Continental Army CommnondUS Army Combat Developments CommandUS Army Materiel Command

CommandantsUS Army War CollegeUS Army Command and General Staff CollegeUS Army Armor SchoolUS Army Aviation SchoolUS Army Chemical SchoolUS Army Combat Surveillance schoolUS Army Electronic Warfare SchoolUS Army Engineer School ,Regraded unclassified when separatedUS Army Field Artillery School 'from classified inclosure.US Army Infantry SchoolUS Army Institute for Military AssistanceUS Army Medical Field Service School

CONFIDENTIAL-

CONFIDENTIAL

TAbLE. CF COITEIMTS (U)3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV ORLL

PARAGRAPH PAGE

1.Satvion 1. Signf9inant Oragin~jn./Unt Artvitimaa. Introduction a 1,. Organization b 1c. Personnel and Administration c 4

-- d. .1'6 lligence d 4e. Operaxions e 12f. Trainj• f .19g. Logistics g 20h. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs h 22i. Engineer Support i 25J. Signal Support J 26k. AxaWy Aviation k 271. Chemical Operations 1 28

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Obsg ja,Evaluation, and Recomaendation.a. Personnel a 30b. Operations b 31c. Training c 37

-d. Intelligence d 38e. Logistics e 38f. Organization f 39g. Other g 40

TABLE OF COITENTS3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV ORLL

Inclosurcs Incl1. 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division 1

a.. Organization Y

b.. Task Organization and Locati6na-2. Aoster of Key eierooiiael 23. Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) 34. Personnel and Administration Data 45. Enemy Unit Locations .56. Combat Statistics 67. G3 Air Operational Support Chart 78. 2nd Battalion 4th Field Artillery PRLL 89. 99th CS Support Battalion ORLL 9

Regraded unclassified when separatedSfrom classified Inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

nnuo1 mnrLnTI AIrL rUrfI.n I IML

j OBLE Or WTElT' (COI;T)3D BDL, 9TH INrF DIV ORLL

Inclosures Incl10. 571st Engineer Company OPL 1O11. 56th Signal Company ORLIo 1112. 483d Military Police Platoon OWLL 1213. Air Cushion Vehicle Unit ORLL 13

* The 3d Brigade ORLL for the last reporting period covered only two months(May and June) due to the redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division. Therefore,this 3d Brigade ORLL will cover four months(July, August, September, and October).

I I

r CONFIDENTIAL

"CONV-1I DENTIA L

DEPARTMIT ,)Y M AM4AMDQUAR=ZZS, 3D MRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO San FIaneico 96371

AVBB-MH 15 November 1969SUJEMT: Operational Report of 3d ,rigade, 9th Infantry DivioIonj for' Period

aiding 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R:) (U)

Comnr,,dinu, ooncrrl, )5th Infantry Division AflN: AVI)C-Mli, APO 96225Caovwrncing Geaor~l, United States Army Vietnam, ATTNh AVHGG (DST), AnO 96375Commanding General, United States Army Pacifiop ATTM: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

a.(C) .D~4j:

(1) During the reporting period, I July 1969-31 October 1969, tho 3dBrigade, 9th Infantry Division continued operations in long An Province and theborder areas of the three adjacent provinces; Hau Nghia, Gia Dinh, Lnd DinhThuong. The brigade headquarters remained located at Tan An. As in the previousreporting period the 3d Brigade continued to participate in Operation ToanThang (Phase III). The objective of Operation Toan Thang III (Complete Victory)is to seek out the eemny with aggressive combined operations to prevent his em-ployaent of men and equipment.

(2) The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was involved in combat duringevery day (123) of this reporting period.

(1) W to the redeployment of the lot and 2d Brigadies of tug 9th InfantryDivision, the 3d Brigade was reorganized as a separate brigade on 20 July 1969.The following units were relieved from the 9th Infantry Division and assignedto the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, vader the provisions of USARV G0 2434,dated 6 July 1969, effective 20 July 1969s

MpC, 3d Bde, 9th Infantry Division

2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mechanized)

6th Batta:Li=, 31st Infantry

2nd Battalion, ,6M Infauby' DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

' 'o DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.0 7- V ToD DiR 5200.0

Inc iosure C-ON FU)ENTIAL

1J

CONFiDENTiAL•JJB•N1115 Novomber 1969

SUBJECT: Oporational Report of 3d rigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Per9odZding 31 October 1969, RCS CSF0R-65 (Ri) (U)

5th Battalion, 60th Infantry

2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery

39th Chemical Detachment

19th Publio Information Detachment

19t% Military History Detacent

264"lh Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

45tb Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

United States Army Air Cushion Vehicle Unit, Republic of Vietnam

(2) Additionally the following nits were provisionally organized and assignedto the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division under the provisions of USARV GO 2434dated 6 July 1969, effective 20 July 1969:

____V11 AGG

Composite Service Support Ba (Prov) 41 1 9 490 541

Headquarters and Headquartern Dot (Prow) 12 1 53 66

Company A (Prov) 12 3 177 192

Company B (PFrov) 9 5 184 198

Company C (Prov) a 1 76 85

Engineer Company (Prov) 5 160 165

Signal Company (Prov) 3 99 102

Militar7 Police Platoon (Prov) 1 39 40

M?%4 Radar Detachment (Prov) 1 7 8

Infantry Platoon (Combat Tracker) (Prov) 10 10

Company, Infantry (Ranger) (Prov) 2 59 61

Military Intelligence Dot (Prov) 9 2 21 32

2

* CONFIDENTIAL

I(ONFIDUNTItIL

AVbB-M.H 15 govrr'rJcr 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Peri odDidcing 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

(3) Additionally, Headquarterb aud Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade 9th InfantryDivision wao provisionally reorganizo', un'(er provisions of ITSATP V Gf' 2.3/ datcd 6July 1969, oi'rk-tive x July 1969, The unit war organised under iTC'j 77-102T!AC 2/68. Sti.ongth 7iuthorization is as follows:

OFF Ea 0 A GG

40 8 155 203

(4) Due to the aircraft configuration (four LOH's and four IJX-IH's) a sixtecnman augmentation to the Brigade Aviation Section was approved, per USARV letterunder 11TOE 77-102T.

(5) The 3d Battalion 7th Inf, 199 LIB which came under the operational controlof the 3d Bde on 2 June 1969, maintained this status when the brigade was re-organized.

(6) On 20 July 1969, the 3d Bde placed the 6th Battalion 31st Infantry underthe operatioxal control of the 9th Infantry Division,

(7) On 26 July 1969, the 9th Inf Div released operational control of the 3dide to the Commanding General, II FFORTCEV, who in turn placed the 3d 2<do uxulOrthe operatioial control of the Co;mnanding General, 25th Inf Division.

(8) On 31 August 1969, 3d Bn, 7th Inf 199 LIB was released from operationn'lcontrol of the 3d Bde and returned to operational control of the 199th LIBwithin its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR).

(9) On 31 August 1969, the 6th Bn, 31st Inf was released from operabion3tlcontrol of the 9th Infantry Division and moved from Dong Tam to Con (0iouc,Long An Province, where it once again cams under the operational control ofthe 3d Bde,

(10) HHO 3d Bde, 9th Iuf Div, provisionaliy reorganized during the period20 July 69 to 1 Oct 69, was reorganized under the provisions of USAPPAC GO705 dated 24 September 1969, effeqtive I October 1969. There were no changesin strength authorization.

(11) Effective 1 October 1969, USARPAC GO 705, dated 24 September 1969granted authority to activate and organize the following units with manningstrengths as indicated:

56th Signal Comp.Wy 3 0 99 102

3

O0N RIDENTIA L

E NIM - i D f_- N -1-JJ)L15 November 1969

61UBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for PeriodZnding 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

571st Engineer Company 5 160 165

99th CS Support Bn 42 9 493 544

483d Military Pollce Platoon 1 39 40

65th Infantry Detach 10 10(Combat Trackers'

Co E (Ranger) 75th Inf 2 59 61

493rd Military Intelligence Det 9 2 21 32

276th Artillery Detach 1 8 9(MPQ-4 Radar)

(12) Organizational Structure - Inal 1

(13) Roster of Key Personnel - Incl 2

(14) Bde TAOI - Inal 3

c. (C) Persnnel and Ad3itnijstUtjto

(1) The redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division and the concurrent re-organization of the 3d Brigade into a separate light infantry brigade increasedthe complexity of personnel and administrative procedures. Since the neworganization is so different from the Brigade organization during the previousreporting period, no attempt has been made to compare statistics.

(2) Genoral Data: Se, Inclosure 4 for information and statistics concerningthe following:

(a) Maintenance of Unit Strength.(b) Personnel Management.(c) Developr.ent and Maintenance of lMorade.(d) ' -pntenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(1) Discussion:

(a) General: Enemy activity in Li An Province during this reportingperiod continued the decline which marked the two week p, riod imnediately fol-lowing the announcement of rodeployment of two brigades of the 9th Infantry

¶r-iion. T-,enpr, f-- sze, - - 4-n -- tt..rnt, l01i lw0.'-1 -- "!- 1r-

C- F) D EN - ALS,,.K

AVBB-7 15 Novomber 1969S7bBJECT; Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th InfantryDvsooreid

Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

fire against isolated targets of opportunity and conducted cporadic operation.a~e at pacifi zsation efforts. Infiltration -.ctivity 'chcd r je.•1 duringihe nonth of August (with the attempted infiltration of the N serie*s uits, the308th Bn a•nd the 267th Bn), Succetisful interdiction efforts by friendly forcescontributed to a subsequent lull in enemyv !Xiltrýrion activity during the monthof September,

Captured doemients and prisoaer ofwar reports obtained during the latterhalf of August and the month of September indicated that enemy units had brokendown into groups of 20 - 30 men, with some further divided into 3 -4 UaM cells.Unit missions were reportedly as follows:

j. Avoid contact.

SPwait resupply and replacoments.

•. Conduct limited anti-pacification operations.

A,. Prepare for future offensive uperations.

During the 3e..ter half of October, a significant increase in enemy activityoccurred,. Intelligence indicators point to possible preparations for a nation-wide offencive. Key cadre from enemy units havo reportedly been sent to Pa Thuand increased contacts are occurring along known enemy lines of comriunica-Jon.It is anticipated that should such an offensive occur, it would probably beduring the middle of November,

(b) Julyi Activity during the month of July was sporadic and general)y oflow intensJty., On 3 July, D-2/60 engaged elements of the 308th Dn iuoving intosouthern Ben !ie District (vic XS 596726). The contact resultcd "n 17 VC -A(BC) and 1 AK-47 captured, On 21 July, A-5/60, operatin(, vicin`-ty . 635704,received SA/AW fire from 2 -3 VC in a bunker. The contact expanded, evonturdl'-'resu2ting in 11 VC KIA (BC), Documents found in the contact area ideri,.1:f"the K4 Bal, lst NVA Regiment,

(c) August: The month of August witnessed increased enemy attempts at unitinfiltration into Long An Province. On 3 August, 5/60 elements operating vicinityXS 345943, engaged eletients cf the 308th Bn. Results of the contact were 2?- VCKIA (BC), 4 prisoners of war, and 6 individual weapons captured. On 4 Auku:;t,Recon 2/47 captured 3 prisonArs of war from C2 Co, 267th MF Bn, vicinity X"..490694. The prisoners otwr- tated C2 "it Was infiltrating i nto Long An Province,and would shortly be joined L> the reminder of the battalion. On 16 .4ugst,B-5/60 captrted 5 prisoners of war in a contact vicinity XS 685726 resultingin 12 VC/NJVA KIA (BC). The prisoners identified the Cl1 Co, N-15 En and statedthat the unit was withdrawing to Ba Thu beca of heavy casual1ties sufferedduring the months of July and August.

5C gONP IDEN'TI/L

-• =--

;UNHILN I IALAVBB-,'.ii 15 November 1969SUBJ"MCT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period

'd-iaig 31 October 1969, RCS CSFQR-65 (RI) (LI)

On 24 August, Ranger Team 16 engaged an estimated 10 VC, resulting in 5 VC.. (SC) �-nd 2 individual weapons and documents captured. The documents iaent-.

ified ona of the UIA's as Senior Colonel Hal Trom, Asstistant Chairman, Peoole'sRevolutionary Party, Long An Province0

On 31 .uzu•u• 1-2/60 contacted an element of taoe 14 B. vicinity X3 643696,The engagemiont resulted in 12 VC KIA (BC),

',d) `eptermberi inemy activity reached its lowest point in thif' -eportingpariod during the month of Septembero Again enemy operationr3 were characto3rized.by !itited attacks by fire, Infiltration activity appeared to decroase signLfi-cwnt2y. Intelligence reports from 25th Infantry Division, later confirred byprison.?r of war interrogation, located the 267th Bn in Tay Ninh Province, Sub-sequent reports also located the majority of the 308th Ba in Ba Thu

On 17 September, A-5/60 supported by B-3/17 engaged an estimated VC squadvicinity XS 665735. The contact resulted in 23 VC KIA (BC) and 3 individualweapons and 3 detainees captured. The detainees identified the K4 Bn. On 26Cepte-moer, A-6/31 engaged an estimated 2 VC platoons of the 520th Bn vicnity"X^ 746639° Results of the contact were 24 VW KTA (BC) and 3 individual weaconscaptured.

(e) October, During the month of October there was a markod increase inen'eiy activity throughout the 3d Brigade TAOIL This increace primarily took theform of incrdased movement along major lines of communicationo This wouldindicate infiltration and resupply activity° Limited attr.cL by fire, harass-,mnt ar4 anti-pacification operations continued at approximately the sarmelevel vs during the previous months of the reporting period, However, there%•'•'rno sigalficant contacts during the month,

During the latter half of the month, intelligence indicated that the enezV

mray be preparing for a nation-wide offensive, possibly beginning in mid-November.

(2) Enemy Order of Battle:

From I July through 31 October, the VC/NVA combat effet-tiveness deteaio--.stcd significantly. In particular, the enemy experienced severe problems inresupply of personnel and equipment to combat units, Generally, Long "n Pro-vj nee '1eur Lervice failed to maintain a high level of combat effic5 ency, Thcist Tnd '"MA Regiment, specifically the X4 -&nd 706 Eattalions, was the m,):t -CcI' eunit An Toaa An vrovince, 0ccol Force CorpanieG in lonrg An ?rovin-.e ccn.t.A.. 'to employ standard gur,!rilla tactics and continurd to avoid contact

DN-inx,- ear.y July, enemy initiated activities continued at a relw•ivelylow le-odl in spi%.e of indications of major attacks. Documents captrued on

CSCONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL,3-Yi 15 novoi"-- 1969

.... K0�.Oe•e otional R port of 3d Er!rade, 9th Tnfantry !;ivi.ion, for Periodinding 31 October 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

8 July in the vicinity of XS 722647 by B-2/60 contained e letter from HQcadre of the 211th Sapper •', Bn to the C2 Sapper Company telling them tor•con Rich Kien Base Camp and the District Chief's house. The document alsocontained a recon map of Can Duoc City.

Documonts captured in the vicinity of XS 555815 on 12 July identified the267th MF Bn and stated that C3/267th Bn had participated in the 12 •ay attackoa Mu Thua City and that there would be a summer attack on Thu Thua City,flo'vever, after returning to Ba Thu, Cambodia, the 267th MF Bn made a suddenchange in AO and since 10 September it has been operating in the vicinityof XS 3316. Since 10 September there have been several contacts with thisunit. PWs confirwed that the 267th MF Bn is targeted against FZ)B Rittgers,•which is atrategically located along a VC/NVA infiltration route into TayNinh Province.

The 308th MF Ba was contacted on 3 August in the vicinity of XS 345914.PWs capturwed said that they were to find a base camp in Thu Thua Districtand wait for the rest of the batta3ion which they were to communicate withby radio. However, the 308th Bn is still hold to be in Pa Thu, Cambodia.

The 6th MF Bn, after avoiding contact for a prolonged period, was con-tacted on 25 August in the vicinity of XS 650909. This was a move slightlyto the north for the battalion. its present AO in the vicinity of XS 6590,is outside of Long An Province and loaves no Main Force unit in the long Anportion of SR2. Documents captured on 25 August and 9 September indicatedthat the 6th Bn was now armed with 1O07m and 122rm rockets with a missionof harassing radar stations by fire.

Z•.. subordinate battalions of the 1st Tnd TI-A Regiment have been greatlyreduced in comcaz effectiveness and aro generally avoiding contact. On 17September, 5/60 contacted the K4 INTA Pn in the vicinity of XS 665735. Thiscontact resulted in 21. NVA KIA (BC) and 2 PWs. On 16 September, 4/50 ARVNRegiment contacted the K6 NVA Bn in the vicinity of XS 613595 killing 14NVA and capturing 4 PWs.

The lst Long An MF Bn was contacted frequently through ?Ws. In itspresent AO of eastern Can Giuoc (D), the unit encountered severe resupplyp-oblems. According to PU interrogations, the battalion wms reorganizedilto bix groups, with orders to remain dispersed and to avoid contact.

The 520-th N1 Bn has been contacted only once significantly. On 26 Sep-tember, in the vic:inity of XS 746639, 6/31 killed 24 VC/hVA who were ident-ified as members of the 5Oth MIP Un.

7

CONFIDENTIAL

,ONr-IDEM'F)AtL

AVBB-I-M 15 Noverat-3r 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period


Tne Deng Phu. 2d Long An and 265th Battalions are presently understrengthand experiencing severe rear service problems. As a result, these Main ForceBattalions are dispersed and avoiding contact.

The Local Force Companies of Long An (P) remained out of significant contactwith one exc•-ption. On 21 August, the 367th RF Company contacted the Cl Can DuocLFC resulting in 4 VC KIA and 11 PWso Generally, Local Force Companies wzerefairly successful :in avoiding contact. Because of their low strength, thesecompanies have beea relegated to guiding Main Force Units and emplacing boobytraps,

111-IT STRENGTH LATJ,- aQL,,0N COODMIT~r

6th 11- Bn 210 NVA/VC 12 Oct PW Southern Duc Hoa XS 6590"267th YF En 350 NVA/VC 19 Oct HC Lower Lngels Wing XT 331638th MF En 175 N'A/VC 3 Aug PW Ba Thu, Cambodia Ea Thu

C1 Ben Thu LFC 40 NVA/VC 1 May HC Eagles Beak XS 585775C2 Ben Thu LFC 30 VC 3 Jun HC W of Ven Co Dong R XS 5074C3 Ren Thu ILC 35 VC 8 Sep A W of Vam Co Tay R XS 4868Long Am City F 30 VC 30 Sep HN South of Tan An XS 5461lot Long An M5. Bn 150 NVA/VC 23 Oct PW Eastern Can Giuoc XS 58722d L-vnr, Ln ME Bn 200 NVA/VC 21 Oct PW Weastern Can Giuoc XS 7970jd Ar•ty N' En 150 -TY.A/VC 15 Oct FW Dispersed in SR3 Dispersed in S R3?2i Sapner VE Bn 150 NVA/VC 25 Oct H1 Dispersed in SK3 Dispersed in SR3265th 1142 Bn 60 NVA/VC 8 Sep PW Eastern Can Giuoc XS 8870520th 1- 3a 175 NVA/VC 26 Sep Con Northern Can Giuoc XS 74630313 Chau Thanh LFC 40 VC 16 Sep HC Binh Phuoc XS 6458C314 Tan Tru LFC 29 VC 14 Oct PW Central Tan Tru XS 6364^2 Tan Tru LFC 28 VC 28 Aug PW Southern Tan Tru XS 6963.1 Can Duoc LFC 8 VC 15 Oct Doe Central Can Duoc XS 7662C2 Can Duoc LFC 15 VC 15 Oct Doe Southern Rach Kien XS 7170Cl Can Giuoc LFr 15 VC 26 Aug PW Western Can Giuoc XS 7671

K4 NVA Bn 200 NVA 25 Oct PW Rach Kien (D) XS 6671K5 NVA Bn 260 NVA 31 Aug PW Tan Tru (D) KXS 5970K6 NVA Bn 200 NVA 13 Oct Doc Binh Phuoc (D) "XS 6060

(3) Discussion of Enemy Techniques and Tactics:

During this reporting period there has been a significant d'-.creasa in thenumber of enemy initiated incidents over the previous reporting period. Briefperiods of enemy initiated incidents did occur throughout the latter half ofthe reporting period, however, these periods were of a uniformly low level

8

" "-DA

CONFIDENTIALS15 :o'ev ihr 1969

,.%1JJ. "•T: Ceretional Report of 3d F.iigade, 9th infantr-y Division, for Periodtnding 31 October 190), RCS C3F0PR-65 (01) (U)

and did not significantly affect the overall trend.

The decrease of enemy initiated activity reflected the tendency of enemywnits to disperse into 20 - 40 men group, (some were u'rther divided into 3-5 man cells), with the missions of avoiding contact snd awaiting resupply andreplceDents.

1,Arin& the month of September, enemy movement along known lines of com--munication increased heavily. The sizo of enemy units contacted along thoseroutes gonorally varied from 3 - 15 men. This increased movement and theaccorpanying low level of enemy initiated incidents would tend to indicatethat the enemy is in the process of strengthening itself for future offensiveactions.

(4) Recapitulation of Enemy Losses:

399 352 451 391:.¢tainees 79 84 124. 75

"'28-cz 3 0 7 50/3 'Spns 2 3 8 10S/A 72 75 101 63

Z". AmiMo 269 159 234 117.iUnes 87 322 105 108Grain 1.0 ton .013 ton .0725 ton 4.88 tonoR npans 28 41 19 14Structures 30 29 67 40Punkors 271 438 645 455

(5) intelligence Sources anQ Agencies:

,a) jrogro3s against the VIet Cong a-tructure (VCI) by the CI•e.ctions, 9th 11 Det, (now 493th '1I Det) hao continued. VX! U•raets, as theywere developed, were passod to brigade F.adquarters or other action agencies.The CI pas-ed 41 V%3 targets to this headquarters during the reporting period.

(b) The Division Interrog.-tion Ssction processed a total of 356dot,..nzs di•-ing the reporting period. Of this total, 132 were classified_rAocc.-t Civilians, 129 were clas:ified Civil Defenkuts, 67 ware c1asified

• •Z 2 ere cl ssied Hoi han•n'. •,I additicnr) tho section proc.-!sed217 b~tcheo of captured doc'rents, of "-hich 20 wtre of tuctichl vAtiq. '7esection nJ.eo procec•ed anproximately 600 poundo of captured material, con-sisting pmi, liy of C. 't-ire Vist Cong veapons, clothing, and equipment.

9

CONFIDENTIAL

CoNIP! DENTr/AL15 November 1969

31UBJ:CT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for periodaiding 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

(6) Significant Activities and New Techniques in the Area of AerialReconnaissance and Ground Sensors:

(a) Aerial Reconnaissance: The Imagery Interpretation Section,consistent with its basic mission, accomplished the following during thereporting period:

1 201 aerial photographic missions were recAived, processed andplotted, From these missions, a total of 47 photc interpretation reports wereprepared and distributed.

, A total of 141 Red Faze sorties and II SUAP so-tVos werereceIvod, ro-al out •nd their re:.its dissemi.ated

TIn response to specific requests, this sectirn prepar3d 8photo mosaics, 15 special target overlays, 1 agricultural overlay, 1 trailoverlay, 1 population overlay, and flew 4 aerial photographic missions.

& 121 photographic missions have been cut and packaged withfield plots for dissemination to 3d Brigade elements, while 120 other photographicmissions with field plots were disseminated to 7th ARVN Infantry Division.

(b) Ground Sensors: The 3d Brigade's Duffel Bag Program, now in itssecond quarter has increased from 7 strings of 39 sensors to 11 strings of 42sensors, Authorized strength for the sensor platoon is 1 officer and 17 enlistedmen, The platoon is divided into a Headquarters Section of 1 officer and 2enlisted men and three Monitoring Sections of 7, 4, and 4 men each.

During the reporting period 532 personnel and 7 sampans weredetected from 114 target activations. Eighty-six targets were reacted to byartil] ery elements.

(c) New Techniques: Two new types of sensors are presently beingevaluated by 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division Sensor Platoon, The PatrolSeismic Intrusion Device is being tested for use by infantry partols inpatrol base or ambush position; The Passive Infrared Intrusion Detector isbeing tested on waterways. The device is activated when a continous infra-redbeam is broken.

(7) Weather and Terrain- During the reporting period monsoonml rain-falls have dominated the weather picture, While wet weather and soggy ter-rain has had little adverse effect on either friendly or enemy operations,early morning overcast skies impose some limitations on the Brigade s nightand airmobile operations.

10

D ",FN L

.. /i~ I -N I I/A\L.

AVBB-Ya 15 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period


(8) Enemy Capabilities, Vul.neabilities and Posrible Courses of Action:

(a) The enemy has tne capability to:

1. Conduct attacks on Province and District seats, other majorcities, and military installations.

•, Conduct brief attacko by fire, hida his equipment, and with-draw from the area prior to employment of countermortar techniques.

2. Conduct att-xcks by fire and harassment on towns, villages,hamlets, outposts ard other installations.

1. Conduct sniper and terrorist attacks on key bridges, roads,RD projects, and population areas.

.. Defend base areas and positions with local security forces

and reinforce within a four kilometer radius.

6. Disperse major units into platoon and squad size elements.

2. Withdraw and disperse easily.

•. Wage political and psychological warfare on the populace and.hold control of any area where there is no friendly security at night.

(b) The enemy is vulnerable to:

1. Loss of support of the population.

2. Friendly superior artillery and air power.

•. Interdiction of the Lines of Ccmmunicstion (LOC) and loss ofcached supplies.

A. Disclosure or capture of attack plans.

5. Detection by friendly surveillance devices.

J. A breakdown in his infrastructure by aggressive allied actions.

'Z. A lack of combat effective troops and a low morale due toheavy casualtice and desertions.

11Q... :IDE.N--m]L.

~ii~~eA ::~z::::u COA.14 lDi:i ::::C f od n

AVBB-MH 1.5 November 1969L ai-JEECT: Operf:tlonal Report of 3d B~rigade, 9th InatDvson,, for Period

wounds

Endig 31Octoer 0,69 RC' CSR-65(RI)ain

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-n thins waith dmphais ng tecrusti andpoining pehiosuppo rtioadte .cncaj.epoplaenine ontesatidnsrs i n additihn t oo wittempingte mzuvrnattamion. o2f6inf,5-6 10c., 2-47o efforts, hep enemy Ifur, inte-7:nsfied haing conty tou betaitalons~o ftoera hc r under its dperatiooal conro enet hns been-

(2)gThe ln a evainl of~ncd h enemy'so'esv activity duain derae infcnl i h ath~reportinZr period. was charycterizntdnuy his rassment ofd outortgamningtiofnoasmlzi eltnswithempuse s of rpecrunits. n inngtespot f'b o~

(3ic in~rbg conestedboarea, Inanddithateipeatoonotiu to ateetn ththeriinro2~Gad 's priciplatonef tatis frkepn the enemy onV--) thes ed disefeorsi to eta3dC gaon c.:Iloftne tooeara Vhcnuc alrge undmer ofi dombineoeation henmyas witeeRn

a(3'1 jfltt Drurig, Chctoerbor, a00 Bushmoaster odcedcmi operations cniu ob h

12Ccc) IDTI

SCON F ID LN-T 1k) L 15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for PeriodEnding 31 Cctober 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

with elements of the 3d Brigade, an increase of 75 percent over September'stota1. These operations have served as an excellent trainsig vehicle for theGVN forces. Many ARVN and RF units have learned air mobiling techniques andcan now conduct those operations well. Previously, !,RVN units conducted onlycompany size ambush patrols at night. However, on recont ambush patrols they havebeen saturating areas at night with platoonrize and smaller ambush patrols, Inaddition, the RF units are now conducting extended operationa of 48 to 72 hours,?revi"--ly, R? unit operations were of a short duration and close to home.Thez improvements are important and have been given impetus through theexample of combined operations.

(4) During the reporting period the brigade's combined operations programextended into anothei area0 At the end of the reporting period, the 50thRegirent and the 2-60 Inf established a Combined Operations Center at tho 2-60lnf base camp in Tan Tru District. It is hopod that this innovation will resultin better coordination in the selectio. of targets, facilitate the coordinationof AOs, aid in the dissemination of intelligence, and accelerate the pacificationeffort.

(5) In late September and early October it was noticed that night operationswithin the brigade's Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) were becoming moreproductive. Contacts were increasing and enemy body count was rising. Inaddition, friendly casualties were significantly less during night operations.The enemy had fragmented, was avoiding contact, and had become extremelyelusive. Only airmobile operations were successful during the daytime. Itbecame apparent that US forces must also fragment and place increased emphasison night operations, for the enemy was moving only at night,

(6) In an attempt to exploit this situation, the brigade decided to employat least 65 percent of its combat platoons at night. Units were directed toemploy no larger than half platoon size ambush patrols. By satursting areaswith many small sm'Lush patrols, the probability for contact increased. Theresrits during Octooer were encouraging. Fifty three percent of oper'tions duringkhe month wore ri ght operations. "Howe"vtr, si.`y-oae percent of t-. c

;:i;Xt:-six percent of the body count a" ,,i-ty -erconL o' ý ,e f veoponr c,3,Lu-',-.Vel'e s:t night. No friArdly soldiers -.ere k.:VIe-3 2t i , ('r. o,.> V•.•-t,,

percent -f the fr.!.cndly wounded oc,;ured a. night. More time is needed beforeccnciusive xesu.1ts can be evaluated, however, it is hoped this favorable trent"w-.ll continue.

(") in spite of the shift to night operations, air mobile operations remlainedt the same level of intensity. The Br.iegade CoAvmnder continuf,d the n.aa•k level

whilb increasing night operations since both netted the ba-.st results in termsof body count and lower friendly casualties, It is significant to note how-ever, that approximately 60 percent of the kills were made by the light fire

-13

C FD h NF)A L

ICONFIDENTIAL

15 November 1969U3JECT: Cperational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period

Eading 31 Octobewr 1969, ROS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

t•ams and assault helicopter gunships in Lluport of the ground elements. Followinginsertion, the cncrmy evading from the target area is more easily detected fromt.e air. Once .ushed, he is quickly eliminated by the supporting gunships.

(8) The successes in Long An Province during the reporting period have beenlargely due to the proper blending of the three techniques emphasized; nightoperations, air mobile operations and combined operations.

(9)

(a) On 0113294 July, gunships from 240th Assault Helicopter Company (AIiC)operating 1 Km North of Ben Luc, vicinity XS 639785 engaged 5 VC w1th organicweapons, resulting in 5 VC KBA (BC), At 1345H in the saone area, the 24tV- 4iCopcounted for one more VC KB' (BC), At 1125 D/5-60 inf supported bý 240th AEC

-. g Yd 2 Vs t .h sa. location resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). The gunships fromLhe 240th AHC Killled 2 additional enemy in the contact area five minutes later,Cne ?ri• pistol .-as captured by D/5-60 Inf, Iu another contact that day at 2320HRCON'/5-60 •Lif engaged an estimated 10-12 VC with organic weapons 9 vicinity XS727655. The 4.2 mortar Plt/5-60 Inf provided illumination, This contact result-ed in seven VC KIA (BC) and three AK47Vs, one M-16, and six 75mm rounds captur.I•On 020205H July D/2-60 Inf was engaged by an unknown size VC Force with SA, AWOand B-40 fire, vicinity XS 679652. The contact resulted in four U0 WIA and one1.3er Scout WIA, At 1135H vicinity XS 665813, A/5-60 Inf supported by the 240thuhiC and B/3-17 Cavalry (Cay) engaged an unmknown size VC force killing two of the

enemy. The 2YOth SAHC accounted for four VC KBA (BC) while B/3-17 Cav killedone VC KBA (BC,, In addition, 2 AK47s, 2 LK47 magazines, and 1000 rounds AX47a:,munition were centured by A/5-60. On 031235H July, vicinity XS 654826 approx-ir..tely six .1m Noc Lh East of Ben Luc, D/2-60 Inf received SA and AW fi-q from

an estimated VC platoon. Fire was returned with organic weapons and Ta.,. Airand a light fire team (LFT) supported. D/2-60 Inf sustained two US KIi and oneUS wounded, At 1255H B/3-17 Cay gunships engaged and killed two VO KBA (BC),The contact continued 'chroughout the afternoon, At 1407H? D Company accountedfcr. two more of the -iemy, and at 1425H, B/3-17 Cay killed an additional threeVC KBA (BC). At 15GMuA, D/260 Inf still in sporadic contact sustained one USKIA and one US WIA, When the enemy broke contact at 1905H', D/2-60 had killedfo-ur more VC and B/3-17 Cay had killed two more of the enemy. Friendly casual-ties for the contact totaled three US KIA and two US WIA,. Enemy losses weret4n VC KBA (BC) (8 by B/3-17 Cav, 2 by Tac Air) and seven VC KIA (BC) by D/2-60Inf. On 051230H July, vicinity XS 411875, B/3-17 Cay engaged with organicweapons five VC, resulting in five VC KBA (BC). Sporadic contact continued iurnti.'1425H with B/3-17 Cav killing seven more VC KBA (BC). Ranger Team 21 was insert-c.l! into the contact area at 1325H killing one VC and capturing 10 AK47s, one 'aCarbine, one M2 Carbine, one RPG-2 Rocket Launcher (RL), fivw RPG-2 rounds, .IRG-7 rounds, one pair of binoculars? one K-63 Chicom radio, three Chicom gr.a

nades, and eight sets of web gear. On 052130H, July vicinity XS 633552, five

14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALation-l •9 15 Nrmber 1969

.,;nrational Feport of 3d Brigaie, 9th Infantry Divisionp for PeriodEnding 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

1ý. SE of Binh Phouc, Recon/2-47 Inf (M) engaged one VC with organic wecpons,resulting in one VO KIA (BC), The contact coatinued until 2352h with US artil-le-y and a LFT supporting, The results of the contact werrc one US MtA, one USW!A, and nino VC KIA (BCO. Two A7To were captiwred, On 10103511 July, vicinityX3 333961 A/5-60 Inf receivmd SA and AW fire from an unknown size VC force, Firew.s ret=unued with organic weapons vhile US Artillery, Tac Air, B/3-17 Cav and24Oth ARGC -,uships supported. One. UH-10 was shot down and heavily damaged. 'Whenthe enemy b-oke contact at 15001 friendly casualties were three WA and enemylosses were unknown, At 1540H, A/5-60 Inf once again came under fire from anunknovn number of VC, The VC broke contact at 1600H w3th unknown enemy lozses.At 172Hý vicinity XS 335962, a B/3-17 Cav OH-6A received one R-G-2round froman unktnon,, number of VC, The aircraft was downed and heavily damaged, Therewtte two US WiPL, D/5-60 was inserted into the contact area to secure the air-crypt and at 19301H received AW fire from an unknown size VC force. Fire wasretu•ntd and the VC broke contact innadiately, The contactresiated in one US•XA and unknown VC losses. On 11 July at 1215H, D/2-60 ln.' engaged tvo VO inthe same area resulting in two VC KIA (BC). At the sme uoca-tinn airstrikekilled threo VO at 1325H,, wh-ile B/3-17 Cav engaged and killtd one more VG,-'4esping the contact area D/5-60 Inf found two VC KILA (BC) (by Arty) froi. tho

day before and one damaged 60mm mortar tube. At 143011, the 240th AHC engagedand killed one rmore VC KBA (MC). On 121400 July, vicinity XS 709602, D/2-60irJ!. engaged one VC wit: organic ,eapons, resulting in ons VC KIU (BC), Contactwith t', energy continued for one h~our, resulting in eight VC KIP, (BC), Therewr* no US casualties. On 211220H July, vicinity XS 635704, A/5-60 10f rocaiwvdSt sand AlW fire from an estimated 3-4 VC in bunkers, The fire was ret-rned withorganic weapons, while US Arty) Tac Air, B/3-17 CRy, rnd th, 240th 'L;KC gunshipssupported. The enemy broke contact at 1225H. Friendly casualties were twowounded, while anemy casualties totaled seven VC KBA (BC) and three VC KIA (BC),At 1650H, A/5-60 inf regained contact and killed two more of tho enamy, Capturedene-!y equipment included one I.Kd7, two R2G-seven RL, two RPG-2 rounds, and asmall amotuit of doctuments. On 222130H, vicinity XS 522758, Ranger Team 14

engagad 6-7 VC in sampans resulting in six VO KIA, and two sanpans destroyed,Cno R-1G-2L, onre US 1ý426 grenade, one steel helmet, and a small aruount of 'webgear were captured.

(b) On 03120011 Auguat, B/3-17 CsY engaged and killed 1 WQ, (KBP) (B')vicinity XS 345943, At the same location A/5-60 Lif sustained 2 US wounded at1240H, when enla-.;'ed by an uninown numbor of VC, Fporadiu contact continued unitl1700H. US casualttes totaled 2 WIll. B/3-17 Cay accounted for 16 7C Ž•3 (Bo)A/5-60 I1f killed 5 of the enemy and R/5-60 Inf killed 1 VC, In addition, 5detainees, 5 A+471al0 ' SKS; 1 Rf-G-2 RL, 42 RPG-2 rounds, 1 P-P- light =chint gun(L•G), ed 1 Chicom type 63 radio were captu-ed. On 1609401} 'u~st, vicinityXS 685726, a B/3-17 Cav OH-6A received SA and AW fire from an estiamted VC platoon."The fire was returned with organic 'Jeapons, resulting in 3 VC KBA f BC). At102511, B/5-60 Inf working vicinity XS 685735, was engaged by an e, 'imated VCsquad. The fire was retirned and the enemy broke oentaot immediately, There

SC D15

CONFIDENTIAL

ICONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-:o 15 November 1969.... e9-h Infantry Division, for Pe-rioSU~X•CT: Oper~ationa•l Report o£ 3d Brigade, 9hIfnr ii•ofrPr

"-1nding 31 October 1969, 11CS C3FOR.65 (RI) (U)

were no US caaualties and enemy lossoe wcre unknowjý: Howevr 2 Hoi Chanharallied to US forces, At 1330119 B/5-60 Inf engaged and killed 5 VC. Sporadicccntact continued "initl 1545-1-, Total firondly casualties were 1 Tiger Scout WIA,:hno.y losses stood at 8 VC KIA (BC) and ., VC XBA (BC,, On 18150011 August, vicinity::s 633 ll 240th AHC engaged 3 VC with orgazic weapons resulting in 3 VC XBA(BC), At 15/i H in the same location, B/3-17 Car in support of B/5-60 Tnf

c,'a• 4 VC, A'•uitg in 4 VC KBA (BC", and 2 LX473 c~ptured, At th'• swrt4a! the 5-60 Inf CIicia-d and Control helicoptoez engaiod i VC vicinity XJi 63/1 1,r,<2J.. in 1 VC XBA (DC), On 20110211 august, vicinity XS 7606M87 at, a~r,;tr!Žo-e:~te~d in 6 VC KB,." (BC), T;, the same location five minutes later• B/3-i7 Cay

w:ith organic woaponz engaged , VC resulting in 1 VC Xlk. (BC), Shortly thereafterC/'3..7 adjusted arty onto 1 VC in the same location, The results were 1 VC KIA(BC), At 18451i; C/3-7 Inf operaiing in tho sBae vicir;,ty adjusted artillery fireonco an unknown numaber of VC resulting in 4 VI V (BC;. Ot 241005F Auvgutvicinity XS 3638639 B/3-17 Cay engaged 4 VC resulting in I VC KBA (BC), RangerTram 16 was inserted into the contact area at 1315H and engaged an estimatedsquad of VO while B/3-1 7 Car supported. Tha Ranger. accouMted for 2 VC KIA(sC) whils B/3-17 Cay killed 3 more of the enemy, Five AK47su one K.54 pisto!2,n z sml! amount of documents qa're capturcd, The information contained inthe docu;ent:; along with visual indontification confirmed that one of theenony 1IA~s was Senior Colonel Hai Tram, Political Commander of SR-3. On291035H AugusL, vicinity XS 545595; the 240th AIiC supporting A and C/2-..& Inifengagod with organic weapons 5 VIC resulting in 5 VC KBA (BC), At 11iOH, A/2-60engaged and killed one of the enemy, and captured one K-54 pistol, Five minuteslater C/2-60 Inf accounted for 2 more VC, Sporadic contqct continued until 1335Hwhen the VC broke contact, Results of this contact were A VC KIA (BC) aMd 5 V"KBA (BC). In another aa-ea, vicinity XS 63371's D/2-60 Xnf initiated contact at1I35K when they killed 3 VC, Sporadic contact continueý until 1600H, In additionto k.:.lling 2 of the enemy, D/2-60 Inf uncovered a sizeable cache- it contained24 Ri-G-2 rounds, 19 107=m rocket morxars, 2 107mm rocket warheads, 34 YCG-2boosters, 2 anti-tank mines,, and 6500 1X47 rounds, On 311315'i August; vicinltyX3 654690, A/2-60 Inf engaged and killed one VC, The 240th AHC in supportof A/2-60 Inf killed onc VC in the same area at 13251L At the same timo the C&0A/2-60 Inf engaged one VC resulting in 1 VC KBA (BC), At 1513H vicinity XS 652690A Company engaged 2 VO with organic weapons, This resulted in 2 VC KIA (BC).Sporadic contact continued until 1740H. Results for the actions were 8 VC XIA(BIC) and 4 VC KBA (BC).

(c) On 123.650H September, vicinity XS 579568, R/2-47 found fresh grave

16

COFIENIAL

II

Ui2, .J... T: Operit. onal Report of 3d i 7 ` Tnf -.r',ry D•,vi-,in, fo" aeriodY:nding 31 October 1969, R1'S CFj'.-65 (tI) (U)

sites containing 22 VC bodies. F'uri .er investigation revealed that on 7 Scpelmoents of 2-60 Inf and 2-47 Inf contacted an unknown size AuO:yv force i'n thisec,-ca with unknown results, Because of the nature of the wounds oil t"14 16ic

nd the locations of the xavu site, 2-47 is creditod with 11 VC KIA )nd2-60 is credited with 11 1,C KIA (BC). On 2520,00H Septcrber, vicinity XS 635715,J,5-60 Inf with orgnic w•.pons, engaged an estimated squad of VW. The enamyi=adiately returned fire and shortly thereafter broke contact. Friendly cas-ualties were two US WIA and one Tiger Scout WIA. Enemy losses were .l1 VC KIA(BC), one RIED, two AY47s, nine B40s rounds, 20 Giicom grenades, threo AK47ntgazines and a small amount of documents. On 17072011 September, vicinity XS

6,5735, A/5-60 Inf apprehended one malo detaineo, Seven minutes lather the 5-.60inf LOIU engaged two VC resulting in one VC KBx• (BC)o At 074311, A/5-60 Inf killedone VC NIA (BC), The contact was supported by artillery and B/3-17 Cav. B/5.-60Tmf was Inserzed into the area and contact continued until 1315H. Results wereone US KIA and one US T.IA, Snemy cazualties totaled 18 VC killed. The 3d Bdesuffered tho loss of the Brigade Commander, Colonel Dale J. Crittenberger thatd**:, w.ioa his Co-mand and Control helicopter collided with a Cobra gunship whileIlying over the 5-60 Inf contact. A total of 12 US were killed in the accident.At 1500H on 18 September, vicinity XS 647710 C/2-60 Inf found 12 VC KIA VThese were credited to the Artillery frou an eariler contact. On 261540H Sept-ember, vicinity XS 746639, A/6-31 inf engaged an estimated tuo VC platoons.Gunshipa from 240th AHC fired in support. The VC returned fire with SA and AW.Coatact continued until 1750H. A/6-31 Inf sustained two US WIA and thr-e TigerScouts WIk.A Enemy losses were 24 killed, with one AU-7, one M-16, and ono BAR'bein-g captured.

(d) On 041120H Oct, vicinity XS 612923, the 190th AHC engaged three VCresulting in three VC KBA (BC)., A/5-60 Inf was inserted into the coutact areaand captured two AK47s, four rifle grenades, three unknown type grenade&, 4Orounds of AK47 ammunition., and a small amount of documents. At 132011, whiesweeping the same areac, A/5-60 Inf engaged and killed an additional three VC.One AK47 was also captured. Sporadic contact continued throughout the afternoonwith S/3-17 Cav killing two more of the enemy and A/5-60 accounting for two KIA(BC), On 11204511 Oct, vicinity XS 590789, R/5-60 ir" with organic weaponsengaged an estimated enemy platoon, ArtJ llery and Navy LIT supported. The VCreturned fire with SA and AW breakina contct at 2100H. Th6 results of the con-tact were nine VC KI (BC) and n friendly -'asualtieso On .180115H Octobey-,D/6-.31 Ia. engaged an estimated VC squad aith organic weapons, Me coutacnt wassupported by the 3d Brigade aviation elemeit and a Na.y 1,;M_ The Nary LIK9accounted for one VC KBA (BC) while B/6-31 Inf killed six of the enemy-, capturedsix A•47s, and deatreyad. two aampans. At 0655EH viciilty XS ,67687, RangerTeam 14 engaged nine VC resulting in nino VC KTA ID'). Two of th- VC were kil-led by snipers. At 2052H1, vicinity XS 591788, R/5-60 Inf wacmcdg with thoVietnamese Navy engaged with organic weapoas 20 VO, US Artillery supportedthe contact. Results.were nine VC KIA (BC), with the 5/60 Iuf snipers

17

N TAVBD-M.• 15 •.'ovb1r 1969

6UBJECT: Operational Rleport of 3d ,Brigade, 9th Infantry DivLimn, f.r Feriod-Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

accounting for three of the enemy, Scattered contact throughoutthe Brigade TAOIthat 3ey produced a total of 37 VC KIA (BC), and two VC KBA (BC), On 23220OH,1ctober, vicinity XS 639541p B/2-47 engagyd with organie o eapons an estimatedsquad of VC. B!3-17 Car supported the contactt A swelp of the contact arearevea.led ton VC KIA (BC)o Therc were no friendly casualties. On 2C0714H Oct,vicinity XS 05283 C/2-47 Inf received small arms and sniper fire from anestimated three V0. The fire wanC returned reselting in two VC KIA (BC) and one"CK47capturedo In the same area at ion5oneC/2-47 sustained one US cIAb tineeoS 9W!m and one Tiander ocout WIA fro a cweaymore mine dooby trap. Thin initiateda s(poradic contact that lasted until 1610H. The contact was supported by TaAir. The results -. the contact were seven VC KIA (EC) and two VC KBA (WC).

In scattered coe.&Act teroughout the TAOI that day Brigade sppots killed 33 of theensmy. On 291415H Oct, vicinity XS 700613, B/3-17 Ca rin support of D/2-60 Infengaged and killed ore VC KBA (BC)u This initiated a sporadic contact thatlasted until 1730H, D/2-6U Inf accounted for eight VC KIA (BC), while u/3-17Cav killed four of the enemy. In addition one PW, one AK4c, one M1 carbine,one 9enm pistol and r o Thioom radios were aapoured.

(10) ,'iq S1n0L .cJJi'3

(a) Artillery Support:

2, Brigade Artillery firing elements continued to support brigade operat-ions in sion An, Hau ng hia, Gia Dinh, and Dinh Tuong Provinces, Fire supportwas abso provided for GRVN units, Civilian irregular Defense Groups, and RegionalForce1/Popularceam Doring the reporting period a Combined Fire SupportCoordination Cpnter (CFSoin ) was establiohede 'ame ChlSCo is designed to coordinateall fire support asseto within Cong An G ovinpou provide complet target clear-aince, evaluate and coordinate all training progrt-ns to upgrade ARVN Artillery.

The li/TPS-25 radar was eMloyed as an integral spport of the overall Brigade planto search andidetecnt o pe s, pe along majsor infiltration roules and deepinto enemy bass areas. The AN/TPS-25 was also used as part of a coordinatedteam designed to seek out and engA-e tha VC at night.

2. Artillery, while under the control of 3d Brigade fired a total of

4,540 missiong expboking a total of 126,258 rounds during the reporting period.

I-

%b) Helicopter Gunship Support;

1. During the reporting period Troop B/3-17 Cav was in d~rect support ofthe brig-ado, providing an average of seven armned helicopters per day. This sup-port consisted of four AHIG Cobra Gunships., four OH6A LOHs, and three UKIHslicks on a daily basis, Missions included support for 3d Bde units in contact,aerial displacement of supplies,, people sniffer operations, defoliation missionsscreening and blocking operations,. aerial reconnaissance, ranger insertions,

18

(L_6 ENF1-

AVBB- CONFIDENTIAL15 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigadi, 9th Infantry Division, for Period

Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Ri) (U)

ranger parakeet flights and ranger extractions. While in support of the 3d Bdeduring the reporting period B/3-17 Ca. flew 7,813 hours, and accounted for 191VC KBA (BC).

2. 3d Bde elements also received gunships support from the US Navy locateaat Pen Luc, Binh Thuy, and Ma Be. The US Navy supported elements of the 3d Bdeon a mission basis with a light fire team (LFT).

(c) Tactical Air Support: A chart reflecting ordanance expended and resultaobtained by Tac Air in support of 3d Brigade units attached as Inclosure 7.

(d) Strategic Air Support: There were no B52 strikes conducted ln supportof the 3d B(.e during the reporting period.

(e) (C) Training:

(1) During the reporting period, the following trait ng was conductedwithin the 3d Brigade, 9th Infant'-y Division:

(a) Replacement Training(b) Battalion Refresher Training(c) In - Country Specialized Training

(2) Replacement training consists of five days of orientation andintensified training in many of the skills necessary to prepare an individualfcr combat duty in Vietnam. The Go Devil Academy, a provisional organizationwithin this command, conducted all replacement trainirg during this quarter.The academy completed an organized and well coordinated move from Long Tam tTan It Airfield during the month of August 1969. New classroom facilities#barracks, and training areas were constructed to house cadre and incomingpersonnel, Currently, plans have been formiulated for construction of a niwrange facility, which is expected to be completed in the near future. Thisrange will be used for instruction on weapons familiarzation, quick Idill tech-niques, grenade throwing., demolitions and explosives training, and instructionon mines and booby traps. Additionally, action is being coordinated to securea piece of land, adjoining Tan An Base Camp, for use in water safety and rivercrossing techniques. The following table shows the number of replacementpersonnel trained during the reporting period:

July 60 400Aug 40 110Sep 39 384Oct 35 89

19

CONFIDENTIAL

AV'1>-ýiH 15 November 1969SUBJ.!T; Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for ?eriod

Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (71)

(3) Battalion Refresher training continued to be conducted by all subord-

inate maneuver units of this command. The primary emphasis was placed on train-ing replacement pers.onnel in those subjects of interest to the Battalion Commander.By continuous trairing and command supervision, all replacement personnel aregiven periodic praictical training in combat related subjects. Commanders arerequired to conduc'o such training to give practical experience to those replace-

ment personnel .. o have been trained in a non-combat MOS.

(4) The Brigade Sniper Training Program continued to produce highly qualifiedsnipers for employment throughout Long An Province, All brigade snipers weretrained at the 25th Infantry Divis on sniper school located at Cu Chi, RVNoDuring the reporting period a total of 19 Porsonnel were trained as snipers°Additionally, from 26 July 1969 to 31 October 1969, snipers accounted for 47enemy eliminated in Long An Province° A total of 39 Kills were attained atnight utilizing a starlight scope. Presently, the Brigade is authorized 36sniper weapons, which are allocated on the basis of eight per maneuver battalionan• :our to the Ranger Company° The brigade sniper -prgram will continue toaccelerate as selected personnel are properly trained and utilized during alloperations.

(5) Beginning in mid - October allocations for the Combat Leaders Courseand several specialist classes were received from the 25th Infantry Division,To date personnel from all battalions and separate companies have sent personneltn tha follow#,g courses offered ct Cu Chi, RVN,

(a) Generator Operator Course(b) Generator Operator Supervisors Course

(c) Small Arms Course(d) Moss Management Course(e) Explosives and Demolitions Course(f) Helicopter Load Preparation Course(g) Combat Leaaersnip Course

In addition, several personnel have been sent to the 1st Signal Bde for techin-cal instructions on radar, signal communications, and audio-visual classes.This headquarters has continued to send qualified Ranger personnel to the MACV

.Recondo School at Nha Tranp, and also to the Phoenix Orientation Course (Intel-ligence g3 thering) at Vung Tau . It has firther been found that consolidationof transportation req..rements at Brigade level, will allow for proper schedul-ing and movement of personnel to and from In-Country school locations,

g. (C) Logistics:

(1) General

20

CONt-I D 2 TIP1L

AVBB-ON Ti 15 Novenber 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Divi•'on, for Period

Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (PI) (U)

(a) The logistical mission of providing planning, guidance, and supportfor a,2 organic, attached unitsunitsander the operational contr(.l of the 3dIriga~e, 9th Infantry Division was accomplished by the Brigade S4 during ther ~or';ng period° The major tactical units supported were five land based bat-talions.

(b) W.en the 3. Brgad• was raorganized as a separate brigade on 20 July1969, a prov'sional support battalion, later designated the 99th CS Support Bat-talions, was organized in Dong Tam to support th e brigado During the later partof August "he Support Battalion displaced to the Tan An Airfield and beganoperationso

(2) Supply:

(a) 3d Brigade units drew supplies from Dong Tam until the SupportBattalion began operations at Tan An, Airfield0 Supplies were then drawn a'follows:

I Class Is All units drew from Class I Point, Tan An Airfield except

the 6th Bn, 31st Infantry, which drew from Camp Davis, Saigon.

SClass II: Brigade Supply office, Tan An Airfield°,

2Ilass III: Retail point at Tan An Airfield.

SClass IV: Material Release Expediters (MRE) yard at Loig Binh Depot.

5 Class V- 3d Ordnance Battalion, Long Binh,

SRepaifr parts are provided through B Corpany, 99th CS Support Bat-talion locat-zd at Ben LWce

(b) A roaru/refuel point for helicopters was established at Rach Kicnin order to conserve blade hours There is an additional reazm/refuel pointlocated at the Tan An Airfield,

(c) Water points operated by the 82nd Engineer Co (Water Supply) arein use at each of the battalion base cemps and at Brigade lieadquarters locatedat Tan An Airfield. This has helped to reduce transportation requirements.

(3) Maintenance:

(a) Maintenance operations continued on a high level during the perioddespite the reorganization of the brigade, The maintenance company at Ben Lucmoved into a compound vacated by a redeploying engineer company° This area was

21

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTI AL

AVB2,-MH 15 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Pe,.±od


more suiteble and allowed a more efficient operation for direct support maint-enancroG

(b) Roadside spot checks have not been conducted during the period dueto the. reorganization° However, each unit received a pre-CMMI in order to helpthoe p-.-pare for the CI241 which will be conducted during the next reportingperiod,

(c) Throughout the reporting period, 3d Brigade continued to ha'vc oneof the lower deadline rates in the command, This has been the result of commandemphasis on maintenance operations at all levels.

(4) Transportation; Organic transportation has been adequate to meetlimited tactical movement and mostadministm$vW requirements of the Brigade.One incident necessitated the use of non-organic transportation. The bridgein Binh Due between Tan An and Tan Tru, was destroyed by enemy sapper-s, cuttingoff the 2d Bn, 60th Infantry's supply route. The 25th Inf Div furnished ,"H47helicopters to air-lift supplies into Tan Tru while the bridge was rebuilt bythe 3d Brigade Engineer Company0 CH47's were also used two or three days eachweek in support of major Brigade tactical moves into the Plain of Reeds.

h. (C) Psvchological Onerations and Civil Affairs:

(1) Psychological Operations:

(a) The 3d Bde PSYOP efforts have been concentrated on supporting theaccelrated Pacification Campaign (APC) in Long An Province, The objectivesof PSYOP during the reporting period have been;

I To strengthen the GVN image and foster respect for the capabilitiesof the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)

2 To give maximum exposure and credit to the GVY partir,-patIon inpacification and development in order to ident.fy improvements with the qVN,

STo impress the civilian population, as vell as the enemy, withthe combined strength of RVNAF and Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMAF).

STo convince the encmy that defeat Is near, and that the onlyalternative to complete defeat is for him to rally to the GVN.

5. To create dissention between the VC and the NVA by exploitingpersonality differences.

J To convince the civilian population that the pacification anddevelopment program is an expression of the response of the GVN to the needs

22Cbi'-1bE~A/L

I

AVBB-I.i 15 November 1969SUBJECT: Operatione-. Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period

EndJng 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

of the people and that th:•ir support and cooperation art essential to the successof the progran.

(b) The major themes during the period were: Chiea Hoi, GVN image, ARVNimage, Third Party Inducement, Voluntary Informant Program (VI), and familytree. In addition, a large portion of the PSYOP effort was directed towardexplaining the secondary road project in Long An and soliciting popular supportand cooperation.

(c) Increased emphasis has been pltted on conducting PSYOP In conjunctianwith normal tactical snd Civic Action activities. Toward accomplishing thismission, ae-ial leaflet drops v~re incorporated into aerial reconnaissance,Comma.nd and Control 11isoions (C&C), and rosnpply flights0 In addition, aconpact 500-watt loudspeakct system was Oevised which can be used from a lightobservation helicopter, Bullhorns were extremely useful when used in conjunctionwith nornal tactical and military civic action operations.

(d) Summary of PSYOP activities (1 July - 31 Oct 69)

JUDPAM pEAFIETS

TPE HOURS TARGET AUDIENCE TYPE NUMBER TARGET AbDIENCE

.70 GROUND 581.625 1 229

(2) Civil t.fairs:

(a) Throughout the reporting period the Brigade's civil affairs effortshave been aimed at complementing and supplementing the GVN pacification and dev-elopment program. Close coordination and cooperation was maintained with theS5, Long An Province, Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS),Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), and the 4th Civil Affairs(CAy Platoono In addition, battalions maintained coordination with the S5'sof their respective districts° This intricate coordination was necessary inorder to insure a uniform application of civil affairs activities throughoutthe province, prevent duplication of effort, and place emphasis in specificareas.

(b) The civic action objectives for the period were:

I To improve the living conditions of the Vietnamase people, thusremoving their cause for dissatisfaction, and in turn, providing a foundationfor pacification and development,

23CLo .F .I DE NTI A L.

I0ON"ýý )F-N.T) A L

AVBB-M4H 15 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period

Ending 31 October 1969; RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

2To improve the relationz between the US armed forces and tho civilianpopulation,

2 To gain and maintain the support of the people for the GVN.

(c) Toward meeting the above objectives, increased emphasis was placed onmedical treatment of the needy . As a result, during this period over 550 moreYEDCAP•s were conducted than during the last reporting period. Additionally,53,000 more people vere treated in comparison with the last reporting period.The total number treated was 106,729. The number of MILCAP programs were asfollows:

NITTCAP M RDCAP DENITC..

136 638 783 23

(d) Civic action Activities also included construction nrolects toimprove the living conditions and transportation routes within Long An Province.These programs were targeted for short duration - high impact results. Ninetypercent of these projects were joint US - Vietnamese ventures, with the US forcessupplying materials and technical guidance, and the Vietnamese providing thelabor force. The following is a list of projects completed during this period.

-IROJE'a UILT OR RE-PAIRED

. DWellings 29

2 Roads 91 KM

. Bridges 4

SSchools 5

SOther 7 (4 culverts, 1 church, 1 orphanage, 1 hospital)

(e) The following is a list of construction materials distributed through-out Long An Province during the reporting period.

1 Cement 3,000 lbs

2 Tin 462 sheets

. Lumber 8,015 board feet

SOther 2,796 lbs

24AOi-FI D E N- IAL

SON` PDENT-)A LAVBB-MH 15 Novemlar 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, "or Period


(M) During the conduct of MII•AP's, the teams distributed 1ýuribus healthitems and commodities. The following itoms were distrubuted during this period.

SHealth and School kits - 2,059

2 Foodstuffs - 7,155 lbs

SSoap - 2,174 bars

4 Clothing - 562 lbs

SOther - 2,007 lbs (to include candy, balloons, rat traps, GVN flags, etr.)

g)Thirty-two English Pronounciatiot classes were conducted with a total

enrollment of 200 students. Training continues for two female tiger scouts tobecome nurses' aides to assist with MILCAPas.

Wh Units of this brigade have continued to arrange for corrective surgery

for needy children at Cho Ray Hospital and amputees at the National Rehabilitationinstitute. The following operatious and treatmentr were performed during thereporting period.

i Cleft pallet correction3 - 11

SArtificial limbs - 5

2 Polio or paralysis treatment - 5i° .!ýr Sunport:

(I) The redeployment of the 1 st and 2nd Brigade of the 9th Inf' ntry Divisionand the reorganJ zation of the ?rd Brigade into a separate brigade in Ju2y 69 imposedan immediate requirement for massive construction to support the brigade'sexpansion. A request was submitted for authorization to construct approximately100,000 square feet of facilities. The request was immediately approved and theproject was divided into two phases. Phase one called for the construction ofapproximately 70,000 square feet of facilities by 25 August 1969. During PhaseI the followiz.i structures were completed: Ten BEQs, three BOQs, three admin-istrative buildings, one warehouse, one mess hall, and numerous showers andlatrines. Phase II construction commenced on 26 August 1969. Since that timetwo warehouses, and one BOQ have been constructed. Construction yet to becompleted includes two BEQs and two administrative buildings, There is noset completion date for Phase II. As of 31 October 19691 14,000 square feetof facilit.es out of the original 100.000 remain to be construoted.

25CONfiELyNTIAL

AVBB-MH :'"i, November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for PeriodEndingý 31 October 1969, RCS C8POR-65 (RI) (U)

(2" In addition to the vertical constraction requirements, the 20th4ngineer Brigade was asked to provide minimum essential requirements (aR)at Tan An Airfield. This AM consisted of Soil Stabilization, hardstands,roads, and adequate drainage. The intense rains of The Soutwest monsocnhaopered these, efforts, but with the anoroaching dry season thi:h pork willproceed rapidly. Several operational Support construction tasks were requestedand approved prior to the reorganization, and are still scheduled to b's accomp-lished during the dry season, These tasks include obtaining earth fill withwaich to build a rearm/refuel facility, a hoverlane. aircraft pariing areasfor both fixed wing and rotary aircraft, with reverments, and a berm aroundnorthern portion of the perimeter, An operational support mission to constructa 60' x 120' concrete pad, to support the relocation of the Air CushionVehicles (ACVs) from Dong Ta% to Ben Luc, was approved. However, constcructionhas - &nntinuously dpl•ved and this project is presently scheduled for 'r-

accomplishments in early November.

(3) During the period the 3rd Brigade and Long An Province officials beganto plan for the opening and upgrading of critical secondary roads in Long AnProvince. This secondary road program was designed to improve tactical oper-ations and support the pacifcation program. An integrated priority list ofroads required was submitted to II Field Forces for approval. The II FieldForce then assigned sections of the program to four different-constructionagencies; the 20th Engineer Brigade, 30th ARVN Engineer Group, the SeabeeDetachment, and the 571st Engineer Comapny, proportionate to their capabilities.Actions were taken to acquire sand, laterite and rock in sufficient quantitiesto.,support the construction agencies in their plamning rxd scheduling. In orderto solicit local support for the secondary road program, civic action personnel,from the 3d Brigade and Long An Province prepared leaflets in conjunction withthe pacification program and additional leaflets describing road maintenancehints for distribution along the secondary roads. Work has begun on nine 6fthe twenty-five roads in the secondary road program and continuous coordinationnas been made to adjust priorities to meet ever-changing needs within theProvince,: Current schedules show that the entire program can be accomplishedby 15 June 1970.

J. Sia,:nal Simnport:

(I) During the first 20 days of JuLy i969, the 3rd Brigade wao still asubordinate unit assigned to the 9th infantry Division, thus, the BrigadeSigrsal Orficer'a only f'unction was to advise the Brigade Commander on signalmatters. Duri.ag this period arrangements were made to establish a BrigadeSignal Office, consisting' of ona Signal Corps ajor, on YISG M-8 (MOS 31Z)and one SP/4 (10S 72B). On 20 July 1969, the Brigade Signal Offics beceaqeoperational and published the first Brigade SOI to be effective on 26 july 1969.The Brigade Signal Office supervised the upgrading of all radio and telephone

26

SN1 ENTI L

C . . I .)L• II L.AVDB4RIH 15 N'Nuvwmbr 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9tb infantry UDvision for Period

F-nding 31 Octob-r 1969, ROS CSFOR-65 (R1i) (W)

systoms within the Brigade,

(2) During August, the Brigade Signal Offtoe continued to supervise the1'pgrading of communications, The largest effort was the expansion of the Tan AnBase telephone system, to include all of the newly assigned staff sections.Plans were also formulated to install a complete telephone system ror the 99thSupport Battalion located at Tan An Airfield.

(3) Du-'i.ng September the telephone systems at Tan An Base and Tan Ani'irfiold were completed with the assistance of the 2nd Signal Group. The25th Division Signal Officer requested that be be allowed to publish the Brigade"C" using the 25th Infantry Division format, It was agreed that the 25thinf Div puu'Wbhh tho BrJvre^ .S01 with the excaetio, of the assignment er freq-unncia, s and call s nsa. This portion of the .C0 w,:z tho ro.porni"i"t.. ty or tI11ebrOgade . fignal Officer. Plans were formultttod to build/ a new co nicationsb,'..kor to house VHF, con-center, switchboard, and radio repair sectiono of the56thi Signal Company0 During uctober the Signal Officer continued to upgradeco.mmunications systems throughout the command, Approval was obtained andplans were drawn fore new communidations l unker, An SSB back-pack radio setAW/-RQ 75, ias obtained from the 25th Inf Div Signal Officer for tests withE/75th Inf, These communications tests will be conducted in November.

k, (C) Armn.Zvat "o: During the reporting period the 3d Brigade'• aviationrequfrements were supported by both II FFORCEV and the Brigade's organic aviationelement,

(1) 11 FFORCEV supported the Brigade with an average of one and half;,ssault Helicopter Company (,MiC) daily, The Brigade was norinally supportedby the 240th AHM, 190th AHC, 118th AHC, and the 116th AHC. Their missions

:icluded airmobile insertions, extractions and resupply, Each A'C orovided64 blade hours daily in support of the 3d Brigade.

(2) The 3d Brigade began operating with its oim organic aircraft elementon 20 July 1969. This element consists of 4 UH-1H helicopters and 4 011O6A (A)s..wz'ing the reporting period the aviation element flew 2,779 blade hours in"rýuprt of the brigade, Their missions included resupply, visual reconnaissance,parakeet flights, sniffer missions, psyop missions (leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts), night hawk, night hunter, ranger insertions and extractions,and courier flights.

(3) B/3-17 Air Cavalry Troop provided direct support for elements of thebrigade,

(4) Brigade requirements for CH-54 helicopters were provided by the 25thinfantry Division on a mission basis.

27

Cmf1EW))

-I

UCONFIDENT! L

1.VB3B-WH 15 Novembor 1 969SU13JECT: operatio;_ :eport of 3d E o , infantry Division for ;-ariod

Ending 31 October 1969, 11CSJ\,. 5'- (RI) (U)i. (o) h: ..gA' 9During the reporting period the brigad' chemical

section contiiueu personrnel d&tect.,In oeruations, application of riot controlagent (CA!.), and defoliation in support of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry DivisicoIoperations,

(i) Personnel Detection - )2-13 Airborne Personnel Detector (;!"D)

(a) During t.he oreporting period there were 569 missions flcvn for atotal flying time of /474 hours. All missions were flown utilizing the UH-1.The results of these missions were reported to S2, 3rd Brigacleo

(b) With the vide acceptance of the improved model of the APD, theolder XIA2 (,PD) detectors are currently being withdra'un from the country.

(c) Maintenance problems have been reduced to a minimum with the re-location vZ operations to Tan An Airfield, The detectors are now subject toless transportation and less exposure to rain and dast hazardso Also, withthe authorization for two detectors, detailed maintenance can be performed atgeneral support level on one machine, without reducing the mission capabilityof the section,

(d) During the reporting period, sniffing results continued to be.JucccosfuA2 in loeating the enemy and denying him the ability to remain undectejd.Considerable success has been achieved daapite the fact that the enemy has brokencown into smaller groups, The only problams exnerienced !n proper utilizationof the sniffer device are due to idiczrncracies in pilot habits in low-levelflight and lack of pilot familiarity with the capabilities and limitations ofthe machine, In .ddition to ý.atermining the speed and direction of the wind,the pilot must maintain a standardized techn'que of low level flight at 80kri-.ts and make gradual turns to prevent the macbine from sniffing the exhaustfmoes of the airtraft, Long An Province's dense population makes valid read-outsoften difficult to obtain,

(2) Riot Control Agert Operations:

(a) During the reporting period there was one mission flown utilizingbulk CS gasý On 24 July 1969, 117 drums of bulk CS were dropped "coverin--thearea from coordinates XS 429686 to XS 415667, This reprevents 4,OOC lbb ofC32, 5 363 lbs of CS0 was utilized in the area southwest of VC Island (vicinityX348725 to prevent snamy infiltration,

(b) There were 21 F-158 Tactical Clusters expended during the reportingperioa. These were employed on point type targets developed from sniffer readingand visually sighted potential enemy positions, In one case, four cannisterswere employea on preparation of an LZ, A potential application,such as suppor ing

28

CONFIDENT IA L

A L•

AVBB-MH 15 November 1969SUBJEC¶1: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period

Endine 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

troops in contact, is being consliered and the section can maintain 15 minutereaction time 24 hours .ily, to apply CS. A new experimentsl CS munition isbeing sought to use in lieu to E-158e when the area coverage offered by theFE-158s is not desired. The XM54 is a standard burning týTe (Beer Can construction)CS grenade writh a 12 second delay fuze. This enables the munition to be emp-loyed from high altitudes without affi'cting its burning time on t-,rget. 40mmCS rounds for the M-79 grenade launchers are readily available and the sectionmaintains a sufficient amount on hand to supply battalion and smaller unitsupon request.

(3) Defoliation:

(a) In July 1969, one helicopter spray was completed expending 240 gallonsof agent orange covering 33 hectares in the area of the "Eagles Beak", -vicinityXS 5877.

(b) Tan Tru, Cnn Giuoo, and Rach Kion base oamps have boen aipplied withhorbioldo, along with teohnioal annintanoe in applying the agent to foliage aroundthmir p6rinu-Ater. 165 gAllong Of Agent White tiv0 bWen eqxpondd, with oovorlAgonot complete to date.

29

CO W:tENTiprl L

&ýONFIDENriI-L. -

AV•~B-J, 15 Novembw- 1969jLWJzCT: Cporational Report of 3rd Brigade, Sth Infan~try Division for Period

Ending 31 October 1v6V, RUS CSi%,-65 (Ri) (1 )

2. Snctiton 2. Lssons Lenrrngd Corrinders' Obngrvn-'ions. Evml•gtions. nrid

a. Psonnel.

(1)

OBSERVATION: Infantry elements with experience in ACV operations obtainedbetter results.

EVALUATiON-: ---The--grea-test- suc-c-e-ss-experi-en-ced by the ACV Unit during thereporting period was obtained while working with units that had previouslyconducted operations in conjunction with the ACVs. The relationship betweenthe ACV Commander, crew and the on board Infantry Squad is identical to thatrelationship between an armored cavalry platoon leader and his organic Infantrysquad. Unit operational effectiveness, coordination of support elements, andefficient command and control result from experience and development of standingoperating procedures. Infantry elements operating with ACVs for the first timerequire a 30 minute briefing and a period of practical exercise in communicationsand command and control before engaging in actual operations.

Rk•COvf*'ND.TIO: TNow that each major command in the brigade has small unitscxporieonced in ACV operntions, if possible, these same platoons should bedAtailod for futurc.ACV missions. Additiona"y, organic infantry should be aparb of any future ACV organization. The size of this organic infantry elenentshould depend on the number of ACVs in the troop. A ten man squad shouJd beauthorized for each ACV.

OD3.•::f.TIC1: Success of the ACV unit "logistical skills on the job train-ing program" is reflected in increased operational use of vehicles.

.1.VLUATION: ReplAcement 7.!.te-vnce personnel (turbine engine, aixfrasne,

hydraulic, and avionic repairmen) who have completed Advanced IndividualTiain.%ng can rapidly adapt to the uncor.ux:on aspects of ACV maintenance in a4.5 d6-Y overlap with individu:ils they are roplacing.

RLCQi -MDATIOiI: That the Xa.1ntonance OJT proTam be continued and thatrca;' aco;.ont personne! be assigned for duty at least 45 days prior to theDLE2M of thc man they are to replace.

(3) (C) I.Indionn Pernortel Aniv"jC

OBSERVATION: The Brigade Surgeon's Office advises the Adjutant General's

Office on all medical personnel assignments within the Brigade.

30CON: PIDENTJFL

LM fI F )1 P. I IM L

A - 15 liovenlber 1 'o693I1EZC1; &,erationai Report of ird Brigade, 9th Infantiy Division for Period

K'a:dlng 31 October 169, RCS CSFOR-65 (R.1) (U)

CoordinaTion bet-ween these two offices nas played a arge-, .o :cco plishme-t of the Brigade's mission. I'; has boen deter-inred-itc't -, ed-cal personneel can be most effectively utilized w•hen the

z't sL. mcnths of their tours arc spent with a field tuit. Supervision of,:,¢i. ',;r ,e!i asignsent ha4 and czn be aTfunction of the Brigade Surgeon's

Office.

zLGCICZ,:;DATIO;: That the Brigade Surgeon's Office continue to advise,'-a utan- General's Office on the assignment of all med".cal personnel

t:rcughout the Brigade.

b . (0) Ce--in

(i) (C) Ecorn uic L e of nn A!r =,bille Thrpet.

cBEK.IOi;: 'When the C&C helicopter recons a planned air assaulttrget for any lenrbw of time, small groups of VC/NVA, foriwerned of theimpending assault, will attempt to evade.

:F•'bATi: The a -iobile concept of US forces in so familiar to theor;::y -hah 4 observirg the CLC he'icopter over an area they are often ableto sun ise a planed air assault target, and escape the target area beforethe arrival of the escort gunships and assault troops.

K ,Cc.-.,DAT:0G,.; That the C&C helicopter, when possible, recon theplan:fed air assault target with gunships of a Light Fire Team (LFT) onstation to destroy these small groups of VC/NVA attempting to elude orevade -he C&C aircraft's observation.

2. (0) Enerv Wa~"niný -DQi

OBSERVATION" The VC/NVA are using noise making warning devices atresiLng areas and conz.o-l aison routes.

BVALUATIOI: The VC/NTVA, wishing to avoid contact acound bunkered restareas, often use trip wire activated ncise maling devices, which "pop" like'",'o ti,, caps, to warn of the presence of US forces. These are used instead of.ocb:- traps on access routes into resting areas to minize endanEr VC/1WAtroo•s ccherwise unfamiliar ':ith the area.

REMC'Z.;DATiON: 'When these noise making warning devices are discovered,T2S troops should be alert to a possible rest area aid rapidly advance toprevent enemy escape and to deny him routes out of the area.

31

CO FI DE NTIfL

k N- r t 1 L1 5 N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 9SbJCT: Opiratioral Report of 3rd Drigade, 9th Irfantry Division for Period


(3) (C)Claore 4ftes pn Fln'-sOMSERVAT:O:; Ciaymore m-inos are often ermployed by U6 forces in areas

where observation can-noT be ma.intained, thus allowing the enemyr to passt:rough the killing zone before the Claymore is detonated.

EVLUA'TIGA: Claymore mines can be effectively employed in areas ihereconstat výiV l-.. q not possible by placing trip flares within the killing

zone. The flare should be tied to a stake. The trip wire r.ast be of suf-ficient height above -he ground to prevent accidental detonation by stalla Iz.as. Personnel must immediately detonate the Claymore mine when a tripflare is set off.

iECCr.ZDATION: That trip flares be used in conjunction with Claymoremines in areas of limited visibility.

(4) (C) gkimer Qeration

OBSEVATION: The Viet Cong can avoid detection by the larger RiverPatrol Doazs by hiding in thick nippa palm and srall carals along theriver shores.

EVALUATION: The S:im-er is a seventeen foot rmi-abour; boat pcwe-red byan eighty-five horsepower outboard engine. I-, is armed with 1'4'o N-60 mochineLuns, one M-49 Erenade launcher, and four M-106 rifles. Thr crew consists offour men.- This combination of a small, light-weight boat, high poered enri: e:an.d automatic weapons makes the Skis;er an ideal vessel 2or waterborne operationsat night. It may he used as security for larger boats, an ambush vessel, andas a reconnaissance boat. The Skim er has proven to be highly effective in find-ing and killing the enercy. The Viet Gong often think the Skirmm:er is a sampanand wa!U" unsuspiciously up to it. It is best employed with reconnaissanceunits which patrol and ambush alonG the rivers.

RECOGIý12*DATiON: Tha& Skimmer Operations be used more extensively alongthe najor rivers and tributaries.

(5) (C) Nihna Palm, Outtin,ý:One atin

OBS-ERVATIOI4: Local VC guerillas are afraid of US units and will notChieu Hoi until US forces depart the arca.

EVALUATION: During the reporting period, 2-60th Inf conducted two nippapalm cutting operations in conjunction with District RF and PF forces. Inboth cases, a targeted village/hamlet area was cordoned by US forces for a

32

CONF IRDENT-AL

n ^M t I -I N I- %-I~ A

t,, Ll 1' IJ t.-I V I I/iL_

AV3Bh-1i 15 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period

Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Ri) (U)

thrce day period. During the day, nippa cutting was conducted by US andRF/PF units with local civilians. Chain saws, "Bush King" saws, andniachetes weie utilized. At night, the US units withdrew from the cuttingarea and set up a seal. In both cases, local VC Chieu Hoied to theDistrict forces after US units had left the area. The Hoi C4ans stated thatthey were afraid to surrender to US forces and had hidden in bunkers for threedays without food or water. They went on to say that this particular oper-ation and other US operations in the area influenced them to Onieu Hoi.

RECOC>I2DATION: That future US operations be followed up by an intensivePsyop Campaign utilizing GVN forces with the emphasis on the Chieu Hoi theme.

(6) (C) The Effeat of Air Pressure on the Velocity of Shrapnel.

OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, an Air Cushion Vehicle strucktwo booby traps during an operation in the Plain of Reeds.

EVALUATION: Although both booby traps did superficial damage to bags,decks, and ballast tanks, there were no casualties on board the ACV (Infantrytrocps were riding the side docks during both incidents) and the handlingand pcrfcrmance characteristics of the vehicle were not impaired. The velocityof the shrapnel afterit had passed through the vehicle's thin aluminum skinand bondalite paneling was tignificantly lower than would be expected. It"is felt that the vehicle's downdraft was responsible for this significantreduction in veloclyt

flECOMLEKD.,TON: That the effects of overpressure and air turbulence be

researched as an effective dissipator of shrapnel.

(7) (C) Logistical Cqpnbfiitv of the Air Cushion Vhielet Unit.

OBSERVATION: Although the primary role of the Air Cushion Vehicle Unitis reconnaissance, security, and raid operations, its inherent load carryingcapacity can lend considerable flexibility to any operation requiring move-ment of troops, supplies, and equipment.

EVALUATION: During the reporting period, two rifle companies were relocatedin multiple lifts covering overland distances of six to eight kilometers.An 81amm mortar, basic load of arfrunition, and crew were relocatk over sixkilometers of marginal terrain -.n tently minutes without reducing the ACVoperational load. The on board Infantry conducted a sweep of the site selectedfor relocation prior to disembarking the mvtar squad.

RECO1,2Z,•D;TION- That supported coxiranders continue to challange andexnloit the Air Cushion Vehicle Unit for support in imaginative combat and

Ce r IDENT)AL

CON Fi D ENTT/AL

AViz-l'i 15 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of' 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division fbr Period

Fnding 31 October 1969, RCS 6SFOR-65 (RI) (U)

aux:illary combat service support roles.

(8) (C) Tn D Signs

OLSERVATIOiN: Tu Dia ("Yot Die") signs are plcced on the perimeter of'thickly wrooded areas to iarn civilians and others of the presence of booby traps1

EVALUATiON: The VC use Tu Dia signs in much the sane manner the US unitsuse minefield :.-arkings; however, in marky areas -arzod by Tu Dia signs noboob- traps actually exist. A Tu Dia area could be booby trapped to harasstroo-) move:ment, 'protect a cache site, protect a rest area, or provideearly warning. If booby traps are locateO in an area marked with Tu Diasigns, they are generally found within 50 yeters of the Tu Dia miarkers andalong existing trails, paths and dikes. Most Tu Dia areas will show signsof recent ene-j movement or occupation.

RECOG 2ý2:DATION: Tu Dia areas ,.iust be checked closely since in mostcases enemy activity does exist or has existed in the area. Valuable int-elligence can be gained as to the methods of operation of the VC by determini,.gthe actual use of the Tu Dia area by the enenr. These areas should not beavoided merely because of the possibilI.ty of booby traps.

(9) (0) EncaEernt of Ni;7ht Targets

OBSERVATION: When engaging targets at night with small arms fire, USunits consistantly fire high.

EVALUATION: It is very difficult at night to &etermine the actual groundlevel when engaging a target. Because of the inability of some US troops todo thi6, they do not have confidence in their ability to engage night targets,and consequently fail to place effective fire on the target.

RECO0'f.',DATION: That more night fire training be given to basic traineesand that troops be instructed to mix tiacer and ball ammunition in theio rag-azines to improve their control at night.

(10) (C) Ene=y Contact on Arbush Patrol

03SERVATION: In recent operations it has been noted that the enemy willfire un a unit'i's holding position during the last reraining minutes ofdaylight.

34

CON [ADLN HIAL

AV5e42-2 15 November 1969SU•35ECT. Operational Report of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period

Iding 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Ri) (U)

EVALUATION: The VC will fire on a unit during the last minutes of day-light as it moves from its holding position to the night ambush sight. Indoing this the VC hope to inflict casualties, cause confusion, and delay,he unitrs movement to the night anbush site,

00EC1%211DATION: That units delay moving out of daylight holding positionsuntil it is completely dark.

(11) (c) Lnvinr. L.2" Xortsr in Deltn Terrm

0BSE21ATI(8 When employing a 4.2" mortar in the Delta, often it willbe foand that the ground is too soft to form a firs' Zoundation for thebaseplate. When firing with this type of baso, the baseplate will slideto such an oexent as to necessitate the baseplte bcing dug up and thetube being; re-laid frequently. Relaying a tube at night under Delta cond-itions is often a Cifficult and lengtVhy process.

EV,,LUATION: if mortars are to be employed in s static position, suchas a base camp defense, a concrete firing platform can 1e conntracted intw to throe days. In the center of the platform should be a' recess largeenough to hold eight inches of sand and a 21- truck tire into which thebaseplate %;-ll be placed. This type of construction will allow at least500) roiunds to be fired per tube without digging up the baseplate and conpletelyprevents any movement of the baseplate during fire missions.

RECO1.ý;2-DATION: That other units be made aware of this technique forlaying a 4,2" m ortar.

(12) (0) Aceuray of the 4.2" Norjgron a Traversinr Fire i1s-ion

OBSERVATION: After the 4.2"' mortar FDC computes a traversing firemzssion, it tells the tube to fire a certain number of rounds on a givendeflection and then to traverse the gun, using the traversing hand wheel,a certain number of turns to the left or right and fire again. The number oftraverses is dependent upon the size of the target and the number of roundsto be expended. This method is quick but greatly reduces accuracy because therecoil of each round will shift the nortar. Therefore, after the traverse

begins, there is no way of knowing axactly how far the gun has been moved bythe recoil.

° EVALUATION: To insure the rounds impact in the target area the FDO shouldnot send the traverses to the gun in 'turns" but instead should plot each

35CONt DENTIAL

C.ONPIDENTIAL

AVI-f-.2 15 November 1 969S7T3J ECT: OReratipma. Report of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period

End'ng 31 October 1969, ROS CSFOR-65 (Ri) (U)

tLavwro e, compute the firing deflection, and send the set of deflectionsto the guns. This will insure that -he mortar moves only the desir,'d nvumberof mils each tine it is fired.

GCON-Z':DATIO:;: That other US units be made aware of this method ofplti.. g a traversing fire mission.

(1)(C) O~pn-~ rezOeation

OESERVATION: Nippa-Flare ope.ations during the wet season have notbeen successful.

EVALATICAN: Daring the reporting period, 445 gallons of diesel fuelwere employed in the Eagle's BeaŽ Area (Vicinity XS 5877) in an attempt toburn off an area. The diesel was delivered by the use of the Agavenco spray

Sn Mt ,c ntec. in a 'U -1 helicopter. iOH's followed the spray ship, droppingwhite phosphorous grenades in an attempt to set the target area afiroýThe target area vas covered with dead nippa pali,ý but was partially wet due tothe constant rain of the Delta monsoon. The ground was also saturated frommontins of rain. The nippa palm could not be ignited inspite of repeated attem,,ptsto do so.

RECOI12EiDATION: That if helicopter Nippa Flame operations are to besuccessful, tney must be accomplished at the height of the dry season when thenippa and sucrounding terrain has had am.ple tire to dry completely.

(14) (0) Employrent of Sniners

OBSERVATICfl: The brigade sniper program has been very effective during thereporting period.

ZVALUATION: In the 3rd Brigade each battalion is authorized 4 sniper teams,each team consisting of two men. These teams are employed as battalion assetsand are under the direct control of the battalion commander. The snipersare utilized exclusively in arn offensive role and their mi:sions are tailoredso that they function in a purely sniper role. This method of employrienthas worked very well for tlhe brigade and in October the 3rd Brigade snipersaccounted for 32 enemy killed. This figure represents a marked increase overresults from previous months,

RiGCOIiIDATION: That other units be made aware of this method of employingtheir sniper teams.

CON P iDENTiAL

U I Vlr- I•i U r-IV I itl L-.

AVB1-11H 15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational. Report of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division fcr PeriodEnoding 3! October 11969, RGS CSF(7-65 (RI) (U)

f15t Hunter Oneratlons

OiSERV,,TION: Night Hunter Operations have proven effective in providingi':"ediate reaction to Intelligence Targets at night,

EVALUATION: The Night Hunter Operation was developed to provide rapidreaction and exploitation of targets acquired at night by strategicallylocated Ground Surveillance Radar sets. The Night Hunter team is comprisedof the following forL- elements: An Air Cavalry Light Scout Team consistingof one AH-IG Cobra Cunship and one UJIHB Comnand and Control helicopterwith Xenon Searchlight, crew served, Starlight Scope and a 7. 6 2mm minigun;Artillery Support; Ground Surveillance Radar support provided by the LI/TPS-25and AN/PPS-5 radar sets; and a Instant Reaction Force consisting of 6-8Rangers. Inen L Night Eunter target (eneny sighting of 5-10 personnel) ispicked up on radar, the Ranger team becomes airborne and heads toward thetarget area. Artillery fire can be placed on the targeT either before or afterthe insertion of the Ranger team. The second method is preferred because itpreserves the element of surprise. Before the Ranger element inserts,twoWnite Phosporous rounds are fired to mark the target, and then continuousillumination is fired while the Razger team is on the ground. The Ranger OICorbits the area and adjusts artillery for the taam. This also allows theXenon Searchlight to be used in spot bing targets in areas not covered effectivelyby artillery illumination. The Night Hunter has proven to be an extremelyeffective means of engaging radar sighted targets at night. The success of theNight Hunter Operation depends on the coordinated efforts and reaction timeof the four elements of the Night Hunter Team. Average reaction tire afternotification of scramble to Ranger insertion is twenty minutes.

RECOOI.•.NDATION: That other units be made aware of the techniques involvedin the Night Hunter Operations.

c. Training

(0)() Sni-'er Eowuipmrtn

OBSERVATION: Sniper equjpnent frequently needs a higher echelon ofcleaning and maintenance zhe the individual sniper is authorized to perform.

EVALUATION: The effects of weather and terrain in the Delta frequentlycause the sniper's veapon and sight to become fouled or inoperative. Theweapon and sniper then must given a non-scheduled standown while the equipment istakeen to the Division sniper school for maintenance.

RECO1•,IDATION: That additioral training be given to the individual sniperso that he is able to perform maintenance and repair of his own equipment; or

37CONFtbEwTrJAL

U)1..V r iVL/LI1V I L#-tL-

AVBB-21i 1 5 November 1 969SUDJEiCT: C-Orational Report of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Pe:,iod

-dlJng 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

that a cjil lod ar:;cvo-e br. assigned to the Brigade to maintain sniper weapono

and equiprmont.

(2) , _

cL jE,V,•TT1.•: l hao boon found theft replacemonto assigned to maneuver

battalions often :m]ae serious errors while conducting combat operationsbecause they did not undersuand unit SOP's.

2VALU.aTi•.: Tc co-,bat th-' uroblem, mandatory classes were organized

for al. replaceuents, These classes were in addition to instruction pres-erted at the Brigade replacement training center, The classes were designedto instruct the replacements in the batbalion's operating techniques. .Theseclasses were taught by small unit leaders. Subject areas included ambushtechniques, airmobile operations, booby traps, prevention of skin disease,

and artillery adjustment. Upon completion uf the training, the replacenentswere able to adjust to combat operations more rapidly and effectively.

R•Cc)•G2;DATION: That each replacement receive orientation training on

the procedures used within the battalion before he participates in combatoperations. For the first 48 hours following assignnent to a battalion,, thenew reolacement should not be involved in combat operations.

(3) (0) ACV Drziver Trai•

GBSERVtTIOG;: Current location and fissions of the ACV Unit have ceriouslyhamperod the OJT driver training program.

EVALUATION: Although there is no immediate problem in availability of

comoetent ACV drivers, three of the five operators piesent for duty DEROSn January 1970. Conduct of a basic driver training course in the vicin.ty

of Ben Luc is impossible because of the tactical situation in the area.

RECO1.2,DATIN: That replacement drivers be train~dý by the ACV contractor

prior to deployment to Vietnam.

d;. Intelligence: i;CN[.______-

e. Logistics:

(i) (C) 1M-548 Cargo Carrier

OBSERVATION: The M-548 Cargo Carrier is a more effective recovery vehicle

than the M-578 Recovery Vehicle in the marsh and paddy areas of the Delta

during the rainy season.

38

CONFIDENTI'AL

AVBB-I• 15 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period


EVALUATION: Duxing the wet season, the Delta is largely a sea of claymud. The M-578 Recovery Vehicle is virtually useless off the road because ofits broad base design and high capability of off road mp- euver due to its highoff road design.

RECa.-NDATION: That the M-548 Cargo Carrier be made available to mech-

anized units a3 augmentation to maintenance recovery sections, particularly inthe Delta.

(2) (C) U•g of Non-Organic Transport tJQ

OBSERVATION: It has been determined from the recent relocation of the3d Brigade Supply Point from Dong Tam to Tan An that close And detailedcoordination must be effected when non-organic transportation is utilized.

EVALUATION: Because there was a limited amount of non-organic vehiclesavailable for use by the 3rd Brigade, it was necessary to obtain the maximumamount of use from each one. It was determined that in order to move greatquantities of supplies in a short period of time, with limited resources, itwas necessary to split the trailer assets into three groups, with only onetractor for three tra.lers. One group was loading, one was unloading, whilestill another group was on the road. This method resulted in a continuousmovement of the trucks, enabling the Brigade to mcva large amounts of supplieswith a minimum of equipment.

RECOMýENDATION: That this management technique be incorpo.ated intoinstruction at the US Arnr Transportation School.

f. Organization

(I) (C) Reorganization of thA ACV Unit

OBSERVATION: Because of the location ond mission of the ACV Unit, a

minimum of three commissioned officers (CO, XO, and Maintenance Officer) areessential to sustain unit operations and administration.

EVALUATION: The ACV Unit has all of the administrative, supply, andoperational requirements of a separate company. Air Cushion Vehicle maint-enance and technical supply activities include a direct support capability.Conduct of on the job training of maintenance and crew personnel programs,property book manangement, support of remote bases, recoverey operations,liaison, coordination, and command and control cannot be realistically vested inone co•missioned officer and one maintenance waxrant officer as indicatedin MTOE 17-109T.

39C-NRI DE NT-tAL

LONP-IDENFI/ LAVBB--E 15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for PeriodEnding 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

RECOMODINDATION: That the original recommendation of an authorizedMTOE strength of three officers (Commanding Officer, 0-4, MOS 1204; ExecutiveOfficer, 0-3, MOS 1204; and Maintenance Officer, 0-2, MOS 1204 be re-evaluated based on current ACV Unit needs.

(2) (C) Security of Brigade HendnuArters

OBSERVATION: The Separate Brigade TOE does not provide for the securityof the Brigade Headquarters.

EVALUATION: The current TOE deletes the rifle platoon from the BrigadeHeadquarters -Company. This element was designed to provide security for theHeadquarters. Since the Separate Brigade Headquarters is not normally co-located with one of its maneuver battalions, the security of the Headquartersrequires a levy from the maneuver battalions.

RECOMMENDATION: That the TOE be changed to include a rifle platoon for

security.

g. Other

(I) (C) D g t6I6gio Disenses

OBSERVATION: The number of man days lost due to dermatologic diseasescan be kept at an acceptably low level by limiting the durEtion of operationsin the field, contingent, of course, on the tactical situation.

EVALUATION: The man days lost due to dermatologic diseases throughout theBrigade compared very favorable with the man days lost figures of last year fora unit of comparable size within the 9th infantry Division. The favorable rateduring the height of the rainy season this year was due to vigorous adherenceby commanders to the policy of limiting combat operations to 48 hours coupledwith the use of grileofulvin prophylaxis and frequent foot inspections by thebattalion surgeons.

BECO1b&NDATIONP That the command policy of limiting operations in paddyareas to 48 hours followed by a 24 hour drying out period be continued as themost important method of preventing dermotologic diseases.

(2) (C) AN/MRC-69 VHF Communication Set

OBSERVATION: The AN/MRC-112, VHF Communication Van, 4 channel capabilityproved insufficient to provide adequate communications to the Brigade and itsfire support bases.

40

CONFIDPF1N-fIAL

ICO I DENIT/AL

AVBB-Mi 15 November 1960SUBJECT: Cperational Report of 3rd 2rgade, 9th Infantry Division for Period

Ending 31 Octobur 1969, RGS CS6'R-65 (RI) (U)

EVALUATION: The de-ýand for circuits was too great and a strict liit ofthese de-ands -u . ve inpaired the Brigade's mission. The more reliableAUV/MLRC-69 was madeo r %,ilble to the Brigade from the outgoing 9th SignalBatltalion and the 532d Signal Battalion in lieu of the 6 channel AN/I±RG-127aulthorized by the X"OE. Systems were installed in each maneuver battalion aswell as the DS I'airnenance Comnapny of the 99th CS Support Battalion. Thisincreaseu circuit quality and relýibility and also provided greater frequencyrange.

RECO.£a)2:D.,T Th at týhe A:•/.C-69 VHF Commucnicatien set or equivaler-tbe •iade availatle when considering connTunications requirements for chebrigade headqua-.ters and bautalion fire support bases.

EB LjiCi;: The means of coordination and transfer of mission essentialdatua botwr-en US and AIPVN artilleýy has been inadequate.

EVALJATIC'T: It has been found in several instances during the reportingperiod that a means of combined fire support coordination for US anc ARVNartillery was comnletely lacking. This precluded massing of fires. allowedneedless dunlication of effort, and did not provide for the full use of firesupport canabilities within -he nrovince, In some cases units were not re-ceiving fire su-pcrt when such support was available because the proper agencieswere not being ad&ised of the request. All of this V'as been elindnated by theinitiation of the Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC). Workingdirectly with Vietnamese fire support agencies and being co-located within theSector TCCO the CFSCC has provided the necessary link between the alliedforces to insure the best utilization of all fire support available through-out the province, In mosz cases the CFSCC is the first US agency to receivethe requirement for additional fire support. This requirement is thenpassed on to the Vietnm-ese c-- US fire support agency capable of providingthis support.

RECO101NDATION: That Combined Fire Support Cocrdination Centers beinitiated throughoat South Vietnam in order to provide the best possiblefire support for both Vietnamese and US Forces,

01 ON P41. _A

CO 2D:TA

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-12i 15 November 1969JUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, for Period

Encding 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

YOR THE COMM.ANDER:

13 Incl WILLIAM N. CICCOIAO1. .d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division LTC, INF

Orf~anization Deputty CommanderTask Organization and Locations

•2. Rei--- e f Kond -rsp a ntl-

-3. actcal-Aret--f Toc tei s tm'Q

6. Combat Statistics7. G3 Air Operational Support Chart

ll. 5 a"l%-.

,- 6.---S,•. - eahcl Uiaty -QR L-

Incis 2 - 5 and 8 - 13 wd HQ, DA

42CONF IDE NTIA L

SAVDC32 (30 Nov 69) Ist IndSU3JECT: Lperational Relort of t1ho 3Id •rigado, 9th Infantry Divisilon for

the period ending 33. October 1969, RCS CJFOR - 65 (R2)

111, Hý 25th iif Div, AO San Francisco 96225

Th-LRU; Commanding General, II FFOACIV, AI'h AVF3C-RL-H, iP0 San Francisco 96266

Comrandinig General, USARV, ATNi~s AV"GC(DST), APO San Francisco 96375

Con. andor-in-ChiefL7, U3 IAC, ATTN: GPUP-DT, APO San Yrancisco 96558

20: Assistant Chief of Scaff for Force Development, DJepartment of the Army,.ashington, D.C. 20310

7.is he.didquarters has reviewed and concurs wirth the Operational Report -Tessons Learned of tU- 3rd brigade, 9th Infantry Division for the periodending 31 October 19t,,.

'FOR T'11 CQC, iýNDER:

/ /'I I . ,,, //.', . /•

/,i J072: L. •d•O~

- LTC, GSActing Chiof of 3taff

mr /3

AVFBC-RE-H (30 Nov 69) 2nd IndSUBJECT: Operational Report of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for

the Period Eding 31 October 1969, ReCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, HQ I1 FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 962661 5 DEC 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTNs AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -Lessons Learned of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for the periodending 31 October 1969.

FOR THE CO EtANDE

E•. G. AACDON~q-DILT, G3Asst AG

44

-C4

u• rU NH i- ru LE IN T nI A

AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 3d indSUB.TECT: Operational Report of 3d 6rigade, 9`h infantry Division, for

Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(J)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AF-Y. VT1TNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 0 2 FED W3

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CxPOP-DT,

APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters ha, reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned

for the quarterly period en(.inr 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade,

9th Infantry Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Coiamonts follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Infantry Units Working With AirCushion VehcIss', page 30, para-raph 2a(1); concur. Infantry elementsexperienced in Air Cushion Vehicles (ACV) operations should be detailedfor future ACV rdissions. Additionally, organic infantry should be consid-ered when deteiriing a part of any future ACV organizations. The size of

this organic infantry element would deperd on the number of ACVts in the

troop.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Replacement Personnel", page 30,paragraph 2a(2); nonconcur. Aesigning maintenance replacement pertjoonelfor duty OJT 45 days prior to the DMOS of his predecessor is consideredimpractical and ineconomical. The presence of men on board for performanceof the same Job for 45 dayts would present a great unit personnel over-strength on one end of the pipeline and a critical personnel shortage on theother. The basic concept is good but the resulting diminishing efficiencydue to the prolonged duplication of man-hours on the same job escalatesthe cost of performing the task. Establishing an accelerated OJT courseat the organizational leol is highly recommended. Above information hasbeen related to the unit.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "SkAizner Operations", page 32, para-graph 2b(4). Concur -with recommendation that skimmer operations be usedmore extensively along the major rivers and tributaries. Because of itssize, high powered engine and fire power, the skiimer is an ideal vesselfor waterborne operations and should be used extensively for security oflarger boats, an ambush vessel and a reconnaissance boat.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Nippa Palm Cutting Operations",page 32, paragraph 2b(5); concur. Existing PSYOP guidance publicationsrecognize the increased effectiveness of messages and operations developedconsidering the vulnerabilities of a target audience and targeted on thatgroup over general PSYOP campaigns and messages delivered at random.Coordination and planning to broadcast specific appeals under particularconditions allows preparation of recorded messages to fit the situation.The recommendation is included in present PSYOPts oolicy.

9" DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR IlTERVALS;

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

CO NFIDENTIAL DOD DIR 5200.10

I AnL..r.,."&I'•! A

0;ll NFi DtE il i AP L

AVHGC-DST (I15 N ov 69) 3d IndSUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for

Peri,(A Ending 31 October 1969, ROS CbF-OR-65 (R2) (U)

e. (U) Reference item concerning "The Effect of Air Pressure on the

Velocity of Shrapnel", page 33, paragraph 2b(6); concur. However, a study

is not necessary as it is a well known fact that friction increases as

density increases which results in drag on moving cb~ects,

f. (C)' Reference item concerrning "Tu Dia Signs". page 34, paragraph2b(8); concur. A thorough search for intblligence indicators in a Tu Dia(You Die) marked area should be made during all operations. Timely andaccurate reporting of aiis information will assist the intelligence sectionin refining the enemy order of battle,

g. (C) Reference item concerning "Laying a 4.2" Mortar in DeltaTerrain", page 35, paragraph 2b(11); concur. The use of a concrete firingplatform to fire the 4.2" mortar in Delta terrain is a good idea. Thisinformation will be considered for inclusion in USARVts Battlefield Reports-Tips for Commnanders.

h. (C) Reference item concerning "Accuracy of the 4.2" Yortar on aTraversing Fire Mission", page 35, paragraph 2b(12); concur. To insurethat the mortar rounds impact in the target area, the FDC should not sendtne traverses to tne weapon in turns, but instead should plot each traverse,compute the firing deflection and send the set of deflections to the mo-.tars.This infornation wili be considered for inclusion in USARV's BattlefieldRoport - TLps for Co7m-nders.

i. (U) Reference item concerrung 9& ployment of Snipers", page 36,pirg-E-ph L ½(,):c onour. This i -a -as covered in a USARV Letter, Subject.

tmploym L Of Snipners; diated 6 Decemtear 1969, which was distributed to theunits in ;i~e field.

'C) Reference i•'cm conce-ning "Sniper Equipment", page 37, para-

graph 2 (1); nonconcur. The striper rifle is a sensitive weapon which canbecome inaccurate or inoperative if not maintained properly. All higherechelon clearing an6 maintenance must be carried out by the qualified gun-smith assined to ihe unit.

/ -- '• . ..

R.m, gnorer.ce tea concerninr "ACV Driver Training", page 38,para raph 2c (3): Concur ;,izh suggestion that ACV replacement drivers betrained prior -o deployment; however, there is no equipment available tobe used for trairing in CONUS,

I. (U) aeference iteml concerning 1"'1.-5L8 Cargo Carzier", page 38,paragraph 2e(1); ncconcur.

(1) The "- Cargo Carrier was not draigned to be used as a primaryrecovery vehicle. However, it can be used in limited recovery operationsfor vehicles of the same or smaller weight by use of its front winch.

CoN iDENTIAL

'f' fl). FJ NI iI ,T I A I

A.VHGC-DST (.15 Nov 69) 3d IndSUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry- Division for

Period Ending 31 October 10,69, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

This p~inciple applios to any vehiclu with front and/or rear winches. The6-ton M-548 vehicle cannot be employed as a substitute for the 27-tonM-578 vehicle. It is highly recormended that the principle of recoveringa vehicle with a "like" or "heavier" vehicle be enployed utilizing themost suitable vehicle from tho existing authorized inventory, especiallyduring light or unusual recovery operations.

(2) Many units ha i- expericn.,ed di fficulties with the M-578 RecoveryVehicle. Using the M-548, which is basically an 1M113A1 fitted with a cargorack, is not a good solution. IUSAR7 now has an ENSURE project to convert aM113A1 to a recovery vehicle which is a good solution to this type problem.

m. (U) Regerence item concerning "Use of Non-Organic Transportationa,page 39, paragraph 2e(2); concur. However, tractor trailers are normallyutilized at a two to onr ratio by the Army and a four to one ratio by civilianindustry. For line haul operations, a two to one ration is normally idealfor the military. In short haul operations, however, with l1mited I=available and good roads to travel over, a three to one ratio can beadvantageous. %nile this has only limited applications, it adds to trans-portation flexibility and should be added to the Transportation'Schooltscurriculum.

n. (U) Reference item concerning "Reorganization of the ACV Unit",page 39, paragraph Pf(1); nonconcur.

(I) At present the'e are no spaces available within USARV resourcesto finance the proposed increase of one officer within the platoon.

(2) This headquarters does not feel it appropriate for a platoonsize unit of this type to have three officers assigned to it.

o. (U) Reference item concerning "Security of Brigade Headquarters",page 40, paragraph 2f(2); concur. The addition of a rifle platoon to theseperate Brigade Headquarters for security appears to have merit. However,at present, there are no spaces available within USARV resources to financethe proposed increase in personnel. In the event it is absolutely necessarythat the unit be reorganized, trade-off spaces must be provided by identity(i.e., officer and enlisted) and a MTOE suhmittea for consideration.

p. (U) Reference, item concerning "Dermatologic Diseases", page 40,paragraph 2g(i); concur. This item was published in USARV Training News-letter No. 6-69, J_--ted 19 November 1969.

q. (U) Reference item concerning "AN/IRC-69 VHF Communication Set",page 40, paragraph 2g(2); concur. The Radio Terminal Set AN/MRc-69 is a

""7

CONFIDENTIAL

1Ujur IU•in I IALAVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 3d mIdSUBJECT% Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for

Period Ending 31 October 1969, RS CM0R-65 (R2) (U)

1st Generation Army Communications assemblage that is being replaced byvarious 2d Generatton A0014S equipment. The 3d Brigade, 9th Inf Div ioauthorized to retain the AN/MR0-69 1 s on hand until such time the newequipment becomes available.

r. (C) Reference item concening "Combined Fire Support CoordinationCenter (CFSCC), page 41, paragraph 2g(3); conc'4r. Combined fire supportcoordination centers should be initiated throighout douth Vietnam for thepurpose of providing the best possible fire support for both Viaitnameseand US forces. This item will be forwarded to MAGV for their consideration.

FOR THE CC4MAER:

L. D." MURRA,

CPT, AQ.Cy fimn: 4SSitont Ad L;', CnoI3d/9th Inf DivII FFVMACV J3-051

- CoNgICENTIAL

GPOP-DT (15 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for

Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 7 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as Indorsed.

FOR THE COMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SFiR 1 rTCPT, AGCAsst AG

49 -

CONIIDENTIAL31 October i969

0.GANI ZAT ION

ASSIGNED UNITS

HIC 3d Brigade

6-31 Inf

2-47 Inf (Mech)

2-60 inf

5-60 Irf

2-4 Arty

65th Inf Det (Combat Tracker)

E/75th Inf (Ranger)

US Arry Air Cushion Vehicle Troop, RVN

45th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

19th Mil Hist Dot

19th PI Det

39th Chem Det

493d MI DDst

99th CS Spt Bn

56th Sig Co

571st Eng Co

483d MP Plt

264th FA Det (Radar)

276th Arty Det (Radar)

ATTACijED UNITS

B/3-17 Cav

1?I C.ON IDENT)ALL

0 Nr-1)E N TIP- L

-I.

3O'st Airfield Control Det. 165th Avn Gp

Weather Det 5th Weather Sqdn

ALO/FAC 19th Tac Spt 8qdn

/4th" Civil Affairýs .'Plt C.,).

Eng Det (Water Supply) 82d Eng Co

ADA Sec (quad 50) 5-2d Arty

ADA Btry (40mm) 5-2d Arty (i Pit)

FA Btr•y 155mm (SP) (GSR) 5-2d Arty (Mission Basis)

FA Brty 155nm (T) (GSR) B&C/5-42d Arty

A Btry/7-S-h Arty (8"/175) (GSR)

1-adio Reasearch Pit 335th RR Co

Mied Det (Den Svc) 36th and 137th Med Det (KJ), on anarea basis

Xed Dot (PM) 20th N1 Unit, on an area basis

Med Det (Vet) 44th Med Bde, on an area basis

Hel Arab Det 44th Med Bde, on an area basis

Interpreters MACV

Kit Clarson Scouts Allocated by USARV G5

MID (14th ARVN) ýUCV

CONFIDENTI-AL

-37

CON FFI ENTItLTASK GRGAI'IZATI(AN AIID UUIT LOCATION

AS OF 310600H OCTOB3ER 1969HHC 3d BEae n ,-v An Main XS 546648

2-4 Arty Bn HQ Tan An Main XS 546648E/75 Inf (Ranger) Tan An Main XS 54664899 CS Spt Bn Tan An Airfield YS 524656

571 Eng Go Tan An Airfield XS 524656

2-47 Inf (Iech). Binh Phouc XS 609553A Go-, Binh Phouc XS 609593

B Cot Binh Phouc XS 609553

C Co:, Binh Fnouc XS 609553

D Co, Binh Fhouc XS 609553B/2-4 Arty Binh Phouc XS 609553

2-60 Inf Tan Tru XS 655624

BOo Tan Tru XS 655624C o Tan Tru XS 655624DCo Tan Tru XS 655624D Co Tan Tru XS 655624

C/2-4 Arty Tan Tru XS 655624

5-60 Inf Rach Kien XS 7446('QA Co Rach Kien XS 744698B Co Rach Kien XS 74469$C Co Rach Kien XS 744699

R-cb," Rach Kien XS 744-698z Co Rach Kien XS 744698

CON FID N Ti AL

CODNFIDENTIALA/2-4 Arty Rach Kien XS 744698

6-31 Inf Can Giuoc XS 833727

A Co Can Giuoc XS 833727

B Co Can Giuoc XS 833727

C Co Cea. Giuoc XS 833727

D Co Can Giuoc XS 833727

E Co Can.Giuoc XS 833727

D/2-4 Arty Can Giujc XS 833727

A/5-42 (155mm) Tan Tru XS 673610

B/5-42 (155 5m) Thu Thua XS 584702

C/7-8 (8;'/17?5rn) Ben Luc XS 637767

C.ONRIDENTMALS3

, - -w -

11ON ¶2lu DF.NTi Af L.

U A S VT1•S CmdTURD

JUL 15 162 391 5 3 0 04 9

-'AUG 8 108 9:32 25 0 i03 8

SEP :r17 -9 352 . 0 75 3

O 7 1OT -1- J -2.

TOTAL 43 440 lA4 81,. 15 0 313 22

US lakIUl lqi ZM 6EP OCT TOT J4UL AUG SEP MC TOT

2-47 2 1 1 1 5 16 10 24 15 65

2-60 7 2 4 0 13 75 37 40 24 176

5-60 5 413 1 13 64 42 24 17 347

&-31 OP CON TO 1 1 2 OP CON TO 10 14 249TH fIF DIV 9TH INF DIV

3-7 0 1 fETUIMED TO 1 0 16 arTURN' TO 16199th LIB 199th LIB

B/3-17 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2

RAI;ER 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2

A1WY 1 0 2 0 3. 5 0 1 0 6

OTHER 0 0 6 0 6 2 0 0 0 2

TOTAL 15 8 17 3 43 162 108 99 71 440

-.1N i DENT I AL.

Inci 6w ... '

CON FID ENTIAL

EkIY LOSSES

UJNIL AUG SEP OCT TOT JUL AUG SEP WOT TOT

2-47 47 74 57 83 261 5 6 1 2 14

2-60 48 55 39 47 189 C 3 2 2 7

5-60 81 64 84 82 311 4 12 5 2 23

6-31 OP CON TO 22 38 60 Of M.TO 18 4 229TH IT• DIV 9TH INF DI•

3-7 15 24 RETURNED TO 39 0 8 ,ETURMED TO 8199TH LIB 199th LIB

B/3-17 72 65 22 32 191 1 0 0 1 2

RA1IGER 20 16 16 24 76 1 0 2 2 5

ARTY 48 70 23 26 167 0 0 0 0 0

A/F 12 37 9 19 77 0 0 0 0 0

ARC 47 48 69 21 185 0 0 0 0 0

OTHER - 0 *6 6 __ C _ 0o 0

TLYIAL 391 453 352 388 1584 11 29 28 13 81

li01 C%tlms

U•'1T JUJL AUG SEP OCT TOTAL

2-47 0 1 0 0 !

2-60 1 1 0 0 2

5-60 2 3 0 2 '7

6-31 OP CON TO 0 1 19TH INF DIV

3-7 0 1 RETURIMD TO 199TH LIB

B/3-17 0 0 0 0 0

CONfIDENTI TL

13 0 0 1

AIM 0 0 0

T CrAL 3 7 0 3

aC.NPI DE~NTI AL

COWI-DE NTIAL

8a3 Ala LIASM-amo ..Ti P JL AUG SEP---OCMISSIONS 6A 1218 3110 3197 8158

BCV3 272 '1 243.1 231.2 290.0 I °37.0(TONS)

N, 20 60 91 J.•BOI.

BLDGS DST 32 21 2/. 31 108

BLDGS DAM 7 1 0 0 a

BNMS DEST 223 229 205 352 I0

MO DAYAM 32 3 G 0 35

amA (BC) 15 1-•0 11 41

KBA (POSS) 6 0 0 0 6

SEC EPL 3 3 4 '13

SAMPAiNS DFST 3 7 6 i, 27

FIGHTING 164 163 28 57 412POSITIONS DEST

Inc!N 7FTU L

mnc 7

iI

uM, U FA' I; 1 I !-ED ________

s..- unty Clas..llo. a.lionDOCUMENT COMNTA. R D 0

(Sec..r.iy rlamtilirclion of tille, body of abastact and IndSEMt al* muxt he wnte'd whe lhc o-.il rthe ep i,

o iGINA TING AC 1. V V1 IY (Cotpot.t. .autor) I2 c I t)o=i I I Y . .

CONFIDENTIALJOQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310 zb. (IrOuD

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

O ESDCRIPTIVE NOTE•S T•Tp of report and inclueliv datt.)

.•xteriences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Jul 69 to 3] Oct 69.S•o1 'O.$ First.•mefl. middle Initial. laet name)1O, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

SPEPORT DATE 7a. TOTAL NO Oý PAGE$ 7ib. NO. OF RPFS

15 No'vember 1969 62 62 -C1ONTRACT OR GRANT NO S. ORIGINATOR'S REPORI NUMBERIM1

b. -O9JECY NO. 694175NIA

Ob. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that m•ay be assigndI.

this report)

,0. ODISTRIBUTION * "ATEIENT

I SUPPLEMAENTARY NOTES U2. SPONSORINO MILITARY AC',IVI -

N/A OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

I:ABSTRACT

* I

Zi -

58

FDRM" UNCLASSIFIEDDDI rNov C'I'7 s

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