Trade Policy Responses to the Crisis: Implications for the WTO and the

Doha Round

Bernard HoekmanInternational Trade Department

World BankBeirut, November 12, 2009

The context• Economic situation under stress

– Global GDP to decline by -2.9% in 2009– Net private capital flows to developing countries

down US$800 billion 2007 peak– Global trade volumes to fall by some 10% in 2009 – Global unemployment up by some 60 million

• To date, limited recourse to protectionism• Many voices arguing that Doha will generate

trivial market access gains at best

Doha: a quixotic quest?

To the contrary

Doha matters more now • Protectionist pressures should not be ignored or

system taken for granted– Unemployment continues to rise, while exports

recovering – recipe for more, not less pressure– Substantial scope to raise tariffs/support industries

• Developing countries hit hard – Doha is an opportunity to help them exit crisis faster– In part by pursuit of trade facilitation and greater

South-South trade

• Can help reduce OECD fiscal outlays (agriculture)• Signaling effect: multilateral cooperation at work

WTO is mostly about policy bindings• Negotiating coin = policy commitments:

– Tariff bindings; specific commitments in services– Policy disciplines (rules of the game)

• Both reduce the size of potential negative spillover effects of national policies– During crisis responses and after – when fiscal stimulus

needs to be reduced

• Reducing applied trade policies (liberalization) is just one element of WTO negotiations– As it was under the GATT: lock-in and MFN extension of

unilateral reforms, in part driven by steady EC expansion

What’s on the table?1. More secure market access in goods 2. New or stronger disciplines on policies that

create negative spillovers3. Some new market opening in agriculture and

manufacturing4. Somewhat greater security of access in

services5. Initiatives to expand export opportunities of

LDCs and low-income countries• NB: many other issues

1. More secure market access in goods

• Modalities will substantially lower average bound tariffs and to a lesser extent, applied rates– Bound average in ag. down to 30%; NAMA: 5%– But what matters is that tariff peaks come down most

—and these are the most costly/constraining

• Ban on agricultural export subsidies • Large cuts in maximum permitted ag. subsidies—

by 70% in US; 60% in EU—bringing them close to/below applied levels

2. Disciplines on policies that create negative spillovers

• Food policies– Subsidy disciplines not just a market access story– Less insulation of national markets will reduce volatility

of world prices; create thicker markets• Cotton. Global support up more than twofold from $2.7

billion in 2007/08 to an estimated $5.9 billion in 2008/09 • Sustainable development

– Fishery policies cost the world economy $50 billion (60% of the landed value of the global catch); EU and US production support > $1bn per year

• Important for food security & livelihoods of many small developing countries/coastal regions

– Tariff reductions on environmental goods – averaging some 10% in low-income countries

3. Some new market opening for goods

• Average farm tariffs confronting developing (OECD) country exporters will drop to 11.5% (12.1%)

• Tariffs on their exports of manufactures to fall to 2.1% (2.4%)

• This is significant: focus on the levels not the change at the margin

4. Services: somewhat greater security0

20

40

60

80

Serv

ices tra

de r

estr

ictive

ne

ss inde

x

SAR AFR LAC EAP MENA OECD ECA

Offer Improvement (Uruguay Round commitment-Doha Offer)

Offer gap(Doha Offer-Actual policy) Actual Policy

Note: A large ‘offer gap’ remains (factor of 2 on average)

5. Initiatives to expand exports of low-income countries

• 97% duty-free, quota free for LDCs– Not as good as 100%, but still worth $1 billion in the

US market• Trade facilitation

– Improving the logistics performance of low income countries to that of middle income countries would increase their trade by more than 50%

• Aid for trade– Not linked to DDA but closure would strengthen

prospects of delivery on Hong Kong commitments, especially given fiscal pressures in OECD

The value of the WTO is revealed/rises in bad times

• Up to mid 2008: “not enough on the table”– Trade was booming; little prospect of backsliding

• That was then….– So far so good on protectionist responses – a low

level fever• But there are policy areas that are not subject to

disciplines – and concluding the DDA is a precondition for starting to do so

Assessing policy responses to date• Lot of action, but no major rise in protection

– Focus of many measures – in North and South – is on China• A number of countries have also liberalized trade or taken trade

facilitation measures• Much of the rise in antidumping and safeguards is in

“traditional” products– Must wait and see if “new” products come to fore– There are lags – e.g., takes time for drop in prices and

unemployment to feed into dumping/injury• Extensive fiscal/financial support to key sectors – finance,

autos – mostly by OECD • Scope for discrimination and political pressure to keep

resources at home—including through procurement

Developing countries have initiated most new “trade remedy” investigations

Source: Chad Bown Global Antidumping Database (World Bank PREM Note 144, October 2009)

Rules seem to be working: (i) imposed measures flat:

(ii) share of investigations leading to higher barriers down:

Getting to yes

WTO Members confront two broad judgments

1. How best to strike a balance between more liberalization of applied policies and more security of access (more bindings)

2. How far and under what conditions to allow for safeguard type actions and trade remedies in return for tighter and more comprehensive tariff and other policy bindings

Market access—“sectorals”• NAMA

– Modalities generate exceptions for sensitive products– Sectoral deals will mostly involve a (small) subset of WTO

members – GATT/WTO rule of thumb has been +/- 90% of world trade

– Could be pursued along lines of ITA and financial-telecom-maritime services talks after Uruguay Round – as part of a Doha agreement

– Progress also possible through (bilateral) scheduling negotiations

• Services– Strong push by industry in EU/US for liberalization– Focus instead on significant additional binding of policies –

arguably could do much to attract more support for a deal

“Safeguards”• Special safeguard mechanism for agriculture

– Often trade protection will not help when there are shocks (raise prices for the poor)

– Analysis suggests a quantity based SSM can increase world price volatility

– Price-based SSM has less negative consequences for world price volatility

• Experience suggests international rules matter but domestic political economy is as important– Focus on monitoring/review; processes that allow

domestic stakeholders to defend their interests

Conclusion: the bird in hand

• Major benefits of Doha lie in greater policy disciplines—improved security of access

• And strengthening of global rules that reduce prospect/size of (future) negative spillovers– Agricultural support policies; environmental goods

• But there will also be liberalization in areas that matter to many developing countries– For market access: tariff peaks– And market entry: trade facilitation, aid for trade

Building on recent progress and lessons• Aid for trade

– EIF: now up and running– Trade Facilitation Facility: Real trade/transactions costs are

the major factor reducing competitiveness of firms/farms in developing countries

– Recent trade finance initiatives by MDBs– Increased emphasis on regional public goods– Interest by private sector to leverage AFT (e.g., Aid for Trade

Facilitation Partnership)• Improve transparency: better data on policies and flows

– Lesson from the crisis: data is a public good – under-provided– This true even for tariffs – but especially subsidies, other

nontariff measures, services policies, and procurement– Build on recommendations of the multi-agency taskforce on

NTMs – allocate resources needed to collect/disseminate data

Possible high return areas for Arab economies

Doing Business (World Bank)

Trading across borders

0

1020

3040

5060

7080

90

Egypt Morocco Tunisia Jordan Turkey UAE

2006

2007

Doing Business ranking

Licensing for a new warehouse

0

2040

60

80100

120

140160

180

Egypt Morocco Tunisia Jordan Turkey UAE

2006

2007

N =178

Recent survey of Arab trading firms: Intra-PAFTAD trading costs have declined

Traders' Estimate of Trade Costs

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

2001 2008

% o

f Im

po

rt V

alu

e

Source: Hoekman and Zarrouk 2008 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper)

Big reductions in time spent on bureaucracy

Person-Days spent on Red Tape

0

50

100

150

200

250

Egypt Jordan Syria

Nu

mb

er o

f d

ays

2001

2008

Procedures have been simplified: signatures

Range of Signature Requirements (Import)

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008

Air Sea Road

Num

ber o

f Sig

natu

res

Lower

Upper

Variance in clearance times

Upper range of clearance delays

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Air Freight Sea Freight Road Freight

Nu

mb

er

of

da

ys

2001

2008

(2008 Survey) (2001 Suvey)*

(Rank) (Rank)

Road Transport & Transit / Maritime Transport

115 (57%) 1 6

Domestic Taxes on Imports (e.g. VAT, Sales taxes, etc)

114 (59%) 2 2

Procedural Requirements (Customs clearance, Inspection & other administrative procedures)

109 (49%) 3 3

Tariffs on Imports 99 (45%) 4 1

Technical Requirements & Compliance to Standards

88 (42%) 5 5

Public Sector Corruption 84 (44%) 6 4

* Zarrouk (2001).

Respondents (Count)

Percent total respondents

Table A - 10 : Ranking The Most Costly Procedural Requirements for

Import Activities in PAFTA Countries

Implications

• Illustrates importance of: – Trade facilitation broadly defined, including as an

instrument to promote integration of regional markets

– This linked to services agenda: logistics, transport, insurance, among others are all determinants of trade costs

– Greater transparency: mechanisms to collect and monitor data on sources of trade costs for firms

– All three areas require action at the national/regional level, but WTO can help

What matters more?• Focus on real trade costs (including NTMs) and services

– What type generates highest potential gains?

• What are the specific policies/barriers that raise costs/limit flows?– A “mapping” exercise: measure policies to permit analysis

and monitoring of change over time– Discriminatory vs. nondiscriminatory measures

• Compile existing data and benchmark policies/performance – generate indices

• Identify key gaps– Bilateral FDI by sector; Bilateral services flows– NTMs: subsidies, product standards, origin rules

Monitor implementation

• Of existing agreements – not just WTO. Also GAFTA, EU/US, GCC– Focus on administrative requirements and impacts –

e.g., effect of rules of origin– Enforcement and transparency mechanisms –

including dispute settlement• Disputes mean agreements are working/relevant to

citizens (enterprises, workers)

• A report on “The State of Arab Integration”?– With private sector; by private sector/civil society