TWO MODERN SINHALESE VIEWSOF NIBBANA

A.D.P Kalansuriya

This paper centres around an analysis of the ideas ofK.N . Jayatilleke and D .J. Kalupahana - two modern Sinhalesethinkers - on the notion of nibbana, very briefly contrastingtheir positions and appraising them in the context of some ofthe key Buddhist statements on nibbana . Throughout thispaper, the historico-cultural situation in which the Dhammawas first delivered is emphasized : a period of intensephilosophical activity in north-eastern India around themiddle of the first millennium BC, during which society wastroubled by the breakdown of tribal unity and the expansionof several petty kingdoms . Religiously, it was a time ofmuch experimentation, doubt and turmoil . The ethico-religious doctrine of nibbana was professed by the Buddhaas the only therapy for man's anguish-stricken life in thischanging world .

In interpreting Buddhism, two methodological principlesshould be maintained :1 . recognition of the boundaries within which the subject-matter - Buddhism or the Dhamma - is to be understood; and2 . avoidance of reading in the interpretations of moderngenerations, especially those of contemporary philosophy inthe English speaking world, into the Dhamma .

As a first step, let us turn to K .N . Jayatilleke asan example of a modern Sinhalese view on the notion ofnibbana . He writes : 'The trans-empirical cannot beempirically described or understood but it can be realisedand attained' (1) . That D .J . Kalupahana, another Sinhalesethinker, seems to differ is evident from the following :

Religion Volume 9 Spring 1979© RKP 1979 0048-721X/79/0901-001 $1 .50/1

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'Jayatilleke's interpretation seems to assume the existenceof a transcendental state realizable after death, a statethat is not describable' (2) . To Kalupahana, Jayatilleke'stheory is metaphysical, and thus a type of theory which theBuddha has rejected . The theory is on the same footing asthat of the Upanisadic atman (self) which was explicitlyrejected by the Buddha . However, doubts arise about theargument put forward by Kalupahana as it is not strictly inconformity with the spirit of the procedural guide based onthe ariyatthangikamagga (the majjhima patipada) by theBuddha .

The attainment of nibbana through the realization ofthe four noble truths is the central aim of the Dhamma, whichis an ethically based procedural guide . This idea can befound in all strata of the Pali nikaya literature . Forinstance, when Potthapada questioned the Buddha as to thelatter's silence regarding the ten metaphysical questions,the reply given was as follows : 'I have made no declarationconcerning these matters because they do not lead to thatwhich is connected with welfare, truth or the leading of theHigher life, to disenchantment (with the world), to thehighest wisdom, or nibbana - the final bliss' (3) .Similarly, the Buddha dismissed the ten metaphysical issues

Let us now turn to Kalupahana's own contention,expressed in the words : 'For to accept a transempirical ortranscendent state, to be realized by the Enlightened oneafter death, is to reject the very basis of early Buddhistepistemology, namely, empiricism' (5) . In the absence of aclear hint from Kalupahana as to the kind of empiricismembodied in Buddhism - the Dhamma, we have to presume anallusion to British empiricists who appealed to sense-perception. This meaning of the term implies thatknowledge comes by way of sense-experience or through thesenses in opposition to rationalism . There are othervariations such as the positivism of the Vienna Circlethinkers, early Wittgensteinian empiricism (that is, LogicalAtomism), Ayer's empiricism, etc . However, it seems to bequite clear from Kalupahana's own statements that it is theempiricism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume to which he refers (6) .His argument, which is not unimpressive, makes Buddhism orthe Dhamma to be both religious and empirical at the sametime . However this notion is also attended by considerableconceptual difficulties .

posed by Malunkyaputta as recorded in the Majjhima Nikaya (4),for the simple reason that it is not necessary to indulge inidle speculation or theorizing to attain nibbana -summum bonum .

the

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If the groundwork of Buddhist epistemology wereempiricist, as conceived by Kalupahana, then what meaningcan be read into the Buddha's categorical denial that he wasa nihilist? The relevant passage in the llikayas is asfollows :

Although, I, monks, am one who speaks thus, there aresome recluses and brahmans who misrepresent me untruly,vainly, not in accordance with fact, saying : 'Therecluse Gotama, is a nihilist, he lays down thecutting off, the destruction, the disappearance ofthe existent entity .' But as this, monks, is justwhat I am not, as this is just what I do not say,therefore, these worthy recluses and brahmans mis-represent me untruly, vainly, falsely and not inaccordance with fact when they say : 'The recluseGotama is a nihilist, he lays down the cutting off,the destruction, the disappearance of the existententity.' Formerly, I, monks, as well as now, laydown simply anguish and the stopping of anguish (7) .

In the above statement the Buddha emphasizes four centralnotions as follows :1 . anguish ;2 . the stopping of anguish ;3 . the patipada (the way) leadingand,4 . the summum bonum - nibbana .In fact, a literal rendering of the notion of 'disappearanceof the existent entity' (see above) in empiricist terms, isalmost equivalent to . 'dissolution of the entity which is anaggregation of sense qualities' . To put it yet moreexplicitly, the dissolution of the aggregation is but thenon-existence of the object or person or whatever isreferred to . Characteristically, this is the knowledgewhich comes by way of sense-experience (sense-perception) .Once the external object (the external person) ceases toexist, ontologically, nothing exists . It is this conclusionthat the Buddha denies, according to the nikaya literature,when he was charged with being an annihilationist withreference to the summum bonum - nibbana, of his teaching .The Buddha claims that he lays down simply a doctrine aboutanguish and the stopping of anguish and not the cutting off,the destruction and the disappearance of the existententity . Therefore, we conclude that Kalupahana's readingof the meanings of advanced Western thought into the Dhammaof Buddhism is uncalled for . It is worth being clearabout this since it will clarify the logical status ofthe notion of nibbana in the Dhamma .

This conclusion is strengthened a great deal if the

to the stopping of anguish ;

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following passages from the nikaya literature are alsocompared with Kalupahana's reading of empiricism into theDhamma, especially with reference to the notion of nibbana .First may be quoted the expression : 'appatitthitenavinnanena parinibbuto' ('attained perfect release, withconsciousness finding no support') (8) . Or in the MajjhimeNikaya, the Buddha argues : 'I, monks, say here and now thata tathagata is untraceable' (9) . One more passage willsuffice : 'Atthamgatassa na pamanam atthi, yena nam vajjutam tassa natthi' ('The person who has attained the goal iswithout measure ; he does not have that with which one canspeak of him .' Suttanipata 1076) (10) . In none of thesepassages was the notion of 'annihilation' being implied .The contentions above note and emphasize 'untraceability,''without measure,' 'all modes of speech are removed', and'perfect release .' In connection with the Suttanipataverse which is crucial to our point of view, ' . . .natthi (hedoes not have that with which one can speak of him)',Kalupahana adds : '(this) if interpreted literally, wouldmean that a being exists in nirvana after death, but that noconcepts can be used to describe him' (11) . However, ifthat is the literal rendering of the Suttanipata verse, inwhat sense is it inadequate? Would there be any sense independing on any other rendering? We contend that the meaning(in its literal rendering) not only remains clear but is alsoin conformity with the conceptual structure of the Dhamma .Ironically, the attempt to find some other meaning on the onehand while on the other hand uprooting central contentions ofthe Dhamma from their truly Buddhist context, is a significantconceptual error . It appears that Kalupahana commits thiserror . This requires further exposition . Kalupahana contends :

as with the question of the extent and duration of theuniverse, there appears to be an epistemologicalproblem, the limitation of empiricism . That, webelieve, is why the Buddha was silent on the statusof the enlightened one after death . It accounts alsofor the Buddha's rejection of two metaphysical theories :the concept of atman and the theory of the existence ofa transcendental state attained after the death of theenlightened one, a state that seems to be identical withthe Brahman of the Upanisads . The silence of theBuddha was thus due to his awareness of the limitationof empiricism rather than of concepts (12) .

Several broad issues are raised in this passage, issues ofmeaning, truth, knowledge and metaphysics . We shall, however,limit ourselves to the central issue .

We said earlier in the paper that Kalupahana rejectsJayatilleke's notion embodying a transcendent state, simply

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because of its metaphysical tones . But we have argued sofar that Buddhism or the Dhamma, conceptually speaking,elicits primitive ethical ideals which were originallyingredients of ancient Indian (Aryan) thinking . Anempiricism based on the Graeco-Roman tradition, whetherBritish Empiricism or Logical Positivism, is not to befound in it. The reason why we side with Jayatilleke'snotion of 'a transcendent state', at this point, is a purelyBuddhist one . We saw that the Buddha did not ally himselfwith the doctrines of the materialists, naive empiricists,etc., which referred to nothing beyond perceptions .Similarly, the Buddha dissociated himself from theeternalistic metaphysics of the Upanisadic seers . From arejection of metaphysics (that is, the eternalisticmetaphysics of the Upanisadic seers) on the one hand, andfrom a rejection on the other hand of materialisticempiricism, it does not follow necessarily that all meta-physical views are rejected . A metaphysical theory aboutnibbana very different from that of the Upanisadic atmanis not necessarily foreign to the central notions of theDhamma . The notions of 'perfect release', 'untraceability','without measure' (na pamanam), 'deep and unfathomable'(gambhiro duppariyagaho)and 'all modes of speech are removed',etc ., do not indicate an empiricism or an empirical epistemo-logy, though that is what Kalupahana concluded . Our argumentis also strengthened a great deal by the following notionin the Nikayas, namely, 'iti vadam appapancam papanceti'('in talking thus one ascribes phenomenal reality to whatis not phenomenally real') (13) . Again, one of Kalupahana'sown contentions, ironically enough, supports our argument .He writes : 'Thus, according to our understanding of theearly Buddhist texts, the silence of the Buddha regardingthese ten questions is due entirely to the limitations ofempiricism, and not to the inability of concepts to describea transcendental reality' (14) . The central notions of thisargument such as 'the limitations of empiricism', 'thesilence of the Buddha', etc ., themselves suggest a basis ofargument which is other than empirical .

What the Buddha said about nibbana - 'the extinctionof consciousness', 'untraceability', 'without measure','deep and unfathomable', 'all modes of speech are removed',etc ., cannot simply be accommodated within one theory ofknowledge because the philosophical reflections that such atheory would involve are not characteristics of the conceptualparadigms of the Buddha's day . Methodologically, the Buddhamoves from facts to ethics and a recognition of this shedsmuch light on the meaning of the summum bonum of Buddhism :nibbana . The Buddha starts with an empirical fact or a

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psychological fact and then goes on to work out itsimplications . Then a moral procedure is designed to eliminatethe empirical or psychological fact in question . This mayappear to be a basic philosophical error, as two logicallydifferent contexts, facts and ethics, are beingsynthesized (15) . The logical category of fact is basicallydistinct from that of value, and it would appear that noknowledge of value or morals can be derived from knowledgeof fact . The argument runs that 'what is' is basicallydistinct from 'what ought to be' and that statements about'what ought to be' are neither true nor false, empirically .The point of the present argument, however, is that thesehighly developed conceptual distinctions were practicallynon-existent in the Buddha's time, especially in the contextof the ancient Indian Buddhist Dhamma, a primitive religion,which belongs intellectually to the ancient Indian thoughtof the sixth century BC . There was at that time no meta-ethics, the study of statements about the good and the right,but only ethics, which is concerned with the study of thegood and the right. Though ethics is banished from the realmof knowledge in highly developed thinking, it is not the casein the Buddhist Dhamma (16) . The conceptual structure ofBuddhism - the Dhamma - is such that there is a clearpassage from the realm of facts to that of morals and viceversa . From anguish or sorrow - psychological fact - tothe way leading to the cessation of anguish or sorrow - morals,we clearly saw how the distinction is bridged . This is asignificant characteristic of the method of the Buddha whichis ignored by the two Sinhalese Buddhist thinkers referred to .As a result they have misjudged the nature of statements inthe Dhamma . Admittedly it consists of both empiricalstatements and ethical statements . For this reason acareless manipulation of the epistemology of the Dhai na cangive rise to significant conceptual errors .

There are innumerable statements in all strata of thenikaya literature which clarify the methodology in question .The following passage from the Majjhima Nikaya testifiesto it :

Visual consciousness arises because of the] eye and[because o7 material shapes, jna7 the meetingof the three that is to say, visual consciousness,the eye and material shape in sensory impingementLon each other] : What one feels one perceives, whatone perceives one reasons about, what one reasonsabout obsesses one ; what obsesses one is the originof the number of perceptions and obsessions which assaila man in regard to material shapes cognisable by theeye, past, future and present (17) .

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The first few statements in this passage are empiricallytrue . The perceptual apparatus which the passage notes isvalid phenomenologically and ontologically . The latterpart, which starts with the notions of 'obsessions' and'assailment', in fact, pierce the logical category of fact .Not merely that the logical category of morals is introduced .That is to say that the patipada or the moral way is givencentral recognition . It is thus evidently clear that thetransition from fact to morals is acceptable within themethodology of the Dhamma . Although an elaboration of thismethodology would be interesting it would be a much largerexercise which we cannot embark on now . To return to ourpoint : according to the above passage which is found inthe Madhupindika sutta in the Majjhima nikaya, it is themind of the human which is being obsessed ; but, then, whatis the patipada (the way) leading to the cessation of theobsession of the mind (anguish)? It is but theariyattangikamagga - the majjhima patipada - which is aprescriptive path designed on an ethical code which is theonly way out of the impasse according to the Dhamma . It isalso summarily stated in the Samyutta Nikaya thus : 'Theway that leads to the extinction of consciousness is theeight-fold noble path' (18) . The above exposition makesexplicit a central conceptual tool in Buddhist logic, namelythe procedure of starting with a fact or a psychologicalfact and finding a transition into ethico-religious morals .This procedure is not to be found, it must be noted, in themodern philosophy of the English-speaking world based on theGraeco-Roman heritage .

Thus, given the morality-oriented nature of the centralBuddhist argument, there needs to be no confusion eitherabout the way (ariyatthangikamagga [patipada) or about thesummum bonum (nibbana) . It is clear that, avoidingannihilationism as well as eternalism, the Buddha projectedan image of himself as a religious teacher who preached thedoctrine of a middle mode of conduct (majjhimena) . It iserroneous, therefore, to consider his doctrine to be anempiricist hypothesis which is either true or false withreference to the summum bonum - nibbana .

The noblest goal in Buddhism, namely, nibbana,implies a transcendent state which is different from thetranscendent Nirguna Brahman of the Upanisadic seers . If alltranscendent states are characterized by the term metaphysical,as is done by Kalupahana, then of necessity the Buddhistnibbana is also transcendent and ipso facto metaphysical .This conclusion, however, is not inconsistent with theethical doctrine of Buddhism - the Dhamma . An understanding

A .D.P . Kalansuriya

of nibbana as a transcendent state does not of necessityinvolve a sloughing off of conceptual connections . Thefamily of notions in the Dhamma, therefore, remainsundisturbed . Needless to say the above conclusion isthoroughly inconsistent with British empiricism or any othersimilar kind of empiricism . To read any kind of empiricisminto the Buddha's doctrine, therefore, is an inappropriatetheoretical exercise which gives rise to philosophical errors .Buddhism is a simple religion with a difficult goal, which,in turn, is conceptually embedded in ancient Indian (Aryan)thinking . In its simplest form it can be expressed thus :Owing to craving, man suffers from anguish ; if anguish isstopped, man escapes craving and attains nibbana .

Is the goal - nibbana - the stopping of anguishequivalent to 'the cutting off, the destruction, thedisappearance of an existent entity'? The Buddha's answerto it is in the negative . An Interchangeability of these twonotions is a logical impossibility. If one equates the twonotions, namely, 'the stopping of anguish' and 'the cuttingoff, the destruction, the disappearance of an existententity', then the Buddha has contended that that is amisrepresentation of his doctrinal position (see above) .To put the point yet more explicitly, nibbana - the stoppingof anguish - the extinction of consciousness - does not amountto 'the cutting off, the destruction, the disappearance of anexistent entity' . The implication is, once the anguish(sorrow) is stopped by following the patipada (the way),which in turn is not inconsistent with the family of notionsof the Dhamma, there remains something in existence, being .The sacrosanct transcendence and the mystical core are butdistinct characteristics of the Dhamma . A denial oftranscendence in this doctrine which is embedded in ancientIndian (Aryan) thinking amounts to the sloughing off ofconceptual associations, isolating the notion from the lifeto which it naturally belongs, in which it is used, and inwhich alone it has meaning . As the later Wittgenstein onceremarked, this is nothing but 'leaving the engineidling' (19) . The reason for his saying so is apparently therash employment of notions leading to confusions ofcategories . In our example, the confusion of categoriesarises owing to the employment of the notion of nibbanaoutside the context of the Dhamma . The eth ico-religiousDhamma logically entails nibbana as a transcendent state .Nibbana as a transcendent state is in conformity with thefamily of notions in the Dhamma . There are many assertionsthat will substantiate this point . We shall quote an examplefrom the Dhammapada : 'Jigaccha parama roger sankhara paramadukha: etam natva vathabhutam nibbanam paramam sukham'

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('Hunger is the greatest disease . Aggregates are the greatestill . Knowing this as it really is, [the wise realize2Nibbana bliss supreme .') (20) . Nibbana is the happinessthe supreme happiness - unparalleled bliss - the highest ofall things (21) . It is beyond the space-time matrix andcausality as it is, conceptually speaking, unconditioned(asankhata) (22) . In keeping with these insights of theDhamma, Jayatilleke contends :

The idea that the Buddha was a 'mere human being' isalso mistaken . For when the Buddha was asked whetherhe was a human being, a Brahma (God) or Mara (Satan),he denied that he was any of them and claimed thathe was Buddha, i .e . an Enlightened Being who hadattained the Transcendent . This does not, however,make the Buddha unique, for it is a status that anyhuman being can aspire to . The significance of thisclaim is brought out in the Brahmanimantanika Sutta,where it is shown that even a Brahma eventuallypasses away while the Buddha, being one with theTranscendent Reality beyond space, time and causation,is not subject to such vicissitudes (23) .

It is but a deathless state (amata) (24) .

Finally, to sum up : it seems that Kalupahana'sreflections on the notion of nibbana affirm confidently thatBuddhism - the Dhamma - is epistemologically empiricist .Not only is this a very difficult thesis to arrive at, itis also hard to prove . Neither the historico-culturalcontext of the Dhamma nor the conceptual structure of theDhamma - the ethico-religious one - supports Kalupahana'sviews of nibbana . While one has to train oneself, onto-logically speaking, for the attainment and the knowledge ofnibbana, it must be noted that there is no implication ofany previous existence of what becomes known . The Buddha inthe Digha nikaya contends that he had expounded the Dhammathroughout, in its entirety, without holding back anythingof his doctrine (25) . The patipada that leads to thecessation of anguish consists of ethical norms, bypractising which disciples will attain nibbana. There is nomodification of the patipada (the way) for any particularperson or class of persons, lay or otherwise, and, if onediligently treads the patipada, as prescribed by the Buddha,nibbana is obtainable in the present life itself . 'Cut offyour affection as though it were an autumn water-lily withthe hand . Cultivate the very path of peace . Nibbana hasbeen expounded by the Happy One (the Buddha)' (26) . Thecomponents of the patipad-a, such as sila, samadhi andpannna, were made use of by the Buddha to explain the problemof human anguish, the ethical way out and the attainment of

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the summum bonum - nibbana . It is very clear, therefore,that the theories of meaning in the logical atomism ofRussell, or of the early Wittgenstein, or of the positivismof the Vienna Circle thinkers, are inappropriate for thestudy of the Dhamma ; for these theories centre aroundtheoretical interests in what can and cannot be stated inlogically principled factual statements . This is not anissue in the Dhamma . Moving away from all such theoreticalperplexity, the Buddha posited a clean soteriology .

As we briefly noted at the outset, experimentation,doubt and turmoil in thinking are ethico-religious, for theyare basically embedded in man's quest for ultimate salvationon the one hand and on the other the ethico-religious pathor the patipada which guides man to his supreme salvation -happiness - nibbana - bliss . Notions such as salvation, path(patipad-a), and unconditioned bliss (nibbana), which togethermake up the family of notions of the Dhamma, cannot beexplained by way of phenomenology - from the point of viewof experience itself - because their base is logicallyspeaking ethical . Finally, is the highest wisdom - nibbanathe final bliss in the Dhamma, metaphysical (that is,meaningless) in the logico-positivistic sense? The aboveargument suggests that the Buddha's silence regardingmetaphysical issues was aimed at discouraging purelytheoretical exercises which hinder the cultivation of thehigher Buddhist virtues - sila, samadhi and panna - whichhelp the disciple to attain nibbana ; and at the same timean ethically defined goal can be considered both metaphysicaland meaningful without contradiction .

NOTES

1 K.N . Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,London : Allen & Unwin 1963, p . 476 .

2 D .J . Kalupahana, Causality : The Central Philosophy ofBuddhism, Honolulu : University Press of Hawaii 1975,p . 179 .

3 T .W . Rhys Davids and J .E . Carpenter (eds), Digha Nikaya,Vol . I, London : Pali Text Society 1899, p . 178 .

4 V . Trenkner and R . Chalmers (eds), Majjhima Nikaya,Trans . I .B . Horner as Middle Length Sayings, London :PTS 1954-9, Vol . I, pp . 426-32 .

5 Causality, op . cit ., p . 179 .6 Ibid ., p . 100 .7 Majjhima Nikaya, op . cit., Vol . I, p . 140.8 L . Feer (ed .), Samyutta Nikaya, Trans . C .A .F . Rhys Davids

and F.L . Woodward as The Book of the Kindred Sayings,London : PTS 1917, Vol . I, p . 122 .

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9 Majjhima Nikaya, op . cit., Vol . I, pp . 139-40.10, F . Max Muller (ed .), Suttanipata, Vol . X, Oxford

University Press 1924, Verse no . 1076 .11 Causality, op . cit ., p . 179 . See also, A.D.P .

Kalansuriya, 'The Ethico-religious nature of theconceptual structure of Buddhism', Dialogue, Vol . IV,Nos . 1 and 2 . August 1977, pp . 51-60 .

12 Causality, op . cit ., p . 180 . See also, A .D.P .Kalansuriya, "'Empirical" Buddhism and philosophy',The Sri Lanka Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol . I,No . 1, June 1976 (Jaffna, Sri Lanka), pp . 33-50 .

13 R . Morris and E . Hardy (eds), Anguttara Nikaya, Trans .F .L . Woodward and R .M. Hare as The Book of the GradualSayings, London : PTS 1932, Vol . II, p . 161 .

14 Causality, op . cit., p . 183 .15 L . Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford :

Basil Blackwell 1953, p . l9e ('language goes on holiday') .16 Majjhima Nikaya, op . cit., Vol . II, p . 211 . See also

A .D .P . Kalansuriya, 'Wittgenstein, meaning-model andBuddhism', Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol . IV,No . 3, April 1977, pp . 381-91 .

17 Majjhima Nikaya, op . cit., Vol . I, pp . 111-12, p . 145 .18 Samyutta Nikaya, op . cit., Vol . III, p . 61 ('ayam

atthangiko maggo vinnenanirodhagamini patipada') .19 Philosophical investigations, op . cit., p . 5le (this

is what the later-Wittgenstein calls 'the engine idling') .20 Dhammapada, Narada Thera, Colombo 1963, Verse no . 203 .21 Ibid., Verse no . 184 .22 Samyutta Nikaya, op . cit ., Vol . IV, p . 359, and

Anguttara Nikaya, op . cit ., Vol . II, p . 34 .23 K .N . Jayatilleke, The Message of the Buddha, ed . Ninian

Smart, London : Allen & Unwin 1975, p . 59 .24 Samyutta Nikaya, op . cit ., Vol . V, p . 8 : 'Nibbanadhatuya

kho etaip bhikkhu adhivacanaip ragavinayo dosavinayomohavinayo asavanaip khayo tena vuccati ti . Yo khobhikkhu ragakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo idam vuccatiamataip ayam eva ariyo attangiko maggo amatagamimaggo .'

25 Dlgha Nikaya, op . cit ., Vol . II, p . 100 .26 Dhammapada, op . cit., Verse no . 285 .

A .D .P . KALANSURIYA is acting Head of the Philosophy Deptat Peradeniya, University of Sri Lanka . As well aspublications on philosophy and Buddhist philosophy inSinhalese, he has contributed articles to, amongst other

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journals, the Indian Philosophical Quarterly, the Journalof the International Association of Buddhist Studies,Foreign Affairs and Social Compass .

Dr A .D .P . Kalansuriya, Philosophy Dept, University oSri Lanka, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka .