Turnout, Political Preferences and Information: Experimental Evidence from Peru

IntroductionTheoretical Model

Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data

ResultsSummary and Discussion

Turnout, Political Preferences and Information:Experimental Evidence from Perú

Gianmarco León

Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE

10th Trobada, Barcelona GSE

Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information




Motivation

Outline

1 IntroductionMotivation

2 Theoretical Model

3 Institutional Background

4 Experimental Design and the Data

5 ResultsBasic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition

6 Summary and Discussion





Motivation

Motivation

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widelyused around the world

Objective:Democratization: everyone’s preferences are represented inthe electoral outcomeInduce voters to get involved in the political process

However,Voting, and enforcing these institutions is costlyInduce less informed, or uninterested voters into the polls





Motivation

Motivation

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widelyused around the worldObjective:

Democratization: everyone’s preferences are represented inthe electoral outcomeInduce voters to get involved in the political process

However,Voting, and enforcing these institutions is costlyInduce less informed, or uninterested voters into the polls





Motivation

Motivation

Voting is at the core of democracy. Yet, participation in electionsremain an open question for most of the economics and politicalscience literatureWe need to understand not only why people vote, but also it is keyto explain who votes, because it determines:

1 Who gets elected and what policies get enactedPerson and Tabellini 2000; Husted and Kenny 1997; Miller 2008; Fujiwara2011

2 To what extent elected officials are held accountableBanerjee, et al. 2010; Chong, et al. 2011; Ferraz and Finan 2008





Motivation

In this paper ...

I explore these issues using a combination of a natural and a fieldexperiment that effectively generates random variation in the finesfor abstention in Perú. The experimental design allows me toaddress four specific questions:

1 How changes in the cost of (not) voting affect turnout?2 What is the effect on the composition of the electorate?3 How does a change in the electorate affect public choice?4 Does mandating voting generate externalities in related

markets?





Motivation

Spoiler Slide

1 A lower fine for abstention reduces turnout. The elasticity ofvoting with respect to the cost is -0.21

2 Consistent with the theoretical model, this reduction inturnout is driven by:

Voters with a lower subjective value of voting/lessinterested in politicsThe uninformedCentrist voters

3 Voters who abstain due to the reduction in the fine: (i) do nothave different policy preferences, on average; (ii) do notacquire less political information; and (iii) are not more likelyto sell their vote, but when they do, have to be paid a higheramount





Outline


2 Theoretical Model









The Voter’s Problem

C(L ; yi ,yL,yRΩi ) represents the utility loss of making a “voting mistake”





Candidate Choice

The utility loss of voting for candidate L is given by:

C(L ; yi ,Ωi ) = E [1u(yi ,yL) < u(yi ,yR) · (u(yi ,yR)−u(yi ,yL)) |Ωi ]

, where, u(yi ,yj) =−(yi −yj)2

Optimal voting rule:

v∗(yi ,Ωi ) =

L

R

if E [u(yi ,yL)−u(yi ,yR) |Ωi ] > 0if E [u(yi ,yL)−u(yi ,yR) |Ωi ] < 0





Candidate Choice

Candidate Choice Cut-off

τi =E[y2

R−y2L |Ωi ]

2E [yR−yL |Ωi ]

Optimal voting rule:

v∗(yi ,Ωi ) =

L

R

if yi < τi

if yi > τi





Turnout

t(yi ,Ωi ) =

10

if C (v∗i (yi ,Ωi ))−di ≤Mi

if C (v∗i (yi ,Ωi ))−di >Mi

A reduction in the fines for abstention (Mi ), will cause a reductionin turnoutThis reduction will be more important among voters who:

1 Have a lower subjective value of voting (di )2 Hold less information about the candidates (Ωi )3 Have an ideology closer to τi





Outline


2 Theoretical Model









Institutional Background

Voting is mandatory for citizens between 18 and 70 years oldConsequence of not voting → Civil disenfranchisementTo get back full citizen rights, a fine has to be paidEnforcement varies in different instances of government andprivate offices





Institutional Background

Before August 2006, the fine was S/.144 (~ US$50)New Law: The fine was reduced for everyone, and thedecrease was steeper for voters in poorer districts:

Extremely poor districts: S/.18 (~ US$6)Poor districts: S/.36 (~ US$12.5)Non-Poor: S/.72 (~ US$25)

However, information about the new costs of not voting is scarce





Perceive Fines - Baseline

0.0

02

.004

.006

.008

Density

0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine

Full Sample

Density: Perceived Fine−Baseline





Outline


2 Theoretical Model









Map of the Districts Sampled





Script for the Treatment Group

Thanks a lot for your collaboration with our study.Now, I would like to give you some information about the sanctions for notvoting.In August 2006, Congress approved a reduction of the fines for not voting (LawNo. 28859). According to this law, citizens who don’t vote are no longersubject to a fine of S/. 144, but the fine is lower for everyone, and its leveldepends of the poverty level of the district. According to the information youhave provided, if you don’t vote in the October election, you will have to pay afine of S/.[AMOUNT IN THE DISTRICT WHERE THE VOTER ISREGISTERED].





Script for the Control Group

Thanks a lot for your collaboration with our study.Now, I would like to give you some information about the sanctions for notvoting.Recall that in Perú, abstaining in any election is subject to a sanction, whichentails the payment of a fine.





Measurement

One of the advantages of my research design is that I am able tomeasure turnout objectively:





Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition

Outline


2 Theoretical Model










Turnout

.9.9

2.9

4.9

6.9

8Tu

rnou

t

Non−poor Poor Ext. PoorPoverty Level of the District

Control Treatment






Perceived Fine (Non Poor): Baseline and Follow-up0

.002

.004

.006

.008

Density

0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine

Control Treatment

Voters from Non−Poor Districts


0.0

05

.01

.015

Density

0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine

Control Treatment

Voters from Non−Poor Districts

Density: Perceived Fine−Follow−up






Perceived Fine (Poor): Baseline and Follow-up0

.002

.004

.006

.008

Density

0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine

Control Treatment

Voters from Poor Districts

Perceived Fine−Baseline

0.0

05

.01

.015

Density

0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine

Control Treatment

Voters from Poor Districts

Perceived Fine−Follow−up






Perceived Fine (Extreme Poor): Baseline and Follow-up0

.002

.004

.006

.008

Density

0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine

Control Treatment

Voters from Extremely Poor Districts


0.0

05

.01

.015

Density

0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine

Control Treatment

Voters from Extremely Poor Districts

Density: Perceived Fine−Follow−up






Estimation Strategy

Given the imperfect compliance among the treatment group andlearning in the control group, I rely on the exogenous variation inthe changes in the perceived fines introduced by the treatment toestimate the local average treatment effect (LATE)The first stage is given by:

4Fine ij = β1NonPoorij ·Treatij +β2Poorij ·Treatij +β3Poorij +β4NonPoorij +γXij +δk +νij

The effect of changes in the perceived fines on turnout for voterswhose information set was updated by the treatment is estimated inthe second stage:

Voteij = β14Fine ij + β2Poor ij + β3NonPoor ij + γXij + δk + εij






Effect of the Treatment on Perceived Fine (FS)

Dep. Var: 4 Perceived FineNon-Poor Poor All

Treatment: Fine S/.72 -18.807 -19.317(4.905)∗∗∗ (4.854)∗∗∗

Treatment: Fine S/.36 -30.465 -30.340(4.756)∗∗∗ (4.692)∗∗∗

Controls Y Y YVillage FE Y Y YMean dep. var. -48.00 -64.99 -56.65Obs. 851 882 1733F-statistic 14.68 41.03 28.66


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IV

Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 ElectionNon-Poor Poor All

4 Perceived Fine 0.0014 0.0017 0.0016(0.0009)∗ (0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.0005)∗∗∗

Controls Y Y YVillage FE Y Y YMean dep. var. 0.948 0.941 0.945Obs. 850 882 1732F-statistic 14.68 41.03 28.66

Reduction in turnout for the average voter in: non-poor district 6.72pp;poor district 11.04pp.

Elasticity of voting with respect to the cost is -0.21


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IV


4 Perceived Fine 0.0014 0.0017 0.0016(0.0009)∗ (0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.0005)∗∗∗

Controls Y Y YVillage FE Y Y YMean dep. var. 0.948 0.941 0.945Obs. 850 882 1732F-statistic 14.68 41.03 28.66

Point estimates for poor and non-poor are not statistically significant:constant elasticity through the income distribution


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Interest in Politics

Dep. Var.: Voted in the 2010 Election(1) (2)

4 Fine*Very interested in politics 0.0001(0.0018)

4 Fine*Interested in politics 0.0012(0.0007)∗

4 Fine*Not interested in politics 0.0018(0.0007)∗∗∗

4 Fine*Very interested in results 0.0007(0.0006)

4 Fine*Interested in results 0.0018(0.0007)∗∗∗

4 Fine*Not interested in results 0.0039(0.001)∗∗

The reduction in turnout due to a decrase in Mi is stronger among voterswith a lower di


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Information About the Candidates

Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 Election(1) (2) (3)

4 Perceived Fine 0.0024 0.0022 0.0024(0.0008)∗∗∗ (0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗∗

4 Fine*Candidate recall -.0023(0.0012)∗∗

4 Fine*Party recall -.0022(0.0011)∗

4 Fine*Cand. + Party recall -.0027(0.0012)∗∗

A reduction in Mi causes a larger reduction in turnout among voters whohave less informartion about the candidates (Ωi)


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Ideological Positions

Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 Election(1) (2)

4 Fine*Left -.0009(0.0026)

4 Fine*Center 0.0015(0.0006)∗∗∗

4 Fine*Right 0.0009(0.0008)

4 Fine*Policy Extreme 1 (Pub. Goods) 0.001(0.0013)

4 Fine*Policy Center 0.002(0.0007)∗∗∗

4 Fine*Policy Extreme 2 (Club Goods) 0.0006(0.0009)

The reduction in turnout due to a decrase in Mi is explained by centristvoters (whose yi is closer to τi )


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Preference Aggregation and Information Acquisition

Lower fines for not voting draw a lower share of the populationthe polls

Particularly, voters who are in the center of the ideologicalspectrum, those who have lower subjective value of voting,and uninformed voters select out of the pool

The natural question that follows regards the implications forthe aggregation of citizen preferences and informationacquisition

Theory is mixed on mandatory voting: Krishna and Morgan(2011), Ghosal and Lockwood (2009)Information acquisition: Martinelli (2005), Oliveros (2011),Degan (2011)






Policy Preferences

Dep. Var.: Voted in the 2010 ElectionCoeff. on Coeff. on

4 Perceived Fine 4 Perceived Fine*PolicyPolicyHealth 0.0019 -.0005

(0.0008)∗∗ (0.0009)Education 0.0009 0.0012

(0.0005)∗ (0.001)Infrastructure 0.001 0.0007

(0.0011) (0.0012)Order and Security 0.0022 -.0012

(0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.001)Promote micro-enterprises/training 0.0016 0.0002

(0.0005)∗∗∗ (0.0012)Agriculture 0.0022 -.0020

(0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗Youth/Women 0.0013 0.0013

(0.0006)∗∗ (0.0011)Cleaning/Environment 0.0013 0.0007

(0.0005)∗∗ (0.001)Institutions 0.0018 -.0010

(0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.001)Social/work programs 0.0017 -.0004

(0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.001)


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Information Acquisition

Dep. Var.:4 Candidate 4 Party 4 Cand.+Party

Recall Recall Recall4 Perceived Fine -.0002 -.0005 -.0004

(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)Village FE Y Y YObs. 1733 1733 1733

Voters who are sensitive to the changes in Mi don’t acquire informationdifferentially


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Vote Buying

Dep. Var:Accepted Money S/. Accepted

for her vote? Directly4 Perceived Fine -.0010 -.0303

(0.0009) (0.0161)∗

Controls Y YVillage FE Y YMean dep. var. 0.287 2.20Obs. 1733 1733R2 -.0103 -.028F-statistic 28.675 28.675

A reduction in Mi (increase in the opportunity cost of voting) doesn’taffect the amount of vote buying, but makes the votes more expensive


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Outline


2 Theoretical Model









Summary and Discussion

1 The elasticity of voting with respect to the cost is -0.212 The reduction in turnout caused by the lower fine changes the

composition of the electorate

Voters who are in the center of the ideological spectrum, thosewho have lower subjective value of voting (or who are lessinterested in politics), and uninformed voters select out of thepool of votersVoters who select out of the electorate do not seem to havedifferent policy preferences than those who vote regardless ofthe finesVoters do not stop acquiring political information





Thanks!





Effect of the Treatment on Turnout (RF)


Treatment: Fine S/.72 -.027 -.026(0.015)∗ (0.015)∗

Treatment: Fine S/.36 -.052 -.053(0.016)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗

Controls Y Y YVillage FE Y Y YMean dep. var. 0.948 0.941 0.945Obs. 850 882 1732

Effect of the treatment on turnout: -2.6pp. for non-poor; -5.3pp. for poor





Change in Perceived Fine

0−

20

−40

−60

−80C

hange in P

erc

eiv

ed F

ine

Non−poor Poor Ext. PoorPoverty Level of the District

Control Treatment





Turnout

Total Treatment Control T - C P-valueExtreme Poor 0.935 0.930 0.940 -0.010 (0.641)Poor 0.940 0.913 0.967 -0.054 (0.001)***Non-Poor 0.948 0.938 0.959 -0.021 (0.175)Total 0.942 0.927 0.958 -0.031 (0.002)***


Turnout, Political Preferences and Information: Experimental Evidence from Peru

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Transcript of Turnout, Political Preferences and Information: Experimental Evidence from Peru