TVSMUN IV- Security Council Guidelines

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TVS MUN 2011 Guidelines Security Council Mateo Benjumea

Transcript of TVSMUN IV- Security Council Guidelines

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TVS MUN 2011Guidelines

Security CouncilMateo Benjumea

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TOPIC #1Situation between East Timor and Indonesia

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EAST TIMORBasic Information

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East Timor

Capital DiliPopulation 821,000 (1994)Area 14,870 Sq.km.

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Where is East Timor?

The Island of Timor lies at the eastern end of the Malay Archipelago, about seven hundred km from Port Darwin on the North Western coast of Australia. Although the western half of the island, with the exception of Oecussi-Ambens, has historically been part of Indonesia, the east of the island has not and has a separate history and identity

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What is the Island like?• Volcanic Island• Mostly mountainous. South’s flat and suited for farming.• Tropical climate. Very high annual rainfall. • It’s main exports are:

Coffee Copra Palm Oil Rice Wax Hides

• Timor ‘s seas are currently being investigated by multinationals searching for oil.

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EAST TIMORBefore 1990

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EARLY HISTORY

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• East Timor has long been involved in international trade.

• Before the Portuguese arrived, the island's woods were traded with the Chinese and the Arabs who bought them by barter; exchanging axes, pottery, lead and other goods for sandalwood.

• The local population was culturally diverse and nearly thirty ethnic languages have been identified.

• The Portugese encouraged the use of Tetum as a common language.

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Antique Hierarchy

Freemen, Slaves and Nomadic Shepherds

Lesser Nobles

Kings or Chiefs Liurai

Dato

Ema-reino Ato Lutum

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COLONIAL ERA

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• Timor was "discovered" by Portuguese navigators in the sixteenth century. Over the next two centuries, contact between the Timorese and the Portuguese centred around Portuguese-sponsored missionary activities. In the eighteenth century, the Portuguese stepped up the colonisation process and established a seat of government in Timor. The Portuguese were not the only colonial power in the area and found themselves in conflict with the Dutch over Timor. Shortly after establishing government in Timor, the Portuguese abandoned the western half of the island to the Dutch. The division of the island was officially set down in a treaty between the Portuguese and the Dutch in 1859. This treaty was not formally ratified by the two governments until 1904.

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• The local people resisted the colonisation of their island. There were armed insurrections in 1719, 1895 and 1959. Some Dominican missionaries supported these revolts against the government. Although under Portuguese influence for such a long time, the Portuguese had little direct effect on the culture. Until the nineteenth century, the liurai (traditional rulers) effectively avoided direct control, and as Portugal went into decline after the first world war, East Timor was largely neglected.

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• During World War II, Japan occupied East Timor. With considerable help from the Timorese, several hundred Australian soldiers carried out a guerrilla war on the island. The cost for helping the Australians was high, villages were burned, and food supplies were seized. The number of Timorese killed by Japanese and in the allied bombing that preceded recapture is estimated at 40,000.

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• Portugal was given East Timor back after the war and continued to neglect the island. But the economy began to improve and this, coupled with a general world-wide move towards decolonization, encouraged more and more Timorese to consider independence.

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• Although the 1959 insurrection failed, the internal pressure for independence increased and in the 1970's a national liberation front was formed. Events in Portugal precipitated the situation, the fall of the fascist regime there in April 1974 significantly strengthened the independence movement in East Timor. The new Portuguese government legalised pro-independence groups and in September 1974 FRETELIN, the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor was founded.

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• Despite its bright start, the decolonisation process was to go radically wrong. Within East Timor, the colonial administration was concerned that things were going too quickly. They helped to form UDT, the Timor Democratic Union, which campaigned for a more gradual move to independence and possible federation with Portugal. Between them, UDT and FRETELIN had the support of 90% of the Timorese population. A third force entered East Timorese politics, APODETI, the Timor Popular Democratic Association, which supported integration with Indonesia. This group had been set up by the Indonesian consulate and failed to gain significant support. Indonesia had been a Dutch colony, a large nation it was comprised of numerous islands colonised by the Dutch in the area, one of which was West Timor.

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• At some point in 1974 the Indonesian generals had set up a covert intelligence operation, Operasi Komodo, which aimed to bring about East Timor's integration with Indonesia by any means.

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THE INDONESIAN

INVASION

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• The "excuse" for the Indonesian invasion was an armed conflict between UDT and FRETELIN, which was in fact largely engineered by the Indonesian army.

• UDT attempted a coup in August 1975. A few days before this, the leaders of UDT, who had no knowledge of any ulterior Indonesian motives, were flown to Jakarta. There they were told, in confidence, by General Murtopo that FRETILIN was a communist group and that they were being trained by the North Vietnamese to take over East Timor. The UDT coup was designed to preempt this, completely fictitious, FRETILIN coup.

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• FRETILIN resisted the UDT takeover and there was a brief armed conflict between the two groups. But within three weeks of the UDT coup, the conflict was over and FRETILIN was in control of the territory. The Indonesian army though continued to claim that there was an ongoing problem and the Indonesian (government controlled) national press reported increasing chaos within East Timor. With very little international press interest these stories were accepted without question.

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• To give further credence to these stories, the Indonesians launched, on October 16, an attack from West Timor. They claimed that this was an attack by the UDT and that this showed the conflict was ongoing. In fact by this stage most of the leaders of the UDT were being held in a refugee camp in West Timor well out of the way. The Indonesian attack went wrong - five western journalists were killed and the Indonesians were successfully bogged down by FRETILIN resistance. There is evidence to suggest that, following the deaths of the western journalists, the Indonesian government temporarily halted the invasion, afraid of a negative reaction from western governments. There was none.

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• The Indonesian government took this as a sign that their invasion would be tolerated. They began to make a series of small incursions to give support to their story that they were only going in to protect the East Timorese from an on-going civil war. In an attempt to get some international recognition, FRETILIN declared unilateral independence on November 28th 1975. The Indonesians responded with a full-scale and very public invasion on December 7th.

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• There was fierce resistance in Dili to this invasion but this was quelled by massive Indonesian reinforcements. On 25th and 26th of December landings at Liquica and Maubara led to more mass killings. By the end of February 1976, the Indonesian appointed government of East Timor admitted that 60,000 East Timorese had died since the invasion. Many Timorese sought refuge behind FRETILIN lines, nearly half a million people may have been displaced in the first few months after the invasion.

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• By April 1976 there were 32,000 Indonesian troops in East Timor and 10,000 in West Timor. On the 31 May a people's assembly was convened by the army. On the 2nd of June, the delegates (all 28 of them, "supervised" by the army) asked the Indonesian government to annex East Timor. On the 17th of July President Suharto signed a bill that made East Timor Indonesia's 27th province. The UN has never accepted this assembly as legitimate and, under International law, the annexation of East Timor remains illegal.

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• Officially, the decolonization process was never completed in East Timor and the UN recognizes Portugal as the administrative power. Portugal was suffering from internal difficulties at the time of the invasion and effectively abandoned East Timor to the Indonesians. They have, however, never accepted the annexation and the Portuguese have campaigned strongly for the East Timorese, particularly over the last few years.

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UNDER INDONESIAN

RULE

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• Gaining control of their new 27th province proved difficult for the Indonesian regime. The East Timorese resisted strongly and the situation only moved significantly in the Indonesian's favour when they managed to acquire counter-insurgency aircraft from a number of western states (See Western Complicity below). These were used to bomb the mountainous areas, where most of the population was hiding. Casualties came not just from the bombing itself, but the attacks were so intense that it was impossible to farm and many people died from starvation.

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• Finally, in 1978 and 79 what was left of the population began to return to their homes, in an attempt to escape the famine and relentless attacks. In order to further depress the people, the Indonesian army split up many communities and forcibly resettled them.

• By the end of 1979, the Indonesian generals believed that they had destroyed all resistance. FRETILIN, who had led the armed resistance, had suffered huge losses and their leader, Nicolau dos Rein Lobato, had been killed in combat in December 1978. The people had also suffered, an estimated 200,000 out of a total population of 700,000 had died. (Although they had initially been enemies, UDT also joined FRETILIN in their resistance to the Indonesians.)

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• But resistance continued. FRETILIN regrouped under their new leader, Xanana Gusmao, and the guerrilla war continued throughout the 1980's. (A ceasefire was negotiated between Gusmao and the head of the Indonesian forces in East Timor in 1983 but rejected by President Suharto).

• In 1988 FRETILIN and UDT set up a coordinating body, CNRM - the National Council for Maubere resistance, through which they could work together for an independent East Timor. Xanana Gusmao, now a CNRM as well as Fretelin leader, was appointed head of the National Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL). (In 1998, the CNRM became CNRT, the national council for Timorese resistance)

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• Since the invasion, the Indonesian regime has acted with brutality towards the local population. The traditional community structures were destroyed by resettlement. Movement was so restricted that famine often arose simply because people could not get to the land to farm. Numerous cases of rape, murder and political imprisonment have been documented.

• What has been the role of the international community in all this ?

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“Western” Complicity

(Western in a cultural sense, most of the countries named are in fact to the north-west, south and north-east of East Timor).

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• On the 22nd of December 1975, the UN Security Council condemned the invasion of East Timor. Since then numerous resolutions supporting the East Timorese have been passed. Portugal, in 1988, managed to secure both European Commission and Parliament support. In 1989 the UN Human Rights sub-commission also expressed concern. But despite this, East Timor was effectively off the International agenda. Why ?

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• Most of the major western states tacitly supported the invasion. US President Gerald Ford was in Jakarta just prior to the invasion. The Australian Government was one of the first to recognise the Indonesian takeover as legitimate and its failure to pursue the death of five journalists working for two Australian news agencies in October 1975 may have encouraged the Indonesian government to proceed.

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• Sales of weapons and aid to Indonesia have been significant. Without the large supplies, including counter-insurgency aircraft bought in 1977, the Indonesian victory would have been far from inevitable. America supplied large amounts of military equipment. Both Britain and France supplied aircraft. Indonesian military personnel were trained in the west.

• It is unlikely that Indonesia would have succeeded in their takeover without this support.

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EAST TIMORAfter 1990

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CONTINUED RESISTANCE

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• Despite continuing resistance, Indonesia felt by 1989 that they were sufficiently in control of East Timor to introduce a policy of transmigration and to allow a papal visit.

• At a mass by the Pope on Oct 12th 1989 in Dili in front of a number of foreign journalists, an anti-Indonesian demonstration took place. This was the start of a new direction for the resistance movement and in January and September 1990 pro-independence demonstrations were again held in Dili. Although suppressed by the regime, the non-violent and political resistance was beginning to grow. This unarmed resistance began to work closely with the armed groups.

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• Initially, the Indonesians do not seem to have seen this new initiave as a major threat. A visit to East Timor by Portuguese MP's was to be allowed in early November 1991, but this was cancelled at the last minute as the Indonesians objected to the presence of an Australian journalist who was to accompany the visit.

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THE SANTA CRUZ

MASSACRE

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• On November 12th 1991 Indonesian troops opened fire on a crowd of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. The demonstration followed a mass for a pro-democracy activist who had been shot by the Indonesian army. What was different about this atrocity, compared to the many which had gone on previously, was that some foreign journalists were present and managed to get much of the shooting on film.

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• Between those killed in the initial shooting and those who were arrested and have never been seen since, an estimated 200 - 300 people were killed.

• The world wide outcry was intense and the Indonesian regime had to set up a commission of inquiry. Some soldiers were sentenced for a few months, however captured demonstrators received sentences from 10 years to life.

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• The Santa Cruz massacre provided the impetus necessary to restart action on the diplomatic front. The UN made a concerted effort to get Portugal and Indonesia around a table to discuss solutions. They hoped to eventually include Timorese leaders: Xanana Gusmao, head of CNRM and FALINTIL; and Bishop Belo, the spiritual leader of Timorese catholics. But before the talks took place, on the 20th December 1992, Xanana was arrested. Shortly afterwards he appeared on television and denounced his fight for independence.

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• In 1993 Xanana Gusmao received a life sentence in a trial that was condemned as unjust by observers. He was only allowed to read 2 pages of a 28 page defence. From prison, a number of smuggled interviews reached the outside and it became clear that Xanana's denouncement was forced, and that he still supported independence. If anything, his imprisonment gave Xanana much greater influence and a higher profile internationally. (His life sentence was commuted to 20 years as part of a "good will" gesture to celebrate one of Suharto's birthdays.)

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1995

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• 1995 saw the 20th anniversary of the invasion, and the fourth anniversary of the Dili massacre. Around this time there was considerable unrest in East Timor and the Indonesian regime arrested and detained large numbers of young men. 1995 saw a return to oppression in East Timor. The number of disappearances increased and there were many reports of detainees being tortured in prison. At the same time as the situation in East Timor was deteriorating, resistance was moving to Jakarta.

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• Young East Timorese had been encouraged to go to Jakarta to study, the regime hoping to weaken the traditional culture further and strengthen their ties to Indonesia. But many of these Timorese had links to the resistance movement. As the anniversaries approached there were demonstrations outside foreign Embassies in Jakarta. The demonstrations usually ended with a number of the protesters jumping into the embassy walls and pleading for asylum. (A number of Timorese simply jumped into embassy's without prior demonstration.) The countries involved did not have to worry about embarassing the Indonesian government by accepting them as Portugal automatically agreed to take them.

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• The largest demonstration in Jakarta, on the anniversary of the invasion, involved not only Timorese but Indonesian pro-democracy activists. This was the first time there had been such a link and was regarded as an extremely positive move by many observers.

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THE INTERNATIONAL

RESPONSE

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• Since the massacre at Santa Cruz the international community was more active on East Timor and some "appropriate noises" were made. This was largely as a result of growing number of individuals and groups who campaigned in their own countries on this issue. Yet the international response was still disappointing. In their 1994 report to the UN, Amnesty International criticised governments who professed concern but then sold Indonesia military equipment.

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• The British government was and remains particularly bad for this sort of double standard. It granted export licenses for 44 Hawk aeroplanes, which are eminently suitable for counter-insurgency use. The British claimed that they were to be used for training purposes and that they had assurances from the Indonesian government that they would not be used in Timor. (Aid and training were given to Indonesia on the same grounds that it would not be used to support its occupation of East Timor). The British government though was highly selective about who it believed, when Hugh O'Shaughnessy, a British Journalist, saw Hawks over Dili on Sunday the 12th of November 1995, the Government chose to believe the blanket denial by the Indonesians.

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• But, although, the British set a bad example, Australia's record at this time was even worse. Australia was one of the few countries to have recognised the invasion and annexation as legitimate. In 1991, it signed an agreement with Jakarta to allow exploration and extraction of the oil reserves in the Timor Sea. Under International law this area still belongs to the Portuguese government who were outraged at the move. Australia also signed in 1995, a security treaty with Indonesia.

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• It should be noted though that Australia has the largest number of Timorese refugees and that there is strong grassroots support for East Timor. Due to this, the Australian government was under constant pressure to change and the Australian press kept the issue in the public arena. Equally, the US also sold weapons to the Suharto regime and was reluctant to criticise its actions.

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1996- MAY 1998

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• 1996/1997 followed 1995 in being a time of continued repression and increasing resistance. Frequently human rights groups reported arbitrary arrests and widespread human rights abuses. The resistance of the local population increased, perhaps encouraged by the award of the Nobel Peace prize to two East Timorese, Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta.

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• Internationally, there was increased activity. The new Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, appointed a special envoy to East Timor to try and regenerate the cancelled tri-partite talks. Jamsheed Marker's first visit to East Timor proved controversial. A group of students, frustrated at being denied access to the UN envoy, demonstrated outside his hotel. The demonstration was broken up violently. There were unconfirmed reports of deaths. Nearly 40 people were arrested and human rights groups received reports of abuse in prison. Despite this unpromising start, the tri-partite talks were restarted and the Portuguese and Indonesian governments agreed to increase the number of meetings to try and find a solution to the problem.

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• One of the most positive developments on the international front came at the end of the year when Nelson Mandela was allowed to meet Xanana Gusmao. Mandela offered to work as a mediator in the conflict and called for Xanana's release.

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• The last few months of 1997 were very difficult for Indonesia, huge forest fires raged uncontrollably throughout Sumatra, causing an environmental disaster that affected most of South East Asia. The Indonesian economy was affected by the sudden and unexpected downturn in the South East Asian economies. This latter factor was to make 1998 one of the most dramatic years in recent Indonesian history.

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• 1998 started out uneventfully. The situation in East Timor worsened as the government and army responded harshly to continued resistance. The drought in the region which had exacerbated the forest fires in Sumatra, led to fears of widespread famine to which East Timor was particularly vulnerable.

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• Indonesia continued to suffer from the impact of the economic downturn. The rupiah lost 80 percent of its value in a matter of months. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their jobs. The Indonesian people began to openly demand the end of the Suharto regime. In february tens of thousands of Indonesians took to the streets. The demonstrations become riots, with the anger of the crowds directed their anger, possibly encouraged by the police, at the Chinese minority. Suharto was re-elected by the people's consultative assembly in April for another five years but lasted less than five weeks. In May he was forced to resign and was replaced by his close colleague, B. J. Habibie.

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TRANSMIGRATION

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• Java is the most densely populated area in the world with 120 million people or 890 per square kilometre - 11 million more than the land can sustain. This was the increasingly pressing reason behind the Suharto government's transmigration policy. In 1997, the government planned to encourage 350 thousand people, 1000 a day, to leave Java. Concerns were raised about where they were going. The Indonesian equivalent of green belt sites included areas of virgin rain forest and also a number of politically sensitive areas where it has been argued that transmigration was being used as a way of swamping local cultures with Javanese culture.

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• Despite the continued resistance to their rule, the Suharto regime actively encouraged Indonesians to emigrate to East Timor by giving them money incentives. It has also made it clear that opportunities for East Timorese on the island would be limited. Civil servants appointments were often made to non-Timorese and non-Timorese businesses were given preference over Timorese ones. The best agricultural land available was given to the newcomers. In turn, East Timorese were encouraged to move to other parts of Indonesia with promises of land when they get there.

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• The inevitable result was a population shift, but the numbers are staggering. Between 1992 and 1997, 100,000 Indonesians moved to East Timor (out of a 1995 population of 800 000.) At its height the influx reached 1,000 people a week. (Reliable figures are not available for the movement of Timorese in the other direction.)

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FAMILY PLANNING IN EAST TIMOR

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• The Indonesian family planning programme won support from the World Bank. But in East Timor it appeared to be being seriously abused.There were anecdotal reports that throughout the 80's and 90's, women were being injected with what they thought were vitamins or tetanus injections. The injections were only given to women, with sometimes whole classes of schoolgirls being injected. Refugees have claimed that they took part in or witnessed such incidents. The women who had had such injections afterwards suffered menstrual problems and had problem conceiving.

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• Rumours spread to the large cities that the injections were Depo-Provera, a contraceptive. Interestingly, according to the Indonesian governments own figures, Depo-Provera is the most popular form of birth control in East Timor. In 1987, 60% of all women using contraception in East Timor used Depo-Provera in comparison to 19% in the rest of Indonesia. By 1990, the figure had risen to 66%

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TOPIC #2

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

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AFGHANISTANBasic Information

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Afghanistan

Capital KabulPopulation 29,121,286 (1994)Area 647,500 sq km

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Where is Afghanistan?

Landlocked and mountainous country, with plains in the north and southwest, Afghanistan is variously described as being located within South Asia, Central Asia and sometimes Western Asia (or the Middle East). Afghanistan's highest point is Nowshak, at 7,485 m (24,557 ft) above sea level.

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AFGHANISTANChronology since 1950

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1953--1954—1955—1956—1959—1961—1963,1964—1965—1969—1972—1973—1974—1975,1977—1978—1979—1980—1984—1986—1987—1988,1989—1992—1994—1995—1996—1997—1998—1999—2000—2001—2002—2003—2004—2005

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1953

Prince Mohammad Daoud becomes Prime Minister.

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The U.S. rejects Afghanistan's request to buy military equipment to modernize the army.

1954

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• Daoud turns to the Soviet Union (Russia) for military

aid.• The Pashtunistan (occupied

Afghan land) issue flares up.

1955

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• Kruschev and Bulgaria agree to help Afghanistan.

• Close ties between Afghanistan and USSR.

1956

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• The Purdah is made optional, women begin to enroll in the University which has become

co-educational.• Women begin to enter the

workforce, and the government.

1959

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Pakistan and Afghanistan come close to war over

Pashtunistan.

1961

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Zahir Shah demands Daoud's resignation. Dr.

Mohammad Yusof becomes Prime

Minister.

1963, 1964

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• The Afghan Communist Party was secretly formed in January. Babrak Karmal is one of

the founders.• In September, first nationwide elections

under the new constitution.• Karmal was elected to the Parliament,

later instigates riots.• Zahir and Yussof form second government.

1965

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•Second nationwide elections.

•Babrak and Hafizullah Amin are elected

1969

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Mohammad Moussa becomes

Prime Minister

1972

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• July 17th: Zahir Shah is on vacation in Europe, when his government is

overthrown in a military coup headed by Daoud Khan and PDPA (Afghan

Communist Party).• Daoud Khan abolishes the monarchy, declares himself President---Republic of

Afghanistan is established.

1973

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• UNESCO names Herat as one of the first cities to

be designated as a part of the worlds cultural

heritage.

1974

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• Daoud Khan presents a new constitution. Women's rights

confirmed.• Daoud starts to oust

suspected opponents from his government.

1975, 1977

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• Bloody Communist coup: Daoud is killed, Taraki is named President, and Karmal becomes his deputy Prime Minister. Tensions rise.

• Mass arrests, tortures, and arrests takes place.• Afghan flag is changed.• Taraki signs treaty of friendship with the Soviet

Union.• June--Afghan guerrilla (Mujahideen) movement is

born.

1978

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1979

• Mass killings • US ambassador killed • Taraki is killed and Hafizullah Amin takes the

Presidency. • Amin is executed, and he is replaced with

Babrak Karmal. • Soviet Union (Russia) invade in December.

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1980

•Dr. Najibullah is brought back from

USSR to run the secret police.

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1984

•UN sends investigators to Afghanistan to examine reported human rights violations.

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1986

•Babrak Karmal is replaced by Dr. Najibullah.

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1987

• Najibullah proposes ceasefire, but the Mujahideen refuse to deal with a "puppet government". • Mujahideen make great gains,

defeat of Soviets eminent.

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1988, 1989

• Peace accords signed in Geneva. • Soviet Union defeated by Afghanistan, total withdrawal

by the Soviets occurred on Feb. 15, 1989. • Experts agree that at least 40,000-50,000 Soviets lost

their lives in action, besides the wounded, suicides, and murders.

• Mujahideen continue to fight against Najibullah's regime.

• May--Afghan guerrillas elect Sibhhatullah Mojadidi as head of their government-in-exile.

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1992

• April 15--The Mujahideen take Kabul and liberate Afghanistan, Najibullah is protected by UN.

• The Mujahideen form an Islamic State--Islamic Jihad Council--elections.

• Iranian and Pakistani interference increases--more fighting--

• Professor Burhannudin Rabbani is elected President.

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1994

• The Taliban militia are born, and advance rapidly against the Rabbani government. • Dostum and Hekmatyar continued

to clash against Rabbani's government, and as a result Kabul is reduced to rubble.

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1995

•Massive gains by the Taliban. • Increased Pakistani and Iranian interference.

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1996• June--Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, head of Hezbi-Islami, having been

eliminated as a military power, signs a peace pact with Rabbani, and returns to Kabul to rule as prime minister.

• September 27--Taliban militia force President Rabbani and his government out of Kabul. After the capture of Kabul, the Taliban execute Najibullah.

• Alliance between Government, Hezbi Wahdat, and Dostum • Oppression of women by the Taliban--women must be fully veiled, no

longer allowed to work, go out alone or even wear white socks. Men are forced to grow beards. Buzkashi, the Afghan national sport is outlawed.

• Tensions rise as Afghan government accuse Pakistan of aiding the Taliban.

• Massive human rights violations by the Taliban.

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1997

• Mass graves of Taliban soldiers containing between 1,500 and 2,000 bodies are found. The men were believed to have been captured in May by general Abdul Malik during the Taliban's brief takeover of Mazar-i-Sharif.

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1998• February--Earthquake strikes in northeastern Afghansitan, killing over

4,000 people, destroying villages and leaving thousands of people homeless.

• August--Taliban finally capture Mazar-i-Sharif, and massacre thousands of innocent civilians afterwards, mostly Hazaras.

• August 20th--United States launches cruise missles hitting Afghanistan's Khost region. US states its intent was to destroy so called terrorist bases/training facilities used by Osama bin Laden and his followers. Some Afghan civilians are also killed.

• September--Tensions rise between Iran and the Taliban. Iranians are angry about the killing of their diplomats and a journalist by the Taliban when they captured Mazar-i-Sharif. Soon they deploy 70,000 troops to carry out military exercises near the Afghan border. In the end, no fighting occurs between the Taliban and the Iranian army

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1999

• February--Earthquake hits eastern Afghanistan, affecting over 30,000 people, and killing at least 60 to 70 people.

• September--The ex-king of Afghanistan, Mohammad Zahir Shah, calls for a grand assembly, or Loya Jirga to discuss ways of bringing peace to the country. The United Front soon welcomes the idea, but the Taliban ridicule Mohammad Zahir Shah's attempts at establishing peace.

• October-- UN Security Council Resolution 1267 is adopted; sanctions against the Taliban on grounds that they offered sanctuary to Osama bin Ladin.

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2000

• May--Taliban torture and kill civilians in the Robatak Pass(on the border between Baghlan and Samangan provinces).

• September--Taloqan finally falls to the Taliban. • December-- UN Security Council Resolution

1333 is adopted; additional sanctions against the Taliban for their continuing support of terrorism and cultivation of narcotics, etc.

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2001• January--Taliban torture and kill numerous civilians (Hazaras) in Yakaolang. • March--Despite pleas and requests from various international diplomats, Islamic scholars, the Taliban

destroy ancient historical statues in the Kabul Museum, historical sites in Ghazni, and blow up the giant Bamiyan Buddhas from the 5th century. World expresses outrage and disgust against the Taliban action.

• April--Ahmad Shah Masood visits Europe to gather support against the Taliban. • April--UN accuses Pakistan of not allowing adequate supply of food and medicines to displaced Afghans,

at the Jalozai camp, near Peshawar. • April-- Mullah Rabbani, the Taliban's second-in-command dies of liver cancer. • May-- Taliban order religious minorities to wear tags identifying themselves as non-Muslims. • September 9-- Ahmad Shah Masood is killed by assassins posing as journalists. Two days later (September

11th), suicide attacks on the U.S. kill more than 3,000 people and destroy the two towers of the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon.

• October-- Abdul Haq is killed by the Taliban. The United States and UK working with the forces of the United Front (UNIFSA) launch air strikes against the Taliban. ( The Americans hold Osama bin Laden directly responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the Taliban were targeted for protecting him.)

• November: Taliban lose control of Mazar-i Sharif. • December 5-- Bonn Agreement. Afghan political groups come together in Bonn, Germany and form an

interim government. Hamid Karzai is chosen as Chairman.

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2002

• April-- Former King Mohammad Zahir returns to Afghanistan (April) -- does not claim throne.

• War continues against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. • June-- Loya Jirga elects Hamid Karzai as President of a

Transitional Government. Karzai picks members of his administration to serve until elections are held in 2004

• July-- Haji Abdul Qadir (brother of Abdul Haq) is killed. US air raid in Uruzgan province kills approximately 48 civilians, many of them members of a wedding party

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2003

•War against Al Qaeda and the Taliban continue -- further weakened. • August - NATO takes control of

security in Kabul.

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2004• January-- Afghanistan adopts a new constitution. The country is now a

republic with 3 branches of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary).

• 2004 October/November - Presidential elections are finally held after being delayed twice. Hamid Karzai is declared the winner, with 55.4% of the votes. He is sworn in December. Karzai's strongest challenger, Yunis Qanuni, came in second with 16.3% of the votes. The elections were not without controversy; allegations of fraud and ballot stuffing were brought up by many of the presidential candidates including Yunis Qanuni. Many felt that Hamid Karzai had an unfair advantage over the other candidates as he had access to financial and logistical resources that many of the other candidates did not have. A panel of international experts was setup to investigate the matter. The panel did find evidence of voting irregularities, however, they said that it was not enough to affect the outcome of the elections.

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2005

• Harsh winter leaves hundreds of people dead. • Major advances in the disarmament process

announced. • March-- Dostum appointed as the Chief of Staff

to the Commander of the Armed Forces. Yunis Qanuni announces new political alliance (March 31st).

• April-- Karzai welcomes the formation of Qanuni's political alliance.

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AFGHANISTANUS Intervention Timeline

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October 15, 1999The Al-Qaeda and Taliban NexusThe United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1267, creating the so-called al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, which links the two groups as terrorist entities and imposes sanctions on their funding, travel, and arms shipments. The UN move follows a period of ascendancy for al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, who guided the terror group from Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan, in the late 1980s, to Sudan in 1991, and back to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The Taliban, which rose from the ashes of Afghanistan's post-Soviet civil war, provides al-Qaeda sanctuary for operations.

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September 09, 2001A Norther Alliance AssassinationAhmad Shah Massoud, commander of the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban coalition, is assassinated by al-Qaeda operatives. The killing of Massoud, a master of guerilla warfare known as the Lion of the Panjshir, deals a serious blow to the anti-Taliban resistance. Terrorism experts believe his assassination assured Osama bin Laden protection by the Taliban after the 9/11 attacks. Expert Peter Bergen later calls Massoud's assassination " the curtain raiser for the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC."

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September 11, 2001Terrorists Strike the United StatesAl-Qaeda operatives hijack four commercial airliners, crashing them into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. A fourth plane crashes in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Close to three thousand people die in the attacks. Although Afghanistan is the base for al-Qaeda, none of the nineteen hijackers are Afghan nationals. Mohammed Atta, an Egyptian, led the group, and fifteen of the hijackers originated from Saudi Arabia. President George W. Bush vows to "win the war against terrorism,", and later zeros in on al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Bush eventually calls on the Taliban regime to "deliver to the United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide in your land," or share in their fate.

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September 18, 2001A War FootingPresident George W. Bush signs into law a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those responsible for attacking the United States on 9/11. This joint resolution will later be cited by the Bush administration as legal rationale for its decision to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism, from invading Afghanistan, to eavesdropping on U.S. citizens without a court order, to standing up the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

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October 07, 2001The Opening SalvoThe U.S. military, with British support, begins a bombing campaign against Taliban forces, officially launching Operation Enduring Freedom. Canada, Australia, Germany, and France pledge future support. The war's early phase (PDF) mainly involves U.S. air strikes on al-Qaeda and Taliban forces that are assisted by a partnernship of about one thousand U.S. special forces, the Northern Alliance, and ethnic Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. The first wave of conventional ground forces arrives twelve days later. Most of the ground combat is between the Taliban and its Afghan opponents.

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November,2001The Taliban in RetreatThe Taliban regime unravels rapidly after its loss at Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces loyal to Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek military leader. Over the next week Taliban strongholds crumble after coalition and Northern Alliance offensives on Taloqan (11/11), Bamiyan (11/11), Herat (11/12), Kabul (11/13), and Jalalabad (11/14). On November 14, 2001, the UN Security Council passes Resolution 1378, calling for a "central role" for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery.

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December 05, 2001An Interim GovermentAfter the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invites major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and a group led by the former king (but not the Taliban), to a conference in Bonn, Germany. On December 5, 2001, the factions sign the Bonn Agreement, endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1383. The agreement, reportedly reached with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because of Iran's support for the Northern Alliance faction, installs Hamid Karzai as interim administration head, and creates an international peacekeeping force to maintain security in Kabul. The Bonn Agreement is followed by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on December 20, which establishes the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF.

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December 09, 2001The Taliban CollapsesThe end of the Taliban regime is generally tied to this date, when the Taliban surrender Kandahar (PDF) and Taliban leader Mullah Omar flees the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by Pashtun leaders. Despite the official fall of the Taliban, however, al-Qaeda leaders continue to hide out in the mountains.

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December, 2001Bin Laden EscapesAfter tracking al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to the well-equipped Tora Bora cave complex southeast of Kabul, Afghan militias engage in a fierce two-week battle (December 3 to 17) with al-Qaeda militants. It results in a few hundred deaths and the eventual escape of bin Laden, who is thought to have left for Pakistan on horseback on December 16--just a day before Afghan forces capture twenty of his remaining men. Despite intelligence pointing to bin Laden's presence in Tora Bora, U.S. forces do not lead the assault, which is carried out by a ragtag Afghan contingent led by Hazrat Ali, Haji Zaman, and Haji Zahir. Some critics will later question why U.S. forces did not take a more assertive role in the engagement.

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March, 2002Mixed SignalsOperation Anaconda, the first major ground assault and the largest operation since Tora Bora, is launched against an estimated eight hundred al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of the city of Gardez (Paktia Province). Nearly two thousand U.S. and one thousand Afghan troops battle the militants. Despite the operation's size, however, Anaconda does not represent a broadening of the war effort. Instead, Pentagon planners begin shifting military and intelligence resources away from Afghanistan in the direction of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which is increasingly mentioned as a chief U.S. threat in the "war on terror."

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April 17, 2002Reconstructing AfghanistanPresident George W. Bush calls for the reconstruction of Afghanistan in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute. "By helping to build an Afghanistan that is free from this evil and is a better place in which to live, we are working in the best traditions of George Marshall," he says, evoking the post-World War II Marshall Plan that revived Western Europe. But the United States and the international community do not come close to Marshall Plan-like reconstruction spending for Afghanistan. The U.S. Congress appropriates over $38 billion in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009.

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June, 2002Transitional Goverment NamedHamid Karzai, chairman of Afghanistan's interim administration since December 2001, is picked to head the country's transitional government. His selection comes during an emergency loya jirga assembled in Kabul, attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women) from Afghanistan's 364 districts. Karzai, leader of the powerful Popalzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns, returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban. Some observers allege Karzai tolerates corruption by members of his clan and his government. The Northern Alliance, dominated by ethnic Tajiks, fails in its effort to set up a prime ministership, but does succeed in checking presidential powers by assigning major authorities to the elected parliament, such as the power to veto senior official nominees and to impeach a president.

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November, 2002Establishing a Reconstruction ModelThe U.S. military creates a civil affairs framework to coordinate redevelopment with UN and nongovernmental organizations and to expand the authority of the Kabul government. These so-called provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs, are stood up first in Gardez in November, followed by Bamiyan, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Herat. Command for individual PRTs is eventually handed over to NATO states. While credited with improving security for aid agencies, the model is not universally praised. Concern mounts that the PRT system lacks central controlling authority, is disorganized, and creates what a U.S. Institute of Peace report calls "an ad hoc approach" to security and development. Such criticism grows beyond the PRT program and becomes a common theme in the NATO war effort, as a maze of national caveats � �restricts the activities of member forces. Critics contend this limits the coalition's effectiveness.

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May 01, 2003“Major Combat” OverDuring a briefing with reporters in Kabul, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declares an end to "major combat." The announcement coincides with President George W. Bush's "mission accomplished" declaration of an end to fighting in Iraq. Rumsfeld says President Bush, U.S. Central Command Chief Gen. Tommy Franks, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai "have concluded that we are at a point where we clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction and activities." There are only eight thousand U.S. soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. It is predicted that the transition from combat to reconstruction will open the door for �many aid organizations, particularly European groups, that had balked at sending troops, supplies, or other assistance.

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August, 2003An International MissionThe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumes control of international security forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, expanding NATO/ISAF's role across the country. It is NATO's first operational commitment outside of Europe. Originally tasked with securing Kabul and its surrounding areas, NATO expands in September 2005, July 2006, and October 2006. The number of ISAF troops grows accordingly, from an initial five thousand to around sixty-five thousand troops from forty-two countries (PDF), including all twenty-eight NATO member states. In 2006, ISAF assumes command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the U.S.-led coalition, and also becomes more involved in intensive combat operations in southern Afghanistan.

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January, 2004A Constitution for AfghanistanAn assembly of 502 Afghan delegates agrees on a constitution for Afghanistan (PDF), creating a strong presidential system intended to unite the country's various ethnic groups. The act is seen as a positive step toward democracy. "Afghans have seized the opportunity provided by the United States and its international partners to lay the foundation for democratic institutions and provide a framework for national elections," declares U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad.

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October 09, 2004A New President for AfghanistanIn historic national balloting, Karzai becomes the first democratically elected head of Afghanistan. Voters turn out in high numbers despite threats of violence and intimidation. Karzai wins with 55 percent of the vote, while his closest rival, former education minister Younis Qanooni, polls 16 percent. Karzai's election victory is marred by accusations of fraud by his opponents and by the kidnapping of three foreign UN election workers by a militant group. But the election is nonetheless hailed as a victory for the fragile nation; Afghans had not gone to the polls since 1969, when they cast ballots in parliamentary elections during the reign of King Mohammed Zahir Shah.

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October 29, 2004Bin Laden SurfacesSignaling the persistent challenges facing the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden releases a videotaped message three weeks after the country's presidential election and just days before the U.S. polls in which George W. Bush will win reelection. In remarks aired on the Arab television network Al Jazeera, bin Laden taunts the Bush administration and takes responsibility for the attacks of September 11, 2001. "We want to restore freedom to our nation, just as you lay waste to our nation," bin Laden says.

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May 23, 2005An Enduring US CommitmentAfghan President Hamid Karzai and President George W. Bush issue a joint declaration (PDF) that pronounces their respective countries strategic partners. The declaration gives U.S. forces access to Afghan military facilities to prosecute "the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism." The alliance's goal, the agreement says, is to "strengthen U.S.-Afghan ties and help ensure Afghanistan's long-term security, democracy, and prosperity." Moreover, the agreement calls for Washington to "help organize, train, equip, and sustain Afghan security forces as Afghanistan develops the capacity to undertake this responsibility," and to continue to rebuild the country's economy and political democracy.

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September 18, 2005Democracy and Afghanistan

More than six million Afghans turn out to vote for the Wolesi Jirga (Council of People), the Meshrano Jirga (Council of Elders), and local councils. Considered the most democratic elections ever in Afghanistan, nearly half those casting ballots are women, viewed as a sign of political progress in a highly patriarchal and conservative society. Sixty-eight out of 249 seats are set aside for female members of Afghanistan's lower house of parliament and 23 out of 102 are reserved in the upper house.

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July, 2006A Bloody ResurgenceViolence increases across the country during the summer months, with intense fighting erupting in the south in July. The number of suicide attacks quintuples from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006, while remotely detonated bombings more than double, to 1,677. Despite a string of recent election successes, some experts blame a faltering central government for the spike in attacks. "As with most insurgencies, the critical precondition [to the Afghan insurgency] is the collapse of governance" (PDF), says Afghanistan expert Seth G. Jones. Jones and other experts point to the many Afghans who lack basic services, the government's difficultly setting up its police forces, and the lack of international forces to assist with security.

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November 2006Cracks in the Coalition

At the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, rifts emerge among member states on troop commitments to Afghanistan. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer sets a target of 2008 for the Afghan National Army to begin to take control of security. "I would hope that by 2008 we will have made considerable progress," he says, "with a more stable political architecture in place, and with a strong interface between NATO and the civilian agencies and effective, trusted Afghan security forces gradually taking control." Leaders of the twenty-six countries agree to remove some national restrictions on how, when, and where forces can be used. But friction continues. With violence against nongovernmental aid workers increasing, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticizes NATO countries in late 2007 Defense Robert Gates criticizes NATO countries in late 2007 for not sending more soldiers. "Our progress in Afghanistan is real but it is fragile," Gates says. "At this time, many allies are unwilling to share the risks, commit the resources, and follow through on collective commitments to this mission and to each other. As a result, we risk allowing what has been achieved in Afghanistan to slip away"

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May 2007A Taliban Commander FallsA notorious Taliban military commander, Mullah Dadullah, is killed in a joint operation by Afghan, U.S., and NATO forces in the south of Afghanistan. Dadullah is believed to have been a leader of guerrilla forces in the war in Helmand Province, deploying suicide bombers and ordering the kidnapping of Westerners. He once told the BBC that hundreds of suicide bombers awaited his command to launch an offensive against foreign troops.

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August 22, 2008Collateral Killings MountAfghan and UN investigations find that errant fire from a U.S. gunship killed dozens of Afghan civilians in the Shindand District of western Herat Province, drawing condemnation from President Hamid Karzai and bolstering Taliban claims that coalition forces are unable to protect the population. U.S. military officials dispute the death toll in this incident as well as claims that a separate incident in Farah Province left as many as 140 civilians dead. After being named top U.S. commander in Afghanistan in mid-2009, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal orders an overhaul of U.S. air strike procedures. "We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories, but suffering strategic defeats, by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people," the general writes.

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February 17, 2009Obama Recommits to AfghanistanNew U.S. President Barack Obama announces plans to send seventeen thousand more troops to the war zone. Obama reaffirms campaign statements that Afghanistan is the more important U.S. front against terrorist forces. He says the United States will stick to a timetable to draw down most combat forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. As of January 2009 the Pentagon has thirty-seven thousand troops in Afghanistan, roughly divided between U.S. and NATO commands. Reinforcements focus on countering a "resurgent" Taliban and stemming the flow of foreign fighters over the Afghan-Pakistan border in the south. Speaking on the troop increase, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates describes the original mission in Afghanistan as "too broad" and calls for establishing limited goals such as preventing and limiting terrorist safe havens.

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March 27, 2009A New American StrategyPresident Obama announces a new strategy for the war effort, linking success in Afghanistan to a stable Pakistan. The core goal of the strategy, as outlined in an interagency white paper, is "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan." The strategy urges the passage of increased aid to Pakistan and a strict standard of measuring progress in fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Plans also call for the deployment of an additional four thousand soldiers to help train the Afghan army and police force. President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan welcomes the strategy, stating that the plan will bring Afghanistan and the �international community closer to success. �

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April 2009A Different Call to NATOSenior U.S. military officials and commanders, altering course from the Bush administration, call on NATO nations to supply non-military assets to Afghanistan. Officials stress the need for NATO members to step up in building Afghan civil society, such as providing resources for provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs. A two-day NATO summit in early April ends with a promise by NATO nations to send an additional five thousand troops to train the Afghan army and police force, and to provide security for the country's August presidential election.

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May 11, 2009Command ChangeSecretary of Defense Robert Gates replaces the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David D. McKiernan, with counterinsurgency and special operations guru Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal. McKiernan's removal comes eleven months after he assumed command of NATO forces in Afghanistan. Gates says the Pentagon needs "fresh thinking" and "fresh eyes" on the Afghanistan war at a time when many analysts say operations there are spiraling out of control. Reports indicate that the appointment of McChrystal is intended to bring a more "aggressive and innovative" approach to the Afghan war effort in tune with a more focused counterinsurgency strategy.

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July, 2009New Strategy, Old BattlesU.S. Marines launch a major offensive in southern Afghanistan, representing a major test for the U.S. military's new counterinsurgency strategy. The offensive, involving four thousand Marines, is launched in response to a growing Taliban insurgency in the country's southern provinces, especially Helmand Province. The operation focuses on restoring government services, bolstering local police forces, and protecting civilians from Taliban incursion. By August 2009 U.S. forces are to number between sixty thousand and sixty-eight thousand.

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November, 2009Afghan Presidential ElectionAfter more than two months of uncertainty following a disputed presidential election on August 20, President Hamid Karzai wins another term. The August 20 election, which pitted Karzai against top contenders Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, was marred by fraud allegations. An investigation by the UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission finds Karzai won only 49.67 percent of the vote, below the 50 percent-plus-one threshold needed to avoid a runoff. Under international pressure, Karzai agrees to a runoff vote on November 7. But a week before the runoff, Karzai's main rival Abdullah pulls out, and Karzai is declared the winner. Concerns over Karzai's legitimacy grow, and the United States and other international partners call for improved governance. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ties all future civilian aid to greater efforts by the Karzai administration to combat corruption.

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December 01, 2009Obama’s Afghan SurgeNine months after renewing the U.S. commitment to the Afghan war effort, President Obama announces a major escalation of the U.S. mission. In a nationally televised speech, the president commits an additional thirty thousand forces to the fight, on top of the sixty-eight thousand in place. These forces, Obama says, "will increase our ability to train competent Afghan Security Forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans." For the first time in the eight-year war effort, a time frame is put on the U.S. military presence, as Obama sets July 2011 as the start of a troop drawdown. But the president does not detail how long a drawdown will take. Obama says U.S. national interests are linked to success in the Afghan war effort, and argues that this temporary surge will force Afghan political and military institutions to assume responsibility for their own affairs.

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June 23, 2010General McChrystal Relieved from Afghan Command

Gen. Stanley McChrystal is relieved of his post as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, following a controversial Rolling Stone article in which he and his aides were quoted criticizing the administration. President Barack Obama nominated Gen. David Petraeus, head of the military's Central Command and architect of the 2007 Iraq surge, to replace McChrystal. The change in command comes at a crucial time in the war, as additional surge forces are scheduled to arrive ahead of a critical operation in Kandahar. Obama emphasizes that his acceptance of McChrystal's resignation did not reflect disagreement over the counterinsurgency strategy he had helped shape. "We are in full agreement about our strategy," says Obama, "this is a change in personnel, not a change in policy."

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