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“Trapped in Qatar”: A Case Study of the Human Rights Violations Facing Migrants in Qatar.

Abstract:

In the run-up to the 2022 World Cup being held in Qatar, the small Gulf nation has required a large

number of migrants to work in the construction industry in order to complete the mammoth task of

providing immense new infrastructural projects. This dissertation will revolve around the human

rights situation of migrants from South and South-East Asia, specifically Nepal, in Qatar providing the

workforce needed to build this infrastructure. The human rights of these workers have been

subjected to a variety of abuses ranging from dangerous working conditions, the confiscation of

passports and the subsequent inability to leave the country (Amnesty International, 2013). The

kafala system present in Qatar has been seen as central to this exploitation by many international

organizations whom argue this legislation is in need of desperate need of reform to prevent further

suffering (ITUC, 2014). By exploring the situation in Qatar and the ways in which migrant’s rights are

being violated, larger issues surrounding migration and human rights will be examined in more

detail. This dissertation will also aim to expose the role of the international community, including

FIFA, with regards to human rights violations and disputes. The national and international

mechanisms and bodies in place for migrants to use as a source of redress will also be critically

discussed to shed further light on the situation in Qatar. Through looking at these issues, this

dissertation will explore the recommendations provided by international bodies to offer a set of

concrete changes needed to create a more successful platform for migrants to claim their rights and

solve their abuses. The over-emphasis on state-actors responsibilities has overshadowed the role of

international organizations whom ought to take a more active stance towards issues of human

rights. It is estimated an additional 500,000 workers will be needed to finish the country’s

developmental plans before the World Cup kick off which is raising further concern for those

trapped in Qatar (ITUC, 2014: 6).

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1. Introduction

When FIFA announced that Qatar had won their bid to host the 2022 World Cup, a wave of

allegations and debate soon followed placing the small Gulf nation into the international spotlight

(Kelly, 2015). Accusations that millions of dollars had found its way into the hands of FIFA officials

have dominated the discussions surrounding Qatar’s bid, often leading to other problem areas like

the treatment of migrant workers to be overlooked (Lloyd-Roberts, 2014). The focus of this

dissertation will revolve around the case of migrants from South and South-East Asia, specifically

Nepal, moving into Qatar to provide the workforce needed to build the infrastructure required in the

lead up to the World Cup. The rapid increase of large numbers of migrants coming into Qatar to

work in the construction industry, as well as domestic and other sectors, has been largely unnoticed

until more recently when the violations of these workers’ human rights was made clear through

several different reports from the media and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (See:

Amnesty International, 2013: Gibson & Pattisson, 2014 ). The abuses these workers are facing range

from deception and broken promises in terms of pay, the confiscation of their passports, the inability

to leave the country, unacceptable accommodation, dangerous working conditions and even death

(Amnesty International, 2013). Qatar’s kafala system in particular has been at the centre of these

violations and is the major concern for many NGOs who have called for the reformation of this

legislation to prevent further suffering of migrants (See: ITUC, 2014). By exploring the context in

which these violations are occurring as well as looking specifically at the exploitations themselves,

wider issues regarding migration and human rights can be identified and addressed.

While migrants make up the majority of the workforce and indeed the population in Qatar, they are

very much at the bottom of social hierarchy, while a few wealthy Qatari families hold all the power

(Donini et al., 2013: 34). Therefore, the concept of structural violence which suggests “violence is

exerted systematically – that is, indirectly - by everyone who belong to a certain social order”

(Farmer, 2004: 307) has been applied to the human rights situation in Qatar as a way of explaining

the current circumstances. Alongside this, the issue of state sovereignty will be brought into the

framework to examine the role of state and non-state actors present in Qatar. The recent global

panic and investment in matters of trafficking, particularly sex trafficking (Mahdavi, 2012), will be

discussed in terms of the effect this increased international attention has had on notions of

migration. The position and duty of the international community and large transnational

organizations, specifically focusing on FIFA in this case, will also be discussed in relation to this issue.

The current emphasis on the responsibilities on state-actors in relation to strengthening human

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rights systems is useful, however it often seems to overshadow the role of non-state bodies and

their human rights obligations.

By establishing the human rights mechanisms available both nationally and internationally for

redress by migrants, wider debates regarding the success and failures of the human rights system in

general will be considered. The suggestion of creating a more engaged and tangible role for the

international community to encourage states to make changes and implement immediate remedies

in the form of legislation will be considered. Through examining the issues with the human rights

system both on a local and international level, the kind of changes which could be implemented to

create a more concrete human rights structure can also be discussed. Recommendations from

international organizations shall be explored to suggest ways in which migrants’ rights could be

strengthened. The key changes involve the reformation of the current legal frameworks and the

adoption of a more active role by the international community. Despite outcry for such

recommendations to be applied to allow for an improvement of migrant’s rights from certain

international bodies, there has yet to be any real signs of change (ITUC, 2014). An estimated 500,000

extra labourers will be required to finish the infrastructural development before the World Cup kick

off according to ITUC (2014: 6). While outside efforts are still being made to improve the human

rights situation in the Gulf region, this has raised further concern over the position of those

becoming trapped in Qatar (ITUC, 2014: 6).

2. Context : The Situation in Qatar

Since its independence in 1971, Qatar has quickly become one of the wealthiest countries in the

world due to its natural gas and oil reserves which have led to it having the highest per capita

income on the globe (DLA Piper, 2014: 22). Qatar is part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which

is made up of several nations within the Gulf region whom have created a unique setting for

enormous labour migration through their small national populations and large array of wealth and

resources (Mednicoff, 2012: 187). This newly-wealthy country has faced growing international

pressure since its bid to hold the World Cup was accepted by FIFA in 2010 resulting in increasing

need for migrant labour (DLA Piper, 2014). As well as building 9 new stadia and renovating the

existing 3, Qatar is spending billions on roads, railways, ports, skyscrapers, hotels and whole new

cities as part of its massive infrastructural development (ITCU, 2014: 11). Due to the national

population being so small, a massive flow of foreign labourers into the country has been needed to

construct these projects on time resulting in 94% of the total workforce in Qatar being made up of

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migrant workers (DLA Piper, 2014: 22). This migration flow has dramatically affected the make-up of

Qatari society, leading to the population of just over 2 million being dominated by foreign workers,

with an estimated 1.4 million migrants currently living in the country (ITCU, 2014: 14).

The migrant workforce in Qatar is largely exported from South and South-East Asia, notably India, Sri

Lanka, Nepal and the Philippines (Amnesty International, 2013). During this dissertation there will be

a focus on Nepali migrants working in the construction sector as many of the recent reports

surrounding the human rights situation in Qatar have centred on the growing number of fatalities

occurring within this national group (See: Gibbon & Pattisson, 2014). Nepali workers have been

increasingly entering into Qatar and other GCC countries since the beginning of the 21 st century due

to their desirable qualities of providing cheap and reliable labour (Bruslé, 2010: 4). This national

group is one of the largest present in Qatar, with a projected 400,000 Nepali workers currently

residing in the country and more expected to arrive in the near future (Donini et al., 2013: 34). These

migrants and hundreds of thousands of others have travelled far distances away from their families

in the hope to earn money in the Gulf to pay off their debts and provide an income for those back

home (ITCU, 2014). Their dreams are often quickly shattered when they arrive to discover a very

different future is ahead of them in Qatar.

The Brokerage and Kafala System in Qatar

When the opportunity arises to work in a wealthy, oil-rich, cosmopolitan country with the promise

of a good wage and added benefits of housing and food allowances, many foreign workers would

jump at the chance. Very often such prospects arise from brokers whom are located in many Asian

countries in order to seek out new recruits to send to the Gulf (Gardner, 2012). Recruitment systems

such as these may be registered with the state or may be unofficial and illegally moving migrants

into GCC countries (Gardner, 2012). Migrants are required to pay fees to these middle-men in order

to be sent to their host countries, this payment is often large requiring individuals to take out further

loans thus increasing their debt (Donini et al., 2013). The hope that their new jobs will help them out

of their economic troubles and provide remittance to their families back home is the driving force

behind many migrant’s decisions to relocate (Gardner, 2012).

To be able to work in most GCC countries, including Qatar, migrants must obtain residency permits

which can only be granted through entering into the kafala or sponsorship system which bonds

workers to a particular employer (Ahmad, 2012: 26). This system allows sponsors to closely control

the movement of migrants through the practice of passport confiscation which countless migrants

become subjected to upon arrival (ITUC, 2014: 18). The sponsorship system empowers employers by

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allowing them to refuse “no objection” certificates or exit permits which are needed to change jobs

or leave the country (HRC, 2014: 7). This leaves migrant workers vulnerable to situations of human

rights abuses and bonded labour (Amnesty International, 2013), which has led to this system being

widely criticised by many international bodies. The Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights

Committee (2014) and organizations such as the International Trade Union Confederation and

Amnesty International have discussed the abuse such legislation allows and contributes to. The

desire for this system to be reformed will be discussed later; however it is worth noting that this

system is seen as the main obstacle in the protection of migrant worker’s rights by many of Qatar’s

international peers (Amnesty International, 2013). Many of the measures taken by sponsors,

including the confiscation of passports, are illegal yet they remain widespread due to the lack of

effective law enforcement, leading to the UN Special Rapporteur to suggest the kafala system “can

amount to forced labour” (HRC, 2014: 7).

The sponsorship system breaks several international conventions revolving around involuntary and

bonded labour, including the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 1957 (ILO, no. 159) and the

Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour 1930 (ILO, no. 29), both of which have been

ratified by Qatar (HRC, 2014: 44). The breaching of many human rights including Articles 4 and 5 of

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948) can also be observed here

in the form of modern slave labour and the mistreatment of migrant workers’ which this produces.

The system as a whole was seen as “inherently abusive” by the DLA Piper (2014: 44-5) investigation

into Qatar as it broke many national and international laws leaving migrant’s “trapped” in the

country. The various human rights violations which the recruitment process and kafala system have

allowed in Qatar shall now be discussed in more detail.

Broken Promises and Broken Bones

On arrival, the mirage of the cosmopolitan super-city of Doha, the capital of Qatar, is soon shattered

when migrants realise they have been misinformed by the agencies they have paid in order to work

in one of the richest countries in the world. Many arrive finding the terms and conditions of their

contracts have been changed and their salaries are much lower than originally promised (Amnesty

International, 2013: 6). As well as wage levels being cut, working hours are often much longer than

previously promised and the type of employment may even be different to that which was

advertised by recruiters (Gardner, 2012: 49). When investigating the situation of migrants in Qatar,

Amnesty International (2013) and the ITUC (2014) found that many migrants had been forced to

continue to work while their wages were frozen by employers for an indefinite period. This left many

workers with no money and no choices except to continue with their jobs in the hope that their pay

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will return in the future (Amnesty International, 2013: 42). Essentially trapped by their employers to

continue working for nothing and with no means of escape due to their passports being seized by

their sponsors, these migrants have found themselves bonded in a form of modern slavery (ITUC,

2014). Alongside being stuck in a sponsorship agreement, many individuals find themselves being

confined to work camps with as many as 16 men to one small room and a bathroom (ITUC, 2014: 7).

While accommodation experiences vary from person to person, the living conditions provided for

foreign workers were largely overcrowded and unsanitary when investigated by the UN Special

Rapporteur, subsequently violating Qatari law and many basic human rights (HRC, 2014: 11). Not

only are these living conditions in violation of workers’ rights, in particular Article 25 (no.1) regarding

adequate standards of living (UN General Assembly, 1948), but the construction sites which they

spend their working days are also potentially deadly environments.

One of the controversies that Qatar originally faced during their approval to host the World Cup was

how the stadia and surrounding commercial areas would be cooled (Kelly, 2015). The average high

temperatures in Doha during June are 41C, which a FIFA appointed taskforce concluded would be a

health risk (Kelly, 2015). This led to the suggestion that the World Cup should be held during the

winter, despite claims by Qatari authorities of revolutionary cooling technologies being created

specifically to tackle this problem (Kelly, 2015). These discussions have been dominating the recent

rhetoric surrounding the event with emphasis on the health of the players and attendants,

consequently ignoring the well-being of the workers building these stadia in such temperatures.

When speaking to Amnesty International (2013: 44), Nepali workers stated that they worked 12 to

14 hour per days in their construction jobs, which risked both their own and others well-being. The

long hours paired with the dangerous working conditions, lack of effective health and safety

procedures and the blistering heat has led to many severe injuries and deaths among migrant

workers (Amnesty International, 2013). Since Qatar won their World Cup bid in 2010, an estimated

1200 workers have died (ITUC, 2014: 15). However this information only accounts for Indian and

Nepali workers as data has not been released by other embassies leading to the realistic body-count

undoubtedly being much higher (ITUC, 2014: 15). The ITUC (2014: 15) have suggested that the death

toll could be as high as 4000 by the 2022 kick off which raises many questions as to what is being

done about these figures by the Qatari government and international bodies. For those who have

survived injuries, their employers would often refuse to pay for their healthcare, fine workers for

taking sick-days, force injured labourers to continue and even deport those who were no longer fit

for work according to workers (Amnesty International, 2013: 43-4). It is clear that a range of both

civil and political (UN General Assembly, 1966a) and economic, social and cultural rights (UN General

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Assembly, 1966b) are being violated in this case, but the question turns to why migrants continue to

come to the Gulf when the death toll is increasing each day.

So Why do they Keep Coming?

With numerous workers being put into dangerous environments, being denied the freedom to leave

the country and even dying, the level of insecurity which migrants face through their entrapment in

the kafala system is clear. The right to life, liberty and security in the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (1948: Article 3) alongside many other fundamental freedoms are noticeably not being upheld

for many workers within Qatar. If this is the case then the question turns to why migrants keep

coming to work in these GCC countries. Gardner (2012) discusses this question in relation to low-

income migrants and in Qatar and their families in Nepal, India and Sri Lanka. As previously

mentioned, migrant’s seek economic opportunities in countries like Qatar to be able to clear their

families’ debts and provide them with an income (Donini et al., 2013). Facing the realities of their

decisions, many decide not to inform their families of their terrible conditions and instead engage in

the system of deception in order to keep their loved ones from worrying (Gardner, 2012: 53). One of

the ways migrants perpetuate the myths surrounding the Gulf regions is by sending home

misleading photographs (Gardner, 2012). These often depict workers looking professional and

respectable while in reality they are working at the bottom of the social hierarchy (Gardner, 2012:

53). This edited version of their time in Qatar which is presented to their family and in turn the wider

community, is one of the many reasons people continue to migrate to the country according to

Gardner (2012: 54-6). The system of misinformation encompasses a range of different actors

including migrants themselves whom feed back into this cycle of deception which recruits more

workers through their false testimonies (Gardner, 2012: 57).

While the adverse circumstances which many workers face in Qatar and other GCC countries are an

obvious abuse of their human rights, the process which surrounds these workers is complex. By

trying to keep their families happy, migrants contribute to and continue the cycle of misinformation

which put them in this position in the first place. As well as this, workers are trapped in a

sponsorship system which favours their employers and leaves them vulnerable to an array of

exploitations (ITUC, 2014). Workers may want to complain, however inefficient national bodies and

laws discourage them and make it hard to claim their human rights (ITCU, 2014). In the next section,

this dissertation will proceed to focus on the general debates regarding migration and human rights

as well as looking at some of the obstacles faced when dealing with these issues. The concepts of

structural violence, state sovereignty and trafficking will be studied and problematized in relation to

this case to look at the broader issues facing the contemporary human rights system.

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3. Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical and Practical Obstacles

Migration and Human Rights

A complex network of actors and legal systems from the ground-level workers up to the state

officials has created a web of exploitation in Qatar. Considering that migration is such a widespread

and global phenomenon, with an estimated 232 million people living outside their home countries

(UN, 2013), it is surprising that it has been largely neglected within human rights discourse until

more recently (Taran, 2002: 9). Due to the massive scale in which migration flows take place and the

ways these affect various social, economic and political structures across the globe, there is a clear

need for such phenomenon to be seriously investigated. Human rights are hard to implement and

protect at the best of times but for those holding the ambiguous position as a marginal and low

status migrant worker, they become even more vulnerable to abuse and harder to safeguard (Taran,

2002: 13). The migration process for many travelling into Qatar and indeed elsewhere around the

globe is largely undocumented and while international laws surrounding foreign employment exist

they are often unsuccessfully implemented (Sangroula, 2008: 2).

The first major step regarding human rights and migration was the implementation of the

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of

Their Families in 1990 by the UN General Assembly (1990). This convention sets out a range of social,

political, civil and economic rights which are applied to both legal and illegal migrants and their

families creating the basis for contemporary discussions surrounding human rights and migration

(Ruhs, 2013: 1). The recognition that migrants and their families are unprotected and highly

vulnerable to human rights abuses is acknowledged throughout this document which also aims to

eliminate such exploitative situations (Taran, 2002: 17). While this convention has set a president for

protecting the rights of migrants across the globe, it was not put into force until 2003 and

disappointingly it has been ratified by less than 50 countries (UN, 2015). The majority of countries

which have ratified this convention are sending countries rather than host states, which raises

questions regarding the ways in which host states view and protect guest migrants (Ruhs, 2013: 1).

Taran (2002:18) blames the small number of ratifications on the lack of active promotion of this

convention within the UN system coupled with the resistance of certain states to apply and expand

human rights frameworks to include migrants. Ruh (2013: 13) argues this shows that the majority of

countries around the world do not see migrant rights as human rights which should be protected by

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law. This proves highly problematic for both activists trying to gain awareness and protection for

migrant rights as well the migrants themselves who want to claim their rights and resolve abuses.

Structural violence and State Sovereignty

Due to the magnitude of migrant abuses in Qatar there is no surprise why the notion of structural

violence has been applied to this case. As defined in the introduction, structural violence as a

concept attempts to deal with and study the extreme inequalities and suffering which are produced

through the structures of society (Farmer, 1996). This idea has been applied to the case in Qatar to

explain the widespread human rights violations of migrants in the country through structural

mechanisms and forces. Donini et al. (2013: 11) have used this concept as a way to explain the

systematic exclusion and marginalization of the Nepali population within Qatar. The levels of abuse

which encompass actors on the ground up to transnational corporations means that it is hard to

pinpoint one particular cause of human rights violations as there are multiple and often invisible

perpetrators (Ho, 2007: 13). Despite this theory being useful in showing the different degrees of

violence which inflict everyone within a particular social structure, it deflects from the agency of

these migrants and their families to make the choice to move to Qatar for work (Gardner, 2012:

Gartaula et al., 2012). While the structure surrounding migrants in Qatar has certainly created a

situation of structural inequality there are obvious violators in this case as well. The recruitment and

sponsorship systems tying migrants to a single employer provides a clear basis for migrants to

become stuck in a situation of poverty and dependence (Amnesty International, 2013). Although this

concept is beneficial in theorizing issues regarding global inequalities and oppression, this should not

be used solely to explain the situation in Qatar as it is clear that there are obvious violators as well as

hidden ones.

As a recently independent nation, Qatar no doubt does not want other states and international

bodies interfering with its domestic affairs. Like Qatar, many other countries have shown a desire to

keep their sovereignty over their own territory when it comes to matters of human rights (Reisman,

1990). The notion of state sovereignty assumes that international law cannot interfere with state

affairs or “enforce” changes but can only persuade countries to honour their obligations for the sake

of national interests (Henkin, 1995/1996: 32). The potential over-emphasis of the state in the

protection of human rights and the previous insufficiency of the international organizations in such

matters suggests a more active stance is needed within the international community. While this idea

will be discussed further later, the issue of state sovereignty has hindered the ability of international

organisations to intervene in such matters. While international bodies, such as the International

Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) put a certain

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amount of pressure on states to commit to their obligations, they are cautious not to encroach too

far into their affairs in the fear that they will stop cooperating (P, 2005: PAGE NO). States reluctance

to expand their present legislation to cover human rights is particularly problematic and illustrates

wider flaws regarding the human rights system as a whole (Taran, 2002: 36). The “price” of rights has

often been used as a way for states to avoid adopting human rights legislation into their domestic

laws, however this is not an acceptable justification for not allowing migrants their human rights

(Ruhs, 2013: 4). This makes it difficult to see how exactly international law is supposed to help those

who have faced rights abuses when the issue of state sovereignty still hangs over contemporary

debates. In Qatar, the government is willing to discuss matters of migration with other states but the

practical establishment of corresponding policies or institutions to aid migrants is largely off-limits

(Martin, 2012: 223). Qatar have used similar tactics to promote its willingness to engage in

international politics, including the hosting of the Qatar Law Forum in 2009 to show itself as an

international player within the field of law (Mednicoff, 2012: 194). Yet when it comes to actual

legislative reforms, Qatar has ignored international pressure and broken its own promises to reform

the kafala system (ITUC, 2014). State sovereignty then is clearly still an issue within contemporary

human rights discourse as states continue to want total control over their territories which prevents

certain mechanisms and laws from being properly implemented.

Sex Trafficking

There is another key issue which has led to the rights of migrants being neglected from the

mainstream rhetoric surrounding human rights. The international attention placed on trafficking and

in particular sex trafficking as a global issue in recent years, while having some positive effects, has

also overshadowed other concepts of migration and forced labour (Mahdavi, 2012). Trafficking as a

phenomenon is complex and involves movement of men, women and children, voluntarily and

forced, for many different purposes and employment positions (Piotrowicz, 2004). This focus on sex

trafficking has produced a heavily gendered narrative centring on female experiences which has led

to other individuals that do not fit this criteria to be left out of the picture (Mahdavi, 2012: 91).

While the forcible trafficking of women for the sex industry is a serious issue which needs to be

addressed, the majority of polices which have been locally established around this problem have

forced many individuals further into the informal economy rather than helping them out (Mahdavi,

2012: 95). The tightening of borders and the subsequent restrictions this has had on migrants’

movements may have had the opposite effect to that which was intended by forcing trafficking

further underground (Taran, 2002). This issue has directly affected migrants in the Gulf region as in

2005 the authorities of the UAE were reviewing the proposed reforms to the kafala system with

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migrants rights groups until a Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report was released by the US Government

which diverted attention to the issue sex trafficking (Mahdavi, 2012: 97). Mahdavi (2012:97) argues

that by directing focus away from the broader context of migrants’ rights through concentrating on

one small area of migration, other individuals that are equally important are subsequently ignored.

Rather than creating opportunities for reform and protective instruments to favour migrants, these

worldwide polices surrounding trafficking often provide increased challenges to migrants and forced

labourers (Mahdavi, 2012: 91). It is clear that while protocol has been put in place in an attempt to

protect these individuals, they are not working effectively to actualise their goals due to the lack of

promotion and international support (Newland, 2005). Migration as a global phenomenon has

created a multicultural world in which virtually all states are increasingly becoming more diverse

(Taran, 2002). This requires political, legal, social and economic mechanisms to be formed to allow

for mediation in an ever-changing society (Taran, 2002: 9). The national and international

mechanisms in place for migrants will now be discussed to place these individuals into a wider

human rights framework. The successes and failures of these bodies will be considered to bring out

further issues regarding migration and human rights as well as the human rights system as a whole.

4. Redress and resolution: human rights and national and international mechanisms

Having briefly discussed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant

Workers and Members of Their Families (UN General Assembly, 1990), it is clear that while

legislation such as this has been put in place in order to protect migrants it has often failed to do so.

In this particular case, there are several sources of redress which migrant workers in Qatar can seek

on a national level. While international bodies are also in place the successfulness of these

mechanisms are often limited as this dissertation will explore.

National

The first and perhaps most commonly used route taken for resolution is through migrants’ national

embassies. The Nepali embassy in Qatar has limited powers and resources as well as being under-

staffed and over-worked, which makes their influence over cases of abuse limited and largely

ineffective (Donini et al., 2013: 38). While embassy staff try to set up meetings, write to Qatari

authorities and provide help, these attempts are often unsuccessful and with dozens of Nepali

migrants arriving at their doors everyday they are only becoming more strained (Donini et al., 2013:

38). In some cases, workers may be refereed to or seek help from the Qatar Labour Department and

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Court, however this process is lengthy and expensive if things proceed to a court level (ITUC, 2014).

Workers themselves believe there is a bias towards sponsors which further discourages people from

using this mechanism (ITUC, 2014: 9). Migrants that have used this service to complain have been

threatened, blacklisted and even deported by employers according to the ITUC (2014: 9) report.

While complaints over rights abuses can be made to these services, sponsors often ignore the

subsequent decisions made by the department and without a creditable enforcement mechanism

this system is generally unsuccessful (ITUC, 2014). The final major body in place to specifically

address human rights violations is the National Human Rights Committee in Qatar which seeks to

promote and provide protection of human rights for those within the state, including citizens,

residents and transit travellers (NHRC, 2015). The aims of this Committee includes assisting and

empowering those who have faced rights violations alongside advocating increased regional and

international cooperation (Access, 2015). Despite having good intentions, this mechanism has been

largely ineffective in helping migrant labourers whom have used it as a source of redress (ITCU,

2014: 19). ITCU (2014: 19) noted that workers had little faith in this system to resolve their problems

as they saw this body as an extension of the corrupt government which meant many migrants were

too scared to go there. Unfortunately for the migrant workers seeking to solve their human rights

abuses, the National Human Rights Committee and other national bodies in Qatar are working within

a fragmented system with ineffective laws and courts which frequently give impunity for exploitative

employers (ITUC, 2014: 19).

International

Alongside these national bodies, there are several international organizations which work in relation

with the UN and focus specifically on issues of migration and labour. IOM was established in 1951 to

promote a more humane migration process by providing services and advice to governments and

migrants alike (IOM, 2015a). IOM has 157 member states which are subject to the IOM Constitution

and 10 states, including Qatar, holding observer status (IOM, 2015a). Acting as part of the UN

system, they are given responsibility for many ad hoc activities but lack the resources and budget to

successfully carry out their global task (Newland, 2005: 9). While IOM are concerned specifically with

issues of migration, there are several other international bodies which centre themselves around

global labour rights and so directly and indirectly involve migration. ILO became a specialized agency

of the UN in 1946 with the aim of promoting rights revolving around work to encourage fair

employment opportunities and strengthen international dialogue surrounding labour-related issues

(ILO, 2015). This organization sets up and oversees international labour standards through

conventions, recommendations and their annual International Labour Conference which acts as a

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platform for ILO state members to express their thoughts and negotiate (Newland, 2005: 9). Other

work-related mechanisms exist like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the ITUC which behave

in similar ways to promote the rights and freedoms of labours including migrant workers.

Together with these international bodies, the UN assembly and the Human Rights Commission (HRC)

can be utilised more generally in the case of human rights abuses. Established in 1947, this body is

used as an instrument to monitor state compliance with international human rights law and to

investigate any allegations of violations (Newland, 2005: 12). While dealing more broadly with

human rights on an international scale, the HRC set up a working group on migrants in 1997 with the

goal to gather information on the obstacles preventing migrants’ human rights and to provide

recommendations (Newland, 2005: 12). The UN Special Rapporteur implemented by the UN in 1999

to investigate human rights issues surrounding migration is another tool created to tackle such

issues (OHCHR, 2015). This position has the jurisdiction to supervise all countries on the globe,

regardless of if they have signed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All

Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) (OHCHR, 2015). In 2013, the current Special

Rapporteur, Francois Crepeau, visited Qatar and, as previously mentioned, observed an array of

abuses present in the country (HRC, 2014). This visit not only verified many of the exploitative

systems in place in Qatar, like the paying of recruitment fees and the kafala system, but has also

helped to bring the case of Qatar into the centre of international human rights discussions.

While these UN bodies have had success in some avenues, these systems are mostly ineffective and

provide limited opportunity for advocacy (Donini et al., 2013: 44). None of these international

organizations have enough funding or resources to be able to monitor or promote the protection of

human rights properly (Taran, 2002: 33). The exception to this is the field of trafficking as this area of

migration has received considerable attention and funding from international bodies and

governments as previously discussed (Taran, 2002: 34). While such international mechanisms exist

to protect migrants such as those residing in Qatar, these bodies have done little in the way of

concretely safeguarding workers. While reports can create awareness of the issue which can

indirectly put pressure on states to make changes, these international mechanisms lack resources

and a sense of authority which often renders them inadequate to deal with such widespread human

rights abuses.

5. Discussion of recommendations and changes to improve the situation in Qatar:

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Through the discussion of the human rights situation among workers in Qatar it is clear that the

current social and legal structure surrounding these migrants is allowing a space for exploitation and

inequality. Several international bodies, including Amnesty International, DLA Piper and the ITUC,

have produced recommendations for Qatar in the hope that these will be considered and integrated

into forthcoming reformation plans. Together with these, the Special Rapporteur’s report and list of

recommendations regarding Qatar’s current legislation shall be discussed here alongside the role of

FIFA and the wider international community in such reformation debates.

The most widely encouraged change put forward by national and international mechanisms as well

as members of the international community is the reformation of the kafala system. The ITUC (2014,

16) have stated that the only way to ensure that migrants’ rights can be actualised and protected is

through the serious improvement or abolishment of this exploitative legislation. Likewise, the DLA

Piper (2014:56) report calls for a careful reviewing of this system to allow improvements to

strengthen migrants’ rights as part of Qatar’s international obligations. Amnesty International (2013:

124) has repeatedly called on the Qatari government for the removal of the sponsorship law to allow

migrants to move between jobs and borders more freely without the permission from their

sponsors. Alongside these campaigns from international bodies and NGOs to seriously reform this

legislation, Francois Crepeau argued in his Special Rapporteur report, for the abolishment of the

kafala system on the grounds that it is an avenue of abuse and exploitation (HRC, 2014:1).

Although FIFA have largely failed to address or tackle the issue of migrants’ rights in Qatar (Amnesty

International, 2013), they have stated that they are working closely with Qatari officials to make

concrete steps towards improving the welfare of migrant workers (FIFA, 2014a). FIFA (2014a) also

claim they have set up meetings to enable discussions on such issues with human rights

organizations, football stakeholders and other international and national bodies. It seems that FIFA

are trying to act as mediators in this particular case when in actuality they hold a level of

responsibility for the widespread exploitation which many migrants have fallen victim to. I shall

discuss this idea further later, however it is important to point out here that the Qatar government is

much more likely to submit to such requests for reformation if the internationally powerful

corporations, like FIFA, push for it. While international NGOS and human rights mechanisms can

apply a certain amount of pressure onto States, this has largely been ignored as Qatar have yet to

reform their kafala system despite promises made to do so (ITCU, 2014).

While the sponsorship system remains the most harmful piece of legislation, the recruitment

process is also in serious need of reform due to its exploitative nature. The ITUC (2014: 6) have

argued that the brokerage scheme which surrounds migrants entry into the country needs to be

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subjected to change and responsibility needs to be placed onto these recruitment agencies. The

abolishment of recruitment fees which leave workers in mounting debt has been recommended by

the Special Rapporteur (HRC, 2014: 17) and DLA Piper (2014: 42). DLA Piper (2014: 42) has also

suggested increased governmental power is needed to blacklist recruitment agents whom have

misinformed and exploited migrant workers through this system. Alongside these reformations, the

desire for new legislation to allow increased freedoms for migrant workers has been advocated by

many NGOs and members of the international community (ITUC, 2014). The Special Rapporteur

(HRC, 2014: 17) noted that Qatar’s current legislation is not adequate and is ineffectively enforced

when it is in place which has led to several human rights abuses in the country. Other suggestions

include putting effective grievance procedures in place (ITCU, 2014), increasing regulation by the

authorities to prevent the confiscation of passports (HRC, 2014: 18), and widespread improvements

of wage levels and working conditions (DLA Piper, 2014: 11-2).

The list of recommendations for change is endless in this case and while certain international groups,

including FIFA, seem optimistic that the human rights situation for migrants in the Gulf will improve,

others are slightly more pessimistic. The abolishment of the kafala system is central to enabling

migrant rights to be realised, however many other structural improvements throughout Qatari

society need to be recognised also to allow workers to properly claim their rights. After previously

discussing the relatively unsuccessful National Human Rights Committee in Qatar, I believe that this

body should be strengthen to provide more effect redress by violated migrants in the case of human

rights abuses (See: DLA Piper, 2014). Bonds between this organization and wider international

human rights bodies could also be reinforced through increased cooperation and the sharing of

information and resources. By sharing information about the human rights situation in Qatar which

has previously been hard to gather (See: ITUC, 2014), the abuses of migrants can be better

understood by both national and international human rights bodies. This increased cooperation

would hopefully encourage the strengthening of human rights in the country through subtly

integrating Qatar into the wider international human rights system. The role of the international

community is also essential in this instance as due to the economic and political nature of this

particular case, it seems that large transnational companies are more likely to have influence over

the Qatari authorities than human rights bodies. While FIFA and other international companies with

stakes in the 2022 World Cup have to some extent advocated for increased welfare for migrant

workers (FIFA, 2013: FIFA, 2014b), there is little accountability of these groups for the violations

occurring under their watch. FIFA is a highly influential and powerful organization which should take

a more active role in overlooking how its events are created and organized including the companies

and workers involved in this process. Rather than state actors putting pressure on Qatar to achieve

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long-term developmental goals surrounding human rights, non-state actors may be more effective in

pushing for immediate changes through legislation. Although Qatar has repeatedly promised to

improve the situation of migrant workers and reform their current sponsorship system under the

suggestion of concerned international bodies, there is little evidence of any significant progress

being made (ITUC, 2014: 6).

6. Conclusion:

The case of Qatar provides an example of a complex human rights situation which places migrants

and their rights in an ambiguous and vulnerable position. From the recruitment process to the kafala

system, migrants’ are subjected to a range exploitative practices which keeps them trapped in their

marginal locations within this ultra-rich society (Amnesty International, 2013). National mechanisms

remain restricted in their ability to protect migrants through their location within a fragmented

system, while international bodies have similar problems due to a lack of resources and funding. In

this particular case there is a need to strengthen the bonds between these national and

international mechanisms to enable a flow of information to help create more immediate and

concrete changes in terms of legislation and redress methods for migrants. While it is clear that

changes cannot and will not happen over-night (FIFA, 2014b), certain immediate mechanisms can be

put in place to help aid reformation. The kafala system is in urgent need of reform as this legislation

is at the centre of abuse in Qatar and will remain to be until it is replaced with more human rights

and migrant friendly legislation. The argument from states that such legislation costs too much to

implement, as discussed, is not an acceptable excuse (Ruhs, 2013: 4), particularly from one of the

richest countries in the world.

As well as illustrating some of the major human rights obstacles present in the Gulf region, this case

study has brought wider issues surrounding structural violence, state sovereignty, trafficking and the

roles of state and non-state actors to the surface. Through this study of the human rights violations

occurring within Qatar, wider issues highlighting the flaws of human rights system can be observed.

While legislation exists in the form of conventions and other legal documentation, there is a lack of

awareness and implementation among states as well as no concrete enforcement mechanisms to

ensure such international standards are being upheld (Ruhs, 2013). The reluctance of states to

implement this international law into their domestic legislation is also problematic, illustrating the

need for the human rights system to review their enforcement methods. While the role of the state

is vital in the promotion and protection of human rights, particularly through the implementation of

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legislation and creation and strengthen of national human rights mechanisms, the duties of the

international community have been largely overlooked. Members of the global community including

non-state bodies and transnational organizations should adopt a more engaged and active role in

the promotion and protection of human rights. In this particular case, FIFA need to push Qatari

officials to make changes to their laws regarding migrant workers as it is their duty as an

international organisation to ensure their events are upholding universal international and human

rights laws. FIFA are well-aware of the human rights abuses migrants are facing on a daily basis (FIFA

2013: 2014a) yet they and other companies are failing to uphold their obligations and remain silent

while those building the stadia in which these groups will profit are dying on a daily basis (ITUC,

2014: 20). It is also important that these non-governmental organizations provide increased help and

resources to states in which violations are occurring to resolve human rights violations more

effectively and promptly. Increased accountability and pressure within the international community

for corporations and other non-state actors to uphold humanitarian duties regarding the protection

of human rights is also essential.

The current vulnerability of migrants needs to be addressed and tackled promptly as the number of

those moving around the globe for work is increasing on an annual basis (Taran, 2002). If, as the

ITUC (2014) have predicted, 50,000 more workers will be required to construct the rest of the

infrastructure in Qatar before the World Cup begins then this issue needs to be taken more

seriously. As hundreds of thousands of migrants from Nepal and elsewhere are struggling to escape

the country which has subjected them to a range of human rights violations, the world watches on in

fascination of how the tiny country will cope with the pressures of the World Cup.

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