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ForewordThe history of World War II is making increasingly clear the central factthat the tightest rein on the military effort of the United States in that war wasimposed by transportation. As long as this nation fights overseas the same

situation is likely to reoccura prospect that gives a special importance to theexposition of the subject in this series. The Army promptly recognized the im-portance of transportation when, as in World War I, it centralized its supervi-sion of this branch of its vast logistical effort in a Chief of Transportation andcreated (inJuly 1942) a Transportation Corps.The Army did not, and could not, control all the factors that entered intothe movement of its men, munitions, and supplies. The larger story the readermust seek elsewhere in the two volumes on Global Logistics and Strategy and inthe theater volumes of the U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR IL Here the storyis told from the records and point of view of the Army's Chief of Transporta-tion, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross. In this volume, the second in the group ofthree Transportation Corps volumes, Mr. Wardlow passes to the policies andmethods adopted to move men and matriel within the continental UnitedStates and out to theaters of operationsthe core of General Gross's missionand to provide the Transportation Corps' quota of equipment and trainedsoldiers necessary to accomplish its oversea mission.

ALBERT C. SMITHMaj. Gen., U. S. A.Chief of Military HistoryWashington, D. C.7 June 1954

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The AuthorMr. Chester Wardlow was pursuing graduate studies in Political Science atthe University of Chicago when the United States entered World War I. In1918, employed by the Shipping Board, he went overseas with the mission thatbecame the American Section of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. From1921 until 1935 he was connected with private shipping organizations. Duringthe period 1935-41 he held the office of Sole Arbiter of the Trans-Atlantic Pas-senger Conference. In 1941 Mr. Wardlow was employed as Coordinator of

Transportation for the Army and remained in that position until 1946. From1946 until his retirement in 1954 he was the Chief Historian of the Transporta-tion Corps. He is the author of the first volume of the Transportation Corpssubseries in the U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, published in 1951.

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war and were still accessible for interviews while this volume was in prepara-tion. The assistance of those who have contributed personally or through theirwritings, and whose names therefore appear in the footnotes, is gratefullyacknowledged. It must be emphasized, however, that the author bearsresponsibility for interpretations of fact and any inadvertent errors or omissions.The statistics used in this book have been drawn so far as possible fromcompilations prepared in the Office of the Comptroller of the Army for thestatistical volume to be published in this series. Special credit is due Mr. GeorgeM. Adams of that office, who by recourse to the original sources has done athorough job of verifying, correcting, and amplifying the statistics compiled inthe Office of the Chief of Transportation during the war. Mr. George R. Powellof the same office has given valuable assistance in the presentation of statisticaldata and the preparation of graphic charts.Special thanks are also due Leo J. Meyer, Colonel, Transportation CorpsReserve, Deputy Chief Historian, who read the manuscript and offered helpfulsuggestions in the light of his wartime experience with Army transportation,and to Marie Premauer, who aided substantially in locating source materialand verifying citations in addition to typing the manuscript. Helen McShaneBailey carried out the final editing, Allen R. Clark copy edited the manuscript,and Margaret E. Tackley selected and prepared the photographs.

CHESTER WARDLOWashington, D. C.7 June 1954


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ContentsChapter PageINTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

I. ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES ... 11Nature a n d Volume of the Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Working Arrangements With t h e Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5Army Policies a n d Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5Mobilization an d Conservation o f Railroad Equipment . . . . . . . . 3 5Special Troop Trains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6Official and Furlough Travel on Regular Trains . . . . . . . . . . 58Movement o f Patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 0Prisoners of War and Enemy Aliens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77A J o b Well Done . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1

IL TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS . . 84Categories o f Troops Moved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6Troopships a n d Sailing Schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9The Ports of Embarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9Movement t o t h e Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 5Troop Staging at the Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 9Embarkation Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 5Troopship Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 6The Liberty Ship as a Troop Carrier. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 45Movement of Organizational Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 8Joint Use of Troopships by the Armed Services . . . . . . . . . . . 161A Test of Method a n d Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 4

III. REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION . . . . . . . . . . 167Return Traffic Before V - E Da y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 7Preparations f o r Redeployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 3Redeployment Between V-E Day and V-J Day . . . . . . . . . . . 1 82Repatriation After th e Surrender o f Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7Evacuation o f Patients From Oversea Theaters . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 2Transportation o f Soldiers' Dependents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 1Repatriation o f the War Dead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 7Results Under Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 9

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Chapter PageIV. FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES . . . . 241

Characteristics of Army Freight Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243Distribution of Freight Among the Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8Routing a n d Related Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 5Control o f Traffic Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 4Transit Storage Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 1Mobilization and Conservation o f Freight Cars . . . . . . . . . . . 295Consolidated C a r Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 5Freight Rates a n d Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 6The Measure of Accomplishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 6

V . OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 7Analysis o f Outbound Freight Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330Regulation o f Oversea Supply Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335Transshipment of Cargo at the Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357Shipment of Ammunition a nd Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 6Packing, Marking, Documentation, a n d Security . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 1Adjustments at th e End of Hostilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405T h e Return Cargo Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 8International A i d Shipments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 0Theater Requirements Met. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 7

V I . MILITARY A N D TECHNICAL TRAINING . . . . . . . . . 4 1 9Distribution o f Training Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 0Schooling for Officers and Officer Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . 425Troop Units for the Operation of Oversea Ports . . . . . . . . . . 431Troop Units f o r Military Railways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 8Crews fo r Smalt Boats an d Amphibious Trucks . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 2Other Types o f Units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 9Cadres, Fillers, a n d Replacements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 1Civilian Schooling f o r Specialists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 5Final Inspection of Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 7Review o f Training P r o b l e m s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 0

VII. THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS E X E C U T I O N . . . . . . 462Scope of the Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 2T h e Headquarters a n d Field Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 5Setting Up the Supply Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 2Contracting Procedures and Aid to Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 1Production Schedules a n d Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 0Maintenance a n d Spare Parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 9Progress i n Technical Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 7Summary o f Successes and Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 3

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No. Page16. Freight Shipped on War Department Bills of Lading by Army Procuring

Services and Commanders of Troop Organizations: December 1941-December 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 2

17. Means of Transport Used for Freight Moved on War Department Bills ofLading in the Zone of Interior: December 1941-December 1945 . . . 24918. Carloads of Freight Released by Traffic Control Division for Shipment to

Ports: July 1943-June 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 519 . Carloads of Export Freight Unloaded by the Railroads at U.S.Ports:1939-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 1

20. Warehouse, Shed, and Open Storage Space at Holding and ReconsignmentPoints: 31 May 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288

21. Percentage of Filled, Booked, and Free Space at Holding and Reconsign-ment Points on Designated Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290

22. Short Tons of Freight Handled In and Out of the Holding and Recon-signment Points: 1942-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 123. Average Tons Per Car Shipped on War Department Bills of Lading by the

Several Shipping Agencies: December 1941-December 1945 . . . . . 30524. Tons of Less-Than-Carload Freight Consolidated by the Army-Navy

Consolidating Stations: July 1942-December 1945 . . . . . . . . . 31025 . Annual Savings Through Rate Adjustment and Classification Activitieso f t h e Traffic Control Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 526. Tons of Cargo Shipped by the Army by Water From the Zone of Interior

to the Several Oversea Areas: December 1941-December 1945 . . . 32827. Tons of Cargo Shipped to Oversea Destinations by the Principal Army

Ports: December 1941-December 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 228. Tons of Cargo Shipped by Water to Oversea Destinations by the Respec-

tive Procuring Services: December 1941-December 1945 . . . . . . 33329 . Aircraft Dispatched to the Army Air Forces Overseas, by Sea and by Air,Crated and Uncrated: January 1942-July 1945 . . . . . . . . . . 365

30. Army Aircraft Transported Overseas Under the Cognizance of the Com-mittee on Aircraft Transportation: March 1943-April 1945 . . . . . 366

31. Motor Vehicles Transported to the Oversea Commands: January 1943-June 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 0

32. Special Army Piers and Backup Storage Facilities for Export Ammunitiona n d Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 1

33. Army-Procured Ammunition and High Explosives Shipped Overseas FromArmy-Controlled Piers at U.S. Ports: December 1941-August 1945 . . 390

34. Cargo Returned From Overseas and Discharged at Army Ports in theUnited States: 1942-1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 0

35. Port Units in Oversea Areas: 31 March 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . 43636 . Transportation Corps Troop Units Activated During World War II ... 43737 . Troops of Other Services Trained at Transportation Corps Installations:

1 August 1942-1 September 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45238. Estimated Value of Transportation Corps Equipment and Supplies

Accepted: Calendar Years 1942-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466xiv


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No. Page39 . Budget Estimates for Transportation Corps Equipment and Supplies: FiscalYears 1942-1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 7

40. Quantities of Major Items of Transportation Equipment Constructed andAccepted in the Zone of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502

Charts1. Army Passengers Moved Monthly by Rail and Bus in Organized Groups

on Routings Provided by the Central Routing Authority in Washington:December 1941-December 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1

2. Revenue Passenger-Miles Accomplished in Pullman-Operated SleepingCars and Parlor Cars: 1939-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3. Passengers Embarked Monthly by the Army at U.S. Ports for OverseaDestinations: December 1941-December 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . 98

4. Passengers Embarked by the Army at U.S. Ports for the Several OverseaAreas: December 1941-December 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

5. Forecast of Troop Redeployment, Prepared by the Chief of Transporta-tion, as of 11 July 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1986. Passengers Debarked Monthly by the Army at U.S. Ports From OverseaCommands: 1943-1946. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 6

7. Passengers Debarked by the Army at the Respective U.S. Ports: 1945-1946. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 78. Freight Moved Monthly by Rail and Other Domestic Carriers on WarDepartment Bills of Lading: December 1941-December 1945 . . . . 2549. Monthly Tonnage of Less-Than-Carload Freight Consolidated by theArmy-Navy Consolidating Stations: July 1942-December 1945. ... 31110 . Army Cargo Shipped Monthly From the Zone of Interior to OverseaDestination: December 1941-December 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . 329

11. Basic Plan for Filling Requisitions From Oversea Commands for ArmyService Forces Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 412. Army-Procured Ammunition and High Explosives Loaded at Army-Controlled Piers for Delivery Overseas: December 1941-August 1945 . 391

IllustrationsSpecially Designed Government-Owned Troop Sleepers . . . . . . . . . 2380th Division Troops Arriving at Camp Forrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Planning Routings and Assignments of Rail E q u i p m e n t . . . . . . . . . . 45Preparing Food in a Converted Baggage-Kitchen Car . . . . . . . . . . 52New Troop Kitchen Car Equipped With Modern Facilities . . . . . . . . 53Special Reservation Bureau for Military P e r s o n n e l . . . . . . . . . . . . 66N e w Self-Contained Army Hospital C a r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2

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PageThree Types of Troop Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Training Facilities at Camp Stoneman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118Staging Area Recreational Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 2Individual Equipment Ready To Be Carried . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126Army Nurses Entraining at Camp Kilmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128Troops Leaving Camp Myles Standish. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Night Embarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 3Red Cross Workers Waving to Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134Crowded Accommodations Aboard a Troop Transport . . . . . . . . . . 140Impromptu Entertainment Aboard Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 2Processing Troop Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 3German Prisoners of War Debarking at a U.S. Port . . . . . . . . . . . 168U S S Wakefield Landing Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 2U S S West Point Embarking Troops a t Naples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 486th Division Troops Arriving at New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185T h e Queen Mary Arriving a t N e w York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 6U.S. Army Hospital Ship St . Mihiel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214U S S Comfort O f f L o s Angeles Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 3Ward Room on the Army Troopship Monterey . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 8Dispensary o n t h e Monterey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 9Litters Ready To Receive Patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230Engineer Pontons Loaded o n Flatcars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 676-mm. G u n Motor Carriages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 7Locomotives Shipped a s Railway F r e i g h t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 0Holding and Reconsignment Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284Outdoor Storage Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 3Two 2-Ton Trucks Loaded on Each Flatcar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300Sixteen -Ton Trucks Loaded on a Flatcar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301The Consolidated Car Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308Maj. Gen. Homer M. Groninger and Maj. Gen. William M. Goodman . . . 341Crated Freight Loaded on the SS William S . Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 0Ten Railroad Tank Cars on the Forward Deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361Transporting Aircraft o n Deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 7Mail on Trucks at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation . . . . . . . . 376Sorting Mail at the New York Port of Embarkation . . . . . . . . . . . 377Special Explosives Loading P i e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385Barricaded Storage Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 6U.S.-Built Broad-Gauge Locomotives for the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . 413Maj. Gen. Frederick Gilbreath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 7Training Transportation Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 9Port Companies i n Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 4Training Troops fo r th e Mil i tary Railway Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 3Amphibian Truck Company Troops in T r a i n i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447Port Company T r o o p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 8Troops Practice Going Over the Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459

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PageU.S.-Built Locomotives for Service Overseas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464Vessels Procured by the Transportation C o r p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474Boats for Harbor and Inshore Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487Seagoing Steel Barge Under Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500Revolving Floating Crane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 1Processing and Crating Shop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506Marine Rope i n Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 7

Illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense except for thefollowing:Southern Pacific Railroad: page 23.Santa Fe Railroad: pages 52, 53.U.S. Maritime Commission: page 92 (middle).Association of American Railroads: page 270.Life Photo, Peter Stackpole: page 300.American Locomotive Company: page 464.

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THE TRANSPORTATION CORPSMOVEMENTS,

TRAINING, AND SUPPLY


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IntroductionOne of the facts stamped indelibly onthe minds of military men by World WarII is that transportation plays a key rolein global warfare. In a conflict fought onforeign soil, success is absolutely dependenton the number of soldiers and the quan-tity of matriel that can be moved to the

oversea commands and the timelinesswith which they are delivered.The primary consideration is trans-oceanic transportation, for in wartime thecapacity needed to move troops and cargofar exceeds the capacity required forpeacetime traffic. But traffic within thezone of interior also expands rapidlyunder a war economy, and means mustbe found for handling military move-

ments promptly while at the same timeaccommodating essential civilian traffic.In the oversea areas where the forces cometo grips with the enemy, the ports of entryand the inland lines of communicationmust be kept operative, notwithstandingthe efforts of the enemy to destroy the fa-cilities and the uncertain value of localcivilian labor.The shipping problem was an especiallyvital one in World War II, as in the pre-vious great conflict, because while theAllies were heavily dependent upon oceantransport, Germany was not.The Ger-mans, who under the Allied plan of strat-egy were to be defeated before the wareffort was turned fully against Japan,struck heavy blows at Allied shipping inthe Atlantic, the Caribbean, and theMediterranean. Their submarines wereso effective for a time that serious doubts

arose in the minds of Allied leaderswhether a sufficiently large fleet of troopand cargo vessels could be built up tomeet the requirements of victory in amultifront war.Such a fleet was achievednevertheless through the unprecedentedperformance of the United States in con-structing new vessels, the increasinglyeffective Allied campaign waged againstthe U-boat, and the economies effected bybringing virtually all shipping availableto the Western Allies under the control ofthe British and U.S. Governments andclosely co-ordinating the operations of thetwo pools. The shipping situation beganto improve perceptibly in the spring of1943; yet up to the time of Germany's sur-render there never was a surplus of ves-sels. In fact, there never was enoughshipping to satisfy those who were direct-ing the expanding Allied war effort.Although excellent results in the effec-tive employment of the Allied cargo fleetswere accomplished through the co-ordi-nating work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and theCombined Shipping Adjus tment Board,

1 This brief explanation of the background of theTransportation Corps, the fundamental problems thatconfronted the Chief of Transportation, and theestablishment that functioned under his command isessentially a recapitulation of information presentedin Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Respon-sibilities, Organization, and Operations, UNITEDSTATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washing-ton, 1951) . Many of the problems and relationshipswill be referred to again in the last chapter of thisvolume, where some observations and conclusions re-garding the activities and accomplishments of theTransportation Corps in connection with movements,training, and supply will be presented.
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4 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPSindividual vessels were not always used tocapacity. During the early years of thewar when the production of military sup-plies in the United States was lagging,sufficient cargo was not always deliveredto he ports to fill the ships that weredestined for low-priority theaters. Evenwhen matriel was available at depots,camps, and manufacturing plants, theprocess of assembling at the ports highlydiversified cargoes from many sources insuch a manner as to avoid port congestionand yet have the cargoes ready for load-ing in accordance with theater prioritiesand convoy schedules was a complicatedone, and some supplies did not arrive asplanned either because of late shipmentor because of unexpectedly long time intransit. The preponderance of bulky andlight items over compact and heavy itemsin Army cargoes frequently made it im-possible for the ports of embarkation toload vessels to their dead-weight capac-ities, even though their cargo spaces werefull.The most serious waste of shippingcame about through holding cargo vesselsidle in the theaters. While such detentionssometimes were caused by unforeseenmilitary developments, too often theywere attributable to the failure of theatercommanders to keep the tonnages thatthey sought to have delivered at particu-lar ports within the capacities of the portsto receive, or to the deliberate use of vesselsas floating warehouses. This problem be-came especially acute in the fall of 1944,and it was not cleared up until the Presi-dent peremptorily directed the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to bring the situation undercontrol.According to prewar plans the Navywas to operate all ocean-going vesselsneeded by the armed forces if the United

States should become a belligerent. TheArmy actually began turning over itstransports to the Navy in the spring of1941, but it soon became apparent thatthe Navy was not in a position to provideenlisted crews for a large number of mer-chant vessels because of the heavy de-mand for combatant crews. Soon afterPearl Harbor, therefore, the two servicesagreed that the Army should man andoperate the vessels that it owned or con-trolled under bareboat charter and calldirectly on the U.S. Maritime Commis-sion for the allocation of such additionalvessels as it might require. During the en-suing year efforts were made to achievean arrangement under which either theNavy or the Army would control all mili-tary shipping, since that was recognizedas more economical than the operation ofseparate fleets, but the two departmentscould not agree on a plan. The bulk of theshipping was therefore operated by agentsof the War Shipping Administration,which took over the operating responsibil-ities of the Maritime Commission inFebruary 1942, and the vessels were allo-cated to the Army and the Navy in ac-cordance with their requirements. Undersubsequent agreements the Navy manneda considerable number of vessels thatwere to be employed by the Army in theforward areas, and the two services freelyinterchanged ship space for both troopsand cargo moving between the zone of in-terior and the theaters.The Maritime Commission was theagency designated by the President toprocure the additional shipping requiredfo r the war effort. Its achievement in de-veloping new shipyards and expandingold ones to produce a total of 55,000,000dead-weight tons of new vessels was out-standing. Since most of these vessels were


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INTRODUCTION 5intended for military use, close collabora-tion was necessary between the militaryauthorities and the Maritime Commissionto insure that the right balance was main-tained between troop capacity, dry cargocapacity, and bulk oil capacity. Duringthe latter part of the war, with extensiveamphibious operations against the Jap-anese in prospect, many specialized vesselswere built to transport troops and cargoesin assault actions. The Joint Chiefs of Staffrepresented the armed forces in determin-ing military shipping requirements. Inorder to facilitate collaboration a repre-sentative of the Maritime Commissionwas designated an associate member ofthe Joint Military Transportation Com-mittee, which worked out programs toprovide the numbers and types of vesselsrequired to support future military under-takings. Because adequate shipping was aprerequisite to victory, the shipbuildingprogram was given a high priority in theallocation of steel and other scarce ma-terials and components.

Since the Army depended heavily onthe War Shipping Administration (WSA)for the allocation of ships to carry itstroops and cargoes overseas and to movethem between bases within the theaters,the working arrangements between theArmy Chief of Transportation and theWar Shipping Administration were ofhigh importance. After an unsatisfactorystart, during a period when procedureswere being worked out and the supply ofvessels was critically short, this relation-ship developed into a very successful col-laboration. On the operating level, whereships and cargoes were matched, an effi-cient working arrangement was achieved.The Army frequently did not get thenumber of vessels it asked for, and it some-times complained vigorously regarding

the number of ships the WSA allocated totransport lend-lease cargoes and to sup-port the British import program, but thepolicies governing these allocations wereset by the President and the WSA hadlittle latitude in carrying them out.The most acute disagreement betweenthe WSA and the Army came to a headin December 1942, when the civilianshipping agency obtained an order fromthe President directing it to assume con-trol of the loading of military cargoes atU.S. ports. The purpose of the order wasto utilize ship capacities more fully byloading a mixture of military and lend-lease cargoes, thus obtaining a better bal-ance of light and heavy items. The Armyand the Navy saw serious objections toplacing the loading of military freight inthe hands of a large number of civilianagents of the WSA and were successful inhaving the order shelved. The Armyrecognized the merit of the War ShippingAdministration's objective, however, andarranged to co-operate with that agencymore fully in mixing military and lend-lease shipments.The domestic carriers were requiredunder the Interstate Commerce Act togive military traffic precedence over allother types of traffic upon demand of thePresident. No such formal demand wasmade, but there was general recognitionof the fact that military traffic should notbe delayed. The railroads, which carriedthe bulk of the Army's personnel andfreight, worked in very close co-operationwith the Chief of Transportation and tookextraordinary measures to move Armyshipments promptly and to expedite themwhen necessary. Transportation Corpsofficers concerned with troop and freightmovements frequently complained of de-layed deliveries and unsuitable equip-


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6 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPSment, but they recognized that the rail-roads were confronted with severe wartimeoperating problems and with an un-precedented volume of civilian and mili-tary traffic.There was a less sympathetic attitudetoward the Office of Defense Transporta-tion (ODT), which the President estab-lished soon after Pearl Harbor to exercisea broad control over all domestic trans-portation. The Chief of Transportationfelt that the ODT was not sufficientlyaggressive in arranging for the constructionof additional rail and motor equipment tomeet the wartime need, and that it wastoo slow in curtailing regular railwaypassenger services in order to make avail-able more adequate transportation facili-ties for troops. The Director of DefenseTransportation, on the other hand, cen-sured the armed forces for their unwilling-ness to allow a larger amount of scarcematerials to be diverted from the militaryprograms to the construction of transpor-tation equipment for domestic services.When the war began there was a nota-ble absence of established methods of co-operation between the Army and theNavy. Aside from the plan to place allmilitary shipping under naval operationin the event of wara plan that was notcarried outvirtually nothing had beendone to co-ordinate the transportation ac-tivities of the two services. Agreement waseven lacking as to the assignment andequipment of vessels for joint amphibiousoperations. The Naval TransportationService and the Army Transport Servicewere being operated entirely independ-ently and were competing with each otherfor additional ships. Separate port estab-lishments were being maintained. Therewas no co-ordination of domestic move-ments of personnel and supplies beyond

that which was provided by the railroadsin their own interest. Floating equipmentand marine supplies were procured sepa-rately and little information was ex-changed. During the war considerableprogress was made in the orderly alloca-tion of vessels to meet strategic needs, thejoint use of ships and ship repair facilities,the harmonization of marine procurementprograms, and the reduction of duplicatesupply shipments to the theaters, but atthe end of hostilities separate steamshipservices were still being maintained andvirtually nothing had been accomplishedto synchronize domestic troop and supplymovements or to eliminate duplicate portoperations. The traditional independenceof the Army and the Navy, the fact thatthe control of Army shipping operationsand inland traffic movements was morecentralized than was the case with theNavy, and the difficulty of adopting newprocedures while working under wartimepressures limited the co-operation thatthe two services could develop after thewar had started.The fact that the Army transportationservice, established in March 1942 andconverted into the Transportation Corpsin the following July, was a wartime crea-tion had a definite influence on its rela-tions with other elements of the WarDepartment. Aside from the necessity ofdeveloping an adequate organization inthe face of wartime manpower shortagesand establishing procedures to govern allphases of the wartime transportation ac-tivity, the Chief of Transportation had todefine and defend his position as the chieftransportation officer of the new Servicesof Supply (later renamed Army ServiceForces).World War I had demonstrated theneed for a unified Army transportation


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INTRODUCTION 7service, and strong recommendations weremade for the continuance of such a serviceafter the war was over. But the hope thatthere would be no more great wars andthe desire to cut government spending ledCongress to disregard this recommenda-tion when enacting the National DefenseAct of 1920. As a result, World War IIfound transportation responsibilities scat-tered among several Army agenciestheSupply Division (G-4) of the GeneralStaff, The Quartermaster General, theChief of Engineers, the Chief of Ord-nance, and the ports of embarkation. Thecreation of a Chief of Transportation in theWar Department reorganization of 9March 1942 did not mean that all trans-portation functions were placed under hiscontrol, but it did provide greater concen-tration of responsibility than had existedpreviously, and the scope of his authoritywas extended as the war progressed.2In assuming the office of Chief of Trans-portation, Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.)Charles P. Gross had two broad objec-tivesto establish a service that wouldembrace as many of the transportationfunctions of the War Department as cir-cumstances would permit, and to main-tain unbroken control of troop and supplymovements from their points of origin atcamps, depots, and factories in the zone ofinterior until their arrival at the overseaports of debarkation. There obviously wasa close interrelationship between thesetwo purposes.

The first objective was largely but notcompletely accomplished. After the firstyear of the war the Chief of Transporta-tion was responsible for all arrangementswith the commercial rail, highway, andwater carriers in the zone of interior, andfor the provision of shipping and the oper-ation of ports of embarkation adequate for

the Army's oversea traffic. He was re-sponsible also for the training of troopsand the procurement of equipment andsupplies required for marine and railoperations in the oversea commands. TheChief of Transportation did not have con-trol of traffic by air, which was regulatedby the Army Air Forces (AAF); he foundit necessary to accord to the AAF a largedegree of independence in controlling itsdomestic freight traff ic by surface car-riers. The design and procurement ofmotor vehicles for oversea highway serv-ices remained with the Chief of Ordnance,and the organization of troop units for theoperation of motor vehicles as well as theestablishment of training programs anddoctrine for such troops remained withThe Quartermaster General.The second objectiveunbroken con-trol of troop and supply movements fromdomestic origins to the oversea ports ofdischargewas attained with but one ex-ception, that is, movements by air, whichwere regulated by the Army Air Forces.Troop and freight movements by rail,motor, or water to the ports of embarka-tion and thence overseas by water wereunder the control of the Chief of Trans-portation at all points. Several proposalswere made that would have disrupted thiscontrol, but the Chief of Transportationwas able to block them. He held con-sistently to the position that continuity ofcontrol was necessary to enable his or-ganization to co-ordinate movements tothe ports of embarkation with ship sched-ules, and thus assure the effective loadingand prompt dispatch of the vessels as wellas the observance of theater priorities.

2 Although from April to July 1942 this off icialwas known as the Chief of Transportation Service,the title Chief of Transportation is used un i fo rm ly inthis history.


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8 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPSThe Chief of Transportation held a

unique position in the Army Service Forces(ASF) organization because of the breadthof the staff responsibilities that he had inaddition to technical and operating re-sponsibilities. The extent of his staff func-tions was the natural result of the positionthat the Transportation Corps had in themilitary structureall other arms andservices depended on it for mass move-ments of men and materiel within thezone of interior and to the oversea com-mands, and to a considerable extent formovements within the oversea areas. Thismeant that from the beginning of strategicplanning the Chief of Transportation, hav-ing knowledge of the means of transporta-tion likely to be available and their capa-bilities under various circumstances, heldthe key to many important military deci-sions. It meant also that his concurrencewas a prerequisite to any adjustments thatmight have to be made in strategic plansbecause of unforeseen developments. TheChief of Transportation built up a strongPlanning Division to aid him in perform-ing his staff functions, and he firmly andsuccessfully opposed a proposal put for-ward in the fall of 1943 to transfer thatdivision to ASF headquarters.The staff functions that the Chief ofTransportation performed and his insist-ence on maintaining direct contact withthe Operations Division (OPD) of theGeneral Staff in regard to the overseatroop movements that OPD had orderedor was planning to order brought him intoconflict with the ASF Director of Opera-tions, Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, on numer-ous occasions. This is understandable sincethe latter was charged with co-ordinatingall ASF activities pertaining to troop andsupply movements. But the Chief of Trans-portation was unwilling to be confined to

the technical and operating aspects oftransportation; or rather, he believed thathis organization would not be fully andproperly performing its mission if it didnot bring its practical knowledge of trans-portation to bear on the staff work pertain-ing to movements. Lt. Gen. Brehon B.Somervell, commanding the Army ServiceForces, recognized the merits of the posi-tions taken by both parties to the argu-ment, and he sought to strike a practicalbalance between the two rather than torule arbitrarily against one or the other.This was fairly well accomplished, bothsides yielding on some points.The fact that the office of the Chief ofTransportation was not established untilMarch 1942 affected not only the Chief ofTransportation's relations with other ele-ments of the War Department but also hisrelations with the theater commanders.He had no direct responsibility for trans-portation operations within the theaters,but he was responsible for furnishing theoversea commanders with capable trans-portation officers, troop units adequatelytrained for transportation tasks, and ma-rine, port, and rail equipment correctlydesigned for theater needs. Starting outwith small resources and very limited ad-vance planning, the Chief of Transporta-tion found the early problems in fulfillingthese responsibilities formidable. Beyondthe difficulties encountered in supplyingpersonnel and materiel, the new Chief ofTransportation was handicapped by anearly lack of standing with the theatercommanders. It took time to acquaintthem with his place in the scheme ofthings, the ways in which he could be ofhelp to them, and the ways in which theycould co-operate with him. General Grossdevoted much time and energy to buildingup a satisfactory entente with the com-


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INTRODUCTION 9manders of the forces overseas, and in theend he felt that his efforts had paid gooddividends. A more difficult problem wasthat of persuading some theater com-manders to accord their chief transporta-tion officers sufficient authority to enablethem to function effectively. On this pointthere was still room for improvement inthe European theater in late 1944, and asatisfactory situation was not obtained inthe Southwest Pacific until the summer of1945.For the fulfillment of his responsibilitiesin the zone of interior the Chief of Trans-portation built up, in addition to a head-quarters organization of about 3,100military and civilian personnel, an exten-sive field establishment, which in thewinter of 1945 embraced personnel (notcounting personnel assigned by servicecommands and attached troop units) total-ing over 180,000. The headquarters staffdealt chiefly with the establishment ofpolicies and procedures and the supervi-sion of activities in the field. The fieldinstallations were the agencies throughwhich policies and procedures approvedin Washington were carried into effecteither through direct operations, as at theports of embarkation and the holding andreconsignment points, or through closerelationships with the common carriersand industry, as in the case of the zonetransportation offices. The procedures ap-proved at headquarters were in large meas-ure based on the operating experiences ofthe field agencies.

The port installations constituted by farthe largest segment of this field establish-ment. The eight ports of embarkation(Boston, New York, Hampton Roads,Charleston, New Orleans, Los Angeles,San Francisco, and Seattle), the threecargo ports (Philadelphia, Baltimore, and

Searsport, Maine), and the three subports(Portland, Oregon; Prince Rupert, BritishColumbia; and Juneau, Alaska), whichwere active at the end of 1944, employedmore than 171,000 military and civilianpersonnel. The New York installationalone employed more than 55,000. Theactivities of the ports of embarkation weremultifarious; they included the operationof shipping terminals, the operation andmaintenance of Army-owned and char-tered transports and harbor boats, therepair and conversion of vessels, the oper-ation of staging areas for the housing andprocessing of intransit troops, the operationof storage and processing facilities forequipment and supplies, the regulation ofthe flow of troops and supplies to the portsin accordance with the ports' ability totransship them and with due regard tomovement orders and theaters requisi-tions, and certain training activities. Thecargo ports and subports had more limitedfunctions.3Nine zone transportation officers, asrepresentatives of the Chief of Transporta-tion, supervised a variety of field activities.These included holding and reconsign-ment points to provide intransit storagefor equipment and supplies destined foroversea areas, freight consolidating stationsand distributing agencies to handle less-than-carload shipments, reservation bu-reaus to obtain accommodations onregular trains for military personnel, rail-road repair shops for the repair of Army-owned locomotives and rolling stock, and,until 1945, such procurement and depotactivities as were not carried on directlyby the Office of the Chief of Transporta-tion. The zone transportation offices, the

3 See Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 95-1 10, for an ex-planation of the different types of port installationand more detailed personnel data.
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10 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPSdistrict transportation offices, which weresubordinate to the zones, and the portagencies (which toward the end of the warbecame district transportation offices) alsorepresented the Chief of Transportation inkeeping movements of troops and suppliesunder observation and in expediting theflow of traffic when circumstances re-quired it.4

The training of officers and enlistedmen constituted a third group of fieldactivities. In the early months of the warall such training was given at the ports ofembarkation, but the greatly increasedrequirements soon necessitated the estab-lishment of special schools and trainingcenters. Although the Chief of Transporta-tion believed that he should command allsuch training installations, under a policy

adopted by ASF headquarters in 1943some of the centers where TransportationCorps troops were trained were operatedby the service commands.

A number of field procurement officeswere set up in the fall of 1942 with directresponsibility to the Chief of Transporta-tion. Before the end of the year, however,field procurement activities, as well asdepot activities, were placed under thesupervision of the zone transportation offi-cers. This arrangement continued untilnear the end of the war; then, with theprocurement program largely accom-plished, these activities were detached fromthe zones and were placed under the directsupervision of the Chief of Transportation.

4 For a fuller discussion of transportation zones,see Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 111-23.


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CHAPTER IArmy Passenger Traffic

in the United StatesThe tremendous upsurge in militarypassenger t raff ic that took place during

the war was apparent to everyone whotraveled. The difficulty of obtaining seatsin railway coaches and buses, the scarcityof sleeping car accommodations, and thethrongs of uniformed men and women en-countered in transportation terminalswere unmistakable evidences. Yet theordinary traveler had no contact with themost significant part of the military traf-ficthat which moved directly frominstallation to installation in special trains.Nor could he have any conception of theextent and complexity of the problemsinvolved in moving large numbers of mili-tary personnel in a prompt, orderly, andeconomical manner by common carriersand in making the available railway andmotor equipment perform maximumservice.In approaching the discussion of theArmy's passenger t raffic , two facts mustbe borne in mind. The first is that civilianas well as military travel increased as aresult of the war. The booming industriescalled for increased business travel, andthe greater income of wage earners gaverise to more travel for personal reasons.The rationing of gasoline and tires causedmany owners to lay up their automobilesand use public transportation instead. Al-though some of the less essential passenger

services were eliminated or curtailed andefforts were made to obtain a voluntaryabstinence from pleasure travel, no posi-tive restriction was placed on the citizen'sright to use the services that were offered.As a result, the 1944 railway passengertraffic, measured in passenger-miles, was334 percent greater than the annual aver-age for the years 1935-39, and intercitymotorbus traffic was 192 percent greater.The second basic fact is that the carrierswere able to make only a limited increasein services after the war began. The build-ing of new equipment and structures wasseverely limited by the scarcity of mate-rials and the higher priority given to mili-tary items. Maintaining adequate trans-portation operating personnel was madedifficult by the manpower requirements ofthe armed forces and the inducementsoffered by other industries. Because ofthese limitations on the ability of the car-riers to increase their services, the in-creased demand for passenger accommo-dations had to be met chief ly by a moreintensive use of existing facilities.1

Nature and Volume of the TrafficArmy passenger traffic fell into severalcategories, each involving special prob-

1 Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities,Organisation, and Operations, pp. 309-49.


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12 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPSlems and requiring special procedures.There were the larger organized troopmovements, usually involving units andtheir organic equipment, which for themost part moved in special trains. Therewere the smaller organized groups thattraveled chiefly on the regular rail andbus services. Military patients being trans-ferred between hospitals or f rom ports ofembarkation to hospitals were moved onboth regular and special trains. Prisoner-of-war groups for obvious reasons weretransported chiefly in special trains or spe-cial cars. The military and civilian per-sonnel of the Army traveling as individualson War Department transportationrequests naturally used the regular serv-ices of the common carriers.2 The samewas true of most military personnel travel-ing while on leave or furlough, althoughsome of this traffic was handled by specialtrains. The Army also arranged for thetravel of military personnel of Alliednations passing through the United Statesand for the initial movements of personsofJapanese descent from the Pacific coastfor relocation.

The number of military passengersmoved by the carriers in World War II farexceeded the number moved during anyearlier period. This was necessarily truebecause the number of men in uniformwas far greater and the plan of train ingrequired more travel.3 Specific data areavailable for only certain categories ofpassengers. During the first eighteenmonths of World War IIthat is, throughMay 1943statistics were prepared on allpassengers moved by rail, motor, air,andwater on War Department requests. Thetotal for that period was 24,490,707, andthe peak month was October 1942 with2,068,533 passengers.4 Thereafter, as an

economy measure, transportation officersin the field were no longer required toreport the number of passengers moved onrequests that they had issued; hence theonly data covering the entire war periodpertain to passengers moved in the organ-ized groups routed by the central routingauthority in Washington. During theforty-nine-month period from December1941 through December 1945, such traffictotaled 35,848,700 passengers; the peakmonth was August 1945, when 1,207,100passengers were moved.5 Neither set offigures includes the travel of Army per-sonnel while on furlough or leave, whichwas at the individual's own expense andby his own arrangement.Since complete data for troop travelwere not compiled, the exact percentageof the whole that military traffic consti-tuted is not known, but some indicativeestimates are available. For the year 1943,the Office of Price Administration esti-mated that the uniformed personnel of thearmed servicesArmy, Navy, MarineCorps, and Coast Guardconstituted 25.3percent of the total number of passengersmoved (excluding commuter travel) and

2 The transportation request is an order on a carrierto furnish transportation to persons for official travelat government expense.3 During the nineteen-month period May 1917-November 1918, the railroads moved 8,875,000 pas-sengers on WD requests on special and regular trains;during a corresponding period, December 1941-June1943, such passengers numbered 21,754,000. See Rpt,Transportation, Comparative Data, World War I-World War II, p. 24, prepared by Contl Div OCT,Jul 43, OCT HB MPR.4 OCT HB Monograph 20, p. 2 and App. I.Roughly 83.8 percent of this traffic moved by rail, 16percent by highway, and 0.2 percent by air and water.5 See Table 1 and Chart 1, pp. 30, 31, below. Rout-ing procedures are explained below, pp. 25-30.

Groups routed by the central routing authority inWashington were estimated to constitute between 50and 60 percent of the total traffic moved on WDtransportation requests.


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ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 13that this military traffic accounted for 39.5percent of the total passenger-miles accom-plished.6 In September 1943 the Office ofDefense Transportation and the Office ofWar Information jointly released data in-dicating that, of the total number of pas-sengers traveling on regularly scheduledtrains and buses (that is, excluding specialtroop trains and buses), 20 percent con-sisted of servicemen and servicewomen inuniform traveling under orders or onleave. Of the remaining 80 percent, itwas estimated that 55 percent representedessential civilian travel and 25 percentnonessential travel.7

Carefully worked out techniques andprocedures were required to get the great-est possible use out of the rail and motorequipment available to the Army. Al-though considerable progress had beenmade with such techniques and proce-dures before the United States entered thewar, much remained to be done to adaptthem to the large and closely timed move-ments that then became frequent. Thefield maneuvers held in 1940 and 1941gave the Army an opportunity to try outits own procedures and its working ar-rangements with the railroads, and also todetermine how far commercial motorvehicles could be used for this purpose.The precipitate entry of the United Statesinto a war involving action in both Atlan-tic and Pacific areas put these arrange-ments and procedures to the acid test. Theresults were gratifying, as General GeorgeC. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, latertestified.8 There remained, nevertheless,many features to be developed and refinedin order for the Army to execute the heavytroop movements of 1943and 1944withsmoothness and efficiency. As an indica-tion of the size of this undertaking, the

Chief of Transportation stated that duringthe period of heavy traffic in the spring of1943 a special troop train was started forevery six minutes in the twenty-four-hourday.9The system under which troops wereinducted and trained was expensive interms of transportation. In World War Ithe typical draftee made three basicmovesfrom home to cantonment, fromcantonment to specialized training camp,and thence to port of embarkation. InWorld War II he made at least fivemovesfrom home to induction station,and thence to reception center, replace-ment training center, unit training center,and port of embarkationand, in addi-tion, most soldiers were moved to special-ized training centers and to trainingmaneuver areas. Induction stations, recep-tion centers, and replacement trainingcenters were numerous and scattered. Spe-cialized training centers were widely dis-persed, and some training was phased,with each phase taking place at a differentstation. Troops and their equipment fre-quently were transported all the wayacross the continent in order to meet the-

6 Exhibit A-68,before ICC, Ex parte 148, October23, 1944, reproduced as App.II in OCT HB Mono-graph 20. As the percentages indicate, the averagehaul for military passengers was longer than that forthe traffic as a whole.

7 ODT Press Release 349,3 Sep 43, OCT HB TopicODT. These figures were released in connection withthe campaign for a voluntary reduction of nonessentialtravel.8 In the Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of theUnited States Army, July 1,1941 toJune 30,1943 . . . ,the Chief of Staff stated that the movement of almost600,000 troops and their impedimenta by rail duringthe first five weeks of the war had been accomplished"in an extremely efficient manner." See also, Memo,Marshall for the President, 3 Mar 42, sub:Troop and

Cargo Mvmts, WDCSA 370.5.9 Statement in NBC radio broadcast, based on datafrom Military Transportation Section AAR, reportedin Railway Age, May 15, 1943.


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14 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPSater requests for certain types of unitspromptly, The Passenger Branch in theOffice of the Chief of Transportation esti-mated that men shipped overseas made onthe average between six and seven movesat Army expense before sailing.10

Many criticisms were leveled at theArmy because of what appeared to be ex-cessive troop movements. These criticismsoriginated with other government agen-cies, railroad officials and shippers, andsoldiers who wanted fewer moves and bet-ter travel accommodations. The Army de-fended its troop movements and system oftraining and, in the beginning, denied thatunnecessary moves were made. Later, theCommanding General, Army ServiceForces, and his Chief of Transportationbecame convinced that the number ofmoves could be reduced without militarydisadvantage and requested the com-manders of the Army Ground Forces andthe Army Air Forces to give the subjecttheir attention.11 The War Departmentalso endeavored to eliminate unnecessaryofficial travel by individuals and to reducegroup meetings, in line with requests madeto all government agencies by J. MonroeJohnson, the Director of Defense Trans-portation, and James F. Byrnes, theDirector of War Mobilization.12

Several officials and divisions in theOffice of the Chief of Transportation wereconcerned with passenger t raff ic . TheAssistant Chief of Transportation for Op-erations, Brig. Gen.Robert H. Wylie, hadan over-all co-ordinating responsibility.The Movements Division, headed first byCol. (later Brig. Gen.) Andrew F. McIn-tyre and then by Col.Donald E. Farr, wasconcerned especially with the movementof troops and troop equipment destined foroversea areas, and the co-ordination of in-

land transportation with staging arrange-ments at the ports of embarkation and withtroop transport schedules. The Rail Divi-sion, headed for a time by Mr. GustavMetzman, then by Col. (later Brig. Gen.)John A. Appleton, and finally by GeneralMcIntyre, represented the Chief of Trans-portation in his endeavor to help the rail-ways meet their equipment and manpowerproblems so that adequate services couldbe maintained. The Highway Division,under the leadership first of Col. FrederickC. Horner and then Col. Lacey V. Mur-row, performed a similar service for thebus operators. The Traffic Control Divi-sion was responsible for arrangements withthe carriers regarding group and individ-ual travel, for instructing transportationofficers in the field concerning their re-sponsibilities and assisting them whennecessary, for the routing of organizedmovements of more than one carload, andfo r controlling special troop movements.Under the Chief of Transportation theday-to-day task of arranging transporta-tion for and supervising the movement ofthe Army's passenger traff ic was chargedto the Traffic Control Division, which washeaded by Mr. (later Brig. Gen.) WilliamJ. Williamson. Under The Quartermaster

10 Memo, CofT for C of Adm Svs SOS,22 Jan 43,OCT 357 New Orleans; Memo, Sp Sv Div for CofT,11 May 43, OCT 5 1 1 ;Memo, Col Edmund C. R.Lasher for Gross, 1 Sep 43; Interv with Col I. SewellMorris, 15 Aug 50 (unless otherwise indicated, all in-terviews were conducted by the author); last two inOCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.

11 See Wardlow, op.cit., p. 348. Memo, CG SOS forCofT, 20 Jan 43, sub: Use of Rail Trans, OCT 511Co-ordination of Troop Mvmts; Memo, CG ASF forDCofS USA, 10 Aug 43; Memo, ACofS G-3 forDCofS, 10 Aug 43; last two in WDCSA 370.5.

12 Memo, ODT to All Government Agencies, 20May 44; WD Memo W 55-44, 27 May 44, sub: Re-duction of Unnecessary Travel; Ltr,SW to Johnson,19 Jul 44; Ltr, Actg SW to Byrnes, 1 Feb 45; Memo,TAG for CG ASF,5 Feb 45, sub:Curta ilment of PassTraf; all in G-4 510.
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ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 15General, who managed Army traffic dur-ing peacetime, this function had been per-formed by the Commercial Traffic Branch,headed by Capt, (later Col.) Edmund C.R. Lasher. When responsibility for trans-portation and traffic was transferred fromThe Quartermaster General to the Chiefof Transportation in March 1942, the per-sonnel of the Commercial Traffic Branchwas also transferred and it became thefoundation on which the Traffic ControlDivision was built. Lasher then becameWilliamson's deputy.13

Working Arrangements With the CarriersThe collaboration of the common car-

riers and the Army was an outstandingexample of team work between privateindustry and government in a nationalemergency. It was especially noteworthybecause, unlike many other industries thatwere wholly or partially withdrawn fromthe civilian field in order that their capac-ity might be devoted to war work, thecarriers continued to meet an expandingcivilian demand while also filling the mili-tary need. The carriers and the Army didnot always see eye to eye in regard to oper-ating and traffic matters, but in the majorendeavormoving troops and militarysupplies swiftly and safely to their destina-tionsthey achieved a high degree ofunderstanding and co-operation.In his negotiations with the carriers onoperating and t raff ic matters the Chief ofTransportation dealt, so far as possible,with agencies representing the respectivebranches of the industry, rather than withthe individual lines. This not only was ad-vantageous from the standpoint of con-ducting negotiations and arriving at uni-form agreements, but it also facilitated thepooling of the equipment of many carriers

to meet the large military requirements.Fortunately the railroads, which carriedthe bulk of the Army's passenger traffic,

were well organized for this purpose. TheAssociation of American Railroads, withheadquarters in Washington, representedlines controlling 97.5 percent of the totalrailroad mileage. Its Car Service Division,with Warren C. Kendall as manager, ex-ercised a broad in f luence over the distri-bution and employment of the passengercars owned by those lines. The MilitaryTransportation Section of the Car ServiceDivision, managed during the greater partof the war by Arthur H. Gass and later byJohn J. Kelly, was designed to deal exclu-sively with the requirements of the armedforces, and during the war it was conven-iently located adjacent to the Traffic Con-trol Division in the Pentagon. In passengertraffic matters the railroads were repre-sented by seven territorial passenger asso-ciations New England, Trunk Line,Central, Southern, Southwestern, Western,and Transcontinentaland by the Inter-territorial Military Committee on whicheach territorial association was repre-sented. This committee, with Hugh W.Siddall as chairman, maintained head-quarters in Chicago and was the channelthrough which most rate and traffic mat-ters were handled between the Army andthe railroads.14The common carriers by bus were notas fully or effectively organized as the rail-roads since they constituted a much newerbranch of the transportation industry andmany small operators were concernedonly with local business. The National

13 Williamson had been general traffic manager ofa large mail-order house and was one of a number ofcivilian experts who were brought into the TC organ-ization to give it the benefit of their experience withtransportation and traffic.14 Wardlow, op. cit.,pp. 312-14.


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16 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPSAssociation of Motor Bus Operators, withheadquarters in Washington, and the Na-tional Bus Traffic Association and NationalBus Military Bureau, located in Chicago,were convenient channels through whichthe Army could negotiate with the opera-tors, but their memberships were limitedand they were much less influential thanthe corresponding organizations in therail field. The use of the commercial air-lines for military passenger traffic wassmall enough that no special organizationsto deal with such traffic were needed.15

The working arrangements regardingt raff ic by rail were incorporated in twobasic agreements that were negotiatedannually between the territorial passengerassociations and the armed forces. TheJoint Military Passenger Agreement wasthe more comprehensive. In addition tofare reductions (called allowances in theagreement), it covered arrangementsrelating to special cars and special trains,the transportation of military baggageand impedimenta, the transportation ofthe bodies of deceased military personnel,the use of baggage cars as kitchen cars fortroop trains, and the routing of traffic.The Joint Military Passenger Equaliza-tion Agreement, which was effective con-currently with the Joint Military Passen-ger Agreement and considered a part ofit, committed carriers that were not re-quired by law to allow 50 percent land-grant deductions from commercial fares infavor of military passengers to allow equaldeductions on corresponding routes, withspecified exceptions.16 The so-called land-grant rates, a much controverted subject,had their origin in the Land Grant Actsby which federal lands were ceded to therailroads during their developmentalperiod. The allowances other than land-

grant deductions, applicable to both land-grant and non-land-grant routes, weremade by the carriers under Section 22 ofthe Interstate Commerce Act. A fewcoastwise steamship lines with which therailroads had through-booking arrange-ments were parties to both agreements.The Joint Military Passenger Agree-ment included separate fare provisions formilitary traffic and nonmilitary traffic.Military traffic embraced chiefly commis-sioned officers, warrant officers, nurses,and enlisted personnel of the U.S. armedforces on active duty, and the allowanceon such traffic was 5 percent from thecommercial one-way fares for all classes oftravel between points between which noland-grant deductions were applicable,and 3 percent from the one-way net fareson routes that were subject to land-grantdeductions. Nonmili tary traffic includedseveral categories of persons who were noton active military duty but whose trans-portation was paid entirely by the U.S.armed forces, and the allowance on suchtraffic was 5 percent from one-way com-mercial fares in all classes.The several classes of transportationaffected by the fare reductions accordedby the Joint Military Passenger Agree-ment were designated first class (standardsleeper and parlor car), intermediate class(tourist sleeper), coach class, and mixedclass (combination of coach and sleeper).Since the Army's policy was to accomplishovernight troop movements in touristsleepers rather than in standard sleepers,

15 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 102, 197, 203, 265.16 The last agreements during the war were JMPA22 an d JMPEA 22, both effective 1 July 1945. For thehistorical background of these agreements, see Com-ments Prepared by Representatives of the War De-partment, Navy Department, and Marine Corps,October 15, 1930, on Senate Bill 4447, 71st Cong., 1stSess., OCT HB Topic Mil Pass Agreements.


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ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 17it benefited from the railroads' agreementto accept intermediate-class fares on manyroutes west of the Mississippi on whichsuch fares were not ordinarily available.The railroads did not accept the interme-diate-class fares east of the Mississippi, butcollected the first-class fare for all troopsmoved in sleepers, standard or tourist,subject of course to the agreed allow-ances.17

One of the advantages that the rail-roads gained under the Joint MilitaryPassenger Agreement was the privilege ofsuggesting the routes on which the trafficof the armed forces should move. Thisenabled them to distribute the traffic on abasis that the carriers accepted as equit-able. The Joint Military Passenger Equal-ization Agreement enabled the territorialpassenger associations, which were respon-sible for the satisfactory distribution ofsuch traffic, to perform that functionwithout the complications that wouldhave arisen if it had been necessary totake land-grant and non-land-grant faresinto consideration in working out eachrouting. The equalization agreement alsoeliminated the necessity of routing trafficon circuitous land-grant routes in order tomeet the government's insistence on thelowest net fare, and in that respect wasadvantageous to both the carriers and thearmed forces. To the carriers the routingprivilege was an essential feature of theagreement, and they sometimes referredto it as the justification for the fare allow-ances that they made. The armed forces,however, had the right under the agree-ments to reject a suggested routing whenit appeared to be unduly circuitous orotherwise disadvantageous from a militarystandpoint.18Another important feature of the JointMilitary Passenger Agreement from the

standpoint of the railroads was the clausethat defined the conditions under whichthe armed forces might use carriers otherthan those parties to the agreement. Inpeacetime and for a period after theUnited States began to rearm, this clausecommitted the armed forces to using theservices of the railway and coastwisesteamship lines for all movements exceptwhen those services were "inadequate tomeet the military necessity of the Govern-ment." As long as this clause was in effect,the possibility of moving troops by com--mercial bus or air lines was exceedinglylimited. Effective 1July 1941, the clausewas modified to permit the armed forcesto use motor and air carriers wheneverthey were able, in the judgment of theofficers arranging the transportation, toprovide "more satisfactory service to meetthe military requirements of the Govern-ment." But even under the modified clausethe railroads were in a preferred positionwith respect to military traffic.19Fare concessions were the key feature ofthe Joint Military Passenger Agreementfrom the Army's standpoint. The Armystarted negotiations for "greater conces-sions from the railroads soon after theemergency began. Whereas the railroadsalways had contended that the routingprivilege was the feature that justified fareconcessions beyond the land-grant deduc-tions, the Army traditionally had stressedthe volume and character of its traffic asthe justification for such concessions.

At a conference in December 1940,when the renewal of the agreement for the17 OCT HB Monograph 21, p. 27; WD CTB 6, 27Jun 44, pars. 3, 4, 5, 6; JMPA 22, Sec.7(4).18 JMPA 22,Sec.27.19 JMPA 17,effective 1 Jul 40, Sec. 6, par. 3;JMPA18, 1 Jul 41, corresponding par. See OCT HB Mono-graph 6, pp. 183-93, for circumstances leading to thischange.


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18 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPSnext fiscal year was being discussed, theArmy representative requested an increasein the allowance on fares affected by land-grant deductions from 3 to 12 percent,and on other fares from 5 to 15 percent.The Army's arguments were that militarytraffic had increased many times since thebeginning of the emergency, that thistraffic came to the railroads without theusual expense of solicitation, and thattroop movements permitted the use ofrailway cars with an intensity that wasnot possible in regular traffic. The carriersdid not accede to this request. They con-tended that, while troop traffic permittedthem some economies, it also entailedspecial arrangements and extraordinaryexpenses.20The Chief of Transportation continuedthe effort to obtain greater fare allowancesfrom the railroads to the end of the war,but without success. The last move in thatdirectionmade in September 1945was aimed at the situation east of theMississippi, where the railroads collectedfirst-class fares for troops moving in eithertourist or standard sleepers and whereland-grant deductions were applicable toonly a limited number of lines. GeneralGross argued that the railroads shouldnot get a greater revenue from a sleepercarrying soldiers than from one carryingcivilians. He pointed out that, althoughthe Army placed 40 to 50 percent morepassengers in a car than was possible withcivilian traffic, the reduction allowed tothe Army under the Joint Military Pas-senger Agreement was only 5 percent.He accordingly instructed General Wil-liamson to undertake a renegotiation offares on the basis of that principle.21 Wil-liamson left the Army during the follow-ing month, and Gross retired at the end ofNovember 1945, up to which time the fare

allowances under the Joint Military Pas-senger Agreement remained unchanged.Before the end of 1945 Congress took ac-tion to abolish land-grant deductions, andan entirely new military rate agreementthen had to be negotiated.

The abolition of land-grant rates cameas the culmination of a struggle in whichthe War Department and the railroadswere on opposite sides. The carriers longhad contended that the government'sgrants of land to western and southernlines in the third quarter of the nineteenthcentury to encourage the extension of railfacilities and the settlement of new terri-tories no longer justified the deduction of50 percent from normal charges whengovernment passengers and freight werehauled.22 The War Department wasreluctant to assume the added transporta-tion expense that the discontinuance ofthe deductions would entail.23 This atti-tude was reflected in the TransportationAct of 1940, which abolished land-grantdeductions for other types of governmenttraffic but retained them for "military ornaval property of the United States mov-ing for military or naval and not for civiluse," and for "members of the military ornaval forces . . . traveling on officialduty." 24

The question of total abolition of land-grant rates again came before Congressduring the war, and again the War De-partment opposed such action. It cited20 OCT HB Monographs 6, pp. 204-07; and 21, pp.28-31.21 Memo, CofT for Williamson, 5 Sep 45, sub: Pas-senger Rates for Mil Travel, OCT HB Gross Day File.22 For the railroads' position, see Robert S. Henry,"The Railroad Land Grant Legend in American His-tory Texts," Mississippi Valley Historical Review,

XXXII, September 1945, pp. 177-94.23 Ltr, Actg SW to Chm House Com on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 11 Jun 38, G-4/24801-2.24 PL 785, 76th Cong., Title III, Pt. II, Sec. 321 (a).


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ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 19the favorable financial position of the car-riers resulting from the heavy wartimetraffic, as well as the huge additional costto the Army, which the Chief of Trans-portation estimated would be about$200,000,000 on passenger and freighttraffic during a war year. The War De-partment, however, indicated that "atanother time and under other conditions"a different situation might obtain, andwhen the question came to a decision soonafter the end of hostilities the departmentacquiesced.25 The abolition of land-grantrates, effective 1 October 1946, consider-ably simplified the arrangements betweenthe armed forces and the railroads regard-ing transportation charges, and in theJoint Military Passenger Agreement thatbecame effective concurrently with thenew law, the fare reduction allowed to thearmed forces was 10 percent f rom com-mercial fares in all classes.26Although the armed forces did not ob-tain greater percentage allowances onrailroad passenger fares during the war,they were successful in adding to the cate-gories of passengers eligible for the allow-ances.27 The scope of the term "militarytraffic" was broadened to include enlistedreservists recalled to active duty, certainfemale personnel of the Medical Depart-ment of the Army, and members of theWomen's Army Corps. The coverage ofthe term "nonmilitary traffic" was ex-tended to include (when traveling ontransportation requests of the armedforces) retired and discharged militarypersonnel returning to their homes, per-sonnel of the American Red Cross, officersof the Army Specialist Corps, studentnurses (civilians), military personnel ofnations receiving aid under the Lend-Lease Act, and alien enemies, prisoners ofwar, and other interned persons.28

The allowances granted under theJoint Military Passenger Agreement ap-plied only to railroad fares, not to spacerates in Pullman cars. The Pullman Com-pany was not a party to this agreementbut separately made certain concessionsto the armed forces. It agreed to providestandard sleepers fo r group movements ofenlisted men when no tourist sleeperswere available and to accept touristsleeper berth rates in such cases. It per-mitted tourist sleepers to operate andtourist berth rates to apply in the easternand southeastern territories, even thoughthere were no regular tourist sleeper serv-ices in those territorities. The PullmanCompany permitted the drawing roomsof tourist sleepers to be occupied at theregular berth rates when the cars werebeing used for military movements. It alsoaccepted the berth rate for the shortestroute between two points when troopswere routed over a longer route under theJoint Military Passenger EqualizationAgreement.29Since the Army aimed to move troopsby special trains whenever practicable,the conditions under which such arrange-

25 Ltrs, SW to Chm House Com on Interstate andForeign Commerce and Chm Senate Com on Inter-state Commerce, 6 Apr 44, AG 500 (6-2-37)(1) Transby Rail; Memo, CofT for USW, 2 Aug 44, OCT HBGross Day File; Senate Com on Interstate Commerceand House Com on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,Hearings on HR 4184, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., March16-23, 1944; Ltr, SW to Chm Senate Com on Inter-state Commerce, 3 Jul 45; Ltr, SW to Dir Bur ofBudget, 6 Dec 45; last two in AG 500 (26 Mar 45)(1);PL 256,79th Cong., approved 12 Dec 45.

26 JMPA 23, 1 Oct 46, Sec. 6(1).27 OCT HB Monographs 6, p. 206; and 21, pp. 3-5.The voluminous correspondence regarding changes inJMPA is filed in OCT 551.1 JMPA.28 JMPA 22,Secs. 3, 4.29 OCT HB Monograph 21, p. 27; Ltr, DC of TrafContl Div OCT to Pullman Co., 26 Jul 45, and reply,2 Aug 45, both in OCT 510 Trans of Parties; WDCTB 6, revised 9 Jun 45, Sec. V.


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ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 21sumed the usual liability. When largermovements took place, the baggage wastransported in bulk (unchecked) in un-attended baggage cars, and in such in-stances the carriers objected to assumingfull liability. They proposed that a clausebe inserted in theJoint Military PassengerAgreement limiting their liability to$25.00 per person on unchecked baggage,with a total liability of $2,500 per baggagecar, unless additional liability was as-sumed under an insurance arrangement.The Army refused to accept this tender,and no such limitation on the carriers'liability was included in the wartimeagreements.34

Providing meals for troops traveling byrail gave rise to a number of problemsafter heavy movements began. The firstproblem involved the question whethertroops using regular trains should be pro-vided with cash or with tickets to covertheir meals when rations in kind (foodboxes) were not furnished. Both the car-riers and the Traffic Control Division inWashington favored the use of tickets,since troops often spent the subsistenceallowance in other ways and the railroadsfound that they had provided food forcustomers that did not appear. The WarDepartment, while directing that tickets"ordinarily" would be used, neverthelessleft it to the officer ordering each move-ment to determine whether tickets or cashshould be provided, on the ground thatthere were occasions when it was inadvis-able or impracticable to use meal tickets.35This meant that there was lack of uni-formity in regard to movements originat-ing with field installations, and the im-practical method of giving troops a cashallowance to cover meals en route con-tinued in use.

A more serious problem involved thedecision whether troops would use theregular dining car service or would be fedfrom troop kitchen cars attached to regu-lar trains. Although the subsistence oftroops was a Quartermaster function andthe subject was covered in the Quarter-master series of War Department regula-tions, the Chief of Transportation took anactive interest because of the bearing thatthe question had on troop morale anddiscipline. In the early part of the warwhen the decision whether or not toattach troop kitchen cars to trains wasleft to the commanding officers of the in-stallations originating the movements, itoften happened that provision was notmade for kitchen cars when large num-bers of troops were moving and that theregular dining cars were unable to accom-modate both civilians and soldiers. Undersuch circumstances there was likely to bea disorderly scramble for food at each stopalong the route. The regulation accord-ingly was changed so that kitchen carswere required for all movements of 100 ormore military personnel involving a jour-ney of twenty-four hours or more duration.They might be used for movements ofsmaller size or shorter duration if the rail-roads could provide them.36

At the outset the Army had no specialkitchen cars. The railroads thereforeagreed to furnish without charge, for each250 troops or fraction thereof (but not forless than 100), an empty baggage car inwhich the Army could install kitchenequipment. The early practice was to re-

34 OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 92-93; JMPA 22,Sec. 23.35 WD Cir 209, 6 Oct 41; AR 3 0 - 2 2 1 5 , 1 Feb 44,

par. 2; OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 256-68.36 AR 30-2215 , 14 Jun 43, par. 2; AR 30-2215 , 1Feb 44, par.2, and Changes 2, 27 Jul 45; OCT HBMonograph 21, pp. 81-83.


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22 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPSmove the kitchen equipment at the endof each trip and ship it back to the stationof origin and to return the car to the rail-road. When troop movements becamea constant operation, the installation andremoval of kitchen equipment was foundto be both time-consuming and costly,and the wear and tear on the cars wasconsiderable. The establishment of a per-manent pool of converted baggage carswas then proposed, but the need forcars in regular baggage service placedlimits on the execution of the plan . Thesituation was relieved when the govern-ment began to acquire special troop kitch-en cars. Nevertheless, baggage cars wereneeded for kitchen purposes to the end ofthe war,and the somewhat complicatedarrangements concerning their employ-ment were detailed in the Joint MilitaryPassenger Agreement.37

Special arrangements were necessary inconnection with the operation of the gov-ernment-owned troop sleepers and troopkitchen cars that began to enter servicelate in 1943. The first order for 1,200troop sleepers and 400 troop kitchen carswas placed by the Defense Plant Corpora-tion in March 1943, and a duplicate orderwas placed in May 1945.38 The troopsleepers provided berths for thirty persons,in ten tiers of three berths each, arrangedcrosswise. Although the cars were of sim-plified design and the facilities were utili-tarian, the troop sleepers were adequateand they were far preferable to coachesfo r overnight travel. The troop kitchencars also were of simplified design, butthey were well equipped and were a greatimprovement over converted baggagecars. The underlying purpose in the con-struction of both types of cars was to pro-vide additional troop train equipment

with a minimum expenditure of scarcematerials and production time.39The operating arrangements pertainingto these government-owned cars were cov-ered by interlocking contracts betweenthe Defense Plant Corporation and thePullman Company, and between the As-sociation of American Railroads and thePullman Company.40 Briefly stated, thearrangements were as follows: The rail-roads paid a mileage rate and the Pull-man Company paid a rental fee to theDefense Plant Corporation for the use ofthe cars. The Pullman Company operatedand maintained the troop sleepers inmuch the same manner as it operated andmaintained its owned equipment. ThePullman Company assigned the troopkitchen cars to service in accordance withthe needs of the armed forces, and was re-sponsible for their maintenance as rail-road equipment at the expense of theDefense Plant Corporation; the armedforces provided and maintained the kitch-en equipment, provided the kitchen sup-plies and mess crews, and were responsiblefor interior cleaning.The principal traff ic arrangementsbetween the armed forces and the carriersregarding the use of troop sleepers andtroop kitchen cars were included in a spe-

37 WD Cir 181, 27 Aug 41, Sec. III; AR 55-135, 31Aug 42, par. 2;JMPA 22, 1 Jul 45, Sec. 24; OCT HBMonograph 21, pp. 51-58.38 Circumstances leading to the placement of theseorders are discussed in Wardlow, op.cit.,pp. 333-34.

39 These special sleepers and kitchen cars were ofall-steel construction, 54 feet-2 inches long over thebumpers, and had no vestibules. They had two4-wheel high-speed trucks and were equipped foroperation in regular passenger train service. For fur-ther technical details, see file OCT HB Rail DivTroop Sleepers and Kitchen Cars.40 Both contracts were published in a pamphlet,Special Troop Car Contracts, OCT HB Rail DivTroop Sleepers and Kitchen Cars.


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ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 23

SPECIALLY DESIGNED GOVERNMENT-OWNED TROOP SLEEPERS andtroop kitchen cars en route to a port.

cial agreement published each year inconnection with the Joint Military Passen-ger Agreement but not as a part of it .41For transportation in troop sleepers thearmed forces paid the railroads fares equalto two thirds of the normal one-way first-class fares, except that when such fareswere greater than the net military faresunder JMPA the lesser fares were appli-cable.42 For Pullman service the armedforces paid the Pullman Company a troopsleeper berth rate equal to one third of thesum of the lower and upper berth ratesapplicable to tourist sleeping cars. Theagreement provided that the PullmanCompany would assign troop sleepers onlywhen tourist sleepers were not available,

but because of the urgent need both typeswere continuously in use.To cover the movement of kitchen cars,the armed forces paid the carriers (rail-roads and Pullman Company) a rate ofsix cents a mile regardless of whether thecars were moving in service or out of serv-ice. In addition, members of the militarymess crews of kitchen cars paid faresaccording to the class of the cars in whichthey had passenger accommodations. Re-quests for the assignment of kitchen cars

41 Joint Agreement T 3, 14 Apr 45, published withJMPA 22, embraced changes to date in original agree-ment of 11 March 1943.42 Troop sleeper railroad fares were applicablethroughout the country, although tourist (intermedi-

ate) fares applied only west of the Mississippi.


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24 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPSwere made to the Pullman Company bythe several armed services when theyarranged for coaches or sleepers to movetheir troops. An Army officer was detailedto the Pullman Company headquarters inChicago to co-ordinate these requests andeliminate unnecessary deadhead mileage.By agreement among the armed services adeadhead movement of a kitchen car wascharged to the service for which the lastin-service movement of the car was made.43

During

Transportation Corps Movements Training and Supply

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