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Transcript of Transportation Security Administration Freight Rail Security Programs Scott Gorton TSA Freight Rail...
Transportation Security Administration Freight Rail Security Programs
Scott GortonTSA Freight Rail Security Division
What We DoWhat We Do
• Focus on people (travelers, workers, crews, vendors)
• Inspect baggage (checked and carry-on)
• Inspect cargo (on passenger planes and cargo planes)
• Aircraft security• Airport perimeter
security • Transit, rail, surface
transportation
Major Focus Areas of TSA
• 452 commercial airports
• 2 million airline passengers daily
• 361 major seaports
• 51,000 ports of call by 7,500 foreign vessels
• 3.9 million miles of public roads
• 140,000 miles of major railroads
• 25,000 miles of commercial navigable waterways
• 2.2 million miles of pipelines
TSA’s Responsibilities Encompass the U.S. Transportation System
TSA Organization
Assistant Administrator
Ports & Intermodal
Highway
Airports
General Aviation
Cargo
Pipeline
Freight Rail
Mass Transit
Office of Transportation Sector Network Management
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR FREIGHT RAIL TRANSPORTAION SECURITYNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR FREIGHT RAIL TRANSPORTAION SECURITY
STRATEGIC GOALReduce the risk associated with the freight rail transportation of potentially dangerous cargoes and increase the resiliency of the freight rail network.
STRATEGIC METHODOLOGY
Partner with industry and government stakeholders to identify and implement programs and processes to achieve measurable risk reduction through
collaborative and regulatory initiatives.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
Reduce the Vulnerability of Cargo
Reduce the Vulnerability of the Network
Reduce the Consequences of Attack
Freight Rail Security Program Goals
Raise the security baseline Reduce the risk associated with the transportation of
Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials Assess freight transportation operations and assets Provide assistance in the implementation of security
risk mitigation strategies
On-going Projects in Freight Rail
Rail Corridor Comprehensive Reviews TIH Risk Reduction Security Action Items Tank Car Tracking Rail Security Rule Dispersion Modeling Tank Car Consequence Training Bridge Criticality Assessments Ammonium Nitrate Studies
Rail Corridor Reviews
TSA’s process that identifies operational practices in an HTUA rail corridor that may result in heightened risk
Comprehensive reviews involve assault planners as well as State and Local officials and their first responders
This process is the baseline for the Security Action Items and Risk Reduction Program
Strategy for TIH Risk reduction
Goal
Achieve a significant reduction in the objectively measured risk of “Toxic-by-Inhalation” rail cargoes through HTUA
• Industry agreement achieves DHS goal over two years
Strategy• Secure chain of custody for TIH shipments • Minimize standing, unattended TIH cars and trains in HTUA • Reduce TIH train delays in HTUA • Establish secure storage area standards for TIH rail cars in
HTUA
11
2007
2008
FY 09
25%
50%
55%
44.72%
59.06%
82.26%
Freight Rail TIH Risk Reduction
Actual vs. Baseline GOAL
TIH Risk Reduction Verification System
Security Action Items
• June 2006, DHS/DOT issued industry best practices called “Security Action Items”:• These 24 practices were distributed to rail carriers and Federal
partners• Security measures for TIH rail carriers• Items address three operational areas: system security, access
control and en route security
• Initiated surveys to ascertain industry implementation in September 2006
• Three supplemental Security Action Items agreed upon with industry in November 2006, for a total of 27
Tank Car Tracking
o Part of the requirements of the Transportation Security Rail Rule
o Carriers must report location of single TIH car within five minutes
o Carriers must report location of all TIH cars on system within thirty minutes
o FY 09 FRSGP - GPS
Rail security rule – Major Provisions
49 CFR Part 1520 1520 Protection of Sensitive Security Information Adds definitions for rail centric terminology to
the SSI rules
Part 1580 – Rail Transportation Security Subpart A—Scope, Definitions, Authority 1580.5: Inspection Authority
Subpart B-Freight Rail Provisions 1580.100: Applicability 1580.101: Requires Rail Security Coordinator 1580.103: Location and Shipping Information 1580.105: Reporting Significant Security
Concerns 1580.107: Chain of Custody and Control 1580.109: Preemptive Effect
Subpart C-Passenger Rail Provisions 1580.201: Rail Security Coordinator 1580.203: Reporting Significant Security
Concerns
Applies to rail carriers, hazmat shippers,
and hazmat receivers
Applies to passengerand mass transit operators
Shipment Cycle
• CARRIER TO CARRIER• INTERCHANGE
• (OUTSIDE HTUA)
• SHIPPER TO CARRIER • CARRIER SWITCHING • CREW CHANGES
• CARRIER TO CARRIER• INTERCHANGE
• (IN HTUA)
• CARRIER TO RECEIVER• (IN HTUA)
• REGULATORY • VOLUNTARY
• CARRIER TO RECEIVER• (OUTSIDE HTUA)
• CARRIER TO CARRIER• INTERCHANGE
• (OUTSIDE HTUA)
• Assess Unattended Cars, Dwell Time Reduction• Chain of Custody Rule
• H
• T
• U
• A
Dispersion ModelingDispersion Modeling
MissionTo identify a scientific and computer based methodology supported by industry, government and academic community that TSA can use to predict the behavior of a TIH (chlorine) release after an attack on a 90 ton DOT Specification 105J500W tank car in a densely populated urban area.
Where We AreValidating • Consensus building• Release testing for both Chlorine and Anhydrous
Ammonia has been conducted• Consolidation of data, release of preliminary results,
and peer review in Summer of 2010
Tank Car Consequence Project Steps
Identify threat and threat scenarios for TIH tank cars – done with FBI help
Determine expected attack hole size in the tank car from a variety of breach tactics – NSWC analysis done, testing in progress
Problems likely with source release conditions (release amount, release rate, chemical phase of released cloud – aerosol, vapor, pooling)
Understand importance of topography, building and structures when modeling a dense gas
Validate with release testing Where We Are:
Weapons testing conducted in Spring 2010 Possibility of developing additional scenarios Formal program consisting of industry and government created
to work on the development of a stronger tank car
Training for Railroad Employees
Freight Rail Security IED Detection and Recognition Training
Bridge Criticality Assessment
Provides the ability to identify the nation’s most critical freight railroad bridges
Provides fact-based, analytical, defendable, and reasonable risk assessment results
Aligns with DHS’ goal of risk-based decision making Augments other critical TSA freight rail assessment
initiatives currently underway (e.g., Corridor Assessments, Comprehensive Reviews)
Intuitive tool for assessing risk to freight railroad bridges
TSA/TSWG Ammonium Nitrate Detonability Review and Assessment Project
Can AN in bulk quantities in rail and highway transportation be “weaponized”?
Weaponized - Using hand carried objects to cause catastrophic explosion related to destruction of property and persons
Task 1: Literature Review and Evaluation – Studies, tests,
accidents
Task 2: AN characteristics
Task 3: Conduct Gap analysis
Task 4: Periodic Project Review Meetings –
Project stakeholders
Project Tasks
Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP)
In FY 2009, the FRSGP funded:
• Security training for frontline employees,• Completion of vulnerability assessments, • Development of security plans within the
freight rail industry and• GPS tracking systems for railroad cars
transporting toxic inhalation hazardous (TIH) materials.
Email us at: [email protected]
More Information at:http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/tsnm/freight_rail/index.shtm