Transformation of Sovereignty and Globalization

In: Grinin, L. E., Beliaev, D. D. and Korotayev, A. V. (eds.), Hierarchy and Power in the History of Civilizations: Political Aspects of Modernity (pp. 191–224). Moscow: KD «Librocom».

Transformation of Sovereignty andGlobalization

Leonid. E. GrininVolgograd Сenter for Social Research

INTRODUCTION

In the world political science the subject of change, ‘diffusion’, or ‘dis-appearing’ of national sovereignty started to be raised in the late 20 th – early 21st century in connection with the problems of globalization and new world order (see e.g., Giddens 1990; Walker and Mendlovitz 1990a; Barkin and Cronin 1994; Farer 1996; Gelber 1997; Held еt al. 1999; Gilpin 2001; Gans 2001; Courchene and Savoie 2003a; Held and McGrew 2003b; Weiss 2003; Tekin 2005; Ilyin 1993b; Ilyin and In-ozemtsev 2001; Tsimbursky 1993 etc.)1. In our opinion, the processes of changing of sovereignty nowadays are among those of much signifi-cance. Presumably, if such processes (of course with much fluctuation) gain strength it will surely affect all spheres of life, including change of ideology and social psychology (the moment which is still underesti-mated by many analysts). Generally speaking, notwithstanding an avalanche of works devoted to the transformation of sovereignty, some topical aspects of the problem mentioned appear to have been disre-garded. The present article is devoted to the analysis of one of such in-sufficiently investigated aspects – the deliberate voluntary reduction of sovereign prerogatives.

In the present paper we have tried to prove that on the whole global-ization contributes to the change and reduction of nomenclature and scope of state sovereign powers, and besides it is a bilateral process: on the one hand, the factors are strengthening that fairly undermine the countries' sovereignty, on the other – most states voluntarily and delib-erately limit the scope of their sovereignty. Naturally, one can also speak about the whole range of important directions, tendencies and processes, which constitute manifold complicated (and in many respects contradictory) dynamics of world political processes; and, as a conse-quence, they do not only limit sovereignty but also, in some way, evi-Grinin / Transformation Sovereignty and Globalization, pp. 191–224

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Hierarchy and Power: Political Aspects of Modernity

dently consolidate it (see e.g., Weiss 2003; Courchene and Savoie 2003b: 8–9; for the analysis of various views on these problems see Thomson 1995; Held and McGrew 2003a, 2003b). Later, we will return to this point. But naturally, it is absolutely impossible to give the whole picture of all processes in one article, so our main task is to investigate the tendency of changing and reducing of the modern prerogatives, es-pecially in view of voluntary actions of the owners of those preroga-tives.

WHY IS THE NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY DIFFICULT AND AMBIGUOUS?

In political science sovereignty is usually defined as the most essential attribute of the state in the form of its complete self-sufficiency i.e., its supremacy in the domestic policy and independence in the foreign one (see e.g., Jary and Jary 1999: 311; Averyanov 1993: 367; Held 2003: 162–163). This notion became widespread in the 19 th century. But al-ready at the beginning of the Modern Age it got quite a definite interpre-tation in the works by Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbs and others (see e.g., Held 2003: 162–163; Hinsley 1989; Shinoda 2000; Ilyin 1993a, 1993b, 2001).

Within the Westphalian system of international relations, (it formed after the Thirty Year War and 1648 Peace Treaties of Westphalia, see e.g., Gross 1948) the principles of state sovereignty gradually obtained the all-European, and then universal appreciation (see about these prin-ciples Held et al. 1999: 37–38). However, it is important to note that this ‘normative trajectory’ of international law was fully described only by the end of the 18th – early 19th century (Ibid.: 37), this was especially connected to the events of the Great French Revolution, and also with Napoleon Wars and a new order established after the Vienna Congress in 1815 (see about it, e.g., Gelber 1997: 4; Barkin and Cronin 1994: 115; Shinoda 2000). At present the UNO Charter and some other inter-national agreements contain regulations on sovereign equality of states and nations' right to self-determination which together with the increas-ing degree of external security of most countries, in our view has suffi-ciently contributed to the consolidation of the idea of national sovereignty in international affairs in the second half of the 20 th century. Indeed, as we will see further, the tendency toward the recognition of the sovereign rights is combined with the tendency toward their volun-tarily constraint by the sovereigns themselves.

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However, the notion of sovereignty is one of the most difficult and ambiguous (see e.g., Maritain 1950; Stankiewicz 1969: 291; Barkin and Cronin 1994; Krasner 2001: 134), and its content has constantly changed and continues changing in connection with the transformations of international relations and characteristics of the states themselves, even in connection with complexity of definition of the notion of state (see e.g., Kratochwil 1986; Mitchell 1991; Barkin and Cronin 1994; see also Grinin and Korotayev 2006; Grinin 2006а, 2007а; about the cradle of European state sovereignty see Mesquita 2000; see also Ruggie 1993). This content also changed depending on who is implied as the supreme sovereign: a feudal monarch having the right to ‘grant or split states when sharing the inheritance’, an enlightened absolute monarch who acts on behalf of people, or the nation itself (see e.g., Yan 1996). Besides, the sovereignty that is absolute in theory of states was always strongly and even fatally limited by different factors (and analysts had mentioned this fact long before the study of the globalization processes began (see for example, Garner 1925; Shinoda 2000). Sovereignty can be regarded in different aspects (e.g., as positive and negative sovereignty [see Jackson 1990]) and versions (see e.g., Ilyin 1993b).

In other words, the notion of sovereignty is not univocal and indis-putable but provokes numerous debates and, thus, demands a consider-able elaboration, including various approaches to the classification of the states themselves possessing sovereignty. Thus, Giddens, for exam-ple, distinguishes state-nations and nation-states correspondingly as ty-pologically earlier and later (Giddens 1985, 1990, 1991; Giddens and Pierson 1998; see also Barkin and Cronin 1994). There is a multitude of other theories, e.g., of quasi-states (Jackson 1990).

In political science one gradually becomes aware of the necessity of re-interpretation and re-appraisal of the notion of ‘sovereignty’ in con-nection with the emergence of the world political community, defining boundaries of private sovereignty, principles of their combination with each other and building their hierarchy, and also taking into considera-tion actions of other different subjects: MNC, numerous non-govern-mental organizations, multinational structures and arrangements, also considering the development of various global ideologies, for example, Global Civil Society (see, for example: Averyanov 1993: 368; Utkin 2000: 41–42; Luneev 2005: 114–115; Vincent 1986; Walker and Mendlovitz 1990b; Camilleri 1990; Barkin and Cronin 1994; Thomson 1995; Daniels and Alarie 2003; Johnson and Mayrand 2003; Keane

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2003; Laxer and Halperin 2003; Tekin 2005). One can agree with Harry Gelber's conclusion: the last decade of the 20th century showed the inca-pacity of the national state to solve increasing complexity of problems, having a global character (Gelber 1997: 12). In particular the 1990s wit-nessed the appearance of numerous works on comprehension of differ-ent aspects of the sovereignty notion because of the events connected with the direct interference and military intervention (including the one sanctioned by the UN) with respect to particular countries such as Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and others (see e.g., Mayall 1991; Roberts 1991: 519–520; Helman and Ratner 1992–1993; Rosas 1994; Tesón 1996; Acevedo and Grossman 1996; Diamond 1996; Regan 1996)2.

GLOBALIZATION, ECONOMY AND WORLD POLICY

Globalization is a result of a very complicated alloy of political, social, economic, civilizational and many other processes of the modern world (see e.g., the analysis of its various aspects or ‘dimensions’ in Giddens 1990). But among these numerous factors one should especially mark out the huge changes in modern productive forces, media, world trade and specialization (Medvedev 2004: 3; Grinin 1999а, 2005, 2007b). It is significant that many researchers first of all point out the economic na-ture of globalization (e.g., Zuev and Myasnikova 2004: 54; Kaplinsky 2003: 4; see also, Anilionis and Zotova 2005). But one should bear in mind the significant fundamental idea that we have already maintained (Grinin 1999а, 2005, 2007b): to consider economic and technical changes as an ‘engine’ of globalization means to admit the non-stop character of the process of globalization or the impossibility to break or turn it back, as nowadays it is impossible to stop or hamper the develop-ment of new technologies3.

Technology and trade entangle the world with new network connec-tions and make national boundaries transparent (see Strange 2003; Held 2003; Habermas 2003; Daniels and Alarie 2003; Russel 1997; Beck 2001; Castells 1999, 2002; see also, Grinin 1999a, 2005, 2007b). Such a situation combined with other factors harshly complicates the conditions external towards the society (Ivanov 2000: 14; see also Kratochwil 1986; Hansen and Park 1995). And, as a result, globalization strongly reduces and changes the scope of national sovereignty and undermines the position of a state as that of the principle subject of international af-fairs (see Grinin 1999a; 2005; 2007b). Thus, changes in production forces in this or that way lead to changes of all other spheres of life in -cluding also the political one (see Grinin 1999а, 1999b).

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This implies an important conclusion that we have already pointed out in other works (Grinin 2005, 2007b): if the inevitable result of glob-alization appears to be the reduction of sovereignty, then it implies huge changes in behavioral patterns of states, corporations and groups, as well as of ordinary people. And though debates about destinies of a state (whether it is dying or consolidating) are quite frequent (see e.g., Thom-son 1995; Gilpin 2001; Held and McGrew 2003a: 121–125; Tekin 2005), the consequence in question is rarely discussed4.

In several works globalization (after some American political scien-tists) is sometimes defined as a process of the USA's will obtrusion to the rest of the world, as a the process of establishing new world order, profitable for the USA (see about it Bazhanov 2004; Brzezinski 1997; Medvedev 2004: 3; Stolyarova 2002: 72; Terentiev 2004; Collins 2002: 118). Actually, the USA's influence is evident and quite real5. But does it mean that exactly Pax Americana should be established, as many sin-cerely believe in the USA?

Certainly, it is possible. However, is it realistic to keep such an or-der permanently? This looks rather doubtful (see e.g., Konyshev 2004: 118–119). It seems more probable that in the nearest future the align-ment of forces in the world will change (for a detailed analysis of such changes see Todd 2004; see also Utkin 2002)6. After all, the presence of some tendencies does not mean that the future is already predetermined (e.g., Panarin 2000: 328). On the contrary, the direction, forms and re-sults of the processes will be constantly dependent on the changing bal-ance of the world forces, on the strategy that will be chosen by these or those countries and associations, on different geopolitical factors and combinations. In our opinion, it means that those who are longing for playing a more important role in the integrating and changing world must forecast and foresee the tendencies to use them for their own bene-fits (about the available possibilities for the lesser countries see: Harris 2003: 65). Undoubtedly, Russia will be able to play an essential role in the new world order, if it selects the right strategy. Thus, one should not mourn for the globalization passing in the American style (see e.g., Кrylova 2004), but find a proper place in the stream of global processes without loosing one's peculiarities, particularly using common cultural-linguistic traditions in the vast territories of the CIS, and also Russian natural geopolitical and resource advantages (this, by the way, has become apparent in the Russian economic strategy during the last three years).

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But what after all globalization is? Its generally accepted definition does not exist and presumably it will not appear in the immediate future, as far as it has most diverse meanings7. Without any claim to a unequiv-ocal definition, we would determine it in the following way. Globaliza-tion is a process as a result of which the world becomes more con-nected and more dependent on all its subjects. Both the increase of the quantity of problems common for states and the expansion of the number and types of integrand subjects take place.

In other words the peculiar system emerges, where the problems of separate countries, nations, regions and other subjects (corporations, dif-ferent associations, global media holding companies etc.) interlace into one tangle. Separate local events and conflicts influence a great number of countries. At the same time decisions in the most significant centers of the world have an effect on all the fates. In general the processes of globalization in the broadest sense are characterized by the abrupt inten-sification and complication of mutual contacts in the basic branches of the economic, political and social life, gaining planetary scales (Ivanov 2004: 19). Globalization is an exclusively versatile process. Practically all spheres of life experience its impact (see e.g., Giddens 2004)8. Lots of positive as well as negative phenomena also gain a global character e.g., the struggle for the preservation of the environment, the antiglobal-istic movement itself (see e.g., Levin 2003), terrorism and criminality (see e.g., Mirsky 2004b: 80; Luneev 2005: 114–115), drug mafia etc. In this sense the idea of globalizing Islam and other religions is of great in-terest (Mirsky 2004a: 35; see also: Schaebler and Stenberg 2004).

Any development always means that a certain part of changes makes the situation sometimes worse in comparison with the previous events (see in more detail Grinin 1997: 68–69; 2006c: 92–94). In our opinion the reducing of the scope of sovereign prerogatives leads both to positive and negative consequences. Thus, the greater than before openness of boundaries provides not only the increase of trade but also contributes to the expansion of terrorism and facilitates drug traffic. At the same time the balance of advantages and disadvantages looks differ-ent for different countries, regions, territories and even different social strata. This implies such an ambiguous perception of globalization. This is not in vain that its critics point at the irregularity in benefiting global-ization and the increasing gap in the living standard of different coun-tries (see e.g., Capra 2004: 171)9. It is important to note that setting up the outlines of the new order, globalization thereby breaks the old one, functioning within the state system's framework, therefore, the speed of the destruction of old relations often exceeds the speed of the formation

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of the new ones. In particular, in a number of countries this becomes ap-parent in the destruction of traditional ideology, based on the sacraliza-tion of fatherland and nations, and consequently, in the weakening of such earlier highly evaluated qualities as patriotism due to the growth of alternative to the national preferences and identifications (the analysis of the phenomena of cosmopolitism, see e.g., Palmer 2003). But instead globalization has not created any complete ideology to fascinate masses.

In other works we have already discussed both the above mentioned fact itself and the point that national boundaries become far less serious barrier for modern technical and economic forces than it was earlier (for more detail see Grinin 1999a; 2006b: 158–159). Many factors contribute to this, especially the powerful development of trade, transport, the role of the international capital, MNC etc. (see, Strange 2003; Held 2003; Habermas 2003; Castells 1999, 2002)10. It is also worth keeping in mind that in the process of world globalization not only states but more and more territories and regions interact (Grebenschikov 2004: 89). We have also pointed out that the most rapid-growing branches of industry are just supranational in their nature. As a case in point we can mention space technologies or Internet which are more and more actively used for commercial purposes (see e.g., Filippova 2000; Boleskina 2000; Zharova 2004). Figuratively speaking, a person nowadays acquires func-tions of a mini-station accepting and transmitting different information often leaving aside national boundaries (for more detail see Grinin 1999а, 2004).

Close interconnections of national economies lead to rapid and more-over uncontrollable reacting to the local crises in different places of the planet. This fact has been recently confirmed by financial crises that hap-pened in different countries, when the vehement international capital pro-voked them in a matter of hours (Volkonsky 1998: 217)11. George Soros concludes (2000) that financial markets are unpredictable and unstable in their nature. One of the main reasons of such instability is founded on the fact that political institutes fall behind economy which overgrew na-tional limits and requires supranational planning (van der Wee 1994: 374) and some forms of joint control over vibration sources of financial and other markets. As Robert Catgner, the editor of the magazine ‘American Prospect’ summarizes ‘the rates are simply too much high to let the risk capital and exchange fluctuations define the destiny of the real economy’ (cited in: Capra 2004: 167).

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GLOBALIZATION, REDUCING SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONALISM

As has been stated above, in practice the sovereign rights and powers both of states and nations were always limited by various factors (see e.g., Krasner 1995–1996). Nevertheless, in theorists' minds ‘West-phalian sovereignty’ (i.e., unlimited sovereign rights) still existed. In present days it becomes clearer that Westphalian system with its princi-ples of international relations has fundamentally changed12. It is also im-portant to mention that nowadays the idea of states' free play seems wrong even from a merely theoretical point of view. The point is that the scope of the inner sovereignty has legally narrowed to a large degree due to the international agreements including the issues concerning hu-man rights (see Averyanov 1993: 368; Vincent 1986; Chopra and Weiss 1992; Shinoda 2000) and what is more – actually, in connection with al-ready formed models and traditions of states' behavior.

As Michael Mann (1997) correctly observes, in works dedicated to the transformation of the position and role of a state in the modern world we often, observe a one-sided debate on the issue whether the state system becomes stronger or weaker, meanwhile the process ap-pears to be quite complicated and ambiguous; in some way the positions of the state system are weakening but in other ways they become stronger (see also Yan 1996: 49)13. Thus, Susanne Strange insists that under the influence of intense economic processes the state power be-comes weaker and at the same time surprisingly notes that the state has started regulating the issues, which before people solved themselves without any state involvement, in particular how to build their own house, how to arrange family relations, so that in her point of view there is almost no sphere where the state bureaucracy would not intervene (Strange 2003: 128). She calls it a paradox though this is quite natural, as such processes never go unilinearly and only in a single direction. The general trajectory is always a complicated balance of alternate changes, though at the same time the system's weakening usually com-bines with strengthening of some its aspects – it occurs at the expense of its components conversion and changes in hierarchy levels.

In connection with what we have mentioned above we would like to emphasize especially the definite narrowness of the approaches even in the investigations concerning sovereignty since many authors study the issue only from the angle that powerful world economic supranational

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and to a great degree anonymous powers influence the transformation of national sovereignty, changing it on the whole as if in spite of or even contrary to the will of the states themselves (see e.g., Keohane 1995; Held 2003; Clark 1999; Slaughter 2000; Strange 2003)14. At the same time another aspect of the problem is almost unnoticed (or it is not re-garded sufficiently important), whereas we consider exactly an excep-tionally important one: sovereignty to a large (probably, prevalent) de-gree is reduced voluntarily by national states themselves. We have al-ready pointed out to those aspects and investigated them in a number of works (see Grinin 1999а, 2004, 2005, 2006b, 2007b).

In our opinion there is a whole range of factors which influence the process of changing national sovereignty including, of course, techno-logical and economic changes (for more details see Grinin 1999а, 1999b, 2007b), the aspiration for escaping wars, the presence of global problems uniting countries, the processes of the regional rapprochement, the rapid extension of the scope of contacts of all types and levels among the residents of different countries; the necessity of solving the great number of issues and settling controversial questions, increasing number of democratic regimes in the world, etc. However, the factor of voluntariness in reducing the scope of powers for the sake of gaining ex-tra prestige and benefits may be considered among them the most signif-icant, moreover, this very fact, as far as we see, defines the necessity of this movement15. Thereupon, we would like to draw attention to the ma-jor process lasting since the end of World War II, as a result of which many countries deliberately start limiting themselves in seemingly most sovereign things (for more details see: Grinin 1999а, 2004, 2005, 2006b, 2007b, 2007c, 2008).

It is enough even to cast a brief glance at the spheres where sovereignty has reduced to agree with above-said. The right to impose duties and taxation and define their rate; to forbid and reward import and export of goods (capitals) and some types of activity; to issue cur-rency; to borrow; to set the rules of keeping the imprisoned and usage of their labor; to use the capital punishment; to proclaim these or those politic liberties or restrict them; to define fundamental rules of elections (and to hold them proper) and electoral qualification, and also a great number of other important things have stopped to be defined only by the wishes of a state itself. Not so long ago the Europeans refused the sanc-tum sanctorum – their own national currencies that had been developed for centuries for the sake of one common currency (euro). Finally, what

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has always been regarded the main thing in sovereignty – the right of war and peace – is under international control. It was only 50 years ago when Russel and Einstein in their famous manifesto wrote: ‘To extirpate war it will require measures for the limitation of the national sovereignty which will wound national pride’ (see Adamovich and Shakhnazarov 1988: 185). Today such a control no longer hurts national pride. World wars and totalitarianism showed that absolute sovereignty including also the right to unleash wars and repressions is dangerous16. Hence it is possible to make an important though on the whole obvi-ous conclusion: the domestic affairs of a state where nobody inter-venes and which are regulated only by national law and traditions, are contracting and international law or law of a definite commu-nity (of collective participation) is expanding (Grinin 1999а; 2004, 2005, 2007c)17.

Undoubtedly, in history one can find many cases of voluntary obli-gations and pacts, which significantly restricted the sovereignty of sov-ereigns and countries. Take for example the Holy Union and its inter-ventions into the revolutionary countries in the first half of the 19 th cen-tury (Malle 1938), or the customs union of the German States of the first half of the 19th century (Deni and Sayo 1938: 78–80). The processes of internationalization have started not today but have already been going on for centuries constantly accelerating. But as we have already men-tioned (Grinin 1999a; 2005: 16–17), the prevalence and power of these processes yesterday and today are incomparable, in other words at present they have obtained a qualitatively different level in comparison with past epochs. First, they have embraced the whole world. Second, the economic alliances were uncommon before and now they have be-come the most typical form of associations. And some of the economic organizations (such as WTO, IMF) encompass the majority of countries of the world. The scale and aims of political associations have also changed. Third, the intensity and regularity of state leaders' contacts have grown enormously. And the problems they solve have changed greatly. Fourth, only a few countries are able to carry out an isolationist policy today and avoid any associations (like the policy of ‘brilliant iso-lation’ that Great Britain was carrying out in the 19th century).

To emphasize the above said it might be mentioned (though it may sound strange) that today the maximum sovereignty (i.e., the minimum restrictions in the use of the sovereign rights) is possessed by the coun-tries that are closed ideologically (China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and some

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other Muslim countries), or economically (such as North Korea, or Cuba), and exactly because of their ‘sovereign rights’ (in particular to create nuclear weapons) sharp conflicts tend to take place. But on the whole even these countries' sovereignty starts to diminish. As for suffi-ciently open and developed countries, in our point of view the tendency to delegate their powers to the international, regional and world organi-zations and associations is absolutely obvious. The only exception is the USA which at times permit themselves to act regardless of many coun-tries opinion, openly putting their national interests above the world and allied ones (see e.g., Kissinger 2002: 2; Brzezinski 2004). But it seems to us that just in this confrontation of the USA and other countries which express a certain collective opinion, probably roots the main in-trigue of the change of the world in the future as well as the transforma-tion of the content of international relations principles (see Grinin 1999а: 28–29; 2005: 9, 25–26; see also Todd 2004).

Thus, there is completely no doubt that today in comparison with the past the sovereignty of completely free and independent countries has become much smaller. And what is extremely impor-tant, many countries quite often give away a part of their sovereign powers voluntarily indeed. We think that such an ‘altruism’ can be se-riously explained only by the fact that such a restriction becomes prof-itable as instead the countries expect to gain quite real advantages (see e.g., Zlokazova 2004: 68). It is quite natural that such an ‘exchange’ has become possible in principle only as a result of the powerful influence of the described (and many unmentioned but implicit) processes. In our view a kind of world public opinion must be noted as an important cause of sovereignty reduction: the wider is the circle of countries vol-untarily limiting their sovereignty the more inferior appear those states which do not make such restrictions.

As has been mentioned above in political science it is realized to a certain degree that the doctrine of national sovereignty has become old-fashioned (Kissinger 2002: 296), moreover, these problems were touched even in the UN Secretaries General Butros Butros-Ghali and Kofi Annan's speeches and articles (see e.g., Annan 1999; see the analy-sis of his ideas in ICISS, 2001). However it seems that most researchers (especially in Russia) still underestimate the gravity of changes of sovereignty and the necessity to re-think this notion itself in the context of modern processes as well as a great number of others, connected with it (see e.g., the information about the predominance of the statecentric

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approaches and views on the policy as an autonomous process within the analysis of the conception of the international politics [Denemark 1999]). At the same time we agree that the state still principally remains (and will endure for quite a long time) the superior unit of historical and political life. Moreover, the division of the new and old phenomena is always a crucially important matter. As Adam Roberts correctly points out a new century (and a new order) comprises very strong elements of the old one (Roberts 1991: 521). However, the scope of the sovereign rights in the modern world has greatly redistributed, so in the interna-tional community there no more exist ‘one and indivisible’ government and public and national sovereignty.

The sovereignty is more often distributed between supranational, national, subnational, and sometimes regional and municipal units (Yan 1996: 49). Consequently, as has been mentioned above, new powerful factors have appeared and in the long run these factors gradually lead the state to stop being the principal sovereign and to give this place to larger supranational formations and structures. And in our opinion this tendency will increase. On the other hand, without fail we would like to add that this is not a one-sided and univocal but a many-sided process: sovereignty will reduce somehow (e.g., in the matters concerning economic strategy) but in some way, it will become stronger and even grow. So, e.g., Egbert Yan considers that ethnical-linguistic, cul-tural and social functions of the state will increase (Yan 1996: 49). That is why it is dangerous to hurry too much to bury national state, for a long time it will remain the leading player in international affairs (as on the whole one should be cautious enough while forecasting the global political changes see e.g., Bobrow 1999; Doran 1999). Besides, as some scholars fairly point out, the abrupt reduction of sovereignty and tradi-tional functions of a state may cause chaos (Utkin 2000: 41–42).

Though sovereignty is contracting, we find significant this principle itself (more exactly – the appeal to it in certain cases), that will probably long remain one of the most important in the international affairs. That is why its open disrespect will continue to provoke condemnation. When old ideas are still alive and the new ones have not become firmly established the collisions may obtain a form of opposition of principles which hides their historical significance. In that case it is difficult to un-derstand who is right, who is wrong. For instance, if one bases oneself on the right of the strong to openly trample on the sovereignty principle even with respect to a dictatorial regime, the sympathy may appear on

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the per se reactionary side. The war in Iraq in 2003 proves this. That is why it appears that in the legal and moral aspects really irreproachable arguments are desirable which would be based on the world organiza-tions decisions (the UN in the first place)18. That is why to support the actions against the regimes-disturbers the sanctions of exactly this kind are important (see e.g., Arbatov 2004: 77)19.

Therefore, as has been shown above, since the end of the Second World War the tendency is more clearly revealed that countries gradu-ally delegate a part of their sovereignty to the world international orga-nizations. Even a larger part of sovereignty passes to regional associa-tions. And the integration of states in suprastate economic associations is becoming more and more important part of globalization. Such supra-national formations are present on almost all continents and in some cases a transformation of economic alliances into political ones is out-lined. Of course, the process of creating really formed, systematically and profoundly integrated suprastate formations can not be quick. Nei-ther will it be smooth in our opinion, since all its members can not ig-nore their own interests and in this or that way they will defend their in-terests against the others. Besides, within the countries themselves dif-ferent political powers interpret national aims quite in a different way. In other words the adjustment of the supra- and intrastate interests is a difficult problem, and different confrontations are inevitable here. Be-sides, common aims also may be interpreted in a different way. In this sense, a very significant example is that of the USA which were able to bring together into a tight knot their purely national narrow political problems (such as the coming elections or the necessity to increase the president popularity) with world interests.

Globalization as has been proved by different studies including ours (e.g., Ryan 1997; Bahcheli et al. 2004b; Grinin 1999а, 2005) produces a dual effect with respect to nationalism. On the one hand, there can be observed a tendency to reduction of national sovereignty, on the other – a heavy growth of nationalism and even the smallest nationalities' striv-ing for gaining their own sovereignty (see about such unacknowledged nations e.g., Bahcheli et al., 2004a). The explanation of the reasons of separatism in the present period, to which we arrived, at first glance may seem paradoxical: nationalism is gaining strength because states are weakening as systems (for more details see Grinin 1999a, 2005). However, there is no real paradox here, especially taking into account that the most states' security is actually provided by the world commu-

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nity and the strongest states (see e.g., Pugh 1997; see also Grinin 1999a, 2005, 2007a). Besides, nations are not eternal essences, but ethnopoliti-cal societies, forming mostly within the state framework (Gellner 1991; Balibar and Wallerstein 2003; Armstrong 1982: 4) and under the influ-ence of technological changes (concerning the influence of printing technologies on the forming of nations see e.g., McLuhan 2005: 408 and others)20. Under certain conditions their solidarity and homogeneity inten-sify, and under the others – vice versa – weaken. So, creating the suprana-tional systems in the 20th century proceeded parallel with the destruction of colonial empires as well as of the old and newly created states, espe-cially multinational ones (see e.g., about Yugoslavia and Czechoslova-kia's collapse: Bookman 1994), note that some of them looked rather sta-ble (the USSR, and earlier in the beginning of the process, Austria-Hun-gary). And such a collapse, as we see it, fulfills in a certain sense a pro-gressive role, facilitating regional and world integration. But it is very morbid and destructive progress, which confirms the above-said ideas that a progress and regress are going hand in hand. The matter in fact is in their balance.

Thus, we are inclined to believe that on the one hand, we expect some forthcoming decades when national problems will stand sharply enough in different regions and countries, since the reasons for national-istic and secessionistic conflicts are very diverse (for a survey of these grounds see, e.g., Brown 1997; Beiner 1999; Diamond and Plattner 1994; Macartney 1996[1934]; Özkırımlı 2000; Voronovich and Ro-manchuk 2008). But, on the other hand, the belief is growing that the national right to the self-determination has turned into the ‘opium for peoples’ (see Altermatt 2000: 104; about the correlation between mo-noethnic and polyethnic states and the reasons for the rise of national-ism in the latter see also: Zagladin et al. 1995: 180–205). As Mikhail Ignatieff puts it, the narcissism of small differences between ethnoses start to flourish (Ignatieff 1999), and the consolidating ethnic ideology forms almost the main resource for the revival of the violence today (Wieviorka 2003: 109). However, at the same time although inconsis-tently and with difficulty, a negative attitude to the abuse of this right is being formed in the world public opinion. As a consequence, in our opinion the aggressive nationalism gradually splitting up the states and producing a threat to the world order must diminish. The disappear-ance of nations and national differences is out of question. As we see it, the process will develop in the right direction when national affairs, problems and relations come from the sphere of the highest politics

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and heated fights to the quieter level, as it happened with the relations among the different directions of Christianity in the majority of Euro-pean countries.

LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE

Turning our mind to the integration processes, one inevitably asks a question whether it is possible in any way and if it is, then in what way to reconcile various interests of hundreds of states having not only di-verse culture but a great gap in the level of development. After all, the acceleration of development of the world and limited time for solving global and other problems do not allow waiting till the underdeveloped countries find their own way of development, because such a search may take centuries. The opinion makes a certain sense that supporting the advance to the overcoming of the backwardness may be achieved only through creating an effective market and an effective state (Elyanov 2004: 16). And what if the state institution is weak, as in Trop-ical Africa (see Lebedeva 2004) and some other places (see on this mat-ter e.g., Langford 1999; Helman and Ratner 1992–1993)? And what should we do if the state is on the contrary strong enough to bar the fairly necessary changes (as in North Korea or Cuba)? And what should be done with the countries whose population and even elite are unable to understand global problems?

Therefore, in our view, the problem passes to the suprastate level and is connected with the transformation of sovereignty and with the external influence on those countries, within which there is no power for independent changes. But we are convinced that whatever mild is such an influence from outside, it will somehow affect sovereignty. Its limitation in our opinion has two levels. On the one hand, the developing countries are themselves ready to unite into regional communities to as-sert their interests together and solve problems. On the other – they are connected with the global confrontation between various developed and developing countries (the North – South problem).

Here is an example of changes at the first level. The regional orga -nizations in Africa, South-East Asia and Asian-Pacific region, as well as in Latin America after the Iraq events accepted a new stricter policy concerning terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. However, they prefer to solve these problems in their own way on their own territory and by means of independent peacemaking organi-zations which they also develop themselves. But at the same time they

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start to search for the means to minimize the risk of the violent Ameri -can invasion and also of the USA using the tactics ‘share and rule’ against the regional members (Bayles 2004: 75; on the issues of the global security in the Third World Countries see also: Buzan 1991).

On the second level a dialogue between the countries' communities (e.g., EU and groups of African countries) becomes more active. But the main thing here is that there are significant reasons, which, we believe, can force the developed countries to speed up the development of the most underdeveloped countries of the world more actively in the medium-term perspective.

First of all, the matter concerns global problems (about other rea -sons see Grinin 1999a: 32–34). They touch the whole World commu-nity, therefore, the Western interest in their solution in the underdevel-oped countries will be surely increasing. And it seems the latter in their turn will have to limit sovereignty in this or that way to fit general rules. For instance, we take the risk of supposing that as demographic and eco-logical problems are closely connected, probably, the regulation of pop-ulation level will gradually become not only national, but also a com-mon matter. But to solve a lot of common problems it is necessary to become aware of the fact that development cannot always widen what requires a voluntary reducing in consumption and also the mechanisms capable of forcing the majority of countries to accept such limitations (see Grinin 1999a, 2005). As D. Bell figuratively mentions, we have ad-vanced enough to be capable of realizing a new vocabulary, where a key word will be limit. The limits of the rise, plundering of the environment, interference in the animate nature, armament limit etc. (Bell 1979: XXIX). And the International Commission on the Environment and de-velopment formulated the concept of the sustainable development, which was passed at the UNO conference in 1992 and which includes two notions: necessary needs and limitations (Yevteev and Perelet 1989: 50). It seems quite probable that there will be allocation of rates of the economic growth in future, as without it other limitations seem impossi-ble to reach (for more details see, Grinin 1999a, 2005).

Though globalization has not started today, in general it is a new, un-known, most complicated and in many ways unpredictable process. How-ever, it is difficult to exaggerate a great role of the economy in the trans-formation of the state (as e.g., Turaev does: 2001, ch. 2). The economy comes forward as the leading factor in this sense only in the long run. We think that some serious changes in other spheres of life are also required

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for a radical change of sovereignty, just as for the formation of bourgeois society the changes in economy were not enough but required also politi-cal revolutions (for more details see Grinin 1999a, 2005). That is why in our opinion, the most important problem for a long time will be that of combining national and supranational, group and world interests. After all only an institutionalized solution of this huge problem will fi-nally establish a more or less stable world order. But this will not be the order which is spoken about with confidence in the USA and NATO, but let us hope a system of a more balanced account of interests of dif-ferent regions and countries. However, the way to such an order is ob-scure, complicated and discrepant. Naturally it will take some time when there must occur a profound turn in the elites and peoples' out-look, and, as a result, the national problems will start to be considered primarily through the prism of common interests and only next in the context of common (regional and world) tasks and problems.

NOTES1 For an almost exhaustive survey of such works prior to 2001 see: ICISS 2001. 2 Naturally, the reasons for military and other intervention into different countries

and its legacy has always been a significant research issue (see e.g., Eley 1972; Vincent 1974; Tillema and Wingen 1982; MacFarlane 1983–1984). However, in the 1990s the number of similar works sharply increased. The above-said can be proved, e.g., by the fact that in the mentioned in Note 1 reference (ICISS 2001) the matter of sovereignty is combined with the theme of the direct intervention (non-intervention) in the domestic affairs of sovereign countries; and more than a half of about 160 items of this bibliogra-phy are dedicated just to this theme; at the same time the absolute majority of the works is referred to the 1990s.

3 To control the process of globalization – and such appeals, and also complaints of its chaotic and unjust character are quite noticeable (see e.g., Martin and Shuman 2001; Stiglitz 2003; Byazrova 2004; Callinicos 2005; Homsky 2002; Lyu 2005; see also Dinello 2003; Galkin 2005) – one should in the first place control directions and rates of economic and technical development that seems a utopia nowadays. However, certain obstacles on the path of this progress in the form of different regulations and quotas will probably appear in future, as we prove it in another study of ours (for more details see Grinin 2005).

4 About possible scenarios of the future see (Ferguson and Mansbach 1999; Kauf-man 1999; Modelski and Thompson 1999). However, some of these predictions are quite straightforward and present a simplified extrapolation of the past processes. In our opinion, the future processes will most likely reveal some circumstances which are im-possible to foresee from the position of our today's experience. On the other hand, some analogies still can exist. For example, in some way the analogy is quite appropriate with rise of the centralized states in the Middle Ages and at present. And these processes usu-ally passed with much difficulty and at the same time essentially differed in various re-

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gions and periods. Naturally, the integration at the regional and, moreover, global scale does not bear any analogy to the process of empire formation; however, it is evident that there will be more than enough compulsions and violations, breaking of stereotypes and also the morbid humiliation of national pride (for more details see Grinin 1999a, 2005, 2007b). Speaking about future tendencies one should take into account that to our mind the assumptions about the tendency to form ‘the new world government body’ sound rather doubtful (Neklessa 2002). Properly speaking, the ideas of world government emerged long ago and were popular after the Second World War, but they still remain un-realistic (see the analysis of the problem in question: Bull 2003: 579–580; Beck 2001; Salmin 1993). We also find rather doubtful the assertions that the European Union must fairly and inevitably transform into a centralized formation like the USE (Lukyanov 2005).

5 Including the cultural level. One can agree that nowadays ‘the chief “globalizers” are the Americans’ (Berger 2002).

6 Even Zbignev Brzezinski is in some doubt concerning the effectiveness of the USA's modern policy and appeals to a deeper comprehension or reformulating foreign policy goals and the American ideology more precisely, believing that it must determine its security in such categories, which will be able to suit others' interests (see Brzezinski 2004). Also David Wilkinson speaks about a sort of ‘unipolarity without hegemony’ but with visible predominance of the USA as of quite a probable forecast of the world inter-national affairs in the future, though he does not deny the possibility of other predictions (Wilkinson 1999).

7 Frequently enough only its certain aspects are emphasized, e.g., global democracy in the world (see e.g., Chase-Dunn 2003; and also Kulaghin 2000).

8 A definite vector in the direction of globalization is present even with respect to such seemingly strictly national organizations, as parliaments. For example, the number of international interparliamentary organizations is about several dozen now (see e.g., Saidov 2004).

9 Indeed it is rather an ambiguous conclusion, as in some cases, e.g. as regards to many African countries, the gap may increase (see: Leftwich 2005: 153), and at the same time in the Second and Third World countries one can see a much higher than av -erage annual economic growth. This concerns particularly some Asian countries, those of the Eastern Europe and the CIS (see e.g., Maddison 2001; World Bank 2005; Shishkhov 2004: 18). The analysis of different directions of criticism of globalization, especially antiglobalists' arguments that it increases cosmopolitism, grades cultures and destroys peoples' personal identity (see Palmer 2003).

10 Concerning various changes in world economy see, e.g., Delyaghin 1998; Maksi-mova 2004: 3; Todd 2004. On the role of the MNC and changes in their activities see: Zimenkov and Romanova 2004. The role of significance of the foreign commerce is widely discussed, since international trade has accelerated for a long range, as compared to the world GDP (Shishkov 2004: 15).

11 Regarding the role of this capital in Asian crises of 1997 see: Мaksimova 2004; Kaplinsky 2003; Capra 2004: 164–166. In general some scientists consider globalization to be based on the financial capital as functional for it (Yevstigneeva and Yevstigneev 2000: 13).

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Grinin / Transformation of Sovereignty and Globalization12 See e.g., the special issue of International Studies Review magazine, 2000, Vol.

2, No. 2, on the subject: ‘Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order’, where this problem was discussed, especially within the following articles: Burch 2000; Blaney and Inayatullah 2000; Caporaso 2000; Litfin 2000; Mattli 2000.

13 In Antony Giddens' point of view (Giddens 1990) the analysis of the change of national state and its sovereignty by most authors is not completely satisfactory and the view on the progressing decrease of sovereignty requires to be considerably specified. Probably, the difficulties in interpretation of changes in world and national policy are also connected with the debate concerning the question whether sovereignty reduces or not what takes place within the context of the old traditions of the theories of interna-tional relations and old arguments of different schools. At the same time in some schol-ars’ communities there is an obvious tendency to consider sovereignty at the level of a theoretically pure phenomenon, which however for some reason must meet the reality. Nevertheless, quite obviously those real relations were often far from armchair scien-tists' ideas. No wonder, for any arguments of the supporters of the idea of reducing sovereignty their opponents produce proves of the fact that this situation is not new in history (see the analysis of various approaches to the comprehension of sovereignty phe-nomenon: Thomson 1995). Therefore, in a certain sense the discussions on sovereignty resemble those in our native science about nations (in the sense that some scholars also strived to find in every nation a complete bulk of features theoretically constructed to form an ideal type, according to M. Weber, nations. And naturally, the real nations dif-fered much in this or that respect from ‘an ideal type’).

J. E. Tomson fairly believes that a more precise definition or a reconsideration of the definition of sovereignty is absolutely necessary (Thomson 1995). Such statements with respect to sovereignty, including the most radical ones have been already made for a long time. For instance, Jack Maritain as early as in the 1950s proved that political philosophy must eliminate sovereignty both as a term and a concept because of its sup-posedly inherent falsity, which misleads some researchers (Maritain 1950: 343). At present the reasoning for reconsideration of the sovereignty concept has been intensified (see e.g., Thomson 1995; Ilyin 1993b, 2001; different versions of such a term-transfor-mation are suggested (see Ibid.; see also: Jackson 1990; Giddens 1985, 1990). However, the researchers still fail to find a consensus.

14 The list of threats to the state sovereignty often includes: global financial flows, multinational corporations, global media empires, Internet etc. The globalists maintain that state authority is greatly weakened by these processes which lead to the boundaries transparency – David Held and Anthony McGrew (2003a: 124) sum up such views.

15 Certainly, it is combined with the imposition, in some cases rather tough, on the countries-disturber (like e.g., Libya) of international rules and agreements, and also with the attempts of a direct interference in the affairs of those countries (like e.g., some re-publics of former Yugoslavia, Israel, Palestine, a numbers of African and Latin Ameri-can countries) that turned out to be incapable of solving inner conflicts or restraining po-litical forces beyond control (see e.g., MacFarlane 1983–1984; Mayall 1991; Roberts 1991: 519–520; Helman and Ratner 1992–1993; Rosas 1994; Tesón 1996; Acevedo and Grossman 1996; Diamond 1996; Regan 1996). Naturally, such actions of the Interna-tional Community or separate countries and coalitions (the USA, UNO) also have a great effect on changing of sovereignty and establishing precedents for the future. Nev-ertheless, it may be claimed that just predominant voluntariness in reducing sovereignty essentially contributes to the formation of a tolerant or even approving opinion to such

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interference on the part of the whole (or majority) of the world public, without which any intervention can neither succeed nor even take place.

16 For instance, Jack Levy in his article clearly brings out that though during the last five centuries the wars between the Great Powers were diminishing in number per time unit, but on the other hand they were constantly increasing in size, heaviness, intensity, concentration and to some extent also significance (Levy 1982).

17 At the same time it is important to mention the fact that during the first post-war decades simultaneously with the increasing reduction of sovereignty the opposite pro-cesses took place, and as a consequence a modern national state became a leading type of the government on the whole planet (see e.g., Held et al., 1999: 46), and the number of national states swiftly increased (in 1945 in there were 51 UN members, and by 1994 this number grew to 185 [The United Nations Organization 1995: 289–291; Webber 1997: 24; Inoguchi 1999: 175]). But there is no contradiction here. It is just the way the complicated processes go on by the time when either these or those forms achieve their peak, their decay already reveals itself. For example, in Europe one can observe the privileges of the nobility and the most mature organizational forms of this estate at the very period of the early bourgeoisie regime formation, i.e. at the moment when the ‘grave digger’ for the nobility (bourgeoisie) was actively developing. In this connection it is indicative that in the second half of the 20 th century sovereignty principles were es-pecially actively accepted not in the developed countries (in particular in the former metropolitan countries) but vice versa at the periphery of the Western World, in the colonies getting their independence and young developing states (for more detail see: Spruyt 2000; about different historical tendencies influencing sovereignty see e.g., In-oguchi 1999).

18 Indeed, this requires a high prestige of the United Nations; however, this prestige is unfortunately rather low (see e.g., the fascinating research about the correlation of the influence of different countries in the UN and the contentment of their position in this organization O'Neill 1996).

19 Concerning problems, strategies, successful and failed actions of the international court and mediation see e.g., Fischer 1982; Kleiboer 1996.

20 About the development of the views on the nature of nations and nationalism see also: Llobera 1994; Diamond and Plattner 1994; Periwal 1995; Woolf 1996; Özkırımlı 2000.

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