Transforming the Housing Choice Voucher System in CaliforniaA Path to Universal Housing?

Ryan K. McBain, Jason M. Ward, Sarah B. Hunter

C O R P O R A T I O N

PerspectiveEXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE

September 2021

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Contents

What Are Vouchers? ..................................................................................................1Benefits .....................................................................................................................................1Limitations ...............................................................................................................................1

A Voucher Shortfall: The Status Quo .......................................................................2California ..................................................................................................................................2Los Angeles County .............................................................................................................2

How to Transform the Housing Voucher System in California ..............................3Path 1 .........................................................................................................................................3Path 2 ........................................................................................................................................3 Path 3 ....................................................................................................................................... 4

Vouchers: Critiques and Relevant Context and Evidence .....................................6Path 1 .........................................................................................................................................6Path 2 ........................................................................................................................................7Path 3 ........................................................................................................................................8

Where to Start ...........................................................................................................9Recommendation 1 ...............................................................................................................9Recommendation 2 ..............................................................................................................9Recommendation 3 ............................................................................................................ 10

Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... 10

Notes ........................................................................................................................ 12

Benefits1. Vouchers support individuals with incomes

below the federal poverty line or at 30 percent of the median local income—i.e., individuals at the greatest risk of experiencing homelessness. Vouchers significantly reduce homelessness— by as much as 80 percent.4

2. Vouchers contribute directly to poverty reduc-tion. Researchers have estimated that a univer-sal voucher system would reduce the national poverty rate by nearly 25 percent.5

3. Vouchers cost the government less than other types of housing assistance, in part because recipients rent existing housing rather than require the construction of new housing.6 Administrative costs are approximately 10 per-cent of the total monthly rental unit costs.7

4. Vouchers are difficult to abuse. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and local agencies have strong income-verification requirements. Payment errors account for less than 0.5 percent of program costs.8

5. Vouchers respect recipient choice. Recipients of vouchers select housing from the private market that is most suitable to their needs and interests.

6. When paired with other supportive programs, vouchers can create opportunities for families to move to lower-poverty, higher-opportunity neighborhoods.9 Vouchers also enable over 1 million elderly and disabled individuals to live independently.10

Limitations 1. Vouchers are demand-side financial incentives.

Vouchers do not directly address the supply shortage of affordable housing present in many parts of the United States.11

2. Vouchers are a direct response to individuals’ housing needs. On their own, vouchers do not address underlying social determinants that could contribute to individuals’ housing needs.12

3. Most households that are eligible to receive a voucher do not receive one. In many settings, vouchers are awarded by lottery to qualifying individuals on long waitlists.13

What Are Vouchers?Vouchers are rental subsidies available to individuals of low-income households.1 Functionally, vouchers reduce the cost of rent so that housing becomes affordable for individuals who otherwise could not pay market price. In the tenant-based housing choice voucher (HCV) program, which is the largest single form of federal housing assistance, recipients of vouchers are free to choose any housing that meets the program’s price cap and other requirements, as long as the landlord accepts vouchers.2 Vouchers represent one of several available tools to meet individuals’ housing needs in the United States.

In this Perspective, we review the impact of the HCV program, explain shortcomings of today’s voucher system, and examine the potential effects of a reformed voucher system to stabilize access to housing for the most- vulnerable Californians. Past research has shown that stable housing is associated with health, educational and vocational benefits, and reduced criminal justice involvement.3

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Los Angeles County• The population of individuals experiencing

homelessness in Los Angeles (LA) County is larger than in any other U.S. county. As of 2020, an estimated 66,436 people experienced homelessness—up 13 percent from 2019.17

• Over 500,000 renter households in LA County spend over 50 percent of their incomes on rent.18

• Demand for vouchers far exceeds supply. When the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) reopened the voucher waiting list for new applications in 2017, almost 200,000 households submitted applications for 20,000 available slots. For context, HACLA has about 50,000 vouchers, and only 2,400 of these vouchers become available in a typical year19—although the American Rescue Plan of 202120 has temporarily expanded the number of available vouchers.21

• The imbalance of housing supply and demand, as estimated by a 2019 McKinsey Global Institute report, results in $32 billion to $36 billion in lost economic output each year.22

A Voucher Shortfall: The Status Quo

California• Over 600,000 people in 300,000 households are

currently leasing properties through the HCV program in California. The HCV program represents the largest single form of federal housing assistance in the state.14

• About one in four low-income households receives housing assistance.15 The remaining eligible individuals are left out of the system because congressional appropriations are insufficient to cover them.16

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How to Transform the Housing Voucher System in CaliforniaWe outline three potential pathways to transform the housing voucher system in California. If implemented, these pathways have the potential to significantly reduce homelessness across the state.

PATH 1

Adopt a universal housing voucher system—so that everyone who qualifies for a voucher receives one Federal programs that provide food assistance and health care—such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), and Medicaid—are available to anyone who meets eligibility criteria: They are entitlements.23 Not so for housing assis-tance. The federal government could provide funding to ensure that all income-eligible renters receive assistance. How much would that cost? A recent estimate is $62 bil-lion to $100 billion per year.24 When compared with the $24 billion allocated for tenant-based rental assistance in 2020, this suggests that the cost for a universal HCV system would entail a three- to fourfold increase in spending if other housing assistance programs were held at their current funding levels.25

While large, this figure is half the cost of the affordable housing infrastructure expenditure proposed in the American Jobs Plan, though a universal HCV system would represent a recurrent—rather than one-time—cost.26 This expansion would represent money transferred directly from public housing authorities (PHAs) to landlords, ensuring that landlords are paid on a timely basis, that mortgages can be paid down, and that housing infrastructure can be repaired. In California, specifically, the cost to provide vouchers to every-one who qualifies—3.5 million people in 1.2 million households—would be roughly $14.5 billion per year.27

PATH 2

Enhance the voucher system—so that housing leads to opportunityInnovative experiments have shown that enhance-ments to housing voucher systems can improve health, social, and economic well-being outcomes for voucher recipients. For example, a large randomized controlled trial in Seattle found that search assistance, landlord engagement, and short-term financial assistance tripled the number of families that relocated to high upward-mobility neighborhoods and that the $2,600 per family cost of these system features was only 2.2 percent of the lifetime cost of a voucher28—though this was not inclusive of increased housing assistance payments (an additional $234 per month over the lifetime of the voucher).29 Whether these added components to the HCV program would successfully translate in cities such as LA and San Diego remains an open question, though preliminary studies offer positive findings.30

In another example, the adjustment of rental sub-sidies based on zip code–level market rates—known as the small area fair market rents (SAFMRs)

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program—has improved location outcomes for Black and Hispanic voucher-eligible households.31 Depending on the setting and payment standard set by PHAs, SAFMRs also have the potential to lower costs or be cost neutral. The final HUD evaluation of the SAFMR program found that subsidy reductions from SAFMRs in low-rent neighborhoods exceeded increases in high-rent neighborhoods.32 This same report also observed modest increases in administrative costs to implement SAFMRs—such as training staff and setting payment standards, quantified as up to several weeks of staff time and several thousand dollars in expenditures.33 Whether specific PHAs have the resources to assume these costs might vary throughout California.

In short, if the HCV program were expanded throughout California, experiments could identify ways to strengthen the program and help improve the lives of voucher recipients. These experiments could be comple-mented with place-based investments to create more high-opportunity areas over time or expand housing supply within existing high-opportunity areas.34

PATH 3

Enforce and encourage landlord participation— so that vouchers are as good as cashMany landlords discriminate against voucher holders because of their negative perceptions of such tenants, the stigma associated with voucher program participation, and concerns about PHAs’ bureaucratic requirements.35 One secret-shopper survey found that more than three-quarters (76 percent) of landlords in LA County refused to rent to voucher holders.36 By contrast, in Washington D.C., where a source-of-income law was in place at the time of the survey, only 15 percent of landlords refused to rent to voucher holders.37

There is a two-step solution to overcome landlord hesitancy. First, stringently enforce recently ratified source-of-income laws in California that compel land-

lords to accept housing vouchers.38 Three mechanisms are available to achieve this: (1) the expansion of fair-housing enforcement budgets to directly investigate landlord practices,39 including through HUD’s Fair Housing Organization Initiative (FHOI) program grants;40 (2) lawsuits brought by district attorneys, attorneys general, and housing rights advocacy groups against landlords with large real estate holdings for voucher discrimination;41 and (3) database track-ing of landlord applicant and tenant lists to identify anomalies.

Second, work with landlord associations in California to understand and alleviate landlords’ con-cerns. This path has been taken, successfully, in several initiatives42—suggesting that a formal structure for dia-logue could prove fruitful. Congress’s mandated expan-sion of the Moving to Work demonstration program is another example of a successful initiative in which PHAs are experimenting with landlord incentives to boost participation in the HCV program.43

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Vouchers: Critiques and Relevant Context and EvidencePATH 1

Adopt a universal housing voucher systemCritique 1.AHousing assistance leads to long-term dependence. One recent article claimed that holders of vouchers have received assistance for an average of 9.1 years.44 The broader literature on this subject also includes concerns about dependence on housing subsidies lead-ing to a reduction in employment rates, work hours, and earnings.45

Evidence 1.AThis average of 9.1 years obscures a distinction between voucher recipients who are elderly or disabled and those who are not disabled or retired.46 It also conflates cur-rent tenure among existing voucher recipients with the average duration of assistance. Among working-age, nondisabled individuals, the median duration of a housing subsidy is only 2.8 years in the United States.47 Additionally, the literature examining the effect of housing subsidies on recipients’ employment, work hours, or earnings is mixed—with multiple studies finding no significant relationships.48 Recent research also finds that HUD housing assistance is associated with improved access to health care.49

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Critique 1.BA universal housing voucher system would drive up prices in the overall housing rental market—particularly if housing supply remains static.50

Evidence 1.BEvidence of driving up prices in the overall housing rental market has been mixed, as indicated in a 2020 literature review.51 In parts of the country with tight housing markets, such as LA, a large influx of vouch-ers would likely increase rental market prices at the lower end of market—although an expansion of this scale has no precedent.52 By contrast, in parts of the country with less tight housing markets, a large influx of vouchers might have a negligible effect or even lower rental market prices. To ensure that a universal voucher system does not generate significant price inflation, equal attention could be paid to increasing the local housing supply while phasing in voucher expansion.

Increased rental market prices could potentially be curbed by an increase in the stock of affordable housing, which could occur through a subset of the broader housing provisions in the American Jobs Plan as originally proposed, although it has not passed in the House of Representatives, and—as of this writing—the proposal is subject to potential change through ongo-ing congressional negotiations. Affordable housing stock also might be increased through the repeal of exclusionary and restrictive zoning laws.53 Two 2019 working papers describe how increasing the housing supply affects prices and residential mobility among individuals of lower-income households.54 An article from that same year provides a broader overview of the debate concerning the relationship between housing supply and prices.55

Critique 1.CMaking housing a right would place too large a strain on the federal budget.

Evidence 1.CAn annual, recurrent expenditure of $62 billion to $100 billion per year is not a trivial amount. However, according to the Congressional Budget Office’s report of the 2020 federal budget, this would represent 1.5 percent of the U.S. $6.6 trillion annual outlay for housing.56

Whether the magnitude of this expenditure is war-ranted and appropriate is a normative question upon which individuals may disagree. Ultimately, though, there is also a cost of inaction: leaving hundreds of thousands of individuals homeless, which creates its own set of societal costs.57

PATH 2

Enhance the voucher system Critique 2.AEnhancements to the HCV system would be costly, and the benefits are unclear.

Evidence 2.AIn scenarios like the Seattle experiment, benefits have been well documented—including the potential for long-term changes in earnings.58 Likewise, the intro-duction of the SAFMR program principally modi-

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fied the algorithm for assessing the fair market value of rents—which has the potential to lead to higher voucher payments in some zip codes and lower voucher payments in other zip codes.59 New experiments on program innovation, such as those underway at HUD,60 could provide additional information about the mag-nitude and scale of the benefits of enhancing the HCV program. The more pilots, the more data from which policymakers can learn and adapt program features.

Critique 2.BThe government should not force people to move out of neighborhoods where their friends and families live simply because they are deemed “low opportunity.”

Evidence 2.BThe goal of tenant-based vouchers is to provide recipi-ents with choice, including the choice to move to areas that might offer a new set of benefits or to stay in their current neighborhood, if that is their preference. These enhancements are intended to provide recipi-ents with options and relevant information to make informed decisions, not to force them to move to one location or another.

PATH 3

Enforce and encourage landlord participationCritique 3.ARenting to voucher recipients is more costly and time-consuming than it is worth for landlords—especially if they can choose tenants without vouchers.61

Evidence 3.AResearch shows that landlords’ perceptions of voucher recipients might be influenced by misinformation and biases that could be mitigated through education and outreach.62 This includes misperceptions about costs. In the context of the HCV program, rent comes from a public agency that ensures timely payment, and rental units with voucher recipients often have lower turnover.63 Both of these benefits lessen landlords’

financial risks in accepting voucher holders as ten-ants. Landlords have also expressed concerns about the opportunity costs incurred as a result of the admin-istrative burden of HCV program participation and delays in leasing. However, PHAs have been experi-menting with reducing administrative burdens, such as annual inspection requirements.64

Critique 3.BVouchers make a community less attractive by bringing in risky tenants. Voucher tenants are more prone to commit crimes and damage property.65

Evidence 3.BOverall, the evidence indicating a relationship between receiving a housing voucher and committing a crime is weak, with mixed findings across studies.66 For exam-ple, a study of over 200 U.S. cities found no indication that subsidized housing contributes to higher crime rates.67 Conversely, housing vouchers give recipients the opportunity to move to safer neighborhoods.68

In addition to providing landlord education to counter negative perceptions of voucher recipients, certain states and PHAs have addressed landlords’ con-cerns head-on. For example, Oregon created a landlord mitigation fund to reimburse landlords for tenant-caused property damage in limited circumstances and appointed an advisory committee to oversee the fund.69 Washington passed a similar landlord mitiga-tion law in 2018.70

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Where to StartRECOMMENDATION 1

As the evidence base on the potential impacts of a uni-versal housing voucher system continues to accrue, this information can be shared with federal policymakers considering legislation.71 The Biden presidential cam-paign stated that a universal housing voucher system was one of its priorities.72 As Congress considers bills to address broad-sweeping societal issues, the magnitude and scope of Americans’ access to affordable housing is likely to be top of mind for the Biden administration.

Policy considerations, such as a phased-in expan-sion of housing vouchers over several years, would also reduce the potential for price distortions in the local housing market. Such incrementalistic strategies have been successful in other contexts, such as the establish-ment of minimum wage laws,73 and the strategies would give the housing market time to adjust supply.

RECOMMENDATION 2

According to the Office of the California State Auditor, the California State Homeless Coordinating and Financial Council (Homeless Council) has made slow progress in implementing a statewide plan to address homelessness.74 Nevertheless, the Homeless Council holds a unique mandate to support homelessness pre-vention throughout the state, and the housing voucher system plays a critical role in this. If the state legislature were to equip the Homeless Council with the relevant mandate, as it did in 2019,75 such a mandate could help state agencies coordinate with PHAs to fund, incentiv-ize, and evaluate programmatic innovations in the HCV program in the 44 local continuum of care sys-tems throughout California.

At the local level, HACLA and the LA County Development Authority could establish a research divi-

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sion or assign personnel responsible to review best practices and evaluate initiatives to strengthen the HCV and other programs—akin to the Performance Management and Analytics Division within New York City’s Housing Authority.76 Funding for this would need to be secured through local, state, or federal chan-nels, such as competitive HUD grants.77 The present federal and state budgets are insufficient to support experiments that could meaningfully improve the HCV program in California. Likewise, the LA Homeless Services Authority’s research and evaluation budget could be supported through the Homeless Council to execute such work. To date, evaluations from efforts such as the LA County Homelessness Initiative have largely been limited to tallying outputs, such as the number of individuals sheltered, rather than assess-ing the causal effects of program innovations.78 More-sophisticated analyses are necessary to identify successes and invest in improvements over time.

RECOMMENDATION 3

States and local jurisdictions could continue to con-sider legislation to curb discriminatory practices among landlords and actively engage with landlords and landlord associations to discuss ways to promote greater landlord participation in the HCV program. Successful models of landlord engagement can be found in the literature79—including in Marin County,

California.80 However, enacting these exemplar models would require PHAs to have sufficient staffing and latitude to execute landlord engagement activities, which would likely entail increased administrative fees for PHAs.81

Attorneys general and district attorneys could also assign members of their offices to identify and prosecute the most-egregious violations, complemented by secret-shopper surveys that identify landlords who are gaming the system.82 To achieve this, fair-housing enforcement budgets could be substantially increased through such mechanisms as HUD’s FHOI program.83

AbbreviationsFHOI Fair Housing Organization Initiative

HACLA Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles

HCV housing choice voucher

HUD U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

LA Los Angeles

PHA public housing authority

SAFMR small area fair market rent

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Notes 1 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet,” webpage, undated.

As of April 1, 2021: https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet2 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet,” webpage, undated.

As of April 1, 2021: https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet3 Lauren Taylor, “Housing and Health: An Overview of the Literature,” Health Affairs, June 7, 2018; Elizabeth J. Mueller

and J. Rosie Tighe, “Making the Case for Affordable Housing: Connecting Housing with Health and Education Outcomes,” Journal of Planning Literature, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2007, pp. 371–385; Andrew Fenelon, Patrick Mayne, Alan E. Simon, Lauren M. Rossen, Veronica Helms, Patricia Lloyd, Jon Sperling, and Barry L. Steffen, “Housing Assistance Programs and Adult Health in the United States,” American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 107, No. 4, 2017, pp. 571–578; Theresa C. Heintze, Lawrence M. Berger, Wendy B. Naidich, and Marcia K. Meyers, “Housing Assistance and Employment: How Far‐Reaching Are the Effects of Rental Subsidies?” Social Service Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, 2006, pp. 635–674; Matthew Desmond and Carl Gershenson, “Housing and Employment Insecurity Among the Working Poor,” Social Problems, Vol. 63, No. 1, February 2016, pp. 46–67; Kimberly Burrowes, “Can Housing Interventions Reduce Incarceration and Recidivism?” Housing Matters, February 27, 2019.

4 Michelle Wood, Jennifer Turnham, and Gregory Mills, “Housing Affordability and Family Well‐Being: Results from the Housing Voucher Evaluation,” Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2008, pp. 367–412; Heather Menzies Munthe-Kaas, Rigmor C. Berg, and Nora Blaasvær, “Effectiveness of Interventions to Reduce Homelessness: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” Campbell Systematic Reviews, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2018, pp. 1–281.

5 Sophie Collyer, Christopher Wimer, Megan Curran, Katherine Friedman, Robert Paul Hartley, David Harris, and Andrew Hinton, Housing Vouchers and Tax Credits: Pairing the Proposal to Transform Section 8 with Expansions to the EITC and the Child Tax Credit Could Cut the National Poverty Rate by Half, Poverty & Social Policy Brief, Vol. 4, No. 9, New York: Columbia University, October 7, 2020.

6 Edgar O. Olsen, “The Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Methods of Delivering Housing Subsidies” working paper, Charlottesville: University of Virginia, October 30, 2009; Daniel Béland, Christopher Howard, and Kimberly J. Morgan, eds., The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Social Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

7 Meryl Finkel, Jennifer Turnham, Larry Buron, Melissa Vandawalker, Bulbul Kaul, Kevin Hathaway, and Chris Kubacki, Housing Choice Voucher Program Administrative Fee Study, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, April 2015.

8 ICF International, FY 2014 Quality Control for Rental Assistance Subsidy Determinations: Final Report, Washington, D.C.: Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, September 25, 2015.

9 Jeffrey Liebman, Jens Ludwig, Lawrence Katz, Raj Chetty, Jeffrey Kling, Lisa Sanbonmatsu, Emma Adam, Greg J. Duncan, Ronald C. Kessler, Lisa A. Gennetian, Stacy Tessler Lindau, Thomas W. McDade, Joshua C. Pinkston, Robert C. Whitaker, Paul Hirschfield, and Nathaniel Hendren, “Evaluating the Impact of Moving to Opportunity in the United States,” Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), undated; Jen Elder and Ben King, “Housing and Homelessness as a Public Health Issue: Executive Summary of Policy Adopted by the American Public Health Association,” Medical Care, Vol. 57, No. 6, June 2019, pp. 401–405.

10 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “Policy Basics: The Housing Choice Voucher Program,” webpage, May 3, 2017, updated April 12, 2021. As of April 1, 2021: https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/ the-housing-choice-voucher-program

11 Oriya Cohen, “The Role of Housing Choice Vouchers in Addressing America’s Rental Housing Crisis,” Housing Matters, April 7, 2020.

12 Rebecca Gale, “Housing Mobility Programs and Health Outcomes,” Health Affairs, June 7, 2018. 13 King County Housing Authority (Washington), “Section 8 Waiting List & Lottery,” webpage, undated. As of June 29,

2021: https://www.kcha.org/housing/vouchers/list?s=fb14 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) Data Dashboard,” webpage,

undated. As of April 23, 2021: https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/dashboard

15 G. Thomas Kingsley, Trends in Housing Problems and Federal Housing Assistance, Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, October 2017; Marcia Fernald, ed., The State of the Nation’s Housing 2020, Cambridge, Mass.: Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, 2020; Douglas Rice, Ehren Dohler, and Alicia Mazzara, How Housing

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Vouchers Can Help Address California’s Rental Crisis, Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, updated February 12, 2016.

16 Matthew Yglesias, “Joe Biden’s Surprisingly Visionary Housing Plan, Explained,” Vox, July 9, 2020. As of April 1, 2021: https://www.vox.com/2020/7/9/21316912/joe-biden-housing-plan-section-8

17 Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority, “2020 Greater Los Angeles Homeless Count Results,” webpage, June 12, 2020. As of April 7, 2021: https://www.lahsa.org/news?article=726-2020-greater-los-angeles-homeless-count-results

18 Office of Policy Development and Research, “Consolidated Planning/CHAS Data,” webpage, undated. As of April 9, 2021: https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/cp.html

19 Doug Smith, “Up to 600,000 Expected to Apply When L.A. Reopens Section 8 Housing List This Month After 13 Years,” Los Angeles Times, October 1, 2017; Affordable Housing Online, “Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles,” webpage, undated. As of April 7, 2021: https://affordablehousingonline.com/housing-authority/California/Housing-Authority-of-the-City-of-Los-Angeles/CA004; Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, “HACLA’s Section 8 Waiting List Lottery Application Period Now Closed,” news release, October 31, 2017. As of April 23, 2021: http://home.hacla.org/News-Notifications/ArticleID/132/HACLAs-Section-8-Waiting-List- Lottery-Application-Period-Now-Closed

20 Public Law 117-2, American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, March 11, 2021.21 Steven Sharp, “State and Federal Relief Packages Could Help L.A. Renters,” Urbanize Los Angeles, May 11, 2021. As of

May 26, 2021: https://urbanize.city/la/post/federal-relief-bill-la-county-rental-assistance-coronavirus22 Jonathan Woetzel, Tim Ward, Shannon Peloquin, Steve Kling, and Sucheta Arora, Affordable Housing in Los Angeles:

Delivering More—and Doing It Faster, Washington, D.C.: McKinsey Global Institute, November 2019.23 Medicaid.gov, “Benefits,” webpage, undated. As of April 9, 2021: https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/benefits/

index.html; Benefits.gov, “Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC),” webpage, undated. As of April 9, 2021: https://www.benefits.gov/benefit/368

24 Mary K. Cunningham, “It’s Time to Reinforce the Housing Safety Net by Adopting Universal Vouchers for Low-Income Renters,” Urban Wire, April 7, 2020.

25 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fiscal Year 2021 Budget in Brief, Washington, D.C., undated. As of May 13, 2021: https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/BudgetinBrief_2020-02_06_Online.pdf

26 White House, “Fact Sheet: The American Jobs Plan,” March 31, 2021. As of August 13, 2021: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/

27 Mary K. Cunningham, “It’s Time to Reinforce the Housing Safety Net by Adopting Universal Vouchers for Low-Income Renters,” Urban Wire, April 7, 2020.

28 Kriston Capps, “How a Section 8 Experiment Could Reveal a Better Way to Escape Poverty,” Bloomberg CityLab, August 4, 2019; Peter Bergman, Raj Chetty, Stefanie DeLuca, Nathaniel Hendren, Lawrence F. Katz, and Christopher Palmer, “Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers to Neighborhood Choice,” Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 26164, March 2020.

29 Peter Bergman, Raj Chetty, Stefanie DeLuca, Nathaniel Hendren, Lawrence F. Katz, and Christopher Palmer, “Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers to Neighborhood Choice,” Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 26164, March 2020.

30 Jeffrey Liebman, Jens Ludwig, Lawrence Katz, Raj Chetty, Jeffrey Kling, Lisa Sanbonmatsu, Emma Adam, Greg J. Duncan, Ronald C. Kessler, Lisa A. Gennetian, Stacy Tessler Lindau, Thomas W. McDade, Joshua C. Pinkston, Robert C. Whitaker, Paul Hirschfield, and Nathaniel Hendren, “Evaluating the Impact of Moving to Opportunity in the United States,” Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), undated; Maria Hanratty, Sara McLanahan, and Becky Pettit, The Impact of the Los Angeles Moving Opportunity Program on Residential Mobility, Neighborhood Characteristics, and Early Child and Parent Outcomes, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, April 1998.

31 Vincent J. Reina, “Do Small Area Fair Market Rents Reduce Racial Disparities in the Voucher Program?” Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 29, No. 5, 2019, pp. 820–834.

32 Samuel Dastrup, Meryl Finkel, Kimberly Burnett, and Tanya de Sousa, Small Area Fair Market Rent Demonstration Evaluation: Final Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, August 2018.

33 Samuel Dastrup, Meryl Finkel, Kimberly Burnett, and Tanya de Sousa, Small Area Fair Market Rent Demonstration Evaluation: Final Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, August 2018.

34 Jeff Chapman and Josh Goodman, How States Can Direct Economic Development to Places and People in Need, Washington, D.C.: Pew Charitable Trusts, February 2021.

35 Phillip M. E. Garboden, Eva Rosen, Stefanie DeLuca, and Kathryn Edin, “Taking Stock: What Drives Landlord Participation in the Housing Choice Voucher Program,” Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 28, No. 6, 2018, pp. 979–1003.

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36 Mary Cunningham, Martha Galvez, Claudia L. Aranda, Rob Santos, Doug Wissoker, Alyse Oneto, Rob Pitingolo, and James Crawford, A Pilot Study of Landlord Acceptance of Housing Choice Vouchers, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, September 2018.

37 Mary Cunningham, Martha Galvez, Claudia L. Aranda, Rob Santos, Doug Wissoker, Alyse Oneto, Rob Pitingolo, and James Crawford, A Pilot Study of Landlord Acceptance of Housing Choice Vouchers, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, September 2018.

38 Poverty & Race Research Action Council, “Appendix B: State, Local, and Federal Laws Barring Source-of-Income Discrimination,” in Expanding Choice: Practical Strategies for Building a Successful Housing Mobility Program, Washington, D.C., 2021.

39 California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, “Housing Discrimination,” webpage, undated. As of May 13, 2021: https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/housing/

40 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “FY 2021 Fair Housing Organization Initiative (FHOI) Program,” webpage, undated. As of May 13, 2021: https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/spm/gmomgmt/grantsinfo/fundingopps/fy21_fhoi

41 Matthew Haag, “‘She Wants Well-Qualified People’: 88 Landlords Accused of Housing Bias,” New York Times, March 15, 2021; “L.A. Tenants Win Groundbreaking $2.5 Million Settlement in Housing Discrimination Lawsuit,” Public Counsel, undated. As of May 13, 2021: http://www.publiccounsel.org/stories?id=0263; Richard Halstead, “Marin, North Bay Rental Discrimination Persists, Housing Advocates Report,” Marin Independent Journal, April 28, 2021.

42 Peter Bergman, Raj Chetty, Stefanie DeLuca, Nathaniel Hendren, Lawrence F. Katz, and Christopher Palmer, “Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers to Neighborhood Choice,” Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 26164, March 2020; Stefanie DeLuca and Peter Rosenblatt, “Walking Away from The Wire: Housing Mobility and Neighborhood Opportunity in Baltimore,” Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2017, pp. 519–546; County of Marin (California), “Landlord Incentives Programs Renewed with County’s Local Partners,” news release, August 9, 2018. As of May 28, 2021: https://www.marincounty.org/main/county-press-releases/press-releases/2018/cda-housingpartnerships-080918

43 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Moving to Work (MTW) Demonstration Program,” webpage, last updated June 21, 2021. As of May 13, 2021: https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/mtw

44 Howard Husock, “How Housing Assistance Leads to Long-Term Dependence—and How to Fix It,” in Jennifer A. Marshall, ed., 2017 Index of Culture & Opportunity, Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2017, pp. 52–53.

45 Deven Carlson, Robert Haveman, Tom Kaplan, and Barbara Wolfe, “Long-Term Earnings and Employment Effects of Housing Voucher Receipt,” Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 71, No. 1, January 2012, pp. 128–150; Brian A. Jacob and Jens Ludwig, “The Effects of Housing Assistance on Labor Supply: Evidence from a Voucher Lottery,” American Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 1, February 2012, pp. 272–304; Robert Moffitt, “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 30, No. 1, 1992, pp. 1–61.

46 Kirk McClure, Length of Stay in Assisted Housing: Multi-Disciplinary Research Team, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, October 2017.

47 Kirk McClure, Length of Stay in Assisted Housing: Multi-Disciplinary Research Team, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, October 2017.

48 Sandra Newman, C. Scott Holupka, and Joseph Harkness, “The Long-Term Effects of Housing Assistance on Work and Welfare,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2009, pp. 81–101; Mark Shroder, “Does Housing Assistance Perversely Affect Self-Sufficiency? A Review Essay,” Journal of Housing Economics, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 2002, pp. 381–417; Gregory Mills, Daniel Gubits, Larry Orr, Judie Feins, Bulbul Kaul, and Michelle Wood, Effects of Housing Vouchers on Welfare Families, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, September 2006.

49 Alan E. Simon, Andrew Fenelon, Veronica Helms, Patricia C. Lloyd, and Lauren M. Rossen, “HUD Housing Assistance Associated with Lower Uninsurance Rates and Unmet Medical Need,” Health Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 6, June 2017, pp. 1016–1023.

50 Ryan Bourne, Government and the Cost of Living: Income-Based vs. Cost-Based Approaches to Alleviating Poverty, Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 847, September 4, 2018.

51 Ingrid Gould Ellen, “What Do We Know About Housing Choice Vouchers?” Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol. 80, January 2020.

52 Michael D. Eriksen and Amanda Ross, “Housing Vouchers and the Price of Rental Housing,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 7, No. 3, August 2015, pp. 154–176.

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53 Joseph Gyourko and Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply, Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2014.

54 Evan Mast, “The Effect of New Market-Rate Housing Construction on the Low-Income Housing Market,” Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Upjohn Institute Working Paper 19-307, July 1, 2019; Brian J. Asquith, Evan Mast, and Davin Reed, “Supply Shock Versus Demand Shock: The Local Effects of New Housing in Low-Income Areas,” Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Upjohn Institute Working Paper 19-316, December 19, 2019.

55 Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen, and Katherine O’Regan, “Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply and Affordability,” Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2019, pp. 25–40.

56 Christine Bogusz, Dan Ready, and Jorge Salazar, “The Federal Budget in Fiscal Year 2020: An Infographic,” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, April 30, 2021. As of May 14, 2021: https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57170

57 Richard Halstead, “Marin, North Bay Rental Discrimination Persists, Housing Advocates Report,” Marin Independent Journal, April 28, 2021; Stefanie DeLuca and Peter Rosenblatt, “Walking Away from The Wire: Housing Mobility and Neighborhood Opportunity in Baltimore,” Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2017, pp. 519–546; County of Marin (California), “Landlord Incentives Programs Renewed with County’s Local Partners,” news release, August 9, 2018. As of May 28, 2021: https://www.marincounty.org/main/county-press-releases/press-releases/2018/cda-housingpartnerships-080918; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Moving to Work (MTW) Demonstration Program,” webpage, last updated June 21, 2021. As of May 13, 2021: https://www.hud.gov/ program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/mtw; Howard Husock, “How Housing Assistance Leads to Long-Term Dependence—and How to Fix It,” in Jennifer A. Marshall, ed., 2017 Index of Culture & Opportunity, Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2017, pp. 52–53.

58 Kriston Capps, “How a Section 8 Experiment Could Reveal a Better Way to Escape Poverty,” Bloomberg CityLab, August 4, 2019; Peter Bergman, Raj Chetty, Stefanie DeLuca, Nathaniel Hendren, Lawrence F. Katz, and Christopher Palmer, “Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers to Neighborhood Choice,” Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 26164, March 2020; Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, and Lawrence F. Katz, “The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment,” American Economic Review, Vol. 106, No. 4, April 2016, pp. 855–902.

59 John Treat, “Establishing a More Effective SAFMR System: The Cost and Benefits of HUD’s 2016 Small Area Fair Market Rent Rule,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 51, 2018.

60 Abt Associates, “Expanding Housing Choice: Abt Team to Evaluate HUD Mobility Demonstration,” news release, November 10, 2020. As of April 7, 2021: https://www.abtassociates.com/who-we-are/news/news-releases/ expanding-housing-choice-abt-team-to-evaluate-hud-mobility

61 Philip M. E. Garboden, Eva Rosen, Stefanie DeLuca, and Kathryn Edin, “Taking Stock: What Drives Landlord Participation in the Housing Choice Voucher Program,” Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 28, No. 6, 2018, pp. 979–1003; Philip Garboden, Eva Rosen, Meredith Greif, Stefanie DeLuca, and Kathryn Edin, Urban Landlords and the Housing Choice Voucher Program—A Research Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2018.

62 Meredith Greif, “Regulating Landlords: Unintended Consequences for Poor Tenants,” City & Community, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 2018, pp. 658–674; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Education and Outreach,” in HCV Landlord Strategy Guidebook, Washington, D.C., undated; “PHAs Encourage Landlord Participation with Incentives,” Evidence Matters, Winter 2019. As of May 28, 2021: https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/winter19/highlight3.html

63 Kirk McClure, Length of Stay in Assisted Housing: Multi-Disciplinary Research Team, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, October 2017; Philip Garboden, Eva Rosen, Meredith Greif, Stefanie DeLuca, and Kathryn Edin, Urban Landlords and the Housing Choice Voucher Program—A Research Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2018; Jennifer E. Cossyleon, Philip M. E. Garboden, and Stefanie DeLuca, Recruiting Opportunity Landlords: Lessons from Landlords in Maryland, Washington, D.C.: Poverty & Race Research Action Council, June 2020. As of May 28, 2021: https://prrac.org/ recruiting-opportunity-landlords-lessons-from-landlords-in-maryland-june-2020/

64 HUD Exchange, “Housing Search Assistance Toolkit: Landlord Outreach and Recruitment,” undated. As of May 13, 2021: https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/housingsearchtool/?housingsearchtoolaction=public:main.landlord- outreach-and-recruitment

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65 Erin Graves, “Rooms for Improvement: A Qualitative Metasynthesis of the Housing Choice Voucher Program,” Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2016, pp. 346–361; Jillian Carr and Vijetha Koppa, “The Effect of Housing Vouchers on Crime: Evidence from a Lottery,” unpublished manuscript, College Station: Texas A&M University, 2020.

66 Ingrid Gould Ellen, Michael Lens, and Katherine M. O’Regan, American Murder Mystery Revisited: Do Housing Voucher Households Cause Crime? NYU Wagner Research Paper No. 2012-02, New York: New York University, 2012.

67 Michael C. Lens, Impact of Housing Vouchers on Crime in U.S. Cities and Suburbs, Los Angeles: UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, undated.

68 Michael C. Lens, Ingrid Gould Ellen, and Katherine O’Regan, Neighborhood Crime Exposure Among Housing Choice Voucher Households, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, February 2011.

69 Martha M. Galvez, Solomon Greene, Alyse D. Oneto, and Patrick Spauster, Protecting Housing Choice Voucher Holders from Discrimination: Lessons from Oregon and Texas, Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, October 2020, p. 23.

70 Washington State Department of Commerce, “Landlord Damage Relief Program,” webpage, undated. As of May 28, 2021: https://www.commerce.wa.gov/serving-communities/homelessness/landlord-fund-programs/landlord-mitigation-program/

71 U.S. House of Representatives, Local Solutions to End Homelessness Act of 2021, H.R.213, 117th Congress, cloture not invoked, January 5, 2021. As of June 29, 2021: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/213

72 Kriston Capps, “Can an ‘Activist HUD’ Make Housing a Human Right?” Bloomberg CityLab, January 29, 2021. 73 William Brown, “The Process of Fixing the British National Minimum Wage, 1997–2007,” BJIR: An International

Journal of Employment Relations, Vol. 47, No. 2, June 2009, pp. 429–443.74 Office of the Auditor of the State of California, Homelessness in California: The State’s Uncoordinated Approach

to Addressing Homelessness Has Hampered the Effectiveness of Its Efforts, Sacramento, Calif., Report 2020-112, February 2021.

75 California Senate, Homeless Coordinating and Financing Council, SB-333, California Legislature 2019–2020 Regular Session, cloture not invoked, July 3, 2019. As of May 28, 2021: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/ billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB333

76 New York City Housing Authority, “Office of the Chief Administrative Officer: Performance Management and Analytics,” webpage, undated. As of April 9, 2021: https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nycha/about/departments/ performance-management-and-analytics-division.page

77 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Funding Opportunities,” webpage, undated. As of May 13, 2021: https://www.hud.gov/grants/

78 Los Angeles County Homeless Initiative, “Homeless Initiative Impact Dashboard,” webpage, undated. As of April 9, 2021: https://homeless.lacounty.gov/impact-dashboard/

79 Peter Bergman, Raj Chetty, Stefanie DeLuca, Nathaniel Hendren, Lawrence F. Katz, and Christopher Palmer, “Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers to Neighborhood Choice,” Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 26164, March 2020; David P. Varady, Joseph Jaroscak, and Reinout Kleinhans, “How to Attract More Landlords to the Housing Choice Voucher Program: A Case Study of Landlord Outreach Efforts,” Urban Research & Practice, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2017, pp. 143–155.

80 County of Marin (California), “Landlord Incentives Programs Renewed with County’s Local Partners,” news release, August 9, 2018. As of May 28, 2021: https://www.marincounty.org/main/county-press-releases/press-releases/2018/cda-housingpartnerships-080918

81 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Housing Choice Voucher Program: CY 2021 Administrative Fee Rates,” undated.

82 Mary Cunningham, Martha Galvez, Claudia L. Aranda, Rob Santos, Doug Wissoker, Alyse Oneto, Rob Pitingolo, and James Crawford, A Pilot Study of Landlord Acceptance of Housing Choice Vouchers, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, September 2018; Kathryn Sotnik, “Boston Leaders Propose ‘Secret Shopper’ Investigation into Housing Discrimination,” NBC Boston, July 9, 2020.

83 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “FY 2021 Fair Housing Organization Initiative (FHOI) Program,” webpage, undated. As of May 13, 2021: https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/spm/gmomgmt/grantsinfo/fundingopps/fy21_fhoi

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PE-A1387-1

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL -BEING

www.rand.org

About This PerspectiveThis Perspective provides a brief overview of the housing choice voucher (HCV) program, with a particular emphasis on its role in providing affordable housing to Californians. This Perspective also discusses potential benefits and challenges associated with the existing HCV program, as well as potential opportunities to modify the program to strengthen its impact. This Perspective may be of interest to legislators and public officials serving in the state of California, as well as those in public, private, and nonprofit sectors who are engaged in housing and housing development issues.

Community Health and Environmental Policy ProgramRAND Social and Economic Well-Being is a division of the RAND Corporation that seeks to actively improve the health and social and economic well-being of populations and communities throughout the world. This research was conducted in the Community Health and Environmental Policy Program within RAND Social and Economic Well-Being. The program focuses on such topics as infrastructure, science and technology, community design, community health promotion, migration and population dynamics, transportation, energy, and climate and the environment, as well as other policy concerns that are influenced by the natural and built environment, technology, and community organizations and institutions that affect well-being. For more information, email chep@rand.org.

FundingFunding for this Perspective was provided by the Lowy family, whose generous gift supported the establishment of the RAND Center on Housing and Homelessness in Los Angeles in 2020.

AcknowledgmentsWe would like to thank Peter Lynn, Heather Schwartz, and Douglas Rice for their thoughtful review and feedback on the development of this Perspective.

About the AuthorsRyan K. McBain is a health policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. He uses quantitative and qualitative methods to evaluate programs and policies meant to improve the lives of vulnerable populations—including individuals experiencing serious mental illness and housing insecurity—within the United States and abroad. McBain holds a Ph.D. in health policy.

Jason M. Ward is an associate economist at the RAND Corporation and is the associate director of the RAND Center for Housing and Homelessness in Los Angeles. He uses the tools of applied microeconomics to study housing, labor markets, education, and health, as well as the links among these domains. Ward holds a Ph.D. in economics.

Sarah B. Hunter is senior behavioral scientist at the RAND Corporation and is the director of the RAND Center for Housing and Homelessness in Los Angeles. Her primary areas of interest are the improvement of services for vulnerable populations, community capacity-building for continuous quality improvement, health care integration, implementation science, and program evaluation. Hunter holds a Ph.D. in social psychology.