No. 1930April 27, 2006

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/bg1930.cfm

Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies

a division of theKathryn and Shelby Cullom DavisInstitute for International Studies

Published by The Heritage Foundation214 Massachusetts Avenue, NEWashington, DC 20002–4999(202) 546-4400 • heritage.org

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or

hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

Trade Security at Sea: Setting National Priorities for Safeguarding America’s Economic Lifeline

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Martin Edwin Andersen

In 2003, The Heritage Foundation establishedthe Maritime Security Working Group to examinethe maritime security challenges facing the UnitedStates. The working group—composed of mem-bers of academe, the private sector, research insti-tutions, and government—released a special reportdetailing threats and gaps in U.S. maritime securityand expressing the need for an overarching strate-gic approach to addressing these shortfalls. InDecember 2005, the Administration released itsNational Strategy for Maritime Security. The strat-egy and its supporting interagency plans reflectedmany of the Maritime Security Working Group’sfindings.

This report addresses the next steps that shouldbe taken.

The most important task in maritime security isto safeguard the flow of global maritime commerce.In this follow-up report, the working groupaddresses the three most significant enablers toestablishing the maritime security regime that thenation needs to protect trade at sea:

• Expanding the capabilities of the U.S. CoastGuard,

• Improving the sharing and usage of commer-cial information, and

• Enhancing international cooperation.

This paper summarizes the conclusions of theMaritime Security Working Group’s first report andoffers findings and recommendations for ensuring

that the maritime component of the global supplychain is safe, resilient, and prosperous.

Fully Funding the Coast Guard. Given the mul-titude of threats and vulnerabilities in the maritimedomain, strengthening the assets that address thegreatest number of threats and vulnerabilitiesmakes the most sense. The missions of the U.S.Coast Guard touch on virtually every aspect ofmaritime operations. Ensuring that the CoastGuard has the resources to perform all of its mis-sions should be the highest priority. Congress andthe Administration should:

• Aggressively fund and accelerate the CoastGuard’s Integrated Deepwater System;

• Establish a national budget for maritimedomain awareness under the Coast Guard;

• Create special operations capabilities and a lawenforcement/port security corps in the CoastGuard;

• Expand the International Port Security Pro-gram; and

No. 1930 April 27, 2006

• Put teeth in the National Fleet Policy.

Getting the Information. Trying to attend toeverything in the world of maritime commercemakes no sense. The goal should be to focus mostof the security assets on the most dangerous andsuspicious people, activities, and things. This willrequire more information, better information, bet-ter analysis, better interagency coordination ofrelated information, and better tactical and strate-gic use of information. This is the most importantjob, but it will not be an easy task.

Collection of data on the supply chain presents aGordian knot involving myriad problems in focus,scope, and efficacy. Both government and thetrade-driven commercial world need the rightinformation to better assess the risks posed by glo-bal threats. International cooperation is required toensure that the right kinds of partnerships are fos-tered across the vast distances of the supply chainto meet such diverse challenges as focusingresources on suspect cargo, containing the need toclose seaports after incident or attack, and “reboot-ing” the infrastructure afterward. Congress and theAdministration should:

• Focus on shipments rather than containers,mandate some form of identifier across the sup-ply chain, and get more and better information;

• Separate the intelligence and compliance func-tions of Customs and Border Protection andcombine intelligence and data collection in a sin-gle, focused authority at a high level elsewhere inthe Department of Homeland Security (DHS);

• Build on the contingency plans and capabilitiesdeveloped by the private sector;

• Require the Department of Defense and theDHS to sponsor joint operations and intelli-gence fusion centers; and

• Require that freight forwarders and other mid-dlemen who move goods be trained in supply-chain security measures and require each suchcompany to have at least one individual with acommercial security clearance who could inter-act with the U.S. government during an incident.

Enhancing International Cooperation. Almostnothing can be accomplished to make the seas saferwithout international support, standardization,and joint effort. Congress and the Administrationshould:

• Restructure U.S. assistance programs,

• Establish U.S. regional interagency commands,

• Engage the North Atlantic Council and NATOconsultative mechanisms,

• Facilitate NATO–European Union coopera-tion, and

• Continue to encourage foreign investment inU.S. maritime infrastructure while safeguardingU.S. security interests.

Conclusion. Implementing these 15 recommen-dations will require concerted and integrated effortfrom Congress and the Administration, particularlythe Departments of Homeland Security, State,Defense, and Transportation.

—James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Senior ResearchFellow for National Security and Homeland Security inthe Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Pol-icy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and ShelbyCullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at TheHeritage Foundation. Martin Edwin Andersen hasserved as a senior adviser for policy planning in theCriminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,communications director for the Port Security Council,and managing editor of Port Security News.

• Almost one-third of the U.S. economydepends on people, goods, and services thattraverse the world’s oceans. Ensuring thefree and secure flow of trade should be thehighest priority in U.S. maritime security.

• The debates over U.S. maritime security pol-icies and programs are overly and inappro-priately focused on ports and shippingcontainers. An effective approach to makingthe seas safer must provide comprehensivesolutions.

• The United States is wasting money by dol-ing out millions of dollars in port securitygrants that are not adding much security.

• The most significant and effective contribu-tions that can be made to enhancing mari-time security involve modernizing the CoastGuard, improving public–private informa-tion sharing, and enhancing internationalcooperation.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/bg1930.cfm

Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies

a division of theKathryn and Shelby Cullom DavisInstitute for International Studies

Published by The Heritage Foundation214 Massachusetts Avenue, NEWashington, DC 20002–4999(202) 546-4400 • heritage.org

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect-ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to

aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

No. 1930April 27, 2006

Talking Points

Trade Security at Sea: Setting National Priorities for Safeguarding America’s Economic Lifeline

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Martin Edwin Andersen

In 2003, The Heritage Foundation established theMaritime Security Working Group to examine themaritime security challenges facing the United States.The working group—composed of members of aca-deme, the private sector, research institutions, andgovernment—released a special report detailingthreats and gaps in U.S. maritime security andexpressing the need for an overarching strategicapproach to addressing these shortfalls. In December2005, the Administration released its National Strat-egy for Maritime Security. The strategy and its sup-porting interagency plans reflected many of theMaritime Security Working Group’s findings.

This report addresses the next steps that should betaken.

The most important task in maritime security is tosafeguard the flow of global maritime commerce. Inthis follow-up report, the working group addressesthe three most significant enablers to establishing themaritime security regime that the nation needs to pro-tect trade at sea:

• Expanding the capabilities of the U.S. Coast Guard,

• Improving the sharing and usage of commercialinformation, and

• Enhancing international cooperation.

This paper summarizes the conclusions of the Mar-itime Security Working Group’s first report and offersfindings and recommendations for ensuring that themaritime component of the global supply chain issafe, resilient, and prosperous.

April 27, 2006No. 1930

page 2

Implementing these measures will requireconcerted and integrated effort from Congressand the Administration, particularly the Depart-ments of Homeland Security, State, Defense, andTransportation.

Making the Seas SaferIn 2003, the Maritime Security Working Group

released a special report, “Making the Seas Safer: ANational Agenda for Maritime Security and Coun-terterrorism.”1 The report explained:

• Why maritime security is so vital to the UnitedStates,

• The principal and emerging threats that need tobe addressed, and

• Gaps in U.S. security and the need for compre-hensive strategic solutions to address them.

Together these facts make the case for establish-ing clear and unambiguous priorities for improvingmaritime security.

The Importance of Maritime Security. Theimportance of the maritime domain cannot beoverestimated. Almost one-third of U.S. grossdomestic product (GDP) is derived from trade, andmost of America’s overseas trade is transported byship. According to the American Association ofPort Authorities, $1.3 billion worth of U.S. goodsmoves in and out of U.S. ports every day. In addi-tion, many major urban centers (more than half ofthe U.S. population) and significant critical infra-structure are in proximity to U.S. ports or are acces-sible by waterways.

Maritime security also has a critical defensedimension. The vast majority of U.S. military forcesand supplies sent overseas transit through U.S.ports. For example, in fiscal year (FY) 2003, theU.S. Military Traffic Management Command (nowcalled the Strategic Distribution and DeploymentCommand) shipped more than 1.6 million tons ofcargo in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.America cannot be prosperous or safe withoutaccess to the sea.

During the next 20 years, maritime commercewill likely become an even larger and more impor-tant component of the global economy. The mainelements of this transformation will probablyinclude continued growth in the seaborne ship-ment of energy products, further adoption of con-tainerized shipping, and the continued rise ofmegaports as commercial hubs for transshipmentand deliveries.

Barring substantial and unanticipated reductionsin the cost of air transport, this trend will persist forthe next few decades. Over 10 million containers,which account for 90 percent of goods transportedacross the seas, entered the United States in 2005.The number of containers entering the U.S. by seacould double by 2010.

Seaborne transport will remain critical todefense as well. Despite the anticipated develop-ment of a new generation of long-range globalstrike aircraft and rapidly deployable future Armycombat forces, it is highly unlikely that the U.S.military will be able to sustain a major campaign inthe foreseeable future without the capacity to trans-port significant assets from the continental UnitedStates by ship.

Long-Term Threats. The long-term maritimesecurity threats to the United States are:

• Internal threats from rogue actors. The great-est vulnerability to maritime infrastructure maybe internal threats (e.g., employees who havean intimate knowledge of operations and facil-ities and access to transportation and portassets).

• Threats from the domestic (land) side. Manyexperts view ports as more vulnerable toattacks launched against the land-side distribu-tion network, destroying the economic viabilityof the port.

• The growth of maritime criminal activity.Piracy, human trafficking, and drug smugglingwill continue, and terrorists could mimic orpartner with these criminal enterprises.

1. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Alane Kochems, eds., “Making the Sea Safer: A National Agenda for Maritime Security and Counterterrorism,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 3, February 17, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/sr03.cfm.

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• The lack of visibility in noncommercial mari-time activity. Currently, the United States lackssufficient means to monitor maritime activity.Terrorists could capitalize on this weakness bylaying mines, launching other types of under-water attacks, using private craft to smugglesmall payloads to locations outside ports, orusing small craft to launch attacks.

• Biological and environmental threats. Thedanger from infectious diseases and other envi-ronmental threats carried by seaborne trafficwill increase with greater maritime commerce.

• Anti-access strategies. An enemy might attackvulnerable targets on U.S. territory as a meansto coerce, deter, or defeat the United States.

• Stand-off attacks from the sea. State and non-state groups could soon be capable of mountingshort-range ballistic missile and cruise missileattacks—possibly employing weapons of massdestruction—from U.S. waters.

Wasting Scarce Resources. Efforts that wastescarce security resources on less credible challengescould prove to be just as dangerous as the realisticthreats. Since September 11, 2001, some analystshave hyped the possibility of spectacular maritimeattacks using nuclear weapons stowed in shippingcontainers or liquid natural gas tankers blown upin U.S. harbors. The Maritime Security WorkingGroup found these scenarios less plausible or feltthat post-9/11 security regimes made them lesslikely.

Qualifying threats is important. The U.S. simplycannot “child-proof” the entire supply chain, elim-inating every conceivable vulnerability and oppor-tunity to attack U.S. interests. Overly fixating onspecific threat scenarios can lead to inefficient andineffective use of resources. One such example isthe misguided call by some Members of Congressto inspect every container bound for the UnitedStates because one could possibly be used to smug-gle a nuclear weapon or a “dirty” bomb (radiologi-cal dispersion device) into the country.

Misguided Port Grants and Inspections. Tocounter the “nuke-in-a-box” threat, some proposespending billions of dollars on container and portsecurity. This argument fails on five counts:

1. The nuke-in-a-box is an unlikely terrorist tac-tic. If an enemy wanted to smuggle a bomb intothe United States, an oil or chemical tanker,roll-on/roll-off car carrier, grain or other bulkvessel, or even private watercraft would be amore logical and secure way to transport it,either directly to the target (e.g., a port) or indi-rectly by landing it in Mexico, Canada, or theCaribbean and then moving it across a remotesection of the U.S. border. Indeed, logic sug-gests (and most experts believe) that a port ismore likely to be attacked from land than fromsea, especially given the lack of visibility intothe domestic trade network, the lack of protec-tion on the landward side, and the ease of con-structing explosive devices with domesticresources. Terrorists are more likely to con-struct smaller items (e.g., biological agents)domestically and then to deliver them throughFedEx.

2. While nuclear smuggling is possible, so aredozens of other attack scenarios. Overinvestingin countering one tactic when terrorists couldeasily employ another is dangerously myopic.

3. Spending billions of dollars and deployingthousands of personnel to search every con-tainer and harden every port is an extremelyinefficient and expensive way to stop terroristsfrom using cargo containers, especially whenthey would probably use other means.

4. There is no apparent viable business case formany of the proposed solutions for “hardening”shipping containers, conducting 100 percentphysical container inspections, or requiringexpensive tracking or monitoring devices.These measures would provide only minimalutility at the cost of billions of dollars in newduties, taxes, and operating costs.

5. Such efforts would divert resources from solu-tions that would measurably strengthen mari-time security, including watching the back doorof American ports through which trucks, trains,and barges travel daily.

As a matter of common sense, the United Statesshould not attempt to make every cargo containerand port into a miniature Fort Knox. Securing trade

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requires an approach that is more comprehensiveand effective than just putting up fences and gates,posting guards at ports, deploying radiation detec-tors at every entry, and inspecting all cargo contain-ers as they enter the country—approaches thatwould waste security resources by inspectingthings that are unlikely security risks and createisolated, easily bypassed chokepoints to addressspecific (and unlikely) threats.

The better answer to the nuke-in-a-box scenarioas well as the much more credible threats is toincrease U.S. efforts to interdict potential dangersbefore they reach the ports and use the best andbroadest possible intelligence available, generatedfrom a combination of commercial information andintelligence. In that regard, security measuresshould focus on building capabilities that willaddress a broad range of dangers rather than fixat-ing on a few Tom Clancy–like scenarios.

Closing the real gaps in the U.S. maritime securityregime is a good place to start. This means focusingthe government on stopping terrorists and criminalsand focusing the private sector on sensible, reason-able, transparent, and uniform actions that willenhance the security of the global supply chain.

What Needs to Be Done. The Maritime SecurityWorking Group identified three broad capabilitiesthat are needed:

• Maritime domain awareness. Given the broadreaches of the global commons and the equallybroad range of threats to the sea-based com-merce, trade, information, and energy system,nothing is more important than developing ahigh degree of maritime domain awareness(MDA). MDA means having the capacity toknow what is going on and to give the rightinformation to the right asset at the right timeand place to address security, safety, economic,and environmental concerns.

• Systems of systems. Maritime commerce is notowned or controlled by any one entity, nor arethe local, state, and federal government agen-cies that provide security unified in their polic-ing of the domain. Integrating disparatecapabilities, building a “system of systems” tooversee and respond to maritime threats, isessential.

• International security regimes. Most of thecommercial firms that dominate maritime tradeare transnational companies. Protecting mari-time commerce and ensuring freedom of the seasrequire international cooperation including glo-bal security standards, joint enforcement, intelli-gence cooperation, and information sharing.That requires formal security regimes. It cannotbe done on an ad hoc basis.

Finally, the working group argued that theUnited States needs an overarching strategy to inte-grate its efforts in these key areas.

Setting PrioritiesIn December 2005, the Administration released

its National Strategy for Maritime Security.2 Thestrategy and its supporting interagency plansreflected many of the groups’ findings.3

Yet much more work needs to be done. Address-ing all the threats and vulnerabilities in the maritimedomain is a daunting task. The Administration’sstrategy does not sufficiently prioritize the effortsthat need to be made. The purpose of this secondreport is to identify the greatest vulnerability and thecritical actions that will best address the weaknessesin the nation’s current maritime security regime.

Safeguarding Trade FirstMaterial progress in the 21st century is inti-

mately tied to a system of international commerceand information that traverses the great oceans ofthe world—a vast global commons. It is the foun-

2. The White House, The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005, at www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf (April 20, 2006).

3. The new U.S. maritime security policy includes three key elements: the Interagency Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee, the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and its eight supporting plans. For links to these elements, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Direc-tive 13,” Web page, at www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0597.xml (March 3, 2006).

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dation of the world in which we live. The mostimportant task in maritime security is to safeguardthe relatively unimpeded flow of global maritimecommerce. Ensuring the continuity of commerceand, in the event of a disruption, the rapid recoveryof this capability should have the highest priority.

The maritime space for mutual enterprise is anenormous and complex economic domain madeup of fishing grounds; telecommunications infra-structure; oil and gas extraction, refining, and dis-tribution; and other global sea-based commercecentered on some 30 to 40 deep-draft megaportswith extensive intermodal connections. These glo-bal trading hubs serve merchant ships carryingcontainers and other goods between the regionsthat produce them and those that consume or usethem, including products such as oil and gas; rawmaterials; grain; break-bulk commodities (e.g.,automobiles and palletized cargo); and other man-ufactures. This transnational and diffuse tradingsystem is owned by the myriad stakeholdersinvolved in such commerce.

No nation benefits more from this global maritimetrading system than the United States. On an averageday, nearly 700 ships larger than 300 gross tons andcarrying goods and passengers approach the U.S.from foreign and domestic ports. In addition, anuntold number of vessels penetrate the U.S. Exclu-sive Economic Zone bound for non-U.S. ports andare therefore not required to report to the UnitedStates. Expanding the problem to a global perspec-tive, at any given time, there may be 120,000 mari-time targets of potential security interest.

Ports can also be tempting targets for terrorists. Aspoints of entry and exit, they are critical nodes thatcould affect terrorist travel and movement of mate-rial support and weapons from foreign points. Theyare also prime targets for terrorist strikes. The eco-nomic, physical, and psychological damage from asignificant terrorist attack that targets maritime com-merce or exploits America’s vulnerability to seastrikes is difficult to estimate. The 9/11 terroristattacks on New York and Washington caused lossesof over $100 billion to the U.S economy alone.Given the nation’s overwhelming dependence onocean-going commerce, a similar sudden attack inthe maritime domain might exceed these costs.

U.S. ports should not be the only concern. Thebulk of U.S. imports are shipped from a handful offoreign megaports. Disruptions in Singapore, Rot-terdam, or Hong Kong could have an equally dra-matic impact on the United States. Ports present awide range of targets, depending on their size andlocation, and U.S. strategy should recognize this.While most of the funding to date has gone to ahandful of large intermodal ports, smaller portsmay be even more vulnerable to the smuggling ofdangerous goods and people.

The stakes are high. A significant breakdown inthe maritime transport system would send shock-waves throughout the world economy. In fact, in aworst-case scenario, a large attack could cause theentire global trading system to halt as governmentsscramble to recover. Drastic and inefficient solu-tions could be imposed, such as completely clos-ing some ports and requiring duplicative andlengthy cargo checks in both originating andreceiving ports.

Trade Security at SeaThe three most significant enablers to establish-

ing the maritime security regime to protect trade atsea are:

• Expanding the capabilities of the U.S. CoastGuard,

• Improving the sharing and usage of commer-cial information, and

• Enhancing international cooperation.

Enabler #1: Fully Funding the Coast GuardGiven the multitude of threats and vulnerabili-

ties in the maritime domain, strengthening theassets that address the greatest number of threatsand vulnerabilities makes the most sense. The mis-sions of the U.S. Coast Guard touch on virtuallyevery aspect of maritime operations. Ensuring thatthe Coast Guard has the resources to perform all ofits missions should be the highest priority.

FindingsThe Coast Guard lacks adequate resources.

The operational requirements for Coast Guardassets have increased significantly since 9/11. Atthe same time, tasks requirements have grown to

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include significant roles in counterterrorism andother homeland security missions.

The strains are showing. Readiness rates of olderCoast Guard ships have declined since FY 2000.Equally troubling, the Coast Guard’s IntegratedDeepwater System—the plan to recapitalize itsaging and increasingly worn-down fleet of cutters,patrol boats, and maritime aircraft—has encoun-tered stiff resistance from Congress and the Officeof Management and Budget. Indeed, under the cur-rent plan, it will take 25 years to complete therecapitalization of U.S. Coast Guard assets.

Efforts to expand maritime domain awarenessare inadequate. Most traffic on the global com-mons is effectively invisible, given current capabil-ities. This makes detecting, identifying, tracking,and investigating without prior warnings or indica-tions unlikely, if not impossible, in most circum-stances. Most national assets are not focused on,accessible to, or configured favorably for maritimesurveillance. The National Strategy for MaritimeSecurity sets specific objectives for achievingimproved MDA, but it does not explicitly identifywhich service or agency should coordinate nationalMDA efforts.

Maritime response and law enforcement capa-bilities are insufficient. The National Strategy forMaritime Security requires a system that will inte-grate and align all federal maritime security programsand initiatives into a comprehensive, cohesive,national effort of scalable layered security. However,the strategy does not explicitly indicate the best fed-eral agency to integrate all maritime security pro-grams and initiatives to achieve this layered defense.It instead relies on the principle of “mutual depart-mental cooperation” (i.e., the Department of Defenseand the Department of Homeland Security—morenarrowly the Customs and Border Protection, whichcontinues to act as a “Lone Ranger” bureaucratically).After four years, this hortatory device has proveninsufficient to overcome bureaucratic and depart-mental inertia and squabbling.

Furthermore, the Coast Guard, which should bethe lead agency in both military and law enforce-

ment responses to maritime security issues, has notdeveloped the law enforcement capacities toaddress current and emerging threats. Coast Guardpersonnel normally do only one or two tours in lawenforcement assignments before mandatory returnto assignments in their primary career field.

The Coast Guard’s international role remainsundervalued, underutilized, and underresourced.The Coast Guard serves as the lead maritime ser-vice in managing programs designed to increase thesecurity of goods shipped to the United States fromoverseas. For example, through bilateral and mul-tilateral engagements instituted under its newInternational Port Security (IPS) Program, it is con-tinuing to internationalize the implementation andevaluation process under the International Shipand Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. During thepast year, the Coast Guard continued to foster part-nerships and build new regional cooperative rela-tionships through international forums such as theSecretariat of the Pacific Community, the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation group, and theOrganization of American States. It also played astrong leadership role through the InternationalMaritime Organization and the U.S. Trade andDevelopment Agency. In addition, the Coast Guardplays an important role in training paramilitarymaritime police forces to combat terrorists andpirates on the high seas.4

While the Coast Guard’s international missionsare expansive, they are underutilized and underre-sourced. The International Port Security Program,the only foreign port/country audit done to deter-mine whether security measures are ISPS compliant,has not been aggressively implemented. With only ahandful of trained professionals to conduct theseaudits, the Coast Guard’s program lacks credibility.

The National Fleet Policy is inadequate. TheNational Fleet Policy is a joint U.S. Navy–CoastGuard declaration that calls (1) for using each ser-vice’s “multi-mission assets, personnel resourcesand shore Command and Control nodes to opti-mize our effectiveness across the full spectrum ofnaval and maritime missions” and (2) for the two

4. “Ready or Not, Here Comes the Coast Guard,” Government Security News, June 14, 2005.

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services to “work together to plan, acquire andmaintain forces that mutually support and comple-ment each service’s roles and missions.”5

The Navy and Coast Guard have failed to imple-ment the National Fleet Policy adequately. For exam-ple, one of the eight supporting plans for theNational Security Strategy is the Maritime Opera-tional Threat Response Plan (MOTR). However,much work remains to be done to determine theoptimal mix of National Fleet assets necessary torespond to the most likely threats and to decidewhich service or agency has the lead in determiningmaritime threat responses. Likewise, the NationalFleet Policy has emphasized hardware issues (ships,planes, and sensors) and neglected equally impor-tant efforts to harmonize operational programs suchas intelligence and information analysis, training,and international assistance programs.

RecommendationsCongress and the Administration should:

• Aggressively fund and accelerate the CoastGuard’s Integrated Deepwater System tocomplete it within 10 to 15 years. As docu-mented in the Coast Guard’s 2003 report toCongress, acceleration is feasible and wouldgenerate numerous efficiencies in the program.Most important, a well-funded and acceleratedprogram would retire aged assets earlier andintroduce far more capable, newer (or con-verted) cutters and aircraft, now planned underthe revised (post-9/11) Deepwater Implemen-tation Plan, more rapidly. Funding for Deepwa-ter should be increased to at least $1.5 billionper year, and related maritime security pro-grams that address awareness, prevention, pro-tection, response, and recovery should receive$500 million per year.

• Establish a national MDA budget and makethe Coast Guard the executive agent for MDAfor maritime security. The Office of Manage-ment and Budget should identify all federalspending in the national MDA budget. The

Commandant of the Coast Guard should sub-mit an annual assessment of all federal spend-ing and proposed expenditures on MDA to thePresident and the Secretaries of Defense,Homeland Security, and Transportation. TheDepartments of Homeland Security, Defense,and Transportation, with the Coast Guard andNavy as executive agents, should be responsi-ble for establishing the architecture for MDAwith the Coast Guard as the lead agency.

• Create special operations capabilities and alaw enforcement/port security corps in theCoast Guard. More robust special capabilitiesare needed to respond to incidents at sea (suchas hijackings) and to interdict threats (such assmuggled weapons materials). The CoastGuard should establish a special operationscapability for maritime response, and theseforces should be a component of the DefenseDepartment’s Special Operational Forces(SOF). Part of the Coast Guard SOF should berotated under the command of Special Opera-tions Command (SOCOM) for global deploy-ment with U.S. Naval Special Forces. Otherunits would operate directly under the CoastGuard for deployment in U.S. waters. Addi-tionally, the Coast Guard needs to create a sep-arate career path for law enforcement and portsecurity professionals and train sufficient per-sonnel to meet global needs.

• Expand the International Port Security Pro-gram. Coast Guard assets that are used to auditforeign port compliance with the InternationalShipping and Port Security codes should be sig-nificantly expanded.

• Put teeth in the National Fleet Policy. A letterof agreement by the Commandant of the CoastGuard and the Chief of Naval Operations is notadequate to ensure development of the right mixof capabilities for the 21st century. The NationalFleet Program requires a more formal manage-ment structure by the Departments of Defenseand Homeland Security, an independent assess-

5. Michael G. Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, and Thomas H. Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard, “National Fleet: A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement,” U.S. Department of the Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, March 3, 2006, at www.navy.mil/palib/cno/2006_national_fleet_policy.pdf (April 19, 2006).

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ment of capabilities needs, and integrated over-sight by relevant congressional committees.

Enabler #2: Getting the InformationTrying to attend to everything in the world of

maritime commerce makes no sense. The goalshould be to focus most of the security assets on themost dangerous and suspicious people, activities,and things. This will require more and better infor-mation, better analysis, better interagency coordi-nation of related information, and better tacticaland strategic use of information. This is the mostimportant job, but it will not be an easy task.

Collection of data on the supply chain presents aGordian knot involving myriad problems in focus,scope, and efficacy. Both government and thetrade-driven commercial world need the rightinformation to better assess the risks posed by glo-bal threats. International cooperation is required toensure that the right kinds of partnerships are fos-tered across the vast distances of the supply chainto meet such diverse challenges as focusingresources on suspect cargo, containing the need toclose seaports after incident or attack, and “reboot-ing” the infrastructure afterward.

FindingsThe government is often asking for informa-

tion from the wrong people. The best informationtypically comes from the parties that generate thedata, are close to the source, or need it for criticaldecisions. Discussions about the burden of ensur-ing trade security have centered mostly on the mar-itime realm, particularly on the role of maritimecarriers. However, carriers are only one of nearly 30components in the supply chain. In a deregulatedworld, even though they are visible and regulatedtargets, they have little need to know detailed infor-mation about the freight that they carry on board. Itis not the carriers’ business to maintain the kind ofinformation required for security purposes beyondsecuring their half of the logistics handoff at pickupand delivery, nor do they have business reasons tomaintain the technical expertise to verify their car-goes with certainty.

While we have not ignored the responsibility ofmanufacturers and retailers to ensure the genera-tion of adequate knowledge about their overseas

shipments and the dissemination of that informa-tion to the appropriate authorities, the governmenthas been reluctant to regulate these parties in anymeaningful way.

Transportation and logistics data tend to becomplex and “dirty.” Right now, much of the datathat are available from parties to the supply chainare raw, not standardized, and unconnected—witha typical overseas trade involving 20–25 parties,30–40 documents, 200-plus data elements, 90 per-cent repetitive data reentry, huge error rates, andhighly heterogeneous sources and users of datausing various means of communication. In otherwords, one never quite knows what one will get.Electronic systems vary in their utility, sophistica-tion, and penetration among the parties to a tradeevent. Much of the world (including much of theU.S.) still conducts much of its business withphones, faxes, and e-mail.

Data collection within the transportation net-work is very difficult. Not only are there myriaddifferent electronic systems and formats, but therealso are 500,000 variations of the tracking codes forinternational port, origin, cargo, and other data cat-egories for the more than 3,000 ports worldwide.Other systems are not even electronic. Yet anotherproblem is “compliance friction,” the predictabletensions that occur when a single agency is chargedwith both gathering anti-terrorism intelligence fromsupply-chain entities and enforcing compliance bythese entities with regulations. In such a setting, theparties required to provide data, even if reassuredthat they will be protected from regulatory scrutiny,are unlikely ever to cooperate fully.

The leadership role played by the Departmentof Homeland Security and the maritime industryhas been inadequate. Fundamental issues abouthow best to share information between the govern-ment and the private sector have not beenaddressed adequately. The effectiveness of the Infor-mation Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs),which are supposed to facilitate the flow of informa-tion between the private sector and the government,has been uneven. In the maritime domain, the ISACis run by the Coast Guard, a federal agency. That iswrong because ISACs are supposed to representsector leadership and commitment to establishing

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effective public–private partnerships. By abdicatingresponsibility for the ISAC, the private sector hasdemonstrated a serious lack of commitment.

Freight forwarders and other service providerscould be a big part of the solution. Forwardersand other middlemen at the data and operationallevels are in a critical control position in overseassupply-chain transactions, but they have not beenformally engaged as a significant part of the secu-rity process. The middlemen handle the money,goods, and documents involved in a transaction aswell as the classification of merchandise. However,historically, they have been at odds with U.S. agen-cies such as the former U.S. Customs Service andthe Federal Maritime Commission, and these“compliance frictions” work against their fuller par-ticipation in the security process. Part of the prob-lem has also been that no business model has beenproposed for purchasing the middlemen’s data, apool of market information that vastly outstripsgovernment data in both quality and detail.

RecommendationsCongress and the President should:

• Focus on shipments rather than containers,mandate some form of identifier across thesupply chain, and get more and better infor-mation. Understanding the context in which acontainer or shipment of goods moves within thesupply chain—where it has been, who touchedit, who paid for it, where it is going, who was onthe ship or truck with it—is more likely to iden-tify a real risk than is attempting to ascertain whatis in every container. An average of 2.7 shipmentsis in each container, yet a shipment can also be 60containers of identical goods shipped in onetransaction by a single party.

Tracking transactions associated with ship-ments across the supply chain from the initialorder in the U.S. to loading it into the containerand through all subsequent handoffs wouldbenefit from a uniform process and uniqueparty-based tracking code. The Food and DrugAdministration already requires parties associ-ated with the manufacture of food and drugsshipped to the United States to have uniqueidentifiers by which the process can be traced

backward to origins. This is a program thatcould certainly be implemented globally acrossthe supply chain, although it would requireinternational agency agreements and pressurefrom the U.S. government.

In many respects, the best way for the govern-ment to obtain better and more accurate datamore quickly and easily is for it to state clearlywhat it needs, establish penalties for noncompli-ance, and let the private sector figure out how todo the job. To date, conversations have consistedlargely of the government asking “What can yougive me?” and the private sector replying, “Whatdo you want?” Assigning the requirement fordata brokering to trade middlemen could be animportant step in pulling together more com-plete and useful transaction information.

• Separate the intelligence and compliancefunctions of Customs and Border Protection(CBP) and combine intelligence and data col-lection in a single, focused authority at a highlevel elsewhere in the DHS. One importantobstacle to sharing information is the privatesector’s concern over “compliance friction.” TheCBP is responsible for information gathering andanalysis and enforcing compliance with tax andtrade laws. These vastly different responsibilitiescomplicate the challenge of developing a candidpartnership with the private sector. Intelligencefunctions should be performed by a separateagency within the DHS, and a firewall should beerected to separate it from compliance functions.Likewise, the maritime ISAC should be run by aprivate sector entity, not by the Coast Guard. Inaddition, the Maritime Sector CoordinatingCouncil, a public–private group that is supposedto coordinate policy issues, should play a moreactive role in developing guidelines to ensureeffective information sharing.

• Build on the contingency plans and capabili-ties developed by the private sector. In theimmediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, theFederal Aviation Administration halted all civil-ian aviation. In the aftermath of a maritimeattack, similar concerns are likely to halt bothU.S. and, to a significant degree, global mari-time traffic. In this event, mechanisms to rap-

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idly reestablish public confidence in the supplychain and resume the flow of commerce tominimize economic disruption will be vital.Sufficient information-sharing and tactical andanalytical capabilities that close the gapbetween public-sector and private-sector needsand operational requirements must be devel-oped rapidly to guard against this contingency.The Maritime Transportation Security Actrequires the government to establish programsto evaluate and certify secure systems of inter-modal transportation. It does not, however,direct that these programs be conceived orimplemented by the federal government. Toreduce risk and exploit the market’s capacity tofind innovative and effective solutions, the DHSshould establish mechanisms that move theprivate sector to develop and share contingen-cies for voluntary measures that might be takenin the event of an incident to ensure the safecontinuity of operations and to minimize theneed to close ports or disrupt trade.

• Require the Department of Defense and theDHS to sponsor joint operations and intelli-gence fusion centers. Having better data for riskassessments is not enough. The Department ofHomeland Security and its partners need toimprove their capability to act on the informa-tion. Congress should require that all U.S. sea-ports establish intelligence and information-sharing fusion centers (Joint Operations Centers)at either the port or regional level, similar to thepilot-project Seahawk at the port of Charlestonand the joint harbor operations centers in Nor-folk and San Diego. These centers should becivilian-led and funded equitably and jointly byall of the public and private stakeholders at eachport. Each of these centers would establish infor-mation-sharing capabilities with the appropriatefederal security agency.

• Require that freight forwarders and othermiddlemen who move goods be trained insupply-chain security measures and require

each such company to have at least one indi-vidual with a commercial security clearancewho could interact with the U.S. governmentduring an incident. Licensing, backgroundchecks, standards of conduct, and auditing offreight forwarders will ensure better coopera-tion in getting data, more accurate data, andgreater surety in their activities. These andother middlemen should be treated as skilled,trusted deputies in the security process.

Enabler #3: Enhancing International Cooperation

Almost nothing can be accomplished to makethe seas safer without international support, stan-dardization, and joint effort.

FindingsFederal agencies have disparate programs to

assist countries in enhancing their maritimesecurity. Various federal agencies conduct port andsecurity assistance programs overseas, and there isoften little requirement that the programs be syn-chronized or integrated. The Department of Home-land Security provides inadequate leadership ininternational trade security affairs. Congress has yetto create an Under Secretary for Policy to lead inthis area, and the department does not have effec-tive and integrated international operations.

In addition, the United States lacks an integrated,interagency approach to addressing regional issues,including many maritime security challenges. ThePentagon has a Unified Command Plan (UCP),which establishes regional military commands, butthe current UCP, like previous ones, focuses prima-rily on planning military operations. As a result,cooperation between the Pentagon and other federalagencies and nongovernmental organizations onregional security operations has been inadequate.6

Much if not most of the data, information, andintelligence needed for MDA initiatives is ownedby nongovernmental, non-U.S. entities. Whilemany foreign countries have already taken stock of

6. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., “Missions, Responsibilities, and Geography: Rethinking How the Pentagon Commands the World,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1792, August 26, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1792.cfm.

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their own maritime security needs and, in somecases, have arrived at programs and proceduresthat are different from what the United States plans,continued U.S. leadership is necessary to coordi-nate efforts. Once plans are in place, they becomehard to change.

Several international organizations will play akey role in determining what information is glo-bally available and how that information can beused. The International Organization for Standard-ization (ISO) is a private-sector industry network ofnational standards bodies with 153 nations repre-sented in its membership. It works in partnershipwith international governmental and nongovern-mental organizations such as the United Nations,World Trade Organization, World Customs Organi-zation, and International Maritime Organizationand through official liaisons with many industryand trade international organizations and associa-tions. The work of drafting voluntary internationalstandards is done by the various ISO technicalcommittees.

Because ISO standards (1) are drafted by inter-national experts in the field who achieve a consen-sus that does not favor a country or industry, (2) arevoluntary, (3) honor no nationality or border, and(4) are pragmatic, the ISO is potentially the bestvehicle to address the breadth of maritime security,supply-chain, and counterterrorism issues. Therecently published ISO 28000 is the specificationfor security management systems for the supplychain. It is generic, overarching, and the first of aseries of standards related to security of the entiresupply chain. The “level playing field” and com-mon language provided by international consensusstandards are potentially effective weapons in safe-guarding not only the flow of global maritime com-merce, but also the entire supply chain from pointof origin to the consumer.

The developing world is the weak link in thechain. Environmental threats, criminals, and ter-rorists are more likely to enter the maritime systemthrough the ports and shipping in the developingworld, where infrastructure and human capitalassets are often lacking, governance is weak, andcorruption is problematic. The U.S. National Secu-rity Strategy rightly calls for encouraging economic

development through free markets and free tradeand enhancing the capacity of developing nationsto compete in a global economy. Concurrently, theUnited States is also rightly promoting interna-tional security regimes designed to prevent terror-ists from attacking or exploiting global tradenetworks. However, the U.S. should take care toensure that these goals do not work against eachother. Unless both priorities are satisfied, develop-ing countries are likely to become less competitive.

The United States and Europe are not integrat-ing their efforts adequately. The United States andEurope represent the world’s two largest importers.It is therefore likely that any programs pursuedjointly by the United States and Europe will gainimmediate global acceptance. However, notenough is being done to synchronize their port andtrade security policies and assistance programs. Acore issue for the United States is the fragmentationwithin Europe on maritime security. Today, theEuropean Union (EU) is not a “one-stop-shop”entity, but a collection of many competing interestsand stakeholders. The area of maritime security isgoverned by different ministries and departmentsin different member states—the ministry of justicein some and the ministry of business affairs, inte-rior, or transport in others.

In the European Commission, several director-ates are involved in all areas under supply-chainsecurity and the subarea of maritime affairs. Thecommission understands the need for a mutualcommon maritime policy (not only on security, butalso on all maritime-related areas including envi-ronmental affairs and resources). The EU MaritimePolicy Task Force has been tasked with assisting aspecial group of EU Commissioners and drafting agreen paper to be published this spring. This willbe followed by a consultation period before futuresteps are taken.

Despite the lack of consensus within the EU,there is a strong will to do it in “a European way”rather than simply following U.S. initiatives. In partthis is because EU member states and, to someextent, the private stakeholders do not perceivethreats in the same way as the United States does.Europeans are generally not worried about prolifer-ation issues, much less maritime terrorism. For

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most people, piracy is an obscure relic from thepast that concerns only the shipping industry. Inshort, today’s EU is not a suitable partner foraddressing maritime security. This needs to change.

Foreign investment in U.S. maritime infra-structure promotes security and economicgrowth. Foreign investment in U.S. maritime infra-structure creates jobs (insourcing) and makesimports cheaper and exports more competitive. Inaddition, when foreign companies operate in U.S.territory, they must meet U.S. security standards,which raises the bar and encourages better securitynot just in their U.S. operations, but also in theiroverseas operations. Discouraging foreign invest-ment in U.S. maritime infrastructure is a terribleidea. In the opinion of many security experts, theaborted Dubai Ports World acquisition of terminalsat several major U.S. ports not only harmed theU.S. economically, but also reduced U.S. maritimeand homeland security by reducing access toimportant information and the capital and exper-tise needed to enhance American port operations.7

RecommendationsCongress and the Administration should:

• Restructure U.S. assistance programs. Con-gress should begin to address this issue byrequiring the Government AccountabilityOffice to inventory and assess the effectivenessof the various U.S. programs and their interna-tional counterparts. Technical assistance fundsshould be used to help developing countriescomply with international security regimes bypromoting good governance practices thatrelate to trade security. Just as the United Stateshas given technical assistance to help countriesjoin the World Trade Organization, it shouldassist countries in understanding and develop-ing strategies to meet the requirements of glo-bal security regimes. In the end, helping thesecountries to help themselves will help theUnited States as well. Every country that joinsthe global security regime shrinks the sanctuar-

ies and opportunities for terrorists plying theglobal networks of trade and travel. To facilitatecoordination of these programs, the U.S. CoastGuard should be made the lead federal agencyfor maritime assistance initiatives, includingbudgetary authority.

• Establish U.S. regional interagency com-mands. To make the United States a suitablepartner in addressing regional security issues,the Pentagon’s UCP should be replaced by jointinteragency groups (intergroups) that wouldincorporate resources from multiple agenciesunder a single command structure for specificmissions. These groups would not make policybut would carry out operational programs. Theintergroups should be established to link areas ofconcern related to national security missions,such as transnational terrorism; transnationalcrime (e.g., piracy, drug smuggling, and humantrafficking); weapons proliferation; and regionalinstability. It will be particularly important toestablish intergroups for Latin America, Africaand the Middle East, and South and CentralAsia. Each intergroup would have a mission setspecific to its area. In each case, however, itwould have significant responsibilities for tradeand maritime security.

• Engage the North Atlantic Council (NAC)and NATO consultative mechanisms. TheNAC has long served as one of the leadingforums for facilitating transatlantic coopera-tion. While trade issues typically fall under thejurisdiction of the European Union for U.S.allies in Europe, trade security lacks an obviousconstituency there, and the U.S. lacks anauthoritative seat at the table within the EUbureaucracy. NATO, however, is a largelyuntapped resource that U.S. leadership coulduse creatively to engage U.S. allies and partnersin pursuing shared maritime security objec-tives. NAC consultations can cover any securityissue that an ambassador introduces. There-fore, the cabinet-level representation in the

7. For example, see James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Alane Kochems, “Security and the Sale of Port Facilities: Facts and Recom-mendations,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 997, February 22, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/wm997.cfm.

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NAC should be expanded—perhaps on an adhoc basis at first—to include the U.S. Secretaryof Homeland Security and counterparts fromNATO capitals to address critical maritimesecurity issues.8

NATO structures—in cooperation with the EUwhere appropriate—could cultivate jointU.S.–European efforts to strengthen maritimesecurity in the developing world. This aspectof the maritime security challenge should beof unique interest to NATO since ports in thedeveloping world could be needed to supportNATO out-of-area deployments. The NATOSecurity Through Science program couldaddress this area by focusing jointly developedtechnology on the basic needs of these poten-tially critical ports with the added benefit ofbuilding good will among governments inincreasingly important regions such as Africaand the Mediterranean. Moreover, NATO’strust funds program offers a streamlinedoption for select allies (as opposed to requir-ing NATO-wide consensus) to partner onefforts that build maritime security competen-cies among the over 50 countries within theNATO map, including the Middle East andEurope.

• Facilitate NATO–EU cooperation. NATO canhelp to bridge the gap between the UnitedStates and the EU on maritime securityissues. Maritime security is primarily a tradesecurity matter, not a defense matter, soNATO has limited authority in this area.However, security and trade in the 21st cen-tury are inevitably intertwined, and theefforts of NATO and the EU need to dovetail.Maritime security is an area in which a newbargain between the EU and NATO will berequired to achieve any substantive advances.Indeed, building a new understanding on abroad concept of security could transform21st century defense requirements. Establish-

ing a suitable EU–NATO partnership in mar-itime security could trigger a broader securityand defense transformation.

• Continue to encourage foreign investment inU.S. maritime infrastructure while safeguard-ing U.S. security interests. The MaritimeTransportation and Security Act (MTSA) of2002 did not consider the sale of maritimeinfrastructure to or between foreign-ownedfirms operating at U.S. ports. Congress shouldconsider revisions to address that shortfall,including requiring security officers at com-pany facilities in U.S. ports to be U.S. citizensand pass a suitable background investigation.Congress could also require a mandatoryreview of company security plans by the CoastGuard prior to the transfer of ownership, noticeafterward of any proposed changes in the plans,and a commitment to assist law enforcementagencies in investigating activities related to thecompany’s operations.

In addition, the law governing the Committeeon Foreign Investments in United States(CFIUS) has not been reviewed by Congresssince 9/11. Congress should amend the law toensure that homeland security concerns areadequately addressed. This might include pro-viding agencies participating in CFIUS withstatutory authority to negotiate commitmentsto address national security concerns, make thecommitments binding under law, and establishpenalties for noncompliance; requiring theDepartments of Homeland Security, Defense,and Justice to rule jointly on all transactionswith significant national security interests(rather than a consensus of the whole commit-tee); and establishing specific reportingrequirements to Congress.

The Way AheadMuch can be done to make maritime com-

merce safer, and it can be done in a way that does

8. Center for the Study of the Presidency, Maximizing NATO in the War on Terror: Presidential Leadership Can Strengthen the Transatlantic Relationship by Defining and Pursuing Shared Homeland Security Interests, May 2005, at www.thepresidency.org/pubs/NatoReportMay05.pdf (April 19, 2006). The study identifies options for how the U.S. can engage NATO and other multilateral organizations in pursuit of Homeland Security objectives.

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not hamstring the United States as global com-petitor or place undue burdens on maritime com-merce. This report argues that the mostimportant next step is to focus on securing tradeby investing in the three most critical enablers:expanding the capabilities of the U.S. CoastGuard, improving the sharing and usage of com-mercial information, and enhancing internationalcooperation.

The 15 recommendations offered in this reportare a “to do” list for implementing the national

security strategy and prioritizing investments intime and effort.

—James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Senior ResearchFellow for National Security and Homeland Security inthe Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Pol-icy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and ShelbyCullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at TheHeritage Foundation. Martin Edwin Andersen hasserved as a senior adviser for policy planning in theCriminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,communications director for the Port Security Council,and managing editor of Port Security News.

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MARITIME SECURITY WORKING GROUP: LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

James Jay Carafano, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation

Mark Gaspar, Director, Coast Guard Business Operations, Lockheed MartinWashington Operations

Mark Johnson, Director, Transportation Security, C&H Patriot Security, LLC

Mike Kichman, Senior Principal Counter-Terrorism Advisor, Office ofCounter-Terrorism and Special Missions, U.S. Coast Guard

Alane Kochems, Policy Analyst for National Security, The Heritage Foundation

Robbin Laird, President, ICSA, LLC

Major General William C. Moore, U.S. Army (Ret.), Computer Sciences Cor-poration

The Honorable Rob Quartel, former member, U.S. Federal Maritime Commis-sion, and Chairman and CEO of Freightdesk Technologies

Luke Ritter, Principal Consultant, Trident Global Partners

Adam Siegel, Senior Analyst, Northrop Grumman Analysis Center

Irvin Varkonyi, Adjunct Professor, Transportation Policy, Operations, andLogistics, George Mason University

Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow and Associate Director, Center for Future Strate-gies, Hudson Institute

Nancy Williams, Vice President, Cotecna, Inc.