Turino, Thomas_Signs, Imagination, And Experience. a Peircian Semiotic Theory for Music

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1/36

Signs of Imagination, Identity, and Experience: A Peircian Semiotic Theory for MusicAuthor(s): Thomas TurinoSource: Ethnomusicology, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring - Summer, 1999), pp. 221-255Published by: University of Illinois Presson behalf of Society for EthnomusicologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/852734.

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2/36

VOL.

43,

NO.

2 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY

SPRING/SUMMER

999

Signs

of

Imagination,

Identity,

and

Experience:

A Peircian Semiotic

Theory

for

Music

THOMASTURINO / University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

People

in

many

societies

intuitively

recognize

the

emotional

power

of

music

in

their

personal,

family,

and

community

life.

If

ethnomusicolo-

gists

have

come to

agree

on

anything

over the last decade

it

is that music

is a

key

resource

for

realizing

personal

and collective identities

which,

in

turn,

are

crucial for

social,

political,

and economic

participation.

These

ob-

servations

are

integrally

related,

and

they

form

the basis of the

central

ques-

tion for musicology: "Whymusic?"

Like the

habitus,

identities are at once individual and

social;

they

are

the affective intersection

of

life

experiences

variably

salient in

any

given

instance.

Identity

is

comprised

of what we know best about our relations

to

self,

others,

and the

world,

and

yet

is often constituted

of

the

things

we

are least able to

talk

about.

Identity

is

grounded

in

multiple

ways

of know-

ing

with affective and direct

experiential

knowledge

often

being

paramount.

The crucial link between

identity

formation and arts like music lies in the

specific

semiotic character of these activities which make

them

particular-

ly affective and direct ways of knowing.

Recent scholars of

ethnomusicology

have

succeeded

in

illustrating

the

intimate interfaces of sound

structures,

social

structures,

and

identity

(e.g.

Seeger

1980,

1986;

Pefia

1985;

Feld

1988;

Pacini Hernandez

1995;

Sugar-

man

1997).

It seems to me that the

challenge

for the next

generation

is

to

develop

a

theory

of

music in relation to what

is

usually

called

"emotion"-

our

inadequate

gloss

for that mammoth

realm

of human

experience

that

falls outside

language-based

thinking

and communication. Such

a

theory

is

necessary

if

we are to move

beyond

mere

description

of

the central

roles

music and dance play in collective events ranging from spirit possession

ceremonies,

mass nationalist

rallies,

and

weddings,

to

the teen dances tak-

ing

place

on a

Friday

night.

?

1999

by

the Board of Trustees

of

the

University

of Illinois

221

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3/36


4/36

Turino:

A

Peircian

Semiotic

Theory

for

Music

223

Figure

1.

Sign or Representamen = Something actually

functioning

as a

sign.

Interpretant

= Object

= What

the sign

What the

sign

creates in the

observer;

stands

for.

the effect

the

sign

has

in/on

the

observer,

including feeling

and

sensation,

physical

reaction,

as

well

as

ideas articulated

and

processed

in

language.

Some

Basic

Principles

1. There can be an infinite unfolding of signs in the mind, a kind of chaining process.

2.

Thirds include Seconds

and

Firsts;

Seconds include

Firsts;

Firsts can

only

determine a

First

(whatever

is a Third determines a

Third,

or

degenerately

a

Second or

a

First,

etc.).

3.

A

fully developed

general

purpose

language

must have

icons,

indices,

and

symbols,

accord-

ing

to Peirce.

Semiosis

involves a

type

of

chaining

process

through

time in which the

interpretant

at one

temporal

stage

becomes

the

sign

for a new

object

at the

next

stage

of

semiosis,

creating

a

new

interpretant

which becomes the next

sign

in

the

next

instant,

ad infinitum until that "train

of

thought"

is inter-

rupted by

another chain of

thought,

or

by

arriving

at a

belief or conclusion.

In

each

instant in the

chain,

the

new

sign

stands for

a

new

object

creating

a new

interpretant-multiple

examples

of this

process

will be

provided

in

what

follows.

Contrasting

with

general

postmodernist

views,

in

Peircian

theory

signs

are neither unmoored from the

objects they signify,

nor are

signs

necessarily only

linked to other

signs.4

Both these

ideas,

derived from

Saussure's

problematic

binary conception

of

linguistic signs,

collapse

the

basic

triadic character of

semiosis

and

the different

moments of semiotic

chaining-that is,

how

sign-object

relations at one

stage

create

a

distinct

effect

(interpretant)

which becomes the

sign

at

the next

stage

in the chain

(Peirce 1991:239).

Peirce

emphasized

that

a

sign

is

not

a

self-evident idea

or

entity

but is the

catalyst

for an effect.

As

conceptualized

within

Peircian

semiotics,

"chains

of

semiosis"

move

between

particularly sensory

and direct

types

of

signs

and effects

to

those



5/36

224

Ethnomusicology,

Spring/Summer

1999

that

are mediated

by

language

(Peirce

1991:70-75).

It

is

my

thesis that

the

power of musicto createemotionalresponsesand to realizepersonaland

social

identities is

based in

the fact

that

musical

signs

are

typically

of

the

direct,

less-mediated

type.

Music

involves

signs

of

feeling

and

experience

rather

than the

types

of

mediational

signs

that are

about

something

else.

Interpretants

and

the

Mind-Body

Dichotomy

Moving

past

the

inadequate

Cartesian

mind-body

and

emotions-thought

dichotomies,

there are

three basic

kinds of

dynamic

interpretants5-three

general

classes

of effects

created

by sign-object

relations

(e.g.

Peirce

1958:393;

1960:5.475;

see

Fitzgerald

1966:71-90).

Peirce called the

first

type

an

emotional

interpretant,

a

direct,

unreflected-upon

feeling

caused

by

a

sign.

Since other

types

of

interpretants

can

also involve

emotion,

this

term

is

confusing;

sense,

feeling,

or

sentiment

interpretant

might

be clos-

er

to

Peirce's idea.

The

second

type

is an

energetic interpretant,

a

physi-

cal

reaction caused

by

a

sign,

be it

unnoticed

foot

tapping

to

music,

an

accelerated

heartbeat

from a

police

siren,

or

unreflexively

drawing

a

finger

back

from a hot

stove.

The third

type

is a

sign-interpretant,

that

is,

a

lin-

guistic-basedconcept.

All

three

interpretanttypes

involve

signs

and all

three

involve

perception

and mental

activity.

This

framework thus

gives

us tools

for

describing

different

types

of mental

activity,

or

"thought,"

be it

language-

based or

not,

and

hence eschews

the strict

mind-body dichotomy

as it

has

typically

been

conceptualized.6

Moreover,

for

Peirce,

the

concept

of mean-

ing,

a

long-debated

problem

in

regard

to

musical

meaning,

is

pragmatical-

ly

simplified by

defining

it as the

actual

effect of a

sign,

that

is,

the

direct

feeling,

physical

reaction,

or

language-based

concept

inspired

in

the

per-

ceiver

by

a musical

sign

(Peirce

1955:30-36).

When a

Tree

Falls

in

the

Forest

The

first

step

in

semiotic

analysis

is to

determine what is the

sign,

what

is

the

object,

what is

the

effect,

and to

whom,

in

any

instance.

While

seem-

ingly

simple,

this

basic

step

is

often

overlooked

leading

to the

postmodernist

conflation

mentioned earlier.

A

fundamental

premise

in

the

Peircian frame-

work

is that a

sign

has

to create

an

effect,

an

interpretant,

within a

living

being;

this

precludes

abstract

assigning

of

meanings,

and in fact

the

hypo-

thetical

manufacturing

of

signs

and

objects

in social

analysis.

When

a

tree

falls in the forest it creates waves through the air, a potential sign, but the

waves do not

function as a

sign

unless

there is

someone there to be

affect-

ed

by

them.

Likewise,

musical

signs

are sonic

events that

create an effect

in a

perceiver;

not

everything

happening

in

music

necessarily

functions as

signs

all

the

time

(something might

not be

apprehended,

might

not

cause



6/36

Turino:

A

Peircian Semiotic

Theory for

Music

225

an

effect).

But within the Peircian framework

if

aspects

of music

create

an

effect,

signs

are

necessarily

involved. In this

context,

ethnography

becomes

crucial to

social

and musical semiotic

analysis

since it allows us

to

identify

what

the

signs

are,

in relation to

what

object,

for

whom,

and

in

which

ways.

Peircian

Categories

for

Signs

and

Sign-Object-Interpretant

Relationships

Peirce

developed

three trichotomies

of

concepts

for

analyzing

differ-

ent

aspects

of a

sign

and distinct

types

of

relationships

between the three

basic components of semiosis: sign-object-interpretant. Combining one

component

from

each

of the three trichotomies

to more

fully comprehend

the nature

of a

given sign,

Peirce arrived

at

ten basic

sign

types

(e.g.

Peirce

1955:98-119;

1991:23-33;1958:390-393; 1960:2.43-2.308).

These

range

from

signs

that

produce

particularly

direct

effects without need for the

mediation of

linguistically-based

thought,

to

signs,

objects,

and

interpret-

ants

grounded

in

language.

I

will

first

go

through

all the

concepts briefly

and

then return to those

that

have the

most

potential

for

explaining

mu-

sic's

power

to

create

affect and

forge

social identities.

Trichotomy

I:

The

Sign

Itself

The

first

trichotomy

involves the nature of the

sign

itself

(see

Fig.2).

Every

chain

of

semiosis

begins

with the

qualisign:

a

pure

quality

embed-

ded in a

sign

such as

redness,

or

the

quality

of a

particular

musical

sound,

or the

quality

of

a harmonic

or melodic relation. This

aspect

helps

deter-

mine

the

identity

and semiotic

potential

of

the

sign.

The

second

concept

in

Trichotomy

I

is

the

sinsign

which is the actual

specific

instance of a

sign,

e.g.,

each individual

appearance

of the word 'the' on this

page

or

the

red-

ness of a

particular

rose. The third term is the

legisign

which is the

sign

as

a

general

type,

e.g.,

"The Star

Spangled

Banner"

as a

piece apart

from

any

given

performance

of

it,

or the word 'the'

apart

from

any

instance

of

it,

or

the

concept

of "the color

red."

Both

qualisigns

and

legisigns

are

dependent

on

actual realizations

(the

sinsign),

just

as

any

realization

is

dependent

on the

qualities

of the

sign

(qualisigns)

which

allow us to

apprehend

it.

Particularly

important,

the

social

meaning

of a

given

instance of a

sign

is also informed

by

its

belong-

ing

to

general

nested classes

of

phenomena

(legisigns).

Thus,

the

effects

of a

given

performance

of the "Star

Spangled

Banner"

sinsign)

are informed

by

being

related to the

piece

as

a

general

class

(legisign)

so

that

we

recog-

nize

it

and relate it

to

former

hearings.

"The

Star

Spangled

Banner" s

also

nested within other

general

classes of

phenomena

such as 'American na-

tionalistic

music,'

and

'music';

these are other

potential

legisigns

for a

giv-



7/36

226

Ethnomusicology, Spring/Summer

1999

Figure

2.

Trichotomy

I: of the

sign

itself.

1.

Qualisign

(tone)

2.

Sinsign

(token)

Sign

3.

Legisign

(type)

Trichotomy

m:

of the

way

a

sign

is

interpreted

as

Trichotomy

II:

of the relation

representing

its

object.

between

sign

and

object.

1.

Rheme

1. Icon

2.

Dicent

-

2. Index

3.

Argument

3.

Symbol

Interpretant Object

1.

emotional

1.

Immediate

object

=

"the

object

as the

interpretant signrepresents t-contained within

Dynamical

Interpretant

2.

energetic

the

sign."

interpretant

2.

Dynamical

bject

=

the

object

outside

3.

a

"sign"

the sign; "the reality

which by some

means contrives

to

determine

the

sign."

Note:

The

sign

must indicate

the

dynamical

object by

a

"hint,"

and

this

hint

(contained

within the

sign)

is the

immediate

object.

en

performance.

As

socially-relative

categories

by

which

phenomena

are

conceptually grouped,

legisigns

are

a

foundational

aspect

of

culture.

Trichotomy

II:

Sign-Object

Relations

Peirce's

second

trichotomy

of

concepts,

involving

the

icon,

index,

and

symbol, specifies

three

ways

that the

sign

and

object

are related

in

a

perceiv-

er.

This

is

the

aspect

of

Peirce's work that has

received

the

most attention.

The term

icon refers to

a

sign

that is related

to

its

object

through

some

type of resemblance between them. The degree, basis, and even accuracy

of

resemblance is not so much at issue as the

fact

that resemblance

calls

forth

the

object

when

perceiving

the

sign.

Thus,

if a literal

musical

quota-

tion or

even

the

vaguest

trace of another

piece

brings

that

piece

to

mind,

iconicity

is

involved-the

experienced quotation

or

trace is

the

sinsign,

the



8/36

Turino:

A

Peircian Semiotic

Theory for

Music

227

piece

as

general

class

(legisign)

is the

object.

Motivic

unity

and most

aspects

of musical form operate iconically. This much is obvious. More important-

ly,

common

musical devices

such as a

rising

melodic

line,

accelerando,

and

crescendo

may

create tension

and

excitement in

a

listener because

they

sound like

so

many

human voices we have heard

rising

in

pitch, speed,

and

volume when the

speaker

becomes excited. For most

listeners,

such

signs

are

typically

not

processed

in

terms

of

language-based thought

but are sim-

ply

felt

because of

a

direct

identity

established

by

resemblance between

the musical

signs

and other

expressions

of

excitement.

Peirce

suggests

three

types

of icons: an

image,

a

diagram,

and a met-

aphor (1955:104-105). In an image, the sign-object relation is based in sim-

ple

qualities

shared;

a musical "trace" or

quote

in

one

piece calling

forth

another

piece

would

be of this

type,

as are

most musical icons. A

diagram

involves

analogous

relations

of the

parts

between

sign

and

object

as the

ba-

sis

of

similarity

between

them;

a

map

is

of

this

type.

In

metaphors,

juxta-

posed

linguistic signs,

which are not

iconically

related

to their

objects

or

to each

other,

posit

some

parallelism

or

similarity

between the

objects

of

the

signs-e.g.,

"A mountain of a man"

suggests

that 'the

man'

is

'large,'

'hard,'

or

'durable.'

The

concept

of

metaphor

has become

popular

in

an-

thropology and ethnomusicology to denote iconicity in general and even

other

types

of semiotic

relations.7

Often

lacking

clear

definition,

the term

has lost its

usefulness

for semiotic and cultural

analysis

whereas,

as with

Peirce's other

formulations,

his definition of

metaphor

more

precisely pin-

points

what is

going

on

semiotically.

The second

concept

in

Trichotomy

II

is index which

refers to

a

sign

that is

related to

its

object

through

co-occurrence in actual

experience.

Smoke

can

serve

as

an index of

fire,

a

TV

show's theme

song

can come to

serve as an index for the

program,

a

V7-I

progression

may

index

musical

closure in European societies, the "StarSpangled Banner"may serve as an

index for

baseball

games,

Fourth of

July

parades,

school

assemblies,

or

imperialism depending

on the

experiences

of the

perceiver.

The

power

of

indices derives from the fact that the

sign-object

relations are

based

in

co-

occurrences

within

one's own

life

experiences,

and thus

become

intimately

bound as

experience.

Peirce uses the term

symbol

in

a

particular

way

that

differs,

and must

be

actively

divorced,

from

standard

usage.8

The Peircian

symbol

is

a

sign

that

is

related to its

object

through

the

use of

language

rather

than

being

fully dependent on iconicity or indexicality. Symbols are themselves of a

general

type

(legisigns)

whose

objects

are

also

general

classes

of

phenom-

ena

(Peirce 1955:102).

Most

linguistic signs-words-are

symbols,9

and

language

is

the

only

semiotic mode

that,

in

and of

itself,

has

symbolic

ca-

pability.10

Language

also uses iconic and indexical

processes

but it is

par-



9/36

228

Ethnomusicology,

Spring/Summer

1999

ticularly

in

propositional speech,

and in the

semantico-referential

functions

of language (i.e., language used to refer to and define other parts of lan-

guage)

where its

symbolic capacities

differentiate

it

radically

from other

semiotic modes

like

music.

After the

early

stages

of

language

acquisition,

we

learn

the

objects

of

words

through

linguistic

explanations,

those

objects

being general

concepts

which are also articulated

through

symbols.

For

example

when we

explain

that 'a cat

is

a

furry

animal,'

both

'furry'

and 'animal' are

general

language-

bound

concepts.

We can

experience

what the

feeling

of

furriness is

by

patting

an actual

cat,

but we can not

designate

the

general feeling

without

symbols anymore than we can reproduce the sensation through them. The

symbolic

function of

language

is what

allows

us

to think

in,

and

express,

generalities.

Yet because

they

are

mediational

signs

which

do not resem-

ble,

or

can be

removed from

direct connections with their

objects, sym-

bols can

not

reproduce

the

feelings

and

experiences

of those

objects. Sym-

bols are

signs

about other

things,

whereas icons

and indices are

signs of

identity

(resemblance,

commonality)

and direct

connections.

Whereas the

meanings

of indices are

dependent

on the

experiences

of

the

perceiver,

and thus can be

quite

fluid

and

varied,

the

meanings

of

sym-

bols are relativelyfixed through social agreement.Dictionaries,mathbooks,

and Morse Code manuals document the conventional

meanings

of

symbols.

If

symbols

are to serve their

special

function of

signification

in

general,

relatively

context-free,

ways,

their

meanings

must

be

basically

fixed and

agreed

upon,

or,

as in this

paper,

(linguistic)

arguments

must

be

made for

why

their

meanings

should

be

altered

or refined. Icons and indices have

distinct semiotic functions and

operate differently.

For the most

part,

musical sounds that

function as

signs

operate

at

the

iconic

and indexical

levels.

The

sound

of

a

particular

Indian

raga

x

may

become a symbol for 'morning' (object) if the relationship is established

in

general

terms

through language

as,

for

example,

through

verbal

expla-

nation

in

an American

classroom,

and

if,

upon

hearing raga

x

subsequent-

ly,

a

student thinks the

general

concept

'morning.'

But note that

in

the initial

setting

up

of this

relationship,

the

sound

of the

raga

was

the

object

of

lin-

guistic signs

referring

to

the music and

linking

it

to

the

general

concept

of

a

given

time

of

day.

More

typically,

musical

sign-object

relations are estab-

lished without the

mediation

of

symbols.

When

growing up

in

India

if a

young

girl

frequently

heard

a

particular

set

of musical sounds

(raga

x)

be-

ing played in the morning over the radio in her home, she might come to

experience

the

sensation

of

'morning'

or

'home,'

or

myriad

other

things

indexed

by

the

sounds when

hearing

them

later in life.

The affective

potential

of

signs

is

highly dependent

on

the

manner in

which the

sign

and

object

are linked. The

wealth as well

as

depth

of asso-



10/36

Turino:

A Peircian Semiotic

Theory

for

Music

229

ciations

with

raga

x are

likely

to

be

quite

different

for the Indian

girl grow-

ing up with it because of the number and variety of indexical associations,

as

compared

to the American student

studying

the

raga

largely

through

propositional

and


speech

in

a

given

class. Indices are

experienced

as

"real"

because

they

are

rooted,

often

redundantly,

in one's

own

life

experiences

and,

as

memory,

become the actual mortarof

personal

and social

identity.

When

given

indices

are tied to the affective

foundations

of ones

personal

or communal

life-home,

family,

childhood,

a

lover,

war

experiences--they

have

special

potential

for

creating

direct

emotional ef-

fects

because

they

are often

unreflexively apprehended

as

"real"

or "true"

parts of the experiences signified. By contrast, symbols are general, medi-

ational

signs

about

rather than

of

the

experiences

they express.

Trichotomy

III:

How the

Sign

Is

Interpreted

Peirce's third

trichotomy--rheme,

dicent,

and

argument--involves

the

way

a

given sign

is

interpreted

as

representing

its

object.

A

rheme

is a

sign

that is

interpreted

as

representing

its

object

as a

qualitative possibility

(Peirce 1955:103).

A

rheme is

a

sign

that is

not

judged

as true or false but

as

something

that

is

simply possible.

Peirce

used the

example

that

any

sin-

gle

word,

say

common nouns like

'cat,'

'god'

'unicorn'

or

'nation,'

are

rhemes because

they

suggest

the

possibility

of these entities

without

(in

themselves)

asserting

the truth

or

falsity

of that

possibility

(1958:392).

Like-

wise,

a

painting

of

an

unknown or

imaginary

person

or scene

may

be in-

terpreted

as

a rheme.

The second

concept

in

Trichotomy

III s the

dicent.

This is a

sign

which

is

understood

to

represent

its

object

in

respect

to actual existence

(Peirce

1955:103).

The most

important

feature

here is that a dicent

is

interpreted

as

really being affected by

its

object.

A

weathervane

is a dicent-index for

'wind

direction'

(object)

because the wind

direction

actually

affects

the

position

of the weathervane

(it

is indexical because

of

co-occurrence

of

wind and

weathervane).

A

linguistic

proposition

is

a

dicent-symbol

because

the

truth of the

sign

is

interpreted

as

really

being

affected

by

the relations

of the

objects

expressed

through

symbols."

Dicent-indices

are

among

the most direct and

convincing

sign

types

because

typically they

are

interpreted

as

being

real, true,

or natural.

They

are often taken for

granted

and

apprehended

with a

part

of

our

awareness

that does not involve linguistic-based signs (i.e., at the levels of feeling or

energetic

interpretants).

The field of

kinesics--"body language"--theorized

by Gregory

Bateson

(1972),

Ray

Birdwhistell

(e.g.,

1960, 1970),

and Edward

Hall

(1977)

is

largely

the

study

of

dicent-indexical

signs.12

"Body

anguage"

is

a dicent

sign

because

it

is

interpreted

as

being

the

direct result of a

per-

son's actual attitude

(object)

and is thus

apprehended

as

actually

being



11/36

230


1999

affected

by

that

object.

Facial

expression, body

position,

and

gesture

typi-

cally create effects at the levels

of

emotional or energetic interpretants.13

It

is true that

signs

that

usually operate

as dicent-indices such as tone

of voice and

"body

language"

can be

manipulated,

for

example

by

actors,

used-car

salesmen,

politicians,

and

false lovers. In

daily

interactions,

some-

one

who

becomes

known

for

being

able to do

this, however,

is branded a

phoney.

Such

people

are

particularly

mistrusted because we are used to

taking

dicent-indices

at face value and are

especially

offended when

peo-

ple manipulate

these

types

of

signs.

The third

concept

in

Trichotomy

III is

argument,

involving

both

sym-

bolic propositions as well as the language-basedpremises upon which the

propositions

can be

interpreted

and assessed.

Argument

is

largely

within

the

propositional,


linguistic

domain and is

not

partic-

ularly

relevant to the

analysis

of musical

signs.

Rhemes and dicent

signs,

however,

are

key

to artistic

practice

and

meaning,

and I will

emphasize

these two

types

later in the discussion.

The Combination of

Components

from the Three Trichotomies

Above I have

already

begun

to illustrate how the

components

from the

three trichotomies must be

put together

to better

comprehend

the full

character of a

given sign.

Described

in

respect

to the

three

trichotomies,

a

common noun

is a

rhematic-symbolic-legisign.

It is

symbolic

because the

sign-object

relation is determined

through language

and

because

both

sign

and

object

are of a

general type.

The term

legisign

is

redundant

in this case

because all

symbols

are

legisigns.

As

explained

above a

noun

is a rheme

because

it

is

interpreted

as

standing

for a

possible type

of

object

rather than

a

specific

existential

object.

As another

example,

a

sudden,

very

loud sound

in music

might

function as

a

rhematic-iconic-legisign

with

objects

like

'thunder,'

or

'explosion.'

The

rhematic

aspect

here is

that these are

possi-

ble

objects

rather than

any

specific

instance of thunder or

explosion.

The

iconic

aspect

is that the

sign

and

object

are related

in the

mind

through

resemblance.

This is a

legisign

when the loud musical sound

is a

general

type

of icon for such

objects.

A weathervane

is

a

dicent-indexical-legisign.

It

is a dicent because the

'direction of the

wind,'

which

is the

object

of the

sign

actually

affects the

sign

(the

direction of the

weathervane);

it is indexical because the

sign

and

object

are related

through

co-occurrence,

and

it

is

a

legisign

because

weath-

ervanes are

a

general

type

of

cultural

phenomenon

(we

have seen

them

before).

Peirce defined

a weathercock as

a

dicent-indexical-sinsign

(1955:115),

and

any

given

instance

is, indeed,

a

sinsign.

I

believe,

howev-

er,

that our

understanding

of

the

significance

of

the direction of the weath-

ervane

depends

on

its status as

a

general

type

of

sign

that we have seen



12/36

Turino: A

Peircian

Semiotic

Theoryfor

Music

231

before

and hence

know how

to

interpret,

i.e.,

its

character

as a

legisign.

This is more than a matter of labelling. Myemphasis on legisign in this case

is

key

to

my analysis

of

how

I

understand the

sign

to be

functioning.

When

framed to be

taken

literally,

facial

expressions,

vocal

quality,

the

manner

of

articulation

involved in

plucking

a

guitar

or

blowing

a

sax

can

all

func-

tion as

dicent-indexical-legisigns.

Any

given

instance of

a

sign

involves

quality

(the

qualisign)

which

al-

lows

us to

recognize

it,

and is a

sinsign.

These

features

can

usually

simply

be

assumed. Most

sinsigns

in

culture,

which

is to

say

most

sinsigns,

signify

because

they

are

immediately

related

to one

or more

general

classes

of

phenomena-legisigns. The way sinsigns stand for their legisigns-i.e., the

way they

are

categorized

and

grouped

with

other

sinsigns

to

form a

gener-

al

type-is usually

a

culturally

relative matter

and is

often

key

to

cultural

analysis.

This is true

for

"body language"

as well

as

weathervanes.

The

meanings

of a

smile

are not

self-evident

cross-culturally

or

even

across

dif-

ferent social

frames

within the same

society

(Birdwhistell

1970).

We learn

to

interpret

smiles

by linking

them

to

general

classes of

dicent-indexical

signs

that we

have

experienced

before

in

given

contexts,

that

is,

we

un-

derstand them

because

they

are

legisigns.

All signs can be analyzed in relation to aspects from the three trichot-

omies,

producing

ten basic

sign

types

(see

Figure

3).

In

discussion,

how-

ever,

signs

are best

identified

by

emphasizing

the

element(s)

most

promi-

nent

to their

function in a

given

instance of

semiosis or for a

given

purpose

in

analysis.

The

same

sign,

then,

might

be called

simply

icon,

or rhematic-

icon,

or

rhematic-iconic-legisign

depending

on what the

analysis

or

descrip-

tion

requires.

The Three

Basic

Categories:

Firstness,

Secondness,

Thirdness

We have

now

gone

through

the three

basic

trichotomies

and

suggest-

ed

how ten

possible

sign

types

can be

identified

from

the

combination of

their

components.

This

entire

semiotic

framework

is

predicated

on

Peirce's

three

most

basic

categories

for all

phenomena

(Peirce

1955:74-97).

These

are

Firstness,

something

in

and of itself

without

relation to

any

second

entity;

Secondness,

relations

between two

entities without

the

mediation

of a

third;

and

Thirdness,

involving

the

mediational

capabilities

of a

per-

son to

bring

a

first and

a second

entity

into

synthetic

or

general

relation-

ships with each other.

The

initial term in

each of

Peirce's

three

trichotomies

(qualisign,

icon,

rheme)

and

Trichotomy

I

(of

the

sign

itself),

pertain

to

Firstness

which is

the

realm of

oneness,

quality

and

possibility.

The second

terms in the tri-

chotomies

(sinsign,

index,

dicent)

and

Trichotomy

II

(relations

between

sign

and

object)

pertain

to

Secondness,

and this is

the realm

of actual ex-



13/36

232

Ethnomusicology,

Spring/Summer

1999

isting

relations and

reality

connections.14 The third terms

(legisign,

symbol,

argument)and Trichotomy III(how the sign is interpreted) are in the realm

of

Thirdness

and are the

most

highly

mediated,

general

signs

appropriate

for abstraction. The

three

types

of

interpretants

outlined earlier also

per-

tain

to

Firstness

(emotional

interpretant),

Secondness

(energetic

interpret-

ant),

and Thirdness

(language-based

concepts).

While

all

semiotic

processes

involve

Thirdness

(the

sign

and

object

brought together

in

the

interpretant

by

a

perceiver),

Peirce's classifications

of

signs

and

of

the

trichotomies themselves move from relative Firstness

to

Thirdness.

Qualisigns

(the

quality

embedded in a

sign

regardless

of

whether it functions as one) pertain to Firstness while argument (symbol-

ic

propositions

and

premises)

is

largely

Thirdness.15

Within

the

Peircian

semiotic framework there

are

multiple

combina-

tions of relative

Firstness, Secondness,

and

Thirdness.

An

indexical-legisign

is a

type

of

sign

that combines

the elements

of

Secondness

(index,

direct

connection)

and

Thirdness

(legisign, general

type).

Iconic and

indexical

legisigns

are

thus a kind of

compromise

solution

falling

mid-way

between

signs

that function in the

most direct unmediated

way

(iconic

sinsign)

and

signs

that

function

at

the most

general

context-free level

(argument)

as

shown in

Figure

3. The vast

majority

of musical

signs

are of three

compro-

mise

types:

rhematic-iconic-legisigns; rhematic-indexical-legisigns;

dicent-

indexical-legisigns.

The

aspect

of

generality provided by

the

legisign

for

each

is,

in

fact,

the cultural

component,

and

a

major

defining

facet of cul-

ture

universally.

The

grouping

of

phenomena

into

general categories

or

types

which,

as we

know,

varies

across cultural

groups,

is

a

primary

foun-

dation of culture

just

as

token-type ("practice-structure,"

"parole-langue")

dialectics

are

crucial

to

cultural transformation.

Semiotic Hierarchies and a

Theory

of Musical Affect

Within

the

Peircian

framework,

higher

level

signs

and effects

(Thirds,

Seconds)

contain the lower levels

(Seconds, Firsts) (see

Figure

3).16

In

or-

der to

understand music's

special potential

for

creating

emotional

effects,

I

am

interested

in

probing

the instances

in

which semiotic

chaining

is

halted

before

reaching

the level

of Thirdness

(symbol, argument, linguistic-based

interpretants).

Signs

which

are

Firsts, Seconds,

and

Thirds,

will

be more

likely

to cre-

ate effects at the same or lower levels of interpretant types. Thus, icons

(Firsts)

will

most

likely

produce

emotional,

sensory

interpretants

(Firsts)

at that

point

in

the semiotic

chain. Indices

(Seconds)

will

produce

ener-

getic

(Seconds)

or

alternatively

feeling

interpretants

(Firsts).

These

types

of

signs,

in and

of

themselves,

will

usually

not

produce higher language-



14/36

Turino: A Peircian Semiotic

Theory

for

Music

233

Figure

3.

Class

Trichotomy Trichotomy

Trichotomy

10 Classes

of

Sign

1

2

3

of

Signs

I A A A

Qualisign

(iconic

rheme)

Firstness

II

B A A Rhematic iconic

sinsign

III

B

B

A

Rhematic

indexical

sinsign

IV B B B Dicent

indexical

sinsign

V

C

A

A

Rhematic iconic

legisign

VI

C B A

Rhematic indexical

legisign

VII

C B B

Dicent

indexical

legisign

VIII C C A

Rhematic

symbolic

legisign

IX

C C B

Dicent

symbolic

legisign

X

C C C

Argument

Thirdness

A=Firstness; B=Secondness;

C=Thirdness

1l=Firstness;

2=Secondness;

3=Thirdness

I

II

I

Firsts

Qualisign

Icon

I

Rheme

Seconds

Sinsign

Index

~

Dicent

Thirds

Legisign

Symbol

Argument

inclusion

possible

nclusion

mediated

interpretants

(Thirds)

at the

point

in the

chain where

they

are

being

processed.

This

notion

is

key

to

my

theory

of

music,

emotion and direct

experi-

ence. Since musical

signs

usually

operate

at the

levels

of

Firstness and Sec-

ondness

they

will

produce interpretants

at

these same levels in the

chain

where

they

occur.

In

contexts where these

types

of

signs

prevail

and

are

the center of

attention-for

example

in

certain

rituals,

concerts,

and

danc-

es-emotional and

direct

energetic

effects

can be

prolonged,

and

move-

ment to the level of Thirdness (language-mediated thought)

postponed.17

Peirce shows that

any

general-purpose

semiotic

system

must

have

icons,

indices,

and

symbols,

which

is

the

case

for

language

but not for semi-

otic

modes like

music and

dance. Peirce was

particularly

nterested

in

higher

level

signs,

their

operations,

and effects.

My

emphasis

diverges

in

that

I am



15/36

234


1999

interested

in

exploring

the lower level

signs

of

possibility

and direct

expe-

rience for the ways they create emotion and social identification. Mytheo-

ry

of musical

affectivity

is based on

the

hypothesis

that the affective

poten-

tial of

signs

is

inversely proportional

to

the

degree

of

mediation,

generality,

and

abstraction. To

reiterate,

lower

level

signs

are

more

likely

to

create

emotional

and

energetic

interpretants,

whereas

signs involving

symbols

are

more

likely

to

generate language-based

responses

and

reasoning--effects

often described

as

"rational"

or

"conscious"

responses.

The

point

here is

that different

types

of

signs

have different

potentials.

Musical

Signs

of

Identity,

Emotion,

and

Experience

Iconicity

of

Style: Signs

of

Identity

Icons

are,

at

root,

signs

of

identity

in

that

they

rely

on some

type

of

resemblance between

sign

and

object,

as,

in

fact,

do all

relationships

of

identity.

Steven

Feld

(1988)

has

discussed how

iconicity

functions

to cre-

ate social

identity

and aesthetic

systems

based

on

identification

within the

social and

ecological

environment. Musical forms

that

"sound

like,"

that is

resemble,

in

some

way,

other

parts

of

social

experience

are received as

true,

good,

and natural

(Becker

and Becker

1981).18

The dense

"in

sync

but

out

of

phase" quality

of Kaluli or African

Pygmy

singing--individual

varia-

tions and

improvisations

merging

within the dense collective

perfor-

mance-'"sound

like" the broader

quality

of social relations

and

are,

in

fact,

based on

the

same

ethics. I have made a similar case

for

Aymara panpipe

performance

in Peru

(1989, 1993).

Feelings

of

iconicity

or

"naturalness"

created

through

the

correspondence

of

style

across different

practices

are

involved here.

The subtle

rhythmic patterns-basic

to

how

we

speak,

how we

walk,

how we

dance,

how

we

play

music-are

unspoken

signs

of who we

are,

whom

we

resemble,

and thus whom

we

are

with.

Conversely,

divergences

in

kinesic

and other features of social

style

directly identify

outsiders,

those

who

are

not like us.

Such

signs

are

typically

felt as relative comfort or dis-

comfort

with others

in

daily

interaction. Sonic

and kinesic

iconicity,

or

lack

thereof, however,

comes to the fore

in

participatory

musical and dance

oc-

casions because

in

such

occasions these

signs

are

the focal

point

of

attention.

Indices:

Signs

of

Experience

and Emotion

While some attention has been

paid

to the

emotion-producing poten-

tial of

iconicity

in

art,

little theoretical

work has been done

in

relation

to

indexicality.

In

fact,

iconic and indexical

signs

typically operate

together



16/36

Turino:

A Peircian Semiotic

Theory

for

Music

235

in

expressive

cultural

practices,

and

indices have their own

special poten-

tials for producing emotional response and social identification.

One source for the affective

power

of musical indices is the fact that

they

are able to

condense

great

quantities

and varieties of

meaning-even

contradictory

meanings-within

a

single sign.

Indices

signify

through

co-oc-

currence

with their

object

in

real-time situations. Once such indexical rela-

tions

have been

established, however,

actual

co-presence

of

sign

and

object

is

no

longer

required;

the index

may

still call to mind

objects

previously

ex-

perientially

attached. But when former

indexically

related

objects

are not

present,

or even

when

they

are,

new elements in the situation

may

become

linked to the same sign. Of key significance to a theory of musical affectiv-

ity,

indices

continually

take on new

layers

of

meaning

while

potentially

also

carrying

along

former associations-a kind of

semantic

snowballing.

Hypothetically,

the

song

that comes to index

a

romantic

relationship,

"our

song,"

may

have

a

very

positive

emotional salience for the lovers

when

things

are

going

well. This

song

initially may

have been

established

as an

indexical

sign

for

the

relationship

(or

the

other)

if

the lovers heard

it

on

their first

date,

their first

dance,

or

when

making

love for

the first time.

Hearing

it on

subsequent

occasions while the

relationship

was

flowering

it might have taken on additionalobjects in relation to those occasions, and

continue

to have a

powerful positive

emotional salience. It

might

carry

both

this salience and

great

sadness

if

the

relationship

ends in

heartbreak. Hear-

ing

the

song

later in

life,

feelings

of

'new

love,'

'the

many

times

together,'

and

'heartbreak,'

might

be called

up

simultaneously

creating

a

complex

response.

The

multiple,

sometimes

conflicting,

objects

creating

the inter-

pretant by

multivocal indices are not

usually processed,

at least

initially,

in

terms

of

symbolic concepts.

Rather we are moved

to

react in a visceral

way

because of the

very complexity

and

incoherent form of the

objects

present-

ed. Due to the very density of the objects called forth by the sign, we ex-

perience layers

of

feeling

which will tend to remain undifferentiated

and

simply

felt.

The

emotional

power

of

such

signs,

of

course,

depends

on the

salience

of

the

objects

indexed.

Indexical

relations

are

grounded

in

personal experience;

the members

of social

groups

will

share

indices

proportional

to common

experiences.

Thus,

indexical

communication is most

prominent

in intimate

groups

such

as married

couples,

families,

close

friends,

and further down the continu-

um,

in small

close-knit

communities

or

neighborhoods.

Indices are

ground-

ed in one's

personal

and social life and thus are constitutive of

identity-

both in the sense

of

being

part-and-parcel

of

ones

personal past,

as well as

being

signs

of

shared social

experience.

Moreover,

the

ability

to commu-

nicate

indexically

within

a

family,

a

community,

or a

group

of

friends,

what



17/36

236

Ethnomusicology,

Spring/Summer

1999

Edward Hall calls

"High-Context"

communication,

in-and-of-itself makes

common experiences, and thus identity, patent.'9

The mass media and

advertising

redundantly

create indexical

signs,

signifying [conjuring

up]

common

experience

and

identity,

beyond

small-

scale,

face

to

face

groups.

This

process

underpins

Benedict Anderson's idea

of

"imagined

communities"

in

significant

ways

(1983).

Nonetheless,

the

meanings

attached to

indices

are

not

general

or

fixed. Unlike

the

meanings

of

symbols,

which can be

confirmed

by

consulting

a

dictionary

or

a

math

book,

indices are

fluid,

multileveled,

and

highly

context-dependent.20

The

effects

of

indices

can

be

guided

by

controlling

the

contexts

of

reception

but they can not be guaranteed. This semantically ambiguous quality of

indices

is

precisely

the

point

of Louise

Meintjes'

article

about the

varied

reception

of Paul

Simon's Graceland album

among

different

groups

inside

and outside South

Africa

(1990).

In

spite

of their rather

unpredictable

con-

sequences,

indices are

frequently

harnessed

for

the construction of social

identities-in

advertising,

in mass

political

rallies

and

propaganda,

and in

ritual

and

ceremonies-because of their

emotion-producing potentials

and

as

pre-existing signs

of

identity.

Like

the

intimate

"our

song"

example,

or the case

of

the Indian

raga

discussed earlier, indices often carry personal meanings, and thus our

emotional investment in them tends to be

higher

than

for

general signs

(symbols),

especially

when

attached

to

significant

aspects

of

our lives.

They

are

"our

signs,"

and

they

are the

primary

sign

types

that

signify

our

per-

sonal

and collective

histories. As Frith

observes,

the

music

of adolescence

and

the

teen

years,

when

people

are

struggling

with

identity

and other

intense

personal

issues,

tends to remain the

most

emotionally

salient

throughout

an individual's life

(1987);

musical indices

are

at

work here.

Most

importantly,

as

signs

of

Secondness,

indices

signify

our

personal

and

collective experiences in a particularlydirect manner, they are "really"at-

tached to events and

aspects

of our

lives,

and

hence

are

experienced

as

real;

they

are

signs

of

our

lives,

not

signs

about them.

The

Semiotic

Potentials

of

Music

Music

integrates

the affective and

identity-forming potentials

of

both

icons and indices

in

special ways,

and is

thus

a central resource in events

and

propaganda

aimed at

creating

social

unity,

participation,

and

purpose.

In terms

of

the

density

of

sign complexes

music also

has

special potentials.

Any

musical unit is

comprised

of a

number

of

components

including:

pitch,

scale

type,

timbre,

rhythmic

motion,

tempo,

melodic

shape,

meter,

dynamics, harmony

(where

applicable),

specific

melodies,

quotes,

genres-

all

sounding

simultaneously. Any

of these

parameters

can

and often do

func-



18/36

Turino:

A Peircian

Semiotic

Theory

for

Music

237

tion as discrete

icons, indices,

rhemes,

and

dicent

signs

which

may

be

meaningfully

combined to

produce

a

macrolevel

sign, although the signifi-

cance

of certain

components

may

be

foregrounded

in

the

musical context.

This

multi-componential aspect

of

music

can

not

be

overemphasized

as

a basis

of

music's

affective

and

semiotic

potential.

Within

any

given

sec-

tion of music the

timbre

may

function as an icon

or index with

certain

effects. The

rhythm,

meter,

tempo,

mode,

melodic

shape,

and texture like-

wise

may

each function as discrete

signs

that

compliment,

chafe,

or con-

tradict the other

signs sounding

at the

same

time-contributing

to the

power

of a

particular

meaning,

to new

insights,

or to

emotional

tension,

respectively. This aspect is in addition to other sequential juxtapositions

of musical

signs through

time.

I have discussed the

semantic

snowballing

of

musical

indices,

that

is,

one

sign

or

sign

complex gathering

multiple

objects

to

it

simultaneously.

The feature I am

describing

here

is different. Music

has the

potential

of

comprising

many

signs

simultaneously

which,

like other art

forms,

makes

it

a

particularly

rich semiotic

mode.

The

multicomponential

nature of music

functions

in

the same

way,

and can be a

multiplication

of

"semanticsnow-

balling"

in relation to the

interpretant:

the

ambiguity

or

density

of the

sign

complex discourages a response in Thirdness and encourages unanalyzed

feeling.

It is this

multi-componential,

and

yet

non-linear

character of musi-

cal

"sign

bundles" that allow for a different

type

of

flexibility

in the creation

of

complex, densely

meaningful

musical

signs

that

compound

the conden-

sation of

meaning,

the

polysemy,

and the

affective

potential.

Social

Frames and

Interpretation:

Rhematic and

Dicent

Signs

in

Art

Because the

concepts

in

Trichotomy

III

involve the manner in

which

a

sign

is

interpreted,

they depend

on the

social

frame

defining

the

type

of

interaction

taking

place.

Gregory

Bateson

(1972),

elaborated the

concept

of

frame

as

metacommunicative

conventions about how

signs

within a

given

interaction

or context are to be

interpreted.

Erving

Goffman

(1974)

and Richard

Bauman

(1977)

extended

this idea

through

the

study

of

cues

that

signalled

specific

frames.

Thus,

a

wink and other

facial

expressions

might

cue a

"joking

frame"

indicating

that

a

proposition

spoken

should not

be taken

literally

as a dicent.

Within a

joking

frame,

linguistic

propositions

are

interpreted

as

rhemes-signs

of

imaginative possibility. Similarly,

we

understand that

the action on a theatrical

stage

should

not be taken at face

value whereas

usually

(i.e.,

without cues to

the

contrary)

linguistic

propo-

sitions,

facial

expressions,

and

body

language

in

daily

interaction are un-

derstood to

be

literal,

and are

interpreted

as dicent

signs

of

people's

actu-



19/36

238


1999

al attitudes.

Even in theatrical contexts

where we know

"people

are

only

acting," signs like facial expression and tone of voice that usuallyfunction

as dicents

may

still be affective because of our

habitual

way

of

receiving

them.

Many

signs

in art are rhemes. A

painting

of an

imaginary

being

or an

imaginary

or

unknown

person may

be

interpreted

as a

rhematic-icon be-

cause the

painting only

suggests

the

possibility

of such

objects

without

positing

their

actual existence. The use of musical

icons

representing

'bird

calls,'

'bombs,' 'thunder,'

or more abstract

qualities

such as a

'pastoral

set-

ting'

are

rhemes in that

they signify

these

things

as

qualitative

possibilities

not specific existential instances. As signs interpreted as representing pos-

sible

or

purely qualitative objects,

rhemes are

crucial to the semiotic

func-

tions of

art

because

they

allow for the

play

of

imagination

and

creativity.

Rhemes

can denote and

represent

what does

not exist

('unicorn'),

or what

does not exist

yet

('rocket

ships'

in

early

science

fiction),

but

they

are cru-

cial to

bringing

new

possibilities

into existence

by

imagining

and

represent-

ing

the

possibility

materially

in art

objects

or

performances.

While the rheme allows for the concretization

of

imagined possibilities

in

art

forms,

dicent

signs

are

particularly powerful

and

convincing

because

they are interpreted as being reallyaffected by the object they signify; they

have a built-in

"truth"value. A

photograph

or

a realistic

painting

socially

framed

as a

portrait

of an

actual

person

(e.g.,

with

a

linguistic

title such as

"King Henry")

are

interpreted

as dicent-indices.

The social

frame

'portrait'

suggests

that the camera or

painter captured

the

image

of

the

object

('the

person')

through

co-occurrence

with that

(posing)

person,

and that the

photo

or

painting

was

actually

affected

by

the

appearance

of the

object

reproduced

in the

sign.

Like a reflection in a

mirror,

portraits

and

especial-

ly

photographs

have

a

strong

iconic

component,

but at

the next

stage

in

the semiotic chain it is their identity as dicent-indices that make us inter-

pret

them as real

representations,

as

"true."

Dicent-indices

are central

to

the

power

of musical

performance.

Roland

Barthes' influential

concept

of "the

grain

of the

voice" -the

direct connec-

tion of

body

to

body

through

certain ineffable

sonic

qualities

of

perfor-

mance-is

grounded

on dicent

signs

(1977).

In musical

performance

we

often

interpret

the

volume,

articulation,

and

quality

of musical

instruments

or voices as

signs

of the "true"

sincerity,

emotional

state, care,

or

training

of the

performer (possible objects).

Facial

expression,

gesture,

and

physi-

cal attitudes are likewise important dicents for the "inner"attitudes of per-

formers

ranging

from

'cool

control' to

'deeply

felt

passion.'

Directly

paral-

lel to

"body

language"

and "tone of voice"

in

everyday

interactions,

we often

interpret

sonic

signs

of

vocal and instrumental

quality

as

actually

being

affected

by

the actual attitude of the

performer (object)

and thus under-



20/36

Turino: A Peircian Semiotic

Theory

for

Music

239

stand

them as "true."Vocal

quality

is

particularly

convincing

in this

regard

whereas instruments

comprise

a

second

layer

of mediation between

the

performer

and

listener.

This

may

be

why

vocal music

is so

predominant

in

popular

music.

In

my

classes,

undergraduates

are

particularly

offended

if

I

suggest

that

their favorite

popular

singer

may

not

have

actually experienced

what she

is

singing

about or

may

not,

at the

time of

performance,

be in the emotional

state

signified

to

the listener

through

the

sonic

qualities

that

they

interpret

as dicent-indices.

They

often do not

accept my analogy

that

professional

singers

can

operate

like actors who train themselves to

reproduce

given

emotional cues for the effectiveness of their art. When my students take

such cues

literally,

these

signs

are

operating

as dicents rather than rhemes

of

possible

emotional

experiences; they

are

thus more

affectively power-

ful

because

they

are

interpreted

as real.

For

many

music

genres

in our

society, especially

in the

popular

music

field,

a common

assumption

is that musicians

really

mean and are

experi-

encing

what

they express

through

"the

grain

of

the voice" and

through

physical

cues.21

That

is,

unlike

acting,

musical

performance

in

many

popu-

lar

genres

is

framed

to be taken

literally

as emotional

expression.

In

short,

these types of sonic and physical dicent signs are powerful for us because

they

are

interpreted

as

being

the direct result of the

feelings

they express,

and

because

they operate

below the level of

propositional speech

which

is more

likely

to

invite us

to

assess truth or

falsity.

We know

words can

lie

or be mistaken.

Within

many

social

frames,

popular

musical

performance

often

being

one of

them,

we

habitually

take dicent

signs

at face value and

we

believe them.

Like

paintings

and

photos,

however,

the social

framing

of

different

types

of musical

performances, recordings, genres,

and artists

may

cause

them to be interpreted as rhemes, or conversely dicent signs, in relation

to the artists'

attitudes

during

"the

performance."

In

genres

such as

blues,

"folk," soul,

and

"roots

rock,"

performance

is

typically

framed in relation

to

authenticity

of

feeling

(dicents).

In

other

genres

where artifice

is more

pronounced,

or where aesthetic

ideologies

emphasize

the

separation

of art

and life

(see

Bourdieu

1984),

the

interpretation

of

emotional cues as rhemes

(i.e.,

signs

of

possible

emotions)

may

be more

likely.

Whether a

sign

func-

tions

as

a

rheme or dicent in relation to

emotional

cues, however,

depends

on the

experience, knowledge,

attitude,

and

even desire to

suspend

disbe-

lief, on the part of the perceiver as well as on the skill of the artist to com-

municate with

emotional

cues. When

my

students take

their favorite

star's

signs

of emotion

literally they

are

operating

as

dicents,

whereas

when

I

question

their

literalness,

the

signs

are

operating

for

me as

rhemes and thus

are less

convincing.



21/36

240


1999

Musical

recordings

are

likewise framed

differently

in relation to their

character as dicent signs or rhemes in relation to "liveperformance."When

framed as "field

recordings"

or

"live

concert

recordings"

we are

more like-

ly

to

interpret

the sounds as

dicent-indices

with

the

microphone(s)

having

Turino, Thomas_Signs, Imagination, And Experience. a Peircian Semiotic Theory for Music

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