Research group Trust, Associations and Legitimacy

(TRALEG)

State-of-the-Art Report

Coordinator: Jelle Visser, AIAS, University of Amsterdam Report edited by Jelle Visser and Monika Ewa Kaminska (AIAS)

January 2007

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION: TRALEG RESEARCH GROUP STATE-OF-THE-ART REPORTS…………...……. PART I: THE TRALEG RESEARCH PROGRAMME ……………………………………………………... PART II: REPORTS BY TRALEG RESEARCH TEAMS…………………………………………………...

MONITORING LIVING CONDITIONS AND QUALITY OF LIFE IN EUROPE.……………… COMPARING MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE. COMBINING MACRO-COMPARISON AND MICRO-LEVEL SURVEY DATA……………………………………………………………...

a. TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP IN POST-INDUSTRIAL EUROPE……. ………….

b. TRENDS IN UNION DENSITY ACROSS EUROPE……………………………………

c. UNION DECLINE AND RISING INEQUALITY- IS THERE A CONNECTION?......

CIVICNESS, EQUALITY, AND DEMOCRACY: A ‘DARK SIDE’ OF SOCIAL CAPTIAL?..... SOCIAL DIVISIONS, PARTY STRATEGY AND POLITICAL CHOICE ……………………...

3

4

15

15

41

41

56

67

85

103

2

INTRODUCTION: TRALEG RESEARCH GROUP STATE-OF-THE-ART REPORTS

The state-of-the-art reports of TRALEG group are meant to offer context for the research

projects that have been advanced since early 2006 within the EQUALSOC Network of

Excellence. The first part of this document introduces the concepts that underlie further

discussion as well as the core themes that constitute the reference framework for research

projects. Framed within the considerations discussed in the first part, the TRALEG group

has developed four research projects that focus, respectively, on ‘Monitoring living

conditions and quality of life in Europe’; ‘Comparing membership in Europe. Combining

Macro-comparison and micro-level survey data’; ‘Civicness, Equality, and Democracy: A

‘dark side’ of social capital?’; ‘How social divisions explain political choices’. The relative

reports of the four research teams are presented in the second part of this document.

3

PART I: THE TRALEG RESEARCH PROGRAMME

Jelle Visser, AIAS, University of Amsterdam, jelle.visser@uva.nl

1.Introduction

TRALEG stands for trust, associability and legitimacy and tries to address the political

dimension of the EQUALSOC NoE’s overall research theme relating to economic change,

quality of life and social cohesion. While this is a very broad field, the group has selected

and has tried to cover some new ground on four specific themes during its first year.

However, before entering into these themes, we like to make some general introductory

remarks. The first issue, here, is a discussion of the relevance of the concept and theory of

social capital for understanding economic change and development, quality of life and

social cohesion.

The social capital literature1 tends to distinguish between the micro- and the macro

level. The micro-level refers to the potential contribution that horizontal organizations and

social networks make to economic change, development and social cohesion. Within the

micro-level there are two types of social capital: cognitive and structural (Uphoff 1996).

The less tangible side of social capital that refers to values, beliefs, attitudes and social

norms is termed here cognitive social capital. These values include the trust, solidarity and

reciprocity that are shared among members of a community and that create the conditions

under which communities can work together for a common good. Structural social capital

includes the composition and practices of local level institutions, both formal and informal

that serve as instruments of community development. Structural social capital is built

through horizontal organizations and networks that have collective and transparent decision

making processes, accountable leaders, and practices of collective action and mutual

responsibility, that may be beneficial for both development and democracy (Sabel 1992).

The macro-level includes formal relationships and structures, such as the rules of law, legal

frameworks, the political regime, the level of decentralization and the level of participation

in the policy formulation process (Bain and Hicks 1998). Macro-level institutions can

provide an enabling environment for structural micro-level institutions to develop. In turn,

local level institutions may support macro institutions and give them some stability

1 See for a useful overview, produced by the Worldbank Initiative on Poverty and Development, their website http://www1.worldbank.org /prem/poverty/scapital/index.htm

4

(Serageldin and Grootaert 2000), but there may also be strong tensions between micro- and

macro-level trust as they generate different conditions for intra- and inter-group

cooperation. The study of such tensions in a multi-level structure (European v. national v.

regional or local level) and of the bridging function of formal structures (e.g. associations,

occupational credentials, legal rules) and cognitive social capital (e.g., values, attitudes,

etc.) is at the heart of this research group. Related to these problems, a number of core

themes have been identified (they are discussed in the following sections) and have

subsequently served as a reference framework for research projects developed by the group.

2.Trust, associability and legitimacy at the societal level

Trust has been recognized as a very important element in a society a while before the

concept of social capital emerged (Arrow 1969). At the societal level, the extent to which

trust has evolved within and between groups has implications for the ability of the political

community to develop modes of coexistence and generally accepted rules of social,

economic and political exchange. In order to understand how this happens, one may follow

Zucker (1986) and distinguish three types of trust: (1) ‘ascribed trust’, referring to trust

among family and close friends; (2) ‘process-based trust’, which is based on a long-term

and frequent relationship between individuals; and (3) ‘extended or generalized trust’,

which is institution-based allowing trust to generalise beyond a given transaction and

beyond specific sets of exchange partners. Such institutions could be based, for example, on

protective and sometimes identity creating mechanism like professional credentials,

associational membership, insurance, etc. Ascribed trust remains in a closed circle of family

or kinship and consequently it does not promote cooperation and networking with other

groups of the society. Hence, it can be advantageous to a certain group but problematic for

society as a whole. This type of trust may be an obstacle for a move to a higher level of

trust like the ‘generalized trust’. Vice versa, a high level of generalised institution-based

trust may be a necessary, albeit not sufficient condition for the ability and willingness of

individuals to interact with each other across groups, different types of transaction and

across widening geographical distances. This would seem to be conditioned by a high

degree of associability, as was claimed by Tocqueville (1835) in his treatise on Democracy

in America.

5

Societal relevance or the ability of a social group to avoid marginalisation depends

on its ability to associate in intermediate organisations that are capable of developing

sufficient power necessary for a voice in the political process. In turn, political procedures

and decisions gain legitimacy by being based on consent from the groups subject to the

decisions. This is particularly relevant in the case of unpopular decisions concerning

welfare state reform. The existence of different positions within a society leads to a variety

of interests expressed in the political arena via interest associations interacting with each

other and with the state. Hence social cohesion is expressed at the societal level in the

ability of interest associations to participate in collective decisions and to negotiate

solutions based on the consent of the parties involved (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). Among

European societies, there is large variation in the associability of different groups, in the

modes of collective decision making, in the extent and relevance of consensus for the

legitimacy of political decisions, and in the overall level of trust among the different groups

within the society. Given changing framework conditions – in particular

internationalisation and Europeanisation, economic change, ageing, and transition processes

in Central and Eastern Europe – both the interests of different societal groups and the

balance of power between them is changing. Thus with regard to the analysis of trust,

associability, and legitimacy at the societal level the aim of the network is to explore the

implications of the variation across countries, of the changes over time, and of the changing

nature of European governance, for the ability of societies to maintain and develop social

and political mechanisms for continuing and enhancing social cohesion.

3. Values and welfare state reform

The shift towards a knowledge economy, aging and changing labour market and family

behaviour necessitate welfare state reform. The politics of such reform may rest on the

capacity of governments to engage the support of trade unions and engage in social

dialogue, and in the ability of governments to dissociate the self-serving protest of

disadvantaged interest groups from the support of the moral majority (Schmidt 2000: 231).

Such a process of ‘normative legitimisation’ may involve the appeal to the values of

solidarity on which the welfare state is supposed to be based on (in the case of pension

reform, and in other to relief the burden of a smaller younger generation this means

invoking the norm of intergenerational solidarity). It may also involve an appeal to

competing values, for instance self-help instead of state provision where less generosity and

6

a new distribution of risks is the objective. Or, in extreme situations, when sacrifices are

asked to ‘save the nation from disaster’ there may be an appeal to the ‘national identity’.

Schmidt (2000) claims that no major and initially unpopular welfare-state reform could

succeed in the medium term if it did not also succeed in changing the underling definition

of moral appropriateneness. It would seem very important to explore this relationship

between welfare reform and values on a comparative basis across Europe.

4.Differences in union strength and social cohesion

Trends in union density are diverging across Europe, with some countries experiencing

substantial decline, while others experience stability or growth. Membership fell by 8%

between 1985 and 1997 in the European Union and aggregate density by 20% (Visser

2003). Differences in levels of union density matter because unions affect wage levels

(Blanchflower and Bryson 2003), wage inequality (Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2003),

labour productivity (Metcalf 2003), firm performance (Hirsch 2004), bargaining behaviour,

coordination and social dialogue (Calmfors et al. 2001).

Although there is a substantial literature on factors associated with union

membership status, most of it relates to Anglo-Saxon countries plus a few other countries

(Riley 1997). This is largely due to the absence of rich micro-data across countries. Current

knowledge on union density across Europe relies on aggregate data mostly from

administrative sources that are not comparable in terms of the sample populations they

cover, data collection methods, and membership definitions (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000).

Participation in voluntary organisations such as unions may engender trust, loyalty,

altruism and cooperation, in part due to information flows reducing the ‘social distance’

between individuals (Glaeser et al. 2002). Others maintain participation in such

organisations is a function of norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that facilitate co-

operation, or that social trust and social participation are simultaneously determined

(Putnam 2000; Johnston and Jowell 2001; Visser 2002). Unionisation matters also for

legitimacy and cohesion, because many employees want union representation but are

unable to get it, leading to a ‘representation gap’ (Bryson and Gomez 2003; Towers 1997).

This representation gap tends to be larger for those with low educational levels,

unemployed, immigrants or ethnic workers, employees in small firms, those in unstable or

flexible labour relations, etc. However, such representation gaps may be mitigated through

coordinated bargaining and legal extension clauses.

7

5.Changes in associability and consequences for social cohesion and legitimacy

In studying associability among citizens and employees (in or out of work), we will not

limit ourselves only to membership and participation in formal associations such as trade

unions and related work- or leisure-oriented societies and clubs, important as they may be.

We intend to study also the nature and changes in what Pérez Díaz (2002) dubs ‘soft

sociability’ (e.g., family and neighbourhood oriented networks, peer groups, youth clubs

and events like festivals or fiestas). The two – formal and informal – may substitute for

each other, as is suggested by Pérez Díaz’ analysis of social capital and associability in

Spain, or move in the same direction.

An important question concerns the informalisation of associational participation

among younger workers – possibly facilitated by access to and use of the Internet. Levels of

membership and participation in trade unions among young people are falling in nearly all

countries, irrespective of educational achievement (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000), but there

may be informal substitutes and more event-based forms of cooperation that gain in

importance. There is a remarkable lack of data and indicators on the less formal types of

associational life and remarkable little research on the (political, social and cultural)

consequences, rather than causes, of shifts in associational participation and, more in

particular, union decline. What does it mean for the worldviews of young people, their

images of themselves, their attitudes towards politics and towards Europe? There is some

evidence that ‘losers in the modernisation process’ may be more easily mobilised by radical

movements, especially on the right, where anti-system traits blend with opposition against

foreigners and against Europe (Kriesi 1999). These relationships may however be

intermediated by the loss of social capital and weakening of classical associational life (not

just of membership but also what membership means in terms of activities, friendships and

social relationships).

6.Formal and informal trust – how does it affect equality?

Another possibility is that, rather than substituting for each other, trust embodied in formal

associations and credentials and trust build on informal and ascribed personal bonds may

conflict with one another, as would appear to be the case in some transitional societies in

which formal rules are resisted by informal activities strongly supported by forms of

ascribed trust (Greif 1999; Gërxhani 2003). Given that CEE countries are going through

8

substantial institutional restructuring, this clash appears to be very important in

understanding the incentives driving predatory activities (e.g., tax evasion; black or grey

labour market). It would be interesting to study recruitment process and job-matching

institutions in this context. It might be expected that, where formal institutions are weak,

recruitment will mostly operate through diffuse networks of friends and family for all kinds

of jobs, whereas in societies with highly formalised (law-controlled) institutions such

personalised forms of recruitment will only be used for particular jobs, either at the very

high or at the very low end of the labour market, where team relations are important and

monitoring is difficult (Wegener 1991, for evidence on Germany). Such differences could

have far-reaching consequences for the application of equal opportunity legislation within

but especially across countries.

7.Unequal access to an returns from associational participation

Comparative research inspired by Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone suggests that social class

and educational attainment are strong predictors of associability. Blue-collar and low-

educated workers participate in fewer and in a smaller range of associations and they are

less active in them (Hall 2002). Offe and Fuchs (2002) report a similar finding for

Germany. They stress the paradox that the less educated depend more on the few

associations they join and are hit hardest by the decline in traditional associations like trade

unions. The local trade union or workingmen club was probably the association by which

manual workers were most ‘captured’ and mobilized into voluntary activities and active

citizenship (Flanders 1952). Offe and Fuchs (2002: 241) develop the hypothesis that for

manual and low-skilled working people trade unions may have served as ‘functional

equivalent’ for the verbal and cognitive skills which middle class people acquired through

(formal) education. For lower-skilled workers, the ‘associational deprivation effect’ will

therefore be smallest in (formal or informal) associational activities that do not require

verbal skills, such as striking, most physical sports, music, or religious worship. Another

hypothesis is that not only formal membership in trade unions, but also informal sociability

is more vulnerable to economic restructuring in the case of less educated workers. Patterns

of informal sociability of these workers tend to revolve around close contacts with kin,

neighbourhood friends and colleagues; consequently, the loss of work, neighbourhood

change and economic restructuring tend to be far more disruptive.

9

8. Welfare state and informal solidarity

Pessimist accounts of the advanced welfare state conjecture that formal or state organised

social solidarity substitutes for informal solidarity and undermines social capital (invested

in voluntary activities directed to helping or supporting others). Others, for instance Stiglitz

(2000), argue that as a society develops economically its social capital must adapt as well,

allowing the interpersonal networks to be partially replaced with the formal institutions of a

market-based economy, such as a structured system of laws imposed by representative

forms of governance.

With the help of the European Values Study these hypotheses can be addressed.

Preliminary research (Van Oorschot and Abrahamson 2003) has shown that welfare

spending is a better predictor of differences in social capital and informal solidarity across

countries than welfare state regime. Welfare state spending tends to have a positive effect

on social capital and a negative or substituting effect on informal solidarity. At the

individual level Van Oorschot finds that people with more social capital, older people,

those on the left, and those attending church show more solidarity towards disabled and

unemployed people, and towards immigrants. But across countries, for all groups, informal

solidarity is lower among people who live in countries that spend more on social protection.

There is also some evidence for a ‘national burden’ or ‘strain’ effect, since informal

solidarity is lower among people that live in countries with an older population, with higher

levels of unemployment and a higher share of immigrants.

9.The role of education on values, trust and associability

One important factor that explains values and attitudes, and thereby affects the social

cohesion of modern European societies, is education. Through education, people develop

values on a wide range of topics, varying from personal issues such as identity and self-

esteem, to positions relating to the external world such as authoritarianism, aesthetic values,

altruistic and civic values, job values and socio-political values (Pascarella and Terenzini

1991). Tertiary education, in particular, seems to have a strong effect on these outcomes.

Education is thought to affect students’ attribution of individual unsatisfactory life

circumstances to society rather than to personal failure. This makes highly educated people

more likely to join voluntary organizations. Education thus provides more to individuals

than just technical skills for the labour market; also competencies can be generated that

10

have a positive influence on the civic responsibilities that individuals feel, enhancing

associability and trust.

The strong effect of education on values, trust and associability could imply that the

educational expansion in European and North-American countries since the 1960s was one

of the main drivers behind the value changes that have been observed during recent decades

(Inglehart 1990). Educational expansion could potentially have led to significant changes in

social cohesion. First, on a micro-level, through educational expansion many people have

obtained levels of schooling beyond their parents’ level. Such a pattern of social mobility

may have led to greater perceived distances between generations, leading to a decrease in

social cohesion within families and within social class. Whereas social immobility would

enhance the perceived norm-enforcing social network, leading to high levels of (micro-

level) social cohesion, increased social distance between generations may have had a

detrimental effect on the social connection that people experience towards the social group

of their social origin. However, on a meso-level of inter-group cohesion, educational

expansion may have led to a more positive influence. Through processes of enlightenment

and social skills acquisition, people may have become more understandable for other social

groups, including ethic minorities. In addition, on the macro-level, increased educational

attainment may have had a positive impact on civic values and duties, and social

responsibilities, again leading to levels of social cohesion that would not have been met if

educational expansion had not taken place. We could furthermore expect that the rapid

expansion in socially oriented occupations and fields of study has an additional positive

impact on social cohesion compared to a situation where technocratic fields of study were

as dominant as they were in the 1950s. Cross-national datasets including countries from all

parts of Europe, such as the European Value Survey and the European Social Survey could

be used to test hypotheses related to these phenomena.

11

REFERENCES Bain, K. and N. Hicks (1998), “Building social capital and reaching out to excluded groups: The challenge of partnerships.” Paper presented at CELAM meeting on The Struggle Against Poverty Towards the Turn of the Millenium, Washington D.C. Blanchflower, D. G., and A. Bryson (2003), "What Effect do Unions Have on Wages Now and Would 'What Would Unions Do' Be Surprised?" NBER Working Paper No. 9973. Bryson, A., and R. Gomez (2003), "Segmentation, Switching Costs and the Demand for Unionization in Britain." CEP Discussion Paper No. 0568. Calmfors, L., A. Booth, M. Burda, D. Checci, R. Naylor, and J. Visser (2001), “The Future of Collective Bargaining in Europe.” In: The Role of Unions in the Twenty-First Century. T. Boeri, A. Brugiavini, and L. Calmfors (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1-156. Card, D., W. Craig Riddell and T. Lemieux (2003), “Unions and the Wage Structure.” In: The International Handbook of Trade Unions. J.T. Addison and C. Schnabel (eds.). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 246-293. Ebbinghaus, B., and J.Visser (2000), Trade Unions in Western Europe Since 1945. London, Palgrave-Macmillan. Flanders, A. (1952), Trade Unions. New York, Longmans, Green and Co. Gërxhani, K. (2003), Tax Evasion in Transition: Outcome of an Institutional Clash? Testing the Feige’s Conjecture. Mimeo. University of Amsterdam. Glaeser, E.L., B.I. Sacerdote and J.A. Scheinkman (2002), “The Social Multiplier.” NBER Working Paper, No. 9153, September 2002. Greif, A. (1999), “Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis.” The American Economic Review. Vol.88:2, 80-84. Hall, P.A. (2002), “Great Britain: The Role of Government and the Distribution of Social Capital.” In: Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. R.D. Putnam (ed.), 21-59. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Hirsch, B.T. (2004), “What Do Unions Do for Economic Performance?” Journal of Labour Research. Vol.: 25 Iss.: 3, 415-455. Inglehart, R.(1990), Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. Johnston, M., and R Jowell (2001), “How Robust is British Civil Society?.” In: British Social Attitudes, The 18th Report: Public Policy, Social Ties. R.Jowell, et al. (eds.). London: Sage. Kriesi, H., et al. (eds.) (1999), Nation and National Identity: the European Experience in Perspective. Zurich: Ruegger.

12

Metcalf, D. (2003), “Union Effects on Productivity, Profitability and Investment.” In: The International Handbook of Trade Unions. J.T. Addison and C. Schnabel (eds.). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 118-172. Offe, C. and S. Fuchs (2002), “A Decline of Social Capital? The German Case.” In: Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. Robert D. Putnam (ed.), 189-243. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Oorschot, W. van and P.Abrahamson (2003), “The Dutch and Danish Miracles Revisited: A Critical Discussion of Activation Policies in Two Small Welfare States.” Social Policy & Administration, Vol. 37, Issue 3, 288-304. Pascarella, E. and P. Terenzini (1991), How College Affects Students: Findings and Insights From Twenty Years of Research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Pérez Díaz, V. (2002), “From Civil War to Civil Society: Social Capital in Spain from the 1930s to the 1990s” In: Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. R. D. Putnam (ed.), 245-287. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Putnam, R. D. (2000), Bowling Alone. The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Riley, N.M. (1997), “Determinants of Union Membership: A Review.” Labour. Vol.: 11 Iss.: 2, 265-301. Sabel, C.F. (1992), “Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Co-operation in a Volatile Economy .“ In: Industrial Districts and Local Economic Regeneration. F. Pyke and W. Sengenberger (eds.). Geneva: International Institute for Labor Studies. Schmidt, V.A. (2000), “Values and Discourse in the Politics of Adjustment”. In Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, F.W. Scharpf and V.A. Schmidt (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 229-309. Serageldin, I. and C. Grootaert (2000), “Defining Social Capital: An Integrating View.” In Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin (eds.), Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 40-59 Stiglitz, J.E. (2000), “Formal and Informal Institutions.” In: Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin (eds.), Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 59-71. Tocqueville, A. de (1835), “Democracy in America.” Blackwood's Edinburgh magazine. Vol.: 37 Iss.: 235, p. 758. Towers, B. (1997), The Representation Gap. Change and Reform in the British and American Workplace. New York: Oxford University Press.

13

Uphoff, N. (1996), “Understanding the World as a Heterogeneous Whole: Insights into Systems from Work on Irrigation.” Systems Journal, Vol.: 13, Iss.: 1, 3-12. Uphoff, N. (2000), “Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experiences of Participation.” In: In Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin (eds.). Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 215-249. Visser, J. (2002), “Why Fewer Workers Join Unions in Europe: A Social Custom Explanation of Membership Trends.” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 40 (3), 403-430. Visser, J. (2003), “Unions and Unionism Around the World.” In: The International Handbook of Trade Unions. J.T. Addison and C. Schnabel (eds.). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 366-415. Visser, J. and A. Hemerijck (1997), ‘A Dutch Miracle ’ – Job growth, welfare reform and corporatism in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Wegener, B. (1991), “Job Mobility and Social Ties - Social Resources, Prior Job and Status Attainment.” American Sociological Review, Vol.: 56 Iss.: 1, 60 –71. Zucker, L.G. (1986), “Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure 1840 to 1920.” In: B.M. Staw and L.L. Cummings (eds.), Research in Organisational Behaviour, Volume 8, 53-111. Greenwich, CN: JAI Press.

14

PART II: REPORTS BY TRALEG RESEARCH TEAMS

MONITORING LIVING CONTIDIONS AND QUALITY OF LIFE IN EUROPE

Coordinators:

Jens Alber, WZB Social Science Research Center Berlin, jalber@wz-berlin.de

Tony Fahey, Economic and Social Research Institute, tony.fahey@esri.ie

Chiara Saraceno, University of Turin, chiara.saraceno@unito.it

Report by:

Ulrich Kohler, WZB Social Science Research Center Berlin, kohler@wz-berlin.de

1.The concept of quality of life

The definitions of quality of life vary across different authors and research fields and refer

to diverse aspects of the overall living conditions of individuals. However, there is

agreement about some general characteristics: Quality of life is normative and value-based

in its character, and related aspects have to be derived from public consensus in a specific

cultural or national setting. In Europe the equal distribution of life chances, the assured

achievement of a minimum standard of living for everyone, access to employment and

social protection are indispensable elements. Thus, the measurement of quality of life or –

taken as a synonym – well-being2 relates to key dimensions such as income, education and

access to material resources, but also to health, care, family issues and social relations.

However, quality of life not only refers to objective living conditions, but also to

their subjective evaluation by the individuals themselves. Overall quality of life is not

restricted to simply rising material standard of living and quantitative growth. The way

people feel about their lives is understood as a crucial dimension of individual well-being.

Thus, the linkage between control over resources and subjective assessments becomes a key

issue for related inequality research (see section 5.3). Additionally, political and cultural

settings are understood as framing living conditions which enable or restrict chances to live

a decent life according to one’s own ideas and aspirations.

2Other terms sometimes used as synonyms are “life satisfaction”, “happiness”, or “welfare”.

15

A huge amount of approaches exist that conceptualise and underpin quality of life

studies theoretically. For example, in the 1970s, based on Galtung’s basic need approach,

Erik Allardt expanded the resource oriented Swedish level of living approach in order to

meet the whole range of conditions for human development. His triad of “Having”,

“Loving” and “Being” is even nowadays often used as a starting point to illustrate the rich

and comprehensive understanding of what quality of life should refer to (Allardt 1993).

Another influential concept focuses special attention on opportunities, choice and

empowerment. Amartya Sen points to “capabilities” as one important aspect quality of life

research has to be concerned with. Capabilities emphasise political and institutional settings

as contextual frames that limit and structure opportunities and options for individuals to

take advantage of certain life chances. To focus on capabilities instead of simply outcomes

underlines the need for policy makers to care for an environment that enables people to

achieve a decent living that comprises enough to eat as well as self-respect (Sen 1993,

2000). Thus, a comprehensive understanding of quality of life would best focus on

outcomes and subjective assessments, but also on resources that condition, facilitate or

constrain people’s choices (Fahey et al. 2003: 16).

2. Importance of monitoring quality of life in Europe

The process of European integration has entered a new stage. Originally, European

unification was predominantly an elite project, driven by the war experience of political

leaders and technocratic elites who sought to overcome Europe’s belligerent past. The

rivalry with the Soviet system during the Cold War and protracted post war prosperity

helped the project to preserve citizen consent even though effective chances for citizen

participation at the European level remained very limited.

Now that the threat posed by the Soviet Union has ceased, and the long years of

prosperity and welfare state expansion have given way to relative economic stagnation,

welfare state curtailments and increased international competition in a globalised world,

”the time of permissive consensus to European integration among European citizens is

over” (Kleinman 2002: 214). Further integration will require that political leaders

demonstrate to increasingly sceptical voters in rather concrete terms which specific welfare

gains are associated with the European project.

16

So far, official documents fulfil this function only partly while elite proponents of

European integration and of EU enlargement frequently settle with rather idealistic

celebrations of general progress rather than giving concrete evidence of actual welfare

gains. Thus, EU official documents usually refer rather vaguely to "productivity gains"

which the European Social Model supposedly implies, while Sandra Kalniete, the former

Latvian Foreign Minister and present EU Commissioner, hailed the 2004 enlargement as

"Europe’s triumph over the twentieth century". In similarly diffuse terms the Italian banker

Padoa-Schioppa praised the EMU for restoring the ancestral monetary unity which Europe

had once enjoyed.

Winning the future consent of sceptical voters in increasingly educated electorates

will presumably require much more concrete forms of “output-legitimation” (Scharpf 1999)

which demonstrate that the EU is indeed a government for the people that promotes the

common welfare of Europeans. This is where the social monitoring of economic and social

conditions in Europe can play an important role. If serious attempts at social accounting

show that the development of the EU is not only associated with continuing or increasing

economic growth, but also with measurable progress in the quality of life of Europeans,

then the process of further integration and enlargement is likely to gain more active and

widespread support from European citizens.

3. Measurement of quality of life

Two strategies to measure quality of life can be distinguished. The first strategy is to

separately measure all dimensions of the well-being. As quality of life has so many

domains, and each of the domains can be measured with objective and/or subjective

indicators this approach normally requires many indicators. Obviously, this strategy makes

it difficult to ascertain quality of life in a survey together with other topics. For a more

complete measurement it is often necessary to set up a survey that is solely dedicated to the

measurement of quality of life (see section 4).

After ascertaining the different dimensions, the wish for a summary measure for

quality of life often arises. The construction of such a summary measure is however

difficult to achieve, as it requires knowledge about the relative importance of the various

dimensions, and it can be argued that these importance weights differ historically,

culturally, and individually. Such an argument points to the individual as the sole authority

17

that knows the importance of goods for his well-being. Thus, only the individual itself can

ascertain his or her overall quality of life. This leads to the second strategy to measure

quality of life, “subjective well-being”3 .

Subjective well-being is either measured with single item questions, or with

multiple item approaches.4 An example of a single item question is the question on

“general life satisfaction” in the European Quality of Life Survey (see pg. EQLS): “All

things considered, how satisfied would you say you are with your life these days? Please

tell me on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means very dissatisfied and 10 means very satisfied”.

Examples for multiple item approaches are the “Satisfaction with Life Scale” (Pavot and

Diener 1993) or the “General Health Questionnaire” (Goldberg and Williams 1978).

Subjective well-being is often used as just one dimension of the first strategy for

ascertaining quality of life. However, in recent times it is increasingly used as stand alone

indicator for the overall well-being (“utility”), primarily by economists (Frey and Stutzer

2000, 2002a, 2002b; Helliwell 2003; Layard 2005; van Praag et al. 2003; Stutzer 2004). In

this sense the authors puts high trust in the validity of such measurements. The justification

of this trust has been tested in several validity studies:

• Different measures of subjective well-being correlate well with one another (Fordyce

1988).

• Happy people are rated as happy by friends and family members (Sandvik et al.

1993; Lepper 1998; Costa and McCrae 1988).

• Subjective well-being is relative stable and sensitive to changing life circumstances

(Ehrhardt et al. 2000; Heady and Wearing 1991).

• Happy people are more often smiling during social interactions (Fernández-Dols and

Ruiz-Belda 1990).

• Happy people are less likely to commit suicide (Koivumaa et al. 2001).

• Changes in the electrical activity of the brain and heart rate account for substantial

variance in reported negative affect (Davidson et al. 2000).

3The Analysis of subjective well-being had its take-off in the 1970s with comprehensive American studies on life satisfaction in different social groups, its determinants as well as the role of aspirations, values, comparison groups and goals (Wilson 1967; Andrews and Withey 1976; Campbell et al. 1976). There is an enormous amount of literature giving comprehensive overviews on the development of this research area summarising the most important findings, see as examples (Diener et al. 1999; Donovan and Halpern 2002). 4A survey on various measures of subjective well-being can be found in (Andrews and Robinson 1991).

18

Further results are published in Andrews and Robinson (1991); Michalos (1991);

Larsen and Fredrickson (1999); Schwarz and Strack (1999); Veenhoven (1993).

In the context of international comparisons, an important issue is whether mere

linguistic differences in the interpretation of the questions are responsible for differences in

subjective well-being between countries. A closer look to Switzerland, however, reveals

that country differences cannot be attributed to language per se. Regardless of the language

they speak, Swiss rank far above the Germans, Italians and French with whom they share

the language. Similar results has been achieved for Flemish and French speaking Belgians

(Inglehart and Rabier 1986). Finally one should note that the country rankings are fairly

stable, regardless whether the terms happiness or satisfaction were applied.

4. Existing data sources for studying European quality of life

At the supranational level of the EU, several data bases aimed at monitoring of the welfare

of Europeans exist:

• The European Quality of Life Survey 2003 (EQLS 2003) was created by the

“European Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living Conditions” to

examine a broad variety of issues in a cross-sectional survey. The objective is to

explore welfare not only in terms of income or material resources but to take also

other dimensions of well-being into account, including health, housing, education,

the quality of social relations and of society, and subjective well-being (Alber et al.,

2005). The second issue of the EQLS will be fielded in 2007.

• The European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which was run from 1994 to

2001, put more emphasis on material living conditions, and had comparatively little

on social relations, civic engagement or the perception of society. The ECHP gives

rather limited information on subjective well-being which refers mostly to work-

related issues like for example satisfaction with working conditions or with the

amount of leisure time.5

• In 2003 the ECHP was replaced by the European Union Survey on Income and

Living Conditions (EU-SILC) which places particular emphasis on the measurement

of income, deprivation, material well-being, including housing, as well as health and

education. Whereas the ECHP was based on a standardised methodology including a 5http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/echpanel/info/data/information.html

19

standard questionnaire yielding identical comparable information for all covered

countries, the EU-SILC is a harmonised data set which is based on a definition of

primary target variables that are binding for all participant countries, whilst leaving

much national leeway for choosing the surveys from which the respective

information is drawn. Whereas the ECHP was defined as a panel study where the

same respondents were repeatedly asked at successive points in time, the EU-SILC

has a longitudinal design only insofar as it provides two types datasets for each

country, a cross-sectional and a longitudinal one. The latter is in most cases extracted

from household panel surveys on the national level like for example the German

GSOEP or the British BHPS. As the cross-sectional and the longitudinal dataset may

derive from different sources, they may not be linkable at the micro level. Both the

ECHP and the EU-SILC are divided into a Household and a Personal file. Compared

to the EQLS, EU-SILC gives little information on social capital, civic engagement,

feelings of alienation or the perception of tensions within the society.6

• The European Social Survey (ESS) was “designed to feed into key European policy

debates” and has been carried out every two years since 2002. It “hopes to measure

and explaining how people’s social values, cultural norms and behaviour patterns are

distributed, the way in which they differ within and between nations, and the

direction and speed at which they are changing.” The questionnaire consists of a

’core’ module which remains relatively constant from round to round and two

’rotating’ modules each devoted to a substantive topic. In the three rounds of the ESS

that have been conducted so far the number of participating EU-25 countries varied

from 19 (round 1 and 3) to 21 (round 2). Almost every dimension of well-being

covered by the EQLS (see above) is also in some ways included in at least one of the

ESS. The only exceptions are housing, perceived tensions within society, and the

domestic division of labour which have not been picked up in any ESS so far. The

ESS also provides a broad spectrum of indicators on subjective well-being and

alienation and it contains detailed information on the respondent’s migration

background. The rotating modules in round 1 concentrate on ”citizenship,

involvement and democracy” as well as on “immigration”. The special topics of

round 2 are “family, work, and well-being” as well as “opinions on health and care

seeking”. The most recent round 3 features as special topics “personal and social 6http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1913,47567825,1913_58814988&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

20

well-being: creating indicators for a flourishing Europe” and “the timing of life: the

organisation of the life course in Europe”.7

• The European Union Labour Force Survey (LFS) is conducted in the 25 Member

States of the European Union and three countries of the European Free Trade

Association (EFTA) in accordance with Council Regulation No 577/1998. The LFS

is a large household sample survey providing quarterly results on labour participation

of people aged 15 and over as well as on persons outside the labour force. The LFS

data covers all industries and occupations and includes data on topics such as hours

worked, second job, unemployment, methods used to find work, part-time

employment, self-employment, education and training.

• Depending on the specific focus of our research interest, there are other specific

comparative data sets at hand. The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) provides data

about household incomes from 30 countries; the European Values Study (EVS),

dealing with value orientations in the field of work, family, social relations, leisure,

politics, economics, religion etc.; the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

(CSES), studying voting behaviour, cleavages in political and social spheres, and

satisfaction with democracy in more than 50 countries.

• For macro-level data, a rich set of Eurostat data concerning economic performance,

public expenditures and other relevant social and economic features of member states

and their welfare systems is at hand.

5. Fields of research

5.1. Open method of coordination: Quality of live as a mean for benchmarking of

countries

One of the driving forces behind the increasing interest on monitoring the Quality of Life in

Europe is the so called “open method of coordination”. The open method basically is as an

evaluation process of the EU member states. It involves a set of guidelines and indicators,

benchmarking and sharing of best practice. In this process quality of life has informally

become a benchmarking criterion for the comparison of countries, and in turn a major

objective for policy makers. This interest in quality of life is quite visible in a report 7http://naticent02.uuhost.uk.uu.net/questionnaire/index.htm

21

published by the British Prime Minister’s “Strategy Unit” on the scientific quality of life

research and its implications for the government (Donovan and Halpern 2002). It is also

reflected in the growing numbers of reports written by or for policy related research

institutes:

Since 2000 the European Commission have annually published the “Reports on the

social situation” (Commission of the European Communities 2000). The aim of these

reports is to provide a comprehensive overview of the social dimension in the EU “and to

contribute to the monitoring of developments in the social field across Member States”. The

reports are designed to deal with quality of life of people living in Europe and provide a

holistic view of the European population and its social conditions as a background of social

policy development. Their special characteristic is that they combine information from

official statistics with survey data on public opinion. Thus they draw on information from

various sources. On the one hand they take macro data taken from Eurostat like

demographic, mortality, migration and education statistics or from specialised databases

like the “European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistic” (ESSPROS) and the

“European Statistics on Accidents at Work” (ESAW). On the other hand they obtain survey

data from polls, like the Eurobarometer surveys, the ECHP, or the Labour Force Surveys

(LFS). Hence these reports are a promising attempt to integrate the official statistics

compiled by statistical offices with survey data which are frequently collected by scholarly

networks.

Each of the annual reports provides information on a special topic. In 2000 this was

the evolving demand for social support and social services and the potential in meeting this

demand, in 2001 the quality of European citizens’ lives in four key areas: population, living

conditions, income distribution and trust and participation in society, in 2002 geographical

mobility, in 2003 the social dimension of health and in 2004 the social dimension of the

enlarged Europe.

For a more in-depth analysis, the European Foundation for the Improvement of

Working and Living Conditions (EF) launched a series of reports on quality of life issues,

which draw on results of Eurobarometer surveys and on the EQLS. The reports were

written by social scientists. So far reports were published on issues relating to:

• Living conditions, low income, income-inequalities and deprivation (Russell and

Whelan 2004; Fahey et al. 2005)

• Working conditions (Kovács and Kapitány 2004)

22

• Social integration, families, work and social networks (Böhnke 2004; Saraceno et al.

2005),

• Life satisfaction, happiness and sense of belonging (Delhey 2004; Böhnke 2005)

• Housing and the local environment (Domanski et al. 2005)

• Health (Alber and Kohler 2004; Anderson 2004)

• Migration (Krieger 2004).

5.2. The macro-perspective: “Does economic growth improve the human lot”?

“Does economic growth improve the human lot?” is the title of a ground breaking article by

Richard Easterlin, first published in 1974 . The question can be seen as the core research

question of many macro economic analyses of quality of life. The starting point of such

analyses is the paradoxical result that country averages of well-being strongly correlate

with economic development between countries (Inglehart 1990; Diener et al. 1995;

Inglehart and Klingemann 2000; Di Tella et al. 2002; Fahey and Smyth 2004), but do not

correlate with the state of economic development within countries over time (Easterlin

1974, 1995, 2005; Diener and Shigehiro 2000; Blanchflower and Oswald 2004; Lane 1998;

Graham and Pettinato 2001).8

Two, closely related explanations are discussed for this “Easterlin Paradox”:

• Relative Status (Irwin 1944; Duesenberry 1949; Becker 1974): it is not the absolute

level of income that matters most but rather one’s position relative to other

individuals (Easterlin 1974, 2001; Clark and Oswald 1996; Delhey and Kohler 2006;

Neumark and Postlewaite 1998; Firebaugh and Tach 2005). A rise of the income of

all can therefore not result in a rise of the happiness of all.

• Adaption Level Theory (Helson 1964; Brickman and Campbell 1971; Campbell et al.

1976; Parducci 1995; Frederick and Loewenstein 1999): the utility of additional

material goods is only transitory. Individuals compare their goods with the past and

are satisfied if they have now more goods than they had in the past. However, the

present state is going to be the past, after some time.

It is evident that empirical research on the validity of the above explanations must be

primarily done on the micro level.

8Different results in Hagerty and Veenhoven (2003).

23

5.3. The micro perspective: Social inequality and subjective well-being

Among social scientists, the main use of measures for subjective well-being is not to

compare the absolute levels between countries but rather to identify its determinants Fahey

et al. (2003: 56). A major field or research here is how dimensions of social inequality

(“objective dimensions of quality of life”) are related to the subjective evaluation of the

overall quality of life. The answer to this question is strongly linked to “social production

function” (SPF) theory (Lindenberg 1989; Ormel et al. 1999).

In modern societies, money can be used to buy the goods one does desire, and if

people successfully match their consumer decisions to their desires they should produce

what economists call utility, and others call satisfaction, happiness or well-being. Income is

therefore probably the most often studied cause of subjective well-being, and it is a robust

and general result of these studies that richer people, on average, report higher subjective

well-being (see among others Frey and Stutzer 2002b: 409). The effect of income has been

demonstrated in such different regions as the USA (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004), the

EU member states (Böhnke 2005; Delhey 2004; Di Tella et al. 2001), Switzerland (Frey

and Stutzer 2000) and Latin America (Graham and Pettinato 2001). It is also a common

finding that the relationship between income and well-being is nonlinear, i.e. the income

effect is stronger with low incomes and extenuates with higher ones (Argyle 1999; Frey and

Stutzer 2002b). However, although there is not much doubt that income has a positive

effect on well-being, the size of the income-effect is usually considered as small compared

to other factors such as unemployment and divorce (Diener et al. 1999; Gardner and

Oswald 2001; Helliwell 2003).

Another important line of research is on the direction of causality. It might either be

that rich people are more satisfied with their life, or that happy people are economically

more successful. The study of the causal direction requires, at least, longitudinal data,

which is not available for Europe as a whole. Studies of well-being before and after sudden

and unexpected gains of income suggest that income in fact causes gains in happiness

(Smith and Razzell 1975; Brickman et al. 1978; Gardner and Oswald 2001).

Another often studied cause for well-being is the employment status, especially

unemployment. There is little doubt that unemployment is linked to well-being for its

connection to income losses. The major question however is, whether unemployment is

24

also effective in non-pecuniary ways (Feather 1990). The answer to this question is of

crucial importance for assertions saying that the social benefit system gets exploited by free

riders, who choose leisure time above regular work. Such assertions implicate that, after

controlling for income, subjective well-being of unemployed persons should be higher than

of economically active persons. Available research however clearly indicates that this is not

the case. Subjective well being is lower for unemployed persons, even after controlling for

personal income and various other factors (Clark and Oswald 1994; Di Tella et al. 2001;

Delhey 2004; Böhnke 2006; Layard 2005). Hence, unemployed persons are on average less

happy than the economically active, even if they have the same income. This means, at

first, that the unemployed do not enjoy their leisure time. To the contrary, unemployment

seems to produce depression and anxiety, and results in a loss of self-esteem and personal

control (Goldsmith et al. 1996). Böhnke (2005) founds that unemployment also leads to

strains in personal relationships. On the long run the psychological cost of unemployment

seems to diminish a little, however (Clark et al. 2001).

Similar to the effect on income, there is also a debate on the causal direction

between unemployment and well-being, i.e. “do unhappy people get unemployed?” The

available research suggests that the main causality runs from unemployment to

unhappiness, and not vice versa (Dew et al. 1992; Graetz 1993; Winkelmann and

Winkelmann 1998; Marks 1999; Oswald 1997).

Karl Marx thought that the division of labour is the cause for the alienation of the

working class. Although Marx’ views are meanwhile called obsolete, it has been shown

that several features of specific work situations in a labour divided environment reduce the

job satisfaction, which in turn strongly effects the overall subjective well-being. Besides

good pay and job security, such features are opportunities for personal control, for skill use,

and for interpersonal contact, as well as supportive supervision, future expectations, and

variety (Warr 1999; Clark 1998, 2001).

Education is another classical dimension of the socio-economic status. The

literature states that education generally has only small effects on life satisfaction, and these

effects seem to be mediated by income, health and social capital (Diener et al. 1999;

Helliwell 2003).

Being of good health is one of the most important factors for objective quality of

life. However, when dealing with subjective well-being it has often turned out that

objective health indicators do only have a small impact (Diener and Lucas 1999). Effects of

25

bad health seem to exist only temporarily (Brickman et al. 1978). However there are strong

effects of self-reported, and hence subjective health indicators on well-being (Helliwell

2003: 339). The importance of such subjective health evaluation for well-being might be

explained by personality (Okun and George 1984), and self reported health might be

therefore used to control for such personality differences.

The private home is “the place where people tend to spend most of their free time,

and decent housing can be seen as a precondition of family well-being, of procreation and

of the socialisation of children” (Domanski and Alber 2006: 85). Actually, the basic right

for satisfactory accommodation is part of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”,

and in so far there can be little doubt that housing-quality is an important dimension of

inequality. Despite of its utmost importance, there has been only sparse analysis that looks

on the effects of housing quality on life satisfaction so far. Several authors report that

having a nice home has been mentioned as one of the factors that are important to have for

a good life (Burns and Grebler 1986; Kiel and Mieszkowski 1990; Delhey 2004). Based on

data from the EQLS, Domanski and Alber (2006: 102–104) show that housing deficits like

broken windows, or lack of flushing toilets strongly influences the general life satisfaction

of Europeans. Other factors, like the quality of the housing environment, or the number of

rooms seem to be less important. Ownership itself does produce higher life satisfaction in

Western Europe, but not in the former communist countries. This pattern is part of a more

general “housing paradox” in Eastern Europe, and can be explained by the rapid

privatisation policies during the transformation (Domanski and Alber 2006).

Gender differences are displayed almost habitually for many fields of public

interest, regardless of whether there is a theoretical justification for it or not. This is also

true for gender differences in subjective well-being. In studying 16 nations Inglehart (1990:

222) found that life satisfaction is marginally higher among women than men, with Russia

being the exceptional case, where it is the other way around. At the same time, women do,

however, also report higher levels of depression than men (Donovan and Halpern 2002). A

recent book by Halpern (2005) explains these seemingly contradictive findings with the

hypothesis that women are more socially connected and therefore more exposed to the

satisfactions and disappointments of their environment.

Regarding age, most studies report lower levels of satisfaction with one’s life in

general for the mid aged people, and higher levels for oldest and youngest age-groups

26

(Campbell et al. 1976; Herzog et al. 1982; Campbell 1981; Inglehart 1990; Helliwell 2003;

Blanchflower and Oswald 2004).

An almost classical dimension of the so called “new” inequalities is social capital.

Many studies have dealt with the impact of social relationships on subjective well-being

and showed, for example, the positive influence of marriage on life satisfaction. Divorce,

separation or widowhood reduce subjective well-being to a remarkable extent, even when

income is taken into account (Diener et al. 1999; Böhnke 2005). Other findings underline

the importance of social relations outside the family (Argyle, 1999), and it has been also

shown that social engagement, sport activities, and participation interact with positive well-

being (Helliwell 2001). Even the negative effects of unemployment on subjective well-

being can be buffered by strong supporting networks (Böhnke 2004).

6. Important topics currently under-analysed

6.1.Education and well-being

To what extent are differences in the quality of jobs increasingly tied to educational degrees

if we compare different age cohorts throughout Europe? What is the relationship between

educational poverty on the one side and deprivation and social exclusion on the other? To

what extent does education serve as an effective shield against deprivation? Does better

education translate not only into better employment chances but also into a richer social

life?

6.2.Health and quality of life

Reducing health inequalities and promoting the quality and accessibility of health and care

arrangements ranks among key policy goals of the European Union, and the open method

of coordination is being extended to health and long-term care. Health must become of

increasing concern to policy makers because health expenditure claims rising proportions of

GDP in Europe’s ageing societies, whilst good health is a major determinant of subjective

well-being (Layard 2005). Hence there is a need for comparative information on issues like

the following: How are health risks distributed over countries, regions or social groups,

where and to what extent does poor health cumulate with other dimensions of disadvantage,

to what extent has the goal of universal access to health care services been realised in the

27

European Union regardless of age, gender, income or region, and how do perceptions of the

accessibility and the quality of health care services vary among groups with different health

risks or from different social backgrounds?

Since mental illnesses represent a growing share of all illnesses a better

understanding of the conditions which bread mental problems is desirable. In a context of

growing emphasis on full employment and more labour force participation this implies to

know more about healthy and unhealthy aspects of work and the proper work-life balance.

How the quality of employment affects physical and mental health and how health shapes

subjective welfare in turn is a crucial question concerning the quality of life of Europeans.

6.3.Poverty, deprivation and the relationship to social cohesion

There are quite a few publications that disentangle to what extent low income coincides

with other types of deprivation and how frequent multiple disadvantage is found in various

countries and regions of the European Union. However, there are three issues which

deserve to be explored even further:

• The relationship between relative and absolute measures of deprivation should be

given further attention. The report by Fahey et al. (2005) revealed that countries with

identical relative income poverty rates may have poverty thresholds at widely

discrepant absolute levels. Hence those at the poverty line in rich countries may have

higher absolute incomes in PPS than those in the top income quartile in poorer

countries. From this, the question arises to which extent the citizens themselves have

left national frames of reference behind and moved to applying international

yardsticks (also see Delhey and Kohler 2006).

• Second, inequalities in the distribution of cumulative measures of privilege or

disadvantage could be studied further in order to reveal to what extent there are

polarisation tendencies within European societies and whether differences across

member states are biggest at the lower, the middle, or the upper end of the well-being

distribution.

• A third aspect worth exploring is to what extent deprivation and inequalities at the

household level overlap with inequalities at the level of single regions. This would

clarify to what extent cumulative disadvantage on the level of households is spatially

concentrated in poorer regions such as those with objective 1 status in EU regional

28

policies, but the small numbers of cases from survey research will set tight limits to

substantive analyses even if sufficient information on the place of residence were

available.

6.4.Perceptions of good governance and of the quality of society

The European Commission recurrently draws attention to the growing importance of good

governance. Departing from a rather dismal notion of present day politics, the European

Commission even identified the reform of European government as one of its four strategic

objectives after the turn of the century in a White Paper published in 2001 (Commission of

European Coummunities 2001). As a partial response to the problems outlined therein it

drew attention to the launching of cross-cutting policy agendas, such as those developed in

Tampere (1999) for freedom, security and justice issues, in Lisbon (2000) for economic and

social renewal up to 2010, or in Göteborg (2001) with the strategy for sustainable

development. In the meantime the negative votes on the European Constitution in France

and the Netherlands have shown that Europeans continue to be sceptical, a situation to

which the Commission responded by declaring a "period of reflection" and by publishing

its "Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate" in a Communication published in 2005.

In light of these developments remarkable little attention has so far been paid to the

perceived quality of the political system and of the quality of society. One reason for this

might be that survey questions concerning objective and subjective living conditions and

questions regarding the perception of the quality of the political system and political

attitudes are usually asked in different surveys so that analyses of the linkages between the

two realms are rarely possible.

6.5.The Europeanisation of aspiration levels and standards of comparison

There are two very distinct and rather unconnected approaches to measure social cohesion

as understood by EU authorities. In social policy documents a high degree of cohesion

stands for a low degree of relative income poverty measured by reference to a national

standard within each member state. In regional policy, instead, reference is made to a

European standard, and cohesion is understood as the similarity of member states with the

normative idea that all member states should be similarly close to the European mean.

Given this discrepancy at the level of policy concepts, it is necessary to know which frames

29

and standards of comparison European citizens have in mind when judging their living

conditions.

The process of European unification and especially the benchmarking implied in the

open method of coordination have exposed national authorities to critical comparisons with

their EU-neighbours. To what extent this increasing importance of European comparisons

at the level of policy-making has diffused to the level of ordinary citizens is an interesting

question, which implies two more specific issues:

• Do Europeans have increasingly similar ideas of what constitutes a good life or do

different national yardsticks persist? To what extent are they beginning to carry out

their own benchmarking independent of what political elites may decide, and which

countries do they consider as setting the relevant standards?

• Are Europeans also becoming more cohesive in the sense of increasingly applying

general norms of appropriateness and extending notions of solidarity beyond the

boundaries of the nation state? To what extent are they developing a European rather

than a national concept of citizenship?

The answers to such questions are of double relevance for policy makers. First, they

help to find out to what extent there is widening gulf between elite and mass orientations

implying the risk that supranational policy making moves further away from the concerns

of ordinary citizens. Secondly, the question is important on analytical grounds for

understanding to what extent economic growth can be expected to breed satisfaction or

dissatisfaction. After the German unification, the people in East Germany experienced a

steep increase in living standards, but since their aspiration levels were now shaped by the

living conditions prevailing in West Germany, their life satisfaction did not increase in line

with the rising standard of living but rather reflected a sense of relative deprivation. It will

be interesting to study if the process of European unification leads to a similar growth of

aspirations reflecting an imposition of Western standards in acceding countries.

6.6.Employment and civil society/work-life balance: is Europe becoming work-rich but

relationally poor?

Europe’s ageing societies clearly need to boost the number of people in active employment

and to increase the productivity of its workforce. Getting more people into paid work is an

economic imperative, especially with respect to the sustainability of public pension

30

schemes. This is from where the strategic objective of the Lisbon agenda to raise the

economic activity rate derives its basic justification.

The attempt to get more or less everyone to work raises the question to what extent

such activation strategies are compatible with the other strategic objective under the Lisbon

agenda to promote social cohesion, inclusion and solidarity. While its economic importance

cannot be questioned, the social meaning of work is less clear. On the one hand, having

paid work is not only an effective antidote against poverty, but also an important source of

social esteem and self-respect, whilst the workplace is also a major if not the main place of

social interaction, social control and social integration. On the other hand, two major

currents of political philosophy in Europe - socialists in the footsteps of Marx as well as the

Catholics since Leo XIII’s Encyclical Rerum Novarum - have always drawn attention to

adverse or alienating aspects of paid work which tends to block people from realizing

themselves in other more meaningful activities or to overburden them in ways which

interfere with family life or with the voluntary association with others. The widely-used

term “work-life-balance” captures this dual meaning of work as a means of or an

impediment to self-realization.

The conceptual ambiguity of work is reflected in the complexity of survey research

findings. On the one hand, there are solid results which underline the psychological and

social importance of work as a stabilizing element in human life. On the other hand, when

asked to divide the previous working day into episodes of various kinds of activities and to

report which activity gave them most happiness, respondents rank sex and socialising as the

two most rewarding, but work and commuting as the two least pleasant experiences among

some 15 episodes during the previous work day (Layard 2005: 15). Survey results also

show that compared to people outside the labour force economically active people have

higher participation rates in various forms of civic engagement, but spend less time in it

(Schwarz 1996).

Conceptually, an adequate work-life balance would mean that people feel they have

enough time to sufficiently engage in five types of activities which are central to human

life: a) paid work to ensure an income; b) unpaid work necessary to maintain ordinary

functioning of self or family (shopping, meals, cleaning, private business matters); c)

socialising with others inside or outside the family; d) time for one’s self, i.e. leisure spent

according to personal preferences beyond socialising; e) sleep.

31

The relevant question then is what forms of work organisation serve best to

combine work and social life outside the work sphere. More specifically: Are there limits in

working time beyond which social contacts maintaining the web of social relations and

subjective well-being suffer? To what extent do certain patterns of work – such as

fragmentation – rather than the volume of work have an impact on stress and subjective

well-being? Which work characteristics are most likely to foster identification with the job

and satisfaction drawn from work? How can work be organised in flexible ways which

allow to combine work duties with social and family obligations? What impact does it

have on absenteeism and productivity on the one side, experienced quality of life on the

other when more flexible arrangements such as the inclusion of child care into the work

setting are provided?

32

REFERENCES

Alber, J., J. Delhey, W. Keck, R. Nauenburg, T. Fahey, B. Maitre, C. Whelan, R. Anderson, C. Saraceno, M. Olagnero, H. Domanski, and A. Ostrowska (2005), Quality of Live in Europe: First European Quality of Life Survey 2003. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Alber, J. and U. Kohler (2004), Health and Care in an Enlarged Europe. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Alber, J. and M. Potu,°cek (2006), European Quality of Life Survey 1: Review of policy and data gaps. Report to the European Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living Conditions. Allardt, E. (1993), “Having, Loving, Being: An alternative to the Swedish Model of Welfare Research.” In: The Quality of Life. M. Nussbaum and A. Sen (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 88–94. Anderson, R. (2004), “Health and Health Care”. In: Quality of life in Europe. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (ed.). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Andrews, F. and S. Withey (1976), Social Indicators of Well-being in America. New York: Plenum. Andrews, F. M. and J.P.Robinson (1991), “Measures of Subjective Well-Being.” In: Measures of Personlity and Social Psychological Attitudes. J.P.Robinson, P.R.Shaver and L.S.Wrightsman (eds.). San Diego: Academic Press, 61–114. Argyle, M. (1999), “Causes and Correlates of Happiness.” In: Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. D. Kahnemann, E.Diener and N.Schwarz (eds.). New York: Russell Sage, 353–373. Becker, G. (1974), “A theory of Social Interactions.” Journal of Political Economy, 82, 1063–1093. Blanchflower, D. G. and A.J.Oswald (2004), “Well-being over time in Britain and the USA.” Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1359–1386. Böhnke, P. (2004), Perceptions of social integration and exclusion in an enlarged Europe. Böhnke, P. (2005), First European Quality of Life Survey: Life Satisfaction, Happiness and Sense of Belonging. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

33

Böhnke, P. (2006), “Einkommensarm, aber beziehungsreich.” In: Europas Osterweiterung: Das Ende der Vertiefung? J.Alber and W.Merkel (eds.). Berlin: Edition Sigma, 107–134. Brickman, P. and D.T.Campbell (1971), “Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Society.” In: Adaptation Level Theory: A Symposium. M.H.Appley (ed.). New York: Academic Press, 287–304. Brickman, P., D.Coates and R.Janoff-Bulman (1978), “Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 917–927. Burns, L. S. and L.Grebler (1986), The Future of Housing Markets. A New Appraisal. London, New York: Plenum. Campbell, A. (1981), The Sense of Well-Being in America. New York: McGraw-Hill. Campbell, A., P.E.Converse and W.L.Rodgers (1976), The quality of American life. Perceptions, evaluations, and satisfactions. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. Clark, A. E. (1998), “What Makes a Good Job? Evidence from OECD Countries”. OECD, Labour Market and Social Policy, Occasional Papers No. 34. Clark, A. E. (2001), “What Really Matters in a Job? Hedonic Measurement Using Quit Data.” Labour Economics, 8, 223–242. Clark, A. E., Y.Georgellis and P.Sanfey (2001), “Scarring: The Psychological Impact of Past Unemployment.” Economica, 68, 221–241. Clark, A. E. and A.J.Oswald (1994), “Unhapppiness and Unemployment.” Economic Journal, 104, 648–659. Clark, A. E. and A.J.Oswald (1996), “Satisfaction and comparison income.” Journal of Public Economics, 61, 359–381. Commission of European Coummunities (2001), European Governance: A White Paper, Brussels. 25.7.2001, COM(2001) 428., online on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.p%

Commission of the European Communities (2000), Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities DG, Social situation in the European Union, online on http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_situation/socsit_en.htm. Costa, P. T. and R. R. McCrae (1988), “Personality in Adulthood; A Six-Year Longitudinal Study of Self-Reports and Spous Ratings on the NEO Personality Inventory.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 853–863.

34

Davidson, R. J., J. R.Marshall, A.J.Tomarken and J.B.Henriques (2000), “While a Phobic Waits: Regional Brain Electrical and Autonomic Activity in Social Phobics During Anticipation of Public Speaking.” Biological Psychiatry, 47, 85–95. Delhey, J. (2004), Life Satisfaction in the Enlarged Europe, Luxembourg: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (http://www.eurofound.eu.int/publications/EF0437EN.pdf). Delhey, J. and U.Kohler (2006), “From Nationally Bounded to Pan-European Inequalities? On the Importance of Foreign Countries as Reference Groups.” European Sociological Review, 22, 125–140. Dew, M. A., E.J.Bromet and L.Penkower (1992), “Mental Health Effects of Job Loss in Women.” Psychological Medicine, 22, 751–764. Di Tella, R., R.J.MacCulloch and R.Layard (2002), Income, Happiness and Inequality as Measures of Welfare. Mimeo: Harvard Business School. Di Tella, R., R.J.MacCulloch and A.J.Oswald (2001), “Preferences over Inflation and Unemployment: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness.” American Economic Review, 91, 335–341. Diener, E., M.Diener and C.Diener (1995), “Factors Predicting the Subjective Well-Being of Nations.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 851–864. Diener, E. and R.Lucas (1999), “Personality and Subjective Well-Being.” In: Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. D. Kahneman, E.Diener and N.Schwarz (eds.). New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 213–229. Diener, E. and O.Shigehiro (2000), “Money and Happiness: Income and Subjective Well-Being Across Nations.” In: Culture and Subjective Well-Being. E. Diener and M.S.Eunkook (eds.). Cambridge: MIT-Press, 185–218. Diener, E., E.Suh, R.Lucas and H.Smith (1999), “Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress.” Psycholgocial Bulletin, 125, 276–302. Domanski, H. and J.Alber (2006), “Paradoxes of Housing in the Enlarged Europe.“ In: Europas Osterweiterung: Das Ende der Vertiefung? J.Alber and W.Merkel (eds.). WZB Jahrbuch 2005, Berlin: Edition Sigma, 85–106. Domanski, H., A.Ostrowska, D.Przybysz and A.Romaniuk (2005), First European Quality of Life Survey: Social dimensions of housing. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

35

Donovan, N. and D.Halpern (2002), Life Satisfaction: the State of Knowledge and Implications for Government. Duesenberry, J. S. (1949), Income, Savings and the Theory of Consumer Behavior. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Easterlin, R. A. (1974), “Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical evidence.” In: Nations and households in economic growth: Essays in honour of Moses Abramowitz. P.A.David and M.W.Reder (eds.). New York and London: Academic Press, 89–125. Easterlin, R. A. (1995), “Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27, 35–48. Easterlin, R. A. (2001), “Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory.” Economic Journal, 111, 465–484. Easterlin, R. A. (2005), “Feeding the Illusion of Growth and Happiness: a Reply to Hagerty and Veenhoven.” Social Indicators Research, 74, 426–443. Ehrhardt, J. J., W.E.Saris and R.Veenhoven (2000), “Stability of Life-Satisfaction over Time.” Journal of Happiness Studies, 1, 177–205. Fahey, T., B.Nolan and C.T.Whelan (2003), Monitoring quality of life in Europe. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Fahey, T. and E.Smyth (2004), “Do Subjecitve Indicators Measure Welfare? Evidence from 33 European societies.” European Societies, 6, 5–27. Fahey, T., C.Whelan and B.Maître (2005), First European Quality of Life Survey: Income Inequalities and Deprivation. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Feather, N. T. (1990), The Psychological Impact of Unemployment, New York: Springer. Fernández-Dols, J.-M. and M.-A.Ruiz-Belda (1990), “Are Smiles a Sign of Happiness? Gold Medal Winners at the Olympic Games.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 1113–1119. Firebaugh, G. and L.Tach (2005), “Relative income and happiness: are Americans on a hedonic treadmill?”. http://www.sociology.psu.edu/faculty/documents/hedonictreadmill-latest_000.pdf.

36

Fordyce, M. A. (1988), “A Review of Research on Happiness Measures: A Sixty Second Index of Happiness and Mental Health.” Social Indicators Research, 20, 355–381. Frederick, S. and G.Loewenstein (1999), “Hedonic Adaptation.” In: Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. D.Kahnemann, E.Diener and N.Schwarz (eds.). New York: Russell Sage Foundations, 302–329. Frey, B. S. and A.Stutzer (2000), “Happiness, Economy and Institutions.” Economic Journal, 110, 918–938. Frey, B. S. and A.Stutzer (2002a), Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Human Well-Being. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Frey, B. S. and A.Stutzer (2002b), “What can economists learn from happiness research?” Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 402–435. Gardner, J. and A.J.Oswald (2001), “Does Money Buy Happiness? A Longitudinal Study Using Data on Windfalls.” http://ideas.repec.org/p/ecj/ac2002/81.html. Goldberg, D. and P.Williams (1978), A User’s Guide to the General Health Questionnaire, Windsor: NFER-Nelson. Goldsmith, A., J.R.Veum and W.J.Darity (1996), “The Impact of Labor Force History on Self-Esteem and its Component Parts, Anxiety, Alienation and Depression.” Journal of Economic Psychology, 17, 183–220. Graetz, B. (1993), “Health Consequences of employment and Unemployment: Longitudinal Evidence for Young Men and Women.” Social Science and Medicine, 36, 715–724. Graham, C. and S.Pettinato (2001), “Happiness, Markets and Democracy: Latin America in Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Happiness Studies, 2, 237–268. Hagerty, M. and R.Veenhoven (2003), “Wealth and happiness revisited – growing national income does go with greater happiness.” Social Indicators Research, 64, 1–27. Halpern, D. (2005), Social Capital, Cambridge: Polity Press. Heady, B. and A.Wearing (1991), “Subjective Well-Being: A Stocks and Flows Framework.” In: Subjective Well-Being: An Interdisciplanary Perspective. F.Strack, M.Argyle and N.Schwarz (eds.). Oxford: Pergamon Press, 7–26. Helliwell, J. F. (2001), “Social Capital, the Economy and Well-Being.” In: The Longest Decade: Canada in the 1990s, vol. 1 of The Review of Economic Performance and Social Progress. K.Banting, A.Sharpe and F.St-Hilaire (eds.). Montreal: Centre for the Study of Living Standards, Institute for Research on Public Policy.

37

Helliwell, J. F. (2003), “How’s life? Combining individual and national variables to explain subjective well-being.” Economic Modelling, 20, 331–360. Helson, H. (1964), Adaptation-Level Theory: An Experimental ans Systematic Approach to Behavior. New York: Harper and Row. Herzog, A., W.L.Rodgers and J.Woodworth (1982), Subjective Well-Being Among different Age Groups. Ann Arbor: Institiute for Social Research. Inglehart, R. (1990), Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. and H.-D. Klingemann (2000), “Genes, culture, democracy, and happiness.” In: Culture and Subjective Well-being. E.Diener and E.Suh (eds.). Cambrige: MIT Press, 165–183. Inglehart, R. and J.-R. Rabier (1986), “Aspirations adapt to situations – but why are the Belgians so much happier than the French?” In: Research on the Quality of Life. F. M. Andrews (ed.). Ann Arbor: ICPSR, 1–56. Irwin, F. (1944), “The Realism of Expectations.” Psychological Review, 51, 120–126. Kiel, K. A. and P.Mieszkowski (1990), “An Examination of Systemic Differences in the Appreciation of Individual Housing Units.” Journal of Real Estate Research, 5, 301–318. Kleinman, M. (2002), A European Welfare State? European Union Social Policy in Context. Palgrave,: Macmillan. Koivumaa, H. H., H. V. Honkanen, K.Heikkilae, J.Kaprio and M.Koskenvuo (2001), “Life Satisfaction and Suicide: A 20-Year Follow-up Study.” American Journal of Psychiatry, 158, 433–439. Kovács, K. and B.Kapitány (2004), Working and Living in an Enlarged Europe. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Krieger, H. (2004), Migration trends in an enlarged Europe. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Lane, R. A. (1998), “The Joyless Market Economy.” In: Economics, Values and Organization. B.-N. Avner and L.Putterman (eds.). New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 461–488.

38

Larsen, R. J. and B. L. Fredrickson (1999), “Measurement Issues in Emotion Research.” In: Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. D.Kahnemann, E.Diener and N.Schwarz (eds.). New York: Russell Sage Foundations, 40–60. Layard, R. (2005), Happiness. Lessons from a New Science. Harmondsworth: Penguin Press. Lepper, H. (1998), “Use of Other-Reports to Validate Subjective Well-Being Measures.” Social Indicators Research, 44, 367–379. Lindenberg, S. (1989), “Social Production Functions, Deficits and Social Revolutions.” Rationality and Society, 1, 51-77. Marks, N. and G.N.Fleming (1999), “Influences and Consequences of Well-being among Australian Young People: 1980–1995.” Social Indicators Research, 46, 301–323. Michalos, A. C. (1991), Global Report on Student Well-Being. Volume 1: Life Satisfaction and Happiness. New York: Springer. Neumark, D. and A.Postlewaite (1998), “Relative Income Concerns and the Rise in married Women’s Employment.” Journal of Public Economy, 70, 157–183. Okun, M. A. and L.George (1984), “Physician and Self-Ratings of Health, Neuroticism and Subjective Well-Being Among Men and Women.” Personality Individual Differences, 5, 533–540. Ormel, J., S.Lindenberg, N.Steverink and L.M.Verbrugge (1999), “Subjective Well-Being and Social Production Functions.” Social Indicators Research, 46, 61–90. Oswald, A. J. (1997), “Happiness and economic performance.” Economic Journal, 107, 1815–1831. Parducci, A. (1995), Happiness, Pleasure, and Judgment: The Contextual Theory and Its Applications. Hillsdale,: Erlbaum. Pavot, W. and E.Diener (1993), “The Affective and Cognitive Context of Self-Reported Measures of Subjective Well-Being.” Social Indicators Research, 28, 1–20. van Praag, B. M., P.Frijters and A.Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003), “The Anatomy of Subjective Well-Being.” Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 51, 29–49. Russell, H. and C. T. Whelan (2004), Low income and deprivation in an enlarged Europe. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

39

Sandvik, E., E.Diener and L.Seidlitz (1993), “Subjective Well-Being: The Convergence and Stability of Self-Report and Non-Self-Reported Measures.” Journal of Personality, 61, 317–342. Saraceno, C., M.Olagnero and P.Torrioni (2005), First European Quality of Life Survey: Families, Work and Social Networks. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Scharpf, F. (1999), Regieren in Europa. Effektiv und demokratisch? Frankfurt a. M./New York: Campus. Schwarz, N. (1996), “Ehrenamtliches Engagement in Deutschland. Ergebnisse der Zeitbudgeterhebung.” Wirtschaft und Statistik, 4, 259–266. Schwarz, N. and F.Strack (1999), “Reports of subjective well-being: judgemental processes and their methodological implications.” In: Well-being: the foundations of hedonic psychology. D.Kahnemann, E.Diener and N.Schwarz (eds.). New York: Sage, 353–373. Sen, A. (1993), “Capability and Well-Being.” In: The Quality of Life. M.Nussbaum and A.Sen (eds.). Oxford: Clarendon, 30–53. Sen, A. (2000), Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny. Manila: Office of Environment and Social Development, Asian Development Bank. Smith, S. and P.Razzell (1975), The Pools Winners. London: Caliban Books. Stutzer, A. (2004), “The Role of Income Aspirations in Individual Happiness.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 54, 89–109. Veenhoven, R. (1993), Happiness in Nations. Subjective Appreciation of Life in 56 Nations 1946–1992. Rotterdam: Erasmus University. Warr, P. (1999), “Well-Being and the Workplace.” In: Well-being: the foundations of hedonic psychology. D.Kahnemann, E.Diener and N.Schwarz (eds.). New York: Sage, 392–412. Wilson, W. (1967), “Correlates of Avowed Happiness.” Psychological Bulletin, 294–306. Winkelmann, L. and R.Winkelmann (1998), “Why are the Unemployed so Unhappy? Evidence from Panel Data.” Economica, 65, 1–15.

40

COMPARING MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE. COMBINING MACRO-COMPARISON AND MICRO-LEVEL SURVEY DATA

Coordinator:

Bernhard Ebbinghaus, University of Mannheim,

bebbinghaus@sowi.uni-mannheim.de

a. TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP IN POST-INDUSTRIAL EUROPE

Report by:

Bernhard Ebbinghaus, University of Mannheim,

bebbinghaus@sowi.uni-mannheim.de

Although trade unions were founded to fight for better protection against social risks of

employees in the industrializing period, they seem in today’s post-industrial societies less

representative of and attuned to groups facing new social risks. Facing increased economic

and social challenges, trade unions seek to open up to new social groups, while maintaining

their strongholds among blue-collar industrial workers and in the public sector. As unions

have made inroads into new groups, their social composition has become more

heterogeneous, and the representation of interests is more difficult in both collective

bargaining and lobbying. In addition, traditionally close ties of the main union movements

with allied (Left) political parties have been de-emphasized by both sides, partly in an effort

to respond to the changing social and political landscape.

New territories for trade union interest representation are marginalised social groups

who bear ‘new social risks’ (NSR). Bonoli (2006) provides a useful threefold

classification of NSR policies: (1) the difficulties to reconcile increased work participation

and traditional family or caring responsibilities, particularly for women with children or

needy relatives; (2) the unemployment and poverty trap for those with low skills in a

knowledge society; and (3) the insufficient social security coverage of those weaker social

groups that have interrupted working careers, fall below mandatory insurance retirements

or receive no private fringe benefits.

This report inquires whether trade unions remain dominated by the interests of the

old social risks (OSR) or whether they are now opening up to the interests of ‘new’ social

risk (NSR) bearers (see also Ebbinghaus 2006b). We will review the mobilisation and

41

representation of old vs. new social interests (see Table 1), discussing the potential

implications for union strategies. In the first part, the main social status and interest groups

that could be seen as facing old social risks will be discussed in the context of the ongoing

membership crisis. An overview is given on OSR groups: the traditional industrial blue-

collar workforce, the well protected public sector employees, the privileged but often

underrepresented white-collar employees in the private sector, and the older workers who

favour the status quo. In a second part, some of the social groupings that face the new

social risks will be discussed: youth, the unemployed, the low skilled, women, as well as

part-time and flexibly employed workers.

1. Organizing Old Social Risks

Over the last two decades, trade unions have been facing major difficulties in recruiting

members both among old and new social groups. Since the 1980s, union density – the share

of wage earners who are union members – declined in all but a few European countries

(Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). Explanations for ‘de-unionisation’, the decline in union

membership and density, as well as cross-national variations in ‘union strength’ have been

manifold, stressing structural, cyclical, and institutional factors (Ebbinghaus and Visser

1999). Long-term socio-economic changes make collective organization more difficult:

deindustrialisation and the growth of private services; white-collar, atypical, and part-time

employment; changes in normative orientation from collectivism towards individualism.

These secular changes, however, only partially explain the development over time, and they

largely fail to account for cross-national variations. Globalisation has not uniformly led to

de-unionisation, instead, the ‘fate’ of unions is contingent on institutional mediating factors

(Scruggs and Lange 2002; Traxler et al. 2001). The Nordic and Belgian union movements

still enjoy the highest level of union density in Western Europe due to the ‘selective

incentive’ of union-run (so called ‘Ghent’) unemployment insurance (Rothstein 1992;

Western 1997) as well as a combination of centralised and decentralised union activities

(Hancké 1993).

1.1. Blue-collar workers

Despite the changing labour force, trade unions tend to represent the traditional core

workforce. The exceptions are unions in the Nordic countries and Belgium with high

42

unionisation; these union movements are more encompassing and represent more closely

the post-industrial society. Among the other countries, however, blue-collar workers still

represent a large share of union members, while they are now in clear minority position in

post-industrial labour force. Although considerable organizational consolidation within the

manufacturing and public service sectors has changed the union landscape in these

countries, they still are lagging behind in organizing the expanding occupational groups, in

particular the white-collar and private service sector workers (Dølvik 2001a; Ebbinghaus

2006).

In Southern Europe, unionisation in the private sector is about one half (or less) the

rate in the public sector, although blue-collar unions dominated in the past, it is the low or

declining union density in the private sector that contributes most to changing the union

landscape. Since the 1980s, British unions witnessed a substantial decline in density among

men, from over 50% to below 30%, largely due to dramatic blue-collar de-unionisation.

The Swedish LO is dominantly blue-collar (except for few unions in services), and still the

majority of all Swedish union members are blue-collar workers. The Danish, Finnish and

Norwegian sister organizations, also aligned with the Left, remain dominantly blue-collar,

though again a large membership share works in the public sector. In contrast to

Continental Europe, however, these main union confederations have a much less

pronounced overrepresentation of men (around 55%), and the strength of blue-collar

unionisation is not a result of weakness in the public sector or the white-collar area.

1.2. The public sector

The public sector remains among the best-organized sectors, despite efforts towards

privatisation, public sector spending cuts, and new public management methods. In the

Nordic countries (with the exception of Norway), public sector unionisation (90-95%) is

today somewhat higher than in the industrial sector (85-90%) and appreciably higher than

the private service sector (around 70-75%). While the public / private gap is relatively small

in the high-density countries, unionisation in the public sector is much higher than in the

market sector, especially in private services, in the countries with overall lower union

density. With the exception of Italy, Ireland, and Portugal, all other Continental European

unions in the public sector enjoy membership mobilisation at least twice the level of the

market sector.

43

Many factors are conductive to better recruitment conditions (Keller 1991): public

employers are more likely to recognize unions and accept union membership across all

levels, collectively regulated advancement and pay schemes are more common,

bureaucratisation is on average higher, and unions have more say in staff policies. In

addition to the role as regulator of employment relations, the welfare state as employer has

a major impact on national labour relations, often providing ‘good practices’ and remaining

a stronghold for union movements (Traxler 1999). Where overall unionisation is relatively

low and declining, union movements thus become increasingly dependent on the better

labour relations in the public sector. The growth to limits of today’s welfare states as well

as increased privatisation, decentralisation, and public management increasingly undermine

this traditional power base. Thus far, attempts at welfare retrenchment have had a

mobilising effect in the public sector across Europe, at times leading to major strikes, while

some governments have sought to negotiate public sector reforms.

1.3. White-collar employees

Unions face the difficulty of organizing the rising white-collar workforce in the private

sector, both technical and office employees in industry and sales as well as professional and

other white-collar employees in the private service sector (Dølvik 2001a). Many of the

white-collar occupations, particularly those of male employees and those that require

professional or academic degrees belong to the privileged groups of employees with

interests tied to old social risks that had been covered by paternalistic employer initiatives,

by private voluntary insurance, and later by state schemes.

There are large differences across countries and across sectors in unionisation of

white-collar workers in the private sector. The Nordic countries show particularly high

levels of unionisation among private sector white-collar workers. Interestingly, male white-

collar workers (particularly in higher level grades) tend to be less organized than women in

Sweden and probably other Nordic countries. With the exception of Switzerland (where

white-collar employees seem as little organized as blue-collar workers), white-collar

employees in the private sector are organized 20-50% less than blue-collar workers on

average. Transport and the finance sector are often better organized than the average, while

a lower degree of unionisation is common to the other private service sectors with high

female employment in decentralised small workplaces, including retailing and catering.

Case studies of service sector unionisation ‘show that the density levels in retail trade range

44

from 60-80% in Sweden, Denmark and Finland, around 25% in Ireland and Norway, to 10-

20% in the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Austria, with France as an outlier

with minimal unionisation. A similar pattern can be found in hotel and restaurants’ (Dølvik

2001b). This is largely due to the weakness of collective bargaining in these decentralised

sectors and the difficulties of union access or works’ council representation in the small-

scale private service sector. The finance sector is an exception to this rule.

Although the top end of the ‘service class’ has increased faster than the bottom-end

servicing jobs, ‘unskilled service jobs in the private sector tend, however, to be

characterised by sometimes severe disadvantages: very low pay, no fringe benefits,

precarious job rights and weak trade union representation’ (Esping-Andersen 1993: 230).

Efforts to privatise public service tasks, the increasingly flexible employment in private

services, and freelance contracts in the professional services provide further challenges.

Thus, the underrepresentation in private services poses major questions for the future of

unionism in general and in the balance between OSR and NSR.

1.4. Older workers

Ageing has also had its impact on most trade unions’ membership base and has shaped their

interest politics. Over the past few years, unions have become major proponents in the

debate on the restructuring of welfare states in Europe. At national and EU levels, reforms

of pay-as-you go pension system and a reversal of early retirement are put forward as

responses to current and future fiscal problems, to the demographic ‘time-bomb’, and to the

low overall employment rates in most parts of Europe (Ebbinghaus 2006). In Continental

Europe, pensioners represent a substantial share of overall union membership, particularly

in the public sector and mining. But in contrast to the more militant Southern trade unions,

other Continental union movements rely on pressure group politics and their positions in

the self-administered social insurance bodies to advance their interests. In contrast, British,

Irish and Nordic unions customarily have a workplace orientation focusing on active

members, while allied interest groupings provide the main political and social organization

for pensioners.

Unions remain more ambivalent about the organization and representation of

pensioners’ interests than is often assumed when looking merely at the number of

pensioners. With the exception of Italy, most unions have not sought to organize the

pensioners to the same degree as those still active in the labour market. Indeed, the older

45

working age groups (45-64) — those that expect to retire within the next years — are the

best-represented group among members, delegates, and officials in most union movements.

Thus, it is less the membership share of pensioners, but the strong unionisation among

workers with seniority rights that shifts the balance towards a defence of the status quo

(Brugiavini et al. 2001).

2. Organizing New Social Risks

2.1. The young

The ageing of union membership is not merely the result of demographic shifts; it also

results from the failure to mobilize young people. Survey research shows that the likelihood

of joining a union decreases with age and recruitment conditions are unlikely to improve in

the future (Klandermanns and Visser 1995). Today’s low mobilisation will thus have

consequences for decades to come, especially since the well-organized cohorts will soon

retire. Certainly, the same structural and cyclical factors explain some of the decline in

youth as they do the overall density rates. Compared to earlier periods and older age

groups, today’s youth have higher risks of joblessness (especially in Southern Europe),

more difficulty to find an apprenticeship, engage more frequently and longer in tertiary

education, obtain more part-time and atypical contracts, and increasingly work in white-

collar and service sector jobs. In countries with low or declining membership trends, the

age gap is particularly pronounced, while in the well organized Nordic and Belgian union

movements, which provide strong selective incentives and workplace representation, youth

membership is relatively high, albeit still lower than the national average.

The low unionisation rate among young people is not merely a life course

phenomena but a combined effect of age-related opportunities for union exposure and a

secular change in ‘decollectivisation’ from cohort to cohort. The low density among young

workers and subsequent underrepresentation of youth interests in Western European union

movements should be a major cause for concern about future membership developments.

For many of these young people, unions seem to be rather old-fashioned movements that

are certainly less attractive than ‘new’ social movements and ‘fun’ leisure activities.

Moreover, the majority of union members, congress delegates, and union officials seem to

be older than ‘40 something’. Since current young cohorts are relatively small, union

officials may not see the immediate effect of recruitment efforts, though this reinforces the

46

problem of low representation. In countries where youth unemployment, atypical work, and

low levels of training are particular problems, young people will be less willing to commit

themselves to long-term membership. Thus in Southern Europe, where segmented labour

markets provide few opportunities to young people, the alienation from union policies

favouring older workers may be highest.

2.2. The unemployed

Since the mid-1970s, long-term mass unemployment has become a major problem of

European welfare states; it has also aggravated the membership problems and taxed the

bargaining power of unions. The unemployed are expected to be more likely to leave the

union, while recruitment and retention of members will be more difficult given the potential

threat of dismissal by employers. Traditionally, some craft unions had even excluded the

unemployed from their ranks, while those unions of less skilled workers that relied strongly

on firm-level recruitment (if not closed shop arrangements) de facto excluded the jobless.

The need to organize the unemployed became recognised only after the onset of mass

unemployment in the late 1970s, though their representation remained very low.

Membership among unemployed persons is particularly high in Scandinavian

countries and Belgium with union-led Ghent unemployment funds. In most other countries,

the unemployed are still hardly organized and represent a small share of all members. The

unemployed were certainly underrepresented in most other unions and their ‘outsider’

interests were seen as not present at the bargaining table at firm or higher levels. In some

cases, the jobless organized their own protest groupings outside the labour movement,

particularly in France with a social movement tradition of collective action.

The rise in mass unemployment since the mid-1970s explains some, but not the

entire decline in overall membership, and not much of cross-national variation. Under some

conditions, unemployment may not hurt, but rather help membership mobilisation. As

several comparative studies have shown, union-led unemployment insurance common in

Denmark, Finland, Sweden (and partly Belgium) provides a selective incentive to join and

stay in a union (Rothstein 1992; Western 1997). Even though there is no legal obligation,

potential members perceive such a link; however, this ‘union security’ may not last forever.

These voluntary schemes are heavily subsidised by the state (or by mandatory employer

contributions), while only the administrative costs are borne by membership dues. The

Nordic governments, facing exceptionally high unemployment in the early 1990s,

47

introduced cost-saving measures or attempted to undermine the union-run unemployment

scheme, as recently occurred in Denmark.

2.3. The low skilled

The low skilled are no ‘new’ social risk group, however, job opportunities for those with

low skills have become less frequent through rationalised production methods and higher

labour costs. Moreover, large-scale labour shedding of low skill jobs since the mid 1970s

has led to particularly high long-term unemployment and early retirement. Those that fail to

attain adequate credentials and occupational skills are clearly disadvantaged for the rest of

their employment careers. While low skills were large-scale phenomena of the blue-collar

industrial workforce in the past, today’s low skilled men and women are competing for low

paid service jobs at the ‘bottom’ of the service class.

Trade unions have traditionally sought to organize unskilled or semi-skilled blue-

collar workers within general trade unions in Britain, Ireland and Denmark, or elsewhere in

industrial unions that sought to be inclusive at all skill levels. Today, the shrinking number

of low-skilled blue-collar workers has received less attention from union organizers, while

unions face important obstacles in organizing the new service ‘proletariat’. Even in Nordic

countries, unskilled workers, particularly men, tend to be less organized than skilled blue-

collar workers, though also lower grade white-collar employees are less likely to organize.

In Britain and Ireland, unskilled men are organized at nearly the same degree as their more

skilled colleagues thanks to the dominance of general unions. In Continental European

countries, industrial unions have found it more difficult to organize unskilled workers,

particularly those with unstable employment careers. Particularly when unions rely on

vocational training as a strategy to increase the skilled workforce and thereby maintain high

wages, unions are not very receptive to the interests of the low skilled. Moreover, the

industrial unions together with the main service sector unions sought to maintain the high

wage strategy also in the service sector.

2.4. Women

A major long-term change has been the promotion of female participation in union

movements. The share of female union membership increased in all countries over the last

decades, but there are wide North-South differences in female labour force participation,

48

union membership, and union density. In Nordic welfare states, women are not only as

likely to be working as men; they are even more prone to join a union today. Because of

high employment and membership rates, Nordic women have more or less achieved parity

in overall membership with their male colleagues; they are in a majority position in many

public sector and private service sector organizations. Similarly, given relatively high

female participation and similar levels of union density in Britain and Ireland, women

represent 45% of union confederation membership.

On the other hand, female labour force participation, union density, and membership

remain much lower in Continental Europe. In Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the

Netherlands, the likelihood to be organized is 20-40% lower for women than for men. Only

every fourth Belgian and Dutch union member and every third German and Austrian

member is a woman. This gender gap is even wider in Southern Europe. Even during the

last decade, in comparison to their membership share, women remained underrepresented

on the main executive committees of most union confederations (Curtin 1999).

Governments have thus far focused less on equal pay issues than on formal anti-

discrimination policies and promotion of female employment, while the collective

bargaining partners were less willing to renegotiate the wage structure than to push for

general pay increases. ‘As a matter of fact, women are largely absent from the collective

bargaining process, and the content of agreements at the national level remains male-

oriented’ (Bergamaschi 2000: 172). In countries with social concertation on income

policies, as in Finland, Belgium or Ireland, gender equality issues are more likely to be

discussed, while in countries with sectoral or decentralised bargaining, unions seem to

leave gender equality issues to government policies.

2.5. Atypical employment

Part-time work is expanding in most countries. Part-time employees are less likely to be

organized by trade unions, largely due to recruitment problems, not least because they are

more difficult to approach for union officials. Part-timers are concentrated in particular

sectors that are difficult to organize and tend to be employed in smaller organizations. To

the degree that part-timers, particularly those with few hours, are not sufficiently covered

under collective bargaining arrangements, labour regulations, or social insurance coverage,

they may not see any advantage in becoming a union member. This then reinforces the

underrepresentation dilemma.

49

The gap between full-time and part-time workers is considerable, with few

significant exceptions. In Continental Europe, union density for part-time employees tends

to be between half of the overall rate (e.g. Western Germany) and about two thirds (e.g.

France), while the part-time rate is somewhat closer (three fourth) to the rate of full-timers

in Britain and Ireland, and nearly or as high in Nordic countries. In the ‘first part-time

economy of the world’ (Visser 2002), the Netherlands, union density for full-time workers

was above 30% in the 1990s and declining relative with working hours to only 3% for those

working a few hours per week (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000: 452). In Britain, union density

for part-time workers remained at around 21% since the early 1990s (Labour Force Survey

2002). In both countries, the rate of unionisation among part-time workers remained stable

throughout the 1990s, indicating that it less the decline in the already low level of

organization, but the overall increase of such employment (and the de-unionisation among

full-time workers) that increasingly challenges union movements.

Even more difficult is the organization of other atypical employment contracts

(fixed-term contracts, posted workers, etc.). In the Netherlands, non-standard ‘flexible’

contracts have grown considerably, partially regulated through the ‘flexicurity’

arrangements via labour law and collective bargaining. Nevertheless, the unionisation rate

of Dutch flexi-workers is only one third of those with standard (permanent) work contracts

in the 1990s (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000: 452). Similarly in the United Kingdom,

temporary workers are less likely to be union members than those permanently employed,

while the gap is nearly twice as high in the private sector and public sector, which has a

higher degree of temporary contracts and special working arrangements in a more union-

friendly environment. Similar obstacles to organizing the ‘new social risk’ group with

flexible employment contracts will be common in the other countries; however, not much

information has thus far been gathered and organizational strategies devised by the trade

unions in Continental European countries are still insufficient.

3. Summary

The main findings concerning the OSR/NSR difference can be subsumed as particular

organizing patterns in the four ‘families’ of union movements across Western Europe. The

Nordic union movements have adapted most to the changing labour force: they rely on

strong workplace organization and encompassing bargaining coverage, they gain from

extended welfare sectors and also profit (except Norwegian unions) from union-run

50

unemployment insurance. The high level of unionisation is common to most sectors and

occupational groups, and female employees are even more likely to be unionised then their

male colleagues.

Trade unions in Britain and to a lesser degree in Ireland have suffered from

decreasing membership, labour market deregulation and bargaining decentralisation since

the 1990s. Given rapid declines in the private sector, the public sector has become the

remaining stronghold of British unionism. The degree of unionisation among the former

core group of male blue-collar workers declined considerably, while unionisation among

women today even exceeds that of men, thanks to the larger concentration in the public

sector. While unions traditionally have not been keen to organize the unemployed, the

general unions cater for unskilled workers to the same degree as for others. The major

challenge British unions face is to organize young workers and to overcome employer

resistance to recruitment. Only every third British worker is a trade union member, and not

many more are covered under collective bargaining; thus, many low skilled workers have to

rely on the state-regulated minimum wage. Lacking bargaining power and widespread

coverage in addition to their limited political influence, British unions are currently unable

to advance the interests of the groups facing new social risks. The situation is somewhat

better in Ireland due to the higher level of organization, the recent economic boom and the

national social pacts that have led to framework agreements.

Union movements in Continental Europe have spent much mobilisation effort and

political capital to defend the old social groups, yet they lag behind in organizing the new

social groups. Corporatist institutionalisation in the bargaining and social policy arena (for

instance via self-administration) as well as statutory workplace representation rights have

provided some ‘buffer’ against direct losses of union power. Continental European union

movements tend to be more dominated by male blue-collar workers, public employees with

secure employment and older workers with seniority rights than those in the Nordic

countries. Trade union membership is certainly ageing, while young people tend to be

much less likely to join and are unlikely to become members at later ages. Although the

share of female membership has expanded with increased labour force participation, the

gender gap among members, works councillors and union officers is still considerable.

Although some public sector and white-collar unions are now clearly dominated by female

member majorities, gender mainstreaming has only slowly entered the bargaining realm

and policy agenda of unions.

51

A major difference between Southern and Central Continental European union

movements is the importance of labour market segmentation. In Southern Europe, youth

unemployment is a more pressing problem and flexible employment contracts, largely

outside the control of unions, have also become a more serious trend. The current dilemma

for trade unions, particularly in Continental Europe, is not only how to open up to these

diverse new social groups, while holding on to the traditional core groups, but also how to

square the circle of representing these diverse interests in collective bargaining and the

public policy arena. Particularly in Continental Europe, the question union leaders face is

how to protect the old social risk interests of the core membership, while simultaneously

advancing the new social risk. With few significant exceptions, the NSR interests are thus

still weakly organized — and unions find it difficult to advance their representation of them

internally and externally.

52

Table 1: Net union density in Western Europe (ISSP 1996)

Net with U* Men Women Age 35-54 Age -34 Age 55+

% % % % % % % Sweden 88.5 87.0 86.9 89.9 92.1 80.6 89.9 Norway 63.4 60.4 60.8 66.6 69.0 52.7 71.3 Great Britain 34.8 32.6 34.4 35.1 36.4 35.1 25.3 Ireland 46.3 41.0 50.1 40.4 55.3 41.3 29.2 Germany (East) 30.3 30.3 30.1 30.4 32.7 24.0 32.4 Germany (West) 26.8 26.4 33.9 15.1 30.2 23.2 25.3 Switzerland 22.1 22.1 25.9 17.5 24.3 17.7 25.5 France 17.3 15.4 18.7 15.7 22.0 9.9 29.3 Italy 32.0 32.0 36.9 23.2 45.7 16.1 37.7 Spain 15.9 12.8 16.8 14.0 20.0 12.6 15.1

Net Private State P-Blue P-White 35+hrs. -35 hrs. % % % % % % %

Sweden 88.5 81.9 94.5 88.3 88.9 Norway 63.4 47.7 82.8 59.3 39.8 64.5 53.7 Great Britain 34.8 22.6 66.6 37.1 27.4 Ireland 46.3 32.7 72.8 43.2 19.9 48.6 35.6 Germany (East) 30.3 27.0 38.4 29.1 24.7 30.0 Germany (West) 26.8 23.5 33.9 30.6 19.1 28.6 13.1 Switzerland 22.1 21.3 32.5 19.9 21.8 24.8 16.0 France 17.3 9.6 31.5 10.1 8.7 18.3 12.1 Italy 32.0 26.3 43.5 31.3 Spain 15.9 11.9 26.0 12.1 8.9 15.9 Source: Ebbinghaus (2006b); calculations based on ISSP (1996) International Social Survey Program: The Role of Government III, Cologne: ZA 2900; Note: Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, France, and Switzerland: weighted; Only dependent employed (more than 15 hrs.); with U*: including unemployed; Private: Private sector; State: public sector; P-Blue: private sector blue-collar workers, P-W: private sector white-collar workers.

53

REFERENCES

Bergamaschi, M. (2000), “The Gender Perspective in the Policies of European Trade Unions.” In: Gender Policies in the European Union. M. Rossilli (ed.). New York: Peter Lang, 159-174. Bonoli, G. (2006), “The Politics of the New Social Policies. Providing Coverage Against Social Risks in Mature Welfare States.” In: The Politics of Postindustrial Welfare States. K. Armingeon and G. Bonoli (eds.). London: Routledge, 3-26. Brugiavini, A., B. et al. (2001), “Part II: What Do Unions Do to the Welfare States?” In: The Role of Unions in the Twenty-First Century. T. Boeri, A. Brugiavini and L. Calmfors (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 157-277. Curtin, J. (1999) Women and Trade Unions: A Comparative Perspective. Aldershot: Ashgate. Dølvik, J.E. (ed.) (2001a), At Your Service? Comparative Perspectives on Employment and Labour Relations in the European Private Sector Services. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang. Dølvik, J.E. (2001b), “The Impact of Post-industrialisation on Employment and Labour Relations - A Comparative Review.” In: At Your Service? J.E. Dølvik (ed.). Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 463-484. Ebbinghaus, B. (2006a), The Reform of Early Retirement in Europe, Japan and the USA,.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ebbinghaus, B. (2006b), "Trade Union movements in post-industrial welfare states. Opening up to new social interests?" In: The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States. K. Armingeon and G. Bonoli (eds.). London: Routledge, 123-142. Ebbinghaus, B. and J. Visser (1999), “When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950-1995.” European Sociological Review, 15:2, 1-24. Ebbinghaus, B. and J. Visser (2000), Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945 (Handbook and CD-ROM). London: Palgrave/Macmillan. Esping-Andersen, G. (1993), “Mobility Regimes and Class Formation.” In: Changing Classes. G. Esping-Andersen (ed.). London: Sage, 225-241. Hancké, B. (1993), “Trade Union Membership in Europe, 1960-1990: Rediscovering Local Unions.” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 31: 4, 593-613. Keller, B. (1991), “The Role of the State as a Corporate Actor in Industrial Relations Systems.” In: Comparative Industrial Relations. R.J. Adams (ed.). London: Harper Collins, 76-93. Klandermanns, B. and J. Visser (eds.) (1995), De vakbeweging na de welvaartsstaat. Assen: Van Gorcum.

54

Rothstein, B. (1992), “Labor-market Institutions and Working-class Strength.” In: Structuring Politics. S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth (eds.). New York: Cambridge University Press, 33-56. Scruggs, L. and P. Lange (2002), “Where Have All the Members Gone? Globalization, Institutions, and Union Density.” Journal of Politics, 64:1, 126-153. Traxler, F. (1999), “The State in Industrial Relations: A Cross-national Analysis of Developments and Socioeconomic Effects.” European Journal of Political Research, 36, 55-85. Traxler, F., S. Blaschke and B. Kittel (2001), National Labour Relations in Internationalized Markets: A Comparative Study of Institutions, Change, and Performance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Visser, J. (2002), “The First Part-Time Economy in the World: A Model to Be Followed?” Journal of European Social Policy, 12:1, 23-42. Western, B. (1997), Between Class and Market: Postwar Unionization in the Capitalist Democracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

55

b.TRENDS IN UNION DENSITY ACROSS EUROPE

Report by:

Alex Bryson, Policy Studies Institute, a.bryson@psi.org.uk

1. Introduction

Literature examining factors associated with union membership status and union joining is

mostly based on experiences of Anglo-Saxon countries. For example, of the 41 individual-

level studies reviewed by Riley (1997), 31 were based on data from the USA, the UK or

Australia (the remainder coming from Germany and the Netherlands). The literature has

grown in the last decade to include evidence for countries such as Israel (Haberfeld 1995)

and Denmark (Bild et al. 1998). However, few studies take a comparative approach to

union membership and there are very few studies analysing the factors associated with

individual membership status across Europe. Consequently, “there is a well agreed upon set

of structural variables that are found to be important for explaining union membership in a

firm, region or country, but it remains to be seen whether these are also able to explain

international differences in unionization” (Schnabel 2003).

This stituation stems mostly from the fact that micro-data across countries are

scarce, if at all available. However, new micro-data produced by the European Social

Survey (ESS), permits accurate estimates for each country (and subgroups of industries or

occupations), for the first time including all 25 members of the European Union. The

survey also allows to measure levels and forms of participation and militancy beyond

formal membership in the union. Participation in unions as ‘democratic organisations’ is of

interest in its own right and Comparison of participation levels across Europe may tell us

something about support and legitimacy of unions, and their potential contribution to social

cohesion.

2. Union density and union participation across countries

As available sources of data on union density across Europe are not comparable in terms of

the sample populations they cover, data collection methods, and membership definitions

(Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000; Visser 2006), what needs further understanding is the nature

of trade unions across Europe, not only as a workplace phenomenon but also as a broader

56

social phenomenon. An issue to be examined is the union density for different sub-

populations. This is important because roughly one-in-six of the 74 million union members

in Europe are not in paid work, including roughly 11 million retired workers (Visser 2003,

2006). An initial analysis of ESS data indicates 75% of members in Europe are employees,

7% are self-employed and the remaining 18% are not in paid work. Furthermore, these

figures differ markedly across European countries. In Western Europe, The proportion of

union members who have retired from the labour market varies from 11,5 percent in

Switzerland to 48 percent in Italy (see Table 1). In Eastern Europe, the percentage of

members not in paid work ranges from 3% in Slovenia to 30% in Hungary.

3. Factors associated with union membership; variation across countries

With the demise of the closed shop in parts of Western Europe and the decoupling

of unionism from the state in many parts of Eastern Europe, membership is largely

voluntary. Under the ‘worker choice’ model of union membership individuals become

members when benefits outweigh costs. When they perceive a net benefit they will pay

union dues, receiving benefits as they would when buying any other service. This utility

can be psychological, for example, fulfilling a desire to conform to a social norm and thus

maintain one’s reputation among co-workers (Booth 1985; Naylor 1990; Visser 2002). It

may also be driven by instrumentalism, wherein employees think they have something

tangible to gain from membership, either in terms of better wages, better non-pecuniary

terms of employment, or insurance against arbitrary employer actions (Kochan 1980).

Triggers leading to membership include feelings of dissatisfaction or alienation at work

(Klandermans 1986), and perceptions of union efficacy and union influence at the

workplace. Political scientists and social psychologists also stress that membership is an

expression of individuals’ political and social self. These factors may have an independent

effect on individuals’ demand for membership as well as influencing their perceptions of

the costs and benefits of joining. The ‘queuing model’ of union membership emphasises

constraints on unionisation arising from union employers’ ability to choose from the queue

of workers wanting union jobs (Abowd and Farber 1982). Employer characteristics may

play an important role in determining individuals’ union status directly – as measures of, or

proxies for, employer policies regarding unionisation – or indirectly, through their influence

on the costs and benefits of union membership (Farber 2001).

57

Based on data containing most of the micro-determinants of union membership

identified in Schnabel’s (2003) recent review, independent associations can be estimated

between union membership status and individual, job and workplace characteristics, union

availability and perceptions of union efficacy. A number of factors (the list is by no means

exhaustive) that would be worth exploring in this respect are listed below.

Gender: traditionally women have a lower probability of membership than men. However,

the gender gap in unionisation has been narrowing since the 1980s (Visser 2003).

Age: the relationship tends to be positive or concave, with the probability of membership

increasing at a decreasing rate with age, perhaps falling off later in life.

Race/nationality: there is mixed evidence on the propensity of people from different ethnic

backgrounds to unionise, partly because of small sample sizes or poor data coding that ESS

overcomes.

Education: The economic returns to membership tend to be lower for the more highly

educated, largely because of the egalitarian policies unions pursue and the higher

bargaining power of better-educated individuals, suggesting an inverse relationship

between education and membership, but empirical studies have also found a concave

relationship.

Income: membership probabilities tend to rise with earnings, as one might expect if union

membership was a normal good, but then fall above a certain wage level, perhaps because

the marginal returns to membership fall among the better off, or because higher paid

employees are more responsive to employer opposition.

Work history and alternative job prospects: the unemployed tend to end their membership

(Elias 1996; Visser 2002). However, if workers with limited employability or higher risks

of unemployment benefit more from the union, they may be more inclined towards

membership when in paid work. On the other hand, those who see ‘exit’ as a viable strategy

may be less likely to join a union since the costs of ‘exit’ relative to ‘voice’ may be lower

(Freeman and Medoff 1984).

Occupation: Manual workers’ probabilities of membership tend to be higher than

nonmanuals’, perhaps because their more homogeneous preferences make them easier to

organise (Schnabel 2003) or because their wage premium is higher (Blanchflower and

Bryson 2003). The majority of union members in Europe are now white-collar workers,

largely because of the expansion of public sector unions (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000).

There has been a convergence in manual and non-manual membership rates and a decline

58

in manuals’ probabilities of membership relative to non-manuals’ once other factors are

controlled for (Bryson and Gomez 2002, 2003a).

Contract type: those employed on shorter hours or limited duration contracts are likely to

have lower probabilities of unionisation if they are less attached to the labour market or

anticipate spending less time in their job than other workers (Booth 1986). However, the

link between atypical contracts and lower investments in employment is no longer as clear

as it used to be given the prevalence of this sort of employment for highly skilled workers

at particular points in the life-cycle.

Establishment size: membership probabilities rise with establishment size (Visser 1991),

perhaps because the benefits of membership (such as the wage premium) rise with size,

impersonal management leads to greater alienation and demand for protection, or because

size proxies unions’ organising costs.

Workplace-level unionisation: The absence of workplace-level unionisation may affect

individual employees’ decisions to join a union because the cost of starting a union in an

unorganised workplace is higher than the cost of becoming a member in an already

unionised workplace (Bain and Elsheikh 1976; Green 1990; Hancké 1993). The social

custom of membership will be stronger where there is a union present (Corneo 1997; Visser

2002). On the other hand, in some parts of Europe, the link between union membership and

an on-site union presence is not strong, especially where bargaining occurs above

workplace level (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999).

Industry: Labour-intensive industries may offer greater resistance to union organising

unless the service is a monopoly good (e.g. public sector) and the costs can be passed onto

consumers/tax payers. But industry effects may also proxy other factors, such as the nature

of collective bargaining, the climate of industrial relations, and the social custom of

membership.

Discontent at work: dissatisfaction with the job and feelings of grievance or unfairness can

trigger joining a union (Klandermans 1986; Kochan 1979, 1980; Berg and Groot 1992).

However, unions may improve conditions for members relative to non-members, resulting

in a positive association between membership and contentedness at work. It might be that

factors not normally observed in surveys, such as dissatisfaction with other aspects of life

may prompt membership and job dissatisfaction.

Union instrumentality and images of unions: non-members’ desire for membership, and

members’ satisfaction with their union, are higher where the union is perceived as effective

in delivering desired outcomes for employees (Farber and Saks 1980; Bryson 2003). Higher

59

union effectiveness implies higher net returns to membership and is consistent with

Kochan’s (1980) and Charlwood’s (2003) psychological models linking worker discontent

and the belief that unions will improve things. Trust in the union (Windolf and Haas 1989)

and perceptions that unions are accountable to their members (Bryson 2003) are also

associated with higher membership probabilities.

Parental background: we do not observe parental union membership, but ESS contains the

mother’s and father’s educational attainment and occupational status when the respondent

was aged 14, both of which are likely to be highly correlated with parental union status, and

have proved significant in previous studies (e.g. Arulampalam and Booth 2000).

Politics and ideological convictions: left-wing political leanings are associated with a

higher probability of union membership (Riley 1997; Schnabel 2003), as are collectivist

orientations more generally (Bryson and Gomez 2002). This is not universally so, since

many union confederations in Europe are associated with parties from across the political

spectrum. Political allegiances may be particularly strong in ex-Communist countries where

union confederations position themselves relative to the old Communist regime across the

political spectrum.

Religion: religious affiliation can determine which union one joins, since unions are often

affiliated to particular religions or denominations (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). A recent

comparative study identified a complex relationship between church attendance and union

membership (Gomez, Lipset and Meltz 2001).

Social capital and social trust. Union members exhibit greater social trust than

nonmembers (Johnston and Jowell 2001). Participation in voluntary organisations such as

unions may engender trust, loyalty, altruism and cooperation, in part due to information

flows reducing the ‘social distance’ between individuals (Glaeser et al. 2002). Others

maintain participation in such organisations is a function of norms of reciprocity and

trustworthiness that facilitate co-operation, or that social trust and social participation are

simultaneously determined (Putnam 2000; Johnston and Jowell 2001, Visser 2002).

Unionisation matters also for legitimacy and cohesion because many employees want union

representation but are unable to get it, which leads to a ‘representation gap’ (Bryson and

Gomez 2003a; Towers 1997). This representation gap tends to be larger for those with low

educational levels, unemployed, immigrants or ethnic workers, employees in small firms,

those in unstable or flexible labour relations, etc. However, such representation gaps may

be mitigated through coordinated bargaining and legal extension clauses.

60

Human values: ESS contains a number of well-validated measures of human values. These

values set standards that ‘help individuals decide whether actions are good or bad, justified

or illegitimate, worth approaching or avoiding, by considering whether they facilitate or

undermine the attainment of cherished values’ (Schwartz 2003: 245). Such actions might

include being a union member. Ours would be the first study to analyse associations

between these values and union membership status.

4. The incidence and correlates of never-membership across countries

The decline in union density in Britain since the early 1980s is accounted for by the

growing proportion of employees who have never been members rather than by an

increased outflow of existing members (Bryson and Gomez 2002). This rise in ‘never-

membership’ bodes particularly ill for unions because union membership is an experience

good so that perceptions of its costs and benefits are strongly influenced by knowledge

passed on by co-workers, neighbours, friends and family (Bryson and Gomez, 2003b).

5. Factors associated with active union participation; differences across Europe

Participation in unions is of interest in its own right for three reasons. First, as voluntary

organisations, unions rely on the active participation of workers for their effectiveness and,

ultimately, for their survival (Jarley 2003). Comparisons of participation levels across

Europe may tell us something about the health of unions over and above union density per

se. Second, in some European countries the distinction between membership and

participation is blurred (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). Comparing membership and

participation rates, and the factors associated with them, offers a richer understanding of the

nature of people’s engagement with trade unions than membership alone. Third,

determinants of active participation may differ from those of membership (Cappellari and

Piccirilli 2004; Flood et al. 2000).

6. Difference in union membership and union participation across countries; impact

of the composition and beliefs of each population

Apart from micro-determinants of union membership status, macro factors such as the state

of the economy (unemployment, inflation, labour demand, wages), political factors (the

61

political complexion of governments and institutional structures) can play a part in union

membership probabilities across countries (Bain and Elsheikh 1976; Scruggs and Lange

2002). For instance, the presence of union-administered unemployment insurance is an

important determinant of cross-national differences in union density levels and trends

(Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; Western 1997).

62

Table 1: Union Membership in 25 countries, total and adjusted membership

year Adjustment, of which on accoun of: In % of reported nonfinancial retired from unemployed self-employed membership membership labour market and students Austria 2002 18,2 0,0 18,2* . . . . Belgium 2002 41,7 12,9 18,1 10,6 0,2 Denmark 2003 20,4 0,0 14,2 5,9 0,3 Finland 2003 29,7 0,0 11,5 8,2 10,0** France 2003 33,0 13,0 20,0 . . . . Germany 2003 19,8 0,0 19,8* . . 0,0 Italy 2004 53,1 3,1 48,0 0,7 1,3 Netherlands 2003 20,1 0,0 19,8* . . 0,3 Norway 2002 26,0 0,0 24,0* . . 2,0 Sweden 2003 20,7 0,0 14,7 5,6 0,4 Switzerland 2001 13,0 0,0 13,0 0,0 0,0 * including unemployed and disabled workers; ** of which 6,1% students Source: Visser (2006). Method: estimates, based on administrative data obtained from unions, following the

estimation methods in Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000).

63

REFERENCES

Abowd, J.M. and H.S. Farber (1982), “Job Queues and the Union Status of Workers”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 36, 354-367.

Arulampalam, W. and A.L. Booth (2000), “Union Status of Young Men in Britain: A Decade of Change”. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 15, 289-310 .

Bain, G. S. and F.Elsheikh (1976), Union Growth and the Business Cycle. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Berg, A.van den and W.Groot (1992), “Union Membership in the Netherlands: A Cross-Sectional Analysis”. Empirical Economics, 17: 4, 537-564. Bild, T., H.Jørgensen, M.Larssen, and M.Madsen (1998), “Do Trade Unions Have a Future. The Case of Denmark”. Acta Sociologica, 41, 195-257. Blanchflower, D. G. and A. Bryson (2003), "What Effect do Unions Have on Wages Now and Would 'What Would Unions Do' Be Surprised?" NBER Working Paper No. 9973. Booth, A.L. (1985), “The Free Rider Problem and a Social Custom Theory of Trade Union Membership”. Quarterly Journal of Economics,100, 253-261.

Booth, A. (1986), “Estimating the Probability of Trade Union Membership: A Study of Men and Women in Britain”. Economica, 53, 41-61.

Bryson, A. (2003), Employee Desire for Unionisation in Britain and its Implications for Union Organising, PSI Discussion Paper Number 12.

Bryson, A. and G.Gomez (2002), “Marching on together? Recent trends in union membership”. In: British Social Attitudes: the 19th Report. A.Park, J.Curtice, K.Thomson, L.Jarvis and C.Bromley (eds.). London: Sage. Bryson, A. and R. Gomez (2003a), "Segmentation, Switching Costs and the Demand for Unionization in Britain." CEP Discussion Paper No. 0568. Bryson, A. and G.Gomez (2003b), “Why Have Workers Stopped Joining Unions”, Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No.589, London School of Economics.

Cappellari, L. and G.Piccirilli (2004), “Union Activism, Workers’ Satisfaction and Organisational Change: Theory and Evidence”. Labour, 18, 145-180.

Charlwood, A. (2003), “Willingness to unionize amongst non-union workers”. In: Representing Workers: Union Recognition and membership in Britain. H.Gospel and S.Wood (eds.). Routledge, London.

64

Corneo, G. (1997), “The theory of the open shop trade union reconsidered”. Labour Economics, 4, 71-84. Ebbinghaus, B. and J.Visser (1999), “When institutions matter: union growth and decline in Western Europe, 1950–1995”. European Sociological Review, 15, 135-158. Ebbinghaus, B. and J.Visser (2000), Trade Unions in Western Europe Since 1945. London, Palgrave-Macmillan. Elias, P. (1996), “Growth and decline in trade union membership in Great Britain: evidence from work histories”. In: Trade Unionism in Recession. D.Gallie, R.Penn and M.Rose (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 175-215. Farber, H.S. (2001), “Notes on the Economics of Labor Unions”. Princeton University Working Paper No. 452 Farber, H. S. and D.H.Saks (1980), “Why Workers Want Unions: The Role of Relative Wages and Job Characteristics”. Journal of Political Economy, 88: 2, 349-369.

Flood, P., T.Turner and P.Willman (2000), “A Segmented Model of Union Participation”, Industrial Relations, Vol. 39: 1, 108-114.

Freeman, R. and J.Medoff (1984), What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books. Gomez, R., S.M. Lipset and N.Meltz (2001), “Religiosity and Unionisation: A Cross-Country Comparison”. Rethinking Institutions for Work and Employment Papers and Proceedings, 38th Annual CIRA Congress. Green, F. (1990), “Trade Union Availability and Trade Union Membership In Britain”. The Manchester School, Vol. LV111, No. 4, 378-394.

Haberfeld, Y. (1995), “Why Do Workers Join Unions?” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48: 4, 656-670. Hancké, B. (1993), “Trade Union Membership in Europe, 1960-1990: Rediscovering Local Unions.” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 31: 4, 593-613.

Jarley, P. (2003), “Unions as Social Capital: Renewal Through a Return to the Logic of Mutual Aid?”. Paper for 13th World Congress of International Industrial Relations Association, Berlin, 2003. Johnston, M. and R Jowell (2001), “How Robust is British Civil Society?.” In: British Social Attitudes, The 18th Report: Public Policy, Social Ties. R.Jowell, et al. (eds.). London: Sage.

65

Klandermans, B. (1986), “Psychology and Trade Union Participation: Joining, Acting, Quitting”. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 59: 1, 189-204.

Kochan, T. A. (1979), “How American workers view labor unions”. Monthly Labor Review, 104: 4, 23-31.

Kochan, T.A. (1980), Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Unwin. Naylor, R. (1990), “A social custom model of collective action”. European Journal of Political Economy, 6, 201-216. Riley, N.M. (1997), “Determinants of Union Membership: A Review.” Labour. Vol.: 11 Iss.: 2, 265-301.

Schnabel, C. (2003), “Determinants of trade union membership”. In: International Handbook of Trade Unions, J.T. Addison and C.Schnabel (eds.). Edward Elgar, Cheltenham England and Northampton Mass., 14-43.

Schwartz, S. (2003), “A Proposal for Measuring Value Orientations across Nations”, In: Report on the development of the European Social Survey core questionnaire. W. Saris (ed.). www.europeansocialsurvey.org Scruggs, L. and P. Lange (2002), “Where Have All the Members Gone? Globalization, Institutions, and Union Density.” Journal of Politics, 64:1, 126-153. Towers, B. (1997), The Representation Gap. Change and Reform in the British and American Workplace. New York: Oxford University Press.

Visser, J. (1991), “Trends in union membership”. Employment Outlook 1991. Paris: OECD. Visser, J. (2002), “Why Fewer Workers Join Unions in Europe: A Social Custom Explanation of Membership Trends.” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 40 (3), 403-430. Visser, J. (2003), “Unions and Unionism Around the World.” In: The International Handbook of Trade Unions. J.T. Addison and C. Schnabel (eds.). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 366-415. Visser, J. (2006), "Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries". Monthly Labor Review, 38-49. Western, B. (1997), Between Class and Market: Postwar Unionization in the Capitalist Democracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Windolf, P. and J.Haas (1989), “Who Joins the Union? Determinants of Trade Union Membership in West Germany 1976-1984”. European Sociological Review, 5: 2, 147-165.

66

c. UNION DECLINE AND RISING INEQUALITY – IS THERE A CONNECTION?

Report by:

Daniele Checchi, University of Milan, daniele.checchi@unimi.it

Jelle Visse, AIAS, University of Amsterdam, jelle.visser@uva.nl

Herman van de Werfhorst, AIAS, University of Amsterdam, h.g.vandewerfhorst@uva.nl

1.Introduction

Trade union membership, in absolute numbers and relative to the size of the labour force,

has declined in recent decades in most industrialised economies, both in and outside the

EU, and both in the EU15 and in the NMS (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000; European

Commission 2004; OECD 2004; Visser 2006). However, it is not fully known what caused

this decline. Cross-national empirical studies of trends in union membership and union

density have often analysed aggregate statistics (Checchi and Visser 2005; Western 1997),

which necessarily limits the scope of explored individual attributes that affect union

membership.

In many countries, earnings inequality has risen in the past decades (European

Commission 2005; Gottschalk and Joyce 1998; OECD, 1996; Rueda and Pontusson 2000)

and a number of scholars have included declining union density or bargaining coverage

among the institutional factors held responsible for the increase in earnings inequality

(Alderson and Nielsen 2002; DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 1996; Freeman 1980; Rueda

and Pontusson 2000; Wallerstein 1999). In their research, Checchi, Visser and Van de

Werfhorst (2007) provide arguments as well as empirical evidence supporting the reverse

causal link, where changing inequality in the economy affects union membership and

associability through changes in incentives and norms.

Figures 1 and 2 present evidence on the relationship between earnings/income

inequality and union density. Figure 1 presents aggregate evidence covering the period

1960-1995 for a group of countries where information on income inequality was available

over a large number of years. For some countries (notably United Kingdom and United

States, but we may add Norway and Sweden) there is a clear negative correlation between

the two variables. In figure 2 we have extracted from our dataset, based on the International

Social Survey Programme (ISSP) comparable measures of inequality and density over the

67

period 1985-2002 computed on individual data. The evidence at the micro-level suggests a

clear negative correlation between earnings/income inequality and union density.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here]

2. How unions affect inequality

There are different reasons why trade unions should compress the wage distribution The

general argument is that unions compress wages among union members and lower the

differential between blue-collar and white-collar worker. Even though this may come at the

price of increasing the differences between unions and no-union members (the so-called

union ‘mark up’, the empirical finding, based on evidence from countries in which there is

a sharp division between firms covered by unions and those that are union-free (i.e. the US,

Canada, the UK), is that the wage compressing effect is larger than the inequality

increasing effect (Freeman 1980; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Card 1998, 2001; Card,

Lemieux and Riddell 2004; Metcalf et al. 2000).

There are various reasons why and how unions compress wages. Firstly, the

aspirations and motives of union leaders and their members may be nested in a ‘moral

economy’ and norms of fairness and equality may have a strong hold on them. Svenson

(1989) has shown how such norms have informed post-war union wage policies of Swedish

and German trade unions, albeit within the sobering realities of coalitional union politics

and economic necessity. Secondly, trade unions may conduct a wage compressing strategy

as part of a growth- and productivity-enhancing strategy, seeking to squeeze low-paid work

in inefficient firms or sectors out of the market (Agell and Lommerud 1993; Horn and

Wolinsky 1988; Streeck 1992). Unions may also try to redistribute income as an alternative

to progressive taxation (Agell 1999), though in both cases adverse effects on employment

temper these egalitarian union policies. In Sweden, the development of an active labour

market policy was intended to address these adverse effects, helping workers to upgrade

skills and jobs, and shortening the time spent in unemployment. Active labour market

policies are costly, however, and require political backing for high levels of taxation

(Calmfors 2001; Martin et al. 2000). Thirdly, internal union politics may favour wage

policies tending to the vote of the median union member. Since most modern unions

organise heterogeneous workers with different skill and pay levels in the same sector or

68

company, there must be a political mechanism for aggregating the potential diverse

preferences of union members and make collective decisions.

For instance, when deciding on annual wage increases lower paid members are

better off with absolute rather than percentage increases. Under the medium voter model

and given a mean wage higher than the medium, as is typically the case in earnings

distributions, union policies will tend towards wage compression (Freeman and Medoff

1984). As this would drive the higher-earnings groups with the strongest bargaining clout

away, union are usually forced to compromise and introduce compensating benefits for

their higher-earning members (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). Another reason why

egalitarian union policies will be mitigated is that strike decisions typically require

supermajorities of 75 percent and more (Mosher 2002). These constraints will be lessened

if union and collective bargaining structures are encompassing and high-skilled workers

cannot ‘exit’. Collective bargaining in Sweden during the 1960s and 1970s would seem a

good illustration of this, though in 1983 the unions representing high-skilled worker in

engineering managed to ‘exit’ via a cross-class coalition with employers in export

industries who wanted more flexibility in wage-setting even at the price of paying higher

wages (Pontusson and Svensson 1996).

Where there is a sharp distinction between the union and non-union sector of

employment, there is evidence that the earnings structure is flatter in the union sector (for

the US: Card 1996, 2001; DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 1996; Freeman and Medoff 1984;

for Canada: Card, Kramarz and Lemieux 1999; Card and Lemieux 2003; DiNardo and

Lemieux 1997; for the UK: Card, Lemieux and Riddell 2004; Metcalf et al. 2000). In

continental European countries this comparison is much harder to make, since collective

agreements negotiated by the trade unions are often extended to non-unionised firms and

generally applied to non-union members. On average, 70 percent of all employees in

continental Western Europe are covered by collective contract negotiated by the trade

unions, decreasing to 14 percent in the US, 32 percent in Canada and 35 percent in the UK

(European Commission 2004; Visser 2006). Where it is possible to compare earnings of

workers covered by collective agreements with similar workers who are not covered, the

‘agreement mark-up’ tends to be two-to three times smaller in Sweden, Norway, Italy,

Germany and the Netherlands compared to the UK, and four times compared to the US

(Aidt and Zannatos 2002; Blanchflower 1996; Teulings and Hartog 1998). However, these

comparisons are rather crude and do not control for union-status selectivity, i.e. the

69

possibility that higher-earning individuals may decide to work in non-union occupations

and firms in the expectation of earning higher wages (Aidt and Zannatos 2002: 41).

If nearly everybody is covered by union contracts or if the same mechanism for

adjusting wage rates applies to all workers independent of union status (as was the case

under the ‘scala mobile’ in Italy before 1992 or with wage indexation in the Netherlands

before 1983), we cannot infer the effect of unions or union-based institutions from a

comparison of union and non-union wages. There are two alternative methods, of which the

second is probably the more effective one (see Freeman 2005). We can compare earnings

distributions across countries with different levels of collective bargaining and union

coverage. Such comparisons invariably show that countries with the highest coverage have

the lowest wage dispersion. Other measures, reinforcing this association, relate to union

structure (unions encompassing low and high earning groups) and bargaining centralisation

(Blau and Kahn 1996; Iversen 1999; OECD 1997, 2004; Visser 1990; Wallerstein 1999).

The second method tries to test whether changes in unionisation and wage-setting

institutions are associated with changes in wage dispersion. Empirical research with British

household data (Bell and Pitt 1998; Gosling and Machin 1995), for instance, demonstrated

a relationship between union decline and the widening of the earnings distribution. Metcalf

et al. (2000) report that UK unions narrow the pay differentials between women and men,

blacks and whites, manual and non-manual workers, and between people with and without

health problems. The authors show also that the equalizing effect of union presence was

much smaller than it had been in an earlier and comparable study with data for 1978, when

British unions registered perhaps their maximum post-war influence (Metcalf 1982). Two-

thirds of the union effect on wage dispersion had disappeared in the late 1990s (Metcalf et

al. 2000:69). Hibbs and Locking (1996) and Iversen (1999) show that pay differentials in

Sweden started to rise after the move from nationwide to industry bargaining in 1983 and

1991. The observed trends in earnings inequality, shown by the data from the structure of

earnings database of Eurostat (European Commission 2005: 165), support the hypothesis

that trend reversals are related to changes in wage-setting institutions. Thus, downward

trends in wage inequality ended in the 1970s in the UK, in 1983 in Sweden (when the

coalition for a nation-wide ‘solidaristic’ wage policy was broken), 1990 in Denmark

(decentralisation of key agreements), 1993 in the Netherlands (the New Direction

Agreement with strong decentralising effects), and 1996 in Germany (following the

progress of opening clauses in sectoral agreements). Of course, these associations in timing

do not constitute proof and should be checked against other influences. However, the data

70

do support the idea that wage dispersion is lowest in countries with nation-wide bargaining

and high union coverage, and also that across time less centralised wage setting is

associated with wider inequality (figure 3).

(Figure 3 about here)

These findings point to the declining capability of trade unions to stem the rise in

earnings inequality. Generally, the rise in earnings inequality across the western world has

been related to skill-biased rather than skill-replacing technological growth, with returns to

education sharply rising during the 1980s and 1990s, whereas average real wages for low-

skilled workers have stagnated or fallen in this period (Acemoglu 2002; see also Alderson

and Nielsen 2002). This development has affected the behaviour of firms and promoted a

change in work organization and wage-setting behaviour, which has profoundly changed

the governance and size of the (internal) labour markets that were the bedrocks for union

organisation. More intensive competition on a worldwide scale has made firms acutely

aware of costs and productivity. The solution many employers have reached is to reorganise

work around decentralised management of human resources, customised products and

working schedules, and reorganise tasks in such ways that they can be partitioned in

modules. This makes it easier to subcontract tasks, employ part-time workers and hire

temporary staff for some tasks, while core works is multi-tasked and carried out in teams.

Employment security and pay are being defined less in terms of the seniority and job status

than in terms of the knowledge, competences and effort workers bring to the jobs and

develop while working. More industrial relations activities have gravitated towards the

level of the firm (Katz and Darbishire 2000; Marginson and Sisson 2004).

Fixing the standard pay rate for the job across firms in the industry was the most

pivotal ‘common rule’” and the most heralded union wage policy of the first decades after

1945, even in the United States (Flanders 1970; Reynolds 1951; Slichter 1950). Objective

pay criteria, based on job descriptions and seniority, diminish the power of supervisors and

the possibilities of discrimination and favouritism. Unions typically pressed for the

standardization of employment contracts in order to protect workers against uncertainty,

simplify collective regulation, de-couple the economic situation of workers from that of

their employing organization, and suspend as much as possible competition between

workers, so as to enable them to act in solidarity (Streeck 2005). Standardization involved

explicit and agreed definitions of ‘normal’ effort, ‘normal’ hours and ‘normal’ pay,

guaranteeing employers reliable performance of predictable routine tasks at an average

71

level of effort, thus allowing the union to act as the guardian of the wage-effort bargain.

This institutional solution of the mid-twentieth century is now deeply challenged.

Breaking away from centralised (industry) agreements gives firms more scope for

merit- and performance based pay (Lindbeck and Snower 2001). In the UK, there is

evidence that performance related and merit pay is associated with the derecognition or the

absence of unions (Heery 2000). According to Brown et al. (1998), in the UK “for many

firms, the advantage of breaking away from an existing structure of collective bargaining

was to increase the dispersion of pay, both within grades and between hierarchical levels”

and “there was a greater tendency towards linking pay rises to individual performance in

derecognising firms than in those retaining collective bargaining. Employers tended to gain

substantial discretion to set individual pay by open-ended appraisal procedures.” One way

of doing this is by making job descriptions vaguer. Across Europe, there is some evidence

that variable and performance related pay has become more wide-spread in recent times

among both non-manual and manual employees, although only for a relatively small

proportion of total weekly or monthly pay (European Commission 2004, 2005).

3. The impact of earnings position on union membership

Assuming that workers join unions partly for self-interested reasons, the attractiveness of

trade unions for particular groups of workers can be seen as a function of the degree to

which unions are seen as effectively serving the material (wage) interests of that group. We

expect that unions are predominantly attractive for intermediate earnings groups, whereas

low-earners and high-earners have, for different reasons, less incentives of joining a trade

union. Highly skilled workers may believe that they do better by staying outside the union,

especially when unions engage in wage compressing policies. In addition, they may have

sufficient bargaining power as individuals. Moreover, if it is true that risk adversity

decreases with income (e.g. Hartog et al. 2002), and if risk adversity is correlated with the

tendency of buying insurances (Barsky et al. 1997), then higher-earning workers should be

less persuaded by the insurance function of trade unions which is based on risk-pooling

(Agell 1999; Agell and Lommerud 1992; Burda 1995). In contrast, low skilled and lower

earning workers should be more attracted by the type of insurance and protection that

unions promise. However, workers whose earnings and working conditions would benefit

most from collective action tend to be least able to get it (Crouch 1982). Lower-paid

workers may be concentrated in sectors and firms that are most difficult to organize, and

72

they may have more frequent spells of unemployment or inactivity, making it more difficult

to retain membership ties (Elias 1996; Klandermans and Visser 1995; Visser 2002).

Moreover, if trade unions have become less effective in reducing earnings differentials and,

in particular defending the real earnings of the low-skilled (see: DiNardo, Fortin and

Lemieux 1996; Metcalf 2005; Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002), lower-paid workers may

not bother to join unions or discontinue membership for reasons of disillusionment (see

Baccaro and Locke 1998). Finally, Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) suggest that

skill-biased technological change has weakened the coalition supporting the (mandatory or

negotiated) minimum wage and thus indirectly contributed to de-unionisation, especially of

workers with lower earners. Together, these propositions support the recent contention of

Streeck (2005:278) that in today’s labour markets “the numbers are rising of those who

have enough market power to do without collective organization, as well as of those who

have too little market power to be capable of it.” Today’s trade unions would seem to be

squeezed into a narrowing middle range of the earnings distribution.

Union decline, therefore, may partially be caused by the compositional change in

the earnings distribution. Simply put: if the tails of the earnings distribution have grown in

size, unions lose ground. For instance, Acemoglu (2002:47) shows that from 1983 to 1993

in the US the employment share in the top and bottom 25-percent job categories has risen

from 35 to 38 per cent. Moreover, if lower- and higher- earning workers are decreasingly

attracted to union membership across time, the compositional change in the earnings

distribution is of even greater relevance.

4. Attitudinal factors and union membership

Union membership is not only affected by individual expected benefits resulting from

objective criteria such as education or earnings, but that attitudes towards inequality do play

a role as well. People are partly motivated to join the trade unions because they feel that

economic inequality in society is too large, earnings should be redistributed, and some form

of collective action towards redistribution is needed. Given the egalitarian agenda of

unions, it is therefore likely that attitudes towards inequality affect the individual decision

to join the union and retain membership. For example, in a representative survey of

attitudes and patterns of joining in the Netherlands in 1992/3, it turned out that union

activity was highly valued because of its association with fairness and equality

(Klandermans and Visser 1995).

73

Attitudes towards inequality can be subdivided in at least three types. The first is the

most general and simply comprises the affirmation that ‘inequality in society is too large’.

The second type is more specific and endorses the opinion that earnings should be

redistributed. One may assume that individuals, while evaluating the level of inequality in a

particular society, have specific ideas about the actual and legitimate earnings of specific

occupations. Relating the estimates of respondents of what they believe are acceptable or

legitimate earnings, we can construct a more specific preference for more or less egalitarian

outcomes. Such specific inequality attitudes have been used by Jasso (1999) to construct a

social justice index with the ISSP data.

Svallfors (1993), using ISSP data, has used such attitudes to compare inequality

attitudes in Sweden and Britain. He found that gender differences in the range of earnings

that were believed legitimate are much larger than in other types of inequality attitudes. He

also reported that in Sweden attitudes about the range of legitimate earnings are strongly

related to social class whereas they hardly are in Britain, where the accepted range of what

people believe to be acceptable earnings is much wider for all classes. Recently, Osberg

and Smeeding (2006) have constructed an empirical measure of specific inequality attitudes

based on respondents’ evaluations of actual and legitimate pay for specific occupations.

Based on their responses to ISSP survey questions on actual and perceived pay for a range

of occupations, it is possible to assign a particular preference for redistribution to individual

respondents. Their measure has the advantage that not only legitimate earnings are

observed, as is the case in Svallfors (1997), but also the perceived actual earnings. By

inspecting both, a preference for redistribution can be calculated which takes account of the

perceived degree of redistribution that has already been achieved.

The third type of attitude that may motivate people to join a trade union is more

specifically concerned with the perceived need for collective action in order to compress

earnings inequality. If egalitarian attitudes motivate people to join the unions, this may

come together with a conviction that collective action is necessary to achieve greater

equality. We call this the ‘inequality needs collective action’ attitude. It is measured by

asking people if they agree with the statement that “inequality in society exists because

people do not join together”.

In addition to the well-known and much studied compositional effects, relating

union decline to changes in labour markets, the rise of the post-industrial society, or the

shift from Old to New Social Risks (see the previous section by Ebbinghaus), in this section

we highlighted the role of growing earnings inequality and of different inequality attitudes,

74

both as a cause and a consequence of union decline. Workers who are union members are

such either because they are not that far from the median earnings position that union

policies seem to benefit most, or because they hold egalitarian opinions and are not

excessively anxious about adverse effects of egalitarian union policies. People belonging to

the top tail of the earnings distribution may rationally ‘vote with their feet’ by leaving union

membership or they never joined the union in the first place. They may see the ‘insurance’

offer by the unions against unforeseen mishaps in the future as too costly for them or they

may tolerate a higher risk for themselves together with a higher level of inequality around

them. Conversely, lower paid workers may leave the unions, or never become member,

when the union’s policies to defend the bottom in the labour market and close the gap in

relative earnings is perceived as ineffective.

75

REFERENCES

Acemoglu, D. (2002), "Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market". Journal of Economic Literature, XL, 7-72. Acemoglu, D. and J.-S.Pischke (1999), "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training." Journal of Policital Economy, 103, 539-572. Acemoglu, D., Ph.Aghion and G.Violante (2001), "Deunionization, Technical Change and Inequality". Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 55, 229-264. Addison, J., R.Bailey and W.Siebert (2003), "The impact of deunionization on earnings dispersion revisited". IZA Discussion Paper. Agell, J. (1999), "On the Benefits from Rigid Labour Markets: Norms, market failures, and social insurance". Economic Journal, 109, 143-164. Agell, J. and K.E.Lommerud (1992), "Union Egalitarianism as Income Insurance". Economica, 59, 295-310. Agell, J. and K.E.Lommerud (1993), "Egalitarianism and Growth". Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 95, 559-579. Aidt, T. and Z.Tzannatos (2002), Union and Collective Bargaining, Economic Effects in a Global Environment. Washington, DC.: The World Bank. Ajzen, I. and M.Fishbein (1980), Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall. Alderson, A.S. and F.Nielsen (2002), "Globalization and the Great U-Turn: Income Inequality Trends in 16 OECD Countries". American Journal of Sociology, 107, 1244-1299. Baccaro, L. and R.M.Locke (1998), "The End of Solidarity? The decline of egalitarian wage policies in Italy and Sweden". European Journal of Industrial Relations, 4, 283-308. Barsky, R.B., F.T. Juster, M.S. Kimball and M.D. Shapiro (1997), "Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An experimental approach in the health and retirement Study". The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 537-579. Bassanini, A., A.Booth, G.Brunello, M.De Paola and E.Leuven (2006), "Workplace training in Europe". Bonn: IZA Discussion Paper n.1640. Bell, B., and M. Pitt (1988), "Trade Union Decline and the Distribution of Earnings in the UK: Evidence from kernel density estimation". Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60, 509-528. Black, B. (2001), "National Culture and Industrial Relations and Pay Structures". Labour, 15.

76

Blanchflower, D. and R.B.Freeman (1997), "The Attitudinal Legacy of Communist Labor Relations". Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50, 438-459. Blanchflower, D.G. (1996), "The Role and Influence of Trade Unions in the OECD". Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper. London: LSE. Blau, F. and L.Kahn (1996), "International Differences in Male Wage Inequality. Institutions versus market forces". Journal of Political Economy, 104, 791-837. Booth, A.L. (1984), "A Public Choice Model of Trade Union Behaviour and Membership". Economic Journal, 883-898. Booth, A.L. (1985), "The Free Rider Problem and a Social Custom Theory of Trade Union Membership". Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 253-261. Brown, W., S.Deakon, M. Hudson, C. Pratten, and P.Ryan (1998), "The Individualisation of Employment Contracts in Britain". London: Department of Trade and Industry, research paper. Calmfors, L., A.Forslung and M.Hemström (2001), "Does active labour market policy work? Lessons from the Swedish experience". Conference paper 'Labour market institutions and public regulation'. Munich: CESufi. Calmfors, L., A.Booth, M.Burda, D.Checchi, R.Naylor and J.Visser (2001), "The Role of Collective Bargaining in Europe". In: The Role of the Unions in the Twenty-First Century. T. Boeri, A. Brugiavini and L. Calmfors (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Card, D. (1996), "The Effects of Unions on the Structure of Wages: A longitudinal analysis". Econometrica, 64, 957-979. Card, D. (1998), "Falling Union Membership and Rising Wage Inequality. What's the connection?" NBER Working Paper 6520. Cambridge, MA. Card, D. (2001), "The Effect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market". Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 54, 296-315. Card, D., F.Kramarz and Th.Lemieux (1999), "Changes in the Relative Structure of Wages and Employment". Canadian Journal of Economics, 32, 843-877. Card, D., F.Kramarz and C. Riddell (2003), "Unions and the Wage Structure". In: International Handbook of Trade Unions. J.T.A.a.C. Schnabe (ed.). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Checchi, D. and J.Visser (2005), "Pattern Persistence in European Trade Union Density - A longitudinal analysis 1950-1996". European Sociological Review, 21, 1-22. Checchi, D., J.Visser and H.van de Werfhorst (2007), "Inequality and Trade Unions". University of Milan, unpublished manuscript. Crouch, C. (1982), Trade Unions. The logic of collective action. Glasgow: Fontana.

77

Deininger, K. and L.Squire (1996), "Measuring income inequality: a new data base". The World Bank Economic Review, 10, 565-591. DiNardo, J., N.M.Fortin and Th.Lemieux (1996), "Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A semi-parametric approach". Econometrica, 64, 1001-1044. Ebbinghaus, B. and J.Visser (2000), Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs 2005. "Earnings Disparities and Determinants of Earnings Distributions in the EU, chapter 4 in Employment in Europe 2005". Brussels. European Commission, DG for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs 2004. "Industrial Relations in Europe, 2004". Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publication of the European Communities. Fehr, E. and S.Gachter (2002), "Altruistic Punishment in Humans". Nature, 137-140. Flanders, A. (1970), Management and Unions. The theory and reform of industrial relations. London: Faber and Faber. Frank, R.H. and Ph. J.Cook (1995), The Winner-Take-All-Society. New York: The Free Press. Freeman, R. B. (19800, "Unionism and the Dispersion of Wages". Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 34, 489-509. Freeman, R.B. (2005), "What Do Unions Do? The 2004 M-Brane Stringtwister edition". NBER working paper 11410. Cambridge, MA. Freeman, R.B. and J.L. Medoff (1984), What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books. Goerke, L. and M.Pannenberg (2004), "Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany". German Economic Review, 5, 481-504. Gosling, A. and S.Machin (1995), "Trade Unions and the Dispersion of Earnings in UK Establishments 1980-90". Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 57, 167-184. Gottschalk, P. and M.Joyce (1998), "Cross-National Differences in the Rise in Earnings Inequality: Market and institutional factors". The Review of Economics and Statistics, LXXX: 489-502. Hartog, J., A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and N.Jonker (2002), "Linking Measured Risk Aversion to Individual Characteristics". Kyklos, 55, 2-16. Hechter, M. (1987), Principles of group solidarity. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

78

Heery, E. (2000), "Trade Unions and the Management of Reward" In: Reward Management: Critical perspectives. G.White and J. Drucker (ed.). London: Routledge, . Hibbs, D.A.Jr. and H.Locking (1996), "Wage Compression, Wage Drift and Wage Inflation in Sweden". Labour Economics, 3, 109-141. Horn, H. and A.Wolinsky (1988), "Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionization". Economic Journal, 98, 484-497. Iversen, T. (1999), Contested Economic Institutions. The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press. Jasso, G. (1999), "How Much Injustice is There in the World? Two new justice indexes". American Sociological Review, 64, 133-168. Katz, H. and O.Darbishire (2000), Converging Divergencies. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Klandermans, B. and J.Visser (eds.) (1995), De vakbeweging na de welvaartsstaat. Assen: Van Gorcum. Lindbeck, A. and D.J.Snower (2001), "Centralized Bargaining and Reorganised Work: Are they compatible?". European Economic Review, 45, 1851-1875. Magnani, E. and D. Prentice (2003), "Did Globalization Reduce Unionization ? Evidence from US manufacturing". Labor Economics, 10, 705-726. Marginson, P. and Sisson, K. (2004), European Integration and Industrial Relations. Multi-level governance in the making. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. Martin, J.P. (2000), "What works among active labour market policies: evidence from OECD countries' experiences". OECD Economic Studies, 30, 79-113. Metcalf, D. (1982), "Unions and the Distribution of Earnings". British Journal of Industrial Relations, 16, 163-179. Metcalf, D. (2005), British Unions: Resurgence or Perdition? London: The Work Foundation. Metcalf, D., K.Hansen and A.Charlwood (2000), "Unions and the Sword of Justice: Unions and pay systems, pay inequality, pay discrimination and low pay". London: London School of Economics, CEPR Discussion Paper, no. 452. Mosher, J. (2002), "Distributional Politics in Labor Unions". American Political Science Association, Annual Meeting. Boston, MA. Naylor, R. (1990), "A social custom model of collective action". European Journal of Political Economy, 6, 201-216.

79

OECD (1996), "Earnings Inequality, Low-Paid Employment and Earnings Mobility". OECD Employment Outlook 1996, 59-108. OECD (2004), "Wage-Setting Institutions and Outcomes". Employment Outlook 2004, 127-182. Osberg, L. and T.Smeeding (2006), " 'Fair Inequality'? Attitudes toward pay differentials: the United States in comparative perspective". American Sociological Review, 71, 450-473. Pontusson, J. and P.Svenson (1996), "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions. The Swedish employer offensive in comparative perspective". Comparative Political Studies, 29, 223-250. Pontusson, J., D.Rueda and Ch.R.Way (2002), "Comparative Political Economy of Wage Distribution: The role of partisanship and labour market institutions". British Journal of Political Science, 32, 281-308. Reynolds, L.G. (1951), The Structure of Labor Markets. Wages and Labor Mobility in Theory and Practice. New York: Harper. Rueda, D. and J.Pontusson (2000), "Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism". World Politics, 52. Schnabel, C. and J.Wagner (2003a), "Determinants of Union Membership in 18 EU Countries: Evidence from micro data, 2002/03". Bonn: IZA DP No. 1464. Schnabel, C. and J.Wagner (2003b), "Trade Union Membership in Eastern and Western Germany: Convergence or divergence?". Bonn: IZA DP No. 707. Slichter, S. (1950), "Notes on the Structure of Wages". Review of Economics and Statistics, 32. Streeck, W. (1992), Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of industrial relations in advanced capitalist economies. London: Sage. Streeck, W. (2005), "Labor Markets and Trade Unions". In: The Handbook of Economic Sociology. N.J. Smelser and R.Swedberg (eds.). Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, with Russell Sage Foundation. Svalfors, S. (1997), "Worlds of Welfare and Attitudes to Redistribution: A comparison of eight western nations". European Sociological Review, 13, 83-104. Svallfors, S. (1993), "Dimensions of Inequality: A comparison of attitudes in Sweden and Britain". European Sociological Review, 9, 267-287. Svensen, P. (1989), Fair Shares. Unions, Pay, and Politics in Sweden and West Germany. Ithaca N.Y: Cornell University Press. Teulings, C. and J.Hartog (1998), Corporatism or Competition. Labour contracts, institutions and wage structures in international comparison. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

80

Visser, J. (1990), "In Search of Inclusive Unionism". Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, 18, 5-278. Visser, J. (2002), "Why Fewer European Workers Join Unions - A social customs explanation of membership trends". British Journal of Industrial Relations, 40, 403-430. Visser, J. (2006), "Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries". Monthly Labor Review, 38-49. Wallerstein, M. (1999), "Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies". American Journal of Political Science, 43, 649-680. Werfhorst, H. G. van de, and N.D.De Graaf (2004), "The Sources of Political Orientations in Post-Industrial Society: Social class and education revisited". British Journal of Sociology, 55, 211-235. Western, B. (1997), Between Capital and Class: Postwar unionization in the capitalist democracies. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

81

Figure 1 – Union membership and income inequality – macro evidence

(source: Deininger-Squire 1996 and Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000) .3

5.4

.45

.5

.4.4

5.5

.55

.25

.3.3

5.4

.6.7

.8

.2.4

.6.8

.1.1

5.2

.25

.25

.3.3

5

.2.3

.4.5

.2.2

5.3

.35

.2.4

.2.3

.4.5

.5.5

2.54

.56

.6.7

.8.9

.3.4

.5.6

.15

.2.2

5.3

30 35 40 45 26 27 28 28 30 32 34 31 31.5 32 32.5 33

26 28 30 32 35 40 45 50 28 30 32 34 30 35 40

32 34 36 38 27 28 29 30 30 35 40 30 32 34 36 38

28 30 32 34 20 25 30 35 34 36 38

australia belgium canada denmark

finland france germany italy

japan netherlands new zealand norway

sweden united kingdom united states

unio

n de

nsity

rate

s - E

bbin

ghau

s-V

isse

r 200

0

Gini index on total incomes - Deininger-Squire 1996 - high quality data

82

Figure 2 – Union membership and income/earnings inequality – micro evidence

(source: ISSP)

1985

1986

1987

19881989 1990

1991

1992

1993

19941995 19961997

1998

199920002002.2

.25

.3.3

5.4

unio

n de

nsity

.2 .25 .3 .35earnings inequality (Gini)

West Germany

199119921993

199419951996 1997

19981999

20002002.2.3

.4.5

.6un

ion

dens

ity

.2 .22 .24 .26 .28earnings inequality (Gini)

East Germany199419951996

1997

1998

19992000

2002

.83.8

4.85.8

6.87.8

8un

ion

dens

ity

.2 .22 .24 .26 .28earnings inequality (Gini)

Sweden

1989 19901991

1992

1993

19941995 19961997

1998

199920002002.2

.25

.3.3

5.4

unio

n de

nsity

.2 .25 .3 .35earnings inequality (Gini)

Norway

1988

1990199119921993

1994 19971998

.35

.4.4

5.5

unio

n de

nsity

.2 .22 .24 .26 .28earnings inequality (Gini)

Italy198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985198519851985

1986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198619861986198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988198819881988

199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901990199019901991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119911991199119921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992199219921992 1993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993199319931993

19941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199419941994199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199519951995199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996199619961996 199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199719971997199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998199819981998

.35

.4.4

5.5

unio

n de

nsity

.2 .22 .24 .26 .28family income inequality (Gini)

Italy

198819891991

19941995

.3.3

2.34

.36.

38un

ion

dens

ity

.22 .24 .26 .28earnings inequality (Gini)

Netherlands

19871988

1989 1991

19941995

1997

1998

2000

2002

.3.3

2.34

.36.

38un

ion

dens

ity

.22 .24 .26 .28 .3 .32family income inequality (Gini)

Netherlands

1985 19861987198819891990

1991

1992 199419951996199719981999 200020012002.3

.4.5

.6.7

unio

n de

nsity

.32 .33 .34 .35 .36earnings inequality (Gini)

Britain

83

FIGURE 3: BARGAINING COVERAGE AND EARNINGS INEQUALITY

EL

LV

LT

EE

PL

HU

CZ

UK SK DE

LU

IE

PT

ES

IT

DKNO

NLBE

SEFI

AT

FR

SL

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

4.50

5.00

5.50

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110

EARNINGS INEQUALITY (D9/D1)

BARGAINING COVERAGE

Rsq = -.539

Source: Earnings inequality (ratio 9-1 decile) from Eurostat, wage structure data, presented in European

Commission (2005, chapter 4). Coverage data: European Commission (2004) and Visser (2006).

84

CIVICNESS, EQUALITY, AND DEMOCRACY: A ‘DARK SIDE’ OF SOCIAL CAPTIAL?

Coordinator:

Jan van Deth,University of Mannheim, jvdeth@sowi.uni-mannheim.de

Report by:

Jan van Deth,University of Mannheim, jvdeth@sowi.uni-mannheim.de

Sonja Zmerli, University of Technology Darmstadt, zmerli@pg.tu-darmstadt.de

Filippo Barbera, University of Torino, filippo.barbera@unito.it

Hajdeja Iglič, University of Ljubljana, hajdeja.iglic@guest.arnes.si

Monika Ewa Kaminska, SSEES, University College London, me_kaminska@interia.pl

1.Introduction and research questions

Notwithstanding the appealing and plausible benevolent consequences of social capital for

democracies, it has been obvious that civil societies do not provide a cure for each and

every problem. In addition, forewarnings have been presented that social capital itself

implies the development of anti- and non-democratic orientations as well as the persistence

of social inequality. In the middle of an ocean of discussions on the positive consequences

of social capital, these less benign aspects are usually overlooked. Several authors dealt

explicitly with a “dark side” of social capital and mention possible noxious, harmful, or

nasty aspects (Levi 1996; Portes, Landolt 1996; Callahan 2005; Lambsdorff et al. 2004). In

spite of these critical approaches towards the concept of social capital, clear-cut definitions

of negative social capital are still as much missing as convincing empirical evidence of its

consequences on democratic decision-making processes.

As a starting point for future analyses several research questions have to be

distinguished on the basis of various conceptual approaches. A first interpretation of the

“dark sides” of social capital follows directly from the fact that norms and values are

immanent (cultural) aspects of social capital. If these norms and values are negative

towards aspects of the system or the regime, then the level of negative political orientations

increases by definition as these norms and values obtain a more significant place in society.

Investigating norms of citizenship, such as the individual intention to participate in political

decision-making processes, tolerance, solidarity or the individual interest in the well-being

85

of others are of specific interest in this respect. A lack of norms of citizenship in a society

can increase political discontent and disaffection which, in the long run, would result in the

deterioration of democratic legitimacy (Rossteutscher 2002; van Deth 2007; Denters et al.

2006; Dalton 2006). Closely related to this interpretation is the core of the argumentation

used by proponents of social capital: exactly because involvement enhances social capital

(social skills, contacts, personal trust) this mechanism can be used for the benefit of any

organisation or social network, regardless of its criminal or non-democratic character.

Commonly mentioned specimens in this context are the Mafia, skinheads, the Ku Klux

Klan, or the Nation of Islam (cf. Levi 1996).

A second variant does not rely on explicit non-democratic attitudes, but stresses a

general aversion against organised decision-making processes in complex societies. For

many advocates of the benign effects of social capital and civil society “… the local, the

face-to-face, and the many sites in which conversation can take place […] are inherently

good, while the professionalized, staffed, nationalized, computerized operation of the

thousands of associations that get typed as special interests are always bad” (Schudson

1998: 280). In order to avoid political arguments, members of clubs and groups will restrain

from starting political discussions, which in turn, encourages the “evaporation of politics”

(Eliasoph 1998; Mutz 2002). Because decision-making processes are the arenas for special

interest par excellence, a spread of romantic support for small-scale organisations

stimulates negative feelings. This interpretation runs counter to conventional approaches

which accentuate the development of civic skills and interpersonal trust within small-scale

organisations as the basis for the development of social trust and, consequently, for positive

social and political feelings (Putnam 1993).

The focus on small-scale organisations establishes a third variant of negative

consequences of social capital. A possible interpretation evolves around the assumption that

the small-scale organisations’ inward-oriented activity may result in an outward-oriented

“non-activity”. Small-scale organisations may become so atomised social structures (with

too strong bonding social capital) that their closure will not allow any permeation of

external inputs (e.g. that would allow economic innovation). The “ascribed trust” (Zucker

1986) present in such segmented structures may weaken the capacity of these structures (or

their members) to engage in (formal and informal) associations that offer the environment

indispensable for developing process-based trust. Also, the closure of small-scale

organisations could become an impediment to participation in decision-making processes

on the meso and macro level, which may have negative results for democratic legitimacy.

86

For local communities with a multitude of small-scale organisations or enterprises

characterised by strong bonding social capital, this implies that the production of local

collective competition goods is hindered (Pérez Díaz 2000; Crouch et al. 2001 and 2004;

McMillan, Woodruff 1999). If social cohesion depends on the ability of interest

associations to participate in collective decisions and to negotiate solutions based on the

consent of the parties involved, too strong bonding social capital will impede social

cohesion. This issue seems to be of particular interest with regard to the problems of trust

and social capital in post-communist, transition societies (e.g. Letki and Evans, 2005).

A related – fourth – argument stresses that the “dark sides” of social capital should

most likely be observed in inward looking and isolated social networks that question the

legitimacy of large-scale political processes (Li et al. 2003; Phillipson, Graham 2003).

Three mechanisms of integration of local clusters of more or less formalized social

networks into the national polity are of specific relevance here. The focus should be firstly

on institutional structures or governance mechanisms, secondly bridging ties provided by

overlapping organizational memberships and thirdly the importance of strong collective

identities which can exist independently of social networks. We assume that the creation of

uncivicness and intolerance is more likely when bridging mechanisms are missing.

A very prominent topic in the debate about the benign consequences of social

capital deals with the issue of elite continuity and circulation in democratising countries.

However, the importance of elite’s continuity and patterns of recruitment for the quality of

the emerging regime are recognised, but predominantly in terms of new elite’s ideological

support for the principles of democracy and market economy, their privileged social and

economic position and meritocratic (un)suitability for holding top management positions .

It is generally believed that elite circulation is more advantageous for the quality of

emerging institutional structures than continuity. A particular aspect of elite’s continuity,

namely its networks of connections and loyalties, constitute an important resource used by

the members of the “old” elites to maintain their dominant political and economic position

in the new regimes, therefore interfering with the quality of political and economic reforms

(Gibson 2001; Rose-Ackerman 2001).

Since former nomenklatura’s reliance on networks has been previously recognised

and researched, it can be argued that the degree of elite continuity is a suitable empirical

proxy for the presence of “bad social capital” of this sort. A vast array of indicators exist

related to political reforms (degree of state capture, level of corruption, regulatory quality,

clientelism) and economic reforms (quality of privatisation process, inflow of foreign

87

investment). Dealing with this fourth type of negative social capital, the key objective is to

merge theoretical and empirical research on elite continuity in transition countries, and the

quality and success of political and economic reforms.

The fifth and last variant of “bad social capital” is of a different nature and draws

attention to the biased mobilization of participants that reflects and confirms social

inequality and the question whether social involvement inevitably results in an over-

representation of active citizens and hence to biased representation of interests. Fiorina

(1999) has drawn attention to the fact that public debate in the United States is heavily

dominated by special interest groups which manage to control decision-making processes.

Even in those cases when the signal and warning functions of arising organisations of the

poorer and weaker parts of society are considerable, the actual outcomes of struggles

probably reflect the interests of more resourceful or more involved groups. The successful

mobilisation of special interests in voluntary organisations, therefore, is more likely to

reflect existing “imbalances” in the distribution of social capital than to compensate for

these inequalities. The main focus, here, lies on the internal processes of interest

formulation in voluntary associations, whether political discussions are taking place

amongst their members, how their interests are conveyed to the public and political

institutions and whether legal frameworks such as the need for public accountability of

associations affect the processes of interest formulation.

On the basis of these aforementioned approaches, we arrive at the expectation that a

higher level of social capital does not only have benevolent consequences, but comes along

with political discontent, disaffection, the persistence of social inequality, biased

representation, economic obstacles leading to the deterioration of democratic legitimacy

(van Deth 2006). These interpretations are used here as the starting point for more

sophisticated examinations. Instead of retreating to the comfortable area of speculation an

attempt should be made to assess the empirical plausibility of arguments focussing on the

less benevolent aspects of social capital in a number of countries. The main questions, then,

are:

1. Does there exist a relationship between certain types of associations and their members’

inclination towards norms of citizenship? What are the origins of norms of citizenship

and to what extent does a lack of these norms in a society undermine democratic

legitimacy? Are all norms of citizenship positively related to the structural and cultural

elements of social capital?

88

2. To what extent does organizational size of an association have an impact on its

members’ willingness and capacity to engage in democratic decision-making processes?

3. Does the closure of small-scale organisations inhibit the development of social trust,

political participation and economic innovation and does the multitude of small-scale

organisations in any given community threat social cohesion and democratic legitimacy?

4. Which political or societal mechanisms are responsible for the influential positions of

the former nomenklatura in the Central and East European countries and to what extent

do they interfere with political or economic reforms?

5. Does social participation foster social inequalities rather than providing means to

overcome them and are social inequalities generally also accentuated within

associations?

Current research has as yet mainly dealt with those negative aspects of social capital

which are addressed by the first and third research question. Therefore, the following

overview of the state of the art does not cover the whole range of topics mentioned so far.

2.State of the art

Related to the first research question is Putnam’s assertion that “internally associations

instil in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness…

Participation in civic organizations inculcates skills of cooperation as well as a sense of

shared responsibility for collective endeavors” (1993: 89-90), because it presents a number

of caveats. Eastis notices that “some organizations broaden social networks, participants in

others develop strong values that may or may not be supportive of democratic institutions,

still other organizations train individuals in civic skills, and of course, some associations do

all or some combination of these” (2001: 168). Stolle shows how organizations differ as to

their objective, internal structure and membership rules and concludes “that some

associations are more virtuous than others” (2001: 234; see also Stolle 1998). Research in

Western European countries, indicates that membership in political/societal organizations is

related with political involvement. However, the impact of participation in welfare

organizations is negative in terms of members’ political involvement (van Deth 2000;

Stolle and Rochon 2001).

For post-communist societies Letki also finds that “types of voluntary associations

vary in their impact: community associations are almost twice as important for increasing

89

political involvement as professional or labor organizations” (2004: 675). However, her

findings indicate that “unlike the non-democratic organizations in established democracies,

participation in a non-democratic political organization under the conditions of an

authoritarian regime did not generate ‘negative’ social capital. Membership in a Communist

party before 1989 is a very good - positive- predictor of political involvement in new ECE

democracies“ (ibid.).

Besides the structural element of social capital, research suggests that social trust both

for established democracies and for post-communist East-Central Europe societies is only

weakly connected with political involvement (Letki 2004, Dekker et al. 1997). Studies of

networks and trust in Russia also indicate that “interpersonal trust has little to do with

attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes” (Gibson 2001: 51). Similarly, norms

of citizenship such as critical and deliberative orientations as well as law-abidingness are

only weakly related to social capital. Solidarity though depicts a stronger relationship with

social capital. In their comparative analysis, Denters et al. (2006) conclude that country-

specific differences exist and that the described patterns can mostly be detected in

established democracies.

Referring to the third research question focussing the characteristics and

consequences of the closure of small-scale organisations some general conclusions can be

drawn. Civic organizations that develop a high level of social closure are usually

characterized by memberships who:

- are very similar according to various demographic and attitudinal characteristics;

- are connected with strong and dense social ties with high level of trust in co-

members;

- have only limited number of group affiliations.

In the sociological literature these characteristics of small groups are understood to

result from two processes: homophily and cognitive balance. Homophily indicates the

tendency that strong social ties develop among similar individuals. This similarity

(especially attitudinal similarity) is further reinforced by the strength of ties since it is

strong social ties that are most important vehicles of interpersonal influence (Lazarsfeld,

Merton 1956; McPherson Miller, Smith-Lovin 1987). The theory of cognitive balance talks

about the psychological strain which is found in the situation when A and B are friends

(strong tie) and B and C are friends but A and C do not know each other. Because of this

90

psychological strain such situation is considered inherently unstable. In the long run A and

C are expected to develop strong ties as well (Homans 1950; Davis 1963).

The distinction is made between the atomistic and fragmented social structure,

depending on the location of social closure. In atomistic social structure trustful relations

are reserved for family relations and close friends (so called primary relations). For

example, such social structure characterized social networks in pre-transition East Germany

and a large part of former Yugoslavia (Volker, Flap 2003; Iglič 2003). In fragmented

societies social closure is a feature of groups, which emerge in public sphere and go well

beyond the primary relations of family and close friendships. The most obvious case for

such groups are ideological and ethnic groups.

Another aspect of the degree of social closure of organisations is tapped by the

distinction made between vertical and horizontal ties. Locally based associations without

vertical ties which connect them to a higher institutional level are assumed to be

detrimental to the development of social trust (Berman 1997; Rueschemeyer 1998; Skocpol

1999). Furthermore, the mixture between horizontal ties connecting small-scale

organisations on the local level and vertical ties connecting the local level to institutional

levels turns out to be a crucial factor for sustaining social cohesion and democratic

legitimacy (Locke 1995).

A further proxy for the social closeness of organisations is provided by the

distinction between bonding and bridging social capital. Additionally, it suggests that the

lack of social capital poses different kinds of problems for the individual and society than

too strong bonding social capital (Putnam 2000).

The studies that build on the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital

often consider them as two aspects of social networks which both help recruiting

individuals into political sphere and make their involvement more efficient. For example, a

number of studies about social networks and social movements claim that political

mobilization is more successful when people are involved in dense networks of strong

relations which are linked by weak bridging ties. While bonding social capital provides

solidarity incentives for collective action, bridging social ties enable coordination on a

larger scale. Bridging ties allow political action to increase in scope and spread throughout

the communities and regions.

A somewhat different argument has been developed in the literature on social

networks and political communication. In this vein of work bonding and bridging social

capital are considered as alternative forms of social capital producing positive as well as

91

negative effects on political involvement. For example, one of the conclusions of the recent

study on the problem of political disagreement in communication networks is that bonding

social capital or involvement of people in small and dense networks reduces the level of

disagreement and attitudinal diversity in networks, while large and sparse networks are able

to sustain political diversity. In addition, individuals in politically diverse networks are

more likely to produce balanced views and avoid extreme positions, which has important

implications for the study of phenomena like tolerance.

One of the reasons for the ability of small and dense networks to reduce political

diversity and by implication also tolerance is the strength of social ties. Strong social ties

are more important channels of interpersonal influence than weak social ties, and dense

networks increase social accountability. Bonding social capital thus reduces heterogeneity

and decreases political and social tolerance, which can be regarded as negative effects. On

the other hand, bridging social capital and diverse networks produce cross pressures which

used to be blamed for the withdrawal of citizens from political life. Looking at various

consequences of disagreement for political engagement the authors of the work on political

disagreement conclude that political heterogeneity within networks has only modest

negative effects on political interest and no effect on voting turnout (Huckfeldt et al. 2004;

Huckfeldt, Sprague 1995).

Another study shows, however, that both political interest and political activity are

affected by the heterogeneity of networks. People who are exposed to cross-pressures in

their networks retreat from different kinds of political activity from the desire to avoid

putting their social relationships at risk. Here we see a significant and negative effect of

social capital on political participation, which is produced by the bridging and not bonding

type of social capital (Mutz 2002).

Similarly, the work on Weimar Germany’s associational life shows that it was dense

networks and bonding social capital that mobilized people for political action (positive

effect of bonding social capital) and drew support for Hitler while simultaneously

deepening cleavages among the groups (Berman 1997). But the contradictions between the

local public sphere and NSDAP grew (negative effect of bonding social capital) as NSDAP

turned into a strong mass party while many of the local Nazi joiners were interested

primarily in defending grass-roots social life against the politicizing attempts by national

parties (Koshar 1987).

On the basis of the above review it can be concluded that the only “empirically

supported negative effects” of social capital on political involvement and engagement are

92

found in the studies on political communication where it is bridging social capital that is

negatively related to the political activity. These negative effects are explained with the

theory of cross-pressures. The bonding social capital usually shows only positive effects by

mobilizing people for collective action. The negative considerations of bonding social

capital fall under the notion of “undesirable phenomena” such as ideological groups,

political extremism and ethnic violence rather than “negative correlations” with different

aspects of political engagement.

In terms of the economic consequences of social capital, literature on economic

growth and development processes examines the role of informal institutions. Maskell and

Malmberg (1999: 170) find that “market failure can only be overcome by the development

of formal and informal institutions; trust relations between firms is by far the most

important of such institutions”, while Raiser suggests that “trust is an important ingredient

in the institutional infrastructure of a market economy” (1999: 1). Storper (1993) claims

that social relations promote knowledge creation in industrial networks between firms.

Edquist (1997) highlights the importance of formal and informal institutions for creating

innovation and concludes that “firms almost never innovate in isolation. (…) they interact

with other organizations to gain, develop, and exchange various kinds of knowledge,

information and other resources”. In this context, different types (bonding vs. bridging and

linking social capital) of social capital are considered (Gittell and Vidal 1998; Woolcock

2002), as well as different types of trust (Zucker 1986), as having different impact on the

functioning of market institutions.

More specifically, McMillan and Woodruff (1999) in their study of Vietnam’s

economy find that reliance on closed networks is vital in context with low level of contract

enforcement provided by formal institutions; however, they also stress that it reduces the

availability of economic opportunities. Similarly, Stark (1997) – analysing corporatisation

and privatisation in Hungary – finds that closed networks based on connections between

state-owned enterprises, privatised subsidiaries and state property agency (recombinets in

Stark’s terminology) proved to be efficient under uncertain conditions of post-communist

transition. However, he admits that the undefined character of these networks

(private/public) “creates acute problems of accountability” (1997:38). In the same volume,

Sedaitis (1997) offers similar conclusions on the business networks in post-communist

Russia where dense networks based on relational capital rooted in the old bureaucratic ties

are important in reducing transaction costs but at the same time they hinder innovation and

alternative economic opportunities. Accordingly, Granovetter (2002, 2005) stresses that

93

small groups have denser networks which sustain shared social norms and prevent the

groups’ members from free-riding. For the same reason, however, small groups may resist

innovation, especially if they pursue radical goals and turn against established values and

group norms.

In a nutshell, the presented lines of reasoning and empirical findings provide a solid

basis for further and more detailed analyses which the research team has currently set out

for.

3.Preliminary results of the „Civicness, Equality and Democracy: A ‘dark side’ of

social capital“ research team

So far, the research team has empirically addressed several research questions which tap the

specific relationships between social capital, political involvement, norms of citizenship,

legitimacy and the capacity of economic innovation on the local level. After discussing

many approaches to operationalize the concet of “bad” social capital, a straightforward

decision was accepted. Since social capital usually is expected to have positive

consequences (more participation, more social cohesion, more equality, better democratic

performance etc) the correlation between social capital and these consequences, generally

speaking, should be positive. Reversing this argument, the detection of negative

correlations between social capital and any other phenomenon can be seen as an

unambiguous indicator of “bad” social capital. In this way the discussion is limited and

more focussed. Instead of debating the specific nature or characteristics of social capital as

being crucial for the depiction of social capital or its consequences as “good” or “bad”,

attention is shifted towards the impact social capital might have. If more social capital leads

to a reduction of something positively valued (for instance, social equality) or to an increase

of something negatively valued (for instance, corruption), then the resulting correlations

will be negative. In this way, a clear conceptualisation of “bad” social capital is obtained

that can be used in a straightforward way.

Some preliminary findings are based on this line of reasoning and are presented in the

following.

Based on the pooled European Social Survey data (2003), members and non-

members of voluntary associations are analysed in terms of their political orientations, such

as satisfaction with democracy, subjective political interest and political saliency. The

descriptive results clearly reveal that more associational members tend to have stronger

94

political orientations than non-members. Being a member in religious organisations,

however, represents the exception to the rule. Significantly fewer members of religious

organisations assign relevant saliency to political matters than non-members do which is

also confirmed by more complex logistic regression analyses.

Another research project aims at, firstly, defining types of social trust and civic

organisations that produce bonding social capital by looking at trust and the strength of

social ties and, secondly, at testing empirically whether bonding types of social trust and

organisations exert negative effects on civic and political orientations as well as political

behaviour. On the basis of the Slovenian “Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy” dataset,

some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. Overall, only few and modest negative effects

of bonding social capital on civic and political orientations and political action can be

detected. Furthermore, the structural aspect of social capital as compared to its cultural

component seems to have a stronger impact on the civic and political parts of life. This

relationship is also confirmed by a Spanish comparative study, another research project in

this team. Finally, civic organisations can indeed be distinguished according to their

members’ characteristics as belonging either to the particularized or generalized types of

trusters.

The importance of regional contexts on the levels and structures of social capital is

revealed by a comparative analysis of autonomous communities in Spain.

The relevance of the institutional context is also addressed by a cross-country

analysis (Britain, Germany, Italy, Sweden). In this study, political trust and satisfaction

with democracy as proxies for legitimacy are considered to be dependent on the social

capital indicator of “time given to help others”. Where welfare state intervention is weak

the time given to help others is assumed to undermine legitimacy mainly because the

provided help is a substitution for the lack of a welfare state. Where welfare state

intervention is stronger, however, this negative relationship should be weaker or completely

disappear. The subsequent empirical tests by and large confirm these assumptions.

The kind of relationship between different norms of citizenship, social trust and

political confidence is the focus of another comparative study. The main findings, so far,

reveal that mostly norms of social order and social trust do not describe a coherent positive

pattern. Furthermore, opinion-related norms are also often negatively related to social trust

and political confidence.

A qualitative study focuses on bonding social capital impacting transition trajectory

shifts in a monostructural (textiles) Polish region (the city of Łódź and the surrounding

95

area). The region, as a result of the 1990s socio-economic transition and the dismantlement

of large state owned textile enterprises (5-8,000 workers), has suffered severe socio-

economic crisis. Following the liquidation of the SOEs, a large number of tiny, family-run

enterprises emerged, with production concentrating mostly on textile/clothing.

Strong bonding social allowed the local entrepreneurs to start up the economic

activity and to prosper in the early phase of post-communist transition (early 1990s) when

enormous demand in both national and ex-USSR markets exceeded these enterprises’

production capacities and they were able to operate relatively freely in the shadow

economy. However, with the consolidation of market economy in later phases of transition

(late 1990s onwards), the analysed enterprises entered into a “vegetative state” (as

expressed by one of the interviewees) following the shrinking of their traditional markets

(ex-Soviet republics and undemanding Polish clients), opening up of the national economy,

and government’s efforts to eradicate shadow economy. This local economy is in a state of

a (cognitive) lock-in, and is following a path-dependent trajectory.

Strong bonding social capital (and “ascribed trust”) present in these segmented

structures have resulted in very high level of social and business networks’ closure and thus

have weakened the capacity of the members to engage in (formal and informal) associations

(Pérez Díaz 2000) thus impeding the creation of process-based trust, participation in

governance processes on local/regional level, (hampering the recreation of generalized -

institutional - trust), and production of local collective competition goods (Crouch et al.

2001, 2004). Reliance on closed networks has limited the availability of economic

opportunities (cf. McMillan and Woodruff 1999).

Following Elster, Offe et al. (1998) three types of variables can be suggested to

account for the level of social and economic consolidation in the studied case: structural

(legacies or inherited endowments of actors with material resources, mentalities and

tradition); institutional (institutionalized agencies; configuration of actors, procedural rules

that emerged on the scene in the early transition period); contingent or decisions on policy

(choices and determination in realisation).

As for the structural dimension, apart from the “low levels of trust in public

institutions and with the habit of relying on inter-personal relations, not public institutions

and laws” (Rose-Ackerman 2001: 415), features that linger on also in other post-communist

societies, specific to the Polish society is the importance of family bonds - as strongly

emphasized by Catholic Church (Skarzynska and Radkiewicz 2006) - or indeed “amoral

familism” (Banfield 1958; Tarkowska and Tarkowski 1990).

96

The institutional variable can be expressed by fuzziness of rules in transition:

institutional instability and disorder, such as „brutal competition because of an instability of

markets”, a situation of „weak social and law control”, „political corruption”, „post-

revolutionary anomie” (Sztompka 1999).

In terms of the contingent variable, state’s reluctance of intervention in economic

restructuring, resulting in basically no industrial policy designed and implemented in post-

communist countries (Miller 1995) can be mentioned.

97

REFERENCES

Banfield, E.C. (1958), The moral basis of a backward society. New York, London: Free Press. Berman, S. (1997), “Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic”, World Politics, April. Callahan, W.A. (2005), “Social capital and corruption”. Perspectives on Politics, 3: 3. Crouch, C. et al. (2001), Local production systems in Europe: Rise or demise? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crouch, C. et al. (2004), Changing governance of local economies: Responses of European local production system. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalton, R. (2006), Citizenship norms and political participation in America: the good news is .... the bad news is wrong. Center for Democracy and Civil Society Occasional Paper Series 2006-01. Davis, J.C. (1963), “Structural balance, mechanical solidarity and interpersonal relations”, American Journal of Sociology, 68. Dekker, P., R. Koopmans, and A. van den Broek (1997), “Voluntary associations, social movements and individual political behavior in Western Europe”. In: Private groups and public life. Social participation, voluntary associations and political involvement in representative democracies. J.W. van Deth (ed.). London: Routledge. Denters, B., O.W. Gabriel and M. Torcal (2006), “Norms of good citizenship”. In: Citizenship and involvement in European democracies: A comparative analysis. J.W. Deth, J.R. Montero and A. Westholm (eds.). London and New York: Routledge. Deth, J.W.van (2000), “Interesting but irrelevant: Social capital and the saliency of politics”. European Journal of Political Research, 37: 2. Deth, J.W.van (2006), “Democracy and involvement: the benevolent aspects of social participation“. In: Political disaffection in Europe. J.R. Montero and M. Torcal (eds.). London: Routledge. Deth, J.W.van (2007), “Norms of citizenship”. In: Oxford handbook of political behaviour. R. Dalton and H.–D. Klingemann (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eastis, C.M. (2001), “Organizational diversity and the production of social capital: one of these groups is not like the other”. In: Beyond Tocqueville: Civil society and the social capital debate in comparative perspective. B. Edwards, M.W. Foley, and M. Diani (eds.). Hanover and London: Tufts University Press. Edquist, C. (1997), “Introduction”. In: Systems of innovations. Technologies, institutions and organizations. C. Edquist (ed.). London and Washington: Pinter.

98

Eliasoph, N. (1998), Avoiding politics. How Americans produce apathy in everyday life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Elster, J., C. Offe et al. (1998), Institutional design in post-communist societies. Rebuilding the ship at sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fiorina, M.P. (1999), “A dark side of civic engagement”. In: Civic engagement in American democracy. T. Skocpol and M.P. Fiorina (eds.). Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Gibson, J.L. (2001), “Social networks, civil society, and the prospects for consolidating Russia’s democratic transition”. American Journal of Political Science, 45:1. Gittell, R. and A. Vidal (1998), Community organizing: Building social capital as a development strategy. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. Gould, R. (1991), “Multiple networks and mobilization in the Paris commune 1871”. American Sociological Review, 56. Graef, P. (2005), „Why should one trust in corruption? The linkage between corruption, norms and social capital“. In: The new institutional economics of corruption. J. Graf Lambsdorff, M. Taube and M. Schramm (eds.). London: Routledge. Granovetter, M. (1973), “The strength of weak ties”. American Journal of Sociology, 78:6. Granovetter, M. (2002), „A theoretical agenda fo economic sociology“. In: The new economic sociology: Developments in an emerging field. M.F. Guillen, R. Collins, P. England and M. Meyer. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Granovetter, M. (2005), “The impact of social structure on economic outcomes”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19: 1. Hassink, R. (2005), “How to unlock regional economies from path dependency? From learning region to learning cluster”. European Planning Studies, 13: 4. Homans, G. (1950), The human group, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Huckfeldt, R. and J. Sprague (1995), Citizens, politics and social communication. New York: Cambridge University Press. Huckfeldt, R., P.E. Johnson and J. Sprague (2004), Political disagreement: The survival of diverse opinions within communication networks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Iglič, H. (2003), „Trust networks and the transition to democracy: Yugoslavia in the mid 1980s“. In: Social capital and the transition to democracy. G. Badescu and E.M. Uslaner (eds.). London: Routledge. Koshar, R. (1987), “From Stammtisch to party: Nazi joiners and the contradictions of grass roots fascism in Weimar Germany”. Journal of Modern History, 59.

99

Lazarsfeld, P.F. and R.K. Merton (1956), „Friendship as a social process“. In: Freedom and control in modern society. M. Berger, T. Abel and C.H. Page (eds.). New York: Octagon Press. Letki, N. (2004), “Socialization for participation? Trust, membership and democratization in East-Central Europe”. Political Research Quarterly, 57:4. Letki, N. and G. Evans (2005), “Endogenizing social trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe”. British Journal of Political Science, 35. Levi, M. (1996), „Social and unsocial capital: A review essay of Robert Putnam’s Making democracy work“. Politics and Society, 24: 1. Li, Y., M. Savage and A. Pickles (2003), “Social capital and social exclusion in England and Wales (1972-1999)”. British Journal of Sociology, 54:4. Locke, R. (1995), Remaking the Italian economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Maskell, P. and A. Malmberg (1999), “Localised learning and industrial competitiveness”. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23: 2. McAdam, D. (1986), “Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of freedom summer”. American Journal of Sociology, 82. McMillan J. and C. Woodruff (1999), “Interfirm relationships and informal credit in Vietnam”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114: 4. McPherson Miller, J. and L. Smith-Lovin (1987), „Homophily in voluntary organizations: Status distance and the composition of face-to-face groups“. American Sociological Review, 52. Miller, J.B. (1995), “Industrial planning and the transition to a market economy”. Economics of Transition, 3: 3. Mizruchi, M. and L.Stearns (2001), “Getting Deals Done: the Use of Social Networks in Bank Decision Making”. American Sociological Review, 66. Mutz, D. (2002), “The consequences of cross-cutting networks for political participation”. American Journal of Political Science, 46. Nuissl, H. (2005), “Trust in a ‘post-socialist region’”. European Urban and Regional Studies, 12: 1. Pérez Díaz, V. (2000), “From ‘civil war’ to ‘civil society’”. ASP Research Paper 36(b). Phillipson, C. and A. Graham (2003), Social networks and social exclusion: Sociological and policy perspectives. Aldershot: Ashgate. Portes, A. and P. Landolt (1996), „The downside of social capital“. The American Prospect, 26.

100

Putnam, R.D. (1993), Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R.D. (2000), Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Raiser, M. (1999), “Trust in transition”. EBRD Working Paper no. 39. Rose-Ackerman, S. (2001), “Trust and honesty in post-socialist societies”, KYKLOS, 54: 2/3. Rossteutscher, S. (2002), “Advocate, or reflection? Associations and political culture”. Political Studies, 50:3. Rueschemeyer, D. (1998), “The self-organization of society and democratic rule: Specifying the relationship”. In: Participation and democracy: East and West. Comparisons and interpretations. D. Rueschemeyer, M. Rueschemeyer and B. Wittrock (eds.). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Schudson, M. (1998), The good citizen. A history of American civic life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sedaitis, J.B. (1997), “Network dynamics of new firm formation: Developing Russian commodity markets”. In: Restructuring networks in post-socialism: Legacies, linkages and localities. G. Grabher and D. Stark (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Skarzynska, K. and P. Radkiewicz (2006), “Trust in people and in families. Similar or different facets of social capital?”. Paper for the conference Facing the Challenge of Understanding Societies in Early 21th Century – Interdisciplinary Perspective. Institute for Social Studies, Warsaw University 1-2 June 2006. Skocpol, T. (1999), “Unravelling from above”. The American Prospect, 25. Stark, D. (1997), “Recombinant property in East European capitalism”. In: Restructuring networks in post-socialism: Legacies, linkages and localities. G. Grabher and D. Stark (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stolle, D. (1998), “Bowling together, bowling alone: The development of generalised trust in voluntary associations”. Political Psychology, 19: 3. Stolle, D. (2001), “Clubs and congregations: The benefits of joining an association”. In: Trust in society. K.S. Cook (ed.). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Stolle, D. and T.R. Rochon (2001), “Are all associations alike? Member diversity, associational type and the creation of social capital”. In: Beyond Tocqueville: Civil society and the social capital debate in comparative perspective. B. Edwards, M.W. Foley, and M. Diani (eds.). Hanover and London: Tufts University Press. Storper, M. (1993), “Regional ‘worlds’ of production. Learning and innovation in the technology districts of France, Italy and USA”. Regional Studies, 27: 5.

101

Sztompka, P. (1999), Trust. A sociological theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tarkowska, E. and J. Tarkowski (1990), “’Amoralny familizm’, czyli o dezintegracji spolecznej w Polsce lat osiemdziesiatych”. In: Grupy i wiezi spoleczne w systemie monocentrycznym, E.Wnuk-Lipinski (ed.). Warszawa, 37-69. Volker, B. and H. Flap (2003), „Communist societies, the velvet revolution, and weak ties: the case of East Germany“. In: Social capital and the transition to democracy. G. Badescu and E.M. Uslaner (eds.). London: Routledge. Woolcock, M. (2002), “Social capital in theory and practice: where do we stand?”. In: Social capital and economic development. J. Isham, T. Kelly and S. Ramaswamy (eds.). Cheltenham et al.: Edward Elgar. Zucker, L.G. (1986), “Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structure 1840 to 1920”. Research in Organisational Behaviour, 8.

102

SOCIAL DIVISIONS, PARTY STRATEGY AND POLITICAL CHOICE

Coordinator:

Geoffrey Evans, Nuffield College, Oxford, Geoffrey.Evans@nuf.ox.ac.uk

Report by:

Geoffrey Evans, Nuffield College, Oxford, Geoffrey.Evans@nuf.ox.ac.uk

Nan Dirk De Graaf, Radboud University Nijmegen, N.deGraaf@ru.nl

1. Introduction

Examination of the social structural basis of partisanship has a long and established history in

political sociology. None the less, most of the debates in this area have concerned descriptive

questions: ‘has class or religion become less important predictor of vote than it used to be?’

Or, have been descriptive comparatively: ‘is class voting stronger in, for example, Britain

than in America?’ Explanatory analyses are in short supply, which why the project we are

engaged in has been initiated. However, before considering and developing on the

explanatory concerns underlying our project we shall first, as befits a state-of-the-art

review, present an overview of previous, primarily descriptive, research in this area. This

focuses, overwhelmingly on class and religion as sources of political preferences.

2. Class

Interest in class voting emerged in response in part to the failed agenda of Marxism, for

whom electoral politics was an expression of the democratic class struggle that supposedly

preceded the expected class-based revolution (Anderson and Davidson 1943). This tended

to result in a focus on class voting as a dispute between just two classes, the working class

and the middle class, and their political representatives, parties of the left and right. Early

research also relied on data obtained at the level of electoral constituencies, with the

consequent need to make strong assumptions about how voters in different classes actually

voted. More recently, studies of class voting have focused on large scale surveys of voters

which have created a vast body of evidence on individual-level class voting. In this work

the best ways in which to define and measure class has been much debated, as have the

most techniques used to summarize statistically the class-vote association (for an overview

103

see Evans 2000). In addition, however, there has been a substantial body of research into

whether or not levels of class voting have weakened as western democracies have moved

from being industrial to post-industrial societies. Possibly the most influential work on the

topic is Robert Alford’s (1963) analysis of trends in class voting in four Anglo-American

democracies (Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States) between 1936 and 1962

using a manual versus nonmanual measure of class position. He also introduced the most

commonly used, cited (and criticized) measure of the level of class voting: the ‘Alford

index’.9 This became the standard instrument in studies that followed, most of which

appeared to show that class voting was in decline. As a result, by the 1990s many

commentators agreed that class voting in modern industrial societies had all but

disappeared (though intense disputes between advocates remained: compare Clarke, Lipset

and Rempel 1993 with Hout, Brooks and Manza 1993). Class was thought to have lost its

importance as a determinant of life-chances and political interests because either the

working class had become richer, white-collar workers had been 'proletarianized’, or social

mobility between classes had increased. At the same time, post-industrial cleavages such as

gender, race, ethnicity, public versus private sector and various identity groups, had

emerged and replaced class-based conflict, while new post-material values had supposedly

led to the ‘new left’ drawing its support from the middle classes thus weakening the class

basis of left-right divisions. Moreover, rising levels of education had ostensibly produced

voters who were calculating and ‘issue oriented’ rather than being driven by collective

identities such as class (for a summary, see Goldthorpe 1996).

All of these accounts assumed that here had indeed been a widespread, secular

decline in class voting. However, during the 1980s a movement emerged that questioned

the validity of this assumption and argued instead that problems of measurement and

analysis seriously undermined the work that had followed Alford’s approach. In particular,

it was argued that the use of a crude manual/nonmanual distinction obscures variations in

the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes (e.g. Heath, Jowell and Curtice

1985). For example, if skilled manual workers are more right-wing than unskilled workers

and the number of skilled workers increases, the Alford estimate of difference between

manual and nonmanual workers will decline even if the relative political positions of

skilled, unskilled, and nonmanual workers remain the same. With this and similar indices

the measurement of the class-vote association is thus open to confounding by changes in

9 The Alford index is the difference between the percentage of manual workers that voted for left-wing parties on the one hand and the percentage of nonmanual workers that voted for these parties on the other.

104

the shape of the class structure. In other words, this type of index confuses differences in

the marginal distributions of the variables with differences in the association it is supposed

to measure – a problem also found with the OLS regression techniques used in, among

others, Franklin, Mackie and Valen’s (1992) 16 nation study that represents the culmination

of this tradition.

In recent years therefore the manual/nonmanual representation of class voting has

been to a large degree superseded. The most influential class schema used currently was

developed by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992), and identifies the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ (small

employers and self-employed), the ‘service class’ (professional and managerial groups), the

‘routine non-manual class’ (typically lower grade clerical ‘white-collar workers’), and the

‘working class’ (foremen and technicians, skilled, semi- and unskilled manual workers).

This shift to greater complexity in the measurement of class has been accompanied by a

similar move away from the measurement of political choice as a dichotomy of left versus

right (or left versus non-left) to a fuller representation of the voters’ spectrum of choice at

the ballot box. Apart from its simplicity, the main reason for the use of a dichotomy to

represent voter choice seems to have been a desire to make systematic cross-national and

over time comparisons. Unfortunately, the selective nature of what is being compared

undermines any true comparability. The problem is analogous to that faced in the analysis

of class position. Changes in the composition of composite categories such as ‘left’ or ‘non-

left’ may lead to spurious changes in estimates of class voting. The use of dichotomies to

represent vote choices and social classes also precludes from observation any processes of

class-party realignment. The concept of class realignment in voting implies a change in the

pattern of association between class and vote without any change in the overall strength of

this association - i.e. without class dealignment or, of course, increase in alignment. But

this cannot be discerned if the distinction between realignment and dealignment is obscured

by restricting the numbers of parties and classes to two.

The other major innovation of the last two decades is in the statistical measurement

of the class-vote association. There has been a move from Alford-type indices to logistic

modeling techniques which measure the strength of the relationship between class and vote

independently of the general popularity of political parties or changes in the sizes of

classes. These techniques also enable the statistical estimation of more complex class and

party relationships thus facilitating greater sophistication in the representation of both class

position and party choice.

105

Research using these advances comes to rather different conclusions than those in the

two-class, two-party tradition (Evans 1999; Hout, Manza and Brooks 1995; Brooks,

Nieuwbeerta and Manza 2004). While there is evidence of a linear decline in left versus non-

left class voting (most notably in Nieuwbeerta 1995), it is not typical. When examined over

the longest available time series, levels of class voting in Britain were found to have

increased during the 1940s and 50s before falling back in the 1960s. Similarly, the United

States, a nation of traditionally low levels of class polarization, may well have seen the

growth of new class-vote cleavages – such as between those who vote and those who do not

(Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995). And in at least some of the new post-communist

democracies the 1990s saw increased levels of class voting as these societies underwent the

rigors of marketization (Mateju, Rehakova and Evans 1999; Whitefield and Evans 1999;

Evans and Whitefield 2006; Evans 2006). Only in certain Scandinavian countries is there

robust evidence of a decline from an unusually high degree of class voting to levels similar

to those in other Western democracies (Ringdal and Hynes 1999).

Despite these methodological and evidential advances, the debate about the decline

of class voting remains active with many authors continuing to claim evidence for a decline

(e.g. Oskarsson 2005). By comparison with this extensive literature examining descriptive

questions signs of empirically-tested theoretical development are far less noticeable (see

Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999) for an exception). Most scholars have assumed a

sociological, relatively deterministic account of the transition to industrial and post-

industrial politics, but there are those who have rejected these in favour of more

voluntaristic models. Kitschelt (1994), for example, argues that the electoral fortunes of

European social democratic parties are largely determined by their strategic appeals, rather

than by secular trends in the class structure - a line of reasoning that echoes Sartori’s (1969)

influential emphasis on the importance of organization, and especially parties, in the

creation of class constituencies. This would suggest that even in post-industrial societies

class voting might increase as well as decrease. It also implies that class-relevant policy

programs should result in increase in the class basis of party support. Evidence for this in

Britain has been provided by Evans, Heath and Payne (1999) who show a close relationship

over a 20 year period between left-right polarization in parties’ manifestos and the extent of

class voting. Later work by Oskarsson (2005) indicates that this pattern is also found

elsewhere in Europe. This is not to say that sociological changes have no impact. Changes

in the relative sizes of classes have been thought to have implications for party strategy:

106

most importantly, in a change to a ‘catch-all’ strategy by parties on the left in response to

the shrinking class basis of support for those parties (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). In

some political systems such moves leave open the space for left parties to attract support

from marginalized working class groups, in others, such as first-past-the-post systems, we

might expect that the start-up costs for electorally viable left parties to be too great.

Unfortunately, many of these arguments still await rigorous tests using survey analysis.

Research that tries to unravel why voters in different classes vote differently is in short

supply, though Weakliem and Heath (1994) provide evidence of the role of rational choice

and inherited preferences, while Evans (1993) provides evidence that promotion prospects

can under conditions account for class differences in left- versus right-wing party support.

A more explicit link between models of class voting and their dependence on advances in

theories of voting behaviour more generally is an area where further development might

still usefully occur.

3.Religion

Religion has received less attention than class as a basis of political preferences.

Interestingly, in most societies where religious based political parties compete with other

political parties, religious based voting is much stronger than class based voting (cf.

Lijphart 1979). For the Netherlands, for example, the relation between denomination and

voting for a religious party has always been much stronger than the relation between class

and voting (De Graaf 1996; Need 1997). However, in some respects work in this area has

mirrored the questions and concerns of the class voting debate. Lane, McKay and Newton

(1997: 150) show that in OECD countries the electoral strength of religious parties in

national elections is in steep decline. Besides a decline in support for religious political

parties there is also an observed decline in religious based voting (i.e. the odds of voting for

a religious party given the voter’s denomination) in the Netherlands (De Graaf 1996). This

coincides with a general trend towards secularization (De Graaf and Te Grotenhuis 2005),

which is particularly strong in the Netherlands (De Graaf and Need 2000; Kelley and De

Graaf 1997), but is found in most Western Societies (Norris and Inglehart 2005). Cross-

national variations in the strength of the association between religion and voting behaviour

have also been examined. Oppenhuis (1995) investigated party choice in Europe for the

elections of the European Parliament in 1989. The differences in impact of the religious

107

cleavage were considerable. The explained variance varied between 1.8% and 27.9 % with

Northern Ireland having the highest score.

There has been hardly any discussion about which religious groups have to be

distinguished, whereas in the literature there has been much debate about the proper

measurement of class. As stated earlier, this debate started with manual/nonmanual

distinction and this evolved in the end of the past century in the more complicated class

schema’s like the EGP-class schema of Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). More recently there

are claims that also the EGP class schema does not give an accurate picture of the class

structure in modern societies anymore. On basis of structural developments there is a claim

that the social and cultural specialists (e.g. Heath and Savage 1995; Güveli and De Graaf

2007; Güveli, Need and De Graaf 2007) are a class of their own as well. On basis of

various validation criteria there is overwhelming evidence that this claim holds water

(Güveli 2006). More interestingly, the class of the social and cultural specialists appears to

be very left-wing, and occasionally even more left wing than the manual class (Güveli

2006). This distinction is therefore also important to be able to give proper judgements

about trends in class voting. Interestingly, such a discussion has hardly started in the

literature on religion as a cleavage. The most plausible explanation is that denominational

differences have always been very clear, which simplifies the analysis of trends and the

most general claim with regard to trends is that religion has become less important. None

the less, in some areas there are grounds for believing that religion might be strengthening

as a basis of political preferences (Kepel 1994). Islam is one obvious area of potential

increase, although there are hardly political parties in Europe that have Islam as an

ideology. However, there was also evidence of a new élan in the Roman Catholic Church

under the leadership of John Paul II, and the expansion of fundamental Protestant groups in

the United States and South-America. Also religion can be seen to have a role in politics to

the degree that political parties stress specific moral issues: Examples are discussions of

abortion and euthanasia. A further factor that is likely to affect voting is the growing

importance of value-based divisions in recent decades that are to some degree independent

of the traditional political discussions such as those pertaining to ‘postmaterialism’ and the

environment (Inglehart 1977, 1990). Weakliem (1991) showed that the importance of a

postmaterialist dimension is stable across time and cohorts for France, Italy, and the

Netherlands for the period 1973-1985 (see also Muller 1999). The rise of more libertarian

political agendas can be expected to produce a reaction from religious groups.

108

Also on basis of the social integration theory, which is rooted in the work of

Durkheim (1897), we can expect changes in religious based voting. This theory contains a

very general hypothesis about norm regulated behavior: the more strongly people are

integrated into a group, the more strongly they comply with any norm of that group (Stark

2004). With regard to traditional religious beliefs this implies that people will believe more

strongly, the stronger they are integrated in a religious group. Church attendance is a

reliable indicator for religious integration. On basis of this we might postulate that in

countries where church attendance is in decline the odds of religious based voting will

decline more strongly than in societies where church attendance is not declining.

We can conclude that in many societies religion is less widespread than formerly

but is likely to be more intensely connected with political preferences where it exists.

4. Towards a greater understanding of causal relationships

Studies of the patterning of social bases underlying political divisions in contemporary

democracies have been more successful at describing such patterns than in understanding

the processes that account for their evolution. What this project proposes is a combined

over time and cross-national research design that enables the simultaneous study of

contextual factors that vary through time and space and which can provide explanations of

why and when social bases of whatever sort underlie political preferences. The key question

therefore is how are political cleavages formed and how do they change?

An influential sociological perspective on this issue – though one that has also been

popular among political scientists - holds that political cleavages are shaped ‘bottom up’,

with social divisions derived from different social locations in groupings relating to

occupational, religious, ethnic, and linguistic structures. These social characteristics shape

interests, values, and preferences. Changes in the social bases of politics are therefore likely

to derive from temporal processes such as secularisation and the growth of individualism. If

this is the case, we would expect (i) the association between religion/class and party

preference will become generally weaker as these social divisions lose their power to shape

divergent values and interests; (ii) the link from social structure to intervening attributes

such as political attitudes and values would also weaken thus accounting for (i); and (iii) as

social blurring can be expected to have a gradual character, we would predict no sharp

discontinuities but rather secular trends (though eventually these might weaken over time

due to ‘floor effects’).

109

A different perspective – again influential both within sociology and political

science - emphases the role of the ‘top down’ institutional structuring of social cleavages.

The extent of social divisions to political preferences derives here from political actors and

their strategies for making politically salient different social characteristics. Change here

would take a more discrete form and its sources could be traced to political actors,

especially changes at the level of party strategies and the emergence of new parties who

shape the focus of political debates and interest representation. We would thus expect that

the association between social structure and political attitudes would not demonstrate an

over time decline; and that changes in the association between social structure and voting

would be unlikely to follow a gradual secular decline.

These perspectives thus come to rather different predictions about the patterning of

change in relationships between social structure and vote and, crucially, in the stability or

otherwise of the relations between social structure and political attitudes. Another key

difference between them is in their expectation of a more or less divided society: the social

change thesis implies a weaker set of social structural divisions in attitudes, whereas the

political change implies that these remain stable, and that voting patterns are weaker due to

party actions. Clearly, the former account suggests that contemporary societies are likely to

be less troubled by problems of legitimation, as there is greater consensus, whereas the

latter implies that divisions may both continue to be robust and that parties might not

always represent constituencies in an equivalent manner, thus raising implications for

representation and legitimacy.

The literature relating to both of the above perspectives is far too extensive to

summarize in this proposal, though it contains the writings of theorists and researchers from

across sociology and political science such as Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Sartori (1969),

Przeworski (1985), Kitschelt (1994), Evans and Whitefield (1993, 2000), Neto and Cox

(1997) inter alios. So far, however, attempts at decisive studies of the relative influence of

bottom up vs top down processes and their relation to class, religious or ethnic political

preferences have been few and far between (for exceptions see Evans, Heath and Payne

1999; Whitefield and Evans 1999; Evans and Whitefield 2006; Oskarsson 2005) and

usually limited in either their geographical coverage, temporal range, or operationalization

of key explanatory or dependent variables. By examining variation over time in the

characteristics of political systems we can understand to what they degree if at all they

condition or reflect the strength of social cleavages. The nature of these social divisions is

110

in principle vast, but in practice there have been a few salient social characteristics that

have provided the greatest insights into political choices: class, religion, and ethnicity.

Thus in his influential four-country comparison Lijphart examined these three

characteristics of social structures and found that, where class, religion and language were

all present as competing bases, religion turns out to be victorious, language is a strong

runner up, and class finishes as a distinct third (1979, p. 452). Lijphart’s explanation for the

success of religion and language is essentially that they involve primordial communal

loyalties. In essence, his theory appears to be a speculation that religious, national and

ethnic cleavages will vanquish class cleavages because of the greater communal loyalties

they engender. But his study, though seminal, provided little evidence that might seriously

test such ideas. In this project we shall take the empirical analysis of the relative importance

of these different social bases to politics much further than has hitherto been the case

through the simultaneous analysis of the social and political changes that can plausibly be

thought to condition the social bases of political preferences across twelve different cases

combining evidence from surveys of populations and party positions through time.

Party competition has evolved differently in these twelve countries with varying

emphasis on the pursuit of the median voter by key parties reflecting in part the form of

electoral rules that are present. One argument is that the extent of party polarization along

salient dimensions of ideology/issues is likely to be a key variable conditioning the logic of

social bases to voting – where an ideological or issue dimension relates to the

interests/values of different social categories we would expect a relationship between

polarization and the magnitude of the association between social category and party

support/voting. Through time some cleavages can be expected to have reduced and other

increased. The general logic of median voter competition and a catch-all strategy would in

general predict decline in political divisions even if social divisions remain pronounced.

Further possible political inputs into levels and forms of social bases to politics can be

expected with the formation of coalitions and new parties.

At the same time there have been social structural changes – for example in the

class structure and degree of religiosity - that also provide grounds for expecting varying

outcomes politically. These compositional changes within a society will affect the number

of traditional supporters of certain parties. Generally these parties tend to shift towards the

centre and this will weaken the association between social structure and party choice, since

there is a less distinctive choice set. An alternative possibility is that parties will open new

areas of competition thus to leading to polarization and social bases to voting that take on a

111

different character. Regardless of the actual empirical outcomes, the important task for this

project is to examine the mutual influence of these patterns of change through time and

across contexts. In doing so we should be able to go beyond the mainly descriptive

aspirations of previous work.

112

REFERENCES

Alford, R. (1963), Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Amorim Neto, O. and G.W.Cox (1997), “Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties.” American Journal of Political Science, 41, 149-174.

Anderson, D. and P.Davidson (1943), Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Brooks, C., P.Nieuwbeerta and J.Manza (2004), “Cleavage-based voting behavior in cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies.” Social Science Research, 35: 88-128.

Clark, T.N., S.M. Lipset. and M.Rempel (1993), “The declining political significance of social class.” International Sociology, 8, 293-316.

De Graaf, N.D. (1996), "Politieke voorkeur en politieke participatie" (Political preference and political Participation). In: Sociale Segmentatie in 2015. H. Ganzeboom and W. Ultee (eds.). Den Haag. WRR voorstudies en achtergronden V96.

De Graaf, N.D. and M. te Grotenhuis (2005), “Afnemend geloof in God en toenemend geloof in een hogere werkelijkheid?” Mens en Maatschappij, 80, 143-158.

De Graaf, N.D. and A.Need (2000), “Losing Faith: is Britain alone?” In: British Social Attitudes: the 17th Report Focusing on Diversity. R.Jowell, J.Curtice, A.Park, K.Thomson, L.Jarvis, C.Bromley and N.Stratford (eds.). London: Sage, 119-135.

De Graaf, N.D., A.Heath, A.Need (2001), “Declining Cleavages and Political Choices: the Interplay of Social and Political Factors in the Netherlands.” Electoral Studies, 20, 1-15.

De Graaf, N.D., P.Nieuwbeerta and A.Heath (1995), “Class mobility and political preference: Individual and contextual effects.” American Journal of Sociology, 100, 997-1027.

Erikson, R. and J.H. Goldthorpe (1992), The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

113

Evans, G. (1993), “Class, prospects, and the life-cycle: explaining the association between class position and political preferences.” Acta Sociologica, 36, 263-276.

Evans, G. (ed.) (1999), The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Evans, G. (2000), “The continued significance of class voting.” Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 401-417.

Evans, G. (2006), “The Social Bases of Political Divisions in Post-Communist Eastern Europe.” Annual Review of Sociology, 32, 245-270.

Evans, G., A.Heath and C.Payne (1999), “Class: Labour as a Catch-All Party?” In: Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term Perspective. G.Evans and P.Norris (eds.). London: Sage, 87-101.

Evans, G. and S.Whitefield (1993), “Identifying the bases of party competition in Eastern Europe.” British Journal of Political Science, 23, 521-548.

Evans, G. and S.Whitefield (1995), “Social and ideological cleavage formation in post-communist Hungary.” Europe-Asia Studies (formerly Soviet Studies), 42, 1177-1204.

Evans, G. and S.Whitefield (1999), “The emergence of class politics and class voting in post-communist Russia.” In: The End of Class Politics? G. Evans (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Evans, G. and S.Whitefield (2000), “Explaining the Formation of Electoral Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies.” In: Elections in Central and Eastern Europe: The First Wave. H-D. Klingemann, E. Mochmann and K. Newton (eds.). Berlin: Edition Sigma, 36-68. Evans, G. and S.Whitefield (2006), “Explaining the rise and persistence of class voting in postcommunist Russia, 1993-2001.” Political Research Quarterly, 59, 23-34.

Franklin, M. (1985), The Decline in Class Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis of Electoral Choice, 1964-1983. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Franklin, M.N., T.Mackie, H.Valen, et al. (1992), Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

114

Goldthorpe, J.H. (1996), “Class and politics in advanced industrial societies.” In: Conflicts about Class: Debating Inequality in Late Industrialism, D. J Lee, and B.S. Turner (eds.). London: Longman. Güveli, A. (2006), New classes within the service class in the Netherlands and Britain: Adjusting the EGP class schema for the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists. Nijmegen University: ICS-dissertation 126. Güveli, A. and N.D.De Graaf (2007, forthcoming), “Career Class (Im)mobility of the Social-Cultural Specialists and the Technocrats in the Netherlands.” European Sociological Review.

Güveli, A., A.Need and N.D.De Graaf (2007, forthcoming), “The rise of ‘new’ social classes within the service class in the Netherlands. Political orientation of social and cultural specialists and technocrats between 1970 and 2003.” Acta Sociologica.

Heath, A. F., R.Jowell and J.Curtice (1985), How Britain Votes. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Hout, M., C.Brooks and J.Manza (1993), “The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies.” International Sociology, 8, 259-277.

Hout, M., C.Brooks and J.Manza (1995), “The democratic class struggle in the United States.” American Sociological Review, 60, 805-828.

Kelley, J. and N.D. De Graaf (1997), "National Context, Parental Socialization, and Religious Belief: Results from 15 Countries." American Sociological Review, 62, 639-659.

Kepel, G. (1994), The revenge of God: the resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the modern world. University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Kitschelt, H. (1994), The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1979), “Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting: The ‘Crucial Experiment’ of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland.” American Political Science Review, 73, 442-458.

Lipset, S. M. and S.Rokkan (1967), “Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments: an introduction”. In: Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives. S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.). New York: The Free Press.

Lipset, S.M. (1960/1981), Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. London: Heinemann.

115

Manza, J., M.Hout and C.Brooks (1995), “Class voting in capitalist democracies since world war II: dealignment, realignment or trendless fluctuation?”. Annual Review of Sociology, 21,137-162.

Mateju, P., B.Rehakova and G.Evans (1999), “The politics of interests and class realignment in the Czech Republic, 1992-96.” In: The End of Class Politics? G. Evans (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Müller, W. (1999), “Class Cleavages in Party Preferences in Germany - Old and New.” In: The End of Class Politics? G. Evans (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Need, A. (1997), “The Kindred Vote: Individual and Family Effects of Social Class and Religion on Electoral Change in the Netherlands, 1956-1994.” Thesis Publishers: Amsterdam. Nijmegen University.

Nieuwbeerta, P. (1995), The Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries, 1945-1990. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.

Nieuwbeerta, P. and N. D. de Graaf (1999), “Traditional Class Voting in 20 Postwar Societies.” In: The End of Class Politics? G. Evans (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nieuwbeerta, P. and W.Ultee (1999), “Class Voting in Western industrialized countries, 1945-90: Systematizing and testing explanations.” European Journal of Political Research, 27, 1-39. Norris, P. and R. Inglehart (2004), Sacred and Secular: religion and politics worldwide. Canbridge University Press.

Oppenhuis (1995), Voting Behavior in Europe. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.

Oskarsson, M. (2005), “Social structure and party choice.” In: The European Voter. J. Thomassen (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 84-105.

Przeworski, A. (1985), Capitalism and Social Democracy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A. and J.Sprague (1986), Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

116

Ringdal K. and K.Hines (1999), “Changes in Class Voting in Norway 1957-1989.” In: The End of Class Politics? G. Evans (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ruiter, S. and N.D.De Graaf (2006), “National Context, Religiosity and Volunteering: Results From 53 Countries.” American Sociological Review, 71, 191-210.

Sartori, G. (1969), “From the sociology of politics to political sociology.” In: Politics and the Social Sciences. S. M. Lipset (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stark, R. (2004), Sociology, 5th ed. Belmont Calif.: Wadsworth.

Weakliem, D. (1991), “The two lefts? Occupation and party choice in France, Italy, and the Netherlands." American Journal of Sociology, 96, 1327- 1361.

Weakliem, D. and A.F.Heath (1994), “Rational Choice and Class Voting.” Rationality and Society, 6, 243-270.

Weakliem, D. and A.F.Heath (1999), “The Secret Life of Class Voting: Britain, France, and the United States Since the 1930s.” In: The End of Class Politics? G. Evans (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Whitefield, S. and G.Evans (1998a), “Electoral Politics in Eastern Europe: Social and Ideological Influences on Partisanship in Post-Communist Societies.” In: Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe. J. Higley, J. Pakulski and W. Wesolowski (eds.). London: Macmillan, 226-250.

Whitefield, S. and G.Evans (1998b), “The Emerging Structure of Partisan Divisions in Russian Politics.” In: Elections and Voters in Post-Communist Russia. M. Wyman, S. White and S. Oates (eds.). London: Edward Elgar, 68-99.

Whitefield, S. and G.Evans (1999), “Class, Markets and Partisanship in Post-Soviet Russia: 1993-96.” Electoral Studies, 18, 155-178.

117