Tannenberg - Geschichtliche Wahrheit über die Schlacht / Erich Ludendorff / 1939/1998
Turning points -...
Transcript of Turning points -...
Retrospective288
13 Turning points
Source 13.1
A photograph dated 1917 showing
German leaders studying maps:
from left, Field Marshall Paul von
Hindenburg, Kaiser Wilhelm II; and
General Erich Ludendorff
KEY DATES
1917
February Germany
commences unrestricted
submarine warfare on
merchant ships
March Tsar Nicholas II
abdicates
April United States
declares war on Germany
October Bolsheviks win
power in Russia; Russia
withdraws from war
December Russia signs
armistice with Germany
1918
March Treaty of
Brest–Litovsk is signed
on 3 March
March Ludendorff
launches Spring Offensive
on Western Front
April Germany
commences massive
advance against British
divisions in Flanders
June Pace of the German
offensive slows with
the failure of Operation
Gneisau and French
counterattack
July Allies break through
German lines; Germany
in retreat
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
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In this chapter, you will learn about the following aspects
of World War I:
W� impacts of the entry of the USA and of the Russian withdrawal
W� Ludendorff’s Spring Offensive and the Allied response
Chapter 13 W Turning points 289
IntroductionThe year 1917 marked two turning points in the course of the war:
in April, the United States broke its policy of isolationism and entered
the war on the side of the Allies
in November, Russia’s Bolshevik party, having staged a successful
revolution, fulfilled its promise to withdraw Russia from the war.
While the first event seemed to strengthen the position of the Allies, the
second, at a time when the war was going badly for the Allies, potentially
weakened them severely.
Source 13.2
Extract from Leon Wolff’s In Flanders Fields, describing the start of the new year, 1917
Somewhere in the limitless darkness a man coughed, a bird twittered an isolated
phrase, a muffled voice spoke up. Many miles behind the front thousands of
lorries, wagons, gun limbers, horses and men moving endlessly along the
Belgian roads furnished a soft, pulsating background . . . Here in the advance
zone of the dread Salient around Ypres hardly a man moved, nor did many even
know or care that the old year was dying.
The officer standing beside the field piece watched the glowing second hand
of his wrist-watch. At the stroke of midnight he said ‘Fire!’ The gun roared, and
a shell was lobbed somewhere into the German positions. A few seconds later
there was a single, distinct, far-off explosion, following which a strained silence
hung in the air. Then the enemy threw up anxious flares, ghastly green but of
great beauty. These illuminated no-man’s land lingeringly, froze it briefly into the
aspect of a charcoal sketch and then faded away.
The British battery fired nine more rounds in erratic succession, paused,
and then another seven more. Thus the new year, 1917, was advertised by
seventeen shells . . . the rest of the evening passed in relative peace there and
elsewhere on the Western Front . . .
Leon Wolff, In Flanders Fields: the 1917 Campaign, Penguin, 2003, first published in 1959.
Impact of the Russian withdrawalAt the outbreak of war in 1914, Russia had the largest army in the world but
was also a nation plagued by serious internal problems.
War on the Eastern Front began on 17 August 1914 when Russia launched
a full-scale offensive against Prussia. By 30 August, General Hindenburg’s
German forces defeated a massive Russian force at the Battle of Tannenburg.
Russia suffered tens of thousands of casualties and lost 92 000 troops as
prisoners of war. The inadequacies of Russia’s logistical planning became
a catastrophic short-coming when faced with a highly industrialised and
organised opponent.
The immense difficulty in supplying and maintaining the massive Russian
army placed a great strain on Russia’s total war effort. At the outset of
war, the Russian people had supported the war effort, but the brutal toll in
Russian lives and terrible suffering brought rebellion.
W
W
isolationism W�a principle of foreign policy that avoided direct involvement in European affairs
isolationism W�a principle of foreign policy that avoided direct involvement in European affairs
SOURCE QUESTIONS
Read source 13.2 which
describes the start of the new
year in the trenches in 1917.
1. Describe the mood that
is suggested at this point
in the war.
2. Using the source and your
own knowledge, explain the
characteristics of war on
the Western Front at the
beginning of 1917.
SOURCE QUESTIONS
Read source 13.2 which
describes the start of the new
year in the trenches in 1917.
1. Describe the mood that
is suggested at this point
in the war.
2. Using the source and your
own knowledge, explain the
characteristics of war on
the Western Front at the
beginning of 1917.
logistical W�organisation behind the transport, supply and movement of troops
logistical W�organisation behind the transport, supply and movement of troops
Retrospective290
DENMARK
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUMG E R M A N Y
FRANCE
R U S S I A
RUMANIA
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA–HUNGARY
LUXEMBOURG
Black
Sea
BALT
IC
SEA
NORTH
SEA
ITALY
Berlin
Prague
Warsaw
Kiev
Hamburg
Munich
Petrograd
Frankfurt
Brussels
Paris
Riga
Eastern Front 1917
Western Front 1917
0 600 km300
N
By May 1915, Germany had taken command of the Eastern Front and,
during the course of the year, Russia lost two million troops. With soldiers
sent to their deaths on the Eastern Front and economic collapse at home,
discontent among the Russian people grew stronger. Russia edged closer to
revolution as the people’s support for the Tsar and his war disintegrated.
By February 1917, the demoralised Russian army had suffered eight million
casualties and one million more Russian soldiers had deserted. With the Tsar’s
authority shattered, the government collapsed and Russia was in revolution.
On 2 March 1917, over three centuries of Romanov rule ended when Tsar
Nicholas II abdicated. Key politicians formed Russia’s new Provisional
Government.
Source 13.3
A photograph showing Tsar
Nicholas addressing some of his
Cossack troops on the Eastern
Front in December 1914
Source 13.3
A photograph showing Tsar
Nicholas addressing some of his
Cossack troops on the Eastern
Front in December 1914
Source 13.4
Map of the Western and Eastern
Fronts in 1917
Source 13.4
Map of the Western and Eastern
Fronts in 1917
abdicate W�to give up or renounce a position of power, right or claim
abdicate W�to give up or renounce a position of power, right or claim
provisional W�a temporary and conditional agreement or system
provisional W�a temporary and conditional agreement or system
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. Describe the image of
the Tsar and his forces
that is communicated in
this photograph from the
Eastern Front.
2. With reference to the text,
explain the image of Russian
forces and the Tsar in 1917.
Chapter 13 W Turning points 291
The Allies welcomed the willingness of the new Provisional Government to
continue Russia’s involvement in the war and honour its military obligations
to its French and British allies. The Russian population did not support this
decision and, in the ensuing months, more and more people transferred their
loyalty to the government’s Bolshevik opponents who promised to end the
war and relieve the sufferings it had induced.
Source 13.5
A Bolshevik propaganda poster
entitled ‘the tired Russian soldier’
Source 13.5
A Bolshevik propaganda poster
entitled ‘the tired Russian soldier’
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. What opinion about the war
is expressed in the source
13.5 poster?
2. How could the source 13.5
poster be interpreted as a
powerful piece of Bolshevik
propaganda?
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. What opinion about the war
is expressed in the source
13.5 poster?
2. How could the source 13.5
poster be interpreted as a
powerful piece of Bolshevik
propaganda?
Retrospective292
In October 1917, a second revolution gave the Bolsheviks power. The
Bolshevik leader, Lenin, called for a separate peace and signed an armistice
with Germany in December 1917. More than three million men had died and
more than nine million were wounded during Russia’s three years of fighting
on the Eastern Front.
Source 13.6
A photograph of Russian and German soldiers dancing and celebrating the end of war on the
Eastern Front in the winter of 1917–18
Treaty of Brest–LitovskThe Russian government’s withdrawal from World War I in 1917 and the subse-
quent Treaty of Brest–Litovsk effectively ended the war on the Eastern Front.
The Bolshevik government declared an armistice with Germany in
December 1917 and, soon after, Lenin instructed his representative,
Adolf Joffe, to commence peace negotiations with Germany and Austria
at Brest–Litovsk. Lenin demanded a peace without annexations or
indemnities and based on Russia’s right to self-determination. Germany
was determined to assert its authority over Russia and dictated harsh
conditions for peace. The Bolshevik delegates declared the terms too
objectionable to sign and stopped negotiations.
On 18 February 1918, the German forces resumed their advance on Russia
and the Bolsheviks were forced to accept the punishment meted out by the
Treaty of Brest–Litovsk. The treaty was a national humiliation for Russia.
By the terms of the treaty, Russia lost a quarter of its European territory,
which meant:
34 per cent of the population
89 per cent of the coal mines
32 per cent of the agricultural land.
By the time the treaty was signed on 3 March 1918, Germany was in control
of almost half of Russia to the east of Moscow. One of the Bolshevik del-
egates, Sokolnikov, declared this ‘a peace which Russia, grinding its teeth, is
forced to accept’.
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Bolsheviks W�members of the Bolshevik party that took power in Russia in October 1917 after another revolution
armistice W�a temporary halt to fighting in order to allow peace negotiations
Bolsheviks W�members of the Bolshevik party that took power in Russia in October 1917 after another revolution
armistice W�a temporary halt to fighting in order to allow peace negotiations
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. Describe what is
happening in the source
13.6 photograph.
2. Assess the usefulness
of this source for providing
an understanding of the
impact of the war on
Russia’s effectiveness
as an ally.
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. Describe what is
happening in the source
13.6 photograph.
2. Assess the usefulness
of this source for providing
an understanding of the
impact of the war on
Russia’s effectiveness
as an ally.
annexations W�territories lost through takeover
indemnities W�payments of compensation for damage or loss
self-determination W�the right of an identifiable group of people to determine their own form of government and the nation to which they belong
annexations W�territories lost through takeover
indemnities W�payments of compensation for damage or loss
self-determination W�the right of an identifiable group of people to determine their own form of government and the nation to which they belong
Chapter 13 W Turning points 293
Article I: Germany, Austria–Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, for the one part,
and Russia, for the other part, declare that the state of war between them
has ceased. They are resolved to live henceforth in peace and amity with
one another.
Article II: The contracting parties will refrain from any agitation or propaganda
against the Government or the public and military institutions of the other
party. In so far as this obligation devolves upon Russia, it holds good also for the
territories occupied by the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance.
Article III: The territories lying to the west of the line agreed upon by the
contracting parties which formerly belonged to Russia, will no longer be
subject to Russian sovereignty; the line agreed upon is traced on the map
submitted as an essential part of this treaty of peace . . . No obligations whatever
toward Russia shall devolve upon the territories referred to, arising from the
fact that they formerly belonged to Russia. Russia refrains from all interference
in the internal relations of these territories. Germany and Austria–Hungary
purpose to determine the future status of these territories in agreement with
their population.
Article IV: As soon as a general peace is concluded and Russian demobilization is
carried out completely Germany will evacuate the territory lying to the east
of the line designated in paragraph 1 of Article III, in so far as Article IV does
not determine otherwise. Russia will do all within her power to insure the
immediate evacuation of the provinces of eastern Anatolia and their lawful
return to Turkey . . .
Article V: Russia will, without delay, carry out the full demobilization of her
army inclusive of those units recently organized by the present Government.
Furthermore, Russia will either bring her warships into Russian ports and
there detain them until the day of the conclusion of a general peace, or disarm
them forthwith. Warships of the States which continue in the state of war
with the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance, in so far as they are within Russian
sovereignty, will be treated as Russian warships . . .
Article XI: The contracting parties mutually renounce compensation for their war
expenses, i.e., of the public expenditures for the conduct of the war, as well as
compensation for war losses, i.e., such losses as were caused [by] them and
their nationals within the war zones by military measures . . .
Military mastery in the westThe Russian collapse enabled Germany to shift its military divisions —
comprising one million men — and resources from the Eastern to the Western
Front. Russia’s allies were enraged by Russia’s withdrawal from the war
and labelled it an act of treachery. At the end of 1917, the military situation
looked bleak for the Allied forces. The Allies predicted they would face a
reinvigorated German military attack in the spring of 1918.
Victory in the east gave the German High Command the confidence needed
to drive a wedge between the British and French armies and force the British
back to the coast of the English Channel. The Central Powers were closer to
victory in the west than they had been since before the Battle of the Marne
in September 1914. The focus of fighting now became military mastery of the
Western Front.
Source 13.7
Extracts from the peace treaty agreed at Brest–Litovsk, 3 March 1918
Source 13.7
Extracts from the peace treaty agreed at Brest–Litovsk, 3 March 1918
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. In your own words,
state the main condition
expressed in each of the
six Articles of the Treaty
of Brest–Litovsk.
2. Explain why the Russians
regarded the treaty as a
national humiliation.
3. Suggest what you think
Germany wanted to achieve
through the Treaty of
Brest–Litovsk.
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. In your own words,
state the main condition
expressed in each of the
six Articles of the Treaty
of Brest–Litovsk.
2. Explain why the Russians
regarded the treaty as a
national humiliation.
3. Suggest what you think
Germany wanted to achieve
through the Treaty of
Brest–Litovsk.
Retrospective294
Impact of the United States’ entry into World War IAt the outbreak of war in 1914, America had declared its neutrality. American
public opinion did not favour one side over the other while its isolationism
reinforced the idea that the war was a European conflict. Little more than
two months before America entered the war against Germany, US President
Woodrow Wilson addressed the Senate and appealed for a settlement of the
European conflict based on ‘peace without victory’ (see source 13.9).
Wilson was a progressive thinker who embraced the ideals of a democratic
peace. Believing in mediation, he set up secret negotiations with Britain
and Germany to establish a peace plan agreement. Wilson’s vision for peace
was rejected.
Source 13.8
‘The Caged British Lion’, a German
propaganda cartoon by Arthur
Johnson from the German journal
Kladderadatsch, 28 April 1918
Source 13.8
‘The Caged British Lion’, a German
propaganda cartoon by Arthur
Johnson from the German journal
Kladderadatsch, 28 April 1918
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. How are Britain and
Germany depicted in the
source 13.8 cartoon?
2. What comment does the
cartoon make about the
course of the war in the
period immediately after
Russia was forced to
accept the Treaty of
Brest–Litovsk?
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. How are Britain and
Germany depicted in the
source 13.8 cartoon?
2. What comment does the
cartoon make about the
course of the war in the
period immediately after
Russia was forced to
accept the Treaty of
Brest–Litovsk?
neutrality W�a nation which does not become involved in the wars of others
neutrality W�a nation which does not become involved in the wars of others
mediation W�to settle disputes through agreement and reconciliation
mediation W�to settle disputes through agreement and reconciliation
Chapter 13 W Turning points 295
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. Who delivered the
source 13.9 speech?
2. Who was the audience?
3. When was the speech
given?
4. Explain what the purpose
of this speech would
have been.
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. Who delivered the
source 13.9 speech?
2. Who was the audience?
3. When was the speech
given?
4. Explain what the purpose
of this speech would
have been.
On the 18th of December last, I addressed an identical note to the governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy . . .
The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace . . .
. . . [I]t must be a peace without victory . . . Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor’s terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.
The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power . . .
While one pro-war consensus fragmented in Russia another crystallised across the Atlantic. This development was sudden. Barely two months before America declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917, there seemed hardly any wish among the public or in Congress for intervention, and no desire by Wilson to propose it. During 1916 American entry alongside the Allies had seemed increasingly unlikely . . .
[T]he Democrats projected the president as ‘the man who kept us out of the war’.Wilson’s diplomacy, however, revolved around three interlocking themes: trade
and loans, blockade and U-boats, and his urge to mediate. His mediation attempts forced him to elaborate his vision of the peace settlement and whetted his appetite for involvement in it. From early in the conflict he contemplated creating an international collective security organization, and pressure groups lobbied for the same objective. In a speech in May 1916 to the most prominent of them, the League to Enforce Peace, he declared himself in favour of establishing such an organization and of American membership in it . . .
Hence in addition to the League of Nations he embraced the ideal of a democratic peace, based on the consent of the governed, national self-
determination, and freedom of the seas.
David Stevenson, 1914–1918: The History of the First World War, Penguin, London, 2004, pp. 310–11.
Source 13.9
Extracts from President Wilson’s ‘Peace Without Victory’ speech to the US Senate on 22 January 1917
Source 13.9
Extracts from President Wilson’s ‘Peace Without Victory’ speech to the US Senate on 22 January 1917
SOURCE QUESTIONS
Read sources 13.9 and 13.10
and answer the following
questions.
1. Explain the two important
developments of 1917.
2. What was the general
American attitude towards
the war two months before
America’s declaration?
3. What had President Wilson
hoped his attempts at
mediation would bring?
4. What ideals did President
Wilson stand for?
Source 13.10
A historian’s comment on the change in attitude of the United States and President Woodrow Wilson
Retrospective296
In 1917, Germany was determined to break the power of the Allies at sea.
The German High Command declared unrestricted submarine warfare on mer-
chant (trading) ships. Between February and March 1917, merchant ships were
sunk in an effort to deprive Britain of food and munitions. In April, a further
196 ships were sunk. British supply lines and sea routes were secured when a
convoy system was established that was supported by US destroyers.
On 2 April 1917, President Woodrow Wilson appeared before the American
Congress and asked them to make the ‘world safe for democracy’ by declaring
war against Germany. America thus entered the war that had ravaged Europe
for over three years. America’s massive industrial and economic resources were
now available to the Allied war effort. American forces brought hundreds of
thousands of new soldiers into the war and this was a great boost to Allied
solders’ morale.
I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious,
very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it
was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the
responsibility of making.
On the third of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary
announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the first day
of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and
use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports
of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports
controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean . . .
I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious
as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of
non-combatants, men, women, and children, engaged in pursuits which have
always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent
and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people
cannot be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare
against mankind.
It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives
taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and
people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in
the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination.
The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will
meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation
of counsel and a temperateness for judgement befitting our character and our
motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be
revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only
the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion . . .
It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I
have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of
fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful
people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself
seeming to be in the balance.
But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things
which we have always carried nearest our hearts — for democracy, for the right of
those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the
rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a
concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the
world itself at last free . . .
convoy W�an armed force or formation of ships that acts as an escort for protection
destroyers W�small, fast warships
convoy W�an armed force or formation of ships that acts as an escort for protection
destroyers W�small, fast warships
Source 13.11
Extracts from President Wilson’s
speech to the US Congress
signalling the US declaration of
war with Germany, 2 April 1917
Source 13.11
Extracts from President Wilson’s
speech to the US Congress
signalling the US declaration of
war with Germany, 2 April 1917
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. Read the source 13.11
speech and explain how
President Wilson’s address
to Congress changed
between January and April.
2. According to source 13.11,
why did America go to war
and what did it involve?
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. Read the source 13.11
speech and explain how
President Wilson’s address
to Congress changed
between January and April.
2. According to source 13.11,
why did America go to war
and what did it involve?
Chapter 13 W Turning points 297
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. What is the subject of the source 13.12 poster and what is the main idea
that is communicated?
2. Millions of Americans were steadfastly opposed to sending troops into war
before 1917. How could the source 13.12 poster have been instrumental in
changing their minds?
Source 13.12
American government poster
from 1918 aimed at bolstering
popular support for the
military effort
Source 13.12
American government poster
from 1918 aimed at bolstering
popular support for the
military effort
Retrospective298
The American decision to declare war on Germany was evolutionary, and
not triggered by a single event. The factors that fi nally culminated in Amer-
ican involvement were:
anti-German feeling that came from the U-boat sinking of the British
liner Lusitania on 8 May 1915, in which 1924 lives were lost, 128 of them
Americans (see source 13.13)
unrestricted warfare infringing the freedom of the seas and the loss
of further American lives from sinking of American ships by German
U-boats. Germany declared unrestricted U-boat warfare on 1 February
1917; two days later America broke off diplomatic relations with Germany.
large sums of money loaned by the Americans to Britain. German victory
would have involved fi nancial loss for America.
Allied propaganda presenting Germany as the aggressor, for example, the
German invasion of Belgium
release of the ‘Zimmerman telegram’ — a German attempt to negotiate
an alliance with Mexico and Japan against the United States. Arthur
Zimmerman, German ambassador to Mexico, proposed a Mexican and
German alliance in the event of war between America and Germany.
with German victory, the former Mexican territories of Arizona, New
Mexico and Texas would be restored to Mexico.
W
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To view and read about the decoding of the telegram, access the website for this book and click on the ‘Zimmerman telegram’ weblink for this chapter (see ‘Weblinks’, page viii).
To view and read about the decoding of the telegram, access the website for this book and click on the ‘Zimmerman telegram’ weblink for this chapter (see ‘Weblinks’, page viii).
Source 13.13
The front page of The New York
Times on 8 May 1915, announcing the sinking of the Lusitania by a German submarine. Inset (at right) is a German advertisement from inside the newspaper warning travellers of the dangers of travelling across the Atlantic on British vessels.
Source 13.13
The front page of The New York
Times on 8 May 1915, announcing the sinking of the Lusitania by a German submarine. Inset (at right) is a German advertisement from inside the newspaper warning travellers of the dangers of travelling across the Atlantic on British vessels.
Chapter 13 W Turning points 299
Source 13.14
An American recruitment poster aimed at stirring the emotions of the American people
following the heavy loss of life in the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915
The American Expeditionary ForceThe Allies were delighted at the American entry into the conflict because
they believed it assured victory. General John J. Pershing was chosen to
head the American Expeditionary Force. American forces were given a
mandate to cooperate with Allies, but fought under their own flag under
American leadership.
SOURCE QUESTION
The sinking of the Lusitania occurred two years before America declared war on Germany. Using sources 13.13, 13.14 and the information from the text, explain:
(a) what kind of vessel the Lusitania was
(b) why it was sunk
(c) what it represented
(d) how the sinking came to be used as such a powerful piece of Allied propaganda.
SOURCE QUESTION
The sinking of the Lusitania occurred two years before America declared war on Germany. Using sources 13.13, 13.14 and the information from the text, explain:
(a) what kind of vessel the Lusitania was
(b) why it was sunk
(c) what it represented
(d) how the sinking came to be used as such a powerful piece of Allied propaganda.
Retrospective300
The build-up of American forces and strength in Europe was slow and
did not provide the immediate Allied salvation that many had hoped for.
The United States had not spent years preparing for the war and so had few
modern weapons, such as howitzers, tanks, mortars, rifle grenades or air-
craft. President Wilson’s declaration of war committed American supplies,
extended loans, supply of naval power and the call-up of half a million Amer-
ican conscripts. However, America was not a military force on the Western
Front until 1918, so their contribution to fighting was limited. It was America’s
potential power that became vital to the Allied war effort. The German forces,
under General Erich Ludendorff, knew that they now had to win, or nego-
tiate a peace, before American support increased to a point where Germany
would be outnumbered on the Western Front.
Source 13.15
A photograph of General
Pershing, head of American
Expeditionary Force, arriving in
France in 1917
Source 13.15
A photograph of General
Pershing, head of American
Expeditionary Force, arriving in
France in 1917
SOURCE QUESTIONS
Examine the source 13.15
image of General Pershing
then answer the following
questions.
1. Who was General Pershing?
2. What sort of a character
does General Pershing
appear in the photo?
3. Why would General
Pershing’s arrival in Europe
be seen as a turning point
in the war?
4. What do you think the
Allied leaders would expect
the role of the AEF to be
in Europe?
SOURCE QUESTIONS
Examine the source 13.15
image of General Pershing
then answer the following
questions.
1. Who was General Pershing?
2. What sort of a character
does General Pershing
appear in the photo?
3. Why would General
Pershing’s arrival in Europe
be seen as a turning point
in the war?
4. What do you think the
Allied leaders would expect
the role of the AEF to be
in Europe?
howitzers W�short-barrelled artillery, particularly useful for shelling at a steep angle
mortars W�short tubular weapons used to fire shells at high angles
howitzers W�short-barrelled artillery, particularly useful for shelling at a steep angle
mortars W�short tubular weapons used to fire shells at high angles
Chapter 13 W Turning points 301
General Ludendorff’s Spring OffensiveNineteen seventeen was a harrowing year for Great Britain and its allies.
Britain had suffered nearly 400 000 casualties in the costly and unsuccessful
offensive called Passchendaele (see chapter 11, pages 239–40). German
U-boats had inflicted further suffering on the British people. Losses at the front
combined with hardship at home to bring all the warring nations to a state
of national war weariness.
In Germany, the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, Germany’s comprehensive
scheme for winning the war (see chapter 11, page 213), had destroyed Kaiser
Wilhelm’s ability to make the decisions required of a leader. German govern-
ment in 1917 was in the hands of General Erich Ludendorff and Field Mar-
shall Paul von Hindenburg. Germany had become a military dictatorship.
SOURCE QUESTION
Explain the power and influence of the two German leaders shown in source 13.16, in
1917.
By the close of 1917, Germany’s military reputation was at stake. General
Ludendorff knew he needed to act quickly to gain a victory before the weight
of American power could swing the war against Germany. Ludendorff was
also determined to place Germany in a stronger position to negotiate at the
future peace talks. Germany had to make immediate use of the advantage
that the Russian surrender gave.
Source 13.16
A photograph from 1917 showing German military leaders Paul von Hindenburg (in the pale coat) and Erich Ludendorff (left) reviewing troops in 1917
Source 13.16
A photograph from 1917 showing German military leaders Paul von Hindenburg (in the pale coat) and Erich Ludendorff (left) reviewing troops in 1917
Retrospective302
Despite the loss of thousands of lives on the Western Front during 1917, the
military position had changed very little. Ludendorff moved for an all-out
bid for victory by launching an enormous offensive in the west. The German
divisions freed from the east could now be deployed to the Western Front.
The German plan of attack was designed to draw Allied forces away from the
Channel ports that were the lifeline of British supplies, capture the ports and
then destroy Allied communications. In the spring of 1918, General Luden-
dorff launched the offensive that could provide Germany with the break-
through to victory.
The 52 German divisions in the east that transferred to the Western
Front provided the numerical superiority on the ground that German
forces needed. Ludendorff knew that the American forces could bring an
additional one million soldiers to France during 1918. In the early spring of
1918, the reinforcements from America were only just beginning to arrive.
The American presence would be catastrophic unless Germany acted rapidly.
Britain and its allies were vulnerable as the offensives of 1917 continued to
take a heavy toll.
Source 13.17
Map showing the Western Front in 1918 and the Channel ports that Germany aimed to
capture
Sein
e
Somme
Aisne
Oise
River
River
River
River
River
Marne
Boulogne
Calais
Ostend
Paris
Brussels
Reims
Compiegne
Cantigny
Ypres
Verdun
Arras
Loos
St r
ai t
of
Do v e r
B E L G I U M
GREAT
BRITAIN
LUXEMBOURG
F R A N C E
0 50 100 km
N
German advanceby mid–1918
SOURCE QUESTION
Where were the Channel ports located and why do you think they became so
important to Germany’s military objectives in 1918?
Chapter 13 W Turning points 303
The Kaiser’s BattleGeneral Ludendorff named the Spring Offensive on the Western Front
Kaiserschlacht — the ‘Kaiser’s Battle’. The military objective was to drive a
wedge between the British and French armies by launching the massive
German assault on Anglo–French lines. The German plan was to force
the British back to the Channel coast and then take Paris. Ludendorff was
looking for an opportunity for Germany to achieve its territorial demands
— the control of Belgium and north-eastern France.
There were two key elements to the German assault:
rapid surprise attacks of ‘storm units’, small squads of elite shock troops
the Feuerwalze, intensive and overwhelming artillery and infantry
bombardment of the enemy command and communications, artillery
and front line; reserves were used to exploit the gap created by
creeping barrage.
Hindenburg thought a victory would lift morale at home, raise the people above
their ‘sullen brooding’. Hindenburg didn’t know much about people either. Those
in Berlin and Munich were supposed to look at their sickly children, their cold
hearths, the turnips on the dinner table, the photograph of the dead son on the
mantelpiece, and take heart that Hindenburg had made a lunge for Paris or the
Channel ports. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, one suspects, thought a victory
would create a momentum of its own. There didn’t seem to be much more to their
strategy than that . . .
Ludendorff decided late in January on a scheme called ‘Michael’. The Germans
would attack on a long front between St Quentin in the south and Arras in the
north, across the old Somme battlefield. The original idea was not, as some
thought, to go for Amiens and then on to the coast. Having broken through, the
Germans would turn right and push the British north, presumably all the way to
the Channel ports. It was rather like Haig’s plan for the Somme in 1916 in reverse.
But the German attack was much more ambitious: the front was to be about fifty
miles, around three times longer than Haig’s of 1916. Ludendorff was going to
direct the battle himself. He set up an advanced headquarters behind Cambrai. He
wanted to be where he could easily reach the front by car. The attack would open
on March 21.
Ludendorff told the Kaiser in mid-February: ‘We must not imagine that this
offensive will be like those in Galicia or Italy; it will be an immense struggle that
will begin at one point, continue at another, and take a long time; it is difficult, but
it will be victorious . . .’
Les Carlyon, The Great War, Pan Macmillan Australia, Sydney, 2006, p. 543.
SOURCE QUESTIONS
Read source 13.18 and answer the following questions.
1. What does the writer suggest was the feeling among the German public about
the forthcoming ‘lunge for Paris and the Channel ports’?
2. What did Hindenburg and Ludendorff hope the Spring Offensive would achieve?
3. Briefly explain the strategy behind Operation Michael.
4. What might be the shortcomings of Operation Michael?
W
W
creeping barrage W�the use of a wall of artillery fire immediately in front of the advancing infantry. As the artillery gunners moved forward to destroy enemy trenches, the infantry, following behind, was ready to take control of a trench once the artillery fire had ceased.
creeping barrage W�the use of a wall of artillery fire immediately in front of the advancing infantry. As the artillery gunners moved forward to destroy enemy trenches, the infantry, following behind, was ready to take control of a trench once the artillery fire had ceased.
Source 13.18
Historian Les Carlyon describes
the mood in Germany in 1918
and Ludendorff’s plan to break
the British and French forces
Source 13.18
Historian Les Carlyon describes
the mood in Germany in 1918
and Ludendorff’s plan to break
the British and French forces
perspective
purpose
perspective
purpose
Retrospective304
Operation Michael, March 1918
Ludendorff launched his offensive with an initial attack, codenamed ‘Michael’.
It began with great shattering explosions at several points along the Allied
lines on 21 March 1918. A barrage of 6000 heavy guns and 30 000 mortars
commenced the offensive. Over two million poison gas shells were fired
during the operation. The weather also came to Germany’s aid on the first
day. When the mustard gas was released, Allied troops were confused even
further by a heavy fog. Five hours after the initial bombardment, and under
the cover of the thick fog, the German infantry moved into the territory held
by the Allies. Small squads of mobile shock troops, with flame throwers and
trench mortars, directed rapid surprise attacks at the Allied front line.
By the end of the first day, 21 000 British soldiers were prisoners of the
Germans. The British and French forces were rapidly driven back. With the
Allied retreat, huge columns of troops were on the move, trudging west
with their wagonloads of wounded. Allied communications had also broken
down and the Allied command was in disarray. In desperation, British Prime
Minister Lloyd George telegraphed US President Woodrow Wilson
requesting American troops to assist the British fighting force. The American
President agreed.
By the end of the first four days of the German attack, the German troops
had crossed the old Somme battlefield, nearly divided British and French
forces at the Front and taken 45 000 Allied prisoners. On the fifth day, the
British rallied and took the Germans by surprise when they launched a
number of small counter-attacks.
Source 13.19
A photograph showing
German troops advancing
towards the Allies’ front line near
Villers-Bretonneux in March 1918
Source 13.19
A photograph showing
German troops advancing
towards the Allies’ front line near
Villers-Bretonneux in March 1918
SOURCE QUESTION
Consider the battle scene
in source 13.19 then write
a short newspaper report to
accompany the photograph.
In your report, explain the
sequence of events that
began with the launching
of Operation Michael,
and the Allied response.
SOURCE QUESTION
Consider the battle scene
in source 13.19 then write
a short newspaper report to
accompany the photograph.
In your report, explain the
sequence of events that
began with the launching
of Operation Michael,
and the Allied response.
Chapter 13 W Turning points 305
By the tenth day of the Spring Offensive, the Germans had smashed the
British Fifth Army under the command of Sir Hubert Gough, regained all
the ground they had lost on the Somme, taken 90 000 prisoners and cap-
tured 1300 guns. Germans forces gained more ground than at any other time
during the war.
The inspirational French general, Ferdinand Foch, was appointed com-
mander in chief of the Allied armies on 26 March 1918. The German Offen-
sive had inadvertently brought about a unified command of the Allied forces.
Foch took control and issued the instruction: ‘We must stop where we are
now. As we have not been able to stop the Germans at the Somme, we must
not retire a single centimetre!’
Operation Michael was followed by four more offensives.
Second Offensive: Operation Georgette, April 1918This was a 16-kilometre German advance in Flanders, east of the River Lys.
Germany used massive artillery power to attack British divisions holding the
fronts of the First and Second Armies in Flanders. In the first day, German
forces pushed approximately six kilometres into Allied territory.
The British position was desperate and, on 11 April 1918, General Haig
appealed to his soldiers: ‘There is no other course open to us but to fight it
out!’. After three weeks of bitter fighting, the British denied German access to
the Channel ports of Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk.
In the 40 days of fighting, the first two offensives of 1918 had resulted in over
700 000 casualties. The German advance stalled when its flank was exposed
and the Allies launched a joint British, French, American, Canadian and
ANZAC counterattack. General Ludendorff called off Georgette on 29 April.
Third Offensive: Operation Blucher-Yorck, May 1918The Third Offensive aimed to take the French forces located in the Chemin
des Dames sector of Champagne. The German advance met no resistance
because it took the French by surprise. British and French front line forces
were bombarded by howitzer and mortar fire and high explosives laced with
gas. On 30 May, at the Battle of the Aisne, the Germans drove the French back
32 kilometres to the banks of the River Marne.
The German advance was halted by 6 June with the assistance of fresh
American reinforcements. The total number of American personnel in France
in March was 284 000; by July it had risen to over one million; by November
there were nearly 2 million Americans in France. US troops provided new
sources of manpower that could not be matched by Germany and its allies.
American troops were being transported to France on board the former ocean
liner Aquitania. With every trans-Atlantic voyage, another 15 000 American
reinforcements arrived in France.
Fourth Offensive: Operation Gneisenau, June 1918Operation Gneisenau commenced with artillery fire on 9 June. The French
were prepared for the attack due to information they had gathered from
German prisoners. The German army took 8000 prisoners within the first day
and managed to advance over 12 kilometres. Despite having gained ground,
the Germans achieved no strategic objective and the pace of the offensive
slowed. At Compiègne, a French counterattack caught the Germans by sur-
prise and signalled the end of Operation Gneisenau on 12 June.
See page 309 to read the
full text of General Haig’s
‘Order of the Day’.
See page 309 to read the
full text of General Haig’s
‘Order of the Day’.
flank W�the extreme left or right wing of an army or fleet, or the subdivision of an army or fleet
flank W�the extreme left or right wing of an army or fleet, or the subdivision of an army or fleet
Retrospective306
Fifth Offensive: Operation Friedensturm, July 1918
Launched on 15 July in the Champagne region, the Fifth Offensive began with
the firing of 9000 tonnes of gas. At one of the main attack points, the French
General, Henri Pétain, had set up a line of unmanned trenches. The Germans
directed much of their gas attack against this line. Manned trenches located
further back were untouched by the bombardment. Fierce resistance and
counterattack by French and American forces halted the German advance.
On 18 July, Foch launched an attack along a 43-kilometre front that sent the
German army into full retreat. The Allies had broken the German line and
took 20 000 German prisoners.
SOURCE QUESTIONS
1. In what way is source 13.20 evidence of the ‘turning point’ in the war?
2. How significant do you think technology, such as the tank featured in source
13.20, was in changing the course of the war?
Read more about the evolution of the tank by accessing the website for this book
and clicking on the Tanks in World War I weblink for this chapter.
The Allied responseBy the end of July 1918, Germany’s Spring Offensive had failed. The Allies had
developed a number of defensive strategies in response to the German tactics.
The proportion of Allied troops on the front line had been reduced, with the
bulk of the fighting force located beyond German artillery range. The front
line became an outpost zone that was primarily defended by snipers and
machine gun posts. Behind the front line positions lay the ‘battle zone’, the
point at which the greatest resistance to the assault lay. The reserves of the
‘rear zone’ were ready to counterattack and push back any force that broke
through the battle zone.
Source 13.20
A photograph of one of the
powerful and manoeuvrable
British Mark IV tanks poised to
cross a ridge near German
positions, 1917–18
Source 13.20
A photograph of one of the
powerful and manoeuvrable
British Mark IV tanks poised to
cross a ridge near German
positions, 1917–18
snipers W�marksmen who waited in hiding for opportunities to shoot soldiers in the opposing trenches
snipers W�marksmen who waited in hiding for opportunities to shoot soldiers in the opposing trenches
Chapter 13 W Turning points 307
After the Kaiser’s Battle had yielded Germany large territorial gains, the
front line moved every day until Germany was within striking range of
Paris. The German armies had stood on the banks of the River Marne and
struck fear into the heart of France. Despite this huge and brilliant victory,
Germany failed to breach the Allied front. Ludendorff had gambled every-
thing on attaining the strategic objective of a quick victory.
When Germany launched its final great offensive on 15 July, Ludendorff’s
army was already depleted and near exhaustion. In the space of the following
six months, the ranks of the German army fell from 5.1 million fighting men
to 4.2 million. To cover the losses they had to endure, the German High
Command required 200 000 new recruits every month. Germany could not
provide the manpower or maintain the supply of provisions required to
support the military advances. Germany lost the initiative.
Despite the terrible losses, the Allied forces had not been broken. After
the four years of this relentless war, the Allies had managed to hold on in
the face of the onslaught. With the arrival of the American reinforcements,
the Allies could absorb their losses. The greater numbers combined with
superior equipment to produce a formidable Anglo–French force. As we will
see in chapter 14, as the Spring Offensive moved into summer, the balance of
war finally shifted.
Tanks, which used to be objects of ridicule, have become a major weapon. They
come rolling forward in a long line, heavily armoured, and they embody the
horror of war for us more than anything else.
We cannot see the gun batteries that are bombarding us, and the oncoming
waves of enemy attackers are human beings just like we are — but tanks are
machines, and their caterpillar tracks run on as endlessly as the war itself.
They spell out annihilation when they roll without feeling into the shell holes
and then climb out again, inexorably, a fleet of steel beasts that crush the dead
and the wounded. Before these we shrivel down into our thin skins, in the face
of their colossal force our arms are like straws and our handgrenades are
like matches . . .
The months drag on. The summer of 1918 is the bloodiest and the hardest
. . . Everyone knows that we are losing the war. Nobody talks about it much. We
are retreating. We won’t be able to attack again after this massive offensive. We
have no more men and no more ammunition . . .
Summer 1918. Never has life at the front been more bitter and more full of
horror than when we are under fire, when the pallid faces are pressed into the
mud and the fists are clenched and your whole being is saying, No! No! No, not
now! Not now at the very last minute! . . .
There are so many airmen here, and they are so skilful that they can hunt
down individuals like rabbits. For every German aircraft there are five British
or American ones. For every hungry, tired German soldier in the trenches there
are five strong, fresh men on the enemy side. For every German army-issue loaf
there are fifty cans of beef over there. We haven’t been defeated, because as
soldiers we are better and more experienced; we have simply been crushed and
pushed back by forces many times superior to ours . . .
Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front, translated from the German by Brian Murdoch, Vintage, London, 1996, pp. 198–201.
Source 13.21
Extracts from the novel All Quiet
on the Western Front by German
soldier Erich Maria Remarque,
describing the failure of the
Spring Offensive from the
German perspective
Source 13.21
Extracts from the novel All Quiet
on the Western Front by German
soldier Erich Maria Remarque,
describing the failure of the
Spring Offensive from the
German perspective
SOURCE QUESTION
As an 18 year old, German soldier Erich Remarque was sent to the Western Front. How does his source 13.21 account, from his novel All
Quiet on the Western Front, contribute to our understanding of:
(a) what had happened to the armies of 1917 and 1918
(b) why Germany was ultimately defeated?
SOURCE QUESTION
As an 18 year old, German soldier Erich Remarque was sent to the Western Front. How does his source 13.21 account, from his novel All
Quiet on the Western Front, contribute to our understanding of:
(a) what had happened to the armies of 1917 and 1918
(b) why Germany was ultimately defeated?
Retrospective308 Retrospective308
HSC exam practiceQuestion 1 (5 marks) Marks
(a) Which group is referred to as ‘Pershing’s Crusaders’ in the source A poster? 2
(b) Using source C, explain in what way the war on the British front changed
in March and April 1918. 2
(c) From the information provided in source D, explain what General Haig considered
to be the German military objective and the necessary Allied military response. 1
Question 2 (10 marks)
How signifi cant was the entry of America into the war in preparing the way for Allied victory?
Use sources A and B and your own knowledge to answer this question.
Question 3 (10 marks)
Assess how useful sources C and D would be for historians studying the impact of the Spring
Offensive on the course of the war and why it was regarded as a ‘turning point’ in World War I.
In your answer, consider the perspectives provided by the TWO sources and the reliability of each one.
Source A
A US poster for the 1918 war fi lm
Pershing’s Crusaders
Source B
Captain T. Helby of the Royal Garrison
Artillery recalls the events of 1918
In March 1918 our retreat had taken
us straight across a series of the old
Somme trenches. These had been
bridged by the Sappers with temporary
wooden bridges of doubtful strength
and just wide enough to take the gun
wheels. Any mistake at one of these
bridges would have been disastrous
— for a gun wheel dropped in a trench
would have blocked the whole road.
However, with the Hun behind us
and perhaps not too far at that, the
driving was superb. No body, nor horse,
put a foot wrong. But when we were
advancing across the Canal du Nord
in September our route went across
a large open fi eld in which there was
one solitary shell hole. One of the guns
managed to put a wheel into that shell
hole! Such is the difference between
withdrawing with a threat of a German
bayonet behind you and advancing
against crumbling opposition.
Quoted in L. Macdonald, 1914–1918:
Voices and Images of the Great War,
Michael Joseph Ltd, London, 1988, p. 283.
309Chapter 3 W Yankees and Confederates in the American states in the mid nineteenth centuryChapter 13 W Turning points 309
Source C
Extracts from Les Carlyon’s The Great War describing the impact of Operation Michael on Allied
forces
The last days of March and the fi rst days of April [1918] were strange times on the British
front. Not since 1914 had the war been so errant, so confused. The era of trench stalemate,
its certainties and rituals, had passed. The frontline now changed by the hour. In many
places there was no such thing, just lines of outposts. In the morning they were here and
in the evening they were there; they were hardly ever where the generals thought they
were. Haig’s army had prided itself on its orderliness. In the last days of March many of
the divisions that faced Ludendorff’s onslaught lived in chaos and listened to rumours.
Formations south of the river were hopelessly mixed up. Gough’s 5th Army — what
was left of it — had become Rawlinson’s 4th Army. Enterprising offi cers would cobble up
scratch ‘divisions’ from labour companies, lost infantrymen, railway workers, walking
wounded, the odd American and passing cavalrymen carrying lances . . .
Les Carlyon, The Great War, Pan Macmillan Australia, Sydney, 2006, p. 579.
Source D
Order of the day, from British Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig to all the British Forces in France,
dated 11 April 1918
Three weeks ago today the enemy began his terrifi c attacks against us on a fi fty-mile front.
His objects are to separate us from the French, to take the Channel ports and destroy the
British Army.
In spite of throwing already 106 divisions into the battle and enduring the most reckless
sacrifi ce of human life, he has as yet made little progress towards his goals.
We owe this to the determined fi ghting and self-sacrifi ce of our troops. Words fail me to
express the admiration which I feel for the splendid resistance offered by all ranks of our
Army under the most trying circumstances.
Many amongst us now are tired. To those I would say that victory will belong to the
side which holds out the longest. The French army is moving rapidly and in great force to
our support.
There is no other course open to us but to fi ght it out! Every position must be held to
the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the
justice of our cause, each one of us must fi ght on to the end. The safety of our homes and
the freedom of mankind alike depend on the conduct of each one of us at this
critical moment.
Signed D. Haig F.M.
Commander-in-Chief
British Armies in France