DOCID: 3860893

&liGRE=Fi'RiO<LENi l(EYl 16LEffl<1 Cryptologic Quarterly

(U) A Partial History of ELINT at NSA I I (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

{U) Introduction

(U) What is electronic intelligence, or ELINT? It is primarily information derived from electron­ic signals that do not contain speech or text (which are COMINT). The "official" description, from the National Security Council Directive No. 17 in 1955, is "the term EUNT is defined as the collection (observation and recording), and the technical processing for later intelligence purpos­es, of information on foreign, non-communica­tions, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation sources."1

~ ELINT has two major branches. One branch is technical ELINT (TechELINT), which describes the signal structure, emission charac­teristics, modes of operation, emitter functions, and weapons systems associations of such emit­ters as radars, beacons, jammers, and navigation­al signals. TechELINT intelligence products sup­port DoD electronic warfare programs; weapons threat and vulnerability assessments; and the design, development, and updating of electronic protection systems. TechELINT is also critical to providing the necessary information to build OpELINT signal collections systems.

~ The other major branch is operational ELINT (OpELINT), which concentrates on locat­ing specific ELINT targets and providing the operational timeline of the emitters. These loca­tional results of OpELINT analysis are commonly called electronic order of battle (EOB). OpELINT also provides threat assessments, often referred to as "tactical ELINT." OpELINT intelligence products are an integral part of the military oper­ations planning and tactics used by military com­manders on the battlefield. OpELINT often pro­vides the commander in the field with an indica­tion of troop movement. Many of these produ~ts

are time sensitive - often measured in minutes and sometimes seconds.

(U) Background

(U) ELINT had its start in World War II, with the invention and use of radar by the Allies and the Axis. The U.S. Army Air Forces had a keen interest in ELINT since they used most German radars at the time to target Allied bombers over Germany, and the air forces wanted to know as much about these radars as possible - including how to evade, "jam," or "spoof' them. The Americans and the British started intercepting those radar signals, and ELINf was born.

fet- Immediately after WWII, the USAF in Europe (USAFE) embarked on an aggressive TechELINT and OpELINT program, including establishing solid and expansive cooperative pro­grams with several foreign partners. This pro­gram was called CREEK ARCH, and USAFE pro­vided extensive financial and equipment support to several of the NATO countries.

(U/~) When NSA was formed in 1952, consideration was given to including ELINT as well as COMINT as part of NSA's charter. None of the DoD military departments wanted that. It is well known that Lieutenant General Ralph Canine, USA, designated director of NSA at that time, felt that managing the DoD COMINT efforts would be enough of a challenge for NSA. Thus, at that time NSA received authority to process and analyze only COMINT signals, not noncommuni­cation signals such as radar and telemetry.

(U//~ DoD ELINT, however, was as much in need of coordination and management as COMINT in the 1950s, particularly a more cohesive signal analysis and processing effort. In

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1952 DoD had set up the Anny-Navy Electronics Evaluation Group (ANEEG) to be housed at the Navy's Nebraska Avenue Station, by coincidence the headquarters of NSA at the time. The ANEEG, staffed with about thirty people, had only informal coordinating collection powers, but was a centralized analysis point for processing and analysis of ELINT intercepts, and a focal point for coordination of ELINT "difficult analy­tic problems."

~In 1957, as ELINT processing problems grew, ANEEG was redesignated the National Technical Processing Center (NTPC); it was under the USAF Air Staff at the time and admin­istratively was designated AFCIN-Z. Thus, in addition to Army and Navy participation, the NTPC had key participants from the USAF. CIA also became a full participant and filled many of the key positions. CIA was then running some special sites and the U-2 program, which had ELINT packages as well as photographic sensors.

(U/7F~t19t As early as 1954, various presi­dential-level committees reviewing intelligence recommended that ELINT be brought under NSA's purview.2 Both the Mark Clark subcom-

mittee of the Hoover Commission in 1954 and the William 0. Baker committee in 1957 made such a recommendation. The Baker committee efforts culminated in the issuance of National Security Council Directive (NSCID) No. 6, "Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence," in early 1958. NSCID No. 6 gave NSA many ELINT powers. 3

(U) The Beginnings of ELINT at NSA

(U / ~ DOD Directive S-3115.2, "Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)," of March 19, 1959, implemented NSCID No. 6 and put NSA in business within DOD.4 One of the first actions taken by NSA in response to the DoD ELINT directive (S-3115.2) and DOD Directive S-5100.20, "The National Security Agency," of March 19, 1959, was to incorporate the NTPC at Nebraska Avenue into NSA as COSA-5, the Non­communications Signals Analysis and Processing Division. COSA-5 was headed by Mr. John Llbbert, the former chief of the NTPC. Figure 1 shows the COSA-5 organization in 1960.5 NTPC then had somewhat fewer than 100 people. This writer was at that time assigned to the Office of Analytic Equipment Development (ANEQ) to

UNCLASSIFIED//~R QFFICJ~ USE OMLY

COSA-5 1 September 1959

NON-COMMUNICATIONS SIGNALS ANALYSIS AND PROCESSING DIVISION

Chief John E. Libbert

I I I I 501-Admin.

1

502 - Tech Support

I 503 - Advanced

I I 504 - Customer

Supp. Grp Grp Techniques Grp Relations Grp I I I I

51 - Space Vehicle and 52 - General Studies and 53 - Sensitive Material Mission Sigital Analysis Analysis Branch Analysis Branch

Branch

UNCLASSIFIED//Ptlft Of'HCtM:: USE QNb¥

(U) Fig. 1. COSA-5, 1959

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.. survey the status of "data processing" and visited several ELINT field sites, theater processing cen­ters, and R&D activities, and published the results in 1960.

~ NSA began various ELINT research and development activities. Some were at the direc­tion of DoDR&E, Dr. Eugene Fubini, who was a staunch supporter of ELINT and of NSA having a strong role in guiding the DoD ELINT R&D activ­ities. The NSA/R SIGINT Plans and Programs Group reviewed the new NSA ELINT responsibil­ities and several of the R&D activities of the mili­tary departments, but the departments were slow in responding to the NSA requests. 6

~ In addition to adding NTPC to the NSA organization, NSA also offered several people in the USAFE organization opportunities to join NSA; they took the lead to develop the first NSA National ELINT Plan (NEP), distributed on 8 February 1966. This plan was updated regularly and produced up until 1985. NSA also produced a comprehensive ELINT Manual in 1965 for com­munity use, particularly in training new ELINT analytic personnel. 7 Some of the DoD military departments and combat commands were not greatly enthused about NSA's new responsibili­ties, and many "management" problems and pro­cedures developed.

~ The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was long used to doing ELINT business "my way" but soon developed a productive and cooperative set of arrangements with NSA. SAC operated the RB-47 reconnaissance fleet and later the RIVET JOINT aircraft. It maintained an ELINT process­ing center operated by the 544th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Offutt AFB at Omaha, Nebraska.

here were theater ELINT cen-

part of the overall DoD ELINT structure devel­oped byNSA.

(U) ELINT at NSA Gains So~1) Strength .• (b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOU8' National Security Council Directive No. 6 was updated in 1972. It combined COMINT and ELINT, was/ retitled "Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)," and formed the founda­tion for NSA/CSS.8 The new NSCID No. 6 gave NSA/CSS even more ELINT powers.

(U//FOUO) Based orrthe new NSCID No. 6 concepts, SIG INT within DoD was implemented by Directive 5100.20, already issued in 1971, and commonly referred to as the "NSA Charter."9 The DoD directive charged NSA with responsibility of managing SIGINT within DoD, and specifically defined SIGINT as including COMINT, ELINT, and TELINT. (Although never changed officially, the term TELINT :has fallen into disuse and has been replaced by FISINT - short for foreign instrumentation signals intelligence - which includes telemetry, missile and satellite com­mand signals, and missile and satellite beacons.)

(U / /ffiUO+.- COSA, which had changed its designator to "C," and elements of the R&D organization were merged to form W Group in 1971. The Group was named the Electronic Intelligence and Systems Management Group within the NSA "Production" (read SIGINT) or anization and was headed byl I

.Technical ELINT was centralized in .....,,.,.,.....-..--- and included the

o ect1on and analysis set .... o ........ p""'r ... oJ""'e ........ s,.... .......... n .... e .... r ....... .,,..s1gnals se.arch and develop-

ment, including ELINT signals,iwas worked in W3 under Mr. David\ Wolfand. Operational

ELINT was fqc.used. in. W 4./ •. /headed by Mr. I JAll NSA systeurs development for ELINT was managed in W7, the Micr~~e

/ Space and Mobile S·y···.s··.··t. em··. ·s·'··· ... O ... •.· .. ·.·.ffice, he·a···d····e··' by Mr. I .......... ----.---,,.........,,.....---...,....---....... 1 lws, headed by Mr. that also eventually became an integral

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o\

......,.,._ ......... luwa:s uthe Sp~~i~ u s;stems Office (read "overhead").

(U / /~ The "W" organization structure provided a fairly cohesive set of people and man­agers that NSA used to manage DoD ELINT col­lection through processing, including the deve­lopment of new systems for ELINT use. It also provided a central NSA focal point for the DoD Science and Technology (S&T) Centers and the JCS Joint and Specified Commands to interface with NSA. Similarly, W Group made for a cohe­sive way to develop the ELINT portion of the Combined Cryptologic Program (CCP) and bud­gets with the DoD military departments. TELINT, closely related to ELINT, was focused in

Wt, headed b~ I the Advanced Weapons and Space Systems/ Office. Figure 2

shows the organizational chcut for W Group in 1970.

(S//'fK) With the advent of successful over­head ELINT, it became obvious the volume of data available from space !collection presented new challenges to NSA. Intermixed with thou­sands of routine emissions .were the high-interest military systems. In the mid-196os NSA provided money and people (Mr. Clau ~ ~an inte) to the USAF program office to deve op the Mission Analysis and Data Services (MADS) subsystem. Proper exploitation of the collected data caused NSA to form the NSA Support Detachment (NSD)

UNCLASSIFIED/ fl"QR QR'l~IAI. ~it~ Q~ w !

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE AND SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT GROUP

I Chief, W I ~ I I I I I

Manage- System Operations Intelligence Target (l

ment Development Staff & Reporting System & Project 1'

Staff &Tech Staff Staff Analysis Center

I I I I I Wt W2 W4 W5 W6 W7 ws

Advanced Technical Opera- Field Fixed HF Space & Special Weapons& El.INT tional Support Systems Mobile Systems

Space ELINT Systems Systems

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Operational Analysis &

Target System

Analysis

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(U) Fig. 2. W Group, 1970

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I A complete ........ ...-~---. ........ ----..~.....-~~---. ......... ~~ history of the development of the use of satellites for ELINT from the GRAB beginning until about 1975 can be found in NRO's The SIGINT Satellite Story, published in 1994.10

(Sj/~I<)

(S//TK) In 1970, to support the new chal­lenges from overhead, NSA established a special APS (Advanced Processing System) budget for overhead

/-I ,_..._._,,

u I .Ln.JI

~ni 1974 the USAFE CREEK ARCH pro­gram was fully integrated into the NSA system, a.nd this effort was later combined with the NSA en ineerin su ort office

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36' 'fSl In 1977 management of the CIA-spon-

sored SIGINT/ELINT arrangements with many other countries was transferred to NSA. CIA con­tinued to have a smaller but active program under the Office of SIGINT Operations (OSO). Special ELINf data processing was performed by the SAD (Signal Analysis Division), now called the CAC {Collection Analysis Center). In the late 1970s and early 1980s at NSA, ELINT data were

•processed and anal ed b the W 2 organization, headed b and later by Dr.

igm icant e. ort was put on searching for rtew ELINT signals\and processing such new data by the Office of Search, W3, head­ed by Dr. w·.. :Thayer. /operational ELINT was focused in W 4, headed b~ I (U) The 1980s - The Highlight Years

·~The 1980s can be/considered the golden age for ELINT. With N$A (W2) controlling the overall world of ELINT,this period led\to many innovations. Figure 3 •shows the NSA "W" Operations Analysis Group where TechELINT and ELINT search functions were focused. OpELINT had been placed back in the appropri­ate "country" SIGINT(a.nalysis organization, e.g., "A" Group for Soviet/ELINT targets. Later in the i198os OpELINT was.brought back into W Group, ! as shown in Figure 4.

(SI (TIC) I I

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TEBAC

UNCLASSIFIED//F6R 6FFl61AL l::ISE 9NLY

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Director, Def/SMAC

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~ ---------I Chief Gordon H. Stark I

MARCH1981

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I Missiles & Space

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Analysis

I I Wo7 Wo2 Wo4

Electronic Warfare ELINT Technology Plans & Operations Technology & Support Staff

I I I I Wt W2 W3 W4 .

Missiles & Space ELINT Technology Search Operational ELINT

UNCLASSIFIED/7'f'8R 8FFISM.b :YSI!; Ql)il:U::

(U) Fig. 4. W Group, 1986

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~e need to keep track of U.S. and friend-ly force systems (blue forces) and other noncom­munist-developed radars that could be threats (grey forces) was recognized and resulted in the creation of the Blue-Grey database. New databa­ses were also created in the area of wartime reserve modes (WARM).

{121" A workable shared analysis effort was established among the service science and tech­nology centers, and W2. The W2 National Technical Processing Center (NTPC) developed many new in-house analysis programs and tech­niques that were disseminated to the S&T analy­sis centers, and new techniques came from the S&T centers to NSA. Yearly conferences, address­ing both technical and operational ELINT, were

held to disseminate fofonnation, discuss current threat systems, and ' project potential future threats and ways to combat them.

·. : ; · ..

/. ~Excellent working relations were estab-lished • with the tactical air warlare center

i(TAWC), which was responsible for developing ·· tactics and testing radar warning receivers, jam-

mers and missile "seekers" to destroy threat sys-terns.

~ j

• ~The synergy of this activity enabled the

U.S. to define the USSR threat and develop war plans to defeat it.

(U) The Early 1990s - And The Soviet Target Collapsed

(U /~In the early 1990s there were sev­eral changes to ELINT analysis focus within W Group. In 1991 W Group had a major reorganiza­tion that created several target-focused divisions. These divisions were responsible for analysis and reporting using all available ELINT, FIS, and PROFORMA on their targets. The divisions com­prised both signals and intelligence analysts from the former W Group offices. While detailed tech­nical reporting of signal characteristics remained as part of the divisions, overall analysis based on all SIGINf, and appropriate supporting collater­al, was added to their mission.

(U/~ In 1994 W Group had another major reorganization and formed a number of inte1ligence topic focused offices. FIS and Tech ELINf were focused in W9W, the Space and Weapons Technologies Office. Responsibility for

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OpELINr was primarily in W9M, the Military Applications Office.

r.i'i/

(U) ELINT in Trouble

;e)'By 1996 it was clear that the fiscal and per­sonnel reductions in the intelligence community had severely affected the community's capability to conduct TechELINT. A DoD-CIA task force conducted a study for the Weapons and Space Systems Subcommittee CW ASSC) of the National SIGINT Committee CSIGCOM) and showed that the communi had reduced the ELINT bud et of

One aspect was t e recogmtion t at t e S are Analysis Agreement between DIA, CIA, and NSA, which had governed ELINT analysis responsibili­ties for many years, was no longer appropriate. A community team was organized to develop a new construct to better serve the needs of customers under the severe resource constraints that exist­ed. The outcome was the Community ELINT Signals Analysis Partnership CCESAP), in which ELINT data distribution, analysis, and reporting were assigned to a specific analytic center based on a combination of factors. These factors includ­ed the analytic center mission, resources to do the work, and successful progress on already assigned work. All of the centers accepted respon­sibility to do all of what needed to be done on a particular data set, even if some of the results were in support of another center's customers. Actual implementation of the CESAP took many

months to achieve due to the need to develop a database to direct and monitor the activity.

"'81'In 1997 the community held a TechELINT and FISINT review co-chaired by Lieutenant General John Gordon, USAF, the assistant DCI for military support, and Ambassador Lynn Hansen, National Intelligence Council vice chair­man for evaluation. The meeting, titled "The Technical Weapons Intelligence Meeting," also deplored the general analytic situation and called for action onthe budget and personnel fronts and on community ELINT and FIS management and processes.12 Things were soon to get even worse.

(U) A Reinvigorated Community Approach

CU /1'fOU~ In April of 1998, Congress direct­ed an ELINT study, and the A/DCI for Collection, Mr. Charles Allen, was assigned the action. The DCI staff and SecDef staff conducted the study. A key action from the resulting study was for NSA /to prepare an ELINT Business Plan, which was

.· accomplished in October 2000. The primary out-come took place January 2001 when OASDI and the DDCI directed that a Community ELINT Management Organization (CEMO) be housed at NSA.13 The OASDI letter started out: "Electronic Intelligence CELINT) is a major cornerstone of America's Information Superiority." One of the several functions of the CEMO is to insure that the ELINT architecture is consistent with the Unified Cryptologic Architecture (UCA) and inte­grated into the Cryptologic Mission Management (CMM) activities and actions.

()ff During 1999 the NSA Business Plan that includes ELINT (as well as COMINT, FIS, and PROFORMA) was completed and forwarded to the Community Management Staff. In 2000 the NSA Office of Weapons and Space was restruc­tured to be better aligned with the ELINT busi­ness plan and the TechELINT process. TechELINT, OpELINT, FISINT, and PROFOR­MA were all included within PIW. This office is

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UNCLASSIFIED//POR OP PlCD\L tm!I'! ~~t:Y

Financial OFFICE OF WEAPONS & SPACE Manager

(DF1) (S2J)

Telemetry Beaconry Staff DSOC L_ Analysis Committee -- (S2Jo9) PMO (TEBAC) (S2Jo9) /

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I I .·· I Target

Technical .. /

Research& DEFS-

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Community MAC SIG INT tional

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(S2J1) (S2J3) (s2J4)

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(U) Fig. S.OWS, 2003

now designated S2J, the Office of Weapons and Space, initially headed b~ lwith little change in mission or function except to include the elements of the Research and Technology Directorate that were transferred to .· the SIGINT Directorate in 2001. Figure 5 shows the current organization of the office.

Cryptologic Quarterly

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//

Acquisition Pr.ogram Manager

(DAtE)

/ .. ···

W&SSenior Enlisted Advisor

I

Technical SIG INT Support (S2J5)

EBf/l'It) In the fall of 2001, Weapons and Space (W&S), in cooperation with the Community ELINT Management Office (CEMO) and the ELINT Program Management Office (PMO), embarked on an initiative to create a technical SIG INT Center of Excellence in Denver. This initiative was part and parcel of ongoing plans to rebuild and revitalize the nation's Technical SIGINT missionto improve support to both national-level customers and the tactical war fighter.

(Sf/l'K) Following discussions with NSA sen­iors in early 2003, planning and implementation

(Si/'fKt- In January 2002, after several months of study and analysis, culminating in a community meeting chaired by the DCI assistant director for collection, Mr. Charles Allen, it was decided to focus and significantly strengthen

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I lwin be a place where actionable intelli-gence requirements are addressed. It will also become a center of "Technical SIGINT" (ELINT, FIS, and PROFORMA) knowledge and expertise where future analysts will be trained.

(U) Notes

1. "(U) QUIS CUSTODIET JPSOS CUSTODES?" Cryptologic Almanac: 5oth Anniversary Series, 2

May 2002, David A. Hatch. (TS/SJ) (Discusses the Herbert Hoover Commission report of 1954 and the Baker report of 1957)

2. (U) American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945 -1989, CCH-E32-95-03 (TCS- 54-649-95), CCH-854-98-01, and CCH-854-99-01, Thomas R Johnson. (TS/SI/TK)

3. (U) NSCJD No.17, Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), dated 16 May 1955. (First national policy document specifically outlining ELINT policy. Established the National Technical Processing Center as a joint DoD/CIA organization administered by DoD.)

4. (U)(Revised) DoD Directive S-3115.2 "Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)," dated March 19,1959. (S) (Replaced DoD Directive S-3115.2 of July 13, 1955, and spelled out NSA, JCS, Joint Commands, and Military Departments functions on ELINT.)

5. (U)DoD Directive S-5100.20, "The National Security Agency," dated March 19, 1959. (S) (Implemented NSCID No. 6 of September 15, 1958, within DoD. Among other actions, transferred the National Technical Processing Center and the Electronic Intelligence Coordinating Group estab­lished by DOD Directive S-3115.2 of July 13, 1955, to NSA.)

6. (U) Introductory Report on ELINT Data Processing - A sub-task of ANEQ Task 350- 7704 (BERLIN) of R/D Project 04-08 (Advanced Processing Techniques), 27 March 1961. (S) ,. 7. (U) ELINT Manual, published by NSA in June

1965. (S) (One of the actions as a response to NSA's training responsibilities under DoD Directive S-3115.2)

8. (U) (Revised) NSCID No. 6of17February1972, and retitled as "Signals Intelligence."(S) (Amp,ng other

responsibilities, it charged NSA to conduct ELINT activities to support electronic warfare activities in a manner that permitted immediate operational use of the information.)

9. (U)(Revised) DoD Directive 5100.20 "The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service," dated December 23, 1971. (U) (Replaced S-5100.20 of March 19, 1959, and S-3115.2 of February 4, 1967. The 1971 version was completely declassified by DoD on May 22, 1990. Defined TELINT as part of SIG­INT and clarified NSA's responsibilities.)

10. (U) The SIGINT Satellite Story, NRO BYE 9197/94, December 1994. (TOP SECRET NOFORN ORCON Handle via BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE­COMINT Control Channels Jointly)

lt. (U) WASSC Study, "Coping With the Electronic Battlefield: A Review of Technical Electronic Intelligence Production Processes," 1 April 1996. (S) (Note: The WSSAG functions are now performed by the National Emitter, Weapons, and Space Subcommittee (NEWSS) of the National SIGINT Committee (SIGCOM) of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

12. (U) Lt Gen John A. Gordon, USAF, Memorandum for the Record, "(U) Results of the Technical Weapons Intelligence Meeting," dated 21 April 1997 (TS//COMINT/TK//X1)

13. (U) Arthur L. Money, ASDC3I and Joan A.

Dempsey DDCI/CM Letter, "Creation of the Community ELINT Management Office (CEMO) (FOUO)," dated 4 January 2001. (Letter to CIA and DoD components - Military Departments, JCS, NSA, DIA, and NRO) establishing CEMO and directing CIA and DoD components to support the effort; NSA DIRGram -159: "Establishment of the Community ELINT Management Office (CEMO)," issued 12 February 2001, Lt Gen Michael Hayden, USAF (U//FOUO)

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