Transforming Government: The Renewal and … Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the...

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2000 Presidential Transition Series April 2000 The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for The Business of Government Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency R. Steven Daniels Associate Professor Department of Government and Public Service University of Alabama at Birmingham Carolyn L. Clark-Daniels Birmingham, Alabama

Transcript of Transforming Government: The Renewal and … Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the...

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2000 PresidentialTransition Series

Apr i l 2000

The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for

The Business of Government

Transforming Government: The Renewal

and Revitalization of the Federal

Emergency Management Agency

R. Steven DanielsAssociate ProfessorDepartment of Government and Public ServiceUniversity of Alabama at Birmingham

Carolyn L. Clark-DanielsBirmingham, Alabama

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About The EndowmentThrough grants for Research, Thought Leadership Forums, andthe SES Leadership Program, The PricewaterhouseCoopersEndowment for The Business of Government stimulatesresearch and facilitates discussion on new approaches toimproving the effectiveness of government at the federal, state,local, and international levels.

Founded in 1998 by PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Endowmentis one of the ways that PricewaterhouseCoopers seeks toadvance knowledge on how to improve public sector effec-tiveness. The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment focuses on the future of the operation and management of the publicsector.

The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for

The Business of Government

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Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 1

Transforming Government:

The Renewal and Revitalization

of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

R. Steven DanielsAssociate Professor

Department of Government and Public ServiceUniversity of Alabama at Birmingham

Carolyn L. Clark-DanielsBirmingham, Alabama

April 2000

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword ......................................................................................4

Executive Summary ......................................................................5

Part One – Lessons Learned From the Transformation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ..............6

Introduction............................................................................6Lesson 1: Experience Counts: Recruit the Best........................6Lesson 2: Clarify Your Mission ................................................7Lesson 3: Structure Your Agency to Reflect the Agency’s Mission ....................................................................7Lesson 4: Leverage the Presidency..........................................8Lesson 5: Use Your Career Staff ..............................................8Lesson 6: Don’t Be Afraid of the Press ....................................8Lesson 7: Provide Governmental and NongovernmentalPartners a Stake in the Outcome ............................................9

Part Two – The FEMA Case Study ................................................10Taking Over: FEMA Under President Bush............................10Problems to be Fixed: The FEMA Legacy ..............................10FEMA Under James Lee Witt: The Phoenix Rises ..................13Challenges Ahead for the Next Administrator ......................18

References ..................................................................................20

Appendix I – History of Federal Emergency Management ..........23

Appendix II ................................................................................25Methodology ........................................................................25List of Interviews ..................................................................26List of Abbreviations ............................................................26

About the Authors ......................................................................27

Key Contact Information ............................................................28

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ForewordApril 2000

On behalf of The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for The Business of Government, we are pleased to present this report by R. Steven Daniels and Carolyn Clark-Daniels entitled “Transforming Government:The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.”

This is the first report in a series supported by The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for The Business ofGovernment in anticipation of the new presidential administration. Grants were awarded to leading acade-mics for research reports that will provide insight into government management issues and offer present andfuture government executives case studies of leaders who have renewed and revitalized government organi-zations and brought about transformation in government.

In this report, Daniels and Clark-Daniels examine the transformation of the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA) under the leadership of James Lee Witt. FEMA is now considered a leading example of theClinton administration’s efforts to transform and reinvent government.

This report is important because it outlines the revitalization of FEMA and provides readers with a set oflessons learned on how to lead change in government. We hope that understanding how Witt was successfulin leading the FEMA transformation can help both present and future government executives direct their ownchange processes.

Paul Lawrence Ian LittmanPartner, PricewaterhouseCoopers Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopersCo-Chair, Endowment Advisory Board Co-Chair, Endowment Advisory [email protected] [email protected]

The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for

The Business of Government

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Although the U.S. Constitution places the executivepower of the national government in the hands of the president of the United States, an incomingpresidential administration confronts serious issuesin managing federal agencies. The experiences ofJames Lee Witt at the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) reveal several importantlessons that an agency should understand beforeattempting to transform an under-funded and under-performing government organization.

Lesson 1: Experience Counts: Recruit the Best

Lesson 2: Clarify Your Mission

Lesson 3: Structure Your Agency to Reflect the Agency’s Mission

Lesson 4: Leverage the Presidency

Lesson 5: Use Your Career Staff

Lesson 6: Don’t Be Afraid of the Press

Lesson 7: Provide Governmental andNongovernmental Partners a Stake in the Outcome

In this study, the researchers investigated the evolu-tion of the disaster assistance programs of FEMAfrom the Bush administration to the Clinton admin-istrations. The federal response to Hurricane Hugo,the Loma Prieta Earthquake, and Hurricane Andrewrevealed serious flaws in FEMA’s structure and pro-

cedures. Extraordinary tensions existed between thesecretive National Preparedness Directorate and themore public State and Local Programs and SupportDirectorate. The Bush administration frequentlybypassed FEMA and centralized response in theWhite House. The administration’s response to cata-strophic disasters was largely reactive. Little of thefunding went toward mitigation of future disasters.The media, Congress, and several evaluative organi-zations including the U.S. General AccountingOffice (USGAO), the National Academy of PublicAdministration (NAPA), and FEMA’s own InspectorGeneral’s Office (FEMA-IG) all underscored theshortcomings of FEMA’s structure and operations.

Learning from the Bush experience, the Clintonadministration moved quickly to recast federal dis-aster response. President Clinton appointed JamesLee Witt, Arkansas’s emergency services director, asdirector of FEMA and elevated the FEMA directorposition to Cabinet-level status. Director Wittmoved to redefine FEMA’s mission, reorganize theagency around basic emergency management func-tions, make FEMA more consumer oriented, rebuildthe staff’s commitment to FEMA’s mission, and redi-rect the focus of disaster assistance toward mitiga-tion. Consequently, media and political criticismhas diminished. However, FEMA is not free fromproblems, with issues regarding financial manage-ment and decision criteria still remaining to beaddressed.

Executive Summary

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IntroductionIn anticipation of the new presidential administra-tion, The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment forThe Business of Government has awarded grants toleading academics to prepare research reports thatwill provide insight into government managementissues and offer government practitioners practicaltools to help them perform their jobs more effec-tively. An example of a best practice in agencytransformation is the revitalization of the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) under theleadership of Director James Lee Witt. FEMA servesas an instructive case study of how to transform atroubled organization. Many public administrationacademics and practitioners have studied thechanges in FEMA under Director Witt to understandhow organizations can be renewed and revitalized.

Lesson 1: Experience Counts —Recruit the BestRecruitment leadership may be one of the president’sand the agency director’s most critical decisions atthe start of an administration. The appointment of

competent and experienced senior agency officialswith a strong interest in the agency’s policies canovercome even intermittent attention by the presi-dent. As long as the senior officials have the directand constant support of the president, experience,competence, and interest can produce successfulpolicy implementation.

Much of the success of the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency under James Lee Witt camefrom President Clinton’s confidence in his leadershipand competence, a fact that was evident to the presi-dent’s staff and members of Congress. A seniorWhite House official argued that future presidentsshould “pick as close as possible to the James LeeWitt model” in selecting agency heads, emphasizing“professionalism, empathy, articulateness with themedia and disaster victims, non-political manage-ment, and a strong relationship with the President.”Unfortunately, consistent recruitment is often thepoor stepchild of presidential and agency manage-ment. Weak appointees can undermine implementa-tion of the president’s program and damage the pub-lic image of the administration.

Part One – Lessons LearnedFrom the Transformation of the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA)

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Many of the problems in disaster management underthe administration of President George Bush can betraced to its failure to appoint competent, experiencedindividuals to the senior positions in FEMA. UnderPresident George Bush, congressional investigatorsconcluded that FEMA was a “dumping ground” forpolitical appointees. Many of FEMA’s senior officialswere transfers from other agencies, often as punish-ment for political infractions. Bush’s only permanentFEMA director was an associate of Chief of Staff JohnSununu who served as New Hampshire’s transporta-tion director. Conversely, President Clinton’s FEMAappointments were all officials with considerableexperience in emergency management. Two served asstate emergency management directors. Two served asFEMA regional directors. One served as GovernorClinton’s liaison with the Arkansas emergency man-agement agency. Their background in emergencymanagement allowed FEMA officials to restructure theagency’s mission and organization within a year of theappointment of the new director. The cumulativeexperience of the senior political employees improvedthe integration of the agency’s various directorates, acritical component of response and recovery to cata-strophic disasters.

Lesson 2: Clarify Your MissionAgencies need a clear mission and well-definedtarget population. One of the key weaknesses ofthe “reinventing government” movement’s attentionto customer service and agency performance is theoften unspoken assumption that public agencies,like businesses, have a single, well-defined goal,such as profit, and clearly identified customers.Most public agencies, especially social serviceagencies, have multiple purposes and clients. Notall of these goals and clients are compatible. Mostagencies resolve these conflicts by emphasizingone goal or population more than others. Thechoice of goals and populations is critical. To per-form effectively and efficiently, the agency mustdefine its mission and target population to makethe most consistent use of its personnel andresources. This choice cannot be unilateral; itrequires the support of both the administration and the agency’s authorization and appropriationssubcommittees and committees in Congress.

During most of President Bush’s administration,FEMA was a schizophrenic agency forced to respond

to catastrophic disasters with two incompatible mis-sions — preserving the government during nuclearattack and providing support to state and local gov-ernments following natural disasters. The lack ofcooperation among FEMA’s key directorates madeeffective response and recovery difficult.

James Lee Witt and his senior staff refocused FEMA’smission on emergency management rather thannational preparedness. The national preparednessfunctions were not abandoned, but were integratedwith the more basic emergency management func-tions. The change in focus redefined the agency’sprimary target population as disaster victims, ratherthan executive branch officials central to the surviv-ability of national decision-making capacity follow-ing a nuclear war.

Lesson 3: Structure Your Agency toReflect the Agency’s MissionMost public officials recognize the importance ofmatching agency structure to agency policy goals.Implementing a program using existing agencystructures and procedures invites policy conflictand the inefficient use of personnel and resources.One of the leading causes of the proliferation ofgovernment agencies is the recognition that match-ing agency structure to agency mission is easier ina new agency than an ongoing one. Ongoing agen-cies usually are expected to provide at least someof the new program functions from existingresources. Nevertheless, an ongoing agency withpolitical support, strong presidential and agencyleadership, a clear mission, and a well-definedclientele generally can find the wherewithal toimplement a new program.

FEMA’s structure under President Bush reflected its divided mission. The agency’s prime missionswere divided between the National PreparednessDirectorate and the State and Local Programs andSupport Directorate. Under Director Witt, FEMAresolved the conflict between national preparednessand disaster assistance by redesigning the agencystructure to emphasize the latter. Director Witt sepa-rated the operational components of the State andLocal Programs and Support Directorate into sepa-rate Preparedness, Mitigation, and Response andRecovery Directorates. The functions of the NationalPreparedness Directorate were spread throughout

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the agency. In addition, Witt assigned every employ-ee of the agency critical roles during response andrecovery operations, regardless of their normalagency functions.

Lesson 4: Leverage the PresidencyEffective policy implementation requires presiden-tial support. Unfortunately, such support is a limit-ed commodity. The demands of the office oftenfocus the attention of the president on crisis deci-sions, symbolic leadership, and priority setting atthe expense of routine decisions, coalition build-ing, and implementation. Presidents frequently shifttheir attention from one policy priority to anotheronce legislation has been signed into law. Theabsence of presidential support allows other forcesto shape the implementation of presidential policy,frequently with contradictory results. Presidentsneed not follow administrative performance indetail. Nevertheless, failure to provide consistentpolicy leadership and appoint sympathetic adminis-trators can lead to policy implementation thatundermines the original intent of the statute.

One of the major differences between the Bush andClinton administrations was the level of supportprovided by the president to disaster management.Bush’s disaster response was largely reactive andbypassed the existing disaster management struc-ture. Clinton’s disaster management policy wasmore proactive and politically sensitive. Clintonalso improved FEMA’s political stature by empha-sizing the lead disaster role of the agency and itsdirector, and by raising the FEMA director to cabi-net status. One former state emergency manage-ment official argued, “Witt’s greatest impact wasthe fact that he linked FEMA to the executivebranch, the Executive Office of the President, andthe president. Witt had access.” Given the increas-ing vulnerability of the United States population tonatural and man-made disasters and the rudimenta-ry steps taken toward sustainable development,access to the president and the elevation of FEMAto cabinet level seem to be critical first steps inensuring presidential support into the future.

Lesson 5: Use Your Career StaffNone of the changes outlined above will be suc-cessful unless the political and career staffs of the

agency are well integrated. Effective recruitment ofexperienced and competent agency leaders andprogram directors provides a basis for this integra-tion. Of equal importance, however, is the degreeto which the policy goals of the administration andthe career staff mesh. The more common the policyideas that are shared between an agency’s politicaland career staff, the greater will be the likelihoodof cooperation.

Most of the burden of pursuing cooperation betweenpolitical and career staff will rest with the agencydirector. Successful directors achieve policy unitythrough one of two methods: political managementor shared experience. The political managers enforceadministration policy directives by issuing clear, con-sistent, and precise instructions. The more coherent,the more congruous, and the more exact the mes-sage, the more difficult it becomes for career staff toignore or distort the intent of the policy. The Reaganadministration changed the direction of federal gov-ernment policy in many agencies by appointing sec-retaries or directors with clearly defined conservativephilosophies promoting smaller government.

Managers who rely on shared experience mostoften lead by example. Cooperation between politi-cal and career staff arises from shared professionalstandards and general agreement on policy goalsarising from those standards. Successful managersoften know as much or more about the current policy functions of the agency as the career staff.Experienced managers also act as effective two-waycommunication conduits between the presidentand the career staff. The Clinton administrationclearly chose the shared experience strategy inappointing James Lee Witt as FEMA director.

Lesson 6: Don’t Be Afraid of thePressFor a modern government agency, the public affairsdirector plays a critical role in defining successfulagency performance. Although most modern jour-nalists are not investigative reporters, the standardsof investigative journalism have permeated mediacoverage of government. A substantial proportionof Pulitzer Prizes for journalism have gone to newsorganizations that have exposed governmentmalfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance.

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Therefore, agencies that can enlist the media in thepursuit of agency goals will better manage the flowof information concerning agency success.

Many of FEMA’s difficulties under the Bush admin-istration arose from its already negative publicimage in the media. Congressional reports chargedthat the agency was a “political dumping ground”for unqualified and marginal appointees. News sto-ries highlighted tensions between political andcareer employees, prompting the creation of aFEMA chapter of the American Federation ofGovernment Employees. FEMA officials aggravatedthe agency’s media problems by trying to force agay employee to identify other gay employeesbefore releasing his travel funds for an overseastrip. These administrative failings prepared theWashington and national media to look for exam-ples of FEMA incompetence.

Director Witt and Public Affairs Director MorrieGoodman quickly recognized that FEMA underPresident Bush had failed a critical political test.Even though FEMA performed well in some areasduring Hurricane Hugo, the Loma Prieta Earthquake,and Hurricane Andrew, the firestorm of media criti-cism drowned much of this positive information.FEMA was used to operating in anonymity, and hadno effective plan for involving the media and, byextension, the public in FEMA operations. As aresult, many initial reports of FEMA response werebased on inaccurate and incomplete information.Under Witt, Public Affairs Director Goodman andsubsequent public affairs directors reshaped FEMA’scommunications to actively engage the mediathroughout the response and recovery period. Bymaking the agency more accessible and by provid-ing the media with prompt answers and information,FEMA disarmed much of the inevitable criticism thatarose in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Moresignificantly, the agency opened a two-way channelfor information between itself and the disaster vic-tims it was serving.

Lesson 7: Provide Governmentaland Nongovernmental Partners aStake in the OutcomeState and local governments, nonprofit agencies,and private organizations implement most federal

domestic policy. The relationship between the fed-eral government and the other organizations is usu-ally as principal and agent. The federal governmentprovides incentives to the implementing organiza-tion to induce them to provide federal goods andservices; and imposes penalties (usually the reduc-tion or elimination of federal funds) for cooperatingorganizations that fail to follow federal guidelines.

The absence of direct authority between the federalgovernment and its governmental and nongovern-mental partners increases the likelihood that thepolicy goals of principal and agent will be incom-patible. The nature and effectiveness of the federalincentives and penalties becomes critical to theoverall success of the policy. The funding penaltiesare largely blunt instruments whose overuse under-mines their effectiveness. The most effective incen-tives are those that recognize the differing goals ofthe federal agency’s partners and actively enlist thestate, local, nonprofit, or private organizations inthe development, planning, and implementation offederal response.

Although the federal role has been increasingsteadily, the intergovernmental context of disastermanagement is easy to forget. Only the affectedlocal jurisdictions can provide the kind of directassistance that most disaster victims require imme-diately after a disaster. State and federal effortsremain largely supportive and financial. Mitigationand preparedness policies are only as effective asthe local economic development policies makethem. Under both Bush and Clinton, the politicalrealities of disaster assistance steadily increased thescope of federal intervention. Over the long run,however, such federalization does not guarantee thekind of prompt response that comes from adequate-ly prepared state and local jurisdictions. DirectorWitt has attempted to buck the trend toward feder-alization by emphasizing the importance of govern-ment, nonprofit, and private partnerships.

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Taking Over: FEMA Under PresidentBushAt the start of the Bush administration, FEMA wasan agency with serious organizational problems thatfunctioned adequately through the Carter andReagan administrations only because the disastersbetween 1979 and 1988 were not catastrophicenough to exceed the agency’s limited capacity.Unfortunately, the historical experience of theagency under the previous administrations providedPresident Bush with little incentive to overcomeFEMA’s organizational weaknesses. President Bushdid not appoint a permanent agency director untilAugust 1990, 19 months after his inauguration.Presidential attention to disaster management issueslargely was reactive, responding to a series of cata-strophic disasters throughout the administration.

The disaster agency that President Bush inheritedwas under-funded, loosely structured, poorly integrated, overly specialized in national securitypreparedness, and weakly led by a succession ofpolitical appointees with little emergency manage-ment experience. FEMA was adequate for the typi-cal disasters confronted during the Reagan andBush administrations where state and local govern-ments provided significant resources. However, theagency proved entirely unprepared for catastrophicdisasters like Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew and theLoma Prieta Earthquake, which shattered state andlocal capabilities.

Problems to be Fixed: The FEMALegacyIn the wake of Hurricane Andrew, public and con-gressional response to FEMA’s performance wasextremely critical. In 1993, several organizationsconducted formal evaluations of FEMA’s perfor-mance during Hurricane Andrew including theFEMA Inspector General’s Office ([FEMA-IG] 1993),the United States Government Accounting Office([USGAO] 1993), and the National Academy ofPublic Administration ([NAPA] 1993). Both theinformal and formal criticisms of FEMA highlightedfour critical organizational problems.

Problem 1: The Inconsistency of PresidentialSupportDuring much of the history of federal intervention,emergency management coexisted uneasily with the institutionalized presidency. During the ColdWar, the national security concerns of emergencymanagement (civil defense and continuity of gov-ernment) seemed more critical and consistentlyimportant to presidents than response and recoveryto natural disasters. The more formally organizedand well-defined functions of commander-in-chiefreinforced this focus. On the other hand, effectivemanagement of the domestic elements of emer-gency management (disaster preparedness, mitiga-tion, response, and recovery) suffered from the highimpact and low probability of most disaster events,the resulting fluctuation of presidential attention

Part Two – The FEMA CaseStudy

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between crisis and indifference, and the need of thepresident to provide psychological support to thepublic but maintain administrative distance from thedisaster agency’s decisions (NAPA 1993: 21-23).

The consolidation of numerous federal emergencymanagement programs into FEMA in 1979 offeredthe promise of enhanced authority. “The agencythus created came closer to having the size andsubstance needed to successfully stand outside theinstitutional presidency and to be of sufficientimportance to warrant the attention and support ofthe presidency when needed (NAPA 1993: 23).”Despite the consolidation, however, a relativelysmall agency like FEMA found it difficult to com-mand and coordinate much larger agencies withoutthe Cold War connection. The President’s executivepower proved less useful than his commander-in-chief power in the development of emergency management authority in the institutionalized presi-dency. In foreign policy crises, FEMA could draw onthe president’s military authority to assure compli-ance by other agencies. In disasters, FEMA had lessreliable access to the president’s executive authorityto guarantee performance. The end of the Cold Warin 1989 further complicated FEMA’s authority prob-lem. One former FEMA and state emergency man-agement official noted to the authors that “the Bushadministration brought an end to the Cold War, butFEMA was slow to respond.”

Problem 2: The “Stovepiping” of FEMAThe unprecedented scope of the disasters(Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew and the Loma PrietaEarthquake) confronting the Bush administrationoverwhelmed both the limited resources and thedisjointed organizational structure of FEMA. Thevarious functions and organizations within FEMAnever fully integrated after the creation of theagency in 1979. One former senior official atFEMA noted that the agency was in “total organiza-tional chaos. The director was isolated from thedirectorates and he was isolated from the regions.”

NAPA concluded that FEMA lacked a coherent setof governing ideas. The absence of vision and mis-sion prevented the development of core organiza-tional values, which in turn precluded the agency’sconstituent parts from consolidating into a work-able organization (NAPA 1993: 42-43). The lack of

core values only reinforced the “stovepiping” ofagency functions, the division of the agency intoindependent and poorly synchronized directorates(FEMA, 1993-1994). Several current and formerFEMA officials, some of whom served in FEMAunder the Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clintonadministrations, specifically identified the keyagency problem as stovepiping.

The worst organizational separation and the worsttensions arose between the National PreparednessDirectorate and the State and Local Programs andSupport Directorate. These directorates performedthe primary preparedness and disaster assistancefunctions of the agency and were continuations ofthe Federal Preparedness Agency and the FederalDisaster Assistance Administration, respectively. Thetwo directorates were intended to be the core of the dual use strategy envisioned by the President’sReorganization Project in 1978 (McIntyre, May 25,1978). However, the high level of secrecy associat-ed with the preparedness function made the transferof information and technology across directoratesnearly impossible. As a result, even 10 years afterthe creation of FEMA, dual use was honored morein the breach than in practice.

Problem 3: The Circumvention of FEMAThe organizational instability and limited resourcesof the disaster assistance agency often promptedearlier presidents to bypass the agency altogetherduring catastrophic disasters. Following the AlaskanEarthquake in 1964, the Johnson administrationand Congress created the Alaskan ReconstructionCommission (ARC) to fund the rebuilding of theAlaskan cities and towns destroyed by the earth-quake and subsequent tsunami. Although the direc-tor of the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) wason the commission, OEP had little responsibility or the recovery operation. After the collapse of theTeton Dam in 1976, the Ford administration quick-ly concluded that the federal government had polit-ical, if not legal, responsibility and used InteriorDepartment authority to compensate for privatedamages (Lynn, June 5, 1976). The funding wasprovided by a supplemental appropriation andadministered by the Department of the Interiorrather than the Federal Disaster AssistanceAdministration (FDAA).

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The Bush administration continued this tradition ofbypassing FEMA during particularly devastating dis-asters. After Hurricane Hugo’s landfall in SouthCarolina, President Bush sent Secretary of theInterior Manuel Lujan to assess damages in theVirgin Islands and Puerto Rico (Bates, September27, 1989). In the aftermath of the Loma PrietaEarthquake on October 17, 1989, the Presidentappointed Secretary of Transportation SamuelSkinner to oversee the recovery operation inCalifornia (Skinner, November 16, 1989). In thewake of Hurricane Andrew, President Bush went astep further and appointed a task force headed bySecretary of Transportation Andrew Card to coordi-nate federal efforts (Bush, August 26, 1992).

The bypassing of the official disaster agency by vari-ous presidents had a number of serious conse-quences. The first was the inevitable duplication ofeffort. Despite presidential intervention, FEMA andits predecessors nevertheless retained both the incli-nation and the statutory requirement to intercede onbehalf of disaster victims. The separate presidentialand agency response efforts unavoidably wastedresources. The second consequence was the man-agement of disaster response and recovery by lessqualified personnel. The White House staff invariablyhad much less emergency management experiencethan permanent agency employees. As a result, eachadministration that relied heavily on presidential pre-emption of disaster recovery had a much longer

learning curve than administrations that relied on apermanent disaster agency, such as FDAA or FEMA.

The third serious side effect of presidential preemp-tion of disaster relief was politicization. WhiteHouse interventions generally had more direct andshort-term political goals than relief efforts mount-ed by FEMA and other disaster relief agencies. Thefinal serious side effect of presidential interventionin disaster management was federalization. Thecentralization of disaster management in the WhiteHouse usually emphasized response and recoveryover mitigation and preparedness. Combined withthe short-term, political focus of most White Housedisaster efforts, the outcome of the federal disasterprogram has been the gradual shift of responsibilityfrom the state and local governments to the nation-al government.

Problem 4: Reactive versus Proactive ResponseDuring the Bush administration, federal law, FEMAregulations, and FEMA policy limited the agency’sability to anticipate disasters for which there wasadequate warning. Although FEMA officials were inplace 24 hours prior to landfall of both HurricanesHugo and Andrew, resources took much longer todeploy. Sufficient quantities of food and clothing didnot arrive in Charleston until six days after Hugo’slandfall (“Charleston Begs Government for Help,”September 28, 1989). Following Hurricane Andrew,FEMA found itself unable to respond quickly despiteadministrative changes. The bulk of the federal aideffort did not arrive until August 29, again six daysafter the disaster (Clary, August 29, 1992).

These delays seriously damaged FEMA’s politicalreputation and its support base in Congress. Part ofthe difficulty rested with FEMA’s coordinating func-tion. The Stafford Act required FEMA to coordinatethe activities of 26 federal agencies (includingFEMA) and the American Red Cross. Most organi-zations resisted such outside direction. Withouttop-level presidential support, FEMA found it diffi-cult to achieve rapid response. Coupled with thelevel of damage in South Carolina in 1989 andSouth Florida in 1992, FEMA’s ability to act wasstrictly limited. Nevertheless, to most political andmedia observers, FEMA’s performance was unnec-essarily bureaucratic and dilatory (Andrews, August 27, 1992; Lippman, August 28, 1992).

President Bush at site of the Loma Prieta Earthquake,San Francisco Marina District.

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FEMA Under James Lee Witt: ThePhoenix RisesThe criticism directed at FEMA’s response to Hugo,Loma Prieta, and Andrew demoralized agency staffand seriously compromised public confidence infederal response to disasters. Nevertheless, the controversy provided a new president and a newFEMA director a unique opportunity to redefineagency performance.

The Appointment of James Lee WittReflecting President Clinton’s commitment to emer-gency management, in April 1993 James Lee Wittbecame the first director of FEMA who had exten-sive emergency management experience. DirectorWitt brought a different focus to the agency.Several FEMA and White House staffers inter-viewed by the researchers indicated that he arrivedat the agency with a greater knowledge of agencyfunctions, limitations, and possibilities than evenlong-term employees of the agency.

Witt took over FEMA with several organizationalchanges in mind:

• The reestablishment of FEMA’s authority in disaster management

• The appointment of senior executives withextensive emergency management experience

• The redefinition of FEMA’s missions and goals

• The restructuring of the agency along function-al lines

• The redesign and reinterpretation of theStafford Act and supporting legislation

• The creation of effective media and politicallinkages

• The development of a proactive strategy for disaster response

The Reestablishment of FEMA’s Disaster AuthorityCritical to FEMA’s transformation was presidentialconfidence in FEMA’s ability to perform its statutoryfunctions. President Bush bypassed the agency andestablished independent task forces for the LomaPrieta Earthquake and Hurricanes Hugo andAndrew, relying on his Secretaries of Transportation

(Samuel Skinner and Andrew Card) for leadership.By contrast, President Clinton placed primaryresponsibility for response and recovery with FEMADirector James Lee Witt. President Clinton raisedthe FEMA directorship to cabinet-level status inFebruary 1996. Interviews with White House per-sonnel conducted by the researchers suggested thatthe Office of the Secretary of the Cabinet placed apriority status on communications from DirectorWitt. The Office had more contacts with FEMA’sdirector than with any other cabinet post.

The Appointment of Experienced EmergencyManagement ExecutivesUnlike President Bush, President Clinton had astrong interest in disaster management. On Witt’srecommendation, the President filled the manypolitically appointed positions in FEMA with indi-viduals with extensive experience in emergencymanagement. The Deputy Director, Robert M.“Mike” Walker, served previously as under secre-tary of the Army, where, in addition to his generalmanagement responsibilities, he supervised theDefense Department’s response to domestic disas-ters. Executive Associate Director for Response andRecovery Lacy E. Suiter, worked in the TennesseeEmergency Management Agency for 30 years, thelast 12 as its director. Associate Director forMitigation Michael J. Armstrong, worked asRegional Director of Region VIII, after working formore than 10 years in Colorado state and localgovernment specializing in conservation, land use,and personnel matters. Kay Goss, the associatedirector for preparedness, worked for 12 years asthen-Governor Bill Clinton’s senior assistant forintergovernmental relations, often acting as liaisonwith the State Office of Emergency Services.

The Redefinition of FEMA’s Mission and GoalsDirector Witt’s experience and the ongoing criticismof FEMA performance led him to strategies to makeFEMA function more productively. Relying on inputfrom FEMA employees, emergency managementpartners, and an internal reassessment of priorities,the agency developed its first new mission state-ment in 10 years: “The mission of the FederalEmergency Management Agency is to provide theleadership and support to reduce the loss of life andproperty and protect our institutions from all types

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14 Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

An Interview with James Lee WittDirector, Federal Emergency Management Agency

(The interview below is excerpted from May/June 1998issue of The Business of Government, published by ThePricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for The Business ofGovernment.)

In your role as chief executive officer of the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA), how do youdefine your job?I found that the job came with a lot of responsibility, andI have taken the job very seriously. Shortly after assumingoffice, I undertook two major initiatives. First, I workedwithin the agency to strengthen it. I wanted to involveemployees in the future of the agency. Second, I refo-cused the organization on the customer by placingemphasis on those we were serving externally.

As a new agency head, it was my job to describe whereFEMA needed to go. After describing where we wantedto go, it was my job to involve the entire organization. Iwanted employee input into how we could best meet ourgoals because I strongly believe in involving our people.I met with the FEMA’s senior managers during a three-day retreat in which I described where I thought theagency was heading.

Can you tell us more about your efforts to involve youremployees?I made a special effort to visit with employees, both atheadquarters and in the regions. I am constantly askingthem what they think we should be doing. I also devel-oped an open-door policy: any employee can make anappointment to see me on Tuesdays to discuss any matter.For those in the regions, they can call and make telephoneappointments to speak with me on Tuesdays. The open-door policy has been very effective. I also started lunchsessions with employees from all over the organization.

I have worked closely with members of the SeniorExecutive Service (SES) in FEMA. When I came in, I toldthem that I thought the agency needed new ideas andnew faces. I thought that they could all benefit from arotation system for SES members. All but two of the SESmembers were enthusiastic about assuming a new joband new challenges. The two who were reluctant turnedout to be happy with their new assignments, and they arenow two of my most effective senior managers.

How do you spend your time externally?I spend a lot of time with Congress. Since PresidentClinton elevated the position of FEMA director to cabinetstatus, I’ve spent more time with other cabinet membersand on special assignments from the White House. Forinstance, FEMA was placed in charge of the ChurchArson Program. Being in the cabinet has also allowed meto share my experiences at FEMA with other cabinetdepartments. FEMA is responsible for coordinating 27federal agencies. This takes time.

What is the best preparation for the position of directorof FEMA?There is no shortcut for experience in emergency man-agement. As a local elected official in Arkansas, I had the opportunity to work with FEMA at the local level. As state director of the Arkansas Office of EmergencyServices, I saw how FEMA programs could be run more efficiently and effectively.

In the future, I think it is likely that Congress will requirethat all FEMA directors have some experience in emer-gency management. I think state and local experienceprovides an essential background for this job.

How did you go about selecting your team at FEMA?When President Clinton appointed me, I asked him forthe opportunity to interview all the political appointeeswho might serve with me in FEMA. The President agreed,and it has made a huge difference. I was able to puttogether a top-notch team. It has worked out very well.

Another factor that has made a big difference is the“crash” training program that we provide to all new political appointees. The training course discusses allissues, programs, and problems they will be dealingwith. It has made a difference. We try to train them dur-ing the time period prior to their confirmation. We havealso found that our effort in preparing appointees fortheir confirmation hearings is a tremendous learningexperience by itself.

FEMA has dramatically improved its image and perfor-mance under your leadership. How did you do it?As I mentioned before, a major part of the transformationwas getting all employees involved. We worked hard atcreating a more customer-focused agency. A major initia-tive was to provide customer service training to all FEMAemployees, including senior management. This was ahuge undertaking.

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Our goal was to make FEMA a better agency, a betterplace to work, and an agency that provided better ser-vice to its customers. We were very pleased that our lat-est customer survey found that over 85% of our clientsapproved of our programs.

Another aspect of managing change is constant commu-nication to employees. You have to keep employeesinformed. I have a director’s report that goes out weekly.I have received a very positive response to it. The report,two to three pages in length, describes what is going onin the agency and how we are doing in meeting ourgoals for the agency.

At the same time that we were involving employees, wewere also improving the operations of the agency. Wedecreased the number of our financial accounts from 45to 14. We simply had too many accounts. We have alsomoved to quarterly spending plans, which was a majorchange from the past when we never quite knew howmuch money we had remaining. I am now holding oursenior managers responsible for their spending. In addi-tion, I’m working closely with our chief financial officerin overseeing the agency’s financial management systems.

All of our changes at FEMA were based on my trustingmy managers. I trusted my people to make the agencywork. I gave them authority to do their jobs and I resistedthe temptation to micro-manage.

We also found that we could improve the delivery of ourservices. After the Northridge earthquake, we found our-selves facing long lines of people waiting to apply forloans. Based on that experience, we revamped our 800-telephone system. We also worked with other agencies,such as the Small Business Administration, in improvingthe loan process. We have dramatically speeded up theprocess and made it more user friendly. We also gave ourfield investigators the latest technology to do their jobs.They now all have Palm Pilot computers to take theirclaims that can then be downloaded and transmitted. Thesystem used to be paper based, with the forms being sentvia Federal Express. All these efforts have reduced thecost of an application from $100 to $46. This has result-ed in $35 million in savings, as well as improved cus-tomer service.

Another major innovation was our initiative to close outas many previous disasters as we could. I found that wewere still working on Hurricane Hugo. We created spe-cial closeout task forces across the nation. This was ahuge problem in that we were still holding money for

those disasters. As a result of this initiative, we havefound $485 million that can now be transferred to ouremergency disaster account. We anticipate that we willfind over $800 million after we close out many of ouropen accounts. I found that we had over 476 open disas-ters that needed to be closed out.

We have also worked hard to cut out as much red tapeas possible and make the agency more responsive to itscustomers. We are now operating in a much more busi-ness-like environment; where we serving customers andtaking responsibility for how our business is run.

What have you learned about public private-sector part-nerships from your experience at FEMA?Our newest project is Project Impact. It is based on creat-ing more public-private partnerships. We have found thatwhile we can’t prevent disasters, we can do a much betterjob at prevention. Investing in prevention can improve theeconomic impact of disasters which now cause so muchpain, anguish, and suffering by disaster victims.

We have selected seven pilot communities for ProjectImpact. In these communities, business CEOs and elect-ed local officials, as well as FEMA staff, are workingtogether to undertake prevention initiatives. Our goal isto build disaster resistant communities. We have learnedfrom our experiences, such as the 1993 Des Moinesfloods. While we could rebuild the water treatment facil-ity in Iowa at a cost of about $14 million, the local econ-omy lost over $300 million. We now need to take morepreventive measures in advance of disasters. Anotherexample is Seattle, which has an important project toretrofit homes to make them more disaster-resistant.

Are you enjoying your second term? You now have thelongest tenure of any FEMA director. What are theadvantages of a second term?After the 1996 election, I thought long and hard aboutreturning to Arkansas. But I talked to the President aboutthis and he asked me to stay and finish the job. I am nowlooking forward to working with Congress in a bi-parti-san initiative to get FEMA ready for the 21st Century. Wehave made much progress and now have the opportunityto really put FEMA on solid footing for the future. I’malso enjoying our new initiatives, such as Project Impact,which I think can really make a difference.

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of hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based,all-hazards management program of mitigation, pre-paredness, response, and recovery” (FEMA 1994).

Under Witt’s direction, the agency based futuremanagement decisions and programs on six goalsrelated to the new mission:

• Create an emergency management partnershipwith other federal agencies, state and localgovernments, volunteer organizations, and the private sector.

• Establish, in concert with FEMA’s partners, anational emergency management system that iscomprehensive, risk-based, and all-hazards inapproach.

• Make hazard mitigation the foundation of thenational emergency management system.

• Provide a rapid and effective response to anydisaster.

• Strengthen state and local emergency management.

• Revitalize the agency and develop a moreeffective and involved cadre of FEMA man-agers, permanent employees, and disasterreservists (FEMA 1994: 2).

The goals reflected a shift in agency focus fromnational preparedness to disaster assistance. Thedominant philosophy became one of customer ser-vice. All senior managers in the agency participatedin a retreat to outline the customer service strategy.The managers then had to sell the philosophy toFEMA employees and implement training programs.

The Reorganization of FEMATo better structure the agency to pursue its mission,FEMA undertook an extensive reorganization.Maximizing input from all levels of the agency,FEMA restructured itself over a six-month period in1993. The new structure reflected the changes inthe mission statement and highlighted the agency’scommitment to a comprehensive, all-hazardsapproach to disaster management. The new agencydirectorates were organized around the basic func-tions of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

The reorganization ensured rapid and effectiveresponse to any disaster. FEMA also overhauled theDisaster Assistance program to take advantage ofdeveloping technology (National PerformanceReview, 1996). It streamlined the disaster applica-tion process through teleregistration, computerizedapplication forms, computerized inspection through

James Lee Witt

James Lee Witt was appointed by President Clinton and con-firmed by the U.S. Senate as director of the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency in 1993. He was the first agency headwho came to the position with experience in emergency management, having previously served as the director of theArkansas Office of Emergency Services for four years.

Mr. Witt’s professional career includes the formation of WittConstruction, a commercial and residential building company.After 12 years as a successful businessman and communityleader, he was elected county judge for Yell County, serving asthe chief elected official of the county, with judicial responsi-bilities for county and juvenile court. After being re-elected sixtimes to that position, Mr. Witt was tapped by then GovernorBill Clinton to assume leadership of the Arkansas Office ofEmergency Services.

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the use of palm-pad computers, and centralizedprocessing at two locations.

Part of the process of reorganization was DirectorWitt’s commitment to improving agency morale.He actively sought employee input on the reorgani-zation. He made all agency personnel critical ele-ments in the disaster assistance effort. In addition,Witt instituted extensive cross training of FEMApersonnel. Under his authority FEMA conductednumerous workshops, retreats, and conferences toeducate FEMA staff in the revised mission andgoals of the agency. He empowered employeeswith more responsibilities and obligations(Schneider 1998), and sought to improve labor-management relations by creating the Labor-Management Partnership Council to maintainstrong relationships between senior officials and FEMA staff.

The Redesign and Reinterpretation of the Stafford ActBefore James Lee Witt became director, FEMA hadalready begun the process of improving coordina-tion among the various elements of disasterresponse and recovery. In April 1992, FEMA negoti-ated the Federal Response Plan with other federalagencies and the American Red Cross. Thefirestorm of criticism that followed HurricaneAndrew revealed serious weaknesses in the Plan.The most serious were FEMA’s belief that theStafford Act prevented federal intervention untilafter the disaster and FEMA’s assumption that feder-al, state, and local agencies would cooperate with-out prior planning (Schneider 1998).

One of Director Witt’s first actions in cooperationwith his senior staff was to broaden the agency’sinterpretation of the Stafford Act to allow for theprepositioning of personnel and resources whenadequate warning existed. The director’s plan alsoincluded the development of multi-agencyEmergency Response Teams, Emergency SupportTeams, and Field Assessment Teams with the abilityto respond to disasters within four hours of occur-rence (FEMA 1996; Schneider 1998). The directorworked closely with the interagency CatastrophicDisaster Response Group that served as the focalpoint for the Federal Response Plan. He also pro-moted a risk-based, all-hazards emergency man-agement system with state and local governmentsand directed regional offices to work more closelywith their state and local counterparts on a regularbasis (FEMA 1994).

The Establishment of an Effective FEMA Media andPolitical PresenceOne of FEMA’s most critical failings under PresidentBush, however, was its lack of public visibility andsupport. In the period following Hurricane Hugoand Loma Prieta, several FEMA officials cited theagency’s relative obscurity as an indication that theagency functioned smoothly under most circum-stances because it did not receive either muchattention or criticism (McAllister, Oct. 6, 1989). By comparison, Witt aggressively increased theagency’s attention on its public education function.He continued the Recovery Times, a newsletter firstdeveloped during Hurricane Andrew that provideddirect information on FEMA disaster relief efforts.Under his leadership, FEMA introduced TheRecovery Channel, a satellite-delivered television

President Clinton talking to California disaster survivors.

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production that broadcasts over public televisionstations and cable networks in areas where disastersare declared.

Unlike many earlier directors of FEMA, Witt wasespecially sensitive to media and political implica-tions of the agency’s decisions. Senior FEMA staffcredited FEMA’s public affairs director at the start ofWitt’s tenure, Morrie Goodman, with a significantrole in changing the agency’s public image. UnderWitt and Goodman, FEMA sought to make themedia an active partner in the dissemination of disaster information. Given FEMA’s poor historywith Congress, Witt also aggressively pursued connections with Congress. He testified numeroustimes before congressional committees, doing so15 times in his first year alone (FEMA 1994). TheOffice of Congressional and Governmental Affairsserved as a two-way conduit of informationbetween the agency and congressional offices.FEMA used information from these exchanges toimprove disaster response in the field.

The Development of a Proactive StrategyThe long-term goal of all of the changes was todecrease disaster costs by refocusing the disastermanagement system on mitigation, defined as mini-mizing the probability and scope of future disasters.Witt pursued the mitigation strategy on severalfronts. The creation of the Mitigation Directoratecombined for the first time the Floodplain Manage-ment, Earthquake Hazards Reduction, NationalHurricane, National Dam Safety, and post-disastermitigation programs. In response to Witt’s urgingfollowing the Great Midwestern Floods, Congressexpanded the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program

from 15 percent of public assistance funds to 15percent of all disaster funds, increasing mitigationresources fivefold. Following the Northridge Earth-quake, FEMA reinforced the role of the FederalCoordinating Officer (FCO) in future disasters byintroducing a deputy FCO for mitigation.

The most significant mitigation activity that FEMAand Director Witt initiated, however, was ProjectImpact. Project Impact attempted to build disaster-resistant communities by developing public-private-nonprofit partnerships in local communities, byexamining the community’s risk of and vulnerabili-ty to natural and man-made disasters, by identify-ing and ranking risk-reduction actions in the com-munity, and by communicating the benefits andresponsibilities of mitigation to the disaster resistantcommunity (FEMA, July 1998).

Challenges Ahead for the NextAdministratorDespite the laudable changes in FEMA’s mission,operations, and public image, the agency is still not free of problems. President Clinton’s decision to increase the political profile of disaster manage-ment probably contributed to the increase inrequests and declarations during his administration(See Figure 1). More seriously, FEMA was slow todevelop explicit or more stringent criteria for provid-ing major disaster assistance (FEMA-IG, March 1999;USGAO, March 26, 1998). Both GAO and theFEMA-IG criticized state governors, the President,and FEMA for failing to match requests and findingsto factual data or published criteria. In fairness,much of this difficulty rested with the reluctance ofmembers of Congress to abandon their roles as dis-aster ombudsmen for their districts and states.

Beyond ambiguity in the declaration process,FEMA’s financial system was not operating up tofederal standards until 1995. An audit by the FEMA-IG of the Disaster Relief Fund in July 1995 revealedunreliable fund financial data, unclear standards ofappropriateness for expenditures, inadequate grantsmanagement, irregular and incomplete loan data,and, in several instances, inefficient and uneconom-ical field operations (FEMA-IG, July 1995).

FEMA did not use appropriate cost-effectiveness cri-teria to evaluate Project Impact programs. State and

President Clinton in Davenport, Iowa, at site of GreatMidwestern Floods.

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local governments did not always submit evaluationdata when applying for hazard mitigation grants.Although FEMA reported cost-benefit analysis as thebasis for grant recommendations, fully one-third ofall hazard mitigation projects were exempted fromcost-benefit analysis by FEMA policy. The criteria forthese exemptions were rarely clear.

Overall, most of FEMA’s current problems arosefrom Director Witt’s decision to balance the dilem-ma of “works better” and “costs less” in favor ofproductivity. In practice, pursuing both goalsproved unworkable. “Working better” suggestedeliminating structures and procedures that inhibitedthe creative use of resources by FEMA officials.“Costing less” implied constraining those same offi-cials with strategic plans and demanding theachievement of measurable outcomes. Witt clearlychose to “work better.” The benefits of thisapproach were short term and were evident inFEMA’s more rapid response and improved publicimage. The costs were longer term and resulted inpoorer evaluation procedures and weaker financialmanagement. A senior congressional staff memberinvestigating Project Impact found it “difficult tomeasure before and after. Some people consider it[Project Impact] to be a political slush fund.”

Director Witt’s stature within the Clinton administra-tion has deflected much of the criticism that mightotherwise result from these financial and evaluation

concerns. The director has proven to be adept atanticipating and minimizing dissatisfaction withFEMA policy and operations. He has also undertak-en substantial financial reforms since the publicationof the 1995 FEMA-IG report. A future director withweaker connections to the White House may findthese concerns to be more critical. Pressures fromCongress, the Office of Management and Budget,and the General Accounting Office may force theagency to shift the balance back from productivity(“works better”) to cost-effectiveness (“costs less”).

Figure 1. Number of Major Disaster Declarations and Turndowns, 1953-1998

0

20

40

60

80

100

Declarations

Year

Num

ber

of D

isas

ters

and

Req

uest

s

Source: FEMA, July 7, 1999Turndowns

54 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 9856

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Andrews, Edmund L. August 27, 1992. “HurricaneAndrew; Storm Poses Test for a Much-BlamedAgency.” New York Times, Section B, p. 8, Col. 3,National Desk. Accessible by Lexis-NexisAcademic Universe - Document.

Bates, David Q. September 27, 1989. “InteriorDepartment Report on Hurricane Hugo.”Memorandum for the President. White HouseOffice of Records Management (WHORM), DI-002,082106SS, George Bush Presidential Library.

Bush, George. August 26, 1992. “Remarks onHurricane Andrew and the Situation in Iraq and anExchange with Reporters.” Weekly Compilation ofPresidential Documents 28: 1512.

“Charleston Begs Government for Help.”September 28, 1989. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, p. 10A. Accessible by Lexis-Nexis AcademicUniverse - Document.

Clary, Mike. August 29, 1992. “Federal DisasterRelief Buoys Battered Florida; Hurricane: LocalOfficials’ Animosity Fades as Troops and SuppliesArrive. The Toll of Homeless Rises to 250,000.” LosAngeles Times, Part A, p. 1, Column 2, NationalDesk. Accessible by Lexis-Nexis AcademicUniverse - Document.

Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA].1994. Reinventing Disaster Response 1994:Northridge Earthquake – The First Five Weeks.Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government PrintingOffice.

__________. April 1994. Renewal of EmergencyManagement: The FEMA One-Year Report, April1993-April 1994. Washington, D.C.: FEMA.

__________. January 24, 1997. “Midwest Floods1993 (Web site).” Virtual Library and ElectronicReading Room. Accessible on the World Wide Webat http://www.fema.gov/library/mw.htm.

__________. September 30, 1997. Strategic Plan FY1998 through FY 2007 with Operational Objectivesthrough FY 2003: Partnership for a Safer Future(Web site). (http://www.fema.gov/library/splan.pdf).Washington, D.C.: FEMA.

__________. July 1998. Project Impact: Building aDisaster Resistant Community. Washington, D.C.:FEMA.

__________. April 1999. Federal EmergencyResponse Plan. Washington, D.C.: FEMA.Accessible on the World Wide Web athttp://www.fema.gov/r-n-r/fed1.htm.

__________. July 7, 1999. “Declarations andTurndowns (Detail).” DARIS Run. Washington,D.C.: FEMA.

__________. December 23, 1999. “FEMAOrganization.” Washington, D.C.: FEMA.Accessible on the World Wide Web athttp://www.fema.gov/about/femaorg.htm.

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Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office ofthe Inspector General, Audit Division. January1993. FEMA’s Disaster Management Program: APerformance Audit after Hurricane Andrew (H-01-93). Washington, D.C.: FEMA-IG.

__________. July 1995. Audit of FEMA’s DisasterRelief Fund (H-16-95). Washington, D.C.: FEMA-IG.

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Kettl, Donald F. September 1998. ReinventingGovernment: A Fifth-Year Report Card (CPM 98-1).Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Accessibleon the World Wide Web athttp://www.brook.edu/gs/cpm/government.pdf.

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Lott, Neal. September 1993. “The Summer of 1993:Flooding in the Midwest and Drought in theSoutheast (TR 93-04).” Washington, D.C.: NationalOceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.Accessible on the World Wide Web at the NationalVirtual Data System http://nndc.noaa.gov/?http://ols.nndc.noaa.gov:7777/plolstore/plsql/olstore.prodspecific?prodnum=C00487-PUB-A0001.

Lynn, James T. June 5, 1976. “Handling of Damagesfor Teton Dam.” Memorandum for the President.Domestic Council. F. Lynn May. Box 9. Folder:FDAA Teton Dam Disaster June 5, 1976 (1). GeraldR. Ford Presidential Library.

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Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 23

Legislative HistoryThe formal history of federal disaster managementpolicy dates from the passage of the Disaster ReliefAct of 1950. Prior to 1950, federal response to nat-ural and man-made disaster was largely ad hoc.Between 1803 and 1950, the U.S. Congress enact-ed 128 separate laws to deal with individual disas-ters (Sylves 1996). After 1950 the federal govern-ment committed itself to supplementing state andlocal disaster relief on a more systematic basis. Atthe time, no one realized the precedent-settingnature of the policy change.

The Disaster Relief Act of 1950 for the first timeprovided a general, federal-level framework for theprovision of emergency relief. The initial law pro-vided only “public assistance” to restore publicfacilities and buildings to pre-disaster standards.Once the precedent of federal intervention hadbeen established, however, considerable pressuredeveloped in the system to expand the federal role(Schneider 1995).

The Disaster Relief Act of 1970 introduced tempo-rary housing, legal services, unemployment insur-ance, and other individual assistance programs. The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 introduced the dis-tinction between emergency and major disasterassistance and the Individual and Family Grant

program. What is most important, the 1974 actbroadened federal emergency management policyfrom the reactive policies of response and recoveryto the more proactive policies of mitigation andpreparedness. The act also introduced the conceptof “multi-hazard” or integrated emergency manage-ment: National, state, and local policies shoulduniformly handle all types of hazards rather thandeal with each disaster as a unique event.

Discontent with the continuing ambiguities of fed-eral disaster policies prompted the passage of theRobert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and EmergencyAssistance Act of 1988. The act clarified emergencydeclarations, delineated the relief responsibilities ofpublic institutions, reiterated the importance of mit-igation and preparedness functions, and outlinedthe intergovernmental process for relief. No majorlegislative changes have occurred since 1988.

The net effect of these legal changes has been agradual increase in the federal role in disaster assis-tance. Under the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, thefederal government was primarily responsible forthe restoration of public facilities. With the passageof the Stafford Act, federal aid expanded to includevarious kinds of individual, nonprofit, and privateassistance. One long-term consequence (as indicat-ed in Figure 1 on pg. 19) has been an uneven but

Appendix I – History ofFederal EmergencyManagement

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24 Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

steady increase in the number of federal disasterrequests and declarations (Federal EmergencyManagement Agency [FEMA], July 7, 1999).

Organizational and AdministrativeChange in Federal DisasterManagementThe gradual expansion of the federal role in disasterassistance was accompanied by considerable orga-nizational instability. The functions of federal disas-ter management had no long-term organizationalhome for much of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.Many of the organizational changes that occurredduring this period reflected the uneasy coexistenceof the disaster assistance, national preparedness,and civil defense functions. The requirement thatthe statutory disaster agency coordinate the activi-ties of 26 federal agencies (including itself) and theAmerican Red Cross further complicated the organi-zational ambiguity of emergency management.

Excluding name changes, five different agenciescoordinated disaster assistance between 1950 and1979: the Housing and Home Finance Administra-tion (HHFA), the Office of Defense Mobilization(ODM), the Office of Civil and Defense Mobiliza-tion (OCDM), the Office of Emergency Prepared-ness (OEP), and the Federal Disaster AssistanceAdministration ([FDAA] National Archives andRecords Administration [NARA] 1999, McLoughlin1985, Schneider 1995). At various times, theseagencies were organized as independent agencies,departments within the Executive Office of the Pres-ident, and sub-cabinet agencies. Whereas FDAAand HHFA exercised only the disaster assistancefunctions, ODM and OEP performed both disasterand preparedness assignments, and OCDM execut-ed all three primary functions.

Disaster assistance was also seriously understaffedand underfunded for much of its history. One seniorFEMA official who worked under OEP, FDAA, andFEMA noted that during Hurricane Camille in 1969,only 15 people staffed the OEP response effort.Disaster relief traditionally was funded with emer-gency, off-budget appropriations. In some cases, thefunding occurred completely independently of exist-ing organizational and financial structures. Followingthe Alaskan Earthquake in 1964, the U.S. Congresswas forced to set up a separate government commis-

sion to oversee the recovery effort. The Ford adminis-tration found itself confronted with a similar necessi-ty after the collapse of the Teton Dam in 1975.

The Early Years of FEMABy 1978, the President, Congress, and state andlocal officials all expressed concern over the state ofdisaster relief. The sub-cabinet status of the keyoperational agencies for disaster assistance, pre-paredness, and civil defense (FDAA, the FederalPreparedness Agency [FPA], and the Defense CivilPreparedness Agency [DCPA] respectively) made itdifficult for them to direct the activities of otherhigher-level agencies. The separation of disasterassistance, preparedness, and civil defense functionsunder the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 dividedresponsibility and generated conflict over appropria-tions. This division limited the disaster system’s abil-ity to produce integrated emergency managementsystems. The treatment of each disaster as an isolat-ed event made the entire disaster assistance systemsensitive to political manipulation. To respond tothese shortcomings, the President’s ReorganizationProject recommended that President Carter com-bine FDAA, FPA, and DCPA into a single, indepen-dent disaster assistance agency, an action heapproved reluctantly (McIntyre, May 25, 1978: 6).

FEMA, created by Reorganization Plan No. 3 andimplemented by Executive Orders 12127 and12148, had operational difficulties from the start.The FPA, DCPA, and FDAA components remainedphysically separated for nearly two years. The twomain directorates, National Preparedness (createdfrom FPA) and State and Local Programs and Support(created from FDAA), had different organizationalcultures that led to “stovepiping” or vertical integra-tion and horizontal separation. Very little communi-cation or support passed between the two direc-torates. This tendency was exacerbated by the cul-ture of secrecy in National Preparedness and by theReagan and Bush administration’s focus on nationalpreparedness over disaster assistance. Despite theseproblems, agency response did not generate publiccriticism because no truly catastrophic disastersoccurred between 1981 and 1988. The strongesthurricane was Gloria (Category 3) in 1985. The mostpowerful earthquake was the Coalinga quake in1983. Although both caused extensive damage, nei-ther produced the level of catastrophic damage thatwould occur under the Bush administration.

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Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 25

Methodology

Research QuestionsIn this study, the researchers investigated the evolu-tion of the disaster assistance programs of FEMAfrom the Bush administration to the Clinton admin-istrations. Public perceptions of agency perfor-mance improved between the two administrations(Schneider, 1995). We investigated the followingbroad research questions:

• Do the improved perceptions reflect realimprovements in agency performance?

• If real, do the improvements appear to be short term or long term?

• Do the improvements reflect technologicalbreakthroughs, changes in leadership, manage-rial improvements, or some combination ofthese factors?

To answer the first question, the authors examinedprevious evaluations of agency performance by theNational Academy of Public Administration (NAPA),the U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO), andthe FEMA Inspector General’s (FEMA-IG) office. We also analyzed the agency’s 1997 strategic plan(FEMA, Sept. 30, 1997). The second questionrequired an investigation of the change in theagency’s organizational culture. The third researchquestion required the identification of the sources ofthe transformation, which can serve as a model forenhancing the business of government.

Study MethodsGiven the six-month period of the grant, theresearchers used the case study approach to focusthe investigation. The researchers compared FEMA’sreadiness and response to three catastrophic disas-ters during the Bush administration (HurricaneHugo, the Loma Prieta Earthquake (both in 1989),and Hurricane Andrew in 1992) to the agency’sreaction to two catastrophic disasters during theClinton administration (the Great MidwesternFloods of 1993 and the Northridge Earthquake in1994). This research allowed a comparison of dis-aster responses for which the agency received con-siderable criticism to ones that generated very posi-tive public relations.

The three Bush administration disasters were evalu-ated from disaster records in the White HouseCentral Files of the Bush Library in College Station,Texas, and published documents. The two Clintonadministration disasters were assessed from FEMArecords, documents, and Internet material, andinterviews with FEMA staff in Washington, D.C.,especially the Mitigation, Preparedness, and theResponse and Recovery Directorates.

The principal issues relate to differences in man-agement style, technological developments, andperformance enhancements that occurred betweenthe administrations. This information will allow theidentification of best practices that distinguish thecurrent FEMA effort and will also provide advice tofuture presidential administrations on the broaderquestions of policy implementation.

Appendix II

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26 Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

List of InterviewsRob Alexander, Senior Legislative Assistant, U.S.Senator Barbara Boxer (D) – California.

Mike Armstrong, Associate Director, MitigationDirectorate, Federal Emergency ManagementAgency.

Kris Balderston, Deputy Assistant to the President,Deputy Cabinet Secretary, Clinton administration.

Keith Bea, Specialist in American NationalGovernment, Congressional Research Service.

Jane Bullock, Chief of Staff, Federal EmergencyManagement Agency.

Bryan Giddings, Legislative Assistant, U.S. SenatorBob Graham (D) - Florida.

Morrie Goodman, Director, Office of Public Affairs,Office of the Secretary, Department of Commerce.

Kay Goss, Associate Director, Preparedness andTraining Directorate, Federal EmergencyManagement Agency.

George Haddow, Deputy Chief of Staff, FederalEmergency Management Agency.

Ann Hearst, Director of Special Projects, U.S.Senator Dianne Feinstein (D) – California.

Berke Kulik, Associate Director of DisasterAssistance, Small Business Administration.

Fran McCarthy, Acting Deputy Director, Office ofCongressional and Legislative Affairs, FederalEmergency Management Agency.

Bill Medigovich, Director, Office of EmergencyTransportation, U.S. Department of Transportation.

George Opfer, Inspector General, FederalEmergency Management Agency.

Marcus Peacock, Senior Professional Staff Member,Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, andEmergency Management, Committee onTransportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House ofRepresentatives.

Lacy Suiter, Associate Director, Response andRecovery Directorate, Federal EmergencyManagement Agency.

James Lee Witt, Director, Federal EmergencyManagement Agency.

List of Abbreviations

ARC Alaskan ReconstructionCommission

DAC Disaster Assistance Center

DCPA Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

FDAA Federal Disaster AssistanceAdministration

FEMA Federal Emergency ManagementAgency

FEMA-IG Federal Emergency ManagementAgency, Inspector General’s Office

FPA Federal Preparedness Agency

HHFA Housing and Home Finance Agency

NAPA National Academy of PublicAdministration

NARA National Archives and RecordsAdministration

NPR National Performance Review

OCDM Office of Civil and DefenseMobilization

ODM Office of Defense Mobilization

OEP Office of Emergency Planning(Preparedness)

PCSD President’s Council on SustainableDevelopment

USGAO United States General AccountingOffice

WHORM White House Office of RecordsManagement

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Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 27

R. Steven Daniels is Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Public Service and Director of the Master of PublicAdministration Program at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. Dr. Daniels has received grants related to disaster management from ThePricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for The Business of Government, theGerald R. Ford Foundation, and the University of Alabama at BirminghamGraduate School, and presented 12 convention papers on presidentialdecision making, FEMA, and disaster management. He is the author orcoauthor of 14 refereed publications and book chapters in the areas ofdecision making, aging, legislative behavior, and public policy in suchjournals as The American Political Science Review, The Gerontologist,Social Science Quarterly, The Journal of Criminal Justice, and The PolicyStudies Review. His doctorate is from the University of Oregon.

Carolyn L. Clark-Daniels is retired from Iowa State University. She has received grants related to disaster management from ThePricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for The Business of Government,National Science Foundation, and the Gerald R. Ford Foundation. Solely and jointly, she has presented 12 convention papers on Presidentialdecision making, FEMA, and disaster management. She is the author orcoauthor of 16 articles and two research reports in the areas of publicadministration, gerontology, decision making, and welfare policy in suchjournals as Social Science Quarterly, The Gerontologist, The Journal ofCriminal Justice, and The Journal of Elder Abuse and Neglect. She has also worked as an auditor for the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Departmentof Health and Human Services). Her doctorate is from the University ofAlabama.

About the Authors

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28 Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

To contact the author:R. Steven DanielsAssociate Professor and Master of Public Administration Program DirectorDepartment of Government and Public ServiceUniversity of Alabama at Birmingham U2381530 3rd Avenue SouthBirmingham, AL 35294-3350(205) 934-8675

e-mail: [email protected]

Carolyn L. Clark-DanielsAssistant Professor (Retired)603 Beaconcrest CircleBirmingham, AL 35209-7410(205) 802-7185

e-mail: [email protected]

Key Contact Information

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To download or order a copy of these reports, visit the Endowment website at: endowment.pwcglobal.com

Managing Workfare: The Case of theWork Experience Program in the NewYork City Parks Department (June 1999)

Steven CohenColumbia University

Results of the Government LeadershipSurvey: A 1999 Survey of FederalExecutives (June 1999)

Mark A. AbramsonSteven A. ClyburnElizabeth MercierPricewaterhouseCoopers

Credit Scoring and Loan Scoring: Toolsfor Improved Management of FederalCredit Programs (July 1999)

Thomas H. StantonJohns Hopkins University

The Importance of Leadership: The Roleof School Principals (September 1999)

Paul TeskeMark Schneider State University of New York at StonyBrook

Leadership for Change: Case Studies in American Local Government(September 1999)

Robert B. DenhardtJanet Vinzant DenhardtArizona State University

Managing Decentralized Departments:The Case of the U.S. Department ofHealth and Human Services (October 1999)

Beryl A. RadinState University of New York at Albany

New Tools for Improving GovernmentRegulation: An Assessment of EmissionsTrading and Other Market-BasedRegulatory Tools (October 1999)

Gary C. BrynerUniversity of Colorado School of Law

Determining a Level Playing Field for Public-Private Competition(November 1999)

Lawrence L. MartinColumbia University

An Assessment of BrownfieldRedevelopment Policies: The MichiganExperience (November 1999)

Richard C. HulaMichigan State University

Religious Organizations, Anti-PovertyRelief, and Charitable Choice: AFeasibility Study of Faith-Based WelfareReform in Mississippi (November 1999)

John P. BartkowskiMississippi State UniversityHelen A. RegisLouisiana State University

Business Improvement Districts andInnovative Service Delivery (November 1999)

Jerry MitchellBaruch College, The City University of New York

Profiles in Excellence: Conversationswith the Best of America’s CareerExecutive Service (November 1999)

Mark W. HuddlestonUniversity of Delaware

San Diego County’s Innovation Program:Using Competition and a Whole LotMore to Improve Public Services(January 2000)

William B. EimickeColumbia University

Using Activity-Based Costing to ManageMore Effectively (January 2000)

Michael H. GranofDavid E. PlattIgor VaysmanUniversity of Texas at Austin

Innovation in the Administration ofPublic Airports (March 2000)

Scott E. TarrySouthern Illinois University

Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of theFederal Emergency Management Agency (April 2000)

R. Steven DanielsUniversity of Alabama at BirminghamCarolyn L. Clark-DanielsBirmingham, Alabama

Transforming Government: Creating the New Defense Procurement System (April 2000)

Kimberly A. HarokopusBoston College

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