Toxic Management Erodes Safety at 'World's Safest' Nuclear Plant - The Japan Times

7/30/2019 Toxic Management Erodes Safety at 'World's Safest' Nuclear Plant - The Japan Times

1/13

13/05/06 Toxic management erodes safety at 'world's safest' nuclear plant - The Japan Times

www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/11/wor ld/toxic -management-erodes-sa fe ty-at-wor lds-sa fest-nuc lear -plant/#.UYcxe ivEwXx 1/13

Toxic management erodes safety at worlds safest nuclear

plantEchoes of Fukushima at Exelons flagship Byron Station in Illinois

On Jan. 30, 2012, Byron Nuclear Generating Station lost operability to all of its safety-related

equipment. At the time, Jim Hazen was the nuclear station operator responsible for the

affected reactor, one of two at the Exelon-owned nuclear plant in Byron, Illinois. NSOs drivenuclear reactors like pilots fly jetliners its mostly autopilot, except when something goes

wrong. Hazen surveyed the control rooms instruments and advised taking actions that would

trigger the plants diesel generators, switching the plant to backup power. According to

multiple sources familiar with the incidents details, including at least one who was directly

involved, this was clearly the proper action to take.

But shift manager Ed Bendis rejected that advice. Hazen repeated it. Sources claim he

repeated it several times. Bendis didnt relent, and the reactor went without safety equipment

for eight minutes, an eternity in fission time.
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/newshttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/newshttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/11/world/toxic-management-erodes-safety-at-worlds-safest-nuclear-plant/#article_historyhttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/newshttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/author/int-dreux_richard/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/world/


2/13



For eight minutes, youve raised your middle finger to the meltdown gods, one reactor

operator said, speaking on condition of anonymity. If anything else happened in that

window and its a safe bet one problem causes another youre screwed.

Without any operable safety equipment or a clear idea of what had caused the accident,

operators knew the plant was vulnerable to any number of accident scenarios, ranging from

the trivial to the catastrophic.

In the aftermath of the incident, the technical details didnt bother the plants reactor

operators it had been an oddball event. The human element, however, was troubling.

Following Hazens advice would have disconnected the reactor from its regular offsite power

supply. In a statistics-obsessed nuclear industry where the indicator a data point

triggered by certain adverse conditions is king and the technical classification of an

incident can ruin a managers career, nobody likes to have a loss of offsite power incident

happen on their watch. Least of all Ed Bendis, who had been exposed to some of the worst

coercion dished out by Dave Hoots, who held a number of senior leadership positions at

Byron through 2009 and is now Exelons chief of internal affairs. A wide range of Byron

employees claim that, during his tenure at Byron, Hoots established himself as an ascendant

manager by smashing operator morale especially when recalcitrant operators insisted on

prioritizing standards over scheduling. Why would I ever restore morale? he once

reportedly asked a reactor operator. You work better afraid.

During the Jan. 30 incident, operators in the field eventually called the control room to report

that a crucial transformer appeared to be on fire. This gave Hazen leverage. He acted to

trigger the plants diesel generators and just like hed said it would the safety equipmentcame back online, ending the event eight long minutes after it had begun.

Those eight minutes symbolize over a decade of abuse, said a plant source. And you can

never undo it. And its never forgotten.

Many of the plants personnel believe that abuse contributed to multiple deaths and a rash of

severe illnesses. It also included, according to this investigation, chronic neglect of working

conditions and employee safety, as well as a raft of verifiable retaliation against the operators

labor union for engaging in legally protected activity. Many of these patterns including anarrangement surrounding plant employees medical benefits that appears to meet the criteria

of the U.S. racketeering statute persist.

The mistreatment matters because sources allege it was often meted out in retaliation for

employee safety efforts that, though often critical and urgent, could have cut into Exelons

bottom line. This retaliation produces a chilling effect within the plant that makes other

employees feel uncomfortable about bringing up their own safety concerns. Though Byron

Station has taken internal measures to monitor such chilling effects, sources say these

measures have been unreliable and ineffective since at least 2000, when managementattempted to persuade the employee responsible for tracking the related statistics to falsify

his findings and then fired him when he refused to cooperate. Further, government

regulation of safety culture falls into a gray area: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is


3/13



tasked with investigating allegations related to chilling effects, but these allegations are

notoriously hard to substantiate, and the bulk of NRC rules about safety culture are equivocal

compared to other agency guidelines.

The NRCs oversight of Byron Station has been anchored by Senior Resident Inspector Bruce

Bartlett for over seven years. Bartletts tenure at Byron has coincided with a number of

regulatory lapses, including one incident that appears to have been subjected to extensive

coverup and obfuscation within the agency. Bartlett has also fumbled on a critical design flaw

at the plant, currently under review, that is similar to flaws he failed to identify at Michigans

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Generating Station, where his inspectorship ushered in one of the

longest site-specific safety-related shutdowns in industry history.

NRC resident inspectors are limited to seven-year tours at individual nuclear sites in an

attempt to ensure robust inspector objectivity. Bartletts tenure passed the seven-year mark

on Christmas Day 2012, but he has been allowed to stay at Byron pending a transfer to the

NRCs regional office, which regulates the plants where he previously served as a resident

inspector. Agency sources explained that the seven-year term limit is, in itself, already an ill-

advised compromise stricter term limits have been abandoned in the face of recruiting

difficulties. Multiple agency sources contend that Bartletts case is illustrative of the resulting

risks to inspector objectivity.

Seven years is absurdly long, one NRC source said. By that point, youre no longer an NRC

asset. Youre an Exelon asset wearing an NRC hat. You start referring to problems at an Exelon

plant as our problems, We have a problem that kind of thing. In Bruces mind, hes not

seeing the line between himself and Exelons employees.

Several of Byrons operators contend that Bartlett frequently grandstands but has rarely taken

substantive action. They point, in particular, to incidents when management compromised

the safety of the control room environment while Bartlett looked on.

Weve been saying it for years: NRC stands for Nobody Really Cares, one reactor operator

said.

Yet Byron owned by Exelon, Americas leading nuclear utility has consistently received

the highest safety rating given by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, the industry

oversight group whose evaluations make or break managers careers.

INPO doesnt publish its ratings, but plant personnel contend that Byrons INPO 1 streak is

the longest in the nation. You hear flagship, a lot, one source said. You hear worlds

safest. Those words are a comfort to the 3,753 residents of rural Byron, who depend on the

plant for continued economic vitality. In an otherwise depressed region, Byron is

conspicuously prosperous, and bitter battles with Exelon over tax assessments have

reminded residents of the grim economic reality that might otherwise await them. As in Fukuiand Fukushima prefectures which, like Illinois, host a disproportionate number of their

nations nuclear power stations local taboos tend to keep public discussion of the plants

troubles to a minimum.


4/13



Byrons safety record has made it an ideal petri dish for the cultivation of future corporate

leaders. Many of Byrons longtime reactor operators allege that these leadership candidates

bring with them a willingness to exploit the plant and its workers for their own short-term

benefit, imbuing Byron with a uniquely dysfunctional safety culture that epitomizes the

nuclear industrys broader vulnerability to profit-driven opportunism.

Its probably about 5 acres out there the part where the shit happens, one operator said.

Per square inch, those 5 acres produce more misery than any other five in the world, at least

as far as nuke plants go.

In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, many of Byrons operators have bristled at the

notion that that disaster bore a uniquely Japanese cultural imprint.

A lot has been made of the cultural element of what precipitated the accident at

Fukushima, said one Byron reactor operator. Even in that official [Nuclear Accident

Independent Investigation Commission] report. And that provides an excuse for American

nuke companies: Oh, that was a Japanese problem. But Byron is the poster child for that type

of cultural failure. Ask Barry Quigley.

On July 18, 2012, Quigley, a former operator who now works in Byron Stations engineering

department, attended the NRCs annual assessment meeting where regulators offer their

evaluation of the plants performance to the public at Byron. Foremost, he was there to

demand answers about Byron Stations HELB (High Energy Line Break) vulnerabilities.

Simply put, there are two large holes in the wall of the plants turbine building that shouldntbe there. They increase the likelihood that in an incident where high-energy piping breaks

and releases a torrent of steam, that steam could travel through the openings and cause

damage to a number of safety-significant systems, or even a loss of operability to all safety-

related equipment. Byrons diesel generators are especially vulnerable. Several HELB

incidents have occurred at other nuclear plants. Its Fukushima-level stupid, explained one

reactor operator. Its a design mistake much like the misplacement of the diesel generators

at Fukushima. But it would be astronomically expensive to fix. So: fat chance.

The so-called fat chance, however, has been Quigleys specialty for almost two decades. The

term whistle-blower would suit him better if he wasnt still employed safety crusades

notwithstanding by Exelon. In 2003 he was nearly terminated, but was eventually returned

to work and was even allowed to cherry-pick his new position. Barry first identified Byrons

HELB vulnerability in 1991, but it wasnt until April 2012 that he filed a petition under NRC

rules to have the plant forced into shutdown until the issue could be addressed.

Quigley feels that the subsequent regulatory process has lacked zeal and thoroughness. NRC

documents indicate that a month after Quigley had filed his petition Bill Ruland, whowas then chairman of the Petition Review Board evaluating Quigleys concerns, had failed to

read the internal Exelon document on which the petition hinged, or to realize that Quigley

himself had authored the document none of which stopped Ruland or the board from


5/13



using the very same document as the technical basis for denying Quigleys shutdown request.

NRC records also indicate that Bartlett hoped the installation of a redundant piece of safety

equipment would help address the problem. But Bartlett appeared unaware that installation

of the same equipment at Braidwood, Byrons sister plant, failed when the equipment blew

apart like a cheap childrens toy immediately after it was installed, according to Braidwood

personnel.

The annual assessment meeting was no more productive. In response to Quigleys HELB

concerns, NRC representative Kenneth OBrien patiently explained what defense in depth

means. A bedrock nuclear design principle, defense in depth calls for nuclear plants to

maintain multiple tiers of fail-safe safety systems. Or, as OBrien put it to nuclear engineer

Quigley: Its like wearing suspenders and a belt at the same time its all right if the belt

comes undone; youve still got your suspenders on.

No, its not hard to believe theyd condescend me, Quigley later said. And its not

important. Its harder to believe they wouldnt catch the problem the HELB problem.

Thats what matters.

Quigley is no stranger to the difficulties of forcing the NRCs gears into motion, and he has

achieved relative success in the past. A Quigley petition in 1999 resulted in fatigue rules for

nuclear workers. The amount of time Barry spent, the amount of money he took out of his

own pocket to win that fight its astounding, said one of the plants operators. He did it

because and I think this was always Barrys greatest fear he didnt want to see anyone get

worked to death. Barry must have felt . . . well, I dont know what he felt when Paul Busser

died. Too little, too late, I guess.

At daughter Kaylas concert in early 2008, Karen Busser touched her husband, Paul, on the

back and felt how his favorite coat hung on his bones. The year had been difficult at work,

anyway. Paul was an NSO, and NSOs do shift work. Their schedules are like those of police

officers or firefighters: several days (and/or nights) on, a few days off. Twelve-hour shifts.

Most operators struggle with shift work reactor operators present at relevant meetings say

that internal studies concerning Byrons inability to retain its operators have concluded that

shift work is the single largest contributor.

But Paul was among the more senior NSOs and had wrangled a day job. This lasted until

several other NSOs had alcohol trouble and had to go off-shift. One landed in Pauls day job,

sending Paul back to shift work.

It was a bad time to go back. A number of management decisions had left NSO staffing

chronically depleted, and the operators labor union had little recourse what few actions

they could take were being relegated to a contractual gray area.

Paul held it together until the holidays, when operator vacation time is at its highest and the

shift work schedule descends into chaos. By January, Paul was exhibiting persistent flulike

symptoms. He started to drop weight, eventually losing almost 40 pounds (18 kg). He hung


6/13



cardboard in his windows at home to keep the sunlight out. He migrated from couches to

beds in search of sleep, but very little came.

This went on for three months before Paul hanged himself in the shed behind his boyhood

home.

After Pauls death, Karen filed a workers compensation lawsuit. The suit alleges that Pauls

onerous and unpredictable work schedule led to a sleep disorder, which produced the mentaldisturbance that killed him. Litigation is ongoing.

This investigation uncovered a number of serious mischaracterizations, withholdings and

equivocations in Exelons defense of the Busser case. Through its expert medical witness,

Exelon states that Paul made no attempt to complain to management about his schedule

burden. But this investigation verified that on at least two separate occasions Paul indicated

to his supervisors that he felt unable to continue shift work.

Exelon claims that an analysis of Pauls schedules demonstrates that his shift work was notespecially onerous. But this investigation determined that Pauls schedule was in fact

extremely onerous, and that Exelons analysis was produced in a statistically manipulative

and misleading manner; further, Exelons analysis is based on incomplete and inaccurate

scheduling documents.

Exelon also claims that Paul exhibited no signs of stress in the workplace, and that any such

signs should have been reported to the NRC immediately, per legal requirements. But this

investigation discovered that, on a night shift shortly before he took his own life, Paul was

seen pacing the hallways near his old office, muttering to himself incomprehensibly. Aradiation technician spotted Paul but didnt report the incident. Approached during the

course of this investigation, the radiation technician who had previously described the

incident to colleagues claimed not to remember whether he had seen Paul acting strangely

that night. Colleagues explained that this technicians failure to report such an incident

would render him vulnerable to firing and to regulatory consequences.In fact, this

investigation discovered that aberrant behavior by licensed personnel at Byron Station goes

chronically underreported. In one instance, the plant was even forced to reinstate its most

erratic operator after terminating him because management had failed to adequatelydocument numerous examples of his aberrant behaviors, including several instances of

physical violence while on duty. Further, management rebuffed NSO attempts to procure

substantive behavioral observation training for the majority of operators.

In their defense of the Busser case, Exelon also points to their Employee Assistance Program

and maintains that reactor operators are empowered to seek psychological or psychiatric

assistance. But an upper manager at Byron Scott Fruin once confided to a loved one

what operators had long alleged: Marriage counseling is the only form of assistance

considered acceptable, and attempts to seek psychotherapy or medication are oftenconsidered convenient excuses to line troublesome employees up for termination. Said


7/13



another informed source: When I saw what it cost them to fire someone that way [a few

hundred dollars at that time] with a psych eval, I thought Oh my God, thats the cheapest way

to fire someone Ive ever seen. Its brilliant, really. But also terrible.

Operators also claim that the stressful nature (and scheduling) of their work renders them

uniquely prone to developing mental illnesses, a contention supported by available medical

literature. A significant number of operators have entertained suicidal thoughts, often due to

workplace stress, and often during their shifts, while they were operating Byrons nuclear

reactors. Many of these operators have avoided seeking help, fearing it could get them fired.

The manner in which Exelons legal team gathered information from Paul Bussers coworkers

is also troubling: Plant employees were not informed that they were being asked to

participate in litigation or that by providing information they were committing to testify

against Pauls widow in court. At least two of the three who provided information feel their

statements have been misconstrued by Exelon. Upon seeing the manner in which the

provided information had been used in expert testimony, one of Exelons witnesses

disavowed the relevant statements. Approached during the course of this investigation,

another witness insisted that he possessed no information whatsoever that could possibly be

relevant to the Busser case.

But Bussers death is only one among a handful that raise serious questions about Byrons

management culture. Operator Mike Childers was supervising a trainee when she made a

minor mistake in the control room. No harm done, but paperwork associated with the

mistake went missing. Management blamed Childers. He was allegedly exposed to extensive

retaliation (punitive scheduling, verbal abuse, physical intimidation). Childers grew sodesperate that he resorted to crawling through a plant Dumpster to search for the documents.

One fellow operator recalled Childers bursting into tears when asked if he needed help easing

the retaliatory scheduling burden hed been exposed to.

As it turned out, the trainee had accidentally taken the paperwork home. Shortly thereafter,

Childers experienced a headache while at work and died of a sudden aneurysm. Childers

colleagues feel strongly that his mistreatment may have played a role in his death.

Sometime around December 2008, Scott Fruin was Byrons shift operations supervisor, the

operations departments second highest position, when a reactor operator with a history of

nodding off on the job fell asleep in the plants Work Control Center. A handful of equipment

operators called on Fruin to force the issue, and it was escalated to Exelons corporate offices.

Corporate sent representatives to conduct interviews at the plant. Exelon confirmed its legal

department investigated an incident matching this description, but claimed the investigation

was inconclusive and declined to provide details.

Sources claim Fruin was subsequently singled out for scapegoating. Fruins boss, OperationsDirector Cheryl Gayheart, whose department was besieged by a litany of deteriorating

performance indicators, appeared to escape any consequences related to the incident. A wide

range of individuals who had worked with Gayheart identified her management style


8/13



which they allege was ineffective and retaliatory as the cause of her departments

deteriorating performance and allege that she had frequently targeted Fruin in order to

protect herself.

Sometime after the incident, Fruin accepted a demotion. Later in 2009, rumors began to

circulate that Fruin had spoken with NRC officials about the sleeping operator. In the early

hours of Sept. 10, he shot himself. He left a suicide note written on a notepad obtained in

Lisle, Illinois, where the Midwestern NRC regional office is located, and where hed been that

day. At Fruins funeral, Byrons plant manager, Brad Adams along with Byrons human

resources manager aggressively questioned Fruins loved ones about whether he had

made any mention of work-related matters in the days and weeks leading up to his death.

A high-ranking NRC source claims that the incident that led to Fruins demotion was never

referred for investigation within the agency. This source also insists that any possibility of a

licensed reactor operator falling asleep at work should occasion such a referral. Furthermore,

this investigation could locate no record that any NRC personnel reviewed the incident,

despite the fact that NRC staff, including Bruce Bartlett, were aware of it. Additional records

searches performed by Paul Gunter of Beyond Nuclear and Michael Keegan of Dont Waste

Michigan also failed to locate relevant records. Contacted by The Japan Times, the NRC

would neither confirm nor deny any information related to Fruin or to the incident for which

he was allegedly scapegoated.

Additionally, this investigation uncovered evidence that chronic staffing issues at the Work

Control Center where ongoing work throughout the plant is assigned and monitored

had contributed to major operating mistakes and safety problems for at least a decade, andthat operators repeated attempts to bring the issue to managements attention during that

time frame had been ignored or met with hostility.

When Fruin first learned about the operator falling asleep on the job, he pushed for the

operators termination. Today, that operator continues to work at Byron Station, running its

nuclear reactors.

In March 2008, Larry Lawson was the NSO tasked with running a test of an auxiliary feedwaterpump. It had been a victim of Byrons chronic maintenance problems for several months. It

had a tendency to emit smoke even catch fire. Worse, it was located in a room with a

carbon dioxide fire suppression system and to test it someone would have to be sent into the

room to observe it during testing. A lack of caution could get that person asphyxiated.

Despite having proclaimed his intent to err on the side of safety, Lawson found himself faced

as the pump began spewing smoke with a supervisor who refused to shut it down. The

pump then burst into flames. Lawsons supervisor still wouldnt take it offline. Fed up, the

other NSO on the unit turned the pump off. Dave Hoots, who had been monitoring the test viaradio, sprinted into the control room and began pressuring Ed Bendis to find a way to

pronounce the burning pump operable, lest its failure produce unflattering indicators.


9/13



Afterward, Bendis hauled Lawson into a meeting wherein Stephen Kuczysnki then

Exelons senior vice president for Midwest operations, now the CEO of Southern Nuclear

Operating Co. telephoned to berate a handful of employees: Did they realize how it made

Kuczynski look when that pump was only operational X percent of the time? Did Lawson

understand what that did to Kuczynskis indicators?

Lawson marveled at Kuczynskis indifference to how close theyd come to ending a mans life.

And Kuczynski, who held a number of upper management positions at Byron before

ascending into Exelons corporate leadership, also happened to be the manager who

operators felt had done more than anyone both individually and on a policy level to

create the plantwide repair morass Lawson had to contend with on a daily basis.

I almost quit on that one, Lawson said of the feedwater pump incident. Steve (Kuczynski)

pulled that kind of stuff. He wasnt the only one.

This investigation discovered that a handful of senior managers at Byron consistently

compromised safety to expedite work. Fearing a possible indicator, Hoots once tried to send

an operator into the plants high-voltage switchyard during a severe lightning storm to make

a minor repair. Kuczynski pressured employees into transporting irradiated equipment

unsafely. At least one critical safety system was modified without legally required NRC

consent. Key monitoring responsibilities including airborne hydrogen levels and the use of

primary water were neglected.

In all of these cases, plant personnel made attempts to warn management about the safety

issues these lapses created, and were largely ignored. If and when the lapses created

incidents, the same managers often deflected blame by denying their actual involvement in

related decision-making and by targeting lower-level employees for scapegoating.

In more than one case, this scapegoating led to dismissal. At Byron, if youre protected,

youre Teflon, one reactor operator said. If youre not protected, youre a sacrificial lamb.

Managements cavalier attitude toward safety resulted in a 2007 incident in which an

essential service-water pipe blew open while it was being cleaned, prompting the shutdown

of Byrons two reactors for 12 days. Later, in 2011, a review of this shutdown caused

prominent nuclear critic David Lochbaum to proclaim, The only difference between Byron

and Fukushima is luck. More than anyone else, blame for the incident lay with the plants

former engineering director, Brad Adams, who had coerced the engineer in charge of

essential service-water into changing the systems indicators from red to green, according

to one Byron engineer with firsthand knowledge of the indicators so that Adams could

avoid allocating further resources to the system. Byron personnel were flabbergasted when

Adams who had been sent to another Exelon plant in the meantime was brought back to

Byron and promoted to plant manager shortly after the incident.

The NRC bungled its oversight of the service-water issue so badly that the Inspector General

official responsible for reviewing it went public in 2011 and Byron wound up in The New York

Times. Bruce Bartlett escaped publicity by the narrowest margin: the whistle-blower, whose


10/13



report heaped blame on Bartlett, didnt give names for fear it would allow the NRC to reduce a

systemic failure to an issue of personal misconduct. Neither did Adams have to face the

music; Hoots came up with an alternate and barely plausible, operators say explanation

blaming first-line supervisors for not pressing upper management hard enough on

maintenance issues. When this explanation was floated at a Nuclear Safety Review Board

meeting following the incident, with much of Exelons top brass in attendance, Barry Quigley

vigorously attacked its credibility, thereby embroiling himself in an extended public debatewith one of Exelons top executives. Plant personnel were shocked when Hoots explanation

was adopted by INPO in their 2008 report, which again awarded Byron the industrys highest

safety rating.

The lack of regard for safety also affected working conditions for reactor operators. Several

patterns of illness arose. At one time, three NSOs all of whom had worked on the same shift

were diagnosed with sarcoidosis, an inflammatory disease whose causes are still not

clearly understood. The third operator to be afflicted was nearly crippled.

This investigation revealed several potential workplace health hazards: Equipment meant to

control the humidity of the control room was often broken or operating at partial capacity;

testing of the ventilation system using a highly toxic plasticizer resulted in a number of health

complaints from operators; a source with firsthand knowledge of related documents

indicated that the control room at Byron was for quite some time accidentally treated

with a toxic cocktail of incompatible cleaning chemicals (Exelon denied this allegation); and,

even now, Byrons ventilation system regularly ejects clouds of fine, black specks into the

control room. Many employees believe the specks are black mold. Operators have protested

but say theyve never received any indication that Exelon has looked into the matter. Exelondenied the existence of these black specks.

The plants health workers and human resources officers have also engaged in the

manipulation of employee health benefits.

This investigation uncovered indications that Exelon has worked with Dr. John Koehler, who

owns of a number of urgent care clinics in the Midwest and has been employed by Exelon in

an occupational health services capacity, to minimize the number of diagnoses and

prescriptions issued to Byron workers that would trigger reporting to the Occupational Safetyand Health Administration (Exelon denied any inappropriate relationship with health care

professionals). Exelon often tells its workers that their visits to Koehlers clinics are for

evaluation, not treatment, but several workers have nonetheless complained about

inadequate and suspicious evaluations. Employee attempts to relay these concerns to the

plant management and its human resources department have been met with indifference.

Byron managers have also attempted to deprive their employees of workers compensation,

and as recently as January to use worker disability as a basis for termination.

The individual stories beggar belief: One employee on the brink of organ failure was ordered

to stop taking medicine and report to work. Hoots forced another employee who had

already been coerced out of applying for disability into physically strenuous fire-brigade

training. Hoots did so despite knowing that the training would aggravate the employees


11/13



disability. And it did. That employee was fired just short of his 50th birthday, denying him

access to his pension and the more generous severance package he would have received if

Exelon had let him work a little longer. He was fired for missing too much work work he

missed as a result of the disability Byron management had discouraged him from

documenting.

This same employee later suffered a massive stroke. His doctors determined there was a

distinct possibility he had suffered small strokes over the preceding years, and they wanted to

know: Why hadnt he take time off from work to have his symptoms investigated?

Sources claim that Hoots ability to launch himself into Exelon managements upper

echelons depended on his busting the union at Byron. Hoots focused on union steward Dan

Cork, the operators strongest advocate. As early as 2000, Hoots was telling his subordinates

that Corks removal was top priority. He began referring to Cork as the head of the snake.

The ensuing campaign against the union found special expression in actions taken

specifically (and solely) against Cork: Management employees were assigned to track Cork as

he traveled the plant on union business, Corks email and computer usage were monitored,

and Hoots went well out of his way to make Cork repeat Initial License Training in the hopes

that Cork would flunk.

Retaliation against the union was most tangible in the deterioration of the union grievance

process, which is the primary mechanism by which members can seek redress for contract

violations and other mistreatment. Sources say Byrons grievance backlog was among the

worst in Exelons 10-plant fleet. Grievances originating from Byron were unusually likely to

require lengthy mediation or litigation. This investigation also discovered that management

employed a number of foot-dragging techniques in order to delay and neutralize union

grievances. Paul Busser considered filing a grievance about his schedule, but decided against

it the process was broken and would expose him to retaliation.

And retaliation had been known to take bizarre forms: Stephen Stimac, an upper manager

linked to several alleged instances of retaliation against safety-conscious work activity, had

spearheaded a management effort to eliminate a favorite menu choice from the unionoperators compensated meal options. As the effort sputtered, Stimac could often be seen

berating union members. I dont owe you a f-ing steak, hed yell. One operator recalls

Stimac nearly getting physical.

Thats how much operator morale was worth to management: less than a steak. In Exelon

terms, less than a fraction of a penny, a management source said.

Another upper manager had gone ballistic when a janitor discovered a bottle full of urine and

reported it to management. He stormed into various rooms at the plant including thecontrol room and demanded that union operators raise their right hands and swear before

God to help find the culprit. Never mind that the operators had been complaining that

management wasnt providing adequate bathroom breaks hence the bottle method for


12/13



years. In any other workplace, that kind of thing might be funny, said one operator. But in

a control room its reckless. Management was making threats, causing resentment, creating

distraction.

Many of Byrons operators also contend that their union has been ineffective at Byron since

Cork retired. They say the union has often been unable to provide its members with adequate

protection from abuse and retaliation, or to effectively enable them to advocate for safety-

conscious conduct at the plant.

Several of Byrons most senior union operators specifically questioned current union head

Dean Apples leadership, which has included a broken promise Apple made to Karen Busser

to supply her with documents that would shed light on her husbands death. Said one union

source, Karen and her situation is nobody to the union.

Asked if Byrons safety culture and work conditions demonstrate any long-term tendency

toward improvement, one operator said, It can seem like things are getting better. But then

you realize youve just gotten used to it being so bad. Basically, were circling the drain, and as

long as we dont go in, no one cares how close we get.

A number of sources pointed to a particular phrase often used by a former reactor operator to

describe the options available to Byron employees: adapt, migrate or die.

In October 2012, Larry Lawson filed an Incident Report at the plant. In it, he catalogued the

chronic staffing issues facing Byron and described the toll that short-staffing has taken on

NSOs. Since I cannot force you to provide better health coverage, or increase the number ofNSOs, Lawson wrote, . . . I will do the one thing that I do have control over. I quit.

In January, Barry Quigley discovered that per NRC request Exelon had run a new batch

of tests on Byrons HELB vulnerability using the more accurate mathematical modeling

system he had championed in his petition. The results were damning and Exelon had hidden

them from regulators. Quigley has reported the coverup to the NRC. The NRC has yet to take

substantive action.

Decades of mostly thankless safety work have left Quigley weary. It is debilitating. It isexhausting, he admitted. He isnt certain if HELB is his final campaign as Byrons resident

safety sentinel. Headway at Exelon with its culture of hiding problems seems to be in

short supply. But he nonetheless does enjoy other aspects of his job at Byron, and is certain

hell keep doing nuclear safety work somewhere. I dont think Ill ever retire, he said, noting

that he has considered applying for a job at the NRC.

In February, Byron Station was notified that it had been rated INPO 2, bringing an end to its

long streak of high safety ratings. A month beforehand, sources familiar with the ratings

process provided this investigation with the forthcoming rating, the date it would be issued,

and the rationale that would be used. Sources also speculated that Byron Site Vice President


13/13


Tim Tulon, recognized by plant employees as a comparatively effective and humane

executive, would be transferred, despite the fact that the safety issues underlying the rating

had been created by previous management regimes.

Tulon was transferred shortly after Byron received its INPO 2 rating.

INPO 1 means the wrong people get promoted. INPO 2 means the wrong heads roll. Thats it.

Politics. Theater, one reactor operator said. None of the people responsible for the brokensafety culture at Byron will face any blame for it. Theyve moved on, moved up. They took the

money and ran.

Since engaging in activities harmful to morale, working conditions and safety culture at Byron

Station, Dave Hoots, Cheryl Gayheart, Stephen Kuczynski, Stephen Stimac and Brad Adams

have all received promotions, either within Exelon or at another utility, Alabama-based

Southern Nuclear.

Akira Yoshikawa contributed reporting to this article. Because a number of sources were

threatened during the course of this investigation, most have been allowed to remain

anonymous. Steps have been taken to protect their identities. Send comments on these

issues to [email protected](mailto:[email protected])

o

z o

z Q w i 5 {

best-teacher-inc.com
http://www.google.com/url?ct=abg&q=https://www.google.com/adsense/support/bin/request.py%3Fcontact%3Dabg_afc%26url%3Dhttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/11/world/toxic-management-erodes-safety-at-worlds-safest-nuclear-plant/%26gl%3DJP%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dca-pub-4223870936880387%26ai0%3DCVbQ8ejGHUYC_JIrZlAXH1oDYBpPf6KwDu9y3m3DMkMDuEhABINvptQNQ_en5_QRgiaPEhPQToAG9m87WA8gBAakC2VZGSnyrRT6oAwHIA9MEqgTMAU_Q2RAJJ2C5jrsMLu2sezo8Lig_3O1JP-ZwCUcJkC768KhGeXpeBmCWnwErshP3Sm9IwE3qJ3zZMmqWTRRSkKq72qfh9ypvS0tbPOVNuXRo-5a5plOWoI6M7lIQ1OVBrCNO9YvAtXN8K9xVPBHolvtwSbN97mcZ-aLXR2KCUVCZEoPDoYRiE1_5Lb4X9JHAN6r0iS3knaC3uLBlROjn-fBsc9ZeVtuUAoA4U2XJgpPfssA9Q0qnQGdTtM3uSEl-b5-dmAb7PFhuQZ0_YYgGAYAHq-SxKQ&usg=AFQjCNEBXWBAzNglyhTSngUeTI-mG1fOCwhttp://www.googleadservices.com/pagead/aclk?sa=L&ai=CVbQ8ejGHUYC_JIrZlAXH1oDYBpPf6KwDu9y3m3DMkMDuEhABINvptQNQ_en5_QRgiaPEhPQToAG9m87WA8gBAakC2VZGSnyrRT6oAwHIA9MEqgTMAU_Q2RAJJ2C5jrsMLu2sezo8Lig_3O1JP-ZwCUcJkC768KhGeXpeBmCWnwErshP3Sm9IwE3qJ3zZMmqWTRRSkKq72qfh9ypvS0tbPOVNuXRo-5a5plOWoI6M7lIQ1OVBrCNO9YvAtXN8K9xVPBHolvtwSbN97mcZ-aLXR2KCUVCZEoPDoYRiE1_5Lb4X9JHAN6r0iS3knaC3uLBlROjn-fBsc9ZeVtuUAoA4U2XJgpPfssA9Q0qnQGdTtM3uSEl-b5-dmAb7PFhuQZ0_YYgGAYAHq-SxKQ&num=1&cid=5GhUbnbTrFzGLTRHh59-U5_b&sig=AOD64_1Jr6D8sSxW-8M2celUidNcC9PZ3w&client=ca-pub-4223870936880387&adurl=http://www.best-teacher-inc.com/mailto:[email protected]://www.japantimes.co.jp/about-us/commenting-policy/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/about-us/republishing/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/contact-us/reader-mail/

Toxic Management Erodes Safety at 'World's Safest' Nuclear Plant - The Japan Times

Documents

Transcript of Toxic Management Erodes Safety at 'World's Safest' Nuclear Plant - The Japan Times