1

Editedby:

J.AmberSchererandJosephA.Schafer

Trustand

TransparencyIssuesinthe

FutureofLawEnforcement

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TRUSTANDTRANSPARENCYISSUES

INTHEFUTUREOFLAWENFORCEMENT

VOLUME8oftheProceedingsofthe

FuturesWorkingGroup

EditedbyJ.AmberSchererandJosephA.Schafer

SuggestedCitation:

Scherer,J.A.,&Schafer,J.A.(Eds.).(2018).Trustandtransparencyissuesinthefutureoflawenforcement:Volume8oftheproceedingsoftheFuturesWorkingGroup.SocietyofPoliceFuturistsInternational.

ReleaseDate:June2018

The opinions and statements expressed throughout this volume are those of the individual authors and contributors and should not be considered and endorsement or a reflection of the official position of the Society of Police Futurists International, the Futures Working Group, or any other institution, or organization for any policy, program, or service.

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TrustandTransparencyIssuesinthe

FutureofLawEnforcement

TableofContents

AWordfromthePresident……..…..…………………………………………….……………………...5

UnderstandingTrustandTransparencyinContemporaryPolicing

JosephA.Schafer&JohnP.Jarvis………………………………………….…………………..6

Transparency,Truth,andPerception:AComplexRelationship

GeneStephens…………………………………………………………………………………………13

TheRoleofLeadershipinFosteringTruthandTransparency

RichardW.Myers………………………………………………………………..……………………17

Private/PublicPartnershipsforFosteringTrustwithintheCommunity

AlYoungs…………………………………………………………………………………….……………25

TheFridayCrabClub,Redux

JosephA.Schafer……………………………………………………………………………………..38

FosteringExternalTrustandTransparencythroughtheUseofPoliceAgencyWebsites

MicheleW.Covington&NicholasE.Libby……………………………………………….48

SocialMedia:UsePolicyandGuidelines

TobyM.Finnie…….……………………………….……………………………………………..……56

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TheExecutionofFourPoliceOfficers:LessonsfromaSocialMediaTempest

TobyM.Finnie&EarlMoulton…………………………………………………………………65

TheRighttoAccuracy:ANewFrontier

MichaelE.Buerger……………………………………..……………………………………………84

Bond-RelationshipDisruption:InDefenseofStrategicandTacticalDeception

SidHeal&MichaelE.Buerger………………………………………………………..…………91

Intelligence,Management,andtheManagementofIntelligence

BernardH.Levin…………………………………………………………..…………………………101

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AWORDFROMTHEPRESIDENT

ThismonographrepresentsanotherofferinginacontinuingseriesofworksauthoredbymembersandaffiliatesofPFI'sFuturesWorkingGroup(FWG).ThefoundationforthismonographwaslaidwhentheFWGwasco-sponsoredbyPFIandtheFederalBureauofInvestigation.TheFBI’ssupportofFWGspanned2002

-2016andthatsupportallowedFWGtodovaluablework.Althoughthismonographisnotbeingco-publishedbytheFBI,PFIgratefullyacknowledgestheFBI’ssupportinthisandmanyotherworkproductswrittenduringmorethanadecadeofstrongcollaboration.

Thecontributionscontainedinthismonographareintendedtosparkideasandincitecreativityinrespondingtothefuturechallengesandopportunitiesthatpolicingandthecriminaljusticecommunitymustconfront.Aswithmostmonographs,thisisaworkingdocument.Itisnotintendedtobethefinalwordordefinitiveperspectiveconcerningthetopicsdiscussed.Rather,thesecontributionsaredesignedtofosterfurtherdiscussionandconsiderationofpossible,probable,andpreferablefuturedirectionsforpolicing.Inthisvein,thecurrentpapersofferaperspectiveonthecriticalissueofhowtrustandtransparencyrelatetothefutureofpolicing.Wehopeyoufindthis,aswellaspastandsubsequentFWGwhitepapers,tobeuseful.

Dr.G.M.Cox

TarletonStateUniversity

2017-2018PresidentofPFI

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UnderstandingTrustandTransparencyinContemporaryPolicing

JosephA.Schafer&JohnP.Jarvis

Thisvolumeofworkingpapersconsiderstheroleoftrustandtransparencyin

contemporaryandfuturepoliceorganizationsandoperations.Trustandtransparencyareof

importanceacrossorganizationalcontexts,particularlywithingovernmentservices.Research

suggeststhatpeoplewhoperceivedecisionmakingtobejustandbasedonappropriate

proceduresaremorelikelytoseethedecisionmakerandtheirdecisionsaslegitimate(see

Sunshine&Tyler,2003;Tyler&Huo,2002;Tyler,2010).Whenpeopletrustdecisionmakers,

seethemashavinglegitimatepower,andbelievetheyuseappropriatepathwaystoselecting

specificchoices,theyaremorelikelytoobeyandcooperate.Thishasclearimportanceand

implicationsforthecriminaljusticesystem,whereobedienceandcooperationarecentralto

ensuringefficaciousandexpedientprocessingandoutcomes.Theseissuesareofcentral

importanceingovernmentservices,especiallywithinpolicing.Indeed,muchofthecontroversy

surroundingUSpolicinginrecentyearsisarguablyrootedindistrustandperceivedlackof

transparencyinpoliceprocesses,high-profilepolice-citizenencounters,andthebroader

oversightofpoliceorganizationsandoperations.TherecommendationsofthePresident’sTask

Forceon21stCenturyPolicing(2015)repeatedlytouchontheneedtomakepolicingmore

transparentandtobuildgreatertrustbetweenthepoliceandthecommunitiestheyserve.

Officersanddepartmentsfrequentlymakechoicesthatarenotpopularwithcitizens.

Thosebeingarrestedarerarelypleasedwiththatoutcome.Dr.Tyler’sworksuggeststhat,in

theaggregate,therewillbemoresupportfor,andcompliancewith,policedecisionsofalltypes

whencitizensperceivethepolicearejustandfair.1Trustandtransparencyarepresumably

centralpathwaystofosteringthebeliefthatofficersanddepartmentsareoperatingina

mannerthatisfair,just,andlegitimate.2Whencitizenstrustthepoliceandseethatoperations

1 Certainly this will not always be the case. Any group or individual can only do so much to ensure compliance and obedience, particularly when decisions are controversial, unpopular, or impactful. 2 This does not suggest that other pathways do not exist. Trust and transparency are important, but not the exclusive mechanisms for engendering public support and compliance.

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arehandledinanappropriatelyvisiblemanner,itwillbeeasiertoperceivethepoliceandtheir

authorityasbeinglegitimate.Whencommunitiestrustthereisappropriateoversightoftheir

police,trustthatofficersareheldsufficientlyaccountablefortheirdecisions,andperceivethat

organizationsoperatewithanappropriateleveloftransparency,thosecommunitiesshould,in

theory,bemoretrustingofthepolicewhencriticalandcontroversialeventsoccur.Thisshould

translateintogreatersupport,cooperation,anddeferencetopoliceauthorityandpower.

Inthecontextofthisvolume,trustrelatestotheabilityofthoseinsideandoutsidethe

organizationtohaveadegreeoffaithandconfidenceintheabilitiesanddecisionsofthosein

control.Trustsuggeststhatdecisionmakerscanengenderasensetheyarereliable,

dependable,andworthy.Trustmightoftensuggestadegreeofpredictability.Inpolicing

contexts,citizenswhobelievetheirpolicedepartmentisdiligent,hardworking,andprofessional

wouldbeexpectedtoshowgreatersupportforthatagencyanditsdecisions.Trustalsohasan

internaldimension;policeofficersmay(ormaynot)haveadegreeoftrustinthemotivation,

competence,andabilitiesoftheirsupervisors.

Inthecontextofthisvolume,transparencycapturesthedegreetowhichdecisionsare

beingmadeinavisiblefashion.Towhatextentareoperationssubjecttoreviewandscrutinyby

outsiders?Towhatextentarethechoicesofdecisionmakersreadilyevident?Asbureaucratic

entities,policeorganizationsandofficersmakeawiderangeofdecisionsonadailybasis.

Traditionallytheforcesandfactorsinfluencingthosedecisionshaveexistedinaratheropaque

environment.Ithasbeeneasytoseetheinputs(crimesreportedtothepolice;fiscalallocations

tothepolicedepartment)andtheoutputs(crimesreportedbythepolice;thebudgetuseto

“spenddown”thedefinedbudget),yetunderstandingwhathappenedinbetween(the‘why’

questions…whyweresomereportedcrimes‘counted’whileotherswerenot?...whydidthe

agencydecidetofundadrugsuppressionunitandnotadrugeducationprogram?)hasbeenfar

moreelusive.Transparencyspeakstoeffortsintendedtoshedmorelighton‘why’questionsby

helpingprovideanunderstandingofhowagenciesandofficersmakedecisions,ratherthan

merelyrelyingonspeculationandinference.

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Trustandtransparencyarerelatedconceptsthatbothseemlikelytoconditionand

shapethelevelofconfidencein,andsupportfor,thepolice.Thesetwoconceptsarenot,

however,identical.Anorganizationcanenjoyahighdegreeoftrustwithoutbeingparticularly

transparent;theconversemightalsobetrue.Likewise,weneedtoconsiderthetrustand

transparencyasforcesexistingbothwithin(internal)andoutside(external)police

organizations.Theformerreferstothenatureofrelationsbetweenanagency’sleadershipand

itsfront-linepersonnel.Internallyanagencymightbequiteopeninhowitoperates,makes

decisions,allocatesresources,etc.,whilethoseoutsidetheorganizationmayhavelittle

understandingorsenseoftransparency.

Likewise,anagency’sexecutivesmightbehaveinsuchawaythatinternaltrustisquite

high;insodoing,externaltrustmightbedamaged.Forexample,formerLAPDChiefDarylGates

hadawell-establishedreputationasa‘copscop’thatpresumablygeneratedahighdegreeof

internaltrust.Gateswasastaunchdefenderofofficersandtheiractionsduringcontroversial

situations.ItwouldbeexpectedofficersgreatlytrustedChiefGatesastheirleaderbecause

theyknewhe‘hadtheirback’iftheywerebeingsubjectedtopublicscrutinyoverhowthey

werepolicingthecommunity.Atthesametime,wemightexpectthatcitizensoftenfelt

disenfranchisedfromLAPDanditspersonnel,questioningwhetherChiefGatesandother

officialswerewillingtoholdofficerstohighstandardsofperformanceandaccountability(see

Reese,2005).

Whyshouldorganizationsvalueandpursuetrustandtransparency?Mostimportantly,

policeorganizationsarerepresentativesofthestateandaregrantedtremendouspowerand

authority.Withthatcomestremendousresponsibilitytothepublicandexternalsovereigns

(i.e.,thecity,county,state,orfederalofficialsoverseeinganagency).Ifpoliceorganizationsare

goingtobeeffectiveincontrollingcrime,theymusthavetheconfidence,support,and

cooperationofthepublictheyserve.Whencitizensperceivegovernmentagenciesandagents

areactinginafairandjustmanner,theyaremoresupportive,compliant,andobedient(Tyler,

2010).Byextension,wewouldexpectthisbehaviorresultsnotonlyinmoreorderly

communities,but,byextension,incitizenswhoaremorewillingtocooperatewiththepolicein

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theinvestigationofspecificcrimesandinbroadereffortstoimprovethequalityoflivingina

jurisdiction.Twomechanismsthatshouldfacilitatetheseprocessesaretrustandtransparency.

Conversely,ifagenciesdonotvaluebeingtrustedbythepublicandbeingtransparentin

theiroperations,theywillnotenjoythesameabilitytoinfluencecrimeandcommunity

conditions.Thedistinctionbetweenagenciesthatdonotanddoseevalueintrust,

transparency,justice,andlegitimacyistheformerseepolicingassomethingdonetothepublic,

whilethelatterseesitassomethingdonewiththepublic.Thisdoesnotsuggestthatagencies

operatingwithanemphasisontrustandtransparencywillexperienceapanaceainwhich

citizensalwayssupportthepoliceandcooperatewithofficers.Rather,itsuggeststhatany

benefitsperceivedtobeassociatedwithde-emphasizingtransparentpoliceoperationsor

emphasizingcontrolovertrustareshort-termgains.Intheaggregate,emphasizingtrustand

transparency(whichwillnotalwaysbeeasy)isbothphilosophically‘right’andwilldothemost

toadvancetheinterestsoftheagencyandcommunity.Furthermore,emergenttechnologies

areincreasinglyforcingtransparencyonagenciesandpolicepersonnel;ratherthanfighting

thatreality,agencieswouldbebetterservedtoseektomaximizethepotentialofthattrend.

Mattersoftrustandtransparencyarenotlimitedtohowpoliceagenciesandpersonnel

intersectwiththeirexternalenvironment.Trustandtransparencyarekeyconsiderationswhen

seekingtounderstandthenatureofpoliceorganizations,operations,andleadership.Parallels

havebeendrawnbetweenTyler’sworksonhowthepoliceinterfacewiththeirexternal

environmentbyexaminingtheleveloftrust,transparency,andperceivedjusticewithinpolice

organizations,aswell(Nix&Wolfe,2016;Rosenbaum&McCarty,2017).Partoftheembedded

logicdrivingthisresearchisthatofficersshouldnotbeexpectedtodemonstrateprocedurally

justandtrustworthypolicingtowardthepubliciftheydonotenjoyorganizationallyjustand

trustworthytreatmentbytheiremployingorganization.Ifpoliceexecutivesexpecttheirofficers

topolicewithaneyeforcitizenperceptions,trust,legitimacy,andfairness,thoseexecutives

mustfirsttreatemployeeswithaneyeforthosesameprinciples(Carr&Maxwell,2017;White

&Kyle,2017).Officerswanttoseeaworkforcewheredecisionsarefair,equitable,and

compliantwithgoverningpolicies,procedures,andlaws.Officerswantaworkplacethatdoes

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notissuearbitraryandinconsistentdiscipline,wherepromotionsarebasedonmeritandnot

favoritism,andwhereaccountabilitysystemsareviewedastreatingofficersfairlyandjustly.

Withina2x2matrix(seebelow)contrastingtheinternalandexternaldimensionsof

trustandtransparency,anagencymightbeassessedashigh,low,neutral,ornegativewithin

eachofthe4cells.Assessmentswouldbeexpectedtovarybothacrossagenciesandalso

acrosstime.Forexample,theexternaltrustinLAPDwouldpresumablybedifferenttodaythan

itwasintheearly1990sneartheendofChiefGates’tenure.TheformerKGBwouldlikelyhave

beenratedasbeingnegativeinall4cells.Presumablyfront-linepersonnelwerenearlyas

fearfuloftheagencyaswerecitizens,knowingthatmethodsweredubious,evidencestandards

non-existent,andthatcontrol,notjustice,wastheultimateobjective.

Internal External

Trust

Transparency

Onehundredyearsago,theBerkeleyPDunderAugustVollmer(seetheessaybySchafer

inthisvoume)wasveryhighoninternaltrustandtransparency,atleastaccordingtothelore

andlimitedhistoricalevidence.BasedonthelatteritislessclearifthemodelVollmerused

generatedexternaltrustandtransparency,thoughthatoutcomewouldseemprobable.It

wouldgenerallybeexpectedthatagenciesthathavehealthyinternaloperationswould

probablyfairwellonexternaltrustandtransparency.Whilethatisnotanautomaticoutcome,

officerscannotbeexpectedtooperateinsupportofahighdegreeofexternaltrustand

transparency(ifthatoutcomeisvalued)withoutseeingthatbehaviormodeledinternally.If

leadersdonottreatpersonnelinawaythatdemonstrateshowtoengenderinternaltrustand

ensureinternaltransparency,itwouldbeunlikelytoroutinelyseefront-linepersonnel

operatinginawaythatwouldfacilitatehighlevelsofexternaltrustandtransparency.

Itcanbeverydifficultforexecutives/agenciestosimultaneouslyandcontinuouslyexcel

inallfourcellsofthe2x2matrix.Sometimesbeinghighinoneareawillreduceandagency’s

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standinginanotherarea,atleasttemporarily.Ifanagencyisexternallytransparentinadmitting

toascandaloroperationalproblems,itmighttemporarilyworkagainstthepublic’strustinthat

agency.Overtime,however,thehonestyandexternaltransparencyofthisapproachwouldbe

expectedtoresultinmorepublicsupportandtrust.Furthermore,attemptingtoconceal

internalissues(lowexternaltransparency)oftencompoundsthedepthofascandalandits

fallout.Whatexecutivesneedtohopeisthatovertimeandintheaggregatetheycanfindways

toexcelinall4cellsofthetable,realizingthatinsomecontextsavictoryinoneareawillbea

defeatinanother.Perfectionwillnotbepossible,buttryingtohide/suppresssimplyyieldsfalse

victory.Andinanincreasinglytransparentworld,itisbecomingincreasinglydifficultto

hide/suppress,makingvoluntarytransparencyallthemoreimportantinordertoreduce

damagetotrust(recognizinglegalmatterscomplicatecompleteandtimelytransparencywhen

situationsarestillbeinginvestigated).

Thefocusofthepresentvolumeisofferingamixtureofperspectivesonhowtrustand

transparencycanbeunderstoodinthecurrentandfutureworldofpolicing.Theauthorsoffera

varietyofviewsonhowpolicingpracticesmightintersectwithtechnologyandcontemporary

socialnormstocreatenewexpectationsofficersandleadersmustunderstandandaddress.The

essaysdonotseektoprovideadefinitiveandfinalwordonmattersoftrustandtransparency.

Rather,theyseektoofferthoughtfulandthoughtprovokingcommentariesandinsightstohelp

guidepolicingtoafuturewheretrustandtransparencyareviewedastoolstoenhancepolice

operationsandpublicservice,notliabilitiesorrisksinneedofmanagementormitigation.

References

Carr,J.D.,&Maxwell,S.R.(2017).Policeofficers’perceptionsoforganizationaljusticeandtheir

trustinthepublic.PolicePractice&Research,DOI:10.1080/15614263.2017.1387784.

Kyle,M.J.,&White,D.R.(2017).Theimpactoflawenforcementofficerperceptionsof

organizationaljusticeontheirattitudesregardingbody-worncameras.JournalofCrime

andJustice,40(1),68-83.

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Nix,J.,&Wolfe,S.E.(2016).SensitivitytotheFergusonEffect:Theroleofmanagerial

organizationaljustice.JournalofCriminalJustice,47,12-20.

President’sCommissionon21stCenturyPolicing.(2015).FinalreportofthePresident’sTask

Forceon21stCenturyPolicing.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicing

Services.

Reese,R.(2005).LeadershipintheLAPD:Walkingthetightrope.Durham,NC:Carolina

AcademicPress.

Rosenbaum,D.P.,&McCarty,W.P.(2017).Organizationaljusticeandofficer‘buyin’in

Americanpolicing.Policing:AnInternationalJournalofPoliceStrategies&

Management,40,71-85.

Sunshine,J.,&Tyler,T.(2003).Theroleofproceduraljusticeandlegitimacyinshapingpublic

supportforpolicing.LawandSocietyReview,37(3),513-547.

Tyler,T.R.(2010).Whypeoplecooperate:Theroleofsocialmotivations.Princeton,NJ:

PrincetonUniversityPress.

Tyler,T.R.,&Huo,Y.J.(2002).Trustinthelaw:Encouragingpubliccooperationwiththepolice

andcourts.NewYork:Russell-SageFoundation.

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Transparency,Truth,andPerception:AComplexRelationship

GeneStephens

Transparencyhasbecomebothabuzzwordandsometimesarealityin21stcentury

government,includingthepublicsafetyarena.A2012presidentialmemorandumfromthe

WhiteHousePressOfficedeclaredtransparencythepolicyoftheUnitedStatesgovernment,

definingitas“todiscloseinformationrapidlyinformsthatthepubliccanreadilyfindanduse,”

andholdingsuchapolicy“promotesaccountabilityandprovidesinformationforcitizensabout

whattheirgovernmentisdoing.”Otherscallforabroadeningoftransparencyfrom“showus

whatyouhavedone”to“letmeparticipateinwhatyou’redoingwhileyou’redoingit”

(www.granicus.com/transparency).Thelatterdefinitioncorrespondstotheapproaches

advocatedinneighborhood-drivenpolicing,reformulatedcommunitypolicing,andeven

networkcentricpolicing.

Whileeveryonestandsfirmlyinfavorof‘truth’inalldealingsinatransparent

environment,thesearchfortruthismuchmorecomplexthanitmightfirstappear.Anyone

whohasbeenatthesceneofadomesticdisputeorstreetbrawlisawarethatthoseatthe

scenereadilyexpoundnumerousversionsof‘thetruth’.Evenaftercollectingallversionsand

physicalevidence,truthoftenremainselusive.Beyondthis,evidence(fromeyewitness

testimonytoforensic)oftenresultsinconflictinginterpretations;thewheelinganddealing

withinthecourtprocessoftenignoresorobscures‘truth’evenfurther.

Arelativelynewdiscipline,PopularCulture(Bailey&Hale,1998)views‘perceptions’as

moreimportantthantruthinthesearchfor‘reality’withinanyculture.Itgoessofarastoposit

thatperceptionsarethemajorfactorindetermining‘truth’andevenshapewhatisacceptedas

truth.Forexample,themyriadCSItelevisionprogramsprovideaperceptionthatforensic

evidenceisalwaysavailable,canbecollectedandanalyzedquickly,andisnecessarytoprovide

swiftandfairjustice.Whereastherealityisthatsuchevidenceissometimesavailableandcan

becollectedbytrained,competentinvestigators,oftensuchevidencehasbeendestroyed

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beforeauthoritiesarrived.Eveniffound,fewcrimelaboratoriescanprovidetestingand

analysisinhoursordays—usuallyitisweeksormonths—andisdoneatafacilitymanymiles

fromthecrimescene.Buttheperceptionhasledtotherealitythatnumerouscasesarelost

becauseforensicevidenceisnotforthcomingandjurors(manyofwhomareCSIfans)expected

itandaresuspiciousaboutwhyitismissing.Thustheperceptionismoreimportantthanthe

truthincreatingreality.

Transparencyrequires“openness,accountability,andhonesty.”Transparencyistobe

judgedbythe“depthofaccess”allowedandthe“depthofknowledge”providedtothepublic

(sunshinereview.org).Agenciesthatscorebestwouldnotonlyallowaccess,butwouldprovide

“proactivedisclosure”ratherthanwaitingforindividualrequestsforpublicrecords.Thus

providingtransparencyandtruthsupportedbypublicperceptionisfarfromsimple;the

complexrelationshipamongtheseandotherfactorsmustbestudiedanddecipheredifany

successistobeexpected.Itmaybethattheprocessismoreimportantthantheresultsand

thatprocessmustfollowfromcarefulanalysisandattentiontopolicydirectionthathasthe

bestchanceofleadingtothedesiredoutcomes.

Transparencyisdifficultinanypublicinstitution,buthasspecialproblemsinpublic

safetyagencies.Howmuchinformationcanorshouldbemadeavailableincaseswhere

suspectsareseeingandhearinginrealtimethesamebroadcasts/webcasts/blogsaseveryone

else?Whenmustinformationbewithheldtoprotecttheidentityandwellbeingofundercover

officersorinformants?Howmuchofdelicatenegotiationswithkidnappersorterroristscanbe

divulgedwithoutputtinglivesatrisk?Canvictims’namesbewithhelduntilnextofkinare

notified;isitevenpossibletowithholdsuchinformationinlightoftheomnipresentmedia?Isa

witnessprotectionprogramevenpossibleunderthisdefinitionordoesopennessrequirefull

disclosureofthewitness’whereaboutsandcircumstances?Howmuchcanbereleasedabout

interagencyhagglingforbudgetdollarswithoutsabotaginganychancethepublicsafety

missioncanbeaccomplished?Forthatmatter,cantherebeanyplaceleftforbehind-closed-

doorsmeetingswhereauthoritiescancandidlydiscussissuesratherthanpoliticallyposturefor

mediaand/orattendingcitizens?

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Evenwhentransparencyistheintentofagencies,truthdoesnotnecessarilyresultfrom

openness.Seeminglysimpletruths—whodidwhattowhomandwhy—areassociatedwith

doubtsanddisputesinmostcases.Keepingthepublicinformedassoonaspossibleinthe

interestoftransparencycanresultinwhatturnsouttobedisseminationofmisinformation,

whichcanruncountertothegoalofestablishingtrustwiththecommunity.Still,transparency

isnotachoice;itoccursinourhyper-connectedsociety—again,notnecessarilyrevealingtruth.

Truthforpurposesofthisdiscussionisbetterunderstoodasarelativeterm,ratherthan

anabsolute.Goodinvestigatorsrealizetheycollectevidence,notproof,andtheysupport

theories,notfact.Popularcultureliteraturepositsthattruthisaproductofperception.That

perceptionismoreimportantthantruthand,indeed,isthesourceoftruth.Thepreeminence

ofperceptionisbasictothepsychologicaltheoryofcognitivedissonance,whichholdsthat

whenanindividualisfacedwithdissonant(conflicting)cognitions(beliefs),discomfortis

createdandtheindividualseekstoreduceoreliminatethedissonance,usuallyintheeasiest

mannerpossible(Festinger,1957).Inmostcases,theindividualacceptingthecognitionthatis

closesttomatchinghis/herestablishedbeliefsremovestheconflict.Thischosenperception

thusbecomeshis/hertruth.Giventhesamechoice,anotherpersonmightfindtheoppositeor

adifferentcognitionmoreinharmonywithhis/herbeliefsystemandthusadoptthat

perception,whichthenbecomeshis/hertruth.Thusthesamesetof‘facts’becomesaseparate

truthfordifferentpeople.

Thisapproachissoingrainedinmostpeoplethattheychoosetheirsourcesof

informationbyhowcloselyitmatchestheirpreconceivedbeliefs,thusavoidingchallengesthat

couldresultincognitivedissonance.Thisisparticularlyevidentinthepublicsafetyarena,

whereadisagreementorconfrontationbetweenacitizen/suspectandapublicsafetyofficer

oftencanresultinvariouscitizengroupstakingsidesinthedisputebasedonpastexperience

andperceptions/beliefsabouteverythingfromcharacterofpolice,characteroftheethnic

groupofthesuspect,characteroftheagegroupofthesuspect,timeofdaytheeventoccurred,

etc.Whilestereotypingoftenisunfairandnotsupportedbythepreponderanceofavailable

evidence,itiswidelyusedbyallasanefficientwayofmanaginginformationandmaking

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decisions;cognitivedissonanceoccurswhenthosestereotypesarechallenged.Aftertheevent,

individualswillseekoutothersand/ormedia(e.g.,talkshows,websites,blogs)thatsupport

andthusreinforcetheirperceptions—theirtruths—aboutthedilemma.

Thustransparencydoesnotequaltruth,nordoestransparencyguaranteethatthe

opennessofprovidinginformationwillresultinthediscoveryoftruth.Still,theopennessand

sinceritywithwhichtheprocessisattemptedcanresultinthedevelopmentofthetrustand

dialoguethatisanessentialprerequisitetosuccessinanycommunitypolicingeffort.

Transparency,truth,andperceptionareinextricablyentwinedinacomplexrelationshipthat

publicsafetyofficialsmustdecipherinordertodevelopfairandeffectivepoliciesthatservethe

uniquecharacteristicsofeachindividualjurisdiction.

References

Bailey,F.Y.&Hale,D.C.(1998).Popularculture,crime,andjustice.Belmont,CA:

Wadsworth.

Festinger,L.(1957).Atheoryofcognitivedissonance.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress.

www.granicus.com/transparency

www.sunshinereview.org

17

TheRoleofLeadershipinFosteringTruthandTransparency

RichardW.Myers

TransparencyShapesCulture

Theleader’sroleinorganizationsisoftentargetedforspeculation,bothinoverstating

andunderestimatingimportance.Havingservedasaleaderforover25yearsinmultiplepolice

agencies,thisauthorcanattestthatday-to-daydecisionmakingbecomeslessandlessofthe

routineoftheleaderasorganizationsgrowinsize.Theimpactthatonemanorwomancan

haveonagroupofemployeeshasmanyvariables,includingthenatureoftheirrole,

experience,thecultureoftheorganization,thehistoryofrelationships,andtheperceptionof

power,whethergenuineorcontrived.Withrespecttoorganizationalculture,however,thereis

nodenyingthecriticalrolethattheCEOplays.Overtime,membersofanorganizationwill

reflecttheculturaltonesetbytheleader,eitherbyembracingtheprinciplesandbehaviors

modeled,oractingouttheconflictthatarisesfrompoorleadership.Forexample,leaderswho

demonstrateactivecollaborationwithoutsideorganizationsgenerallywillseeanoverall

climateofcollaboration;leaderswhoareinsularwill,conversely,seepartitioned,protective,

andsurvivalbehaviorswithintheirmembership.Oneareainwhichtheleader’sexamplesetsa

strongorganizationalexpectationistransparencyandtruthfulness.Astrongexampleoftruth

andtransparencybyleadershiphasimplicationsbothinternalandexternaltotheorganization.

Internally,transparencyandtruthfulnessshapeanddefineelementsoforganizational

communication.Whenaleaderspeaksdirectly,honestly,andisnotafraidtorevealallsidesof

anissueofimportancetothemembership,itempowersotherstoexchangeinformationina

similarmanner.Withtime,honestandopencommunicationbecomesanexpectation,and

peersarelikelytoholdeachotherhighlyaccountableforsustainingthiscommunicationstyle.

Leaderswhoownuptothetruthandthepricetagthatcomeswithitaremuchmorecredible

thanthosewhoavoidit;thoseleaderswhoseektoconcealordenyfaceanevengreaterlossof

credibility,andwithit,thelossoflegitimacy.

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Externally,particularlyinhighvisibilityorganizationssuchaspolicedepartments,

leaderswhoareforthrightconveytotheoutsideworldthathonestyandtransparencydefine

howtheorganizationwilltreatcustomers,critics,constituents,andeventheirownemployees.

Nowhereisthismorecriticalthanintimesofcrisisandwhenanorganizationmakesamistake.

Noorganizationisimpervioustoerror;whenhigh-riskorganizationserr,however,the

expectationforaccountabilityishigh.FormerChicagoPoliceSuperintendentTerryHilliardwas

knownfortheexpression:“Ifyoumessup….fessupandcleanup.”Ultimately,aCEO’s

behaviorswilllargelyshapetheorganization’sreputationfortrustandlegitimacy.

Despitethewide-rangingconjectureoftheroleofthepoliceCEO,mostpoliceleaders

areinthebusinessofshapingorganizationalculture.TheCEOwill,fromthetimeoftheir

appointment,constantlyassessthoseculturalelementsthatarepositiveandshouldbe

strengthenedandthosethatneedchanging.Successfulculturalchangeismostlikelywhenthe

CEOengagestheemployeesintheprocessandmaintainsapacethatischallengingyet

attainableforthemembership.ACEOwhoarosefromwithintherankshasperceptionsto

overcome,relatedtopersonalhistoryandsomewhomightbelievetheirloyaltytohistory

trumpstheneedforchange.ACEOappointedfromtheoutsidehasthechallengeofquickly

assimilatingandunderstandingculturalnuancestowhichtheyhavenotbeenpreviously

exposed.Inbothcases,culturalchangeinvolves‘sacredcows’;CEOsmustbesensitivein

communicatinganyneedforchange,pacingthechangeappropriately,andsignificantly

engagingtheemployees.

InternalTransparency

Focusinginternallyintheorganization,analmostuniversalphenomenoninpolice

organizationsisavaryinglevelofinherentmistrustbetweentherankandfileemployeesand

theCEO.Anabsenceofthismistrustistheexception,despitethefactthateachandevery

policeorganizationhasitsownuniqueculture.Inanyindustry,includingpolicing,therearetwo

kindsofculture,however.ThefirstmaybestbedescribedasThePoliceCulture,containing

elementsthatseemuniversalinalmostallpoliceorganizations.Theseculturalelementsare

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perpetuatedbyboththenatureofpoliceworkandthestrongnetworkingwithintheindustry.

AnexampleofanalmostuniversaldynamicofThePoliceCultureisthesignificantimpactthata

line-of-dutydeathhasonanentireorganizationandthesurroundingregionalfraternityof

police.Thedeathofanofficeralmostalwaysbringsasenseofcloseness,theresultofthe

sharedpainandrealityofthedangersoftheprofession.ItisanecessityandexpectationofThe

PoliceCulturetoamassagreatgatheringofpolicefromfarandwide,toexpressthecollective

griefandcompassionforthesurvivingco-workersandfamilymembers.

Locally,thesecondkindofcultureisthatwhichisuniquetoeachandevery

organization,nomatterthesize.Thus,theindustry‘Culture’andthelocal‘culture’combineto

formthatwhichistrulyindividualandunique.Intheaboveline-of-dutydeathexample,the

localculturewilldictatesomeoftheuniquenuancesofthefuneral,alongwiththelingering

psychologicalimpactonthedepartmentmembers,andhowinvolvedthedepartmentwillbe

withthesurvivingfamily.Thelocalculturemayallowforananalyticaldissectionoftheincident

sothatthelostlifemaycontinuetoprovideofficersafetylessonsforthepeergroup,whilein

otherlocalcultures,itmaybecometabootocritiqueanyactionsofthedeparted.

Bothkindsofculturesworktofeedanypresentelementofmistrustbetweenlaborand

management.Manyagencieshaveanhistoric‘mushroomsyndrome’,whereintheemployees

feel‘keptinthedarkandfedcompost,’evenifthisiscontrarytothestyleofthecurrentleader.

Industry-wide,thereisacommonperceptionthattheCEOisfarremovedfromthe‘realwork’

ofthestreetofficers,andthereoftenisafactualbasisforthatsense.Aswrittenpreviouslyby

theFuturesWorkingGroup,strictlyhierarchicalorganizationsaresubjecttothefilteringthat

comesfrommultiplelayersofsupervision,distortingmessagingsothatresultsrarelyalignwith

thestated‘truth’(Jackson,Myers,&Cowper,2010).And,inmostorganizations,therumormill

operatesataspeedwithwhichformalcommunicationscannotcompete.Collectively,these

cumulativefactorsbreedadegreeofmistrust.

ConscientiousCEOswillinvestsignificantefforttoovercomethisinherentmistrustand

theirdirectmessagingtoemployeesisastrongopportunityfortransparency.Nomatterwhat

sizeorganization,CEOswhomeetdirectlywithgroupsofemployeesenjoyanunfiltered

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experiencethatcomeswithimmediatefeedback.Asanewlyappointedpolicechieffrom

outsidetheorganization,Ifounditextremelyhelpfultoscheduletimetoattendshiftchanges

ateachoftheregionalpolicestationsundermycommand.Theattendingofficersbeganto

knowmeastheleaderANDasaperson.Theinteractionsprovidedaplatformtodirectlyconvey

theleader’sintentandvision,aswellaslisteningsessionstohearemployeeconcernsdirectly.

DirectdistributionofwrittencommunicationfromtheCEOwillbefreefromfilteringaswell;

however,sometimesaCEOsmessagedoesnotconnectwelldirectlywithlinelevelemployees

withoutsomedegreeofloyalandaccuratetranslationfrommiddlemanagement.Middle

managerswillknowthelocalcultureandhowtobesttranslateanymessagesthatmaybe

viewedasesotericortooacademictorelatetolinelevelemployees.

Filter-freewrittencommunicationismorelikelytooccuriftheCEOreliesonhighly

repetitiveandcleartalkingpoints,resultinginsupervisorsandmiddlemanagers‘carryingthe

flag’astheyfulfilltheinformaltranslationrole.Fromthedayofmyappointmentasthenew

chieffromoutsidetheorganization,Ibegantalkingaboutfourstraightforwardkeythemesof

myleader’svision.Irepeatedthosethemesalongwithexpandeddefinitionsthroughoutthe

termofmytenure.Overthecourseoftime,itwasapparentthatothersreferredtothose

themesastheydiscussedprograms,tactics,andconcernswithintheorganization.Theriskwith

anylevelofdirectcommunicationbetweentheleaderandthetroopsisthatitcanbe

threateningtomiddlemanagers;unlessthemanagersunderstandandembracethisstrategy,

theymayresistorevensabotagewhileengaginginsurvivalbehaviors.Ultimately,leaderswho

arewillingtoputasideegotoexplaintheiractionsanddecisionswillincreaseboth

transparencyandtrust.

Internaltransparencycomeswithbothbenefitsandcosts.Thebenefitsincludean

increasedsenseoftrustamongandwithinemployees.TheCEOisbetterabletosetavisionand

philosophyfortheentireorganizationtofollow.Consistenttruthfulnessandtransparencyby

theCEOisusuallyaccompaniedbyincreasedrespect,akeyingredientforstrongfollowership.

TheCEOneedstobepreparedforthecosts.Especiallyearlyon,someemployeeswilltestthe

newtransparency,asktoughquestions,anddemandexplanations.Somewillstudiouslytrack

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whathasbeensaidandcalloutanydeviationfrompreviouslystatedfacts,evenif

unintentional.Consistencybecomescriticalinthisenvironment.Sometimestransparency

unavoidablyshedslightonindividuals;rankandfilemayoverlookorevenviewthiswithglee

whenitadverselyimpactssomeoneofrankorauthority.However,whenalinelevelemployee

suffers,itmayresultinanoverallorganizationalrejectionorrevolt.WheneveraCEObeginsto

lifttheveilawayfromanorganization’s‘dirtylittlesecrets’therewilllikelybepushback,

especiallyifitresultsininquiriesintolongstandingpractices,policies,andotherelementsthat

comprisethesacredculture.

ExternalTransparency

Evenwhensomeofthepreviouslymentionedpushbackspillsoutintotheexternal

environment,practicingstrongexternaltransparencyprovidesahighlyeffectivemeansforboth

theCEOandtheentireorganizationtotelltheirstorytothecommunity.Whiletherelationship

betweenthemediaandthepolicevariesfromcommunitytocommunity,almostall

organizationswilllamentacertaindegreeofspinanddistortionbysomelocalreporters.Many

organizationsaregeneratingtheirownnewsthroughtheproactiveuseofsocialmedia;this

offersadirectandunfilteredmeanstodemonstratetrustandtransparency.Itiseasierto

attackanonymitythanitistheknown.Proactiveanddirectpubliccommunication,bathedin

transparency,increasespublicawarenessandfamiliaritywiththeirlocalpolice,inturn

increasingtrust.Somepoliceagenciesarestrategicallyadvancinginthepathofprivatesector

marketing,developingarecognizablebrandandevendirectmarketingtheirstoryandoutreach

tospecificsegmentsofthepublicthatmaybenefitfromastrongerrelationshipwiththepolice.

Increasingtrustwithminoritygroups,mentalhealthprovidersandconsumers,schools,

businesses,andunderrepresentedsegmentsofsocietycanonlybenefitthepartnership

betweenthepoliceandthecommunity.Whileservingaschiefinalargecommunity,I

developedadvisorycommitteesfromwithintheminoritycommunitiesandthefaith

communitiestoprovideadirectexchangeofinformation.Overtime,themutualtrustlevelrose

significantly;thisrequiredaleveloffranknessthatattimeswasuncomfortableforthe

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attendingcommandstaff,butprovidedatimelymodelingopportunityasaleaderto

demonstratethevalueoftransparency.Thewillingnesstorevealaspectsofthepolice

organizationthathavehistoricallybeeninaccessiblecanreversepriormediadrivenperceptions

andgrowtrust.Genuinetransparency,however,isnotsimplymarketingthegoodnews.The

previousquoteabout‘ifyoumessup,fessup’highlightstheequallyimportantresponsibilityto

acknowledgemistakes,lessonslearned,andproposedsolutions.

Externaltransparencycarriespotentialcosts,aswell.Theinitialincreaseintransparency

mayincluderevealingpreviouslywithhelderrorsormisbehaviors;intheshortterm,thismay

increasemistrustasthepublicponderswhytheinformationwasnotreleasedpreviously.To

strengthenmyagency’scompliancewithpublicaccountabilitystandards,ouragencybegan

publishingannualInternalAffairsInvestigationsummarydata.Membersofthecommandstaff

werehighlyreluctanttopublishthesummarydata,rightfullyconcernedaboutstimulating

increasedmediascrutiny.Overtime,themediakeysinonthetrendsupordownandlesson

specificcases,exceptforthemoreegregiousandtitillatingexamples.

Someemployeesmaynotreadilyacceptorappreciatealeader’sairingthe

organization’s‘dirtylaundry,’resultinginlongertermresentmentandpushback.Atthe

extreme,nomatterwhatdegreeoftransparencyexists,renegadeemployeesatsomeagencies

haveembarkedontheirownexternaltransparencyefforts.Examplesinmanycitiesinclude

postedcommentsattheendofweb-basednewsstoriesbloggedbythoseidentifying

themselvesaspoliceemployees.Evenmoreseverearesocialmediapostsandcontrolledby

destructivecurrentorformeremployeeswhomayweaveathreadoftruthamongtheir

extremeperceptionsandmisstatements.SuchcontentposesasignificantchallengetotheCEO

whoseeksinternalandexternaltransparency;ononehand,theydonotwanttolegitimizethe

blogsbyacknowledgingtheirexistence,andontheotherhand,ignoringthemprovidesno

counterbalance.

Finally,anunintendedconsequenceofincreasedexternaltransparencymayresultin

the‘givethemaninchandthey’lltakeamile’syndrome.Oneormoremembersofthemedia

mayneverbesatisfiedwiththeincreasedflowoffactsandinformation,insteadincreasingtheir

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demandsformoreandmoreprobativeandsensitiveinformation.Eventhemosttransparent-

mindedCEOrecognizesthatinthepolicingbusiness,employeesafetyandcertainmissions

requirestrictconfidentiality.

FutureConsiderationsonTransparency

CEOswhoarehesitanttoembracethespiritoftransparencymayhavenochoiceinthe

future.Opensourceinformationisincreasinginspeedofavailabilityandisbecoming

ubiquitousforanyandall,includingpoliceorganizationmembers.Anyattemptstokeep

informationfromemployeeswillonlydrivethemtoseekalternativesources;thispreemptsthe

leader’sabilitytoremovefilteringthatmightaltertheperceptionsoftheemployees.

Conversely,theCEOwhohasaclearvisionofadvancedtransparencycouldturntosocialmedia

andsimilartechnologiesasameanstoproactivelygetinformationouttoemployeesaheadof

therumormill.

Despitetherelentlesspursuitoffasterdisseminationofinformation,speedwillneedto

bebalancedwithaccuracyandcompleteness.Informationinpolicingisdynamic;the‘truth’

oftenchangesasmorefactsareknown.Themediatendstooverlookthisdynamicinpolicing,

resultingintheappearanceofuncertaintybythepoliceorevenintentionaldeceit.Howpolice

employeesexplainandupdatedynamicinformationwilllargelyinfluenceifthetransparency

helpsorhindersincreasedtrust.Associalmediahasexploded,attemptstokeepinformation

secretorproprietaryhavebecomefutile.Thosewhoclingtothehistoricabilitytoconceal

unpleasantcircumstancesareatincreasedriskofirrelevance.Futureleaderswilldemonstrate

skillattransparencycoupledwithaccountability.

Finally,empoweredemployeesaremostlikelytobehavewithalevelofexternal

transparency.TheroleoftheCEOtofirmlygroundtheorganizationanditsmemberswith

valuesandprinciplesanddefinetheboundariesofacceptablebehaviorsiscrucialinthis

environment(Myers,2007).Inallqualityorganizations,aclimatethatallowsgrowththrough

innovationandevenmistakesservestoempoweremployeesandincreasetheircompetencies.

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Atransparentpoliceorganizationwillnottrytodisavoworcoverupmistakes;rather,itwill

rewardemployeegrowthandbuildtrustwithitscommunitythrougheducationand

accessibility.

References

Jackson,J.,Myers,R.,&Cowper,T.(2010).Leadershipinthenet-centricorganization.InJ.

Schafer&S.Boyd(eds.),Advancingpoliceleadership:Considerations,lessonslearned,

andpreferablefutures(pp.138-149).Quantico,VA:FuturesWorkingGroup.

Myers,R.(2007).Frompyramidstonetworks:Policestructureandleadershipin2020.InJ.

Schafer(ed.),Policing2020:Exploringthefutureofcrime,communities,andpolicing

(pp.487-519).Quantico,VA:FuturesWorkingGroup.

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Private/PublicPartnershipsforFosteringTrustwithintheCommunity

AlanYoungs

OneneedonlyreviewtheeventsinAurora,Colorado,duringtheAuroratheatre

shootingonJuly20th,2012toseeanexampleofhowpolicecanbuildtrustinthecommunityin

timesofcrisis.Apoliceresponseof90secondsafterthefirst911callandtheabilitytomobilize

alargenumberofofficersforrapidresponsekeptthelossoflifefromreachingevenhigher

levels.Twelvepeoplediedand58wereinjured.Communicationbetweendepartmentsand

districtsweresecondtonone.Therespondingofficersexemplifiedprofessionalism.TheEMTs

andprivatesectormedicalpersonnelworkedwiththepoliceasateamandwereallattheir

best.TheleadershipfromtheAuroraChiefofPoliceDanOateswassuperb.Whilethemedia

clamoredfordetails,ChiefOatesgavethemimportantfacts,butclearlydeclaredthat

informationpertinenttothecasewouldnotbereleasedlestthecasebejeopardizedand

justicenotbedeliveredtothevictims.Hewascalm,hewasinformative,hewas

compassionate,andhereassuredthepublicthattheirsafetywasofutmostimportance.

Itwasobviousinthishorrificsituation,aswithotherssuchasSeptember11th,

Columbine,andLasVegasthatthepoliceproudlydisplayedthetrainingtheyhadreceivedto

protectandserve.Still,astheoldadagegoes,peopleloveandwantthepoliceincrisis.Trust

canbeerodedwhentransparencyandtrutharelacking.Transparencyandtruthshouldalways

bepartofdailypolicework.Itisnot,aswithChiefOates,alwaystellingeverythingthatis

happening,butcommunicatinginawaythatpeopleunderstandthereasonsinformationis

withheld.Itisnotjustwhatiscommunicatedbuthowitiscommunicated.Transparency

extendstopolicebudgets,salaries,pensions,training,andexpertise.Itisadmittingthatthe

privatesectorcaninsomecasesdoasgoodorbetterajobatalowercost.Itiskeeping

budgets,salaries,overtime,andpensionprogramsbeforethepubliceyebecausetheycanbe

andshouldbejustifiable.

Everyonesuffersinaneconomiccrisis.Thereneedstobebalancebetweentheprivate

andpublicsector.Governmentsworldwideareviewedaswastefulandoftencorrupt.Public

26

workersareviewedasbeingrewardedmorethantheprivatesectorworker,theirpensions,

medicalbenefits,andsalariesuntouchedbymarketconditions.Thisisnotalwaystrue,butthe

perceptionremainsandcutsarebeingdemandednationwidetopublicworkerbenefitsand

bargainingpowers.Buildingandmaintainingrelationshipsoftrustbetweenlawenforcement

andthecommunitiestheyserveisthecornerstoneofsuccessfulpolicing.Theimportanceof

trustingrelationshipswillpreventactsofcrimeandterrorism.Withtheevolvingnatureof

immigrantandminoritycommunities,communitypolicingisdescribedasasuccessfulstrategy

thatcanbeusedbylawenforcementtocollaborateandpartnerwithlocalcommunities.The

buildingandmaintenanceoftrusttakesagreatdealofcontinuouseffort.

Unfortunately,theethicalworkofthousandsoflocallawenforcementofficersiseasily

undonebytheactionsofoneunethicalofficer.Oftentheindictmentofoneseemslikean

indictmentofall.Thechallengesfacedmustbeaddressedwithlawenforcementand

communitiestodeveloprelationshipsoftrust.Forlawenforcementagencies,itmeansthat

meaningfuldialogandcollaborationwithcommunitiesneedstooccurinamannerthat

increaseslegitimacyoftheagencyintheeyesofthatcommunity.Forcommunities,their

leadersandrepresentativesmustcollaboratewithlawenforcementandshareresponsibilityfor

addressingtheproblemsofadministrationandbudgeting,aswellascrimeandterrorism

prevention.

Therearenearly18,000stateandlocallawenforcementagenciesintheUnitedStates

employingover700,000full-timeswornpersonnel(Reaves,2011).Ithasbeenestimatedthat

therearealmost2millionindividualsengagedinsomeformofprivatesecuritywithintheU.S.

Privatesecuritycompaniesofferawidevarietyofservicesfrombasicunarmedguardsto

sophisticatedcomputersecurity.Over80%ofourcountry’sinfrastructure(water,power,

transportation,etc.)isprotectedbyprivatesecurity.Publiclawenforcementhasthelegal

mandatetoenforcelawsandwhilesomeeffortshavebeenmadetoadoptapreventionmodel,

inrecentyears,theyhavemorefrequentlyfollowedtheenforcementmodel.Privatesecurity

generallyfollowsapreventionstrategy.Cooperativeeffortsamongthepublic,police,andthe

privatesectorarenotnew.However,sincetheattackonSeptember11,2001,therehasalso

27

beenakeeninterestinpublic/privatepartnershipsthatwouldincreasehomelandsecurity.

Collaborationandinformationsharingbetweenbothwillbecriticaltoanysuccesswewillhave

incombatingterrorism.

BuildingandSustainingTrustCanBeDifficult

Howthecommunityperceiveslawenforcementdependsoneachpolicedepartment.

Howthedepartmentinteractswithitscitizens,howaccessibleitistothecommunity,andhow

itmanagesinternalissuesareintegraltotheprofessionoverall.Itisforthesereasonsthat

buildingandmaintainingcommunitytrustisthehallmarkofeffectivepolicing.Thepublic’strust

inlawenforcementmaybefleetingifpoliceexecutivesdonotcontinuallyreinforcesound,

ethicalpoliciesandprocedurestoagencypersonnelandtothepublic.Maintaininghonorand

integritywithintheorganizationwillresultinbuildingandsustainingatrustingrelationship

betweenthepublicandthepolice.

TherapidlychangingdemographicfaceofAmericaischangingthelandscapeofthe

communitiesthatlawenforcementagenciesserve.TheUnitedStatesisanationbrought

togetherunderthepromiseofliberty,equality,andopportunity,foundedonprinciplesandthe

ruleoflaw.Thepolicearetheguardiansofthelawsandprinciplesandservethenoblecauseof

preservingourdemocracy24/7,365daysayearonthefrontlinesoftheUnitedStates,the

streetsandhomesofAmerica.UnlikethemilitarythatdefendstheUnitedStatesfromforeign

threats,thepolicemissionistoproactivelydefendandpreserveachosenwayoflife:

democracy.Assuch,thepolicebeingthemostvisiblerepresentativesofgovernmentinsociety

arethemostcrucialelementofajust,fair,andfreenation.

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TheFutureofPublic/PrivatePartnerships

Today’spolicedepartmentsareundermonumentalpressuretoreducecrimewithfewer

resources.3Privatizationoflawenforcementisnotanewconcept(Bayley&Shearing,2001).

Franceledthewayinthesystematicnationalizationofpolicinginthe17thcentury.

NationalizationofpolicingfollowedthroughouttherestofcontinentalEuropeandwas

concentratedlargelyintowns,whichoftendeferredtotheprivateauthorityofthelandowning

aristocracy.IntheUnitedStates,wherecitiesgraduallygovernmentalizedpolicinginthemiddle

ofthe19thcentury,privatepolicingneverreallydied.Theeconomicboominthelate1990’s

increasedwagesandratesofemployment.Thisimpactedthereductionofcrime.Duringthe

1990’scriminalpunishmentalsoincreased.Onceconvicted,prisonersnowstayedincarcerated

longer.Crimeappearstodecreasewhenpunishmentincreasesandthereverseprovestrueas

well.In2017,theneedformoreprisonspacehasincreasedandalthoughthecostofbuilding

andmaintainingmoreprisonsishigh,thecostofnotdoingsoappearstobehigher.Thecurrent

economyisforcingtheearlyreleaseofprisonersandtheeffectshaveyettobedetermined

especiallyinCalifornia.

TerenceJ.ManganandMichaelG.Shanahanhavedocumentedthemovementinmore

recenttimes(1990).Whilethe1960swascharacterizedasaperiodofindifferencetoward

privatesecurity,andthe1970sasoneofchangingperceptionsandsomemistrustofthe

industry,theyrightlypredictedthe1990swouldbeaneraofcollaborationandjointventures

betweenpubliclawenforcementandprivatesecurity.Inthefuture,thistrendwillcontinue.

Thisisnecessitatedbythefactthatindividualandcorporatecitizenswhoarepolicedbypublic

lawenforcementarealsoincreasinglybecomingtheclientsofprivatesecurity,asillustratedby

theuseofcorporatesecurityandtheincreaseinthenumberofgatedcommunities.

Thegoalforpolicedepartmentsistocontinuethereductionincrimerates.However,

achievingthisrequiresmorepolicingandmorecostpreciselywhenlawenforcementagencies

3For graphic representations of the trends on expenditures for law enforcement officers and number of police officers compared

to private security agents, please visit www.ncpa.org/studies/s181/gif/s181c.gif and www.ncpa.org/studies/s181/gif/s181d.gif

29

faceseriousrecruitmentproblems,additionalequipmentcosts,adecreaseintaxrevenues,and

legislativerestrictionsdenyingaccesstoanysurpluses.“Manymunicipalitiesandcountieslack

thenecessaryfundsduetolegislatedlimitsontaxationandspending.Fortunately,privatization

ofcertainpolicefunctionshasprovenapowerfulsolutiontotheproblem.Thesteadydeclineof

governments’capitalresourcesandtheirincreasinglyurgentsearchforwaystocontinue

providingtheservicesthatcitizensdemandwithoutraisingtaxesaredrivingtheprivatization

trend.Somefederalagencieshavesavedasmuchas50percentbyhiringcontractorstoprovide

services”(Smith,1991).Justascorporationsoutsourcemanyservicestoenablethemto

concentrateoncorecompetencies,theuseofprivatefirmsbylawenforcementagenciesfrees

themtoconcentratetheireffortsondutiesthatonlytrainedpoliceofficerscan,andshould,do.

Public-privatepartnershipscanprovidemanybenefits,especiallyintermsofpairinglaw

enforcementwithaprivatesecurityprovidertosavepublicmonies.

Perhapsthemostpromisingbutleaststudiedsourceofexternalsupportforpolice

reformistheprivatebusinesscommunity.Notonlydoprivatesectorcompaniescommand

politicalattention,theyholdtalent,dynamism,creativity,andawealthofresourcesthatcanbe

usefultoreformerswithinpoliceagencies.Atthesametime,partnershipswithprivate

businesses,ifpoorlystructured,canerodetheprofessionalismandlegitimacyofpolice

organizations.Themostsuccessfulpoliceleaderswhowelcomeorpromotepartnershipswith

thebusinesscommunityarecarefulnottoadopttheprofitmotiveofbusinessastheirown,nor

toassumethatallbusinesspeoplenecessarilyunderstandcustomerserviceorqualitycontrol

(Bhanu&Stone,2004).

Moreover,simplybyengagingwithpoliceleadersintheprocessofretrainingthefront-

linestaff,businessleaderscanhelpbuildacultureofserviceinpoliceorganizations.AsDavid

Bayleynotes,“Increasingcontactsbetweenpolicepersonnelandrespectable,non-criminal

membersofthepublicisanimportantwayofencouragingthedevelopmentofanaccountable,

service-orientedpoliceorganization”(Bayley,2001).Thepolicedependoncitizenstoassistin

almosteveryaspectofcrimepreventionandinvestigation.Mobilizingthatpublicsupportis

essentialtothecoremissionandgoodtreatmentofthepublicisonewaytobuildpublic

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support.Goodtreatmentandprofessionalservicearehardenoughtodeliverincalm

encountersbetweenpoliceandcitizens,butparticularlychallengingintheemotionallycharged

circumstancesinwhichcitizensandthepolicetypicallyturntoeachotherforhelp.“Apartfrom

officialsinspecializedcrimedetectionagencies,mostoperationalpoliceofficialsengagedin

routine,daytoday,policingprobablyspendmostoftheirtimeassistingpeoplewhoare

experiencingsomekindofpersonalemergency”(Crawshaw,Devlin,&Williamson,1998).Like

themostsuccessfulbusinesses,policeorganizationsshouldberecruiting,training,and

supervisingtoachievethehighestlevelofservicetocitizens.

ExamplesofPrivate/PublicPartnerships

Lakewood,Colorado

Lakewoodoffersanexampleofthebenefitsofoutsourcinglawenforcementtasksto

privatefirms.Lakewoodhasapopulationof154,000withinthemetropolitanDenverarea.Its

progressiveapproachtopublic-privatepartnershipsinlawenforcementisdemonstratedbyits

trackrecord.Thecityhascontractedwithoutsidefirmsforpolicedepartmentassistancefor

over25years.Thisprogressiveattitudecomesfromacommunityknownforitsqualitypolicing

—duetoitsrecruitmentandtrainingprograms,andits48-yearhistoryofrequiringcollege

degreesfromitsofficers.Lakewoodhasproducedmorepolicechiefspercapitathananyother

cityinthenation.ApproximatelyoneofeverytenofficershiredinLakewoodhasgoneonto

becometoplawenforcementexecutives.TheyincludethechiefsofdepartmentsinNaperville,

Illinois;Clearwater,Florida;Kettering,Ohio;andtherecentInternationalAssociationofChiefs

ofPolicepresident,Plano,TexasChiefofPolice,andCityManager.

TheLakewoodPoliceDepartmentwasrecognizedin1996asoneoftheeightbest

suburbanlawenforcementpoliceagenciesbyapanelofexpertsqueriedbyGood

Housekeepingmagazine.Itisatwo-timehonoreebytheColoradoAssociationofChiefsof

Policeforinnovationinlawenforcement.In2002LakewoodreceivedthePioneerAwardforits

public/privatepartnershipswithFirstWatchSecurity,whichwasalsoresponsibleforsecurityat

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theDenverInternationalAirport.AsofJanuary1,2011,anewagreementwasestablishedwith

G4SSecureSolutionsU.S.A.(formerlyWackenhut).Currentlytheypay$45.00perhourfor

CrimeSceneSecurity(12hourminimum)andHospitalPrisonerSecurity(4hourminimum)and

$60.00anhour(12hourshift)foramarkedvehicle.

Manycrimescenestakeanaverageoftwodaystoprocess.Since24-hourprotectionis

required,itmakescompleteeconomicsensetoutilizeprivatesecurityforthisassignmentata

muchlessercost.TheG4Sofficersarespeciallyselectedforcrimescenedetailbasedontheir

backgroundandexperience,andoftenattendLakewoodPoliceDepartmentrollcallsfor

training(justasmembersoftheLakewoodpoliceattendG4Srollcalls).TheG4Sofficersknow

therulesofevidence,andmanyarecertifiedpoliceofficersinthestateofColorado.They

provide24-hourassistance,typicallyrespondingwithinfourhoursofthedepartment’srequest.

Allhavebeeninvestigatedforbackgroundclearancesandhavebeenprocessedthroughthe

ColoradoBureauofInvestigationtoensuretheyhavenocriminalrecord.AsRussellRuffin,a

reporterforLawEnforcementTelevisionNetworkputsitsosuccinctly,“Payingaprivate

securityofficeranhourlyratetoguardaprisoneroracrimescenefreesuppoliceofficers.

Policedon’thavetocallinanofficeronovertimeorpullsomeoneoffpatrolduty”(Ruffin,

http://www.ncpa.org).

NewOrleans,Louisiana

DuringthewakeofHurricaneKatrina,aninvestigativereportcondemnedtheNew

OrleansPoliceDepartmentonvirtuallyeveryaspectofpolicework.AlthoughmanyNOPD

officersshouldbepraisedfortheiractions,theirstorieswilllikelynevergettoldbecauseofthe

callousdisregardforthetruthdisplayedbysomemembersofthedepartment.Trustistheglue

ofpolicing,andsuccessisimprovedwhenthereisapartnershipinkeepingcommunitiessafer.

Policecanhelpdevelopasymbiotic‘we’relationshipinsteadofan‘usandthem’onebymaking

transparencyandapproachablevisibilitypartoftheirequationin‘protectingandserving.’

32

Currently,theNOPDisunderaDepartmentofJusticeconsentdecree.TheDOJissued

recommendationstoimprovetheNOPDandensurefundamentalculturalchange.Thegoalof

theDOJrecommendationsistosparkreformsthatwilltakeholdandremaininplacemorethan

adecadefromnow.Therecommendationsincludeasignificantemphasisintransparency,

communityengagement,andsustainability.Twentycommunityleadersfromindustry,

academia,andtheclergyserveontheboardofTheNewOrleansPoliceFoundation,apublic-

privatepartnershipdedicatedtostrengtheningthepolicedepartmentandpromotingpublic

safetyinNewOrleans.Leavingpoliceoversighttootheragencies,thefoundationfocuseson

crimereduction.Sinceitscreationin1995,theFoundationhaschangedthepolice

department’sdefinitionof‘success’fromnumberofarrestsmadetoreductionincrimerates.It

hassustainedtheinterestofthebusinesscommunitybyshowingthecorrelationbetweenthe

dropincrimerateandriseinhotelroomoccupancy.Itprovidesmaterialsupporttopolice

officersbywayofhealthinsuranceandtuitionreimbursement.TheFoundationmaintainsopen

communicationswiththemayor’soffice,citycouncil,federalagencies,andthepolice

department.

Fresno,California

Injustoneexample,onecanseethesavingswhichwerereapedbytheFresno,

Californiasheriff’sdepartmentbyoutsourcingitstransportofprisoners.Itcostthedepartment

$284totransportaprisonerfromSanDiegotoFresnousingaprivatefirm.Thesametripusing

sheriff’sdepartmentpersonnelandequipmentwouldcostthreetimesasmuch(West,1993).

SanFrancisco,California

Likemanypolicedepartmentsaroundthecountry,theSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment

wasslowtoadoptcutting-edgetechnology—nosurpriseconsideringthechroniclackoffunding

forlawenforcement.HundredsofcitiesrelyonCOPLINK,asystemforsharinginformation

amongmultiplejurisdictions,butfewgotothetroubleofbuildingtheirowndatawarehouse.In

33

fact,SFPDuntilrecentlywaspracticallydevoidoftechnology—ironicconsideringSan

Francisco’sstandingasatechnologyhub.Crimereportingmethodsinthecitybythebayhad

notevolvedforalongperiodoftime.Thepolicedepartmentdidnotevenhavedepartment-

widee-mailuntil2011.SFPDhasquicklysheditsLudditepast.Theweb-basedcrimedata

warehouseisoperational(containingovertwodecadesoftext,photos,maps,sound,and

video),andthedepartmenthasrolledoutanappdesignedtoletofficersfilereportsandaccess

thecrimedatawarehousewithtabletsandsmartphones.FormerPoliceChiefGregSuhr

wantedtoallowofficerstostayinthefieldlonger,insteadofspendinghoursintheofficefiling

reportsoncomputers.

SanFrancisco’sembraceoftechnologyfollowedthearrivalofEdLeeasmayorofSan

FranciscoinJanuary2011.AppointedbytheBoardofSupervisorstoserveoutthetermof

GavinNewsom—whohadbeenelectedstatelieutenantgovernor—Leewentontowinthe

mayoralelection.Unfortunately,MayorLeepassedawayin2017.Leewantedtomodernizecity

government.Hecametoofficewithanimportantally–RonConway,SiliconValley’scurrent

super-angelparexcellence.ConwaybackedLeeintheelectionandwantedabusiness-friendly

citygovernment.HefiguredLee,withsomehelp,couldbringSanFranciscointothe21st

century.Aftertheelection,LeeandConwaycreatedSanFranciscoCitizensInitiativefor

TechnologyandInnovation,to“leveragingthecollectivepowerofthetechsectorasaforcefor

civicaction.”Itnowboastsnearly300membercompaniesrepresenting90percentofthecity’s

techpopulation.TheCitizensInitiativegave$100,000fordevelopmentofSFPD’scrimedata

warehouse,aswellasthenewmobileapp.Hewlett-Packardchippedinwith60high-end

notebookPCs,thatgaveofficersinthefieldaccesstothecrimedatawarehouse.

Thenewmobileapp,developedbyCitizensInitiativememberArcTouch,letspolice

dispensewiththepaper,cameras,andaudiorecorderstheyhavetraditionallycarriedintothe

field.Instead,officerswithtabletsormobilephonesuseGPS,imagerecording,andspeech

recognitiontocreatecrimereportsinthetimeittakestograbadoughnutandacupofcoffee.

Thereportscanbetransmittedfromamobiledevicetothecrimedatawarehouse,wherethe

real-timeinformationcanhelpotherdepartmentpersonneltracktrends,matchsuspects,and

34

generallymakethecityasaferplace.ArcTouchsaidtheappwilldelivered“theholygrail—any

informationyouneed,availableatanytime.”Whowouldhaveguessedthatthesupercopof

thefuturewouldbearmedwithaniPad?4

Chicago,Illinois

Partnershipsbetweenlocallawenforcementagenciesandprivatebusinessesare

trending,especiallyincyberspace.ThecityofChicago’scamerasystemincludesanetworkof

publicandprivatesurveillancecameras.AbouthalfofthevideofeedsavailabletotheChicago

policecomefromprivatecamerasthatcanbeaccessedbylawenforcementpersonnel.The

ChicagoSunTimesreportedina12/13/2016articlethatthereare2700publicsafetycameras

inChicagothatarepartofabroadernetworkof27,000privateandgoverned-owned

surveillancecameras.MayorRahmEmanuelstatedinthesamearticlethatcameras“havebeen

extremely”helpfulinfightingcrimeparticularlyontheChicagoTransitAuthority.Chicago’s

OfficeofEmergencyManagementandCommunicationsconductsauditstoensurethatonly

approvedpersonnelhaveaccesstothesurveillancesystemanduseitappropriately.

Publicandprivatesectorpartnershipsbetweenpoliceandprivatesecurityguardswill

continuetoexpand,especiallyinChicagowherehightechcamerasoutnumberpoliceofficers.

TheproblemwithprogramssuchasChicago'slatestpublic/privatepolicingstrategyislackof

oversight,clearboundaries,andvetting-justtonameafew.Privatesecurityagenciesare

regulatedbyeachstate.Therefore,hiringstandards,trainingandbackgroundchecksvary.

WhilethevideofeedwillgototheCPD,theprivatesecurityfirmwillhaveaccesstothelive

videofeedintheofficeandinthesecuritypatrolcars.5

4Einstein, D. “San Francisco Cops”. Retrieved July 25, 2012 from www.forbes.com.

5“Chicago police partner with private security firm”. Retrieved June 3rd, 2012 from www.examiner.com.

35

Minneapolis,Minnesota

In2003,TargetCorporationfootedthebillforatleast30securitysurveillancecamerasit

sharedwiththeMinneapolisPoliceDepartment.Target’sSafeCityinitiativewasan

unprecedentedmergeintothegovernment'sbusinessfollowing9/11.London-stylecameras

wereinstalledovera10-blockshoppingareaincludingTarget'scorporateheadquartersandthe

TargetCenter.CivilrightsgroupsarguedthattheSafeCityinitiativewouldimpactU.S.citizens'

rightstofreedomofexpressionandprivacy.

UnitedKingdom

Eveninsomeofthebestresourcedandmostrespectedpoliceorganizations,business

leadersareguidingtheprocessofcontinuingreform.IntheUnitedKingdom,forexample,

LondonFirst,amembershiporganizationofsomeofthebiggestLondonbusinesses,is

sponsoring‘jointmentorships’thatpairbusinessleadersandpoliceboroughcommandersto

exchangeviewsandexpertise.LondonFirstisapplyingbusinesspracticesinrecruitingand

trainingtoimprovethosefunctionsinthepoliceserviceandplanstousethebusiness

community’sexpertiseinmarketingandcommunicationstoimprovetheprofileofthepolicein

London.OrganizersassertthatLondonisalreadyoneofthesafestcitiesintheworld,butthey

insistthatbusinessleadershavearoleinmakingitevensaferandbetterpoliced.6

HowtoApproachaPublic/PrivatePartnership

Totakeadvantageofthemanybenefitsapublic/privatepartnershipcanprovide,

especiallyintermsofpairinglawenforcementwithaprivatesecurityprovidertosavepublic

monies,keepinmindthefollowingrecommendationsissuedbytheIndependentPolicyReport

(Blackstone&Hakim,1996):

6Partnership in Policing (February, 2001). http://www.c-london.co.uk/data/partnership in_policy.pdf.

36

· Servicesthathavethepotentialtobepricedshouldbeconsideredcandidatesforprivateprovisionorusercharges.

· Considerationshouldbegiventoprivatizingtasksthatdonotrequirethefullrangeofskillsofpublicpoliceofficers.Notonlywouldsavingsbeobtained,butalsopoliceofficerswouldbecomemoreavailableforperformingthetasksonlytheycanperform.

· Servicessuchasresponsetoalarmscouldbeprovidedprivately.Inanycase,theowners

ofalarmsshouldpayfortheservicestheydemand.SaltLakeCityandLasVegashavemodelverifiedalarmprograms.

· Privatesecuritycanbeeffectiveinadistinctgeographicarea.Therefore,apartment

complexes,amongothers,oughttobeencouragedtoconsiderprivatepolicing.Competitionamongapartmentcomplexestoprovidesaferenvironmentsoughttobeencouraged.Infact,requiringorencouragingpublicationofapartments’safetyexperiencemightbedesirabletopermitrenterstomakeinformedchoices.

· Governmentswouldprobablybewellservedbyfacilitatinganexpansionofprivate

security.Anyrelativelylow-skillorspecializedhigh-skillservicesthatarecurrentlyprovidedpubliclycouldbeconsideredascandidatesfortransfertoprivatesecurity.

· Monitoringcontractorcomplianceandperformancemustnotbesocostlyasto

eliminatethesavingsfromprivatization.

· Statelegislaturesshouldconsiderwhetherthecurrentlegalstatusandregulationspertainingtoprivatesecurityareappropriateinviewoftheexpandedroleexpectedfromprivatesecurity.Specifically,emergencyvehiclestatusandexpandedpowersofarrestoughttobeexamined.

· Problem-orientedpolicingisamethodthatofferstheprospectofimproved

police/privatepartnershipsindealingwithspecificcrimeproblems.

· Governmentsshouldbeencouragedtoexpandtheuseofcommunitypolicing,becausetheapproachoffershopeforimprovingpoliceperformanceandthecommunity’ssenseofparticipation.Likeprivatization,communitypolicinghelpssocietybetterdeterminetheuseofitsscarcepoliceresources.Further,itbringsthepolice“back”toconstituents.Successfulcommunitypolicingsatisfiesthedesiresofthecommunity.

Conclusion

Theimportanceoftrustandtransparencywithlawenforcementandthecommunityare

essentialtothesuccessofbothentities.Itisthedutyofeverypoliceleadertodaytoembrace

37

thechallenge,understandthecomplexities,andtakebold,proactive,transformativeactions

thatwillclosethegapbetweenwhereweareandwherewemustbe.Thedialogueistaking

placeincommunitiesacrosstheUnitedStates.Ifagenciesarewillingtolistenwithgraceand

respect,engageinintellectualhonestyandprofessionalintrospection,andseekthekindof

mindshiftsandheartshiftsrequiredoftwenty-firstcenturypolicing,thentheyhavethe

opportunitytotrulybeguardiansofthegreatdemocracy.

Reference

Bayley,D.H.(2001).Democratizingthepoliceabroad:Whattodoandhowtodoit.Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofJustice.

Bayley,D.H.&Shearing,C.D.(2001).Thenewstructureofpolicing:Description,conceptualization,andresearchagenda.Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofJustice,NationalInstituteofJustice.

Bhanu,C.&Stone,C.(2004).Public-privatepartnershipsforpolicereform.NewYork:VeraInstituteofJustice.

Blackstone,E.A.&Hakim,S.(1996).Policeservices:Theprivatechallenge.Oakland,CA:IndependentInstitute.

Crawshaw,R.,Devlin,B.&Williamson,T.(1998).Humanrightsandpolicingstandardsforgoodbehaviourandastrategyforchange.TheHague:KluwerLawInternational.

Mangan,T.J.&Shanahan,M.G.(1990).Publiclawenforcement/privatesecurity:Anewpartnership?FBILawEnforcementBulletin,59(1),18-22.

Reaves,B.(2006).Censusofstateandlocallawenforcementagencies,2008.Washington,DC:BureauofJusticeStatistics.

Smith,W.J.(1991).Privatesectordevelopment:Awinningstrategyfornewpolicestations,sheriff’sstations,andjails.ThePoliceChief,63(8),29-33.

West,M.L.(1993).Getapieceoftheprivatizationpie:Privatesecurityagencies.SecurityManagement,37(3),54.

38

TheFridayCrabClub,Redux

JosephA.Schafer

AugustVollmerstandsasagiantinthehistoryofpoliceprofessionalisminAmerica.As

leaderoftheBerkeley(CA)PoliceDepartmentfrom1905-1932,Vollmerworkedtirelesslyto

advancetheimagethatpolicingwasnotsimplyajob,butwasaprofession.Assuch,officers

wereexpectedtobeeducated,articulateexpertswhocouldusecontemporarytechnologyand

knowledgetodeliverpolicingserviceswithintegrityandquality.Vollmerplayedamajorrolein

advancinghighereducationinpolicing,contributingtheemergenceofcriminologyandcriminal

justiceaslegitimateacademicdisciplines.Heemphasizedproblemsolving,analysis,andthe

empowermentoffront-linepersonnel.ThoughVollmer’svisionofprofessionalismand

educationmaydifferfromtheidealswepursueacenturylater,hislegacyendures.Though

historytendstoemphasizehisroleasanadvocateforeducation,Vollmerwasalsoinnovativein

howhethoughtaboutorganizationalpracticesandemployeerelations.

Asaniconicfigure,muchloresurroundsthewayinwhichVollmerledhisownagency.It

isquitepossiblehislegacyhasbecomeromanticized,yeteveniftheyarenotentirelyaccurate

theaccountsofhisapproachesinBerkeleyareinstructivebecauseofwhatcanbelearned

aboutmodelsfororganizationsandpersonnelmanagement.AmongotherapproachesVollmer

utilizedinBerkeleyPDwastheFridayCrabClub.Basedonarchivalresearchandinterviewswith

formerBerkeleyofficers,notedVollmerbiographersGeneandElaineCartedescribedthese

meetingsasfollows.

EveryFriday,allofficersnotondutyattendedagroupmeetingtodiscussdepartmentmatters.Oneofficerrecalled:“Ifyoufiredyourgun,youwouldhavetogetupbeforethewholegroupontheFridayCrabClubhourandgivethefactorsonwhathappened,andtherewasadecisionmadebythemenfromthestandpointofthiswayorthisway;rightorwrong.TheFridaymeetings,informallycalledtheCrabClub,wereacombinationgripeandlearningsession.“Forinstance,ifyouhadanythingagainstanymaninthedepartment,yousaiditrightthereinfrontofhim,andafteritwasoveritwasforgotten,“rememberedoneofficer.(1975,pp.46-47)

39

TheCrabClubservedtwoimportantfunctions.First,itwasavenueinwhichpeerreview

ensuredaccountabilityandprofessionalism.Officershadtoanswertotheirco-workerswhen

theyengagedinhighconsequenceactions,suchasdischargingafirearm.Oversightand

accountabilitywerenotsimplyimposedfromtopexecutives;theywereexpectedaspectsof

peer-to-peerrelationships.Second,theCrabClubwasavenuetoresolveinterpersonaldisputes

andconflicts.Problemsamongco-workerswerenotallowedtoremainhidden,wherethey

mightfesterandgrow;theyweretoberesolvedinadirectandtimelymanner.

ToVollmer’swayofthinking,itwasimportantforofficerstohaveachancetodiscuss

interpersonalconflictinasuitablemanner;badfeelingsshouldnotlingerandworsen.Iftwo

officershadadisagreement,thatmattershouldbeairedandresolvedquickly.Ifofficershad

questionsaboutmanagementpractices,theyneededtohavethechancetovoiceconcernsand

seekfurtherinformationbeforeresentmentandresistancecouldtakehold.Ifanincidenthad

occurredduringtheweekthatwasnoteffectivelyhandled,theinvolvedpartiesneededto

discusswhathappenedandwhatmistakesweremade.Officersneededtobeheldaccountable

totheirpeersfortheirdecisionsandactions.Inmanyways,thispracticewasaprecursortothe

contemporarymorbidityandmortalitymeetingsoftenheldinmedicalsettings.Suchevents

requiredoctorsintrainingtoexplaintotheirpeershowacasewashandledandhonestly

discussthepossibilityoferrorsandoversights.Theobjectivewasnottoshameorhumiliate

officers,butrathertocreatelearningmomentsandtoensurepoorchoicesdidnotbecome

acceptedinstitutionalpractice.Thisapproachservedtheaddedfunctionofreinforcingthat

officershadanobligationtoremainaccountableandprofessional,andthatthisobligation

extendednotonlytotheorganization,buttoone’speers,aswell.

Itispossibletheloresurroundingthispracticehasinflateditsactualefficacywithinthe

BerkeleyPD.Furthermore,changesinprofessionalpracticesandcivilliabilitymighthave

renderedsomeaspectsoftheapproachimpracticalinmodernagencies(i.e.,officersdiscussing

thechoicetodischargetheirfirearmsinapeer-to-peervenue).Itislikelypoliceunionism

furthercomplicatesthecontemporaryuseoftheclassicalmodeloftheFridayCrabClub.Even

atthetime,itispossibleparticipatingofficersviewedthesemeetingsnotasachancetoair

40

grievances,butasanuncomfortableexperience.Themeetingmayhavebeenmoreakintothe

hostilityandanimositywithwhichsomehavecharacterizedCompstatmeetingsintheNYPDin

the1990s(Greene,1999;Haberfeld,2006).Historicaldiscussionsofthesemeetingsarevery

limited(Carte&Carte,1975)andmaybeofquestionableveracity.Noneoftheselimitations

invalidatetheunderlyingideasimbuedintheCrabClubmodel,particularlyasitrelatestothe

ideasoftrustandtransparencyincontemporarypoliceorganizations.

Forthepurposesofthisessay,Iwouldaskthereader’sindulgencebystickingwiththe

mythical,ifnot-fullyvalidatedimage,oftheFridayCrabClub.Considertheidealizedimageof

aninstitutionalizedmanagementpracticethatcreatedareasonablysafeandneutral

environmentinwhichtwoofficerscoulddiscussinterpersonaldifferences,disagreements,and

conflicts.WhiletheseofficersmightnotbecomefastfriendsasaresultoftheFridayCrabClub,

theexperiencemightallowthemtopreventtheirconflictsfromgrowingandimpedingtheir

abilitytodotheirjobeffectively.Consideravenueinwhichofficerscouldaskquestionsabout

policiesandprocedures,allowingmanagementtoreceiveinputandallayconcerns.Ratherthan

operationaledictsbeingmeetwithresistanceandobfuscation,theycouldbeunderstoodand

(perhapsreluctantly)accepted.Consideramanagementpracticethatmadeaccountabilitynot

simplysomethingimposedonofficersbytheirsuperiors,butensuredaccountabilitywas

somethingofficersunderstoodtheyowedtotheircoworkers.

InconsideringthenexusbetweentheFridayCrabClubandpoliceunionism,Kellingand

Kliesmet(1995)suggestVollmerwasaheadofthemanagementthinkingofhistime.

Inotherwords,Vollmer,beforethemanagementtheoriesofFrederickTaylorbecameintegraltothereformmodel,wasexperimentingwiththedevelopmentofagenuinelyprofessionalmodelofpolicing.Thismodelincludedhighereducation,collegialcontrol,ageneralistpolicepractitioner,specialtiesattheserviceofgeneralists,devolutionofauthoritytopractitioners,andcollaborationwithotherprofessions(p.200).

Imaginetheexistenceofaforuminwhichofficersandorganizationslearnedfrommistakes,

ratherthanseekingtoburyerrorsand/orvilifythosedeemed(rightlyorwrongly)tobeatfault.

Policeofficersandagenciescouldbecomelearningorganizations(Geller,1997)byturningpast

41

problemsintoteachablemoments.TheFridayCrabClubcreatedaforuminwhichofficerscould

exertcollegialpeer-to-peeraccountabilityto,andcontrolover,oneanother,ratherthanrelying

onachieftoexertcompletecommandandcontroluponfrontlinepersonnelandtheir

professionalism.Controlintheworkplacewasdonewithone’sco-workers,ratherthanbeinga

forceimposedupononefromonhigh.

WhethertheFridayCrabClubtrulyworkedinthispurportedfashionorhassimply

becomeromanticizedovertimeislargelyimmaterial.Whatishelpfulforthesepurposesisthe

poweroftheimageratherthantheveracityoftheclaim.WhatsuchaCrabClubwouldprovide

isasafeforuminwhich‘dirtylaundry,’illwill,andmistakescouldbeairedinasafemanner.

Officersmightnotlikealltheirpeers.Officersmightnotlikeeverymanagementdecision.The

agencymightnotagreewitheverydecisionmadebyitsofficers.TheFridayCrabClubwould

nothavecreatedacompletelyharmoniousandfriendlyagency.Theidealizednotionconveyed

bytheexample,however,isofanagencythataddressespotentiallytoxicmattersinthe

healthiestwaypossible.TheFridayCrabClubwouldbeawell-regulatedsepticsystem.Fecal

matterisstillproduced,butitishandledinthesafestandmostsanitarywaypossible;properly

functioning,undesirableby-productsstillexist,buttheyarecontainedanddon’tspilloverinto

areastheydonotbelong.Internally,itmightbeexpectedthattrustandtransparencywouldbe

quitehigh.

TheefficacyoftheCrabClubisapowerfulandalluringorganizationaltoolthatcouldbe

beneficialinmyriadprofessionalcontextsfarbeyondjustpolicing.Oneissuethatmadethe

idealizedCrabClubsointriguingisthatitwasaninternalandprivatemechanismformattersto

beprocessed,addressed,andresolved.Thoughperhapsnotallparticipantswereorwouldbe

completelysatisfiedwiththeprocessandoutcome,theideaconveysavisionoforganizations

dealingwithinternalstrifeandconflictinaconstructivemanner.Ideaswouldbeallowedto

flourish,enjoyrefinement,andbenefitallinvolved.Thechoicesofexecutivesandsupervisors

mightbeexplainedtofollowers.Ineffect,the‘dirtylaundry’oftheorganizationmightbeaired

inasafe,private,andhealthymanner,whilealsoadvancinginnovationandemployee-initiated

effortsintheworkplace.

42

FridayCrabClub,Redux

FeworganizationsofanytypelikelymeettheidealizedvisionoftheFridayCrabClub.

Conflictisallowedtofester.Newideasarenotencouraged.Communicationflowsupthe

organization,whilethoseatthetopoftendonotdoenoughtoprovideinformationtothose

theylead.Thepolice,likesomanyotherorganizations,sufferfromunhealthyinternal

communicationandconflictmanagement.Inpasterasthissituationleftfewoptionsfor

affectedpersonnel.Officerswerelefttoventtooneanotherinsmallgroupswhilehuddled

aroundwatercoolers,meetingincoffeeshops,orsittinginidlingpatrolcars.Inrare

circumstances,shiftsupervisorsmightallowsucheventstooccurduringpre-shiftbriefings.In

theabsenceofaformalFridayCrabClub,officerscouldexpresstheirfrustrationtotheirpeers.

Agencysupervisorsandexecutives,however,hadnowaytoreceiveinputorcomplaintsfrom

personnel,perhapsbyveryconsciousdesign.Accountabilityremainedaforcelargelyimposed

uponofficersfromonhighwithintheorganization(thoughcertainlymyriadadhocexceptions

tothisobservationhaveexisted).Co-workerswhohadaconflictwithoneanotherdidnotenjoy

anestablishedframeworkwithinwhichtoexpresstheirconcernsandfrustrations.Ineffect,

muchofthebenefitoftheFridayCrabClubwasdeniedtopersonnelandtherewasnowayfor

themtocompensateforthatshortcoming.

TheriseoftheInternethasredefinedthecapacityofofficerstovent,dealwithconflict,

andexpressdispleasurewithagencyleaders,particularlysincetheearly2000s.Awiderangeof

discussionboards,listservs,blogs,andwebsiteshaveemergedthatallowofficerstoair

grievances(realorperceived),complain,andshareconcernswithoneanother.7Froman

organizationalperspectivethisisachallengingevolution.Twoofficersventingaboutthechief

whiledrinkingcoffeeinadonutshopmightactuallybeahealthyprocess.Thosesameofficers

havingthesameexchangeinapubliconlineforumopenstheconversationtotheentireworld

andcreatesarecordofthatconversationthat,ifnotpermanent,isatleastlong-lasting.Morale

7 Examples of this situation abound, though they tend to be transitory in nature. Among other examples is the website leoaffairs.com, started by two officers in the Tampa (FL) area and now hosting forums covering agencies from coast-to-coast. These forums were largely a public and anonymous venue for complaining about agencies, leaders, personnel, and practices. Countless blogs and websites have come and gone, creating (at least temporarily) a public Crab Club for a specific agency and/or issue.

43

canbeenhancedthroughdonutshopconversations;moralecanbeerodedthroughonline

discussions.

Intheabsenceofeffectiveorganizationalpracticesthatallowofficerstodealwith

conflictanddisagreement,whilesimultaneouslyadvancingcommunication,officershave

innovatedandcreatedonlinemechanismstofillthatneed.Someofthesemechanismsare

privateoratleastrestrictedtovettedmembersofthelawenforcementcommunity.Others

are,byintentanddesign,completelypublicandseektoreachcommunityresidents,themedia,

andlocalpoliticalofficials.Theproblemwithinformaltechnology-enabledalternativestothe

FridayCrabClubisthatsuchinnovativealternativesmaybepublicandenduring.Theyprovide

externaltransparencythatmightultimatelybecounterproductive,potentiallyerodingexternal

trust,andtheydonotactuallyprovidethefullrangeofbenefitspresumedundertheFriday

CrabClubmodel.TheFridayCrabClub,Reduxmodelisdrivenbytechnologythatmakesconflict

anddisputesmattersofpublicrecord.Theyriskmakingallegationsanonymous(perhaps

elevatingtheriskofdistortions,half-truths,andblatantlies)andleantowardone-way

conversations(i.e.,anofficerorofficerscomplainingabouttheagencyand/oritsleaders,

withoutthebenefitofaresponsefromthetargetedparty).TheReduxmodelisdecidedly

inferiortotheoriginalmodelbecauseitfailstoprovidethehealthyaspectoftheoriginal

model…two-waycommunicationanddialog.

ThepointoftheFridayCrabClub,Reduxmodelisthatwhatwasformerlyhidden(at

leastintheshorttermandtothegeneralbenefitoftheorganization)isnowquitepublic.

Membersofthepublicareprivytoinformationthatwaspreviouslyunavaible.Insome

instancesandfromsomeperspectivesthisisapositiveevolution.Iftherearefundamental

problemswithagencyleaders,operations,anddecisionsitisaboonforcitizensandcommunity

leaderstoknowaboutthatsituation.Theproblem,ofcourse,isthatnoteverythingexpressed

intheReduxmodelisaccurateorevenalegitimateproblem.TheReduxmodeltendstoonly

broadcasttheperspectiveandconcernsofthoseupsetwithasituation;theofficialpositionof

theagencyanditsleadersisalmostnevertransmittedthroughthesamemodalities.Thus,the

Reduxmodelcanbealoneofficerspeakingtruthtopower.Itisjustaslikelytobeadisaffected

44

employeeorsetofemployeeswhoaredistorting,maligning,andbesmirching.Itisnota

processthatfacilitatestwo-waydialogandtheresolutionofconflict.Rather,itisaprocessthat

inflamesalreadytenserelationswithinanorganizationandexposesabroadertoa

controversialsituation.

Messengerscananddohavetheirownagendas.Conflictscanbelegitimizedunderthe

glossofwhistle-blowingand‘speakingtruthtopower.’Liesandinnuendocanbeleveraged

againstthosethemessengerdislikesforanynumberofreasons.Everyorganization,asevery

family,hasproblems,conflicts,andskeletonsinthecloset.Revealingeventrueconcernswith

completetransparencycanmakeitmoredifficulttocorrectandresolveproblems.Itisnot

alwaysbeneficialforchildrentoknowtheirparentsareexperiencingmaritalstrife.Such

awarenesscansometimescomplicateorimpedetheabilitytocorrecttheproblem.Parallels

existwiththeproblemspoliceorganizationsconfront.Thepublicdoesnotalwaysbenefitfrom

knowingaspectsofanexecutive’spersonallifeorthatthesheriffhasjustpromotedher

nephewwithintheorganization.Sometimeswhatappearstobenepotismisblatantfavoritism;

othertimesthenephewmightbethebestpersonforthepromotion.

Achiefoncerelatedtotheauthorthatuponassumingcommandofalargeagencyhe

learnedofanofficerwhooperatedablogthatwaswidelyreadbyagencycriticsandthelocal

media.Theblogassailedanumberofproblemsintheagencyandamongitsexecutives.The

officerdidnotopenlydisclosehisidentityontheblog,buteveryoneintheagencyknewwho

waswritingtheblog.Thechiefexpressedthattheofficer’sactions,whilewellintentioned,were

misdirected.Theofficersoughttoshedlightonpersistentproblemsintheagency;theofficer

presumablysawhimselfasawhistle-blowerwhowasseekingtoadvancetheorganizationin

thelong-term.Fromtheperspectiveofthechief,however,theofficerwasactuallymakingit

moredifficulttoaddresspersistentproblemsintheorganization,particularlyasanoutsider

assuminganewcommand.Theblogreducedmoraleamongmanyintheagency.Itsowedthe

seedsofdiscontent.Itprovided‘ammunition’toagencycriticsthroughoutthecity.Itmadethe

agencyappearineptratherthannormal.Everylargeagencyhasproblemsandnoemployeewill

agreewithalldecisionsmadebytheirleaders.Ratherthanservingtohealwounds,theblog

45

aggravatedoldwoundsandinflamednewproblems.Eveniftheofficerwasgenerallyright,the

actionsinflictedfurtherdamageontheorganization.

FromtheviewpointofofficersengagingintheFridayCrabClub,Reduxmodel,however,

whatalternativedotheyhave?Theiragencyprovidesthemwithnoacceptablewaytoexpress

concerns,askquestions,anddealwithconflict.TheeaseandvisibilityoftheReduxapproachis

seductive.Thoughitbringsthewrongtransparencytotheorganization,atleastitprovides

transparencythatotherwisemightnotexist.Tomakeabroadgeneralization,theRedux

approachisnotlikelytoemergeinhealthyandfunctionalorganizations.Asagraduatestudent,

theauthortookseveralcoursesinlaborrelationstaughtbyanelderstatesmanoftheunion

movementinAmerica.Herepeatedlyremarkedthatunionsrarelyemergeinorganizationsthat

havehealthylabor-managementrelations.Ifemployeesarecontentintheworkplacetheyhave

littlereasontoseektoorganize.Parallelsmightbeseentotheuseofmoderntechnologyto

facilitatethepublicairingofwhatwasprivateintheclassicalFridayCrabClubmodeldeveloped

andemployedbyVollmer.TheReduxmodelisamoveofdesperationbythosewhofeelthey

havenootherwayfortheirvoicetobeheard.Clearlytheremightoccasionallybeaproblematic

employeeineventhebestorganization.Yetonthewhole,wewouldnotexpecttoseethe

Reduxmodelemergewhenemployeesarecontentwithexistingstructuresandmechanisms.

TheNexuswithTrust&Transparency

Theopeningchapterofthisvolumepresentedtheideathattrustandtransparencyexist

ontwodimensionsinpolicing:internalandexternal.Thoughperhapsnotexplicitorintentional,

thetraditionalFridayCrabClubmodelgeneratedneededinternaltrustandtransparency.

Officerswereheldaccountable,disputescouldberesolved,andmanagementinteractedwith

linepersonneltoexchangeideas,fieldquestions,andaddressconcerns.Yettheproverbialdirty

laundrywithintheseprocesseswasairedawayfrompublicview.Inthisway,Vollmercould

generatestronginternaltrustandtransparency.Becausematterswereresolvedinhousethere

waslittlefoddertofuelmediascrutinyorlocalconcernwithpoliceoperations.Inthiswaythe

FridayCrabClubmodelhelpedgenerateexternaltrustandtransparencybyminimizingpublic

46

evidencethatcitizenshadaneedtobeconcernedwiththeBerkeleyPoliceDepartment.8

Healthyinternaloperationsarelikelytoengenderhealthyexternalrelations.Whentopagency

leadersseektoaddressinternalstrife,conflict,andcontroversyinahealthy,direct,and

functionalmanner,itmightbeexpectedthatorientationwill(moreoftenthannot)extend

outwardtothewaystrustandtransparencyarenurturedandmaintainedwiththecommunity

andotherexternalparties.

TheeasewithwhichofficerscanimplementtheReduxmodelamplifiestheimportance

ofmodernleadersattendingtointernaltrustandtransparency.Unlikepriorerasoftechnology,

officersdonothavetosufferinsilencewithintheworkplace.Someoneupsetanddiscontent

withaspectsoftheirorganizationhasanall-too-easywaytoventthatsituationnotsimplytoa

co-workerovercoffee,buttotheentireworld(perhapsevenwhileon-dutyusingasmartphone

ortablet).LeaderscannotcompletelycircumventtheprospectsthatofficerswillusetheRedux

model,nomatterhowhealthytheinternalaspectsoftheorganization.Butleaderscannot

pretendorpresumetheycanpreventtheuseofReduxmodelapproaches.Thetransparency

foundthroughoutthecontemporaryworldwillonlycontinuetoexpandandgrow.Theriseof

Reduxapproachesshouldreinforcethatwiseleaderswillstudyandconsiderhowtheymight

facilitateahealthyandfunctionalrevitalizationoftheFridayCrabClub.Technologyhasmade

theReduxmodelaweaponusedagainstagenciesandleaders.Thisdoesnothavetobethe

case.TechnologycanbeusetoreinvigorateandreinterprettheclassicalFridayCrabClubmodel

inawaythat,whilenotperfect(anditcertainlywasnotperfectinBPD100yearsago),canlead

togreaterinternaltrustandtransparencyintheworkplace.

8 To be sure, this does not suggest that citizens would be accurate in viewing BPD (or any other agency handling internal disputes in a private manner) as trustworthy and transparent. The absence of smoke does not always mean there is an absence of fire. It might be expected that suppressing public awareness of officer/organizational misdeeds is a temporary fix. Over time, it would be expected that efforts to preserve public trust by decreasing external transparency will fail and perhaps have worse consequences for the agency and its executives.

47

References

Carte,G.E.,&Carte,E.H.(1975).PolicereformintheUnitedStates:TheeraofAugust

Vollmer,1905-1932.Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

Geller,W.A.(1997).Supposewewerereallyseriousaboutpolicedepartmentsbecoming

‘learningorganizations?’NationalInstituteofJusticeJournal,234,2-8.

Greene,J.A.(1999).Zerotolerance:PolicepoliciesandpracticesinNewYorkCity.Crime&

Delinquency,45,171-187.

Haberfeld,M.R.(2006).Policeleadership.UpperSaddleRiver,NJ:Pearson-PrenticeHall.

Kelling,G.L.,&Kliesmet,R.B.(1995).Policeunions,policeculture,theFridayCrabClub,and

policeabuseofforce.InW.A.Geller&H.Toch(Eds.)Andjusticeforall:

Understanding&controllingpoliceabuseofforce(pp.197-204).Washington,DC:

PoliceExecutiveResearchForum.

48

FosteringExternalTrustandTransparencythroughtheUseofPoliceAgencyWebsites

MicheleW.CovingtonandNicholasE.Libby

Introduction

SinceitsinceptionintheUnitedStates,oneoftheinherentproblemsinpolicinghas

beenthelackoftrustbetweenagenciesandthecommunitiestheyserve.Trustandoversight

wereprincipalissuesformanyyears.Thiswasespeciallytruebeforetheageofprofessionalism,

whenagenciesbegantocleanuptheirmisconduct,cutpoliticaltiesandfocusonpolicingasan

independentprofession.Thelawlessnessofthepolice,theirsystematiccorruption,and

nonenforcementandselectiveenforcementofthelawswasoneoftheparamountissuesin

municipalpoliticsduringthelate1800s(Uchida,2010).Historically,thetenuousrelationship

betweenofficerandconstituenthascausedmanyproblems,butinrecentyears,withincreased

concernoverethicsandtransparencyandwiththedawnofthecommunitypolicingera,this

stressandmistrusthascometolightandstartedtodecline.Betweentherecentpopularityof

community-orientedpolicingstrategiesandamoreferventpublicdemandforhonestand

trustworthypoliceagencies,methodstoincreaseexternaltransparencyhavebecomemajor

topicsofdebateforagenciestoday.Trustandtransparencyinpolicingarenotoptional;they

aremandatoryforpoliceagenciesinanysocietythatwishtodemonstratelegitimacy(Markham

andPunch2007,300).Fosteringtrustandtransparencyisanespeciallyimportanttopicinthe

currenteragiventheriseof24/7newsnetworksandproliferationofpersonalaccountsand

experiencesthatmaybereadilyaccessibleonlineinbothtextandvideoformats,eventhough

bothnewsandpersonalaccountsmayhavequestionableaccuracyorsimplynotbedeveloped

enoughtotelltheentirestory.Whiletherehasbeenawiderangeofthelevelofopenness

basedonagencylocation,size,andleadership,therehasbeenarecentgeneralshiftinattitude

thathasledmanyagenciestobemoreopenwiththeirinformationandtowantto

communicatewiththepublicdirectly.

49

Alongthesametimelinesastheattitudinalshifttomoreopenagencies,therehasbeen

anupswinginsocietalusesoftechnology.Withinrecentyears,wehavewitnessedamassive

proliferationofpersonalcomputers,tablets,andsmartphonesalongsideincreasesin

availabilityofpubliclyaccessiblebroadbandwirelessinternetaccessandhomeinternetuse.

AccordingtotheUSCensusBureau(File&Ryan,2014),asof2013,74.4%ofhouseholds

reportedhavinganinternetconnectioninthehome,atrendwhichhasbeenincreasingsteadily

sincethelate1990s(File,2013).

ThisriseintheuseoftechnologyhascompletelyalteredtheAmericanwayof

communication.Forexample,theproliferationofcellphoneshasmadeitpossibleformost

peopletogetintouchwithnearlyeveryonetheyknow,nomatterwheretheyare.

Furthermore,increasesintheavailabilityofwirelessnetworks,tablets,andsmartphoneshas

madeitpossibleforpeopletogatherinformationonlineevenwhenawayfromtheirhomeand

officecomputers.Relativelyrecentadvancesincommunication,suchase-mail,havebegunto

beovershadowedwiththeadventofsocialnetworkingsitesandtheabilitytosendtext

messagesratherthanmakephonecalls.Withtherecentexponentialincreaseincapabilityand

affordabilityoftechnology,manypoliceagencieswiththeresourcestosparehavefoundlittle

reasonnottomovealongwiththetechnologicalrevolution.Thisisaproactiveapproachfor

agenciestotake.Usingtheinternet,specificallyagencywebsites,tovoluntarilyprovide

informationtothepublicshowsgoodwillandportraysthepoliceagencyasmoretransparentto

theoutsideworld,especiallytothecommunityitserves.

Therecentmovementstowardmoretransparentpoliceagenciesandmorewidespread

useoftechnologyarestillgoingstrong,andthereisnoindicationthateitherofthesetrends

willslowdowninthenearfuture.Consideringthis,manyagenciesarenowexploringdifferent

optionstoopenlyshareinformationwiththepublic.Onewayforagenciestoaccomplishthis

goalhasbeenthedevelopmentanduseofindividualpoliceagencywebsites,whichhave

becomeverycommonoverthelastfewyears.One-hundredpercentofthelargestagenciesin

theU.S.andover40%ofallagenciesuseanagencywebsitetosomeextent(Kilburn&Krieger,

2014;Rosenbaum,etal.,2011).Thesesitescanbetailoredtoanyagency’sspecificneed,and

50

almostanyagency’sbudget.Therearemanyoptionsforexternalinformationsharingthrough

anagencywebsiteandmanyadvantagestosodoing.

StrategiesforExternalCommunication

Informationgatheringonpoliceagencywebsitesisbidirectional:citizenscangoonline

toreceiveinformationfromapoliceagencyortoprovideinformationtotheagency.Many

policeagencies,suchastheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartment(www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/)and

theOrlandoPoliceDepartment(www.cityoforlando.net/police)havedesignedtheirwebsitesto

beabletoreceiveinformationfromthepublic,suchascrimetipsorservicerequeststhatdo

notnecessarilyrequireone-on-oneinteraction.Thisfreesuppersonnelresourcesandmay

makecitizensmorecomfortableprovidingtipsorotherinformationiftheyfeelagreater

degreeofanonymityanddonothavetofaceanofficerorotherpoliceemployeeinperson.It

mayleadcitizenstofeelthattheyaremoreinvestedintheircommunitiesandthattheyenjoy

moreofaworkingrelationshipwiththeirlocalpoliceagencyratherthanfeelingingrainedinthe

traditional‘usvs.them’mentality.

Usinganagencywebsitetocollectinformationfromcitizenscanbenefitanagency,but

agencywebsitesaremosthelpfulinprovidinginformation.Recently,moreandmoreagencies

havebeguntousetheirwebsitesasadirectlineofcommunicationwiththepublic.Historically,

themainoutletofinformationaboutlocalpolicehasbeenlocalmedia,whichwasnotalways

anidealsituation.Thequalityofrelationshipsbetweenpoliceagenciesandmediaoutletsvaries

widelyfromjurisdictiontojurisdiction,andtherehaveoftenbeenproblemswhenastorywas

reportedinabiasedmannerorwhenthelocalnewsagencyranastorywithoutallofthe

pertinentinformation.Problemsstemmingfrommediacoverageofpolicestorieshaveled

agenciestofindtheirownmeansofcommunicatingwiththepublic;intheinformationagethis

hasmeantrapidlyincreasingtheuseofwebsites.

Furthermore,inmanyareasthetypesofinformationprovidedtothepublicbyinternet

isfarbroaderthaninthepastwhenwebsitessimplyshowedapictureofthechief,theagency’s

51

address,andaphonenumbertocalltobecomeanofficer.Agenciesnowprovidesuchawide

arrayofinformationthroughtheirwebsites,suchascrimemaps(Louisville(KY)MetroPolice

www.louisvilleky.gov/MetroPolice/)andmapsofcallsforservice(ColoradoSprings(CO)Police

www.springsgov.com/police),linkstocurrentagencyinitiatives(Phoenix(AZ)Police

http://phoenix.gov/police),andevenselectedinformationfromincidentreports(Madison(WI)

Policewww.cityofmadison.com/incidentReports).Policeagencywebsitesarenowusedto

publicizemostwantedsuspects(Roanoke(VA)Policewww.roanokeva.gov›Departmentsand

Divisions›Police),missingpersons(FortSmith(AR)Policewww.fortsmithpd.org),andto

providelinkstowebsitesforsexoffenderregistriesandotherpertinentlawenforcement

agencies(MetropolitanPolice(Washington,DC)http://mpdc.dc.gov).

Inadditiontocrimemapsandincidentreports,agenciescanmaketheirownrecordings

ofeventssuchasnewsinterviewswithpoliceofficialsandmeetingsbetweenpoliceofficials

andthegeneralpublicandposttheseonagencywebsites.Notonlydoesthisbroadenthe

scopeofinformationavailabletothepublic,butitcanalsoserveasarecordofpolice

interactionthatisuneditedbyathirdparty,suchasthenewsmedia.Tofurtherfosterpublic

andpoliceinteraction,manyagencieshavemadeuseofsocialnetworkingwebsitessuchas

FacebookandTwittertoprovideinformationtothepublicorreceivefeedbackfromtheir

constituents.Insomecases,thisroutecanbebeneficialtosmallerlawenforcementagencies

thatdonothavetheresourcestohostandmaintaintheirownwebsite.

AdvantagesofWebsiteCommunication

Thetypesofinformationprovidedbypolicewebsiteshaveincreasedsignificantlyin

recentyearsandbyallindicationstheywillcontinuetodosointhefuture.Inlargepart,thisis

becausetherearesignificantadvantagestothismethodofdirectcommunicationwiththe

public.Intermsofexternaltrustandtransparencyalone,theinternetisanexcellentrouteof

communication.ManyAmericansnowgoonlinetosearchforalmostanyinformationthey

needanditbehoovesagenciestobeasourceofthatinformation.Whenacitizengoesonline

andtypesthenameoftheirlocalpoliceagencyintoasearchengine,avideoofafightbetween

52

anofficerandacitizenonYouTubedoesnothavetobetheonlysourceofinformation;thisis

anexcellentopportunityforcitizenstofindalinktoastoryontheagencywebsiteabouta

recentsuccessfuldrugraidthatmadethecommunityasaferplace.Sooftenthepubliconly

seesthenegativeaspectsofpoliceworkandexamplesofbrokentrustbetweenofficersand

theircommunities.Agencywebsitescanprovideanoutletwheregoodnewscanbeshared,as

well.

Usingawebsitetodisseminateinformationcansaveagencyresourcesbecauseauser-

friendlywebsitecanpreventanemployeefromhavingtoanswersomanyinquiriespersonally.

Asurveyof1,379policeagenciesservingapopulationof25,000ormore,foundthatalmost

threeoutoffourchiefsreceivedstatisticsrequestsatleastmonthly(JRSA,2005).Almostonein

threereceivedtheserequestsatleastweekly.Requestsforsimplestatisticsandmorecouldbe

handledthroughawebsiteinwhichthepubliccouldretrievethedesiredinformation

themselves.Thiswouldrequirerelativelylittlemaintenancewhenupandrunningandthe

agencywouldhavefullauthorityoverwhattypesofinformationtorelease.Obviously,

disseminatinginformationondemandthroughawebsiteismorelikelytobecosteffectivefor

largeragenciesservinglargerpopulations,buttherearesomebenefitsthatapplyregardlessof

agencysize.Anytimeanagencywillinglyputsinformationoutforopenpublicconsumption,it

reflectsgoodwillonthatagency.Theagencyappearsopenandwillingtosharewiththepublic

andestablishesadirectlineofcommunicationbyusingamediumthroughwhichmanycitizens

enjoycommunicating.

ChallengesofWebsiteCommunication

Ofcourse,thereareinherentdangersinsharinginformationwiththepublicviawebsite,

somemoreproblematicthanothers.Obviously,policeagenciesmustcarefullycontrolthedata

thattheyreleasetothepublicfortacticalandsafetyreasons,aswellasforethicalandlegal

concerns.Someonemustapprovewhatinformationisreleasedandwhatistobeheldprivately.

Withthesedecisions,itisimportantnottochooseinformationtoreleasebasedonbiases

towardtheagency.Agenciesmustnotusetheirwebsitesasfalsetransparencytogarner

53

goodwillfromthepublicwhentheyareactuallyreleasingbiasedinformation;thiswillonlylead

tomistrustbetweentheagencyandthepublic.Alongthesamelinesofchoosingwhichdatato

release,thereisalwaysariskthattheinformationwillbemisinterpreted.Itiscrucialtokeep

theinformationsimpleandeasytounderstandandtoprovideexplanationsanddefinitions

whereverappropriate.Furthermore,thereisoftenatimelaginthedatadisplayedonthe

websitebecauseofthetimeittakestogetthedataputintothesystemandontothesiteafter

ithasbeenapprovedforrelease.Itisimportanttoavoidconfusionbyclearingstatinghowfar

behindthecurrentdatetheinformationisandtoprovideabriefexplanationforthegapin

layman’sterms.

Datamayhaveinaccuracies;itisofutmostimportancetoensurethequalityofthe

informationreleasedasmuchaspossible.Inalargeagencyreleasinglargeamountsof

informationthroughtheweb,someerrorsarelikely.Evenagencieswithconscientious

employeeswhodoublecheckthedatabeingreleasedwillprobablyfindanoccasionalminor

error.Thismaycauseethicalproblemsifincorrectinformationisreleased,butitcouldalsolead

tolegalproblems.Itmaybebeneficialforagenciestoconsultalegalauthorityabouttheir

responsibilitiesandabouttheoptionofincludingonthewebsiteadisclaimeragainsterrors

madeingoodfaith.

Anotherchallengeforanagencythatwishestocommunicatethroughawebsitemaybe

cost.Althoughhavingawebsitesetupisrelativelyinexpensivenow,manyagenciesare

strugglinginthecurrenteconomytofindfundsinthebudgettoremainstaffed,muchlessto

expandthetechnologyunderuse.Forlargeragencies,usingawebsiteforinformationsharing

willbecosteffectiveasthiswillfreeupmanpowertobeusedelsewhereratherthan

respondingtocallsforinformation,service,orcomplaints.Smalleragencies,however,maynot

receiveasmanyrequestsforinformation.Itmaystillbehoovesmalleragenciestohavea

websiteforexposure,butagenciesthatservesmallerpopulations(andusuallyhavesmaller

budgets)maychoosetoofferlessfeaturesonawebsitethanlargeragencies,allowingforvery

littlemaintenanceoncethesiteisupandrunning.Thiscanprovidebasicinformationforthe

publicthroughamediumthatmanycitizensnowprefertousewithalmostnocostafterthe

54

initialsetupofthesite.Furthermore,asmentionedpreviously,agenciescanalsoopttotake

advantageoffreeservicesprovidedbysocialnetworkingwebsitessuchasFacebookand

Twitterinordertomaintainanonlinepresencewiththepublicortosupplementtheirexisting

website.

AfinalpotentialissuetoconsideristhatwhileinternetuseisquitehighintheUnited

States,itisnotamethodofcommunicationthateverypersonuses.Theuseofawebsiteto

shareinformationandincreasetransparencywillreachmanycitizens,butnotallofthem.

Agenciesthatchoosetousethismodeofcommunicationshouldkeepinmindthatawebsiteis

anadditiontoothersourcesofpubliccommunication;itisnotabasestrategy.

Conclusions

Therecentpushtowardmoreaccountabilityandtransparencybetweenpoliceagencies

andthepublichasledmanyagenciestolookfornewandinnovativewaystoshareinformation

andbeopenwiththecitizensintheirjurisdictions.Onemethodofcommunicationthatmany

agencieshavechosenistheagencywebsite.Whiletheremaybesomeareasofconcern

regardingsharinginformationpubliclythroughawebsite,carefulplanninganddecision-making

abouttheinformationtobesharedcaneliminatemostofthesepotentialproblems.Atpresent,

however,researchhasfoundthateasily-accessiblewebsitesdoinfluencepublicperceptionina

positiveway(Kilburn&Krieger,2014).Thisstrategyseemstobeworkingwellforagencies,and

theinternetsavvypublicappearstoenjoycommunicatinginthisfashion.

Asagenciesgarnermoreandmoredatathroughtheuseofnewtechnologiessuchas

crimemappingandanalysistools,thereismuchmoreinformationtobeshared,andmuchofit

canbeveryusefultothepublic.Informationthatischosencarefullysoasnottocompromise

security,confidentiality,orthemissionofthejob,canbesharedrelativelyeasilyand

inexpensivelythroughwebsites,oftensavingagencyfundswhilesimultaneouslyfostering

goodwillandtrustamonglawenforcementagenciesandtheirconstituencies.Withtherapid

growthintechnologyinrecentyearsandthepushtowardmoreaccountabilityamongpolice

55

agencies,itmaysoonbeallbutrequiredthatuseofagencywebsitesbepartofthetoolkitused

bypoliceintheirinteractionswiththepublic.Unfortunately,recentresearchsuggeststhat

manyagencieswithwebsitesunderutilizethem(Rosenbaum,etal.,2011),indicatingalackof

foresightandproactivityinkeepingupwithexistingandemergingsocialtrendswithinthe

generalpublic.

References

File,T.(2013).ComputerandinternetuseintheUnitedStates:Populationcharacteristics.Washington,DC:U.S.CensusBureau,U.S.DepartmentofCommerce.

File,T.,&Ryan,C.(2014).ComputerandinternetaccessintheUnitedStates:2013.Americancommunitysurveyreports.Washington,DC:U.S.CensusBureau,U.S.DepartmentofCommerce.

JusticeResearchandStatisticsAssociation.(2005).Useofdatainpolicedepartments:Asurveyofpolicechiefsanddataanalysts.Washington,DC:JRSA.

Kilburn,M.,&Krieger,L.(2014).Policinginaninformationage:TheprevalenceofstateandlocallawenforcementagenciesutilisingtheWorldWideWebtoconnecttothecommunity.InternationalJournalofPoliceScience&Management,16(3),221-227.

Markham,G.,&Punch,M.(2007).Embracingaccountability:Thewayforward—partone.Policing:AJournalofPolicyandPractice,1(3),300-308.

Rosenbaum,D.P.,Graziano,L.M.,Stephens,C.D.,&Schuck,A.M.(2011).Understandingcommunitypolicingandlegitimacy-seekingbehaviorinvirtualreality:Anationalstudyofmunicipalpolicewebsites.PoliceQuarterly,14(1),25-47.

Uchida,C.D.(2010).ThedevelopmentoftheAmericanpolice:Anhistoricaloverview.InR.G.DunhamandG.P.Alpert(eds.)Criticalissuesinpolicing:Contemporaryreadings(5thed.)(pp.17-36).LongGrove,IL:Waveland.

56

SocialMedia:Use,PolicyandGuidelines

TobyM.Finnie

Theproliferationofnewandemergingsocialnetworkingtechnologiespresents

significantchallengesforpoliceadministratorsandmanagers.Witheachtechnological

breakthrough,administratorsshouldforestalluseandpracticesthatmayreflectnegatively

uponthedepartmentanditsemployees.Usepoliciesshouldbewrittenonlyafterdraftersgain

abasicunderstandingofhowthesocialmediaapplicationworks,andariskassessmentis

conducted.

Onecouldnot,forexample,draftusepolicyforatelephonewithoutfirstunderstanding

itsoperation:

• Lifttheheadsetfromthecradle

• Listenfora“dialtone”

• Enteranaccesscode(bydialorbypushbutton)

• Listenfora“handshake”(ringingtone)

• Waitforaresponsefromthepartycalled

• Initiateandcompletetheconversation

• Disconnectthe“handshake”byreturningthehandsettothecradle.

Termsofusetomitigaterisksandliabilitymightrequirethatofficersandstaffmakeandreceive

nopersonalcalls,limitlongdistancecalls,refusecollectcalls,andlogallincomingandoutgoing

calls.Officersmightalsoberemindedtomaintainaprofessionaldemeanorduringalltelephone

conversations.

Failuretoanalyzeemergingtechnologies,toevaluateforpossibleuseorabuseby

personnel,andtoprepareuseguidelinesforbothon-andoff-dutypersonnelmayleadto

unintendedandpotentiallycostlyoutcomes:

57

• ApolicedepartmentinthePacificNorthwestissuedcellulartelephonestoitsofficers

withnoguidelinesforuse.Administratorswerestunnedtolearnthat—amere30days

afterissuance—officershadexceededthedepartment’scontractedusageallowance

fortheentireyear!

• Threepoliceofficersweresuspendedwithoutpayandorderedtoundergosensitivity

trainingaftertheydiscussedpolicingdutiesandpostedoffensiveremarksabout

homosexualsanddevelopmentallydisabledpersonsonaMyspace.comwebsite.

(AssociatedPress,2006)9

• Acriminaldefenseattorneysuccessfullyusedanofficer’scommentspostedonasocial

networkingwebsitetoinfertothejurythattheofficerusedexcessiveforceduring

arrestofthesuspect.Duringtestimony,thejurylearnedthattheofficerhadsethis

MySpace.commoodto“devious”andhadposted“VaughaniswatchingTrainingDayto

brushuponproperpoliceprocedure”onhisFacebookhomepageonthesamedayhe

arrestedthesuspect.Theofficer

alsowrote,“Ifhewantedtotune

himupsome,heshouldhave

delayedcuffinghim”and“ifyou’re

goingtohitacuffedsuspect,at

leastgetyourmoney’sworth

’causenowhe’sgoingtoget

disciplined….”(Dwyer,2009)10

Theofficerhaduploadedimages

ofhimselfinbodybuildingposesthat

couldbeconstruedas“intimidating.”That

9 Associated Press (2006, July 7) Police suspended over MySpace comments. KXNet.com North Dakota News. Retrieved October 22, 2009 from <http://www.kxnet.com/custom404.asp?404;http://www.kxnet.com/t/drunken-driving/20905.asp> 10 Dwyer, Jim. (2009, March 10) The Officer Who Posted Too Much on MySpace. New York Times. Retrieved October 21, 2009 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/nyregion/11about.html?_r=3>

An officer’s photo images and comments posted on his social media web site came back to haunt him during trial testimony.

Photograph Source: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2009/03/13/1236447441188.htmll

58

imageaidedthedefendantandjurytopositivelyidentifytheofficerastheownerofthe

website.Thejuryacquittedtheaccused.

Inthesituationsdescribedabove,unnecessaryexpense,negativepublicity,andan

undesirableoutcomeattrialcouldhavebeenavoidedhadpolicemanagersproactivelyworked

todevelopguidelinesadvisingofficersandstaffonacceptableusesofnewtechnology.

Consistencyinenforcementofclearlywrittensocialmediausepolicieswillhelptoprotectthe

agencyagainstliabilityandreduceemployee’misunderstandingsaboutexpectationsofprivacy.

“WeareallPIOsnow”

Thedaysofdepartment-authorizedPublicInformationOfficersfunnelingtheflowof

informationtomediaandthepublicareover.Wisepoliceadministratorsunderstandthatnow

anyofficerorstaffmemberisaPIO,forbetterorforworse.Itshouldberememberedthat

newsreportersandjournalistsregularlyconductonlinesearchesforbackgroundinformation

onpoliceofficers,suspects,andwitnesses—andsodoordinarycitizens,criminals,anddefense

attorneys.Inthepast,newspaperandmagazinearticlestendedtobecomelostindustyold

librarystacks,butthatisnolongerthecase.InformationpostedontheInternetoftenremains

accessiblelongafterausertakesactivestepstodeletedataandimagestheypreviously

uploaded.Despitepopularbelief,websitesthatrestrictaccesstousersthroughlog-inpass

codesmaynotprovidesufficientbarrierstopublicscrutiny.

InJuly2009threeorganizations(NationalAssociationofBlackLawEnforcementOfficer,

localchapteroftheNationalBlackPoliceAssociationandNAACP)filedaclassactionlawsuitin

federalcourtagainstthePhiladelphiaPoliceDepartmentforallowingitsofficerstopost

“blatantlyracist…andoffensive”contentonapopularwebsitedevotedtopublicsafety.Also

namedasadefendantwas“McQ,”analiasallegedlybelongingtoasergeantwithPhiladelphia

policeandadministrator-moderatorofthewebsite“Domelights.com.”Thelawsuitrequested

thecourttoremedy:

“…invidious racial discrimination on the part of the Philadelphia Police

59

Department, inallowing,throughcustom,practiceandpolicy,agroupofwhitePhiladelphia Police Officers, including officers of supervisory rank, to operate,publish,disseminateandperpetuateduringtheiremploymentaspoliceofficers,bothonandoff duty, ablatantly racist, anti-minority, disgusting andoffensivepublic InternetwebsitecalledDomelights.comthathasbecomean insult toallAfrican-AmericanPoliceOfficers,andhascreatedaraciallyharassingandhostileworkenvironment….”(GuardianCivicLeague,Inc.2009)11

ThelawsuitallegedthePhiladelphiaPoliceDepartment“…evidencedapolicy,practiceor

customofallowingtheuseoftheircomputersforaraciallyhostilepurpose,andallowingits

employeePoliceOfficerstoengagepublically[sic]inraciallyoffensiveandhostilecommentary

andpostings”(GuardianCivicLeague,Inc.2009).12

Accordingtosomelegalanalysts,asuccessfuloutcometothelawsuitwouldhingeon

whetherthePhiladelphiaPoliceDepartmentimplicitlypermitteditsofficerstopostcomments

viacity-ownedcomputers,orwhethercommandstaffwereawareofanddisregarded

informationthatofficerswerepostingraciallyoffensivecommentswhileonduty.Afterthe

lawsuitwasfiled,additionalriskmanagementproblemsbecameapparent:onceidentity

becomesknown,“McQ’s”susceptibilitytoretaliationmaydirectlyeffectstaffingassignments.

Alsoofconcernispotentialretaliationagainstotherofficers:

…[S]omeone outside the department has expressed an intent to operate awebsite identifying the Domelights regulars — complete with shifts, stationassignments, carnumbers andbadgenumbers—and that the command stafffearsescalationandthereforewantstodefusethissituation.(Post,2009)13

Notonlydoesthelossoftrustdisruptpolicedepartmentoperations,mistrustandracial

biasesmayflow—likeaminitsunami—intothecommunity,carryingwithitseedsofcivil

unrest.Someadministratorswilldecidetoforbidanyuseofsocialmediabutthatmaynotbe

thewisestcourseofactiontotake.Policemanagersshouldnotforestallsubordinates’useof

11 Guardian Civic League, Inc., et al. v. Philadelphia Police Department, et al. (2009, July 15) in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Page 19. Retrieved October 17, 2009 from http://www.whyy.org/news/itsourcity/complaint.pdf 12 Guardian Civic League, Inc., et al. v. Philadelphia Police Department, et al. (2009, July 15) 13 Post, David. (2009, July 26). The Volokh Conspiracy - More From the City That Brought You the First Amendment. Message by “Authur Kirkland” posted at 7.26.2009 2:15 pm to <http://volokh.com/posts/1248534075.shtml>

60

socialnetworkingtechnologiesbecausetobeeffectiveenforcersofthepeaceinthe

TechnologyAge,officersmustbecomeasfamiliarwithonlinecommunitiesastheyarewith

brickandmortarcommunities.Instead,managersshoulddeveloppolicythatguidesofficersto

maintainprofessionaldemeanorwhenusingsocialmediaapplications.

InCops2.0,guestbloggerLauriStevensdescribessevencoreprinciplesofficersshould

bemindfulofwhenusingsocialmediaapplications.Summarized,theyare:

Integrity.Whetheron-oroff-duty,officersshouldstrivetobeethicalandhonestintheir

communications,rememberingthattheyareheldtoahighstandardinthecommunity.

UseDisclaimers.Officersshouldclearlyidentifycommentsastheirown.

Identity.Officersshouldusetheirrealnameswhenrepresentingtheiragencies.

Department-sanctionedtools.Officersshouldbeencouragedtouseagency-approved

socialmediaandtheiruseshouldbecloselysupervised.

Competence.Officersshoulddemonstrateproficiencyintheiruseofsocialmedia

applications.

Commandstaffresponsibility.Policemanagersandadministratorsshouldavoidusing

publiclyaccessiblesocialmediatocommunicatewithofficersandstaff.

Training.Agenciesshouldprovidesocialmediatrainingforofficersandstaff.(Stevens,

2009)14

Socialmediaapplicationshaveprofoundlychangedthewaytheworldcommunicates.

Thereisnogoingback.Lawenforcementmustadaptorriskbecomingobsolete.Propertraining

andwell-craftedusepolicieswillmakeitpossibleforpolicetobetterservetheircommunities,

bothinthecorporealworldandtheonlineone.

14 Stevens, Lauri. (2009, August 17) Guest post: Social media policies for law enforcement. Cops2.0. Retrieved October 24, 2009 from http://cops2point0.com/2009/08/17/guest-post-social-media-policies-for-law-enforcement/

61

SocialMedia:ConsiderationsforBackgroundandInternalAffairsInvestigators

Policemanagersintendingtoconductinquiriesinvolvingemployees’useofsocialmedia

ortoreviewapplicants’socialnetworkingwebsitesshouldbeawareoflegalramificationsand

potentialexposuretocivilsuit,especiallyifitisdecidedtocompelemployeesorapplicantsto

provideuseridentificationandpasswordstotheirsocialnetworkingsites.

A search is constitutional if it does not violate a person's “reasonable” or“legitimate” expectation of privacy. (Katz v. United States, 1967)15This inquiryembracestwodiscretequestions:first,whethertheindividual'sconductreflects“an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and second, whether theindividual'ssubjectiveexpectationofprivacy is“onethatsociety ispreparedtorecognizeas‘reasonable.’”(USDepartmentofJustice,2002)16Thereisasyetnohardandfastguidelinethatclarifieswhetheranexpectationof

privacyinelectronicallystoredinformationisconstitutionallyreasonable:

Todeterminewhetheran individualhasa reasonableexpectationofprivacy ininformation stored in a computer, it helps to treat the computer like a closedcontainer suchasabriefcaseor file cabinet. TheFourthAmendmentgenerallyprohibits lawenforcement fromaccessing and viewing information stored in acomputer without a warrant if it would be prohibited from opening a closedcontainerandexaminingitscontentsinthesamesituation.(U.S.DepartmentofJustice,2002)17TraditionalFourthAmendmentprinciples,suchasthosegoverningclosedcontainers,

applytodigitalevidence.Backgroundinvestigators,intheireagernesstoexamineapplicants’

socialnetworkingsites,shouldnotlosesightofthefactthatevenduringahomevisit,

investigatorscannotreadpersonaldiariesandcorrespondence,flipthroughphotograph

albums,orperusedocumentsstoredinfilecabinets.Neithershouldtheycapriciouslyinspect

digitalfilesstoredonanapplicant’scomputer.

15 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967). Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute. Retrieved October 7, 2009 from <http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?389+347> 16 US Department of Justice (2002) Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations. United States Department of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Criminal Division. Retrieved October 7, 2009 from <http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm#_IB_>17 U.S. Department of Justice, (2002)

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Severalfederalstatutesgovernaccesstoanddisclosureofcertaintypesofdigital

information:

• ElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyAct

• WiretapAct

• PenRegisterandTrapandTraceStatute

• StoredWireandElectronicCommunicationsAct

• PrivacyProtectionAct

Statestatutesmaybemorerestrictivethancorrespondingfederallaws.Policemanagersshould

befamiliarwithbothfederalandstatestatutesbecauseviolationsmayresultinevidentiary

challengesorcivilsuit.

Somedatastoredinsocialnetworkingsitesmaybeprivilegedorprotected.For

example,thesitemaycontainreferencestoreligioustexts,discussionsaboutreligiousbeliefs,

ormessagesfromareligiousadvisor.Theuserinquestionmayhaveexchangedemailwithan

attorneyaboutalawsuitorthedraftingofawill.Theusermayhavereceivedatextmessage

sentviaasmartphonefromhisphysician.Investigatorsshouldtakecaretobecognizantofthe

potentialforprivilegedinformationtoexistonsocialmediasitesunderreviewandtocomply

withapplicablelegallimitationsregardingsuchinformation.Onewaytoreduceriskwouldbe

tohaveanindependentreviewerexaminesocialmediaofapplicantsandreportfindingsthat

donotincludeprivilegedorprotectedclassinformationtothehiringboard.

Inthecourseofconductingareviewofanindividual’ssocialnetworkingsites,evidence

ofacrimemaybediscovered.Inthatcase,theinvestigatorshouldimmediatelydiscontinuethe

review,treatthecomputerasadigitalcrimescene,andobtainasearchwarrant.Forabasic

overviewofissuesregardingcareandhandlingofdigitalevidence,seeElectronicCrimeScene

Investigation:AGuideforFirstResponders(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-

sum/187736.htm).Thepotentialtofollowuponanycriminalcasesthatmaybediscoveredare

notlikelytobecompromisedifreviewsofsocialmediasitesaretreatedasiftheywerecriminal

investigationsfromtheonset.

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Employeesorapplicantswhofeeltheyhavebeendiscriminatedagainstorwrongly

accusedofmisconductmayopttofilecomplaintsundertheNationalLaborRelationsAct,Civil

RightsAct,orclaimwhistleblowerprotection.Clearandconcisepoliciesthatbothguideand

protectinvestigatorsareneededtohelpguardagainstfederalandstateprivacylawviolations.

Carefullydrafted,wellthoughtoutconsentformsarealsoneededtoensureapplicants,

employees,theagencyanditsinvestigatorsareprotected.

InvestigativePolicyandProcedure

Procedureandpolicyforgainingaccesstoapplicants’andemployees’socialmedia

websitesarenotyetstandardized.Prudentadministratorswillproceedwithcaution,

rememberingthatanagency’sneedtoknowdoesnotoutweighapplicants’oremployees’

rightstoprivacy.Investigatorsshouldnotcastasidetrainingandstandardinvestigative

practicesforlackofcommonlyacceptedpoliciesandproceduresforsocialmedia

investigations.Thereisnoexcuseforinvestigatorstoactoutsideoftheirexistingtraining.

Humanresourcebackgroundinvestigatorsarecurrentlyexploringthreeapproaches:

• TorequestuserIDsandpasswordssothattheycanloginto“private”compartmentsof

socialmediawebsites

• Toeschewpasscodeaccessandtoonlysearchforandexaminepubliclyaccessible

socialmediasites.

• Tohavetheapplicantoremployeeaddtheinvestigatorasa“friend”togainaccessto

privatesectionsofsocialnetworkingsites.

Theagencyshouldworkwithlegalcounseltoensurethatconsentformsarecarefullydrafted,

takingintoconsiderationnondisclosureoutsidetheagencyorhumanresourceprovider,and

includelimitations(suchasnotfollowinglinkstoothersitesincluding“friends”sites).

Proceduralguidelinesshouldalsoalertinvestigatorstobeawareofandadheretothird

partyproviders’termsofservice(TOS)agreements.Forexample,both“Facebook.com”and

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“Google.com”TOSagreementsrestrictusersfromcertainactivities.Facebook's"Registration

andAccountSecurity"TOSstipulates:

1.Youwillnot...createanaccountforanyoneotherthanyourselfwithoutpermission.

[...]

6.Youwillnotshareyourpassword,letanyoneelseaccessyouraccount,ordoanything

elsethatmightjeopardizethesecurityofyouraccount.(See

<http://www.facebook.com/terms.php>)

Google's"PasswordsandAccountSecurity"TOSstate:

6.1Youagreeandunderstandthatyouareresponsibleformaintainingthe

confidentialityofpasswordsassociatedwithanyaccountyouusetoaccesstheServices.

(See<http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS>)

Investigatorsshouldalsorefrainfromexpandingthereviewoutsideoftheuser’s

website,forexample,byclickingonlinks,activatingvideooraudiofiles,orvisitingtheuser’s

friends’socialmediasites.Finally,investigatorsshouldbeawarethatauser’ssitemayhave

beenalteredbyanunauthorizedintruderwhocannoteasilybeidentified.Byadheringto

carefullydraftedoperationalpolicy,agenciescanavoidhiringdiscriminationclaimsandstill

conductthoroughbackgroundorinternalinvestigationsofsocialmediasites.

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TheExecutionofFourPoliceOfficers:

LessonsfromaSocialMediaTempest

TobyM.FinnieandEarlMoulton

TheNov.29,2009,murdersofSgt.MarkRenningerandOfficersTinaGriswold,

GregRichardsandRonaldOwensweretheworstincidentofviolenceagainstlaw

enforcementinstatehistory,andthemanhuntthatfollowedwasthelargest

fugitivesearchinstatehistory.—SeattleTimes

Whetherlocal,nationalorinternational,highprofileeventscapturethepublic’s

attentionandarousedesirestoparticipateinmeaningfulways.Socialmediaenablesand

facilitatescommunityparticipationatlevelsheretoforeunimaginable.WebsitessuchasTwitter,

Facebook,Flicker,andYoutubewereprimarilydesignedforonlinesocializing.However,these

andotherapplicationsandwebsitesalsoempoweruserscaughtupincrisestosharetext,

image,video,andaudiofilesinrealtime.Thissharingoccurswellbeforepublicinformation

officersorconventionalnewsmediacanobtain,processandpublishthedata.TheseWeb2.0

toolshaveturnedpassiveobserversintoactivereporters.Nolongercontenttostand

submissivelybehindthecrimescenetape,today’snet-savvycitizenjournalistscanunflinchingly

insertthemselvesintoinvestigativeprocesses,sometimesenhancingandsometimesinterfering

withpoliceoperations.

InWashingtonstate,theexecution-stylemurderoffourpoliceofficersandtheensuing

searchforthefugitiveshooterignitedafirestormofsocialnetworkingactivitiesandintroduced

anewparadigmforlawenforcement:It’snolongercrowdmanagement;nowit’scloud

management.

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TheInternet“Cloud”

CaseStudy:TheIncident

At8:15AMonaquietSundaymorning,MauriceClemmonsstrodeintoacoffeeshop,

shotandkilledfouruniformedLakewoodpoliceofficerswhiletheyworkedontheirlaptop

computers.Itwasatargetedattackagainstthepatrolsquadandtheirsergeant:Sgt.Mark

RennigerandOfficerTinaGriswoldwerekilledbeforetheycouldreact.OfficerRonaldOwens

waskilledashephysicallyengagedwithClemmons.PolicedeterminedthatOfficerGreg

RichardsalsostruggledwithClemmonsandfiredhisweapon,woundingClemmons(itwaslater

confirmed),beforebeingshotandkilled.WitnessesobservedClemmonsgettingintothe

passengersideofawhitepickuptruckandfleeingthescene.A40-hourlongmulti-jurisdictional

manhuntensuedinvolving600officersfrom16local,state,andfederalagencies.

TheSeattleTimesnewspapergavewidecoveragetothecrimeanditsaftermath,bothin

printandonline,usingsocialmediatoolssuchasTwitter,Facebookand“GoogleWave,”an

experimentalwebapplication(withfurtherdevelopmentcurrentlysuspended):

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AGoogleWavestartedbytheSeattleTimesisbeingusedtotrackinformationaboutthesearchforamansuspectedofkillingfourpoliceofficers.It'sthefirstGoogle-supportedmanhuntandfinallyadecentuseforWave.DuetoGoogleWave'srealtimeupdatingcapabilities,thisisactuallyaratherfittinguse.Peoplearepostingeverythingtheyknow,frominformationaboutthesuspect(rightdowntohisoldpicturesandTwitteraccounts)tonewsfrompolicescanners.AGoogleMapofthemanhuntisalsobeingmaintainedwiththemajoreventsofthesearch.(Golijan,2009)

Grippedbytheunfoldingdrama,citizenjournalistsimmediatelybeganpostingbriefmessages

toTwitteraccounts,includingthehashtag“#WAshooting”setupbytheSeattleTimes.Editors

creditedtenstaffers’tweetswithdrivingarecord-breaking3.3millionpageviewsto

Seattletimes.com,usingthelinkedTwitteraccounttopushupdatedinformationouttoreaders

(Cook,2009).ThesuccessoftheSeattleTimesindrivingtraffic,andtherebyrevenue,means

thatthismodelisapermanent,notephemeral,phenomenon.Theresultwasapowerful

informationflow,combiningresourcesfromseveralmediaoutlets,governmententities,and

ordinarycitizenswhoaddedfirstpersoninsights.

Thefirstindicationofaparadigmshiftincrisismanagementaroseearlyinthehuntfor

thefugitive.Anhouraftertheshooting,apickuptruckmatchingthedescriptionofthevehicle

usedinthegetawaywasspottedinaparkinglotnearthecrimescene:

StreetsaroundthecoffeeshopwereblockedofflateSundaymorning,andapolicehelicopterhoveredoveralargecrowdofinvestigators.TVvideoshowedpolicetakingpossessionofapickuptruckparkedinagrocerystoreinParkland(Johnson,2009).

Passersbynotedtheintenseinterestbythepoliceandusedcellularphonestosnappicturesof

thepickuptruckanduploadtheimagestoFacebook,Twitter,Flicker,personalblogs,andother

socialmediaaccounts.Beforelawenforcementcouldsendoutapressreleaseandbeforethe

mediacouldeditandbroadcastthevideotape,imagesofthetruckwere‘outinthewild.’This

clearlyraisedthelikelihoodthatrelativesandfriendsrenderingaidtothefugitivemightlearn

aboutandalerthimtothediscoveryoftheabandonedpickuptruck.Ontheotherhand,the

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informationservedtonotifythecitizenrytodiscontinuethecrowd-sourcedsearchforthe

vehicleandtoslowtheunrelatedreportingofwhitepickuptrucksflowingtolawenforcement.

Anadditionalpieceofinformationabouta‘personofinterest’brokeontheInternet

beforelawenforcementhadanopportunitytopubliclyannounceit.Inanafter-eventanalysis,

RenaySanMiguel(2009)explained:

TheSeattleTimes’fact-checkingandsource-workingcametotheforeSundayafternoon,whenitsWebsiteendedupidentifyingasuspect--beforethePierceCountySheriff'swerereadytorevealthatinformation.…InbetweenupdatesfromPierceCountySheriff'sspokespersonEdTroyer,IcheckedSeattleTimes.comandsawonthefrontpagethatreportershadconfirmationonasuspectname--MauriceClemmons,a37-year-oldwithalongstringofconvictionsinArkansasandWashingtonstates.However,Troyerhadyettonameasuspect.I'llswearonastackofAssociatedPressstylebooksthatmeresecondsafterthatstoryappearedonline,reportersatthecommandpostweregettingtextmessagesfromassignmentdesks,andtweetswereflyingwithlinkstothestory.Troyerwasforcedtosteptothemicrophonesabout15minutesafterInoticedtheWebpage,confirmingtheTimes'storybysayingsomethingtotheeffectthat"wehadtodothisbeforewewerequiteready."Atatelevisedpressconference,PierceCountySheriffPublicInformationOfficerEd

Troyerannounced:

"I know that someof youhavehad this name, and I appreciate that youheldbackonituntilwedidsomeoperationsbecausewedon'twanttogetanybodyhurtorjeopardizeit.We’restill inthemiddleofthoseoperationsbutweknowthecatisoutofthebag(sotospeak)onhisname,sowewantedeverybodytohave it at once. ...We’re not going to elaborate anymore; you guys knowwecan't.Weweren'teventotallyreadytodothisyet.Wewantedabitmoretimetoconfirmsomethings;we'restillintheprocessofconfirmingthings.Wewanttomake sure thatwehave everything accurate and, at this point, that'swhatwe'resaying, thathe'sapersonof interest. Ican'tchange ituntilwegetmoreinformationandthatmayhappenvery,veryquickly.”(TyneRoseMedia,2009)TheavailabilityofsensitiveinformationontheInternetposesongoingissuesforlaw

enforcement.TheverylegitimateconcernsalludedtobyTroyerremainedevenafter

confirmingthesuspectidentity.Withthebenefitofhindsight,itisusefultoaskwhatlaw

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enforcementpurposeordutywasservedbyconfirmingtheidentityofthesuspectpriorto

meetinglawenforcementneeds.

Asking“Whosepurposewasserved?”createsanotherperspective.Thequestion

suggeststhatthereporters‘forced’Troyer’sannouncementtomeettheirneeds.Justasthe

SeattleTimeswebsitehadalreadydone,thosereporterswerefreetoreporttheidentity

withoutconfirmation,butwereseekingconfirmationtomeettheirneedsforliabilitypurposes.

Inmakingthedifficultchoicesliketheseinmid-crisis,itmaybeusefultoreflectonthedifferent

audiencesbeingreachedbydifferentformsofinformationrelease.Inthiscasethereleaseto

mainstreamreporterslikelywouldreachamuchlargerlocalaudiencethanthatreachedbythe

variousInternetsources.

ThattheInternetsourcesprovedaccurateneedstobeacknowledged.Asanearlier

studyhasdemonstrated,adhocgroupsofindividualsaidedbysocialmediatoolsareentirely

capableofassessingcomplexdatasourcesandarrivingataccurateconclusions(Vieweg,etal,

2008).Theself-correctingnatureofsocialmediauseisillustratedbyaBOLAtweetedbythe

SeattleTimes:

“RT@dlboardman:Copslookingforgreen1997MazdaMilleniaWAlicense208SSXregistered

toClemmons'wife.”

—#washooting/carnitos/Mon30Nov200920:14:20+0000

Thatpostingwasretweetednumeroustimes,thencanceledwithanupdatedtweetfromKIRO

TV:

“Policenolongerlookingfor_1997MazdaMillenia-WSPTrooperBrandyKesslersaysitwas

sold2monthsago”

—#washooting/KIRO7Seattle/Mon30Nov200922:54:02+0000

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Inthemeantime,mediastaffandcitizen-userscontinuedtoprovideimages,linksand

commentaryatafastandfuriouspace.Forexample,about500GoogleWaveparticipantshad

accesstothefollowinginformation:

• LinkstorelevantTwitteraccounts

• Descriptionofthesuspectthatincludedamugshot,possiblealiasesandalinktothe

suspect’s(presumed)Twitteraccount

• Namesofschoolsplacedonsecuritylockdown

• Acopyofabulletinissuedbyauniversityadvisingthatcampuspolicewerefollowingup

onatipandsearchingthegrounds.Studentsandfacultywereadvisedtobealertand

especiallyawareoftheirsurroundings

• LinkstopolicescannertrafficsitesontheInternet

• LinkstovideofeedsonnewsmediaandYoutube.comsites

• Informationaboutvictims’memorials,includinglinkstoFacebookandMyspace

• Linkstodonationsitesforvictims’families

• Identificationofareasunderlawenforcementsurveillanceorsearches

• Arealtimechatareaforuserstoshareinformation

Thebarrageofonlinepostsanduploadedfileshadpotentialtojeopardizepoliceoperations,

threatenofficers’safetyandcompromiseinvestigations.“Newsorganizationssometimestook

theirstaffingcuesfromwhatresidentssentinfromsmartphonesorcomputers.…Acitizen

tweetedaboutcopssearchingontheirstreet;KING[TV]sentanearbyreportertocheckitout”

(SanMiguel,2009).

Tweetedon#washooting:“Ican'tbelievethey'rebymyhouse!UWPDhasnowarrivedat

CowenParkandtheycloseddownpartofthestreet!”

—AtomicPunk,Mon30Nov200912:59:45+0000

SeattleplaywrightPaulMullinreadthrough5710Twitterentries(#WAShooting,n.d.)in

apost-eventanalysisofthesocialconstructsthathadformed.InaninterviewwithKUWO

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producerJeremyRichards,Mullincommentedthatcertainpostsbegantostandoutfrom

others.Henotedthatwhetherinformationwasaccurateornot,somepeoplebegantoact

uponit:

SomebodyshowedupatCowenParkafterseeingonTwitterthatpolicethoughtMauriceClemmonsmightbethere—andthisguyshowedupatCowenParkinbodyarmor,withapistol!Needlesstosay,thepolicewerenothappyaboutthis.(Richards,2011)

Anotherwebsite,Seattlecrime.com,followingandreportingonSeattlepolice’sscannertraffic,

producedamoredetailedversionoftheCowenParkincident:

UPDATE@12:30p.m.:PoliceareformingaperimeteraroundCowenParkandpushinggatheredmembersofthemediabackfromtheirpositions.Apparentlytracesofbloodwerefoundinabathroominthepark.ScannerchatterindicatespoliceareclosingoffsegmentsofBrooklynAve.intheU-Dist.-Ravennaareatopedestriansandcartraffic.UPDATE1:44PM:AmanwhowaswearingbodyarmorandpackingapistolshowedupatCowenPark.Policebrieflydetainedtheman,whohasaconcealedweaponspermit,asitisapparentlyillegalforthosenotinlawenforcementtopossesssucharmor.WeagreewiththeP-I'sCaseyMcNerthneywhenhetweeted:“ReportsofmanwithbodyarmorshowsupatCowenParktohelp.Hedidn'thelp.”(Spangenthal-Lee,2009)Lawenforcementhaslongunderstoodtheimpactofradioscanningandmade

encryptionandradioprotocoldecisionsaccordingly.However,thosedecisionsmayneedtobe

revisited.Inthesocialmediaworld,asingleindividuallisteningtoascannerhasaneffect

amplifiedbypostingradiotransmissionsonsocialmedia.

Twitterpostto#washooting:“They'recomplainingabouttheTimes'photosonscanner.”

—AtomicPunk,Mon30Nov200912:59:45+0000

PolicewerealsodispleasedwithaphotographerwhoworkedfortheSeattleTimes.

AccordingtoMullin:

CliffDesPeaux,aphotographerwhowasaninternwiththeSeattleTimes,wasatoneofthelocationsthattheSeattleSWATteamhadsurrounded,thinkingClemmonswasinside.Itwasutterlydark,sodarkthattheotherphotographerDesPeauxwaswith

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couldn’tgetanypictures.ButCliffhadanewcamerathathewasshootingshotswith—thathewasjustpointingatthedark—andwhenhelookedathisviewfinder,hecouldseethattheSWATteamwasmovinginonthishouseatthreeinthemorning.He’stweetingfromthescene;hisTwitterfollowersexplodefromsevento700;CBSnewsistweetinghim,askinghimtocallthemattheirheadquartersinNewYorkCity.AndthenhegetsacallfromtheSeattleTimessaying,“Youneedtostoptweetingoratleastyouneedtostoptweetingpoliceactivityinanongoingmanhunt.”

Twitterpostto#washooting:“EdTroyerPierceCountyDetectivejustspoketo@Q13Foxat9

channel110oncomcast.Askedpeople2notreporttheirmovements”

—virginiagriffey,Tue01Dec200902:38:18+0000

Mullinfurtherexplained:

BasicallywhathadhappenedisthattheSeattlePolicewerefollowingDesPeaux’sTwitter feeds (because theSeattleTimeswas running it liveat theirweb site).What they [the police] said to the Times which the Times then passed ontoDesPeaux—whowas a young guy who didn’t know any better— You don’tcoverwhatthepoliceareabouttodo.Youcancoverwhatthey’redoingandyoucancoverwhatthey’vedonebutifyou’retippingtheirhandasthey’retryingtomoveoninonadangerousarmedcriminal….Youknow?That’sbad!

Theelementofsurprisenecessaryinsomepoliceoperationsislosingouttosocialmedia.Police

mustassumethatcriminalswillmonitorsocialnetworkingsitestolearn—asbesttheycanand

inrealtime—whatpoliceareupto.

TwofurtherlessonspresentthemselvesfromDesPeaux'sactions.Thefirstofthesemay

providesomecoldcomforttolawenforcementmanagers.ThemanagementoftheSeattle

Timesisfacing,andhavingasmuchtroubledealingwith,thechangescreatedbysocialmedia.

Theirtrainingandacculturationprocessesareclearlyinadequatetomeettheirownneeds.The

secondlessoncomesfromthetechnologyitself.ThetechnologythatrevealedtheSWAT

movementsisalsoavailabletocriminals.ThatchangeshowSWATneedstoconductoperations.

Itmaybecomenecessarytore-thinkthedistancesrequiredforoperationalperimetersinorder

toprotectagainstsuchuse.Theadvancementoftechnologymeansthatallaspectsoflaw

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enforcementresponseneedconstantre-assessment.ThelengthoftimethataStandard

OperatingProcedureremainsrelevantisrapidlyapproachingzero.

Notonlywerepolicecommunicationsbeingmonitored,butalsofireandrescue

broadcasts.Someindividualsattemptedtolearnaccesscodestomoresensitivepolice

communications—andotherusersrespondedwithsuggestions:

Twitterpoststo#washooting:

“SPDSWAToperationschannelstillellusivetome.Anybodyknowtheradiofrequency/

talkgrouptheyareusing” —esl_zone,Tue01Dec200907:41:42

“@esl_zonehereisalinkwithallthedifferentfreq'sforSPD

http://www.radioreference.com/apps/db/?sid=604”—akfirefighter,Tue01Dec200907:47:00

@esl_zonehere'slinktotrunkfreqshttp://www.muppetlabs.com/~chris/scanner/trunk.txt

—200TMaster,Tue01Dec200908:48:29

Thesetweetsshowanadditionalcomplexityofthesocialmediareality.Notonlyarelaw

enforcementobjectivesjeopardizedbymembersofthepublic,partnersinemergencyresponse

cancreateinformationleaks.Boththeintentionaltweetsmadebyfireandambulanceservices

fortheirownpurposesandtheleaksbytheironsitepersonnel,allofwhomarecarryingsocial

media-enableddevices,arebeyondthecontroloflawenforcementpoliciesandprotocols.

Understandingthoserisksforeachotherisoneofthenewdutiesofallemergencyresponse

personnel.

Createdwithweb-basedapplicationssuchasDipity.comtimelinesfollowedeventsfrom

onecitytoanother,storybystory,videobyvideo.Digital“pin”mapsdisplayedup-to-the-

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minuteactivitiesandgeographiclocationsofpoliceoperations.

PoliceResponseTrackingMapusingGoogleWaveApplication(GeneralGentry,2009)

MultiplepostsfromtheTwitteraccount“#washooting”describeeventsinvolvingthe

fugitiveMauriceClemmonsandhisfinalandfatalconfrontationwithSeattlePoliceOfficer

BenjaminKellyonTuesday,December1,2009atapproximately2:45AM.

Archivedpoststo#washooting(2009)(Note:usernamesandtimestampshavebeenomitted

butmessagesotherwiseappearasposted):

Possiblesuspectmaleblackwithmoleonface4430SouthCanyonStpossiblecapture

happeningnowlessthan5secondsago

Allunitsarerespondingtothatlocation.Soundsliketheythinktheyhavehim.

Guildrephasbeenrequested...Suspectproblyshot

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Theygotasuspectmatchinghisdescriptiononthegroundrightnow.Possibletheymighthave

him!

TheyarecallininMEDICtothesceneofthissuspect!!!Pleasetellmetheyjustgothim!

Scannerlisteners...besuretoturnonSFDAMRandhospitalfreqsforsuspectcondition.Hehas

beenshotbySPD

TheshooterfromLakewoodhasbeenshotat42nd

Suspectinroutetoharborview...

Scannerpeople:MonitorHarborviewandSFDfreq.SPDridingwithsuspecttoHarborview

Commandpostisgoigntobesetuponscenethislookslikeitisit!

45thandKenyon.SWATmovingin.ScannermentionedsuspectgoingtoHarborview.Isthisit?

Scannerisgettingquiet...channell3312isopened!containmentisdone!itisover!

Theyarejokingandlaughingonscannerpoliceseemhappy!Suspectvehiclesbeenlookingfor

2xatresidence.

Lawenforcementsourceconfirmssuspectarrestedon4400blockofS.KenyonwasMaurice

Clemmons.

Possibleofficerinvolvedshootinginthe4400blockofSKenyon.PIOsKappelandWhitcomb

enroutetothescene.

Epilogue:OnDecember1,2009,TwitteruserErikM.Hicks(“@emhicks00”)postedthe

followingmessage:

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IMAGESOURCE:http://twitter.com/#!/emhicks00/status/6254726791

RespondingtoaninquiryfromDavidQuinlan,KIROTV,“emhicks00”wrote:

IMAGESOURCE:http://twitter.com/David_Quinlan/status/6285059601

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Aswithsomany“facts”ontheInternet,thesourceofthephotouploadedby

“@emhicks00”isnotnecessarilyapostalinspector:

Forgiveme,butthat’saboutasclosetosegueingbackintoChristmasSeasonasI’mlikelytogetthisweek.Rightnow,Ican’tofferanythingmuchmorecheerfulthanapictureofadeadcop-killer,forwardedbyabrotherinthenorthwest.(Copshavecellphonecamerastoo)(Ayoob,2009).

Internalaffairsinvestigationswerelaunchedinpolice,fire,andmedicalexaminer’sofficesinan

attempttodeterminetheindividualresponsibleforobtainingandpublishingonlineapictureof

thedeceasedsuspect,MauriceClemmons.

ImplicationsforLawEnforcement

Whetherit’spursuitofawantedsuspect,rescueofalostchild,orresponsetoanatural

disaster,socialmedianetworkingenablesordinarycitizenstobecomeinvestedinthenarrative

whethercrisismanagementsupervisorswantthemtoornot.Inhisemergencymgmt.comblog,

GeraldBaroncontendsthat“It’snotyourresponseanymore—it’stheirs.”(Baron,2011April

12)Perhapsamorepracticalandusefulconceptisthattheadventofsocialmediaemphasizes

whathasalwaysbeentrue:Atbase,theresponseofemergencyservicesneedstobe

understoodas‘ours.’Alltheplayershaveneedsandaspirationsandallofthoseneedtobe

underactiveconsiderationinanyemergencyresponse.

Internetsavvyusersarenolongercontenttowaitfor“newsateleven.”Incident

commandersandpublicinformationofficersmustfindwaystousesocialnetworkingtoolsto

accuratelyinformthepublic,dispelrumors,monitorforactionableintelligenceandgenerate

trust.Whicheverwaysthatanagencymaydiscovertousesocialmedia,theywillneedto

understandthereasonthatsocialmediaispowerfulandsoeffective.Thehistoryof

communicationsuptotheadventoftheInternetwasabouttheprogressofmovingfromone-

to-onecommunicationtoone-to-manytechnology.Socialmediahasaddedthecapabilityfor

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one-to-allcommunicationswhileretainingthecapabilitiesforone-to-oneandone-to-many

communications.Thisevolutionhasbeencoupledwiththecompletelackofanycapacityissues

tocreatethesocialmediaworld.

Thesocialmediaworldisnotconfinedtoaparticulargroupofparticipants.Thesocial

mediaworldisnotconfinedtoparticularkindsofinformation.Thesocialmediaworldisnot

confinedtoanyparticulargeography,jurisdiction,nationstate,languageortimezone.Because

somuchofthecitizenryhaveharnessedthepowerofthesocialmediaworldintheirprivate

lives,theyhaveformedtheentirelyreasonableexpectationthattheirpublicinstitutionswilldo

thesame.

Crisisandemergencycommunicationplanningtodaymustincludeaprocessfor

managinginteraction.ChiefBillBoyd,CityofBellinghamFireDepartmentdescribesthe

challenges:

ThedaysofaPublicInformationOfficer(PIO)sittingdownatacomputerandgeneratingatwoparagraphmediareleaseacoupleoftimesaday,andaninterviewhereandtherearegone.IfyoustillthinkthisisallthePIOreallyhastodothenyoumightaswellgivethemanoldtypewriterandcarbonpaper.AsanIncidentCommander(IC),I“definethebox”thePIOwilloperatewithin(givingthemtheflexibilityandboundariestoimmediatelyreleaseinformationwithoutmehavingtoapproveit).TheICneedstoimmediatelysetpolicy,validatekeyrealtimemessageconceptsandthendothemostimportantthing-letthePIOloosetodotheirjob.AsanICinthisdayandage,Icanillaffordtogetfurtherbehindtheinformationdisseminationcurve(assumingwearealreadybehindthankstosocialmedia,cameracellphones,etc.).

ThisalsomeansPIOsmustbeskilledincreatingshortmessages,and

relayingtheminthemostsuccinctway(howwouldyourelayanevacuationorderonTwitter?).InthemajoreventsIhavebeeninvolvedwithovertheyears,thistypeofmessagingwasnotavailable.Now,itisthepreferredmethodofcommunicationbymany.Yet,itremainsforeigntomanyintheemergencyresponsecommunity.

ICsneedtowakeupandrealizetheimpactoftheexplosivegrowthof

socialmediaandtheresultingexpectationforimmediateandaccurateinformation.IfthepublicdoesnotgetitfromIncidentCommandtheywillgetitfromsomewhereelse,relayinaccurateinformationand/orundermineyourauthoritybyventingtheirfrustrationsaboutlackofinformation(Baron,2010).

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Socialmedianetworkinghasforeverchangedincidentcommanders’andpublicinformation

officer’roles.Forward-thinkingleaderswillfindwaystointegratesocialmedianetworkinginto

crisiscommunicationoperations.Inconstructingthesenewapproaches,thoseleaderswillneed

toconsidertwoprimaryaspectsofthesocialmediaworld.Aprimaryattributeofsocialmediais

thatitoccursinrealtime.Asthegraphicbelowillustrates,thereisvirtuallynotimelagbetween

eventsintherealworldandthereportingofthoseeventsinthevirtualworld.Anyintegration

ofsocialmediaintolawenforcement'sresponsesduringcrisismustgivefulleffecttothis

reality.

Source:

http://media.govtech.net/BlogFeeder/CRISIS_COMM/Before_Now_Public_Info_Grap

hic.png

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Asecondprimaryaspectofsocialmediaisthatcommunicationsinsocialmediaforums

becomemoderatedbyparticularusersthataretrustedbythewiderusercommunity(Vieweg,

2008).Thisaspectholdsanumberofimplicationsforcrisismanagers.First,inordertobe

trusted,auserneedstobeknownforprovidinggoodinformation.Whatthismeansisthatitis

possibleforagenciestoestablishtheirpresenceinvarioussocialmediacommunitiesin

advance.Byproperlymaintainingthatpresence,anagencycanmediatewhatinformationgets

sharedandwherethatsharingtakesplace.Havingestablishedtrustinadvance,anagencycan

leveragethattrustduringasubsequentcrisisevent.

Traditionally,policymakershavelookedataproblem,researchedit,developedapolicy

andthenmovedontothenextissue.Thismodelwillnotworkwhendealingwithsocialmedia.

TheInternetisconstantlycreatingnew,andre-creatingolder,functions.Eventhepeoplewho

designthesefunctionsdonotandcannotfullyanticipatealltheusestowhichafunctionwillbe

put.Forexample,theuseofTwitterasacommandandcontrolmechanismforactivistswasas

unanticipatedbyitscreatorsasbylawenforcement.Theimplicationoftheconstantchange

andexpansioninthesocialmediaworldisthatunderstanding,leveragingandrespondingto

thosechangesrequiresasimilarflexibilityinpolicy.Theveryconceptofflexiblepolicywillbe

viewedbysomeasanoxymoronbutisnonethelessanabsoluterequirement.

Asimilarflexibilitymayberequiredinrespectofagencypersonnelwhomaybe

expectedtohavetodealwithsocialmedia.Thepracticehasevolvedinemergencyresponse

agenciestoappointparticularindividualsorunitsasmediarelationsorpublicinformation

officers.Thatpracticeevolvedtomeettheneedsandrequirementsofmainstreammedia.

However,mainstreammediahasremainedrelevantonlytotheextentthatithasembracedthe

toolsandtechniquesofsocialmedia.Consequentlytheirneedscannowbemetbyanagency's

competentuseofsocialmedia.Thisobservationalsoleadstotheconclusionthatindividuals

whomayhavebeenselectedforPIOdutiesbasedontheirabilitytomeetmainstreammedia

needsmaynotbetherightindividualsforeffectivecommunicationsinsocialmedia.Itmay

evenbetimetoconsiderwhethercommunicationviasocialmediaisthejobforsomeoneoris

itsomepartofeveryone'sjob.

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Thespeedandvolumeofinformationthatemergesincrisissituationsontoday's

Internetcarrieswithitsignificantproblemsforlawenforcement.Ourabilitytomitigatethe

challengesandtoleveragetheopportunitieswillbereflectedbythedegreethatanagency

embracesthepositiveaspectsoftheInternet.People,policiesandproceduresinpolicingneed

tobeflexible.Theyneedtobecontinuouslyconnectedtomultiplesourcesofinformation.And

theyneedtobeabletorespondinInternettime:immediately.

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SanMiguel,R.(2009,December4).ApainfulsocialmediaforayforSeattlejournalists.

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Vieweg,S.,Palen,L.,Liu,S.B.,Hughes,A.L.&Sutton,J.(2008)CollectiveIntelligenceinDisaster:

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TheRighttoAccuracy:ANewFrontier

MichaelE.Buerger

Whether‘privacy’asweonceunderstooditstillexistsremainsahotlycontested

proposition.Mostofushaveencounteredthetersedismissalthat“Youalreadyhaveno

privacy;getoverit.”Whilewemightclingtothedesireforprivacy,wedailyencounter

evidencethattechnology’sCambrianexplosionhasseriouslyerodedandredefined,ifnot

eradicated,ouroldexpectationsofhavingcontroloverinformationaboutourselves.

TheimmediateimpactonmostAmericanswouldseemtobetargetedadvertising,but

therearemoreseriousconsequencesofthewidespreadavailabilityofpersonaldata:identity

theftistheonemostcommonlythoughtof,butintheinterconnectednessofcyberspace,other

negativeconsequencesmayresult.Identitytheft–thejournalisticmemeforaprocessbetter

describedas“identityappropriation”or“identitycloning”–cantakeseveralforms.

Unauthorizeddigital‘identities’canbeusedtomakecreditapplications,andthencompilehuge

unpaidbillsfrompurchases.Illegalimmigrantsuseappropriatedidentitydataascoverwhile

workingforU.S.companies.Andsomeindividualsadopttheclonedidentityofotherstoescape

anundesirableorunsavorypast:someseektoshedcriminalidentities,otherstoescape

abusiverelationships,andperhapssomemerelytostartover.

Identitytheftforfinancialgaincreatesconsiderablehavocforitsvictims,particularly

whentheirclonedpersonaehaverunupenoughunpaidbillstoaffecttherealperson’scredit

rating.Victimsofthiskindofidentitytheftrecounttalesoflaboriouseffortstocleartheir

names,aprocessrequiringmanymonthsifnotyearsofpainstakingreconstructionoftheir

finances.Forthosecitizenswhodiscoverthattheiridentitywasappropriatedforothercriminal

purposes,immediateconsequences(arrest,detentioninjail,etc.)canbemoresevere,butthe

resolutionisoftenfasterandsomewhateasier.Manyidentifytheftvictimsdescribe

circumstancesverysimilartothefictionalsceneattheresorthotelinthe1995movieTheNet,

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inwhichtheflesh-and-bloodAngelaBennetttriestoassertheridentitytothehotelclerk,who

repeatedlydeniesherbecause“thecomputersays”shecheckedoutseveraldaysearlier.

HowQuicklyWeArrivedHere

OlderAmericansinheritedexpectationsofprivacythatwereforgedinphysicality.

Closeddoors,sealedmail,face-to-faceconversationsandconfidenceswerethenorm,and

socialconventionsreinforcedtheexpectations.AllwereprotectedatonetimebytheFourth

AmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitution:therightofthepeopletobesecureintheir

persons,property,papers,andeffects…allphysicalentities.Privatecommunicationswere

protectedbythePostalServiceandbylawsthatcriminalizedtampering.

Privatepaperrecordsonceexistedinoneplace.Theywerevulnerabletocompromise,

ofcourse,throughburglary,theftbyemployees,orerroneouslybeingdiscarded.Theywere

alsovulnerabletodestructionbyflood,fire,orothermeans.Atthecore,thephysicalrecord–

inadoctor’soffice,oratalocalstore–wasmaintainedbyoneorbothofthepeopleinvolved.

However,theadventofthephotocopier(andmorerecently,cell-phonecameras)createda

newhazard,lossofprivately-heldinformationwithoutthelossoftheoriginaldocumentto

markitspassing.

Inthelastquarter-century,analternativeuniversehasovertakenthephysicalworld.

Thetelegraph,theradio,thetelephone,andtelevisionwereallharbingers:infitsandstarts,

theytranscendedthelimitationsofphysicalspace.Thecomputeragehasknitthemintoa

singleentity–cyberspace–thatcombinesalloftheirfunctions,createsnewpossibilities,and

informsayounggenerationwithsocialunderstandingsfardifferentfromthoseoftheir

forebears.Thenpaperfilesweretransformedintodatabasesandtheolderexpectationsof

dyadicrelationshipsdisappearedasindividual,cash-basedtransactionswerereplacedbya

networkofintermediaries:banks,creditcardcompanies,insurancecompanies,andmultiple

layersofintermediaryvendors.Thesystemproliferatedbecauseofperceivedbenefitstothe

individual:timewascompressed,usuallytothebenefitoftheclients.Theprocessneededto

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duplicateandsharelargeamountsofinformationchangedfromalaborious,time-consuming

effortinfrontofaphotocopyingmachine,toasimpleseriesofkeystrokesandclicksona

computer.

Theunintendedconsequenceofthattransformationhasbeentomakeformerlyprivate

datasemi-public.Theprocessbeganlongbeforethedatabase,becausethesupposedlydyadic

relationshipbetweenpatientanddoctorisnotdyadicinfact.Insurancecompaniesreceivethe

informationinordertodetermineeligibilityforpaymentandallofthemajoractorsmay

outsourceportionsoftheiroperationstointermediaries.Bankrecords,creditcardrecords,and

otherfinancialhistoriesarecompiledintocredithistoriesandratingsthatareavailableto

individualsandcorporationsalike.

TheDirectionWeAreGoing

Seeninthemostfavorablelight,suchdatabasesallowthosewhowouldextendcredit(a

commercialtransaction)tomakeinformeddecisionsonthelikelihoodofbeingrepaid,reducing

theirriskoflossandtheoreticallyimprovingtheoveralleconomy.Asmoreandmore

informationemergesaboutthequietproliferationofdata-sharinganddata-mining

intermediarycorporations,themorethenegativesemerge.Targetedadvertisingisthemost

visiblemanifestation,butsubtleandoverteffortsatsocialengineering(“Peoplelikeyouwho

boughtthisitemalsobought…”)nowprovideanominousundertonetocommunicationsfrom

cyberspace.

Withtheadventofcomputerizedrecordssystemsasthefoundationofjudgment,society

inheritsfoursourcesofpotentialdistortionoftherecordsbase:

1. humanerroruponentry;

2. computer-locatederror,resultingfromcodingerrors,glitchesinpowersources,

anddegradationovertime;

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3. intentionaldistortionduetomalicioushacking(oftenaimednotatthe

individual,butatthecorporationhostingthedatabase);and

4. unintentionaldistortionasaresultofwidespreadvirusandothermalware

distribution“inthewild.”

Databasesareinherentlyabstract:atthebestoftimes,individualdataentriesarenot

accuraterepresentationsoftherealindividualwhosenametheybear,butratherselected

sliversofinformationpertinenttothecorporationororganizationthatoriginallycollectedthe

information.Thedefactoabolitionoftimeincyberspacecompoundstheproblem.The

TralfamadoriansinKurtVonnegut’sSlaughterhouseFivemighthaveseenhumansasalongpink

trailthroughtime,butincyberspacethattemporalelongationiscompressedintoasingle

dense,bloatedcaricatureofeverysecondoftheindividual’slifetodate.Maturation,changeof

externalcircumstances,heroiceffortsatself-improvementhavenoswaythere,noristhereany

discernibleefforttoidentifyorcorrecterror(routineverificationandcorrectiveprocedures

maybeintheprimarydatabases,butoncelooseinthesecondarymarket,itisunlikelythat

errorcouldbeidentified:thereisnofinancialincentivetodosoandthepresumptionof

accuracyreigns).

ThePersonwhosenameornumberiscontainedinadatabaseisrepresentedthere,but

onlybyaseriesofnumericalentriesinpreselectedcategories.Thosecategoriesaredetermined

byprivatevendorsfortheirownpurposesandrepresentonlytheslenderportionofthe

person’slifethatisofimmediateconcerntothecorporatehost.Whetherthosecategories–

andthevaluestheentityascribestothemforeachindividual–arepreciselyrenderedoreven

commonacrosstheuniverseofdatabasesinwhichtheyarecompiledisfarfromcertain.Even

lesscertainisthedegreeofpatternandvariabilitythattheyrepresent,inthesingularfora

particularvendororintheaggregatewhendatabasesaremerged.

Criticalreaderswillnodoubtobjectthatacarefulanalystwouldmakeallowancesfor

theprogressionoftime,butthatisinfactoneofthepointsofthisessay:a“righttoaccuracy”

requiressuchaneffortbeconducted,buthumanbehaviorisnotthatdiligent.Sloppinessdue

tofatigueordistractedattention,slipshodworkperformedunderconditionsofennuior

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resentment(ofboss,ofstationinlife,ofthewaytheworldisgoingtoHeckinahandbasket,

etc.),allintroduceunintended–anduncorrected–errorsintodatabases.Therateofthaterror

maybeknowntosome,butisnotwidelydisseminated;norareparticularsmadeavailableto

thosewhoserecordsareaffected.

Twodevelopmentshavearisenthatcastevenmorebalefulaspectsontheserecords.

Thisfirstisthecorporateannexationofthedataitself,claimingthatinformationprovidedbyan

individualforthepurposesofobtainingcreditortomakeapurchaseunderotherarrangements

becomesthesolely-ownedpropertyofthecorporation,divorcedentirelyfromtheindividual

thatabstractsetofdatarepresents.Thesecondistheuseofthecollectedandlinkeddatabases

–“BigData,”inthecurrentparlance–fornetworkanalysisandintelligencegatheringby

enforcementagenciesandagents.

Data-miningisthenexusoftheprivate-publicdivision.Thepoorly-namedOperation

Carnivorewaspremisedonthefederalgovernment’sabilitytocompilecommercially-available

databasesandexaminethemforpatternsthatsuggested(orverified)criminalactivity.The

specterof“BigBrother”rootingthroughtheeverydaytransactionsofprivatecitizenswas

sufficientlyrepellanttoforcetheterminationoftheprogram,despitethefactthatcorporate

entitiesroutinelyengageinthesamepractice.InthemovieMinorityReport,speakingofthe

Pre-Cogswhopredictmurdersbeforetheyhappen,thecharacterofDannyWitwerremindsus

that“[t]heoracleisn’twherethepoweris,anyway.Thepowerhasalwaysbeenwiththe

priests…eveniftheyhadtoinventtheoracle.”Moderndatabases--BigData--arethe

contemporaryoracles,siliconequivalentsofthePre-Cogsinthemovie:thebeliefthattheycan

predicthumanactivityispromotedbythepriestsofBigData.

Themostcriticaljunctureisthatofthedecision:judgmentsaremadeaboutindividuals

baseduponthecompilationand‘smoothing’ofmultipleabstractrepresentations,allwithout

anycontactwiththeactualperson.Dataarenot‘facts,’necessarily,andall‘facts’aresubjectto

interpretationinanyevent.Thattheremaybenodefenseagainstajudgmentmadeasaresult

ofinterpretingpatternsinadatabaseistroubling,raisingthespecterofawrongdecision,with

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near-catastrophicconsequencesfortheindividual:ineffect,constitutinga21st-centuryCourtof

StarChamber.

TheRighttoAccuracy

Ifprivacyisindeedanindefensiblerelic,applicableonlytophysicalintrusionintoa

privateresidenceorotherstructure,theninvokinga‘righttoprivacy’isthewrongargumentto

poseagainsttheperilsofcyberspace.ThosewhodefendBigDatacorrectlypointoutthatmost

‘private’informationissharedvoluntarily,eveneagerly,inordertoobtainsomegoodsor

serviceinreturn:inthatview,informationhasalreadybeencommoditizedbytheconsumer.

Thecounter-argumentthatitisallbutimpossibletoliveinthemodernagewithoutsuch

transactionsisaccurate,butultimatelyprobablyirrelevant.Thegenerationalshifttobroad-

scaleexposureviasocialmediaisanotheraspectthaterodesthenotionoftraditionalFourth

Amendmentprotectionsforcommercialdata,thoughsocietyisintheearlystagesofthat

transformation,andmayyetarriveatdifferentsocialpracticesiftheharmsthreatento

outweighthebenefits.

WhatisneededinitsplaceisaConstitutionalrighttoaccuracy,aconceptthatshould

includetime-relevanceaswellasindividualentryprecision,amongotherconcerns.Thereisa

time-honored,well-usedprocessforamendingtheUnitedStatesConstitutiontomeetthe

emergingdemandsofachangingworld;itispolitical,ittakestime,anditdoesnotalways

producethedesiredresults,butitspracticalandmetaphysicalcloutisfarmorelikelyto

producepositiveincrementalchangesregardlessoftheultimateoutcome.Whileitistruethat

theConstitutionprotectscitizensonlyagainstgovernmentaction,suchanamendmentcould

wellbefashionedtoinvoke,orcoordinatewiththeCommerceClause,andsimultaneously

empowergovernmenttoextendcomparableprotectionstocitizensthroughregulationofthe

datamarkets.Therearemany,manyissuesanddetailstobeworkedout–notleastofwhichis

theburdenofestablishingtheabilitytoverifytheaccuracyofbillionsofindividualentries–but

theprocessstartswiththeassertion.Thenextstepsneedtooccurinthepublicdomain,a

seriesofconversationsaboutthepositives,thenegatives,andthemechanicsofcreatinga

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systemthatprotectsusfromhavingtodefendourrealselvesagainstasimulacrumcreatedby

demonsinthemachine.

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Bond-RelationshipDisruption:

InDefenseofStrategicandTacticalDeception

SidHealandMichaelE.Buerger

Toalesserorgreaterextent,allhumaninteractionsrelyonsomeformoftrust.Criminal

enterprisesarenoexception,thoughtheirinteractionsinvolveadifferentdefinitionoftrust

thanthatwhichmostlaw-abidingcitizenswouldrecognize.Streetgangs,drugcartels,and

othercriminalgroupshaverigidcodesofconduct,enforcedbyviolence.Thisisadarksideof

trustbaseduponpredictabilityofbehavior.Whilesomemightarguethatthesebondsare

basedonfearratherthantrust,acloserexaminationrevealsthatfearisjustthetoolusedto

establishtrust.Itisnotmutualtrust,butaone-wayrelationshipthatallowscriminalleadership

totrustitssubordinates.Itistheconfidentassurancethatfailingtocomplywiththerulesand

expectationsofthosewithauthoritywillresultinretribution.Moreimportantly,themeasures

takentoenforcethistrustaresurerandfarharsherthanthoseofagovernmentattemptingto

discourageit:itreliesonsureanddirectpunishment,unencumberedbychecksandbalances,

concernsaboutcivilrights,orsafeguardsagainsterror.Thelargerandmoreformalthecriminal

enterprise,themorepersuasivethisfactorbecomes.

Abondisthusformedbetweenmembersandgroupsofacriminalenterprisethat

enablesplansandtransactionstosucceedwithoutthecumbersomewrittencontractsthat

characterizebusinessarrangementsinthecivilworld.Crimelordscantrusttheirconfederates

becauseofacombinationofinternalizedloyaltiesandtheveryrealisticfearofretributionfor

thosefailingtomeettheminimumstandards.Weproposethateventhosebondscanbe

broken,oratleastrenderedlesstrustworthy,throughacombinationoftechnological

improvementandsocialengineering.Admittedly,thereareslipperyethicalslopesinherentin

theendeavor,butthelawrecognizesabalanceunder“competingharms.”

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Bondrelationshiptargetingisnotjustanewstrategy,butanentirelydifferentwayof

thinking.Ithasvalue,notjustinseriouscriminaloffenses,butinalltypesofcriminalventures.

Traditionalreversestingoperationshaveoperatedonthesameprincipleastheoptions

proposedbelow:ifanyon-streetdrugpusher,prostitute,orfencecanbeanundercoverpolice

agent,thethief’sabilitytorelyupon‘trust’tocompleteacriminaltransactionisseriously

eroded.Reversestingoperationsaretimeandlaborintensive,however.

Theremainderofthispaperwillhighlightsomeoftheconceptsinthehopesof

stimulatingthoughtandingenuityindeterringcrimeandmakingourcommunitiessaferwith

tacticsthatexploitnewtechnologiesaswellasold.Aswithanytacticsemployedbyagentsof

government,thereareethicalandlegalconstraintstoconsider,buteffectivelawenforcement

oftenpushestheenvelopeoflaw,especiallyinnewareaswheretechnologycreatesnew

possibilitiesnotenvisionedinearliereras.Weofferthesescenariosasthink-pieces,notas

panaceas.

ExamplesandIllustrations

Example#1:RadarChirping

Onesimpleillustrationoftheprincipleofbondrelationshiptargetinginvolvesspeeding

driversintentionallyavoidingthepostedlimitswiththeuseofradarandlaserdetectors.Inthis

case,thetrustrelationshipisbetweenapersonandapieceofequipment.Thelikelihoodofa

motoristignoringthepostedspeedlimitislargelyreliantupontheirdegreeofconfidencethat

theradar/laserdetectorwillprovidesufficientwarning.Thetrustoneplacesinsuchadeviceis

alow-level‘bond’andwithoutconstitutionalorhumanrightsimplications.

Attackingthisbondrelationshipinvolvespolicedepartmentsemployingportableand

inexpensivetransmitters,called‘chirpers,’thatpulseradarandlasersignalstointentionallyset

offthedetectorspurchasedbythewould-bespeedersandinviolationofthelocalspeedlimit.

Thismethodworksintwoways.Thefirstoccurswiththeslowingofdriverswhoarealertedofa

potentiallawenforcement‘speedtrap’whentheirdetectorsignalsthemandtheyslowdown

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toavoidthepenalties.Thesecondoccurswhendriversdiscoverthatpoliceareusingchirpers

insteadofactualradarorlaserspeeddeterminationdevices,becausetheirdetectorsbecome

lessreliableforpredictingwhentheyareactuallybeingtargeted.Infact,themoreoftenthese

detectorswerefalselyactivatedthelessreliabletheybecome,untilatsomepointtheycouldbe

consideredcompletelyworthless.Thus,thevalueofatechnologybuiltandusedtodefeatthe

legitimateeffortsofgovernmenttogaincompliancewithalawcouldbecompletelynegated

withoutthenecessityoflegallyprohibitingthemandtheaccompanyingcostandeffortof

enforcement.

Applyingtheprincipletohumaninteractionsraisessomeotherissues,butalsosuggests

similarbenefits.Inthisexample,therearecertainregulatoryconsiderations(licensingthe

‘chirping’unit,forinstance),butthepotentialbenefitsoutweightheinitialexpenseandeffort.

Becausethedevicesare‘send’only,withnocalibrationorcourtpresentationsinvolved,

ongoingcertificationisnegligible,andverificationoffrequencycanbedonein-houseatlimited

expense.

Example#2:PropertyIdentification

Thebondbetweenathiefandhis“fence”18isanoldone,paradoxicallyrestingupon

anonymity:theanonymouslinkbetweenanitemofstolenpropertyanditsrightfulowner.The

twentieth-centuryrequirementthatpawnshopownersandotherdealersinsecond-handgoods

keeprecordsofthepropertyattemptedtomitigatethislink,butwasunderminedbythe

anonymityofthethief.Whilethefencemightverywellknowathief’strueidentity,theuseof

falseidentificationservestofilltheblankspaceintheledgerexaminedbythepoliceandunless

thepolicearephysicallypresentatthetimeofthetransaction,thereceiverofthestolen

propertywouldhaveaplausible,ifthin,defenseagainstchargesofcomplicity.Theillicit

relationshipisfacilitatedbythethief’strustthatthefencewillnotrevealtheidentityofthe

personwhopawnedtheitem.

18 As used here, a “fence” refers to a person who receives and disposes of stolen goods.

94

Theexpansionoftechnologyhasalreadylimitedthisanonymityandmoreisinthe

offing.Propertysuchasjewelry—difficulttomarkwithanowner-inscribednumber(OIN)under

earliertechnologies—cannowbelabeledusinglasertechnology,withoutdestroyingthe

estheticsoftheitem.ConcealedRFIDchipslinkspecificitemstospecificowners.Althoughany

electronicsystemisvulnerabletoelectroniccountermeasures,itrequiresagreaterinvestment

onthepartofthefence—thethiefisunlikelytomakesuchaninvestment—andthemere

possessionofequipmentcapableofalteringRFIDfrequencieserodesthefence’sclaimto

“honestmistake.”

Theadventofbiometricsonalargerscalethaniscurrentlyavailablewillfurtherstrip

theanonymityofthethief,especiallyifbiometricsystemsmakereal-timereportstoaproperty

databasemonitoredbyalgorithmsorbythehumaneye.Thelagtimebetweentheftand

discoverymaywellbegreaterthanthatbetweenthetheftandfencing,soimmediate

apprehensionmaynotoccur.Notwithstanding,thebenefitliesinincreasingthecertaintythat

theconnectionwillbemadeatsomepoint.Attheveryleast,thefencelosesthepotential

profitofpropertyidentifiedasstolen,aswellasthefundsalreadypaidtothethief,notto

mentiontheincreasedvulnerabilityforfutureventuresafterevenoncebeenidentifiedasa

possiblesuspect.

Thesystemwillremainvulnerabletoitsgreatestcurrentweakness,thehumanlaxness

thatfailstorecordserialnumbersoridentifyvaluablepropertywithanOIN.Tighteningthe

noosearoundpropertythatisrecordedneverthelessraisesthepotentialcosttothethief,and

tothefence.Anancillarybenefitoftheeffortliesinthefactthatwhatpropertyissoprotected,

andwhatisnot,isunknowntothefence.Thegreatergainwillbethatneitherthethiefnorthe

propertywillbeasanonymousasbefore,andthebondoftrustbetweenfenceandthiefwillbe

muchmoredubious.

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Example#3:CollaborativePolicing

Oneoftheearliestformsofpolicingiscalledthe“hueandcry”method.Datingbackto

atleasttheearlymiddleages,thismethodworkedbysummoningeveryable-bodiedmale

withinshoutingdistancetoassistintheapprehensionofacriminal.Asthepolicingfunction

becamemorecapablethesystemhasallbutdisappearedbutresidualformsstillexistinthe

lawsthatallowprivatepersonstomakearrests,andpossecomitatus.19Collaborativepolicingis

aformofbondrelationshiptargetinginwhichthebondsbetweenmembersofthecommunity

andlawenforcementofficersarestrengthenedthroughcollaboration.Similartothepopular

communityorientedpolicingmodel,collaborativepolicingisfarmorerobustanddescribesan

effortthatactivelyinvolvescitizens,especiallyvictims,inthesafetyandwell-beingoftheirown

communities.Considerthefollowingexample,whichexpandsthestolenpropertyexample

above.

Riskisthemetricwhenmeasuringtrust,withzeroriskequatingtocompletetrustand

one-hundredpercentequatingtonotrust.Hence,anymannerofraisingtheriskdegradesthe

trustbondnecessaryforacriminalenterprise.20Inthiscase,abondexistsbetweenthe

legitimateownerandhispropertybecauseofhisabilitytoidentifyandproveownership.The

bondisalsoincreasedinbothwayswhentheownerfindsandidentifieshispropertyandcalls

lawenforcementfortheappropriateenforcementaction.Ataminimum,thepropertyowner

recovershispropertybutoftenthepersonsellingitisarrestedandprosecutedforreceiving

stolenpropertyandeventhethiefbecomesvulnerable,especiallyifthefenceattemptsto

makeacaseofhisowninnocencebyclaiminghisignoranceofitsstolenstatusbynamingthe

thief.Thus,thebondbetweenthelegitimateownerandhispropertyisincreased

commensuratewithhisabilitytoidentifyandlocateitcoupledwithhisproofofownership.21

Conversely,thebondbetweenthethiefandhisfenceisdegradedcommensuratewiththerisk

19 Posse comitatus is a legal requirement compelling able-bodied men to assist a law enforcement officer when called upon. It is codified in the penal statutes of many states. 20 This method is often referred to as “ubiquitous risk” in that anything that increases the risk of unpleasant outcomes decreases the behavior likely to lead to it. The greater the risk (surety of detection) the less likely the behavior will be repeated. 21 Most often the only thing necessary to prove ownership is the fact that the legitimate owner has made a previous claim of theft and taken the legal steps to file a police report and seek recovery.

96

ofbeingdetected.Accordingly,anythingthatincreasesthisriskbecomesaforcemultiplierinits

ownright.

Whilelawenforcementofficerscurrentlyhavetheabilityofsearchingstolenproperty

databasesforstolenproperty,allowingcitizenstoidentifypropertyontheirowncan

dramaticallyenhancethelikelihoodofdetection.Thisisoccurringwithincreasingfrequencyas

victimsoftheftsactivelysearchwebsiteslikeeBay,Craig’slist,andotherplaceswhereused

goodsarecommonlysold,thenreporttopolicewhentheydiscovertheirownpropertyforsale.

AWeb-basedinventoryofstolenpropertyexpandsthereachofthecitizen’sabilitytosearch

withoutcompromisinganyoftheexistinginvestigatoryprocedures.Simplylistingstolen

propertywithadequateidentification(i.e.serialnumber)withthereportingagencyanda

meansofcontactingthemprovidestheabilityforcollaborationbetweenvictimsandlaw

enforcement.Evenunregulatedyardsalesandotherplaceswherestolenpropertyisliquidated

becomevulnerabletodetectionandconfiscationwiththepotentialofprosecutionand

penalties.

Withtheadventofcellphones,mobilecomputing,andthelike,appletswouldallow

nearinstantaneouscapabilitiestocheckpropertybeforepurchase.Inasimilarvein,many

portablecommunicationsdevices(cellphonesandtablets,e.g.)containsoftwarelinkedtoa

GPScapacitytolocatethemiflostorstolen.Whileaprofessionalorexperiencedthiefwillknow

howtodisablesuchprotectivemeasures,theyremainadefenseagainstcasualtheft.

Example#4:Under-ReportedDrugSeizures

AdrugcourierassociatedwithanotoriousMexicandruggangisinterceptedwith500

kilosofdrugs.Duringinterrogation,thesuspectrefusestoidentifyhissupplieroranypertinent

informationforfearthathislifewillbeindangerfromhiscriminalcompatriots,abondfar

strongerthananyincentivespolicecanprovideforbargaining.Aprisonsentencefortrafficking

isthepriceofdoingbusiness—oneforwhichhemaywellberewarded—andtheprison

environmentmayincludeagangthatwillprotecthim.Iftheindividualisshownapressrelease

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thatcreditshimwithonly400kilosatthetimeofhisarrest,thebondrelationshipchanges.He

knowshehad500kilos,thepoliceknowhehad500kilos,andmoreimportantly,thenarco-

bosswhotrustedhimwiththeshipmentknowshehad500kilos.Thenarco-bosswill

presumablyassumethatthetraffickerforapersonalprofitdivertedthe‘missing’100kilos.

Thusthetrustrelationshipbetweenthecourierandthetraffickerhasbeendegraded,perhaps

evendestroyed.

Thepolicehavenotexactlylied:thetraffickerdidindeedhave400kilos.Whatthe

policehavedoneiseffectivelyenlistedthenarco-bossasanunwittingconfederate,aproxy

whomightinflictaharmfromwhichthepolicethemselvesprovidethebestprotection.Useof

theunder-reportingstratagemshiftsthenatureofthebondbetweenthetraffickerandthe

narco-bosstothepointwhereanewbondisneeded,abondbetweenthepoliceandthe

trafficker,fortheprotectionofthetrafficker.Withthatshift,theinterrogatorhasleverageto

turnthetraffickerintoaninformant.

Whilethismayworkasatactic,itisunlikelythatitwilleverbeacceptedasastrategy

giventheadmittedpsychologicalinfluencesthatwillinevitablybeclaimed‘forced’asuspectto

confess.Variationsofthismethodmightbeusedinothermanners,evenifnotaseffective.

Considerthesamescenariomultipliedbythehundredsofincidentsinwhichitoccurs.Theonly

thingnecessarytoincreasetheriskisthatpolicenotreporttheexactamountofseizures,ever.

Thisiswellwithinthelegalitiesandabilitiesofpoliceagenciesandcreatesaconditioninwhich

couriersareshieldedwhenarrestedbecausesuppliersareneverquitesurehowmuchofthe

contrabandwasactuallyseized.Thisencouragescourierstobecome‘self-employed’by

skimmingdrugs(unappealingbutwithnogreaterharmtothecommunity)while

simultaneouslydiminishingthetrustbetweencouriersandsuppliersintoto.

Example#5:Prison/StreetGangCommunications

Gangenforcementofficersarewellawareofthebondbetweenprisongangsandstreet

gangs.Gangleaderscommunicatestrategyanddecisionstosubordinatesinthecommunity,

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retainingeffectivecontrolofthegroup’sactivitieseventhoughtechnicallyremovedfrom

society.Twohigh-profilecasesthatreceivedextensivemediacoverageillustratethecase:Luis

Felipe,knownasKingBlood,waskeptinsolitaryconfinementinNewYorkbecausedespitea

murderconviction,hewasdirectingnotonlygangactivityoftheLatinKings,butviolent

retributionsfrominsidethegeneralprisonpopulation.OntheWestCoast,theMexicanMafia

issuedadecreethreateningdeathuponarrivalinprisonforanylocalgangmemberswhoeven

accidentallyinjuredinnocentHispanicbystandersduringshootings.Withintwoweeksgang-

styleshootingsofhousesanddrive-byshootingshaddroppedbyhalf.Thefactthatthe

MexicanMafiahadachievedasignificantreductioninthesecrimeswherelawenforcementhad

failed—andwithoutforce—allbutwentwithoutnotice.

Likethenarco-trafficker,amutualtrust—initiallyandultimatelybaseduponretributive

force—bindstheallegianceoffree-worldsubordinatestoincarceratedelders.Wenote,

however,thatmemberscaninternalizetherigidgangcodesovertime,eliminatingtheneedfor

ongoingthreats.Thenotionofbonddisruptiondiscussedbelowhingesnotupontheinitial

violence,butupontheultimatecoerciveforcethatliesintheMexicanMafiaexample.

Disruptingthebondrelationshipamonggangmembersisasyetahypotheticalpossibility,but

technicallypossible.Thoughthegangcommunicationroutesinvolvebothhigh-andlow-tech

means(cellphones,wall-tappingincodes,notes,messengers,corruptionofprisonguardsand

manipulationofnon-ganginmatesthroughfavorsandthreats,etc.),increasinglyrobust

surveillancemeasuresmakeitpossibletointerceptthecommunicationsandbreakthecodes.A

seriesoffalsemessagessentbylawenforcementofficialsthroughagang’scommunication

networkswouldhavethedualadvantageoffirst,influencinganymemberwhofollowedthe

directive,andsecond,arousingsuspicionofevenlegitimatemessagessentbythegangs.

Countermeasureswouldhavetobeemployedbygangsthatwouldrequireadditionalsecurity

effortsandcomplicatecommunicationsforeverafter.

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Example#6:OlfactoryIsolations

Mobactionsareinmanywaystheantithesisofcriminalnetworks,whereleadersare

selectedadhocratherthanfromprovenmeritandtargetsaremorespontaneousthan

preplanned.Inconfrontationalstreetactions—whicharedistinctfromwell-plannedand

organizedprotestactivities—themobisoftenincitedbyasmallgroupofinformalleaderswith

anagenda.Inmostcasestheseprovocateursarenearlyimmunefromarrestwhileincitinga

crowdbecausetheforcenecessarytoaffecttheirarrestissufficienttostarttheveryriotthat

thepoliceareattemptingtoavoid.Thusadilemmaisrevealedinthatallowingthe

provocateurstocontinueislikelytoresultinariotbutarrestingthemisequallylikelytoresult

inthesameoutcome.Inthiscase,thebondsbetweentheprovocateursandthecrowdare

stronger(evenifonlytemporarily)thanthosebetweenthepoliceandthecrowd.Suchbonds

areephemeral,usuallyforgedbyemotionalreactionstoaparticularsetofcircumstances.The

provocateurexploitstheemotionalstateofthecrowdbyprovidinginflammatorystatements

andrationales,orfalselyclaimingtohaveobservedpoliceactionsthatdidnotoccur.

Conventionalriotcontroltechniquesandweaponsmaybejustifiedtoneutralizethe

provocateur,butcanonlybeemployedatgreatriskofincitingtheveryriotthepoliceare

attemptingtoavoid.Sometechnologiesnowprovideanabilitytosimultaneouslyattackboth

theagitatorsandthebondsnecessarytoorganizeandoverseeriotousbehavior.Onegood

exampleiswiththeuseofamalodorant.Unlikeconventionalriotcontrolagentsthatcause

extremediscomfortwithburningeyes,coughing,andpainfulbreathing,malodorantssimply

smellbad—horriblybad!Malodorantscanbedeliveredintheformofsmallprojectiles(i.e.

liquid-filledpaintballs)thatarepainfulbutotherwisenon-injurious.Oncedousedwitha

malodorant,however,theagitatorhasgreatdifficultyinenduringthestench.Moretothe

point,thenaturalprotectionmeasuresforthepeoplearoundhimaretomoveupwindand

fartheraway,thusdegradinganabilitytoorganizeandincitethecrowd.Furthermore,even

brushingagainstthepersoncontaminatedissufficienttotransferenoughchemicaltocontinue

100

thedispersal,muchliketheodorofaskunk.Inthismanner,theagitatorbecomeshisown

dispersalagentandforallintentsandpurposes,isthenonlethalequivalentofTyphoidMary.22

Aswithanynewstrategy,therearemanyconcernsthatremain,nottheleastofwhich

arelegalandethicalconcernsandpublicacceptance.Nevertheless,theprincipleofbond

relationshiptargetingprovidespromisingsolutionsforsituationsthatareinherentlydifficult

anddangerousandaversetoconventionalmethodsofdeterrence.Traditionalreversesting

operationshaveoperatedonthesameprincipleastheoptionsproposedabove:whenanyon-

streetdrugpusher,prostitute,orfencecanbeanundercoverpoliceagent,acriminal

associate’sabilitytorelyupon“trust”tocompleteacriminaltransactionbecomesseriously

eroded.

Applyingthebonddisruptionprincipletonetworksandorganizationswillalsocarrya

costintermsofpolicepersonneltimeandinvestmentinequipment.Thereturnforthat

investmentliesinthegreaterimpactacrossawiderpopulationthanjustthosewhoare

arrestedinastingoperation.Theeffectscanbemorelong-lasting,extendingtheuncertainty

andraisingthecostofdoingillegalbusiness,anyofwhichmakesthecriminalbehaviorless

likelytoreoccur.

22 Mary Mallon became known as “Typhoid Mary,” after it was determined that she was a healthy carrier of a deadly pathogen—typhoid fever. As used in this example, the agitator remains free but will continue to disperse the foul-smelling malodorant wherever he attempts to continue his illegal activities until he washes it off.

101

Intelligence,Management,andtheManagementofIntelligence

BernardH.Levin

Inanydiscussionoftrustandtransparencyasitrelatestointelligence,onewouldbe

remisswereonenottomentionTheNationalCommissiononTerroristAttacksupontheUnited

States(Kean,2004).MostreadersarefamiliarwiththefindingsoftheCommissionasthey

relatetointelligence.Thispaperwillnotre-plowthatground,butratherwillfocusmostlyon

classificationproclivitiesandhumanfrailtiesasweconsiderthefutureofintelligence.

Ihaveexperiencedthejoysandtravailsofvariousclassificationsystems,fromtheArmy

SecurityAgencyofyoretovariouslocalandstatepolicedepartments,3-letteragencies,andthe

privatesector.Inallofthosedomains,overthecourseofhalfacentury,Ihaveobservedthata

similarheuristichasprevailed--whenindoubt,classify.Inthewordsofoneofourcolleagues,

anexperiencedandwell-respectedpolicechief,"...theystampthat[‘lawenforcement

sensitive’]oneverythingincludingthelunchlist."Onemightsafelysaythesameof"forofficial

useonly,"“restricted”,andsimilarphrases.

ThatcolleagueandIarebynomeansthefirsttonotethis.TheInspectorGeneral

announcedyetanotherreviewofover-classificationattheDepartmentofDefense

(http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20120208/DEPARTMENTS01/202080305/IG-reviewing-

overclassification-DoD).Acoupleofyearsago,PresidentObamasigned“Thereducingover-

classificationact”(http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/10/07/president-signs-hr-553-

reducing-over-classification-act).In2004,theHouseofRepresentativessubcommitteeon

NationalSecurity,EmergingThreatsandInternationalRelationspublished,“Toomanysecrets:

Over-classificationasabarriertocriticalinformationsharing”

(http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2004/082404transcript.pdf).Theearliestover-classification

reportthatIhavefoundisthereportoftheCoolidgeCommitteeof1956

(http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appg.html).Similarobservationsprobablydateto

thedawnofclassification.Theaboveaddressesonlyfederalclassification,butsimilarissues

occurinsideeverylawenforcementagencyinthenation,allapproximately18,000ofthem.

102

Sometimestheclassificationprocessmanifeststheabsurd.Forexample,mostofus

probablyhaveseenclassifiedsummariesofarticlesthathaveappearedinnewspapersand

withoutanyanalysisatall.Thatthesourcedocumentsappearedintheopenliteratureandare

readilysearchableontheInternetclearlydoesnotbarclassificationofcompilations.Itmerely

makestheclassificationabsurd.Sometimesevendocumentsthathavelongbeeninthepublic

realmhavebeenretroactivelyclassified,asifsomehowallthoseinpossessionofthemwould

disappearornolongersharethem(e.g.,Waxman,2004).

Anotherrangeofabsurdityisover-classificationthatresultsinmerelysensitive

informationbeinglabeledsecret,topsecret,orevenhigher.Andafinalrangeofabsurdityis

thedurationofclassificationforitemsthatmaybeembarrassingratherthanthreatening.Items

halfacenturyoldyetstillclassifiedarenotunheardof.Leonard(2011)providesuswithan

interestingcase,towit:

Considerthisstrangecasefromearlierthisyear.OnJune8,theNationalSecurityAgency,atop-secretgovernmentspyagency,heraldedthe"declassification"ofa200-year-oldpublication,translatedfromtheoriginalGerman,oncryptography.Itturnsout,however,asreportedbyStevenAftergoodoftheFederationofAmericanScientistsonhisblogSecrecyNews,thatthe1809studyhadlongbeenpubliclyavailableandhadevenbeendigitizedandpublishedonlinethroughGoogleBooksseveralyearsearlier.Infact,the19thcenturystudyhadnotmetthegovernment'sownstandardsforclassificationinthefirstplace.

So,whyisover-classificationaproblemforintelligence?Becauseclassificationiswhatsilosare

madeof,whatmakesitdifficultorimpossibleforustograspthat"needtoshare"musttrump

"needtoknow"andevenmakesthejobofanalystspointlesslydifficult.

Transparencyisanoverarchingforce.Itunderminestheincreasinglyproblem-prone

natureofclassification.Wenotewhentransparencytakesbigjumps,aswithvariousWikileaks

exposés(e.g.,Dishneau,2012),butthesocialphenomenonthatistheInternet,manifestviaan

evanescentsetofsocialmedia,isaninexorabledrivingforceforexposure.Wepushbackthe

ocean,buttheoceanwillwin.Ratherthancontinuingtopushbacktheocean,ourtimewould

bebetterspentfiguringouthowwecanusetrustandtransparencytomakeasaferandmore

securenation.Andworld.

103

Somepathsforwardarereasonablyobvious.Crowdsourcingofintelligenceisfamiliarto

manyreaders.Soisnet-centricinformationprocessingandsharing.Asomewhatmoreradical

approachmightapply,tosomeextentatleast--openbookmanagement(Stack,1992;Case,

1995).OnemightarguethatthebeginningofsuchanapproachtointelligenceistheIntellipedia

(https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/intellipedia-celebrates-third-

anniversary.html).However,evenifweweretodefeattheforcesofoverclassificationandwe

weretoachievetotaltrustandtransparencywithintheintelligenceindustry,wewouldstillbe

facedwithintelligencefailures.

TheFuture:WhenProphesyFails....

And,inevitably,itwill.So,whywillintelligencefail?Therearemanyreasons,well

beyondtheusualcomplaintsofclassification/silosandinadequate/insufficient

collection/processing.Itisworthre-readingHeuer'sclassicPsychologyofIntelligenceAnalysis

(1999).Heuerdevotesfivechapterstocognitivebiasesinintelligencework,althoughhedoes

nothappentodirectlyaddressthoselistedbelow.Therearemanymorecognitivebiaseswith

thepotentialtodistortorderailourintelligenceefforts,e.g.,seethe"Listofcognitivebiases"

pageofWikipedia.

1.Confirmationbias:Wesearchfor,selectandrememberinformationthatsupportsour

ownperspectivesandignore,rejectandforgetinformationthatconflictswithwhatwe

believetobetrue.Confirmationbiasisastrongeffectandexistsevenwhenpeopleare

quitecognizantoftheconfirmationbiasashavingpotentialfordistortingour

conclusions.InthewordsofKlein(2011),“Afulltabulationofall17questionsshowed

thatnogroupclearlyout-stupidstheothers.Theyappearaboutequallystupidwhen

facedwithproperchallengestotheirposition.”

2.Assumptionofself-knowledgeandself-prediction:Muchoftheevaluationand

applicationofintelligenceassumeswehaveaveridicaloratleastclose-to-veridical

pictureofourselves,ourbiases,ourlimitations,etc.However,availableevidencemakes

104

clearthatthefactsareotherwise,e.g.,WilsonandDunn(2004),andthatthereare

significantdifferencesinhowself-knowledgeworksin,e.g.,malesandfemales

(Boucher,2011).

Whenitcomestoself-prediction,wearenotverygoodeither.Koehler,WhiteandJohn

(2011),amongmanyothers,showedthatourabilitytopredictourownbehavioris

heavilyinfluencedbypresentconditions.Ifwehavetroublepredictingourown

behavior,itfollowsthattheuseofintelligencetopredictthebehaviorofothersis

unlikelytobeanybetterandisprobablyevenworse.

3.Therationalman.Theevidencethatpeopleareirrationalandoftenmaladaptiveis

overwhelming(e.g.,Park&Kim,2009;Reading,2011;Baumeister&Lobbestael,2011).

Onlytheirrationallyoptimisticwouldassumecollectors,analystsandconsumersof

intelligencetobeotherwise.

Onbalance,givenourintrinsichumanhandicapsandgiveninadditionourinsistenceon

hierarchicalcollection,processinganddistributionofintelligence,itisamazingthatwedoas

wellaswedo.

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