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Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

tZ ZOTO- 7 -L)

Report No. 7443-SU

STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT

SUDAN

KHARTOUM - PORT 'UDAN RCAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

NOVEMBER 14, 1989

Infrastructure Operations DivisionEastern Africa DepartmentAfrica Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfonnance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

The official currency unit in the Sudan is the Sudanese Pound.

Official Rate US$1.00 = £Sd. 4.5

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 Meter = 3.28 Feet (ft)1 Kilometer (km) = 0.62 Miles (mi)1 Square Kilometer (km2 ) = 0.386 Square mile (sq. mi)1 Kilogram (kg) = 2.2 Pounds (lbs)1 Metric ton (ton) = 2,205 pounds (lbs)

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AADT Average Annual Daily TrafficCAD Civil Aviation DepartmentCBR California Bearing RatioESA Equivalent Standard AxleHOIS Highway Organization and Investment StudyKfW Kreditanstalt fur WiederaufbarMHCPW Ministry of Housing, Construction and Public WorksMFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic PlanningMOT Ministry of TransportNGO Non-governmental OrganizationODA Overseas Development Administration (UK)PMS Pavement Management SystemPPU Project Planning Unit, Ministry of Finance and

Economic PlanningRCC Revolutionary Command CouncilRBPC Road and Bridges Public CorporationRERP Railways Emergency Recovery ProgramRTC River Transport CorporationSAC Sudan Airways CorporationSPC Sea Ports CorporationSRC Sudan Railways CorporationUSAID U.S. Agency for International DevelopmentVOC Vehicle Operating Costs

FISCAL YEAR

Government July 1 - June 30RBPC July 1 - June 30

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUDANKhartoum - Port Sudan Road Rehabilitation Project

Staff ApPraisal Report

Table of Contents

Page No.

CREDIT AND PROJECT SUMMARY ......................................... iv

I. THE TRANSPORT SECTOR ................................................ 1

A. Country Background and Economic Setting ......................... 1B. The Transport System ............................................ 2C. Role of Transport in the Economy ................................ 5D. Government Policy and Transport Issues .......................... 6E. Past Bank Group Transport Sector Operations .................... 10F. Bank Strategy .................................................. 12G. Rationale for Bank Group Involvement ........................... 12

II. THE HIGHWAY SUBSECTOR .............................................. 13

A. The Network .................................................... 13B. The Highway Authority - The Roads & Bridges Public Corporation.17C. Axle Load Regulation and Road Safety ........................... 25D. Road Transport ................................................ 26

tIII THE PROJECT.29ITI. TEPOCT........................................................ 2

A. Project Origin and Preparation ............................ ._29B. Project Objectives ...... 31C. Project Description ...... 31D. Cost Estimates ...... _'E. Financing ...... 37F. Implementation ...... 38G. Procurement ...... 38H. Disbursements ...... 39I. Accounting, Auditing and Reporting Requirements ...... 413. Environmental Aspects .......................................... 42

IV. EC,ONOMIC EVALUATION ...... 43

A. General ...... 42B. Traffic on Khartoum-Port Sudan Road ...... 43C. Economic Analysis ...... 44D. Risks ................. ;46

V. RECOMMENDATIONS ....................... 48

This report was prepared on the basis of missions in March and June 1988 byJane E. M. Holt (Mission Leader and Sr. Financial Analyst), Eduard Irgens(Highway Engineer) and Djordje Jovanovic (Sr. Transport Economist). Projectpreparation was financed by an IDA-administered grant from the Kingdom ofNorway to the Republic of Sudan.

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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ANNEX I - Tables

Table 2.1 Existing Constructed RoadsTable 2.2 Roads Under Construction or Proposed for ConstructionTable 2.3 Project Ranking by NPVTable 2.4 Highway Investment ProgramTable 2.5 Revenue Collection from the Road SectorTable 2.6 Road Traffic Accidents in Sudan, 1973-83Table 2.7 Fuel Supply and Vehicle Fleet

Table 3.1 Implementation Schedule

ANNEX II - FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Residual Life (1986) in ESA8O and in YearsFigure 2.2 RBPC Organization Chart

ANNEX III RBPC Equipment Inventory

ANNEX IV Institutional Support for RBPC -Outlined Terms of Reference

ANNEX V Terms of Reference for the Development of anAxle Load Control System

ANNEX VI Rescue Equipment

ANNEX VII Outlined Terms of Reference for the Development andImplementation of a Pavement Management System

ANNEX VIII Agreed Action Plans for Implementation of a RoadClassification System and RBPC Organizational Changes

IBRD Map Number 21991

- iii-

DOCUMENTS IN THE FILE

1. Highway Organization and Investment Study (HOIS), Final Report ofSeptember 1987, Norconsult.

2. Technical and Economic Feasibility Study for Khartoum - Wad MedaniRoad Corridor (The Global Study), Final Report by Dar Al ilandasah.

3. Road Toll Feasibility Study by Transport and Communications Sectionof the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, July 1987.

4. Port Sudan Road. Final ReRort Phase I, Norconsult and Newtech,December 1988.

5. Port Sudan Road. Draft Final Report Phase I. Revised section onBridges, Norconsult, October 198S.

6. Port Sudan Road Rehabilitation Project - Detailed Engineering andFinal Bidding Documents, Norconsult and Newtech, September 1989.

7. Sudan TraL1sport Study, 1974.

8. Road Maintenance Programme, Final Report, Louis Berger InternationalInc., September 1979.

9. Feeder Road Master Plan, Norconsult A/S, 1979

10. Transport Statistical Bulletin 1980/81 - Transport and CommunicationSection, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, March 1982.

11. Projects Seeking Financing Report (Project Identification) -Transport and Communications Sector, Ministry of Finance and EconomicPlanning, May 1982.

12. Assessment of Past Performance 1977-81, Transport and Communications- Transport and Communications Sector, Ministry of Finance andEconomic Planning, April 1982.

13. Impact of Domestic Petroleum Production on the Transport in theSudan, Transport and Communications Sector, Ministry of Finance andEconomic Planning, November 1981,

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SUDAN

KHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

CREDIT AND PROJECT SUMMARY

Borrowers The Republic of Sudan

Beneficiary: Roads and Bridges Public Corporation (RBPC)

Amount: SDR 65.7 Million (US$82.2 Million equivalent)

Terms: Standard with 40 years maturity

Project Description: The Project consists of:

(a) Road Construction: reconstruction of 70 kmand overlay of about 500 km ofdeteriorating sections of the Khartoum-PortSudan Road that would otherwise becandidates for costly reconstruction in afew years; repairs to one hundred or sobridges along the road; constructionsupervision; completion of a roadconstruction component under the SecondHighways Project.

(b) Axle Load Control System: implementationof an Axle Load Control System, includingprovision of technical assistance andtraining, rescue vehicles and dataprocessing equipment, construction andequipping of permanent and mobileweighbridges.

(c) Pavement Management System: implementationof a Pavement Management System includingprovision of technical assisLance andtraining.

(d) Institutional Support for RBPC:continuation of technical assistance andtraining begun in previous proJects tosupport RBPC's maintenance capability andgeneral institutional development.

Benefits: The main benefits from the road rehabilitatiunwill be savings in vehicle operating costs.The Government will also benefit by avoidingotherwise even costlier road reconstruction andby implementing the Project's institutionalmeasures. Additional benefits will result fromtime savings and improved road safety but theyare difficult to quantify. The major directbeneficiaries of the reduced transport costs andimproved road safety will be truck and busowners/operators and passenger car owners. TheAxle Load Control System will reduce overloadingand prevent premature deterioration of thereconstructed road. The Pavement ManagementSystem will enable RBPC and Government to bettermonitor and plan maintenance for its paved Loadsystem.

Riskss The major risk of the Project relates to theinstitutional measures. The Axle Load ControlSystem may not be successful due to possibleopposition from road transport users, failure ofRBPC and the Police to carry out fully theproposed system, or general socic-behavioralfactors. Similarly, RBPC's implementation ofthe Pavement Management System may not besuccessful because of possible organizationaland managerial weaknesses. These risks arereduced by the fact that technical assistancebegun under the Highways III Project will becontinued under the Project to provideinstitutional support and by the recognized needfor these measures and the strong commitmentsgiven both by RBPC and Government to implementthem.

Proiect Financing Plan: GOS US$ 16.1 MillionIDA US$ 82.2 MillionKfW US$ 16.1 Million

US$114.4 Million

Economic Rate of Returns 36Z

President Report: Report No. P-4898-SU, Dated November 1, 1989

Mans No. IBRD 21991

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Estimated Costs a/ LOCAL FOREIGN TOTAL----(US$ Million)----

Road Construction 12.0 73.5 85.5

Khartoum-Port Sudan Road Rehabilitation 11.1 55.7 66.8Constraction Supervision 0.9 2.2 3.1Completion of Jebel Aulia - Ed DueimRoad Construction 0.0 15.6 15.6

Implementation of an Axle Load Control Syetem 0.3 2.7 3.0

Construction of weighbridges 0.3 0.7 1.0Weighbridge Equipment 0.0 0.6 0.6Technical Assistance and Training 0.0 0.4 0.4Road Safety and Rescue Equipment 0.0 1.0 1.0

Implementation of a Pavement Management System 0.0 0.8 0.8

Equipment 0.0 0.2 0.2Technical Assistance & Training 0.0 0.6 0.6

Institutional Support for RBPC 0.0 1.4 1.4

Technical Assistance 0.0 1.2 1.2Training 0.0 0.2 0.2

BASE COST 12.3 78.2 90.5

Contingencies 3.8 20.1 23.9

Physical Contingencies 1.4 7.7 9.1Price Contingencies 2.4 12.4 14.8

TOTAL PROJECT COSTS 16.1 98.3 114.4

a/ Net of duties and taxes.

Financing Plan: LOCAL FOREIGN TOTAL----(US$ Million)----

Government 16.1 0.0 16.1

KfW 0.0 16.1 16.1

IDA 0.0 82.2 82.2

TOTAL 16.1 98.3 114.4

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PROCUREMENT METHOD AND DISBURSEMENTS

PROJECT PROCUREMENT METHOD TOTAL COST

ICe LCB OTHERTotal IDA Total IDA Total IDA Total IDA

------------------------------------------------------------------- ___--------__-------

CIVIL WORKS

Khartoum-Port Sudan RoadRehabilitation 88.1 665. 8k.1 58.6Construction ofWeigh-bridges 1.8 0.7 1.8 0.7Completion of Jebel Aulia-Ed Dueim Road Construction 0.0 0.0 156. 1656 156.8 1S.8

EQUIPMENT

Axle Load Control System -Weighbridges and Equipment 2.0 2.0 0.1 0.1 2.1 2.1

Pavement Management System -Equipment 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8

CONSULTANT SERVICES ond TRAINING

Construction Supervision 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1Axle Load Control System -TA and Training 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2

Pavement Management System -TA and Trining 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8

Institutional Support for RBPCTA and Training 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1

--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------__-------

TOTAL 91.7 68.7 0.1 0.1 22.6 8.1 114.4 82.2------------------------------------------------------------------ __---------..--- -----

3. Disbursements

3.1 Except for con.sultant services and training, of which most costsare foreign, the Credit will be disbursed against foreign cost only; theGovernment will be funding local costs. The Credit will be disbursed asfollows:

AMOUNT(USl=TTTTon)

A. Civil Works 100% of Foreign Expenditures

B. Equipment and spare parts 100X of Foreign Expenditures

C. Consultant Services and Training 100X of Total Expenditures

ESTIMATED IDA DISBURSEMENTSIDA FISCAL YEAR

90 91 92 93 94-------------US$ million…-------------

IDA Credit

Annual 25.2 19.8 27.0 9.0 1.2Cumulative 25.2 45.0 72 81 82.2

SUDAN

KHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

Staff Appraisal Report

I. THE TRANSPORT SECTOR

A. Country Background and Economic Setting

1.0i With an area of 2.5 million (m) square kilometers, Sudan is thelargest country in Africa with a population of about 23 m and a per capitaGNP in 1988 of US$330. Nearly one-third of the land is desert or semi-desert and much of the country is sparsely populated. About two-thirds ofthe land area is suitable for crop or pastoral production. The economy isheavily dependent on exports of cotton, livestock, groundnuts, sesame dndgum arabic. The manufacturing sector is relatively small, and thecountry's infrastructure is weak.

1.02 Sudan currently faces an extremely difficult economic situation,which is the consequence of a ciril war and econoric mismanagement,aggravated by three years of drought and a major flood in 1988. Economicmismanagement stems from controls on the private sector, born out ofmistrust of market mechanisms and an over-extended and inefficient publicsector.

1.03 Economic performance over the past decade has been poor. GDP grewby only 1 percent per annum over this period. As a result, per capitaincome and consumption fell to levels well below those prevailing in theearly 1970's. Agriculture grew at barely one-half of one percent perannum. Poverty and malnutrition are now widespread. Traditional foodsecurity structures and the health care delivery system have virtuallycollapsed. Severe shortages of essential production inputs and consuniergoods are commonplace. Investment, as a proportion of GDP, has decreasedsignificantly. Infrastructure is in a serious state of disrepair.National savings have declined sharply, with public savings substantiallynegative throughout the decade. The financing of the budget deficits(averaging about 11 percent of GDP since the beginning of the 1980's) andof large losses of parastatals has placed severe demands on the bankingsystem and led to rapid monetery expansion. This has fueled levels ofinflation between 25 and 45 percent per annum. The real value of importsand exports has sharply declined. The country has accumLlated a largeforeign debt of around US$12 billion, of which arrears amount to half ofthe total.

1.04 Between 19;4 and 1984, the Government entered into a series ofagreements with the IMF, and received policy-based IDA credits in 1980 and1983. These attempted reforms generally failed because of inability tosustain demand management measures. Nevertheless, in 1983, there was ashort-lived success in carrying out adjustment measures, including asubstantial devaluation. Unfortunately, this success faded in 1984 amidthe political turmoil that marked the last days of the Nimeiri Government.In October 1987, the Government, with IMF and Bank Group assistance,adopted a one-year program as a prelude to comprehensive economic policy

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reforms. The Government unified the exchange rates to a more realisticlevel and adopted fiscal and monetary measures to restrain the budgetdeficit and inflation. A more comprehensive structural adjustment program,featuring deregulation of the private sector, parastatal sector reforms,and tax reforms was formulated by the Government. In 1988, however,implementation was interrupted, firstly by the heavy rains and floods inAugust which caused widespread disruption in the economy and, thereafter,by political turmoil as a result of disagreement among members of thecoalition government over the approach to seeking an end to the civil war.In June 1989, the coalition government was overthrown in a military coupled by Lt-General Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir who has appointed aRevolutionary Command Council (RCC) and a Cabinet of Ministers to run theaffairs of the country.

B. The Transvort System

1.05 Sudan's transport system is inadequate for the largest country inAfrica; with an area of 2.5 million square kilometers, Sudan's 20,000 km ofroads (only 2,335 km of which are paved) and 4,800 km railway networkaverage only 8 km of road and 1.9 km of rail per thousand squarekilometers. Transport is sparse because a harsh climate and long distancesbetween major markets make difficult the provision of inexpensive,efficient and reliable surface transport. Rail and road systems cross hot,aiid deserts in the north, northeast and central zones and skirt swamps inthe south. Sudan also has 3,000 km of waterways but in practice thepotentially cheap river transport of the Nile is little used; in the norththe Nile is repeatedly interrupted by unnavigable rapids, while in thesouth the White Nile meanders through the Sudd, a vast swamp withcontinually shifting channels. Trarsportation in the west is mostlyrudimentary, depending almost entirely on unpaved roads and desert tracksand on two old, poorly maintained, rail branch lines although several newroad projects in the west are under development. An 850 km pipelinebetween Port Sudan and Khartoum and about 20 airports supplement surfacetransport.

1.06 The major transport corridor is between Port Sudan on the Red Seaand Khartoum, the capital, 787 km by rail, 1,182 km by road and 850 km bypipeline. The corridor handles most of land transport and carries importsand exports from and to the Port. Collectively, the three modes transportabout 4.6 million tons annually. The majority of this traffic, over 90%,is carried over the road, despite its being nearly 40% longer than its railcompetitor. The railway traverses a straight route through the desert fromthe coast to Khartoum while the highway passes through the most populatedand economically active areas of the country, swinging south from PortSudan to Gedaref before turning westwards toward Khartoum. Due to severeoverloading and lack of proper maintenance, sections of this road are nowexperiencing severe surface and base failure some of which, if not repairedsoon, will break-up completely within a year and others will becomecandidates for reconstruction rather than resealing/overlay. Withoutreconstruction, unpaved detours around broken sections will proliferate andvehicle operating costs and transit time will increase dramatically.Rehabilitation of this vital transport link is thus urgently needed and isthe focus of the proposed Project.

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1.07 As the road conditions deteriorate, transit times and vehicleoperating costs will increase. Such a development is unfortunate; roadtransport is already costly because of Sudan's dependency on imports forpetroleum, the high rate of wear and tear these vehicles experience inSudan, as well as shortages of fuel, spare parts and tires, and lack ofappropriate repair facilities. The trucking industry is operatedrelatively *fficiently by owner-operators and several privately owned largecompanies but is beginning to decline because of these handicaps. Demandfor road transport remains strong, however; rail competition is weak.Although the rail system is extensive and has a significant advantage indistance over road transport, reliability is low, transit time excessiveand locomotive and wagon availability sporadic. Substandard management andoperations together with lack of spare parts are largely responsible forthe decline. Government policies that favor road transport have alsocontributed to the imbalance of modes.

Highways

1.08 The highway sector is discussed in more detail in Chapter II.

Railways

1.09 Sudan's 4800 km railway system is the largest in Africa with themain route extending from Port Sudan via Atbara to Khartoum, with analternate link between the port and Sennar via Kassala. The Sudan RailwaysCorporation (SRC) is a parastatal organization reporting to the Minister ofTransport and Communications (MOTC). SRC's facilities are old; much of thetrack is in poor condition, especially in the west, and needs renewal; andlack of spare parts affects virtually every facet of rail operations.Night time signalling is almost non-existent due to lack of bulbs andbatteries; and the telecommunications system is subject to frequentbreakdowns. Annual traffic carried by the rail has declined from over 3.0million tons in tne early 1970's to about 600,000 tons in 1988.

1.10 To arrest further financial deterioration, improve utilization ofexisting capacity and strengthen and restructure SRC so it can operate morecommercially and move toward self-sufficiency, IDA and other donors (AfDB,EEC, the Government of the Netherlands, KfW and ODA) are implementing aUS$99.4 Railways Emergency Recovery Project (RERP) (Credit 1894-SU, signedJune 10, 1988) to finance a team of technical and managerial experts,training, urgently needed locomotive spare parts, essential equipment andother spares and some emergency track repairs. Government changed SRC'stop management in mid 1987. The new management's reform program has begunto be implemented and SRC's operations are improving.

Pipeline

1.11 Fuel (diesel) is primarily transported between Port Sudan andKhartoum by a pipeline 850 km long which was opened in 1977. In 1986/87the pipeline transported over 480,000 tons of white fuel (gasoline, dieselfuel). The pipeline is presently operating at about 60? of design capacitybecause of low pumping power; 6 pumping stations are now in operation.Meanwhile, an increasing amount of fuel (600,000 tons in 1986) is moving bymore expensive road transport.

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Ports

1.12 Sudan has only one major seaport, Port Sudan, located on the RedSea about 1,180 km by road from Khartoum. Run by a parastatal, the SeaPorts Corporation (SPC) has eleven general berths on its north side andfour specialized berths on its south side for grain, containers, roll on-roll off and petroleum. Total throughput has ranged from 4.2 to 4.6million tons over the last three years. Theoretical capacity is higheralthough inefficiency reduces capacity and produces congestion. SPC isoverstaffed, its overall productivity is less than 200 tons per employeeper year, a figure low by any standard. Ships have waited at anchor, somemore than 15 days. Cargo can wait for two to three weeks on the quaybefore it is nofficially" received by the Port authorities. SPC has hadsevere maintenance difficulties resulting from inadequate procurementprocedures for spare parts and lack of qualified maintenance staff.Despite the need to use its resources for spare parts and equipment toimprove operational productivity, SPC has recently invested in portfacilities nearby with no economic justification. The Port was run forsome time by acting officials in its top two positions, but a new permanentmanager was appointed in November, 1988, in fulf_llment of a commitmentgiven within the framework of the Emergency Flood Reconstruction Project(Credit 2011-SU), Government is now committed to strengthening SPC'smanagement and has reinstated a Chairman of the Board who had been onadministrative leave. The Bank is currently preparing a Third Port Projectthat will support implementation of a corporate plan, improvement offinancial management, construction of safe handling facilities forpetroleum products, provision of cargo handling equipment and improvementof the traffic facilitation process.

River Transport

1.13 River transport is used on the Kosti-Malakal-Juba (1,450 km) andthe Karima-Dongola (290 km) sections of the Nile system but currentlyaccounts for only 1Z of total freight traffic in the country and lately,has been operating only as far as Malakal (500 km) due to securityproblems. Nonetheless, donors have increasingly turned to river transportto ship grain to food-starved populations in strife-torn areas of theSouth. Most barges and tugs are owned and operated by a Governmentparastatal, the River Transport Corporation (RTC), but a few privateoperators also provide service. Use of river transport is constrained byhostilities in the southern part of the country as well as by adversephysical conditions, such as shallow water during the 3-4 low-water months,unnavigable rapids in the north, a huge swamp in the south, water hyacinthencroachment, inadequate berthing and cargo handling facilities and by theinefficient services of the RTC for traffic other than oil products andfood which receive priority. Also, private operators complain that RTCdoes not permit them access to RTC's docks despite legislation to thecontrary, a problem the new Minister of Transport has agreed to address.

Civil Aviation

1.1; Sudan has about 20 airports, of which only three are paved andonly one, Khartoum, is classified as an international airport that can takewide-body aircrafts in all-weather conditions. Upgrading of electroniclanding aids and installation of navigational aids and telecommunication3

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equipment for major regional routes was completed two years ago. TheGovernment has plans to construct new airports at Malakal, Wau and Nyala,and upgrade facilities at El Obeid. Air traffic control and navigationalcommunications within Sudan are the responsibility of the Civil AviationDepartment (CAD) which, although part of the Ministry of Defense, functionsas a civilian department. Sudan's domestic air traffic it handled nearlyexclusively by the Sudan Airways Corporation (SAC), using Khartoum as itshub; in 1987 SAC owned 6 jets (4 Boeing 707 and 2 Boeing 737) and threeFokker 27.

C. Role of Transport in the Economy

1.15 Inadequate facilities and high transport costs are seriousproblems in Sudan and have slowed development of major sectors of theeconomy, hampered drought relief, flood emergency measures, and morerecently, delivery of food to food-starved populations in the South, andmade difficult the export of harvested crops, particularly in the West. Inaddition tr" its effect on agriculture, the inadequacy of Sudan'stransportation infrastructure is also cited as a major reason why Sudan'smanufacturing sector has not been able to reach acceptable levels ofcapacity utilization, efficiency and profitability.

1.16 Economic recovery in Sudan depends upon increasing agriculturalproduction as well as upon reducing the costs and improving the timelyavailability of imports. These objectives, in turn, depend upon theprovision of reliable, efficient transport. Geographic factors maketransport a particularly critical component to development. The country isvast and the major centers of population are far from Sudan's only realconnection with the outside world: Port Sudan. Khartoum is 800 km, byrail, and nearly 1200 km by road, inland; the southwestern agriculturalareas, with substantial economic potential are another 1000 km fromKhartoum. Productive areas in the El Gedaref and eastern areas of thecountry are more than 800 km south of Port Sudan. Bordering Ethiopia,these areas, and those further south, have little alternative to using PortSudan. Virtually, all imports and exports, therefore, must travel at least1,000 km and more likely, close to 2,000 km.

1.17 Most of this traffic, 4.6 million tons of imports and exports in1986, travels on the Khartoum-Port Sudan road; the 1986 transport split wasrail 10%, pipeline 14% and road 75Z, including most exports, all cotton andall molasses, as well as the majority of imports, including 600,000 tons ofpetroleum (vs. 194,000 tons for rail) and 683,000 tons of flour and wheat(vs. 115,000 tons for rail), and all containers. Avoiding the completebreak-up of some sections of the Khartoum-Port Sudan road, prolonging itslife and protecting the investment of other sections otherwise in jeopardyis thus essential to Sudan's existence as well as economic recovery. Evenif the RERP is successful in raising the level of traffic carried by SRC,it is unlikely that rail will ever recapture more than 302 of the totalmarket. Moreover, it will take some time for SRC to improve. The presentvolume of tonnage to be moved to and from Port Sudan is sufficient tojustify rehabilitation of both road and rail. In any case, the road is,and is likely to remain, Sudan's lifeline and most critical transport link

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in the entire country for the medium term. In the lcnger term it is likelythat a newer and more direct route will be built from Khartoum to PortSudan, through the desert via Atbara, but this development is at least tenyears in the future. From an economic viewpoint, Loth rail and roadinvestments are justified.

D. Government Policy and Transport Issues

1.18 Prior to June 30, 1989 when the Revolutionary Command Council cameinto power, Government's transport policy was to achieve an optimalintermodal mix that provides consumer-oriented service at the least cost tothe nation. The transport policy was to be enforced through appropriatemeasures with respect to investment, pricing, energy, regulation,coordination and organization. The carrying out of these policies,however, has been handicapped by managerial and institutional weaknesses inSudan's various transport entities, including transport planning, and byGOS policies to subsidize fuel, to protect Sudan's domestic tire andbattery production and to allow overstaffing of parastatals. The RCC hasnot yet issued a specific transport policy statement but its appointmentsin the transport sector consist of individuals with managerial andoperational experience in the sector. The transport issues to be addressedby the new Government are described below.

Public Finance

1.19 Capital Expenditures. Historically, investment decisions by GOSreflect the importance Government gives transport in Sudan's economicdevelopment.1 Out of the government Development Budget for 1985/86 -1986/87 of £Sd 2.28 billion, 21Z was envisaged for the sector, whichcompares favorably with transport's share in other countries in the region.Total investments tentatively proposed for the transport sector in the fouryear period 1988/89 - 1991/92 are £Sd 2.38 billion (US$ 528 million at theofficial exchange rate), or 14Z of the total investment in the country.2

1.20 Within this budget, Government's main priority is to financeexpansion of its inadequate transport system. Since trucks handle mosttransport even without paved roads, Government is concentrating onexpanding its highway network. To this end Government is now focussing onconstructing road links along a north-south and east-west axis so as toenable transport from one end of the country to the other in at least twodirections (para. 2.15). Outside the highway sector, Government iscommitted to developing port capacity as economic growth demands and to

1/ The sector, moreover, has an important role in the economy andaccounted for about 1OX of GDP in 1984.

2/ Sudan's overall economic situation is so constrained, however, thatbudgeted expenditures for transportation do not meet projected needs.Moreover, rarely do actual expenditures equal those budgeted. Duringthe period 1977-83, the actual vs. planned expenditure of the transportand communication sector was only 47Z.

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building new port facilities to permit the separate handling of passengers,livestock and oil imports. In the railroad sector, Government is trying tominimize investments to those absolutely necessary to maintain presentoperations until ongoing efforts to revitalize railway operations, beingimplemented in the RERP, demonstrate whether more substantialrehabilitation investments will be worthwhile.

1.21 Recurrent Expenditures. In the highway sector, GOS has been moreconcerned with expansion of the network than with the maintenance ofexisting facilities or strengthening the highway authority, the Roads andBridges Public Corporation (RBPC). Nonetheless Government is committed tomaintaining its investment in highways, as evidenced by the road tollsystem that is in place and its willingness to implement the axle loadcontrol system proposed in the Project but RBPC's limited capacity in thisrespect has led Government to seek donor assistance for road maintenance aswell as investment. Improving RBPC's maintenance capacity is a focus ofthe ongoing Third Highway Project, is to be augmented by the proposedProject and will be a focus of the upcoming Fourth Highway Project.Development of a long-term maintenance strategy will be made easier withthe implementation of the proposed Project's Pavement Management System(PMS). Even with RBPC's present capacity, however, the adequacy of fundsallocated by Government to RBPC for road maintenance is insufficient.

1.22 In the port subsector, after substantial concentration onimproving port operations under the First and Second Port Projects, morerecently Government has pursued investments somewhat at the expense of themaintenance of cargo handling equipment and facilities already built. As aconsequence, cargo handling equipment was unusable and quays became socongested that it was difficult to service ships at berths (pari. 1.08).SPC has agreed to concentrate on improving this record and is now workingwith IDA to develop action plans and cargo handling investment requirementsto be implemented under the upcoming Third Port Project. In the railroadsector, a major focus of the RERP is to enhance preventive maintenance oflocomotive and rehabilitation equipment and facilities long neglected. Inthe river transport sector, Government is concentrating on rehabilitatingand maintaining its fleet of ferries, with donor assistance from Germany.

1.23 Cost Recovery. In principle GOS embraces concepts of costrecovery in all of the transport sectors. In the highway sector, GOS hasinstituted road tolls to raise funds for road maintenance, but the levelsare not sufficient to cover road maintenance needs (para. 2.26).Government collects other funds from road users, including fuel taxes;however, none of these funds is earmarked for road maintenance. Thus theissue is not so much the adequacy of taxation as it is the Ellocation byGovernment of funds collected from road users, sufficient to financenecessary road maintenance. 3

31 A related point is that government vehicles, including those carryingaid cargo and petroleum, are exempL from the road toll tax. As a greatpercentage of the traffic using the road consists of these vehicles,Government is thus responsible for much of the wearing down of the roadyet has not made adequate provision for maintaining it.

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Pricing

1.24 Transport Pricing. Pricing of road and rail transport is based onthe concept of cost recovery. Road transport is operated by private ownersand rates are governed by market forces except for transport of Governmentcargo which, in the last year, is being carried at rates set by Government.Rail transport tariffs must be approved by its Board of Directors and,under the prior Government by the Council of Ministers. Ordinarily, thisapproval has been obtained without great delay but tariff increasesproposed by SRC in November of 1988 were delayed by nearly one year.Fortunately, SRC's proposed tariff increases were recently approved by thenew Government, a process that involved approval by the Minister of Financein addition to SRC's Board of Directors. These new tariffs were sorelyneeded as SRC has been in a disastrous financial situation ever sincesalaries were doubled by Government decree in February 1988. Meanwhile,SRC has been using its informally granted tariff flexibility to help coverthe gap by entering into contract arrangements directly with customers atrates higher than the old tariffs.

1.25 Subsidization of Fuel Prices. GOS's fuel pricing policies have inthe past distorted intermodal competition because they subsidize dieselfuel to the benefit of road tranbport (para. 2.56). These subsidies needto be phased out and a system for frequent reviews instituted to ensurethat fuel prices continue to reflect their import costs. The issue isbeing discussed with the IMF in a wider context than this Project.

Import Policies

1.26 Tires and Batteries. Import of tires and batteries has beenseverely restricted in Sudan so as to protect domestic production. Therestriction has led to shortages that hamper the efficient operation of thetrucking industry. The situation had been improved with the introductionof an "own resources" scheme, which allowed the use of privately heldforeign exchange for the importation of a range of products including tiresand batteries, but this scheme has been suspended by the RCC. Liftingrestrictions and reinstatement of an "own resources" scheme are subjects ofdiscussions between GOS and the IMF.

Sector Management

1.27 Transport Planning. Transport planning is undertaken by atransport unit within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP).Established with assistance from a planning team under a UNDP financedproject, executed by the Bank, the unit was formed to evaluate investmentproposals by the various transport agencies and make judgments on theirrelative merits. The main weakness of the present arrangement is, however,that the individual agencies presenting proposals to the Finance Ministryhave varying degrees of planning capability. In some cases MFEP undertakessub-sectoral planning and feasibility study functions without sufficientcoordination with the agencies involved or with the Ministry of Transportwhich has almost no planning resources. Transport planning preferablyshould be undertaken by the transport agencies themselves and planssubsequently assessed in the context of broader economic issues by MDEP.

1.28 RBPC's planning unit is particularly weak (para. 2.32). Moreover,as is the case with some of the other sectors, planning of new roads isdirected more by MFEP than RBPC. Assistance to improve RBPC's planningcapacity which is a focus of the ongoing Third Highway Project, will beenhanced by the Pavement Management System to be implemented in the Projectand will be continued in the Fourth Highway Project.

1.29 The failure to concentrate port investment on critically neededspare parts, and the failure to ensure access by private barge operators ofRTC's docking facilities and the failure to provide access to foreigncurrency to private truckers, reflects the lack of coordination andoverview authority of the MOTC. The upcoming port project includes acomponent to support a planning unit in the MOTC with equipment andtechnical assistance.

1.30 RBPC's Organization and Legal Framework. RBPC is legally a publiccorporation but in practice has little autonomy and functions like anyother government department (para 2.18). In as much as RBPC is not arevenue earning entity, GOS may wish to consider making RBPC a "highwayauthority" within a ministry. This issue will be considered within thecontext of the dialogue on RBPC's reorganization. Whether a corporation ornot, RBPC's operational flexibility is being hampered by limitations on thelevel of tenders its General Manager can approve (para. 2.30). Governmenthas agreed to empower RBPC's Board of Directors to raise the level.Another issue is that RBPC's jurisdictional maintenance responsibilitiesare unclear because legally, the definition of a "national" road ismissing. RBPC needs to develop and incorporate within the legal framework,therefore, a road classificaticn system (para. 2.04). RBPC'sorganizational structure also suffers from a number of problems (para.2.21). Government presented a draft reorganization plan of RBPC to IDA atnegotiations. Government also agreed to develop a road classificationsystem and to implement agreed organizational changes according to agreedaction plans (Annex VIII).

Maintenance Hanagement

1.31 Management of existing equipment and infrastructure is an issuefcr RBPC as well as for other transport entities in Sudan, notably SRC andRTC. In large measure, lack of skilled management personnel is central tothe problem: thus, technical assistance and training have been keycomponents of Bank-financed projects in all the transport subsectors. ThePMS and the institutional support for RBPC to be provided in the proposedProject should augment efforts being made in the ongoing Third HighwayProject to address this issue. Access to foreign exchange is another majorproblem, both in the railroad subsector which has been starved of capitalfor years and has crippled locomotives and decrepit facilities as a result,and, more recently, in the trucking sector. Similarly, RBPC needs foreignexchange, primarily for bitumen, but also for spare parts and equipment.Until relatively recently RBPC bought these items on the parallel marketbut increasing controls by Government over foreign exchange is limitingthis option. The failure of Government to provide foreign exchange toentities critical to Sudan's economy is the subject of discussion withGovernment in contexts broader than this Project.

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Axle Load Control

1.32 Heavy overloading contributed substantially to the prematuredeterioration of the Khartoum - Port Sudan road to be rehabilitated underthe Project. Yet Sudan does not have an axle load control system in place.Moreover, the sections of the Road Traffic Act dealing with axle loadlimitations arc presently too vague to be enforceable (para 2.43).Initiation and implementation of a realistic program of axle load controltherefore will be a crucial element in the proposed Project. Governmenthas prepared draft legislation to clarify these sections and thus set thestage for effective enforcement (para. 2.45). It was agreed thatGovernment: (a) establish, not later than July 1, 1990, axle load limitsacceptable to the Association; (b) take, not later than July 1, 1991, allmeasures to enforce such limits, including the implementation of an AxleLoad Control system (para 5.02).

Staffing of Parastatals

1.33 Most of Sudan's transport parastatals are overstaffed andinefficient. Recent Government policy endorsed efforts by the SudanRailways Corporation to reduce staff within the context of the RERP. Aneffort was also made to reduce staff of Sudan Airways but Governmentreinstated those scheduled to be cut. RBPC is not necessarily overstaffed,but it is inefficient due to a variety of reasons (para. 2.21), some ofwhich are being addressed in the ongoing Third Highway Project and some ofwhich will be addressed in this proposed Project. The Bank group is al&xoaddressing these issues within the framework of a Public Enterprise Project(Credit 1789-SU) and as part of its dialogue on macroeconomic policy.

E. Previous Bank Group Transport Sector Operations

1.34 The Bank Group has been assisting in the development of moderntransportation modes in Sudan as well as in slowly improving transportplanning since the First Railway Loan in 1958. In transport, the Bank'sstrategy is to support the rehabilit&tion of facilities and operatingefficiency of Sudan's transport entities. Toward these ends, the Bank hasprovided: (i) facilities and equipment for the railway, seaport and roadsystems; and (ii) technical assistance and training to strengtheninstitutional capabilities in the sector. The Bank has emphasized trainingand institutional development as a means of achieving long-termimprovements in utilization of capacity and operating efficiency of therecipient agencies.

1.35 The proposed Project will be the Bank Group's fourth lendingoperation in highways. The First Highway Project (Cr. 331-SU, US$7.0million), approved in 1971, was completed satisfactorily in 1980, aboutfour years behind schedule, mainly due to delays in equipment procurementfor the road betterment and maintenance programs and to lack of sufficientlocal funds. However, a re-evaluation of the project showed that theinvestment was sound (Project Completion Report of June 30, 1981). TheSecond Highway Project approved in 1979 (Cr. 882-SU, US$41.0 million)included institutional imp- vements to the Highway administration in the

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southern Sudan as well as the construction of the Jebel Aulia - Ed Dueimroad to a bitumen standard. The latter was completed with considerablecost overruns in 1984 that necessitated the deletion of two Nile Riverferries from the Project and led to a dispute over the interpretationi ofthe contract document regarding the method by which cost increases shouldbe reimbursed. Payment of the arbitration award resulting from the recentresolution of the dispute has been inclu 1 as a component in the Project.The Third Highway Project was approved in 1984 (Cr. 1450-SU, SDR 15.5million). In an attempt to assist the Government in its efforts to solveits institutional shortcomings, the Project included a large TechnicalAssistance component. Consultants are advising RBPC staff in roadmaintenance and planning, as well as in the running of the mechanicalworkshop in Khartoum. A training program for mechanics and roadmaintenance crews, has also started. After long delays in starting up, theproject is now progressing reasonably well with expected completion in1991, about 2 years behind SAR estimate. RBPC needs technical assistanceto carry out its large construction and maintenance program and to continuethe encouraging progress in its planning routines. It is thereforeproposed to include a technical assistance component large enough toprovide RBPC with expert advisers iT addition to those experts needed toinitiate the Axle Load Control System and PMS System (para. 3.17). TheBank Group was also involved in improving farm roads under the New HalfaIrrigation Project (Cr. 1022-SU, US$40.0 million, 1980) and in developingsecondary roads under the Southern Region Agricultural Project (Cr. 904-SU,1979), cofinanced by the British ODA.

1.36 There have been other Bank-Group financed transport operations inSudan. The First Port Project (Cr. 781-SU, US$22.0 million, 1978), theSecond Port Project (Cr. 1233-SU, US$25.0 million, 1982) and three previousrailway projects (Loan 202-SU, US$39.0 million, 1958; Loan 440-SU, US$31.0million, 1964; and Cr. 457-SU, US$24.0 million, 1974) included provisionsfor the modernization and improvement of transport facilities. A TechnicalAssistance Credit, approved in 1976 (Cr. 614-SU, US$4.0 million), includedpre-investment work in transportation; while the Fourth Railway Projectapproved in 1977 (Cr. 727-SU and Loan 1467-T-SU, US$8.0 millionrespectively) concentrated on upgrading the level of efficiency of SRCoperations and provision of motive power and rolling stock.

1.37 The Bank Group's experience in the transport sector has beenmixed. In general, physical implementation of projects in the transportsector has been satisfactory, although there have been considerable delaysdue to: (a) complicated procurement, bid evaluation and contract awardprocedures; (b) cost increases which have necessitated revisions in projectscope; and (c) insufficient response to some invitations to bid. The FirstDomestic Aviation Project suffered from the above problems to the extentthat the IDA-financed portion of the Project was cancelled. The roadcontract in the Second Highway Project experienced problems which resultedin arbitration. Much of the involvement with SRC has not been successful--successive projects being bedevilled with problems concerning equipmentsuitability, spare parts shortage, weak management and staff training andmorale. In the ports subsector, the Second Project was completed butprocurement problems prevented the Borrower from utilizing nearly US$1.5million in the Project. The general lessons to be learned are that project

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implementation takes longer than expected in Sudan, benefits are generallyslow to materialize, and prediction of costs is difficult, particularly inmore remote areas.

F. Bank Strategy

1.38 The Bank's experience in the transport sector, in sum,demonstrates that the traditional approach of assuming that institutionalimprovements will be generated from the momentum of investments andassociated TA, does not apply in the case of Sudan. The Bank's strategytherefore should be to focus on institutional development, both withrespect to sector planning and sector operation and maintenance. Such astrategy will be supported by: (a) essential investments; (b) specificmeasurable operational objectives; (c) related incremental operationalsupport tied to performance of the objectives; and (d) coaching TA (thetraining and follow-up system of TA).

1.39 The Second and Third Highways projects evolved toward thatapproach. The former aimed to help develop the highway administration inthe former Southern Region which was divided on July 1, 1983 into threeregions (Bahr-el-Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria). The ongoing projectsupports a team of road experts under contract with a consultant to giveRBPC technical assistance in a variety of organizational and operationalaspects to help improve RBPC's road maintenance capability.

1.40 In addition to addressing a physical need, the proposed Project isdesigned to build upon some of the institutional measures in the ongoingproject by setting the stage for preventing similar emergencies in thefuture. Implementation of an Axle Load Control System should reducepremature deterioration of the road, and the establishment of a PavementManagement System should provide early warning of similar emergencies.Continuation of the more general technical assistance being provided underthe ongoing Project should enable RBPC to incorporate these two newactivities within its organization and use them to improve its overallplarning and road maintenance capability.

G. Rationale for Bank Group Involvement

1.41 The proposed Project is justified because avoiding the completebreak-up of some sections of the Khartoum - Port Sudan road and prolongingthe life and protecting the investment of additional parts otherwise injeopardy are essential to Sudan's existence as well as economic recovery.Sudan's highway authority, although gradually improving its ability tomaintain this and other parts of the road network, does not yet have thecapacity to undertake the emergency work required to keep the road open.Nor does Government have the foreign exchange available to fund privatecontractors to do the work. Timely reconstruction and overlay of the worstsections will avert the need to make much greater investments in thefuture.

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II. THE HIGHWAY SUBSECTOR

A. The Network

2.01 Sudan's road network totals an estimated 20,000 km, of which 2,335km are paved and another 6,000 km, mostly in the South, where suitablelateritic materials are available, are gravelled. Development of Sudan'spaved road network is of recent origin with construction of the firstintercity roads beginning during the 1965 - 70 period. The road network issupplemented by numerous tracks where terrain and soil conditions permit,passable only with trucks or four-wheel drive vehicles. Tracks in thecountry's eastern half are generally closed for three to four months duringthe wet season from June to October while those through desert areas arepassable most of the year.

2.02 The recently completed Highway Organization and Investment Study(HOIS), carried out by consultants (Norconsult) under the ongoing ThirdHighway Project, undertook an inventory of Sudan's roads. Based on thisstudy, and on information from the Roads and Bridges Public Corporation,the gazetted Sudan highway network can be classified as follows:

SUDAN HIGHWAY NETWORF.

Road Length - Km

Primary Secondary Tertiary TotalRoads Roads Roads

Bitumen 2,037 127 171 2,335Gravel 2,289 2,077 1,483 5,849Other - 6,000 * 5,816 * 11,816 *

Total 4,326 8,204 7,470 20,000 *

Source: HOIS and RBPC data, July, 1988.* Estimated.

2.03 In addition, there are approximately 3,000 km of special purposeroads constructed under irrigation and rural development projects. Alisting of the Sudan's main paved and gravel roads is contained in Annex I,Table 2.1. The map shows existing routes by type of surface.

2.04 Road Classification System. There is no official roadclassification system in Sudan and consequently the division ofresponsibility for road maintenance among the central, regional and localgovernments is unclear (para. 2.19). Government has recognized the need toclarify the legal status of its road network and define the various classesof roads and the authority responsible for each. Recommendations forinstituting a formalized classification were made in the HOIS. Government

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has established an interministerial committee to review theserecommendations and draft clarifying legislation. Government has agreed toestablish a road classification system in accordance with an agreed actionplan (para. 5.01 and Annex VIII).

2.05 Khartoum - Port Sudan Road. The most important road in thecountry, and the focus of the proposed Project, extends from Port Sudan onthe Red Sea to Khartoum via Haiya, Kassala, El Gedaref and Wad Medani;1,182 km long it thus represents 50Z of Sudan's paved network. The roadwas built in sections, between 7 and 18 years ago. The oldest sectionbetween Khartoum and Wad Medani was completed in 1970; the last section,between Wad Medani and El Gedaref was completed in 1981 but received anoverlay three years later. Passing through the most populated andeconomically active areas of the country, the road is heavily used,carrying annually about 3.5 million tons of imports and exports. Due tosevere overloading, and lack of proper maintenance, combined withGovernment's failure to provide part of the road (Gedaref - Port Sudan)with a 50 mm wearing course as called for in the original pavement design,certain sections of the road are now experiencing severe surface and basefailure and are in urgent need of rehabilitation. Avoiding furtherdeterioration and protecting other sections in jeopardy, is essential toSudan's economic well-being and is the focus of the proposed Project.

2.06 The worst sections of the road are between Gedaref and Port Sudanwhere the road is designed with a 7.00 m wide carriageway, which is widenedto 3 lanes on the steep sections of the Akaba Pass near Sinkat. Theshoulders are 2.50 m wide between Gedaref and Kassala, and between Suakinand Port Sudan, but only 1.50 m on the rest of the road. The pavement wasdesigned to carry about 8 million Equivalent Standard Axles. It wasassumed that the legal axle load limit of 10 tons would be adhered to.Depending upon the in situ CBR - values of the subgrade, the pavementlayers were stipulated as follows:

80 mm Bit. upper basecourse (stage 1.)150-220 mm Granular lower basecourse0-300 mm Granular subbase

A 50 mm AC wearing course was intended to be added at a later date,denending on the traffic pattern that would develop. Unfortunately, thisfinal top layer has not been laid on any section of the road apart from ashort section near Gedaref. Because of this, the average bearing capacityof the road was not more than 2.2 million ESA-80, as compared to 8 millionif the top 50 mm had been applied. As a result, some sections have failedalready.

2.07 There are 111 bridges between El Gedaref and Port Sudan of astandard reinforced concrete design. The standard span length is 15.6 m,and the number of spans varies from 1 to 10. The bridge decks are eitherprecast slabs (Kassala - Port Sudan) or cast-in-situ slabs (El Gedaref -Kassala). The last bridge, across the Atbara River, is constructed withprecast, post-tensioned girders and a cast-in-situ slab. There are 9 spansof about 40 m each. The original design included a 50 mm asphalt concreteoverlay over the whole road, including the bridges. This overlay was never

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provided. This design change, combined with severe overloading over manyyears, contributed to the collapse in late 1987, of part of the deckelements on one of the bridges between Suakin and Port Sudan. Given thelarge number of bridges of the same design, there was a need to establishwhether the collapse was an isolated case, or whether general constructionproblems or an inherent design fault could lead to similar problems with anumber of the bridges. A survey of bridges has been carried out as part ofthe detailed engineering. This study concluded that the deck slabs on 105out of the 112 bridges (total length about 5000 m) are showing signs ofdistress. Consequently, the detailed engineering and the contractdocuments presently under preparation will incorporate strengthening of allbridges, most likely by adding new cast-in-situ-slabs using the old deck asshuttering. Bridge rehabilitation will be included in one of the two civilworks contracts.

Condition of the Roads

2.08 As part of the HOIS, Norconsult undertook a pavement evaluationsurvey in August 1986 of Sudan's most travelled paved roads, including theone from Khartoum to Port Sudan. Benkelman beam measurements were used toassess the strength of the roads and estimate the residual life. Theresults are shown in Annex II, Figure 2.1.

2.09 Khartoum - Port Sudan Road. Sections of the Khartoum - Port Sudanroad have reached the end of their design life and need reconstruction orstrengthening. Since the survey, deteriorating sections of the Khartoum -Port Sudan road have gotten worse. As part of the preparation for thisProject, Norconsult reexamined the Port Sudan - Khartoum road in the firstquarter of 1988, and after the floods 1Zn August 1988, and found 70 km inneed of reconstruction and 496 km in need of overlay to prevent damage tothe pavement structure. The Project thus consists primarily of fundsnecessary to undertake these repairs.

2.10 The primary cause of the premature deterioration on this road isoverloading. Road pavements are generally designed to carry a certainnumber of Equivalent Standard Axles (ESA - 80) of eight tons, during theroad's design life. If the traffic forecasts are too low, or the axleloads on the road too high, the service life of the road will be less thananticipated. 1 In either case, the result will be early deterioration ofthe pavement, higher vehicle operating costs, more expensive roadmaintenance work and premature need for costly reconstructioL of the road.

2.11 On the critical sections of the Port Sudan - Khartoum road, about50% of the heavy vehicle axle loads are above the present legal limit of 10tons, according to surveys done by Norconsult. The average number of ESA's(EquivalenL Standard Axle) for a heavy vehicle varied around 50, while thelegal limit would indicate a norm of about 6. The survey found one vehiclerepresenting 352 standard axles and ESA values between 200 and 250 wereobserved daily. These findings are extraordinary and clearly show theextent of the problem in Sudan. Heavy vehicles with axle loads over 10

1/ The relative damaging effect caused by an axle load increasesdramatically with increasing axle loads.

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tons are responsible for 961 of the pavement damage, while the number ofthese axles constitutes only 45? of all axles passing over the road.Consequently, if overloading can be reduced, the life of the road can bedramatically lengthened.

2.12 The number of heavy vehicles trrvelling between Khartoum and PortSudan is fairly constant along the entire road, varying between 172 and 206vehicles per day (1986). Between Khartoum and Wad Medani, the number ofmedium vehicles is significantly higher than on the rest of the road.Total estimated average annual daily traffic (AADT) in 1986 on this sectionwas 4,400 vehicles.

2.13 Other Roads. Other bitumen roads in the country are also showingsigns of distress. Government's capacity tc maintain its road network isinadequate, so much so that a number of donors have agreed to fundmaintenance of roads originally built with their funds for the initialyears after construction. Government's own force account unit, if properlyequipped, should be able to undertake repair and resealing work on many ofthese roads and on sections of the Gedaref - Port Sudan road not includedin the Project. The Project thus provides for the procurement of roadconstruction and maintenance equipment for this purpose. In the case ofthe Wad Medani to Gedaref section of the Khartoum - Port Sudan road, thedonor involved in the original construction also will be asked to assistGovernment in such periodic maintenance work.

2.14 As for the condition of the gravel roads, most of which are in theSouth, less precise information is available. Maintenance needs in theSouth are reported to be significant because of neglect during years ofcivil strife there, but continued hostilities prevent any thoroughinventory of needs being undertaken.

Current and Planned Highway Prolects

2.15 Sudan's road network is so inadequate that Government's primaryfocus in the highway subsector has been to plan and finance its expansion.Currently an additional 755 km are under construction and another 3637 kmare at various stages of preparation, as detailed in Annex I, Table 2.2.Government's first priority is to link the road system on a north-southaxis; secondarily, to put together an east-west axis. Toward the formergoal, Government wanes to extend northwards by first building a road toDongola from Omdurman; another high priority road would be parallel to therailway route to Atbara, across the Atabara river there and on to Haiya andPort Sudan; in the longer term Government would extend the road from Atbaranorth to Halfa and Egypt via Merowe and Dongola. In the South,Government's priority is to connect the road from Renk to Bor. On theEast-West axis, plans include buildirg a road on the north-east side of theBlue Nile from Khartoum to Wad Medani to relieve the most heavilytrafficked route in the country, some additional roads in the Gedarefregion, and westward, to expand and connect the engineered network from ElObeid to Zalinger and eventually to Geneina and Adre on the Chadian border.

2.16 Most of the proposed new road construction has been estimated ashaving high rates of return in a series of pre-feasibility and feasibilitystudies undertaken to help Government assess its priorities. Among the

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most important of these arL the Sudan Transport Study (1974), the RoadMaintenance Study (1979), the Feeder Road Master Plan (1979), a Technicaland Economic Feasibility Study of the Khartoum - Wad Medani Road Corridor,Final Global Study Report (1986) and most recently the HOIS. Thesestudies, and the analyses accompan ing detailed engineering of roads chosenfor construction, have resulted in the production of a comprehensive and,on the whole, soundly conceived program for development. A listing of theproposed investments, ranked in order of internal rate of return, iscontained in Annex I, Table 2.3.

2.17 For the past twenty years the focus of IDA's assistance in thehighway subsector has been aimed at building up Sudan's capacity to planand carry out maintenance of existing roads. To this end the Bank hasfocussed on providing technical assistance and maintenance equipment to theRoads and Bridges Public Corporation. Only once in the last twenty yearshas the Bank assisted with the construction of a new road: under theSecond Highway Project, IDA funded the construction of 158 km between JebelAulia and Ed Dueim (see paras. 1.35 and 3.12). Given the link betweenagricultural development, key to Sudan's economic recovery and long termviability and roads, the funding of new roads by IDA may become part of theforthcoming Fourth Highway Project. In any case, IDA will seek to play arole in coordinating new investments by promoting projects shown in AnnexI, Table 2.4.

B. The Highway Authority - The Roads and Bridges Public Corporation

Legal Framework

2.18 Sudan's highway network is administered by the Roads and BridgesPublic Corporation (RBPC). Established in August 1973 as a publiccorporation, RBPC is supervised by a Board of Directors which reports tothe Minister of Works, Housing and Public Utilities. The Board consists ofa full-time Chairman, the Director General of RBPC, representatives fromthe Ministry of Works, Housing and Public Utilities, the Ministry ofFinance and Economic Planning, the private sector, and RBPC employees.RBPC's status as public corporation was reconstituted in 1983 under thePublic Corporations Act and seems related to its having use of fundscollected from road tolls for maintenance. These funds are inadequate tofund real maintenance needs, do not help meeting foreign exchangerequirements and lead to a situation whereby Government tends to overlookthe need to supplement the road tolls in its own budget for recurrentexpenditure. Moreover, in practice the Corporation has little autonomy andfunctions like any other government department. Given RBPC's role ascaretaker and developer of Sudan's highway network, and the lack of revenueearning capacity to fully finance its activities, Government might be well-advised to formalize the existing situation by establishing a HighwayAuthority within the Ministry.

2.19 By statute, RBPC is solely responsible for studies, design,construction, construction supervision and maintenance of all nationalroads and bridges in the country, but, as referred to in para. 2.34, there

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is no legal definition of a "national" road. RBPC interprets itsresponsibility to be limited to bitumen roads and bridges outsidemunicipalities. The maintenance of earth and gravel roads is left to theregional governments to perform although RBPC's local regional managersprovide technical assistance. Also excluded, via a caveat that states"with the exception of roads and bridges that are under the jurisdiction ofother bodies," are roads constructed under special projects such asirrigation and rural development schemes in which case maintenanceresponsibility rests with the public corporations established to manage theschemes. It was agreed that Government will establish an appropriate roadclassification system in accordance with an agreed action plan (Annex VIII)(para. 5.01).

Organization

2.20 RBPC is headquartered at Khartoum and has regional managerslocated in the provinces. It operates a central workshop in Khartoiun, andsix road maintenance workshops along the network (Derdeb, Sinkat, El Girba,Aroma, Sennar and Kosti). A new workshop was constructed in Juba under theSecond Highway Project but for the most part maintenance of roads in theSouth is left to the provincial governments there. According to RBPC,staff employed as of July 1988 consisted of 154 engineers, 1,067 othertechnical staff including laborers and 260 administrative personnel.

2.21 RBPC's present organization (depicted in Annex II, Figure 2.2) isbasically unchanged since 1973 despite recommendations to reorganize madeby consultants under the First Highway Project. At the top, the presentorganization suffers from a blurring of the responsibilities between theChairman and Director General. The Chairman implicitly assumes authorityfor operating the corporation although full power and responsibility havebeen vested in the Director General. This situation has weakened thecorporation's decision-making capacity. Sometimes, important decisions areeither not made or are referred to higher authorities to resolve. Theorganization also suffers from: (i) too wide a span of control at the topmanagement level --- i.e. there are too many departments all reporting onan equal basis to thae Director General; (ii) too many levels of managementwhich control fewer and fewer subordinates as the hierarchy descends; (iii)underutilization of experienced staff; (iv) limited delegation in somedepartments; (v) insufficient attention given to the planning function;(vi) lack of operational authority particularly with regard to procurementand contract administration; (vii) no director of finance andadministration; (viii) too horizontal a structure in the accounts andfinancial departments (Chief, Budget and Accounts equates with the post ofFinancial Manager, a Director of Stores and Purchasing assisted by a SeniorPurchasing Officer functions outside the finance department); and (ix)there is a need to streamline the stores procedures and operations.

2.22 These and other points are also raised in the HOIS whicb reviewedthe existing role and organization of RBPC, and recommended improvements toits organization taking into account available staff at various levels.Several alternatives to the existing organizational structure werepresented in the HOIS, and the one recommended by the consultant is shown

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in Annex II, FJg. 2.3. The Government established a task force to considerthe recommendations of the HOIS and presented its draft organization planto IDA at negotiations. It was agreed tl.at Government would implement itsplan according to an agreed action plan (Annex VIII) (para. 5.01).

Financing of Investments

2.23 Highway expenditures, particularly for construction, have beenincreasing substantially in the last ten years as detailed in the tablebelow. These expenditures are financed from three sources: (i) Governmentgeneral revenues; (ii) foreign aid; and (iii) road toll revenues.

RBPC Expenditure on Roads (£Sd. Million)

FY 1979 1980 19e1 1932 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Construction 80.67 84.80 81.11 23.69 28.30 88.00 37.3 a8.0 149.1 181.0% of Total 97.88 98.27 96.14 92.08 86.86 87.88 78.88 67.39 87.91 81.82MAINTENANCEStrengthening 0.29 0.86 0.30 0.41 1.60 2.00 6.6 18.6 10.0 11.4(Periodic)Regular 0.28 0.80 0.82 0.37 2.00 1.50 4.6 8.0 6.6 11.9SUB-TOTAL 0.67 0.68 0.62 0.78 8.60 3.50 10.00 21.60 16.60 23.30% of Total 1.81 1.82 1.90 3.04 10.92 8.06 19.80 37.39 9.14 14.46

Administrative Expenses andTraining 0.27 0.68 0.97 1.25 1.08 2.00 8.20 8.00 6.00 8.80

TOTAL EXPENDITURES£Sd. 31.41 35.63 32.70 26.62 32.96 43.50 60.60 57.60 169.60 161.10

EXCHANGE RATES:Official 0.60 0.90 1.30 1.30 2.60 2.60 4.60 4.60Free Market 1.60 1.80 2.00 3.60 4.80 8.0 10.0

,OTAL EXPENDITURES USS EQUIVALENT:Official 86.40 28.47 26.38 33.46 20.20 23.00 37.69 36.80Free Market 17.08 18.31 21.76 14.43 11.98 21.20 16.11

ROAD TOLLS COLLECTED: 0.97 0.82 1.09 1.79 8.60 4.60 8.80 13.40

Source: HOIS and RBPC.* The total revenue structure will be reviewed as part of the preparation for theFourth Highway Project.

2.24 Until recently, total revenues collected from road users were wellin excess of the total annual expenditures shown above. As shown in AnnexI, Table 2.5, the level of general revenues generated by road users hasbeen climbing steadily, averaging about £Sd 100 million annually in theearly 1980's and is now in the neighborhood of £Sd 150 million per year.

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The resulting gap is likely to widen unless Government raises the level offuel taxes or road tolls. Reassessment of the total revenue structure,including tolls, fuel and vehicle taxes will be reviewed as part of thepreparation for the Fourth Highway Project. This amount includes tolls,which were introduced in FY80 on the Khartoum-Port Sudan Road. Tolls havegrown from a total of £Sd 0.97 million in FY86 to £Sd.6.8 million in FY87and 13.40 million in FY88. By comparison expenditures in £Sd have risendramatically in the last couple of years due to the effect of highinflation, and are now in the order of ESd 170 million.

R6PC Expenditure on RoadsToM In US 5 and Ld

170' - - - -

140'

gJ 120T - =

* 100go

D _0 - - - - - - -

E 0- - -

U ~ ~ ~

.u 70 '-

2.25 Budget. As shown in the table above, RBPC's total expenditureshave increased considerably since 1981 (about 500?) from £Sd. 32.0 millionto £Sd. 160 million. Yet in real terms there has been no increase, sinceover the same period, the value of the Sudanese Pound has been declining byabout the same factor (£Sd. 1.8 to 10.0 to the US$), as illustrated in theabove graph. On average over the last four years, development expenditureshave taken up 75Z of the total expenditures on roads. RBPC have, for thelast four years, requested a budget of £Sd 20 million per year for routinemaintenance, but only an amount equivalent to the total revenue collectedin tolls during the preceding financial year has been allocated as shown inthe Table below. Funds spent in FY88 on maintenance represent little morethan 2? of Government's recurrent budget and a little more than 0.2? of theGNP. The cost spent per km. for routine maintenance is equivalent toUS$250 at free market rates or US$550 at official rates.

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Routine Maintenance Budget(ESd. Millions)

Funds Tolls Funds Made FundsYear Requested Collected Available Spent

1984/85 20 3.51985/86 20 4.5 3.5 3.51986/87 20 6.8 4.5 4.51987/88 20 13.4 * 5.5 * 5.8 *

* Estimate.Source: RBPC.

2.26 This amount is far from adequate. Bitumen, as well as othermaterial, is difficult to obtain, and even if available, the price is high.Sudan's maintenance budget, as in many other countries, is heavily burdenedby salaries, leaving little for materials and equipment expenses.Government recognizes the need for greater funds. RBPC, together withMFEP, estimated in FY86 that it would cost £Sd 16,881,000 per year toprovide routine maintenance to preserve the approximately 2235 km roads inan adequate condition. (Source Table 18, Road Toll Feasibility Study, July1987). This level of expenditure corresponds to £Sd 7,556 per km., or US$1675/km at 4.5 rate of exchange or US$ 765/km at the current market rate.A figure between US$1,500 and US$2,000 would be considered adequate undernormal circumstances.

2.27 Government's definition of periodic maintenance includes bothstrengthening and upgrading, operations that normally are included in thedevelopment budget. In a way, this is a reflection of the fact that littleresealing is taking place and that ill-maintained roads tend to fall intothe category where reconstruction is required, as in the case of theKhartoum-Port Sudan road. The figures spent on periodic maintenance, (ESd11.4 million in FY88), would have been reasonable for a relatively youngnetwork (approximately US$1100 per km/year) had all the funds been used foractual periodic maintenance.

2.28 In view of the inadequacy of funds, donors have felt compelled tocontinue their involvement in projects even after construction iscompleted. Temporarily, this aid has lessened the maintenance burden onthe Government, and vital links have been kept open. In the long termGovernment must develop RBPC's own capacity and provide funds to maintainthe road network. Achievement of this latter objective will be soughtwithin the context of the macroeconomic dialogue between Government andIDA.

2.29 Capital Expenditures. Expenditures for new projects average about£Sd. 140.0 million per year and add toughly 100 km per year to the roadnetwork. Plans for the future are more ambitious. Government's four-yearinvestment program, 1988/89 to 1991/92, together with RBPC's long-term planup to 1997/98 is shown in Annex I, Table 2.4. Unit rates for construction

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are based on RBPC's and appraisal mission's estimates rather than the lowfigures used by MDEP in its preparation of the PIP. The average annualprojected expenditure in the first four years of the program is just under£Sd. 500 million or US$100.0 million, about 3 1/2 times the amounts spentin recent years and about 2 times the number of kilometers built. Judgingfrom past experience, it is unlikely the Sudan will be able to carry outsuch an ambitious program, even with the support of the many donors thattraditionally have assisted in the highway sector over many years.Nonetheless, the majority of the projects included in the program have ahigh estimated Internal Rate of Return, and it is likely that some of themwith the highest priority will be included in the upcoming Fourth HighwayProject as part of the implementation of a sound, phased expansion program.

2.30 Financial and Accounting Systems. The HOIS contains a number ofsound recommendations regarding the improvement of RBPC's accounting,budget, procurement, planning, management information and stores managementsystems. IDA encourages Government and RBPC to implement theserecommendations and is providing an expert to help do so under the proposedProject. One of the main objectives of these recommendations is to providegreater financial and operating autonomy. Of particular importance to IDAis the suggestion that the maximum amount within the budget, that theGeneral Manager may approve for tenders should be raised substantiallyabove its present level of £Sd 5,000 (equivalent to US$ 500 at currentmarket exchange rates) to benefit smoother operation. Similarly regionaldirectors should be able to approve higher expenditures without approvalfrom headquarters. It was agreed that Government would, not later thanMarch 31, 1990, empower RBPC's Board of Director to approve expenditures ofup to £Sd 250,000 (para. 5.01).

Planning

2.31 Investment Planning. RBPC's planning unit is understaffed andill-placed organizationally within RBPC; its resulting weakness is one ofRBPC's most fundamental problems. Pre-feasibility studies are usuallyundertaken by consultants contracting directly with MFEP, a situation thatleads to a rivalry between RBPC and the MFEP that has, on occasion,handicapped subsequent project implementation. Under the Third HighwayProject, the planning function is being strengthened both in terms ofstaffing and equipment. The unit is carrying out a pilot scheme for axleload control and regular traffic surveys. Provided the unit is givenadequate resources, after the technical assistance team has left, it isexpected that the RBPC will be able to continue long-term planning dutiesfor the road sector. The HOIS recommends that the Planning Unit be set upas a staff function reporting directly to the Director General. RBPC willelevate the planning unit according to a reorganization program to beimplementee in accordance with an agreed action plan (Annex VIII) (para.5.01). An expert transport economist/planner will be provided under theProject to assist the planning unit in its efforts.

2.32 Maintenance Planning. RBPC's maintenance planning is also weak;it is done more on the basis of available funds than on projecting realneeds. The technical assistance tearT in the ongoing Third Highway Projectis working with RBPC's maintenance department to improve planning. Under

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the Project, RBPC will be required to present to the Association an annualmaintenance plan, by September 30 of each year, relating budget to physicalworks programmed for the subsequent year and relating work to beaccomplished with maintenance needs of the road network in the long term.A road maintenance engineer, to be provided under the Project will assistin this effort, using data provided by the Pavement Evaluation Unit.

2.33 Pavement Evaluation Unit. Pavement evaluation is essential to thepreparation of a maintenance strategy and a maintenance program for theroad network. A system of regular pavement monitoring can detect potentialdeterioration of the road and permit remedial measures to be taken beforecostly reconstruction is required. As part of its pavement evaluationstudy, Norconsult trained staff of the Roads and Bridges Public Corporationin pavement evaluation methods. Reactivating such a unit and trainingappropriate staff to conduct routine pavement evaluation is of vitalimportance. To assist in preparing this Project, a small pavementevaluation unit was reestablished. Equipment, vehicles, data processingcapability, technical assistance and training necessary to implement acomprehensive Pavement Management System that will endure in the long termis provided for in the Project. During the implementation phase, this unitwill be under the Planning Department of RBPC. Once fully operational, itis expected that the Maintenance Department will take over.

Design and Construction

2.34 RBPC has a design section in its projects directorate but onlyminor road improvements and bridges are designed in-house. Detailedengineering of major works is carried out by consulting firms and the mainfunction of the RBPC design staff is to supervise their work. RBPC hasnot established its own design standards, but by and large, the geometricdesign of newly constructed roads has been uniform. There is a need toprepare a Road Design Manual and Standard Specifications for Sudan. Thisneed will be addressed in the upcoming Fourth Highway Project.

2.35 Construction work is carried out primarily by foreign contractors,but on occasion, by RBPC direct labor. Where RBPC has constructed works byforce account, - the Wad Medani Sennar-Kosti road (217 km), is one case, -a management team provided by consultants assisted the RBPC sitemanagement. Transport of materials is subcontracted out to localtransporters and a few domestic road contractors are beginning to competewith foreign firms for construction work itself. In the Kardofan RainfedAgricultural Project, six domestic contractors were pre-qualified and thereare Sudanese contractors undertaking road projects of a similar scopefinanced by USAID. The proposed Fourth Highway Project should include acomponent to provide support to this emerging industry.

Maintenance Organization and Equipment

2.36 The maintenance organization is directed from the Head Office inKhartoum and divided into five regions in the North and three in the South.The region is again divided into divisions. Staffing (engineers,technicians and laborers) is generally adequate - but utilization of staffand equipment is sub-optimal due to lack of adequate and timely provision

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of funds, lack of delegation of authority to use the funds, insufficientmanagement capacity and lack of spare parts, fuel and foreign exchange forbitumen and other materials.

2.37 Nonetheless RBPC is trying to improve its ability to maintainroads and undertake reconstruction projects and its efforts are beingsupported by the ongoing IDA-funded Third Highway Project. The Projectprovides for additional technical assistance as a continuation of the TAcomponent under the Third Highway Project. Under previous Credits, theAssociation financed road maintenance equipment and RBPC has alsobenefitted from a Japanese Credit for purchase of equipment and spares,British ODA assistance for workshop improvements and equipment left overfrom construction projects and from a EfW-financed maintenance unit in theWest. Many items of equipment have since become scrap, however, due tolack of proper maintenance and age. Overall equipment availability is lowbecause of old equipment, lack of trained mechanics, poor workshoporganization and management and insufficient supply of spare parts.

2.38 Under the Third Highway Project, Government is preparing acomprehensive inventory of all equipment belonging to RBPC. Annex IIIgives the preliminary results of this survey after about 70Z of the stock-taking is complete. On average, only about 252 of all pieces of equipmentis operational, about 301 is considered repairable and the balance 45X,should be replaced. This is a reflection of the fact that a largeproportion of RBPC's equipment is "leftovers" from completed contractswhere the contractor did not demobilize, but handed the equipment over tothe Government upon completion of the works. Considered generous at thetime, the now non-functional equipment is swamping the maintenance yardsand leaving stores filled with unsuitable spares. Consequently,standardization becomes difficult. The proposed Fourth Highway Projectwill thus provide for road maintenance equipment and materials to increasethe capacity of the RBPC to carry out routine and periodic maintenance.

Training

2.39 RBPC has a permanent Training Committee made up of DepartmentHeads and a small Training Unit (3 Staff members) operating under theDirector General. The Committee decides training related policy issues andselects candidates for training. The Training Unit itself deals primarilywith the administrative issues. RBPC offers limited training programs foroperators and mechanics, orientation programs for newly recruitedengineers, external programs coordinated by the Training Unit andmanagement development programs offered by the Sudan Academy forAdministrative Services. On the whole, however, the Training Unit isinadequately staffed and funded, and the entire training function isrudimentary.

2.40 The Third Highway Project tried to augment RBPC's trainingcapacity by funding equipment for the Khartoum Pclytechnic Institute (IPI)in exchange for scholarships for RBPC but the hoped for cooperation did notmaterialize as intended. Programs for internal training are beingdeveloped and tested, primarily in maintenance operations and at themechanical workshop at "Kilo 10" under the technical assistance component

- 25 -

of the ongoing Third Highway Project. Also, a Training Produc:ion Unit(TPU) has been established, mainly to provide practical trainingopportunities for repair and resealing of paved roads. In the longer term,however, RBPC needs to establish and develop a separate training division,properly staffed, equipped and funded. Building upon the experience gainedunder the Third Highways Project, the proposed Project will provide somegeneral training as well as training of RBPC and Police staff to implementthe Axle Load Control and Pavement Management Systems.

C. Axle Load Regulation and Road Safety

Lramework

2.41 Road traffic legislation dates back to the Road Traffic Act of1945. It was repealed in 1962 when the Road Traffic Act of 1962 (RTA 62)was put into force. In 1975, the Highway Traffic Regulations (HTR 75) wereannexed to RTA 62. In between these dates, there was a 'Change of trafficto the right hand side of the road" Act in 1973. In recognition of thegreat number of vehicles imported to Sudan, and the many kilometers ofpaved highway constructed during the last 15 years, RTA 62 was furtheramended by the Road Traffic Act of 1983 (RTA 83). The HTR 75 was notamended parallel to the RTA in 1983, and is still in force, confusingmatters somewhat, especially as far as axle load regulations are concerned.

2.42 To protect the investment in roads, as well as for reasons of roadsafety, the dimensions and weights of vehicles operating on public roadsmust be limited. Section 16 of HTR 75 states that '... no person shalldrive or cause to be driven a vehicle which exceeds 9 tons on thehighway...' This is interpreted as meaning 9 tons axle load. Section 27in RTA 83 states that "...vehicles of carrying capacity of 5 tons or more,not exceeding 10 tons maximum, should not exceed overall height 16 feet(4.88 m).' The 10 tons is commonly referred to as the maximum axle load.

2.43 These two regulations lead to the maximum load on a single axlebeing interpreted as 9/10 tons or 9 (10) tons. No regulations arereferring to axle spacing, single or dual wheels, and tandem axles(bogies). The RTA contains detailed regulations regarding maximumpermissible heights of vehicles, as well as maximum permissible length an!width.

2.44 In view of the foregoing, Government is in the process ofredrafting the Highway Traffic Regulations to provide a legal frameworkthat eliminates the confusion and vagueness so that the PoliLd and RBPC canprosecute cases of axle load violations. A draft of the revised axle loadlegislation was submitted to IDA in December 1988. It was agreed that therevised legislation will be implemented by July 1, 1991.

Axle Load Control

2.45 To date, use of weigh bridges to control axle loads under theexisting law has been minimal but RBPC has approached major offenders(sugar and cement factories) to voluntarily reduce overloading. As a result

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of the HOIS findings and strong recommendations to implement an axle loadcontrol system, more recently RBPC has initiated a pilot scheme to gainexperience with the use of portable weigh-bridges, but not to controloverloading at this stage. A progress report was sent to IDA in December,1988. Revision of the axle load legislation as well as initiation andimplementation of an Axle Load Control System will be critical elements inthe proposed Project. It was agreed that Government will: (a) establish,not later than July 1, 1990, axle load limits acceptable to theAssociation; (b) take not later than j2L 1, 1991, all measures necessaryto enforce such limits including implementation of the Axle Load ControlSystem (para. 5.01).

Road Safety

2.46 The number of accidents depends largely on driver behavior,conditions of the roads and the quality of vehicles, but it is also anindicator of the quality of the legislation and its enforcement. TheHighway Traffic Police has started systematically to collect data onaccidents. Annex I, Table 2.6 shows the nationwide accident statistics forthe period 1973-83. The 1983 figures indicate a positive development, withsubstantial reduction in number of both deaths and injuries.

2.47 As is the case in most developing countries, the accidentfrequency in Sudan (accidents per vehicle) is 10-20 times higher than inthe industrialized countries. This is a great challenge for continuedtraffic safety efforts, and an indication of the great potential forimprovement in this field. Consequently, the Project provides forvehicles, safety equipment and rescue equipment to assist the TrafficPolice in its efforts to improve the road safety situation.

D. Road Transport

2.48 The expansion of Sudan's highways has brought tremendous growth inroad transport. Road transport is carrying 882 of total traffic, both inpassengers and goods (in 1969/70 the share was about 25Z). 2The number of licensed vehicles over time is shown in Annex I, Table 2.7.

2.49 Freight Traffic. Road vehicles now carry about 902 of all trafficon the main corridor between Port Sudan and Khartoum. The growth in roadfreight traffic over the period 1974 - 88 averaged 5-6Z per year. Annualaverage daily traffic (AADT) varies considerably over the main roadnetwork, from about 4400 v.p.d. on the Khartoum-Wad Medani road to lessthan 50 v.p.d. on less trafficked sections. The Norconsult study estimatesthat average traffic growth rates will be in the order of 4-5Z p.a. overthe next 20 years.

2/ Traffic volumes have been established, based partly on review ofseveral feasibility studies carried out over the last 15 years,countrywide by RBPC and by Berger (1974), Norconsult/EIU (1979) andNorconsult/Newtech (1986).

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2.50 The shift from rail to road is not entirely due to the growingnetwork of paved roads; some of it is also due to the fact that the qualityand quantity of rail service have declined. Road transport is now beingsubstituted for rail even in regions from El Obeid westward, (and northtoward Wadi Halfa,) where the established rail system should have anadvantage. Although costly in absolute terms, road transport isessentially "unregulated," heavily competitive and efficient.

2.51 Passenger Traffic. Road passenger services are provided almostexclusively by private operators, employing buses of various sizes, butnormally standard single deck of about 60-70 passenger capacity, and bymodified trucks. The bus fleet has increased to about 5,000 vehicles andprobably carries about 6 billion passenger km per year, well in excess ofthe 1 billion passenger-km per year carried by SRC. It also carriesappreciably greater traffic than private cars which number about 100,000and a very rough estimate suggests that commercial road transport accountsfor two-thirds of passenger movements. The public transport operators arelicensed, but as far as can be judged, the Government does not controltariffs or routing. They are subject to the same financial conditions asdescribed under trucking.

2.52 Trucking Industry. Most of the country's estimated 50,000 trucksare privately owned and there are a few large fleets. Competition has beenheightened by the presence of about 700 truckers from Ethiopia who undercutprevailing rates. As of early 1988 there were 4200 long haul vehicles,trucks, tractor-trailers and tankers less than ten years old, with anestimated annual capacity of 4.0 million tons. Capacity of all heavytrucks and trailers in the country is estimated at 200,000 tons; capacityof small and medium trucks for hire is 170,000 tons. This capacity is morethan adequate for Sudan's transport demand (para 1.13). Fuel shortages,lack of spare parts, tires and repair facilities, and the scarcity offoreign exchange to replace depreciated vehicles are beginning to handicapthe industry; some companies have gone out of business and it is estimatedthat 30Z of the fleet is now out-of-service awaiting spare parts. Thecombination of shortages and rising costs make it likely that the truckingindustry will continue to decrease in size in the future.

2.53 Trucking operations are largely concentrated in an area bounded byKhartoum, Kosti, Ed Damazin and Port Sudan. Important operations alsooccur between Kosti and Malakal, around El Obeid, and between the southernregional capital of Juba and the rail terminal of Wau and between Ugandaand Kenya. Other areas are poorly served and in the west and south, inparticular, there are serious capacity shortages.

2.54 The traditional Sudanese vehicle has been of 6 tons capacity,often of the Bedford type, with a locally constructed body. This was wellsuited to the mixture of earth and gravel roads prevailing. With the rapidexpansion of the paved network, heavier trucks with trailers became optimalfor the longer hauls, and on the Port Sudan - Khartoum road, they nowpredominate. These truck combinations are technically the most suitablefor existing conditions. As container movements becomo more importanttractor/trailer combinations will become more appropriate.

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2.55 The trucking industry and ancillary activities such as theprovision of service facilities and establishment of local componentmanufacture is privately financed. This requires access to substantialforeign exchange resources which; the recorded c.i.f. value of importedvehicles and spares was £Sd 100 million in 1986. This does not include rawmaterials for the local tire and battery industry.

2.56 Fuel. Fuel supply is inadequate for demand and is actuallydeclining, particularly on a per vehicle basis, as shown in Annex I, Table2.10. Fuel prices are regulated by the Government and diesel fuel prLce isbelow cost. Government has been urged to end this subsidy and permit themarket place to set fuel prices. Devaluation of the Sudanese pound in theFall of 1987 led to the adjustment of the retail price of gasoline from£Sd. 7.5 to £Sd. 10.0 (1989) per regular gallon. in line with settingprices at commercial rates at the time. However, the retail price ofdiesel fuel, which is more important for the transport sector, was leftunchanged at a low level of £Sd. 4.0 per gallon. Failure to alter thediesel price is even more significant as the value of the Sudanese poundhas eroded substantially since the late 1987; the commercial exchange rateis 12.2 £SdlUS$, compared with the official rate of 4.5 £Sd/US$. Toeliminate the fuel subsidy altogether using the commercial exchange rate,the price should be raised to about £Sd. 9.5 per gallon, an increase ofabout 138Z. Implementation of higher fuel prices would, in turn, raisetrucking rates nearly 80Z.

2.57 Fuel pricing, particularly the phased elimination of subsidies, isa topic in the on-going macroeconomic discussions between Government andthe IMF (para. 1.25).

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III. THE PROJECT

A. Project Origin and Preparation

3.01 Under the ongoing Third Highway Project, the Khartoum-Port Sudanroad was studied by Norconsult, and it was concluded that a substantialproportion of the road is !.a urgent need of attention if further costlydeterioration is to be av. Lded. Inspection showed some sections already inneed of full reconstruction.

3.02 In March 1987, an IDA mission inspected the Khartoum-Port Sudanroad, in the company of Roads and Bridges management and confirmed thefindings of the Norconsult Study. Several other donor agencies and NGOsinvolved in drought relief operations also have expressed concern about therapid deterioration of sections of the Khartoum - Port Sudan road. A pre-appraisal mission, accompanied by RBPC representatives and the Norconsultteam, carried out another inspection of the Khartoum-Port Sudan road inMarch 1988. This inspection concluded that the road had deterioratedfurther.

3.03 In view of the road's importance to Sudan, Government requestedthe Bank to initiate an emergency highway rehabilitation project to financeurgently needed repairs so as to keep open the road. The most damagedsections are located between Gedaref and Port Sudan and are the focus ofthe proposed Project. The heavy rains and flood in August 1988 revealedweaknesses in the pavement on sections previously classified as "good" or'fair", and it became necessary to increase the length of the sections tobe provided with an overlay by about 25 percent. The total length of roadbetween Gedaref and Port Sudan to be rehabilitated under the Project is 566km, 75 percent of this section or 48 percent of the whole road.1

1/ The Khartoum - Wad Medani - Gedaref sections were also investigated, aspart of HOIS, but in general, the quality of these sections was suchthat urgent attention did not seem warranted, and they were notincluded in the proposed Project. Subsequently however, it has beennoticed that a relatively short section near the Gedaref end is showingsigns of.distress. Government is fully aware of the problem, and isapproaching the original donor, The Republic of China, to obtainassistance for any repair or strengthening that may become necessary.Timing of any needed rehabilitation of the Khartoum - Wad Medanisection may also be affected by plans to relieve congestion on thissection, either by building a new road on the north-eastern side of theBlue Nile, or a second carriageway along the present alignment.

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3.04 Detailed engineering work for the sections included in thisProject is being carried out by Norconsult in two phases. The first phase,funded as an extension of the Third Highway Project contract withNorconsult (HOIS), identified the precise locations of the sections to beincluded in the Project. The second phase, under which detailedengineering and tender documents are being prepared, has been financed fromfunds added to the Third Highway Project through a grant from the NorwegianGovernment.

3.05 In late 1987, the deck slab on one of the 112 bridges on theGedaref - Port Sudan section collapsed. Given the number of bridges of thesams design on the road, a preliminary survey of the br-idges was includedas part of the detailed engineering in order to examine whether thecollapse was an isolated case. The study concluded that 105 of the bridgesare showing signs of listress that sooner or later will result in similardeck collapses (para. 2.07). Consequently, strengthening of the bridgeshas been included in the Project.

3.06 Detailed engineering for the main civil works component wassubstantially completed in January 1989. Tender documents have beenprepared by Consultants and it is expected that contracts for civil workscan be awarded in April 1990.

3.07 As preparation for implementing the axle load legislation,Government is reviewing legislation used in other countries and has agreedto prepare draft legislation ciarifying sections of the Road Act dealingwith axle load limitations (paras. 2.45 and 5.01). RBPC is currentlyundertaking a pilot project, with help from the technical assistance teamfinanced under the ongoing project, to measure axle loads now passing onthe Khartoum-Port Sudan road with mobile weigh bridges. RBPC has submitteda status report on its experience to date. This report providesinformation necessary for Government to finalize legislation.

3.08 RBPC and IDA have also held substantial discussions with theCommissioner of the Police and key officers to determine equipment neededto enforce the axle load limitations. The Police have also prepared anaction plan for conducting a Public Awareness Campaign once the stage isset to implement the axle load control program.

3.09 Under the ongoing Third Highway Project, consultants established asystem of monitoring the paved roads in Sudan. The results included in theHOIS formed the basis for the proposed Project. The monitoring system isto be expanded into a full Pavement Management System under the Projectthrough the procurement of equipment and with the help of technicalassistance.

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B. Proiect Obiectives

3.10 The primary purpose of the proposed Project is to finance urgentlyneeded repairs on Sudan's main transport artery so that it remains open andfunctional and to extend the useful life of the road. Additionally theProject seeks to assist Government in putting into place institutionalmeasures aimed at preventing such emergencies from arising in the future.As such, the Project does not address some of RBPC's longer terminstitutional problems, many of which were discussed in the HOIS and arenow under Government review, as these are bettet dealt with under theproposed Fourth Highway Project. Similarly, some of the transport issuesmentioned in Chapter I are beyond the scope of this Project and will besubjects for discussion with Government in better-suited contexts.

3.11 The specific objectives of the proposed Project are: (i) to arrestdeterioration and avert the need for even greater investment on the Gedaref- Port Sudan section of the Port Sudan to Khartoum road by reconstructingor strengthening sections in need of urgent repair, thus protecting capitalinvestment in Sudan's main transport corridor and preventing transportcosts and delivery times from increasing; (ii) to plan and implement aneffective Axle Load Control System to prevent or reduce the abuse of theroad once the road has been rehabilitated; (iii) to institute a PavementManagement System so that RBPC can better assess, alert itself to potentialproblems and plan future road maintenance and reconstruction needs in atimely fashion; and (iv) to continue supporting RBPC's institutionaldevelopment with technical assistance and training.

C. Project Description

3.12 The Project, for which an IDA Credit of SDR 65.7 million (US$82.2million) is proposed totals US$114.4 million and includes: (i) roadconstruction, consisting of rehabilitation of the Khartoum - Port SudanRoad (US$88.1 million), construction supervision (US$4.1 million) andfunding of a cost overrun on the Jebel Aulia - Ed Dueim Road constructioncomponent of the Second Highways Project (US$15.6 million); (ii)implementation of an Axle Load Control System, including provision oftechnical assistance, training, and construction and equipment forpermanent and mobile weighbridges (including rescue and road safetyequipment) (US$4.6 million); (iii) implementation of a Pavement ManagementSystem including provision of technical assistance and training (US$0.9million); and (iv) institustional support for RBPC in the form of technicalassistance and training (US$1.1 million). Project components are discussedin more detail below:

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Khartoum-Port Sudan Road Rehabilitation ProjectRoad Works ProRram

…--------------------------------------------------------------__------------__------------COST

SECTION LENGTH TYPE KM KM US3/Km ESTIMATEKM OF MEASURE REC OVAC (1000) US$ MILL.

---CONTRACT f 1------1. Gedaref - Kassala 208.90 RECONSTRUCTION 31.70 269.92 8.68

OVAC 100 m 62.40 181.28 8.46OVAC 80 mm 68.80 136.56 7.97

Rehabilitation OVAC 70 mm 18.80 118.48 1.61in X of total: OVAC BO mm 28.70 108.84 2.57

100.00 OVAC 60 mm 28.60 94.08 2.68OVAC 40 mm 0.00 80.64 0.00

Subtotal 208.90 81.70 177.20 31.84---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------__------------

2. Kassala - Eriba 140.00 RECONSTRUCTION 26.90 289.92 8.99OVAC 100 m 0.00 181.28 0.00OVAC 80 mm 1.80 136.62 0.18

Rehabilitation in OVAC 70 mm 9.00 118.48 1.06X of total: OVAC 80 mm 8.60 108.84 0.93

72.88 OVAC 50 am 0.00 94.08 0.00OVAC 40 mm 58.60 80.84 4.68NIL 38.7

Subtotal 101.30 26.90 76.40 13.71

TOTAL CONTRACT #1 848.90 REC 100 mm 67.80 15.56X of Total: OVAC 262.80 30.00

88.91 310.20 148.83 46.66

-- CONTRACT # 2-----8. Eriba - Malys 208.20 OVAC 80 mm 13.00 87.36 1.14Rehabilitation in X OVAC 60 mmof Total: OVAC 40 mm 40.00 62.72 2.61

26.46 NIL 166.2Subtotal 53.00 3.84

=,_________________________________________________________________________________________,

4. Halya - Suakin 146.60 RECOPSTRUCTION 12.40 249.78 3.10OVAC 80 mm 7.80 109.78 0.86OVAC 70 mm 21.30 100.80 2.15

Rehabilitation In X OVAC 60 mm 24.90 87.38 2.18of Total: OVAC 60 m 6.60 76.04 0.49

100.00 OVAC 40 mm 73.60 62.72 4.82NIL

Subtotal 12.40 184.10 13.38---------------------------.------------------------------------ __-----------__------------

5. Suakin - Port Sud 65.70 OVAC 80 mm 4.90 109.78 0.64OVAC 70 mm 10.90 10.80 1.10

Rehabilitation In S OVAC 50 mm 5.10 76.04 0.38of Total: OVAC 40 mm 86.80 62.72 2.26

100.00 NILSubtotal 56.70 4.26

------------------------------------------------------------------ __---------__------------

TOTAL CONTRACT # 2 411.40 12.40 248.80 21.29In X of Total: 62.28

GRAND TOTAL RECONSTRUCTION 70.00 18.64CONTRACTS 1+2: 760.30 OVERLAY 496.40 48.19

In S of Total : 74.50 SUm 658.40 118.00 86.83

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Road Conatruction

3.13 Khartoum - Port Sudan Road Rehabilitation - Reconstruction andOverlay. The primary component of the proposed Project will be thereconstruction and overlay of the Khartoum - Port Sudan Road betweenGedaref and Port Sudan. The number of kilometers to be reconstructed orgiven an overlay totals 566 km, or 75 percent of the entire Gedaref-PortSudan section. The amount of overlay varies from section to section, asshown below, because the road was built in stages by different contractorsand subsequently has been subject to varyir.g degrees of wear and tear.Overall, the project is designed to repair all damaged sections so that theresidual life of the entJre road is extended approximately te.a years(measured in Equivalent Standard Axles ESA 80).

3.14 Reconstruction will comprise removal of the existing asphaltsurfacing, reprocessing of the base course for use as subbase and importingnew base and surfacing layers. The reconstructed sections will have apavement consisting of:

100 mm asphalt concrete surfacing.150 mm crushed aggregate base course.

The overlay design and cost estimate is based on levelling the existingpavement with an asphalt concrete regulating course and an asphalt concreteoverlay varying between 40 and 80 mm in thickness. After rehabilitation,the pavement is expected to provide a design life of 6 - million ESA 80.

3.15 Rehabilitation of Bridges. The Project also includes therehabilitation of about 111 bridges at a total cost of US$9.4 million.

3.16 Cost Overrun of Jebel Aulia - Ed Dueim Road Construction. TheProject includes a component to enable the Government to pay the agreedarbitration award resulting from a dispute that arose from a disagreementbetween the contractor and the client during the construction of the JebelAulia - Ed Dueim road financed under the Second Highways Project (Credit882-SU). There were considerable cost increases during execution, comparedwith the tender. The contract document was ambiguous regarding foreigncurrency payments for such cost increases. The dispuite was taken toarbitration in accordance with the relevant provisions in the contract, andthe arbitration award was given in 1988, after the Credit was closed andall funds disbursed.

Implementation of an Axle Load Control System

3.17 Technical Assistance and TraininR. The Project will assistGovernment in initiating and implementing an Axle Load Control System thatwill reduce the number of axle loads exceeding the legal limits. To thisend the Project provides for consultant services to plan, design, superviseand implement an Axle Load Control System appropriate for Sudan, accordingto outline Terms of Reference contained in Annex V. Although details willbe developed d-iring the course of the Project, it is envisaged that thecontrol of axle load will be undertaken by operating mobile weighbridges atprepared sites. In addition, permanent weighbridge stations would be built

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for transporters use in checking axle loads. RBPC is, by statute, chargedwith protecting the road through the control of axle loads, but can onlyenforce the law with the assistance of the Police. The Project thusincludes technical assistance and staff training for the Police Departmentas well as the RBPC.

3.18 Civil Works - Construction of Permanent Weighbridge Stations. TheProject will provide for the design and construction of permanentweighbridge stations to be operated in conjunction with mobileweighbridges: one in Port Sudan and one in Khartoum (or Wad Medani).These stations will consist of a permanent scale and supporting facilitiesincluding a parking area, office and staff housing. The main purpose ofthese stations will be to provide a facility where truckers can check axleloads without being prosecuted, so as to enable them to adjust vehicleloading to comply with the legislation before embarking on a long journey.These stations could also be used to verify the accuracy of the mobileweighbridges, when the need arises. Government will investigate theoptions for effective operation of the control system including thepossibility of having private entrepreneurs operate and maintain thepermanent weighbridge stations.

3.19 Construction of Mobile Weighbridges Sites. The Project alsoprovides for the construction of about 20 strategically located weighbridgesites where 6 mobile weighbridge units can safely set up their scales andcarry out axle load controls at irregular intervals. The sites willconsist of a concrete area with a scale-pit, on/off ramps, parking area andan office.

3.10 Equipment. The Project will provide two permanent and six mobileweighbridges. The Project provides vehicles for the Police to patrol theroad and assist RBPC in enforcing the axle load limits (Annex VI).

3.21 The Project also includes patrol cars, radios, traffic safety aidsand rescue equipment (cranes) needed for the police to clear accidents anddisabled vehicles from the road. A small amount for computer support tostore and analyze traffic statistics and undertake analyses in conjunctionwith RBPC's axle load enforcement activities also will be provided.

Implementation of a Pavement Management System

3.22 Technical Assistance and Training. To enable RBPC to continuallymonitor its paved road system so that road deterioration of the scaletaking place today on the Khartoum - Port Sudan road is not allowed tocontinue without adequate provision for repair or reconstruction, and toassist RBPC in better programming its road maintenance operations, theProject will finance the establishment of a Pavement Management System forthe whole of the bitumenized network. The system will be designed andimplemented with technical assistance, according to outline Terms ofReferenice contained in Annex VII. Such technical assistance might beprovided through a twinning arrangement or through a consulting firm. TheProject also includes the cost of training RBPC staff to operate thePavement Management System.

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3.23 Equipment. The Project will provide equipment suffirient tooutfit two pavement evaluating teams, including vehicles, Benkleman beams,and other relatively simple monitoring devices. Stand-by equipment will beprovided and a second team could be set up during the latter part of theProject.

Institutional Support for RBPC

3.24 Technical Assistance and Training. To continue supporting RBPC'sinstitutional development and to ensure that the organization as a wholebenefits from PMS data, the Project includes technical assistance to RBPC.A team including a road maintenance expert, a planning expert and afinancial controller will be provided following the expiration of thetechnical assistance contract funded under the ongoing Highway Project.Terms of reference are shown in Annex VIII.

D. Cost Estimates

3.25 The total Project cost, including physical and pricecontingencies, but net of taxes and duties, is estimated at US$114.4million with a foreign exchange component of US$98.3 million as shown inthe table of Project Cost Estimates. The estimates are based on December1988 prices. The cost estimates for the main civil works componentsincluding bridge rehabilitation are based upon the Engineer's estimatessubmitted in December 1988. Price contingencies to provide for anticipatedcost increases over the implementation period are based on price increasesof 7.2Z in 1989 and 1990; and 4.42 each in years 1991, 1992 and 1993. Theinternational rates have been also used for local costs on the assumptionthat the difference between the domestic and international inflation willbe offset by adjustments in the exchange rate of Sudanese Pounds.Estimates for equipment are based on prices experienced in the Sudan forthe various items to be purchased. Cost estimates for the technicalassistance components are based on known unit man-month rates in the Sudan.The estimates include cost of accommodation, transport and allowances forlocal staff. Physical contingencies of 10.0 have been added to the basecost. Price and physical contingencies total US$23.9 million, or 20.1? ofthe total Project cost.

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PROJECT COST ESTIMATES *

US8 Millon XLocal Forelgn Total Foreign

A. CIVIL WORKS

(1) Khartoum-Port Sudan RoadRehabilitation 11.0 65.7 66.8 8ax

(li) Construction of Weigh-Bridges 0.8 0.7 1.0 76X(1ii) Cost Overrun on Jebel Aulia-

Ed Duelm Road Construction 0.0 16.6 16.6 100X

SUBTOTAL 11.8 72.1 83.4 86x

B. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS

(I) Axle Load Control System,Weighbridges A Equipment 0.0 0.6 0.6 100X

(11) Pavement Monagement System Equipment 0.0 0.2 0.2 100X

SUBTOTAL 0.0 1.8 1.8 100X

C. CONSULTANT SERVICES AND TRAINING

(1) Construction Supervision 0.9 2.2 8.1 70X(11) Axle Load Control System -

Technical Assistance A Training 0.0 1.0 1.0 100X(iii) Pavement Management System -

Technical Assistance A Training 0.0 0.6 0.5 100X(iv) Institutional Support for RBPC 0.0 0.7 0.7

SUBTOTAL 0.9 4.4 5.8 82X

--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------__----

BASE COST 12.8 78.2 90.6 100X

------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__----

D. CONTINGENCIES

(l) Physical (1OX) 1.4 7.7 9.1(il) Price 2.4 12.4 14.8

SUBTOTAL 8.8 20.1 28.9

------------------------------------------------------------------- __---------_---

GRAND TOTAL 16.1 98.8 114.4 86x--- Ba---e--co--ts--as---of--December-----1988---net---of--ta--es---and--d--t-_es.-

* Base costs as of December 1988 net of taxes and duties.

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E. FinancinB

3.26 The total Project cost is US$114.4 million. IDA's contributionwould be US$82.2 million, KfW's DM 30 million (US$16.1 million equivalent)and Government will finance local costs of the Project, estimated atUS$16.1 million equivalent. As a condition of cross effectiveness theGovernment would have to obtain the necessary cofinancing of the Projectfrom KfW. Details are shown below.

Financing Plan Table

Total Cost ------- FUNDING ------Incl. Cont. IDA KfW GOS

A. CIVIL WORKS

(i) Khartoum-Port Sudan RoadRehabilitation 88.1 56.6 15.9 15.7

(ii) Construction of Weighbridges 1.3 0.7 0.2 0.4

(iii) Cost Overrun on Jebel Aulia-Ed Dueim Road Construction 15.6 15.6

SUBTOTAL 105.0 72.8 16.1 16.1

B. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS

(i) Axle Load Control Systems 2.1 2.1(ii) Pavement Management Equipment 0.3 0.3

----------------------------------

SUBTOTAL 2.4 2.4 0.0 0.0

C. CONSULTANT SERVICES & TRAINING

(i) Construction Supervision 4.1 4.1(ii) Axle Load Control System

TA and Training 1.2 1.2(iii) Pavement Management System

TA and Training 0.6 0.6(iv) Institutional Support for RBPC 1.1 1.1

----------------------------------

SUBTOTAL 7.0 7.0 0.0 0.0

GRAND TOTAL INCL.CONTINGENCIES 114.4 82.2 16.1 16.1

…-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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F. Implementation

3.27 The RBPC will be responsible for execution of the Project.Consultants will be used: (i) to prepare and supervise the civil workscomponents; (ii) to assist in the implementation of the Axle Load Controland Pavement Management Systems; and (iii) to support RBPC's maintenancecapability and institutional development. Detailed engineering for themain civil works component was carried out by consultants financed under agrant from the Kingdom of Norway. The time schedule for implementation ofthe Project is based on a 5-year period starting actual construction inJune 1990 (Table 3.1). The schedule is considered realistic since theProject has been given high priority by Government and since the bulk ofthe project consists of works to be carried out by international firmsunder supervision by international consultants.

G. Procurement

3.28 Procurement arrangements for the Project are expected to apply asshown in the Table hereunder. Civil works contracts for the Khartoum -Port Sudan Road rehabilitation including bridge rehabilitation, probablytwo in number, would be awarded on the basis of international competitivebidding (ICB) in accordance with the Bank's guidelines for procurement.The weigh-bridge sites and stations will be constructed as part of the maincivil works contracts. Equipment for axle load measurements, pavementmonitoring, and rescue and traffic control will be procured through ICB.Subject to IDA's approval, equipment, spare parts and vehicles, notexceeding the equivalent of US$100,000 per contract, up to an aggregateamount of US$0.2 million may be procured through international shopping andup to an aggregate amount of US$100,000 through LCB. Further, allcontracts greater than US$50,000 equivalent, would be subject to priorreview by IDA before final award of such contracts.

3.29 Consultants services for construction supervision, as well astechnical assistance for the Axle Load Control System, Pavement ManagementSystem and institutional support for RBPC will be procured in accordancewith the Bank's guidelines for consultancy services. Training will beorganized mainly through agreements with the technical assistance teams.

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Procurement Arrangements

-------------------------------.-------------------- __-----------------------__-------

PROJECT PROCUREMENT METHOD TOTAL COST

ICB LCB OTHERTotal IDA Totsl I DA Total IDA Total IDA

------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-------

CIVIL WORKS

Khartoum-Port Sudan RoadRehabilitation 88.1 56.6 88.1 68.6Construction ofWeigh-bridges 1.3 0.7 1.8 0.7Cost Overrun Jebel Aulia-Ed Dusim Road Construction 0.0 0.0 1656 15.6 1656 15.6

EQUIPMENT

Axle Load Control System -Weighbridges and Equipment 2.0 2.0 0.1 0.1 2.1 2.1

Pavement Management System -Equipment 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.3

CONSULTANT SERVICES and TRAINING

Construction Supervision 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1Axle Load Control System -

TA and Training 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2Pavement Management System -TA and Training 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6

Institutional Support for RBPC 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------__-------

TOTAL 91.7 68.7 0.1 0.1 22.6 6.1 114.4 82.2------------------------------------------------------------------ __---------__-------

H. Disbursements

3.30 Except for consultant services and training, of which most costsare foreign, the Credit will be disbursed against foreign cost only; theGovernment will be funding local costs. The Credit will be disbursed asfollows:

AMOUNT(USS million)

A. Civil Works 100% of Foreign Expenditures

B. Equipment and spare parts 100% of Foreign Expenditures

C. Consultant Services and Training 100% of Total Expenditures

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3.31 The Project is expected to be completed by September 30, 1993, andthe Credit closing date would be March 31, 1994. An estimated schedule fordisbursement funds is set out below. All disbursements will be fullydocumented to the satisfaction of the Association. Payments againstcontracts for equipment and technical assistance less than US$30,000 wouldbe disbursed under a statement of expenditure (SOE). Documents verifyingexpenditures for the SOE are to be kept in a central place for review byIDA supervision missions. Detailed engineering and bidding documents forthese contracts were completed in September 1989. The award of the civilworks contract will enable relatively quick disbursement, as the scheduledimplementation is three years. The estimated schedule of disbursements ofthe Credit is shown in the Disbursement Table. A special account tofacilitate Project payments for all expenditures in the amount ofUS$500,000 will be opened in the name of RBPC in a Bank acceptable for suchpurpose to Government and IDA, probably the Eximbank in Khartoum.

Estimated Schedule of Disbursement

Bank Fiscal Year Quarterly Cumulative Disbursementand Quarter Ending Disbursement at End of Suarter

(US$ Mill Iion) (US MillIion)

FY 1990

March 31, 1990 16.0 16.0June 30, 1990 10.0 26.0

FY 1991

September 30, 1990 2.0 27.0December 31, 1990 2.0 29.0March 31, 1991 3.0 32.0June 30, 1991 5.0 37.0

FY 1992

September 30, 1991 6.0 43.0December 31, 1991 8.0 49.0March 31, 1992 6.0 56.0June 30, 1992 7.0 62.0

FY 1993

September 30, 1992 5.0 87.0December 31, 1992 4.0 71.0March 31, 1993 3.0 74.0June 30, 1993 3.0 77.0

FY 1994

September 30, 1993 2.0 79.0December 31, 1993 2.0 81.0March 31, 1994 1.2 82.2

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I. Accounting, Auditing and Reporting Requirements

3.32 Project accounts will be maintained by RBPC with separate accountsfor each component. RBPC's accounting system and staff are adequate tomaintain satisfactory project accounts. Auditing of the RBPC is theresponsibility of the Auditor General and accounts on ongoing Projects havebeen audited up to FY1986. The Government has agreed that an independeatauditor would be appointed to audit the project accounts as required andnot later than six months after the close of each financial year. Theauditor would furnish the Association certified copies of the Project'sfinancial statements for such year and a report of such scope and in suchdetail as the Association shall have requested.

3.33 The audit provided by the Auditor-General would make specificreference to the special accounts operation and to expenditures withdrawnunuer the SOE procedures and express a separate opinion on these matters.Expenditures for equipment to be used by the police for traffic control andenforcing axle load legislation will be separately audited and a reportprepared for that purpose.

3.34 RBPC will be responsible for Project reporting as follows:

(i) Inception, progress and final reports on technical assistanceby consultants for the Axle Load Control System, the PavementManagement System and the experts assisting RBPC;

(ii) Quarterly progress reports and completion report on all Projectcomponents by RBPC;

(iii) By January 1 of each year an audit report on the Projectaccount by the Auditor General or an independent auditor; and

(iv) Semi-annual progress reports on compliance with agreed actionplans regarding: (a) development of a road classificationsystem; (b) implementation of agreed organizational changeswithin RBPC; (c) passage of revised legislation regarding axleload limitations and implementation of an Axle Load ControlSystem; and (d) implementation of a PMS.

3.35 The Government agreed on these reporting requirements, as well asa project completion report by RBPC in a form satisfactory to theAssociation not later than six months after the project closing date.

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J. Environmental Aspects

3.36 The Project is expected to have positive and negative influenceson the environment as shown in the Table below but since the maincomponents are limited to strengthening existing facilities, theenvironmental effects will be very limited in the long run.

POSSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

ASPECT POSITIVE NEGATIVE

1. Short Term

(i) Construction Reduced *oil erosion by Dust, detours,activities improvement to drainage traffic delays,

fumes, spoilmaterials.

(i) Quarries Dust, landscape,noise, resources.

(Iii) Bridges/Rehab. Detours, delays.

2. Long Term

(i) Improved road Riding quality

(ii) Bridge/Rehab. Reduced risk of collapseand traffic accidents

(iii) Axle load Reduced loads More vehicles.control and damage

(Iv) PUS Delay in next rehabilitationoperation

(v) Rescue More rapid clearance ofEquipment accidents, reductionand patrol of related accidents;Vehicles faster repair of damaged

vehicles; and Improvedrecovery chances ofaccident victims.

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IV. ECONOMIC EVALUATION

A. General

4.01 Road transport in Sudan carries over 902 of the total commercialtraffic in the country. The proposed Project is aimed atreconstruction/overlay of 566 km or about 48Z of the length of the mainroad Khartoum-Port Sudan (1,182 km). The road is the only corridor to thedeep sea port and the backbone of the road network and land transport ingeneral. Therefore, it has not only a major role in the economicdevelopment of Sudan, but also plays a critical role in the transport ofrelief cargo.

4.02 The road traverses the most populated and economically activeareas in the country and is essential not only to export/import trafficflow but also to the internal traffic. The economic rate of return for theproposed road works (about 80o of the total project base costs) is about36Z. The remaining Project components (weigh-bridges and other equipmentfor axle load and traffic control and technical assistance, althoughdifficult to quantify, are expected to produce important benefits to roadsafety and to the life and physical condition of the road. Only a modestreduction of overloading was assumed in the analysis in recognition of thedifficult experience other countries have had when tackling the problem ofoverloaded vehicles. The Project's economic rate of return, therefore, isnot very sensitive to the success of the Axle Load Control System.

B. Traffic on Khartoum-Port Sudan Road

4.03 The read is by far the most trafficked one in the country. Itcarries annually about 3.5 - 4.0 million tons of external dry cargo trade(long distance traffic); sorghum, petroleum products, wheat andconstruction materials have the largest share in imports, while cotton,molasses and livestock are most prominent export items. However, there isa heavy imbalance between the traffic flows resulting in 6:1 ratio oninbound vs. outbound traffic. That in turn results in a relatively lowaverage load factor of long distance vehicles estimated at about 65Z. Inaddition to the long distance traffic, there is also local traffic (overone million tons per year) and sizeable passenger traffic; out of about 29million passengers transported on roads (about 95? of all passengertransport) the major part was carried on the Khartoum-Port Sudan road.

4.04 Traffic volumes on the road have been high with a significantshare of long distance vehicles, i.e., trucks and tractor trailers. On thefive road sections included in the Project, the largest traffic volumeswere recorded on Suakin-Port Sudan (57 km) and on the longest sectionGedaref-Kassala (209 kn.). In recent years only occasional traffic countshave been undertaken on the road, either by consultants, by RBPC or byMFEP. Summarized results of the counts for 1986 and 1988 together withtraffic forecast are presented in the table below. It is important to notethat: (i) the share of long distance trucks, even without medium size

- 44 -

trucks and buses, varies between 372 - 63Z; and (ii) there is a majordifference in traffic volumes among the sections on the whole road lengthi.e., between 616 - 1,616 vehicles per day. That could be explained by thecomposition of the traffic on the road, by its length and by the impact oflocal traffic in specific road zones.

Road Traffic Flows in ADTActual Projected

1986 1988 1998 2002Section ADT Hvy.Tr. ADT Hvy.Tr. ADT Hvy.Tr. ADT Hvy.Tr.

Gedaref-Kassala 775 294 918 359 1180 460 1360 530Kassala-Haiya 557 348 650 408 830 520 960 600Haiya-Sinkat-

Suakin 760 338 767 408 980 520 1130 600Suakin-Port Sudan 948 378 616 604 2070 770 2380 890

4.05 In the preparation of the Project there was no time to carry outsystematic traffic counts in 1988; instead only a limited counting was doneby consultants (Norconsult) on the sections affected by the project.Although the results of 1988 counts might not be representative for theyear, they match the past trend of the traffic development on the road. Inthe economic analysis, the year 1988 was taken as the base; possible minordeviations in the actual traffic volume in 1988 should not, however, makeany major impact on the economic justification of the Project (para. 4.12).

4.06 In assessing future traffic growth and projecting average dailytraffic (ADT) for 1998 and 2002 (table above), a gradual increase of therailway traffic (to 1.2 million tons by 1992 through 1996), assumed in arecent railway project, was taken into account. Taking also into accountpast development of the road traffic it was conservatively assumed that inthe period 1988-1998 traffic on the road would grow at an annual rate of2.52. while in the following years (after 1998) it would grow at 3.5% peryear. In terms of tonnage, the traffic volume would thus increase fromabout 6 billion ton/km (in 1988) to about 7.7 billion ton/km in 1998 and8.8 billion ton/km in the year 2002.

C. Economic Analysis

4.07 The economic analysis was carried out in 1988 prices using anestimated shadow exchange rate of ESd 8.0 = US$1.0. The investment periodwas envisaged to take about three years. The proposed Project was notassumed to generate any additional traffic on the road between Gedaref andPort Sudan (para. 4.10).

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4.08 The economic analysis was carried out by comparing "with" and"without" the Project cases. In the "without" case, it is assumed that theroad will continue to deteriorate with traffic volumes increasingnonetheless, but with increasing vehicle operating costs as the roaddeteriorates. In the "with" the Project case (proposedreconstruction/overlay), it is assumed that significant improvements to theroad (pavement strengthening, reconstruction of shoulders and improvementof roadside drains) will be made to eliminate the need for costlyreconstruction in the short-term, to protect the capital investments inroads and to reduce Vehicle Operating Costs (VOCs) over the estimated 15-year life of the civil works (1992-2006).

4.09 The main benefits to be derived from the Project will be savingsin vehicle operating costs. Additional benefits will result in timesavings and from improved road safety but they are difficult to quantifyand were not included in the analysis. The major direct beneficiaries ofthe reduced transport costs and improved road safety will be truck and busowners/operators and passenger car owners. Since the road transportindustry is highly competitive, it is expected that a high proportion ofthese benefits will be passed on to transport users -- urban/ruralpopulation and to the consumers of goods being transported in the roadvicinity. The Government will also benefit from savings from deferred,costly road reconstruction.

4.10 Vehicle operating costs on the Project roads have been calculatedseparately for each road se-tion, for each year, taking into account thecondition of road surface, the expected deterioration from climate andtraffic, as well as the estimated maintenance operation to be carried outon the roads. VOCs were calculated by consultants (Norconsult) using theHighway Design and Maintenance Standards Model (HDM). Four typical vehiclegroups were selected (light vehicles, medium trucks, heavy truck trailersand buses). During the estimated economic life, VOCs are, however,expected to increase gradually -- at a higher pace for the "without theProject" case. Savings in VOC were calculated for normal traffic only,since no traffic was assumed to be generated as the result of civil works.

4.11 The economic analysis was carried out in economic prices, net oftaxes and duties. The major assumptions and inputs in the 15-yearcost/benefit analysis are as follows. The total costs included in theeconomic evaluation comprise: (i) cost of civil works (reconstruction andoverlay); and (ii) 1O physical contingencies and cost of supervision;appropriate costs of routine andJ periodic maintenance were also included inthe analysis. The benefits considered in the economic analysis includesavings in VOCs for the normal traffic growing at modest rates (para.4.06).

4.12 The cost/benefit analysis based upon the assumptions explained inparas. 4.07 - 4.11 shows that the proposed civil works yield high ERRs andthat the Project is economically well justified. The combined ERR for allthe project road sections (566 km) is estimated at 35.8%; ERR forindividual roads sections range from 23.9Z - 63.82 as shown in the tablebelow. The ERRs would have been even higher had the additional benefits(para. 4.09) been taken into account. In the sensitivity analysis the

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Project remains well-justified. Assuming an increase in project cost of20Z and a simultaneous decrease of benefits by 20Z of the ERR forindividual road sections ranges from 15Z - 48.3Z.

Results of Economic Evaluation

Length of Sectionsto Be Reconstructed

Link or Given an Overlay ERR (Z)

Gedaref-Kassala 209 31.9Kassala-Haiya 154 23.9Haiya-Sinkat 82 38.4Sinkat-Suakin 64 41.4Suakin-Port Sudan 57 63.8

All Road Section: 566 35.8

4.13 The Project also includes additional funds (US$15.6 millionequivalent) required to cover the cost overrun on the contract for theconstruction of the Jebel Aulia - Ed Dueim Road (158 km), originallyincluded under a previous road project (para. 3.12). The economic analysisof the road construction to two-lane bituminous paved standard was carriedout on the basis of total actual construction costs in the period 1981-84including the additional costs indicated above; the economic benefits werebased on: (i) savings in vehicle operating costs of regular traffic on theroad; (ii) savings in road maintenance costs; and (iii) benefits (50z) fromgenerated traffic by the new road. The actual traffic on the road,following the road construction (1986) was relatively high ranging between460 vpd - 930 vpd. With the cost overrun, the basis of economic life of 25years the economic rate of return of the road construction is now 14.5?, ascompared to the appraisal estimate of 14Z.

D. Risks

4.14 On the civil works component of the Project, there is little riskof implementation since the work will be carried out by contract awardedunder ICB. The risk of cost escalation is also small and in any event, theeconomic rate of return remains high even with substantial cost increases.With respect to the objective of extending the life of the entire road byrehabilitating sectors most in need of urgent repairs, there is a risk thatsections not included in the Project might fail and require investmentsooner than anticipated. This risk is reduced by the introduction in theProject of equipment and technical assistance to increase RBPC's capacityto carry out periodic maintenance operations. Furthermore, during

- 47 -

identification and preparation of the upcoming Fourth Highway Project, theperformance of the Khartoum - Port Sudan road will be closely monitored,and if necessary, a second rehabilitation phase will be included inHighways IV tentatively scheduled for implementation in 1991-96.

4.15 The major risk of the Project relates to the institutionalmeasures included in the Project, introduction of an Axle Load ControlSystem and a Pavement Management System. The Axle Load Control System,which aims at reducing overloading and preventing premature deteriorationof the reconstructed road, may not be successful due to possible oppositionfrom road transport users, failure of RBPC and the Police to carry outfully the proposed system, or general socio-behavioral factors. Similarly,RBPC's implementation of the Pavement Management System may not besuccessfully implemented because of possible organizational and managerialweaknesses. These risks are reduced by the fact that a technicalassistance team funded by the Highways III Project is now in place and bythe recognized need for these measures and the strong commitments givenboth by RBPC and Government to implement them.

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V. RECOMMENDATION

5.01 Agreements were reached on the following matters:

(a) GOS to establish, not later than July 1, 1990, axle loadlimits acceptable to the Association; take not later thanJuly 1, 1991, all measures necessary to enforce such limits,including the implementation of the Axle Load Control Systemand appropriate arrangements for the cooperation of RBPC andthe traffic police (para. 2.45);

(b) GOS to establish and thereafter maintain a PavementManagement System within RBPC to monitor Sudan's bitumen roadnetwork, not later than July 1, 1991 (para. 3.22);

(c) an action plan for establishing a road classification systemwithin Sudan (paras. 1.30, 2.04 and 2.19);

(d) an action plan for implementing agreed organizational changeswithin RBPC (paras. 1.30, 2.22, 2.31 and 2.33);

(e) to improve RBPC's operational autonomy, by March 31, 1990,GOS would empower the Board of Directors of RBPC to approveexpenditures of up to £Sd 250,000 to be incurred by RBPC inaccordance with its budgetary provisions (para. 2.30);

(f) RBPC to present to the Association a maintenance plan, bySeptember 30 of each year, relating budget to physical worksprogrammed for the subsequent year and relating work to beaccomplished with maintenance needs of the road network inthe long term (para. 2.32); and

(g) RBPC to prepare quarterly progress reports on projectcomponents and on compliance with agreed action plan(para. 3.34).

5.02 As a condition of effectiveness, Government would have obtainedthe necessary cofinancing of the Project from KfW (para. 3.26).

5.03 Subject to the above conditions, the proposed Project is suitablefor a Credit of SDR 60.2 million (US$82.2 million equivalent) at standardIDA terms with 40 years maturity.

- 49 -

ANNEX IPage 1 of 8

Table 2.1

Existing Constructed Roads

Road Section Total Length Road Typein Km.

Khartoum - Wad Medani 187 PavedWad Medani - Gedaref 227Khartoum - Jebel Aulia 40Omdurman - Waid Sedina 22Khartoum - El Geili 42Summit - Erkowit 34Tokar - Sallalat 17Gedaref - Hillat 17Kalaskola - White Nile 6Gedaref - Kassala 220Kassala - Haiya 350Haiya - Port Sudan 206Dubeibat - Dilling - Kadugli 188Wad Medani - Sennar 107

Sennar - Kosti 110Jebel Aulia - Rabak 267

Nyala - Kas - Zalingei 210Sennar - Singa 70Wad Medani - Barakat 15El Obeid - Dubeibat 94 GravelEl Fasher - Nyala 225Juba - Bor 150Juba - Nimule 175Juba - Aba 213Juba - Kapoeta 314

Juba - Wau - Raga 510

Tombura - Yambio - Maridi - Juba 540

Source: Roads and Bridges Public Corporation.

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ANNEX IPage 2 of 8

Table 2.2

Roads Under Construction or Proposed for Construction

Road Section Length in Km Comments

A. Under Construction

Rabak - Renk 166 Up to JebelenEl Obeid - Tendelti 185Kosti - Tendelti 116Sennar - Damazin 228 (Sennar - Singa completed)Singa Bridge -Atbara - Berber - Abidya 60

B. Design Complete

Gedaref - Gallabat 154Kassala - Sabdarat 30Wad El Huri - Sim sim 77Gedaref - Suki 178Kadugli - Talodi 100Geili - Shendi - Atbara 97 Tendering initiated, 1989

Construction Schedule.Dilling - Habila 42

C. Under Study

Zalingei - Geneina - Chad Pre-Feasibility StudyBorder 193 completed

El Obeid - En Nahud 215Khartoum - Kassala 401Khartoum - Wad Medani (East) 210Atbara - Haiya 300 Study completedAtbara - Marawi - Dongola - Halfa 1190Gedaref - Gallabat 154 Feasibility Study completed

D. Proposed for Study

Omdurman - Dongola 547En Nahud - El Fasher 452Talodi - Malakal 246Wad Medani - Ed Dueim 138Renk - Malakal 310Malakal - Bor 400Port Sudan - Tokar 1000

Source: Roads and Bridges Public Corporation and Ministry of EconomicPlanning.

- 51 -

ANNEX ITable 2.3 Page 3 of 8

Proiect Ranking by Net Present Value According toAppropriate Road Surface

Project AADT in Operating YearLength ____________ NVP Norconsult

Project Km lot Sth 10th (£Sd. M.) IRR

Khartoum - Wad Medani 210 6,222 89,189 12,280 656.8 49.0

Omdurman - Dongola 647 876 470 636 180.4 22.5

Singa - Damazine 768 1,028 1,278 189.6 82.0

Khartoum - Atbara - Haiya 600 273 J83 468 168.5 22.0

Um Ruwaba - El Obeid 150 309 407 482 61.6 26.1

Kosti - Um Ruwaba 164 326 424 506 66.8 23.4

Wad El Huri - Sim Sim 77 229 818 383 27.4 23.4

El Gedaref - El Suki 178 126 178 217 16.4 21.0

Now Halfa - Kashim El Girba 97 263 340 413 12.1 18.8

En Nahu - El Obeld 216 184 172 204 11.4 18.0

En Nahud - Nyala 128 162 194 8.6 18.8

Rabak - Renk 168 148 185 219 7.8 18.8

El Gedaret - Um Barskat 110 99 183 158 1.2 16.9

Dilling - Habila 42 97 132 156 1.1 18.8

Khartoum - Kassala 401 206 278 847 (0.04) 15.1

Renk - Malakal 810 114 147 172 (0.5) 14.9

Kadugli - Talodi 100 67 73 8B (12.0) 4.6

El Gedaref - Galabat 154 67 76 92 (16.1) 6.1

Zalingei - Geneina - Adre 198 81 39 48 (84.8) (4.1)

Talodi - Molakal 246 48 67 67 (84.8) 0.7

Malakal - Bor 400 77 98 114 (38.8) 6.5

Ed Damar-Marawi-Dongola-Halfa 98 100 121 (97.8) 6.6

En Nahud - El Fasher 462 202 254 308 (127.8) 18.1

The ranking of projects accords fairly closely with the general order of priorities givenby Government to road construction. The Roads and Bridges Public Corporation has, an oneof Its main aims for road development, the linking of the road system on the north-southaxis, with the Khartoum-Atbara-Halys road as of particular Importance. Thle general aim Isfulfilled in the rankings. Tho sest-west was given as a second priority with the El Obeid- En Nahud road an of particular Importance. The rankings of the east-west road projectsaccord with this.

LEGEND: F = Feasibility, Ongoing _. compI.D = Design, ongoing or cropi.

Table 2.4 - RDPC, IGUWAY INVES2MENT PROMRAI6, 1989-98 C = construction, ongoing or compl.

Length Coat Donor Annual ExpendituresProject km LSd Mill Status Support 88/ 89/ 90/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 94/ 95/ 96/ 97/

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

CRO ROAMS

1. Koeti-Tendelti 116 250 C NORAD(D),ADB(C) 40 40 40 20

2. Tendelti-El Obeid 185 830 C USAID (C) 100 100 100 60

3. Kadugli-Talodi 100 150 C EC(D), USAID(C) 25 50 50 25

4. 31 ObeLd-E1 Dibeibat 100 175 C Dutch Aid (C) 90 30

5. Sennar-Singa-Damazin 220 570 c Kuwait/AF(C) 50 150 150 150 70

6. 31 Pasher-l Geneina 360 650 C Italy (C) 90 90 17. Singa Bridge 175 C China (C) 20 60 60 35 >

8. QLliL-Atbara-Haiya 540 1900 F,D Arab Fund (F+D) 100 300 300 300 300 300 300 ~9. Odur an-Dongola 547 650 p 100 200 200 200

10. Western Sudan Bridges 64 D 10 20 20 14

11. E1 Debelbat-Kadugli 187 145 C EC (D+C) 20 50 50 25

12. Juba-Kenya border 345 250 D EC (D+C) 30 70 70

13. 31 ObeLd-En Nahud 215 360 F DANIDA/ADB (F) 60 120 120 60

14. Khartoum-Wad Nedani(East) 186 550 F 100 200

15. Rabak-Renk 166 100 D KfW (D) 15 40 35 15

16. Wad 31 Hurl-Sim Sim 77 125 D 30 30

17. 31 Gedaref-El Suki 178 250 50 50 50

18. Dusim-Managil-Medanl 190 270 Arab donors (C) 45 90 90 45

19. En Nahud-Nyala 270 300 USAID/Japan 50 50 50 50 50 50

20. Nyala-Zalingei 170 150 C FRG/RfW (C) 1S 20

21. En Nahud-El Fasher 452 675 F 50 100 100 100

22. Renk-Malakal 310 500 50 50 50

23. Talodi-Malakal 246 400 F 50 50

24. Suakin-Toker 120 300 50 100 100 50

inuCO,wAax ROADS m 25. Um Rwaba-Abasia 100 40 C USAID (D+C) 10 10 10 10 X x26. Abasia-Abugebeina 100 100 C USAID (D+C) 20 20 20 20 20 o27. New Halfa-Kashim el Girba 97 D Kuwait (D)

28. Dilling-Habila 42 350 D ) 25 100 100 100 25 x

29. Wad Medani-Abulharaz 145 D

TOTALS 5,764 10,279 335 520 605 795 890 804 835 950 1,06S 845.... ==== ==.............===

Table 2. 5

SUDANKHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

Revenue Collection from the Road Sector(LSd Million)

--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------__-----------------------------------------------______

69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/76 76/76 78/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/i4 Average15 Yenr

A Import Duties

1. Passenger Cars 0.83 0.35 0.90 1.86 1.14 2.90 5.72 10.21 3.83 6.63 15.73 16.91 19.32 18.28 29.40 8.832. Box-Cars 0.68 0.38 0.78 1.00 0.98 3.77 4.44 2.88 4.41 4.35 3.31 6.10 20.90 14.43 13.73 6.873. Buses 0.52 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.55 0.75 0.17 0.52 0.22 0.76 2.74 1.22 1.61 1.88 2.02 2.104. Lorries A Trucks 0.88 0.84 1.21 0.24 1.27 0.36 7.22 0.74 1.79 0.82 1.20 1.23 7.21 14.63 3.33 3.245. Other Types of

Motor Vehicles 0.72 0.20 0.21 0.65 0.42 1.38 2.39 1.48 1.24 1.06 1.18 1.24 1.34 1.25 2.48 1.136. Spare Parts 1.70 1.58 1.62 0.03 2.3S 3.47 2.01 3.74 4.16 6.28 6.03 8.61 8.01 10.40 16.17 6.10 w7. Tires 0.79 0.94 0.83 0.83 1.43 2.08 1.33 2.75 3.31 4.16 2.74 5.19 3.25 0.99 1.76 2.168. Benzine 0.28 0.23 0.93 0.34 0.48 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.26 0.41 0.65 0.399. Gas Oil 0.63 0.92 1.23 2.03 8.30 2.09 0.86 1.27 0.27 0.4, 0.85 1.71 21.20 29.16 28.51 10.8310. Crude Fuel Prod. 4.74 4.81 4.71 5.87 9.38 3.13 0.19 0.90 0.42 0.87 3.18 3.9211. Other Type of

Petroleum 1.91 1.94 2.08 1.01 1.62 1.34 1.67 1.97 2.06 1.89 2.08 2.76

B. Excise Duties

1. Fuel - - - - - - - - 20.20 19.51 26.02 27.72 14.60 2.44 2.49 15.97

2. Tires - - - - - - - - - - - 0.71 0.64 1.78 2.67 1.33

C. Vehicle Licensing 0.23 0.30 0.38 0.46 0.64 0.82 0.70 0.78 0.86 0.94 1.01 1.08 1.21 1.58 3.09 0.92

D. Vehicle Surcharge, - - - - - - - - - - - 2.09 2.37 2.68 3.03 2.64 1d

E. Road Tolls - - - - - - - - - - - 0.97 0.82 1.15 1.26 0.81 m

F. Driving Licensing 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.34 0.10 U I

TOTAL 13.93 12.40 15.14 16.32 28.62 22.11 27.84 27.49 43.09 48.87 65.74 81.97 100.82 100.88 110.28 60.74

…--------------------------------------------------------------- - ------------------------------------------------------------- - _

- 54 -

ANNEX IPage 6 of 8

Table 2.6

Road Traffic Accidents In Sudan 1978-OS

TotalYeur Death X Serious X Others X total X Accidents

Index(1989 = 100)

1978/74 470 9 1,246 23 8,783 68 5,448 100 1141974/75 478 9 1,288 26 8,618 a6 5,874 100 11a1976/78 269 48 3,905 48 3,992 49 8,168 100 -1978/77 86B 9 1,862 23 8,992 68 6,879 100 2081977/78 68O 10 1,882 26 4,116 64 6,874 100 1351978/79 692 12 1,824 81 8,260 56 6,778 100 1211979/80 668 9 1,828 26 4,816 6s 7,801 100 1531980/81 728 9 2,027 27 4,862 84 7,606 100 1801981/82 740 10 1,862 26 4,698 64 7,295 100 1641982/88 479 8 1,818 27 8,808 a6 5,903 100 124

Source: Central Traffic Office in the Sudan (Khartoum)

- 55 -

ANNEX IPage 7 of 8

Table 2.7

Fuel Supply and Vehicle Fleet 1974-84

Total fuel consumption Index fuelYear in road transport * Vehicle fleet availability

Metric tons Index Number Index per vehicle1974=100 1974=100 1974=100

1974 218,473 100 79,079 100 1001975 245,373 112 79,135 100 1121976 284,794 130 101,591 128 1021977 318.867 146 121,769 154 941978 332,446 152 135,062 171 891979 362,990 166 146,809 186 891980 400,278 183 165,270 209 881981 420,035 192 203,246 257 751982 397,123 182 263,098 333 681983 430,044 197 244,067 309 641984 397,123 182 263,098 333 55

Source: GPC, TSB 1984/85.* 100% benzine consumption and road transport's actual share of total gas

oil concumption.

Table 3. 1

Project Implementation Schedule

99 90 91 92 93 94Sep Nov Jan MarApr JunJul Sep NovDec Feb AprMay JulAug OctNov JanFeb Apr JunJul Sepflct Dec Feb AprWal JulAugSeP Nov Ja

StatuslI 1 2 1 2 1 2 4 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 12 1 1 4

A.KHARTOUN - PORT SUDAN ROAD 0 N ..

Tender period . .

Wvard supervision contract A . ..

Supervision of Civil WorksContract Peri.APayment of cost overrun N

B.AXLE LOAD CONTROL SYSTEN On... .... .. . ..

Design Meilhbridges EConsulti . . ... . .n.

0%Equipment procuresent A... .. . .

V.cighbridge construction U Tecbnical Assistance I Traimig. .

PR-Campaigne .

C.PAVEMENT NANAEMENT SYSTEM D M . ..

Design by Consultan%.. .... .

Technical Assistance STrainingProcurement of Equipsent. ..

o SUPPORT FOR ABPC Dl ...

TIA and Traininq C

0 -

- 57 -

ANXIIPage 1 of 2

PFgure 2,1

Residual Life (1986) in ESA8 O and in Years

wtotm- Port Sudan ( 1114km)

'-4

0

'-4

p4

Iharto~a Wsd Gedarf * Kasai&MeI' ^ - Sudan

0340 800. 1200OCoLflO9, b

Vad %11danL - Ko.tL I J.Aulo -Ed XWaI (153a)

Cu~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~CCu~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0

0~~~~~~~~~

0.

Wed Seenar Kostt k1 Ed

Oa.da.ge, kmhoNnogs, km

SUDANKHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

ORGANIZATION OF THE ROADS AND BRIDGES PUBLIC CORPORATION

H.E. MINISTER OF CONSTRUCIONa PUBLIC WOVIaS

DHIRECO EEAL

DDIIROR C8IENA

P5~OtW. DTRBA caDLIERTI. Da.oira 4tERTOtCrdOR a~A 8e

MECHANICAS PtOJECTS 0A

MANAUR TEEMICAL~~~~~~~~~~~~WO ROEE ANO

SUPRSWIS11IN

S: OR~~~~~~~~~~~~~~LBOAOtE

DIRTwrm

DIFtECTOR OUtECtOR ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~DI~ORLAO~1WE

1~4EHANICAL MAIN H. Q. SUB- MW4ANICAL EnVI

CHnF I CHIE41F 11F 41F I04CHSF B4. I41 I cHIS: CHIEF 01F DRT~DREO

ENGINEEFt n EMD~~~~~~~~ECIEE

rLtIN UP ISION DEII SLIS LAB. cmT M. G. ET

Source: Roads A Bridges Public Corporation

Figure 2. 2

SUDAN

KHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

Roads & Bridges Public Corporation Equipment Inventory

RBPC Equipment of the Regions: Khartoum/Sennar/Eastern Region w/out Aroma and Kinkat (about 70X)

OPERATIONAL REPAIRABLE SCRAP

DESCRIPTION TOTAL No X No No %

Dozers (size DO up) 38 14 38.84 16 42.10 8 21.05

Scrapers (incl. elevator scrapers) 19 1 5.26 6 31.57 12 63.15

Graders (all sizes) 80 15 18.76 29 36.25 38 45.00 qv

Wheel loaders 46 1S 33.33 21 48.88 9 20.00

Traxcavators 8 3 37.60 2 25.00 3 37.60

Excavators 10 2 20.00 2 20.00 6 60.00

Trencher 1 -- --- 1 100.00 -- ---

Steel rollers s0 7 23.33 2 6.66 21 70.00

Vibrating rollers 15 __ 5 33.33 10 66.66

Tyre rollers 21 6 28.67 9 42.86 6 28.57

Tamping compactors (CAT 826) 2 2 100.00 -- --_ -- --

Towed tyro rollers 13 1 7.69 2 16.38 10 76.92 0 H

Towed vibrating rollers 3 -- --- -- --- 3 100.00

Towed tamping rollers 6 __ 5 83.33 1 16.66

SUDAN

KHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

Roads & Bridges Public Corporation Equipment Inventory

RBPC Equipment of the Regions: Khartoum/Sennar/Eastern Region w/out Aroma and Kinkat (about 70%)

OPERATIONAL REPAIRABLE SCRAP

DESCRIPTION TOTAL No X No X No X

Road finisher 15 5 33.33 3 20.00 7 48.88

Small compaction rollers (hand leaded) 7 1 14.28 3 42.85 3 42.86

Road stabilier (HARNISHFEGER) I - 1 _ 100.00

Towed disc plows S __ 4 80.00 1 20.00 l

Towed rippers 4 - - 4 100.00

Towed rotary cutter (mixer) 4 __ 4 100.00

Mobile compressor 22 7 31.81 12 64.64 3 13.63

Crawler crane 1 I_ 1 100.00 __

Automobile cranes 9 9 33.33 6 66.56 1 11.11

Cranes on truck chassis 2 1 60.00 1 60.00 __

Asphalt mixing plants (different sizes) 8 4 50.00 1 12.60 3 37.50 X

Sub-base mixing plants 1 --- 1 100.00 __ __ H

Concrete mixing plants 2 - - 2 100.00 __

Bitumen spray tanker (black topper) 6 3 60. 00 1 16.86 2 33.33

SUDAN

KHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

Roads & Bridges Public Corporation Equipment Inventory

RBPC Equipment of the Regions: Khartoum/Sennar/Eastern Region w/out Aroma and Kinkat (about 70%)

OPERATIONAL REPAIRABLE SCRAP

DESCRIPTION TOTAL No U No U No X

Mobile asphalt batching plants 4 2 60.00 2 60.00 _

Towed bitumen sprayer 3 2 88.66 1 33.33 __

Formtractors 7 - - 3 42.85 4 57.14

Add-on chipping spreaders 3 2 6666 .8 1 33.33 ON

Forklifts 9 4 44.44 3 33.33 2 22.22 1Trucks-tippers+lorries(FIAT 897NP/30oPC/e82N3) 101 8 7.92 32 31.68 61 60.39

Trucks - all other FIAT types 11 1 9.09 3 27.27 7 63.63

MITSUBISHI'FUSO - tippers + lorries 66 33 50.00 25 37.87 8 12.12

NISSAN - tippers + lorries a 2 33.33 3 60.00 1 16.68

All other manufacturers - tippers + lorries 148 28 18.91 24 16.21 96 64.86 8_ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__ _ __ __ cWater + fuel tankers 38 16 42.10 10 26.31 12 31.57

Road tractors 6 4 66.66 2 33.33 __

Concrete mixer trucks 10 -- ___ _ 10 100.00 p.

Rock dumper 20 3 15.00 j ___ 17 85.00

SUDAN

KHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

Roads & Bridges Public Corporation Equipment Inventory

RBPC Equipment of the Regions: Khartoum/Sennar/Eastern Region w/out Aroma and Kinkat (about 70%)

OPERATIONAL REPAIRABLE SCRAP

DESCRIPTION TOTAL No X No X No %

Flat semi-trailers 7 1 14.28 4 67.14 2 28.57

Low loader - semi-trailers 4 2 50.00 2 50.00 --

Hydraulic dumpers 6 _ 6 100.00

Bottom dumper - semi trailer 2 -- -_ _2 100.00

Forklifts 8 3 37.50 3 37.50 2 2S.00

Generators (up to 100 kVA) 9 4 44.44 5 65.55 -_

Generators (more than 100 kVA) 28 14 53.84 10 38.48 2 7.68

Drill riggs with hammer a 4 60.00 a 37.50 1 12.60

Crusher plants 6 2 33.33 2 33.33 2 33.33

Jaw and cone crushers - mobile and stationary mnot connectod to crusher plants 18 __ ___ 8 37.50 10 62.60 4-

Chipping washing units 3 a 100.00 -- --- -- -- o

sum 904 228 (25.22U) 277 (30.64U) 399 (44.13X)

- 63 -

ANNEX IVPage 1 of 4

SUDAN

KHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

Institutional Support for RBPC

Introduction

Under the Third Highway Project, IDA financed technicalassistance to RBPC to improve general planning, road maintenance andmechanical workshop operation. RBPC would like to continue thisassistance, particularly because the organization is in the process ofexamining its policies with respect to its finance, operations andinstitutional framework. RBPC therefore has decided to include in theproject a component of a technical assistance team of three experts tobe provided through a consulting firm for a period of three years asfollows:

1 financial expert1 road maintenance engineer1 transport economist/planner

The individual expert will work within the RBPC organizationand provide advise and assistance as required in order to complete theimplementation of the Highway Organization and Investment Studyrecommendations and the proposals presented by the technical assistanceteam under the Third Highway Project. Each expert is expected toprepare quarterly reports to the Director General on his activities.

The outlined terms of reference for each post are given below:

1. Financial Expert

The expert will be the principal financial and administrativeadviser to the Director of Finance and Administration of RBPC. He/shewill, advise, assist and participate in the following tasks:

(i) RBPC's efforts to improve its financial base and todevelop concrete policy proposals with respect toimproving its financial, operational and human resources.

(ii) The running of the finance and administrative department,including recruitment and training of staff members.

- 64 -

ANNEX IVPage 2 of 4

(iii) RBPC's efforts to implement recommendations in the HOISregarding the improvement of its accounting, budget,procurement, planning, management information and storesmanagement systems.

(iv) RBPC's efforts to streamline its stores and suppliesoperations.

(v) introducing financial statements and budgets that presentall RBPC's activities and make possible the preparationof annual and multi-year programs of maintenance andconstruction; the preparing of annual budgets, financialreporting and audit reports, etc.

Qualifications

The financial expert should be experienced in cost accountingand financial management. In particular, he/she shall:

Mi) hold a degree in accounting or butsiness administration.

(ii) have at least 10 years experience in his field, of whichat least two years should have been in the field ofmanaging finance and administration for a highwayadministration or similar government agency.

(iii) knowledge of spreadsheet programs and other appropriatemodern office technology;

(iv) have a working knowledge in reading, writing and speakingEnglish, and preferably also, Arabic,

2. Road Maintenance Engineer

The road maintenance engineer will report to, and takedirections from, the Director of Maintenance and be part of the HeadOffice maintenance management team. He/she will assist in:

(i) RBPC's efforts to improve its financial base and todevelop concrete policy proposals with respect toimproving its financial, operational and human resources.

_ 65 -

ANNEX r7Page 3 of 4

(ii) implementation of an appropriate management system fromwhich annual and multi-year road maintenance programs canbe developed as recommended by consultants funded underthe Third Highway Project.

(iii) provide headquarters support for the technical assistanceteams to assist in the introduction of the PavementManagement System and the axle-load control system.

(iv) propose and assist in implementing annual roadmaintenance programs, and

(v) assist in the implementation of the training programs.

Qualifications

The road maintenance engineer will have:

(i) a university degree in civil engineering

(ii) at least ten years experience in the field of highwayengineering, including design, construction andmaintenance.

(iii) at least four years management experience in a highwaymaintenance organization.

(iv) some knowledge of training methods; and

(v) a working knowledge of English and preferable Arabic

3. Transport Economist/Planner

The transport economist will be the principal economic adviserto RBPC. The adviser will report to, and take directions from, theDirector of Planning, RBPC, with reasonable access to the DirectorGeneral of RBPC and through him to data from other departments asnecessary for him to perform his duties. He/she will, as a member ofthe Planning Unit, advise, assist and participate in the followingtasks:

(i) running of the Unit, including recruitment and trainingof new members;

-66 -

ANNEX IVPage 4 of 4

(ii) RBPC's efforts to improve its financial base and todevelop concrete policy proposals with respect toimproving its financial, operational and human resources.

(iii) running the traffic counting system;

(iv) establishing an axle load control system;

(v) preparation of feasibility studies;

(vi) preparation of development plans in the road sector,review of government investment plans and budgetallocations for the transport sector with particularreference to highways and trucking.

(vii) reviewing the economic implications of existing andproposed changes in legislation;

(viii) ensuring good contact with respect to economic matters,between RBPC and Government Ministries, parastatals andthe private sector;

(ix) prepare feasibility studies and loan application forfinancial assistance from outside lending agencies; and

(x) assist in preparing the annual budget.

Qualifications

The expert will be a transport economist experienced in theexecution of transport projects. Ir. particular, he/she shall:

(i) hold a degree in economics;

(ii) have at least 10 years experience as a transporteconomist, for part of that time in a senior capacity;

(iii) be experience in dealing with Government officials at ahigh level;

(iv) be familiar with the techniques of cost/benefit analysis,and the use of modern office technology; and

(v) have a working knowledge in readirg, writing and speakingEnglish and preferable also, Arabic.

- 67 -

ANNEX VPage 1 of 2

SUDAN

KHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

Development of Axle Load Control SystemOutline Terms of Reference

Background

Somie of the main highways in the Sudan are deteriorating rapidlyas a result of inadequate maintenance and of severe overloading. As partof a strategy to deal with this situation, Government intends to controlvehicle axle loads. For this purpose, Government requires the services ofan engineering consultant with relevant experience to advise the RBPC andthe Police on the form and operation of an Axle Load Control System.

The legal framework governing road traffic is being reviewed.Meanwhile, the Roads and Bridges Public Corporation (RBPC) has carried outa program of research on overloading during the second half of 1988 underthe Third Highway Project. This pilot scheme has provided some initialexperience in measuring axle loads.

Objective

Design and implement an effective axle load control system toreduce abuse of the road system in Sudan. It is envisaged that this systemwill be operated by RBPC in cooperation with the Police.

Services to Be Provided by the Consultant

Revise the Legal Framework

Review existing legislation for vehicle weight and axle loadcontrol in light of relevant experience in other countries.

If necessary, advise on modifications to the legislation and/orthe regulations related to vehicle axle loading and control. Assist as maybe required with redrafting legislation and/or regulations.

Design the Axle Load Control System

Review the findings and the operating experience of the pilotscheme for axle load measurement undertaken by RBPC.

Review equipment options (including permanent and mobile unitsand combinations of these) in the light of all operational factors andcosts.

Prepare preliminary design and cost estimates for alternative,effective and practical axle load control systems (identifying anyacceptable options). Provide a plan for the implementation of the proposedrecommended system.

- 68 -ANNEX VPage 2 of 2

Advise on the need for, and form of, facilities to assisttransport operators in conforming with axle load regulations.

Advise on the recurrent funding required to operate the proposedsystem and on the scope for establishing all or part of the system as self-financing.

Subject to agreement, prepare the detailed design and costestimate for the selected system, defining fully all inputs, operations andadministrative requirements.

Set Up the Axle Load Control System

Specify equipment for the agreed system. If so required, assistin the procurement of the equipment.

If so required, supervise construction of the permanent works.

Supervise the installation and commissioning of equipment.

Draft the operating procedures for RBPC and the Police. Thesemust cover all aepects such as action on an overloaded vehicle, securityarrangements, dealing with abnormal loads, prosecution procedures etc.

Draw up, in consulting with RBPC and the Police, a program fortraining all staff required. This should include arrangements for anyrefresher training which is recommended and for integrating new appointees.

Provide examples of suitable publicity material and assist thePolice to plan the campaigns to inform the public and transport operators.

Implementation

Monitor the public awareness campaign and assist RBPC with thecampaign for informing the transport operators. Advise on the need for,and form of, any follow-up publicity.

Train RBPC and Police staff and advise on the requirements fortraining new staff.

Assist with the operation of the system on a trial basis andwith the introduction of any desirable modifications.

Services to Be Provided by Government

Office accommodation

Personnel from RBPC and the Police.

All necessary administrative and support facilities.

- 69 -

AX VI

RESCUE EqUIPMENT FOR THE POLICE

UNIT COST TOTALITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER USi COST

VEHICLES Traffic patrol, carsto supervise thetraffic on theKhartoum-P.Sudan rd. 40 ISO" SONU

COMMUNICATION EqUIPMENT VHF radio setafor ths patrole care 0 Iwo SO8N

CRANES (WRECKER) Hoavy duty (4BT) 1 12000 1200MMedium (IOT) 1 6Sam 66W

SAFETY EQUIPMENT Various it.s Sam

TRAINING Data collectionTraffic mnag eme ntAccident invost.Vehicle inspectionTraffic safety 29 SUB OuBS

CONTINGENCIES 10 W

GRAND TOTAL -

- 70 -

ANNEX VIIPage 1 of 3

KHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

Develop and Implement a Pavement Management System

Outline Terms of Reference

A. Background

The main highways in the Sudan are deteriorating rapidly as aresult of inadequate maintenance and damage caused by vehicles which areseverely overloaded. As part of a strategy for dealing with this problem,Government intends to introduce a system which will enable the Roads andBridges Public Corporation (RBPC) to monitor the performance of the pavedroad network and will provide a basis for guiding the allocation ofresources for road maintenance.

For this purpose, Government requires the services of anengineering consultant with relevant experience to advise RBPC on the formand operation of an appropriate Pavement Management System and to assistwith the implementation of this system.

This work will follow on from pavement condition surveys whichRBPC has carried out under the Third Highway Project.

B. Obiective

Institute a pavement management system so that RBPC can betterassess, alert itself to potential problems and plan road maintenance,strengthening and reconstruction needs in a timely fashion.

The basis of the system is expected to be regular, objectiveassessment of pavement condition. This would be evaluated with data ontraffic volumes and loading and on current road maintenance activity toprovide a basis for preparing optimal maintenance programs in the future.

C. Services to Be Provided by the Consultant

Monitoring of Pavement Condition

Design and establish procedures for monitoring pavementcondition by the regular measurement of key parameters. It is envisagedthat the parameters will be:

- pavement deflection;- crack intensity;- pothole occurrence;- rut depth;- drainage defects- visual rating.

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ANNEX VIIPage 2 of 3

Additional parameters should be recommended if these areconsidered desirable.

Assess existing equipment for pavement monitoring and recommendany additional equipment or spare part which is required. Procure theserequirements if requested to do so.

It is envisaged that pavement condition will be monitored by aunit to be set up and trained for this purpose in the Planning Division ofRBPC. It is envisaged that once the unit is well established,responsibility for it would be transferred to the Maintenance Division.

Review the present procedures for the routine recording andreporting of simple measures of pavement condition by the Section Depots.It is envisaged that this would cover the following:

- subjective rating of pavement;- occurrence of potholes and cracks;- other pavement defects;- shoulder and drainage defects.

Propose procedures for data collection and analyzing,summarizing and reporting pavement condition measurements. Assist RBPC toimplement a system of agreed procedures and to modify these if necessary.

Maintenance Activity

Advise on a system for recording and reporting maintenance workwhich is carried out on the paved road network.

Assist RBPC to establish an agreed form of reporting, monitorthe operation of this and advise on any adjustments which are desirable.

Advise outstations (Depots) on reporting routines consistentwith the proposed PMS requirements.

Road Traffic

Advise on procedures for routine checking and classifyingtraffic flows on the sealed road network.

Advise on a procedure for monitoring axle loading (use recordsfrom the proposed axle load control system once this is operating).

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ANNEX VIIPagc 4 of 3

Assist RBPC to implement agreed traffic monitoring and reportingprecedures. Initially it may be practical to integrate these activitieswith the other duties of the Pavement Monitoring Unit.

Pavement Maintenance and Strengthening Requirements

Advise on the design of suitable data banks for pavementcondition, traffic and maintenance activity, possibly using microcomputerswhich RBPC has. Advise on any additional equipment required. Assist withthe setting up and the use of the agreed data filing systems and with theimplementation of any modifications which are necessary.

Advise on practical procedures for determining maintenancerequirement and priorities and for anticipating the need for pavementupgrading. Design the preferred procedures in detail and assist RBPC toimplement them in drawing up an annual road maintenance program andoutlining future upgrading requirements.

Advise on the recurrent budget which RBPC will require tooperate the Pavement Management System, initially and in the long run.

D. Services to Be Provided by Government

Staff to operate all components of the Pavement ManagementSystem, both during the study phase and for future operations.

Relevant equipment acquired under the Third Highways Project.

Funds for the recurrent budget necessary to operate the PavementManagement System.

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ANNEX VIIIPage 1 of 2

SUDAN

KHARTOUH - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

SUDAN'S ROAD CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

ACTION PLAN

1. RBPC to review current legal framework, in particular, the RoadAct, and establish to what extent the road classification system describedin the Road Act is suitable for the future. The target date is August 31,1989. (This has been done.)

2. If necessary, RBPC will prepare the draft legislation requiredfor updating the Road Act in respect of road classification. Target dateis December 31, 1989.

3. RBPC to draw up a map covering all proposed classified roadswith classification according to a set description for trunk secondary andtertiary roads. Target date is June 30, 1990.

4. RBPC to prep&re the framework for the administration of thevarious classes of roads described in the proposed Road Act. Target dateis September 30, 1990.

5. RBPC will present to the Minister a comprehensive proposal fornew road classification system. Target date is December 31, 1990.

6. Target date for full-fledged implementation of the newclassification system including administrative arrangements will be July 1,1991.

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ANNEX VIIIPage 2 of 2

SUDAN

K1ARTOUH - PORT SUDAN ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT

RBPC' S ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

ACTION PLAN

1. Official comments by IDA on RBPC's proposed organizationalframwork to be sent to GOS by March 1, 1989. (This has been done.)

2. Organizational changes to be finalized and any Governemntalclearances necessary to their implementation arranged by RBPC by May 1,1989. (This has been done.)

3. Organizational changes to be implemented by July 1, 1989. (Thishas been done.)

4. RBPC to *end to IDA a report commenting on the effectiveness ofthe revised organization and recommend further changes, if necessary, byJuly 1, 1990.

5. IDA to comment officially on RBPC's report and make suggestionsfor further changes, if appropriate, by September 30, 1990.

MAP SECTION

2r 24- 26 2r 30- 3r ,i 3U w

S U D A N

KHARTOUM - PORT SUDAN REHABILITATION PROJECTTransport network

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Construcion to Bituminou s Poved Stanard .. * .

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4. Existing Roads N / KErYA t

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*------- Gravel Roads, Including Roads Under Construction 4 | OF EGYPT

Secondory Roads, Unsurfoced D A

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S RBPC Workshops o wo 200 300 400 nNEbsoM z

A Other Workshops Plarned -KILOETERS 2 CYAD -

-2- KILOMETERS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~es- l,O&,,B IC r/ L a

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