Toward Theory of Antiliterature

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Liberation of Difference: Toward a Theory of AntiliteratureAuthor(s): Mark D. SeemSource: New Literary History, Vol. 5, No. 1, What Is Literature? (Autumn, 1973), pp. 119-133Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/468411Accessed: 10-03-2015 06:36 UTC

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2/16

Liberation

f

Difference:

Toward a

Theory

of

Antiliterature

Mark

D.

Seem

I. DiscursiveonstraintsndRepresentation

CCW

HAT

IS

'WRITING'

(that

of

writers')

f

not

a

...

form f

subjection,

perhaps

taking rather different

orms,

ut

whose main

stresses

re nonetheless nalogous,"'

asks

Michel Foucault in

L'Ordre

du discours

"The

Order

of

Discourse,"

translated s

"The

Discourse

on

Language").

The

"order of

discourse"

is

our

starting

oint,

hen.

Is

there

"machine

de

guerre,"

a

literary

discoursewhich

might

have the

status

of

a

counterdiscourse,

n anti-

literature?

f such

be

the

case,

what

exactly

s

different

bout

thisnew

type

of discursive

ctivity;

what

are

the

conditions nd

nature of this

difference? shall first

ttempt

o

explain

these theoretical

roblems,

relying

specially

n the

critical/theoretical

ctivity

f Michel Foucault

and

Gilles

Deleuze.3

Next,

I shall

analyze

briefly

few

passages

from

Proust'sRemembrance

f

Things

Past,

as an

example

of such a counter-

discourse.

In "The

Discourse

on

Language,"

Foucault

defines

discursive

on-

straints nd examinesthe whole interplay f limitation, arefaction,

and

appropriation

f discourse.

First,

he

delineates

those

constraints

imposed

from

without:

excluded and forbidden

peech,

the division

I

The

Discourse

on

Language

(L'Ordre

du

Discours),

tr.

Rupert Swyer,

n

Social

Science

Information

(April

1971),

pp.

7-30,

and included

as an

appendix

to

the

English

translation

of

L'archdologie

du Savoir

(The

Archeology

of Knowledge)

(New

York,

1972).

This

paper

was

originally presented

by

Foucault as

his

in-

augural

lecture

at the

College

de

France.

2

"Machine

de

guerre"

means

literally

war

machine,"

and is an

expression

used

by

Deleuze

and

Guattari

in

Capitalisme

et

schizophrenie: L'Anti-Oedipe (Paris,

1972).

3

Particularly

Foucault's

theoretical

works: Madness

and

Civilization,

The

Order

of Things,

The

Archeology

f

Knowledge,

and The Discourse on

Language.

Deleuze's

major

works are

unfortunately

ot

yet

translated, except

for

the

book on

Proust,

and

are:

Nietzsche

et

la

philosophie,

La

logique

du

sens,

Difdrence

et

rdpitition,

Proust

and

Signs,

culminating

in

his most

recent

work with

F6lix

Guattari,

Capitalisme

et

schizophrdnie.


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3/16

120

NEW LITERARY HISTORY

betweenreason and

madness,4

nd the

volontg

e

ve'rit6

will

to

truth).

Here,

as

Foucault

emphasizes,

t is

mainly

matter

f

collective

ower

and

singular

desire: that

power

which marksdiscoursewith taboos

and

prohibitions

sexual

taboos and

political prohibitions,

or ex-

ample),

which

imposes

silence

on

certain

discourses

in

the case

of

"madness"),

and

which forbids lies." Discourse

would,

therefore,

ay

only

what

is

permitted,

r

what Reason

permits

o tell the

Truth

of

the

world.

This last

constraint,

hat

will to truth

which

s

always

the

result

of an

interplay

f

power

and

authority,

overns

he

other two.

Speaking

of literature

oucault

says:

"All those

who,

at

one

moment

or another

n our

history,

ave

attempted

o mould this

will

to truth

and to turn it

against

truth,

t that

very

point

where truthunder-

takes

to

justify

he

taboo

and to define

madness;

all

those,

from

Nietzsche

to Artaud

and

Bataille,

must now stand as

(probably

haughty)

signposts

or all

our future

work."5

Foucault

then focuses

on the internal

procedures,

where

discourse

itself

xercises

ts own

control. Here it is

no

longer

question

of desire

and

power,

but

rather

of

events

and chance

as

they

establish

the

boundaries

of

discourse.

First,

here

s

critical

ommentary-that

ac-

tivity estined orestatewhat was already aidor writtenntheprimary

text,

which serves

s a

basis for

the

meta-identity

f

the

commentary.

Critical

commentarymerely

engages

in a

repetitive

ct of

mimesis,

forging deceptive

copy

of the

primary

ext.

Furthermore,

hefunc-

tion

of

the author

also

limits the

contingency

f

discourse

and

its

status

s

event.

It

is,

in

fact,

lways

the

position

f the

author

vis-a-vis

his textwhich

places

his

discourse.

oucault

suggests,

or

example,

hat

the

anonymity

f

scientific

iscourse,

where one

is

concerned

only

with

a

"truth"

ccessible

o

everyone,

s

opposed

to

both the

singularity

(and responsibility) f the author n the literature f the eighteenth

century

nd to

the

disappearing

uthor of the

contemporary

iterary

stage

such

as

Beckett

and

other

anonymous,

or

quasi-anonymous,

figures.

Where

it

was

once

asked

(and

certain

iterary

riticism e-

mands)

that

the author

guarantee

the

unity

of

his

work and

subtly

demonstrate

he

hidden

meaning

runningthrough

t,

it would

now

appear

that these

demands are no

longer

valid

in

relation

o this

anti-

literary

iscourse.

Chance

and discursive vent are

thereby

imited

by

an

identity

n the form of the

individuality

nd the I of the

author

(even though

this

may

hide behind the fradulent oice of a third

4

See Madness and Civilization:

A

History of Insanity

in

the

Age

of

Reason

(New

York,

1965)

for an

in

depth

discussion

of

this division.

5

The Discourse

on

Language.

Reference

to

subsequent

quotes

from this book

will be

given

as

page

numbers in

parentheses

in the

text.




4/16


5/16

I22

NEW LITERARY

HISTORY

if

not

a

similar

ystem

f

qualification

f

the

writer/author

s

precisely

the one who

"represents"

he

truth;

f not a

representation

estined

o

a closed circle of readers;if not,finally, he

privileged roperty

f a

group

of

people

who have

it

in

their

power

to

say

what

will

fall

into

this

category

f

"literary"

iscourse-that

is

to

say,

this

ominous

circle

of

university

iterary

riticismwhich

fixes,

by

itself,

he role of

the

author

and

the

status

of

this

discourse?

According

o

Foucault,

there

are a certainnumber

of

philosophical

themes

which

respond

o these

imitations

nd constraints

nd,

at

the

same

time,

reinforce hem.

First,

philosophy proposes

an

"ideal

truth" nd an "immanentrationality"s, respectively,he law of dis-

course and the

principle

of

its

ordering.

Next,

philosophy

einforces

the

power

and breadth

of

these limitations

y negating

the

specific

reality

of

discourse.

It

performs

his

in three

ways:

first,

he

con-

cept

of the

"founding

ubject":

Writing/speaking

ubjects

are

seen

as

carriers

f

meaning,

rather han as those who

practice

discourse-

a

prodigious

gnorance

of the

reality

f

discourse Second

there

s

the

notion

of

the

"originating

xperience,"

which

presupposes primary

complicity

ith

the world-a worldthatwould

open

itself o a

reading

in orderto disengage he mmanentmeaning. Such a viewreveals he

world

as made

of

meanings

and

ideas,

and

analysis

need

only

focus

its

glance

on

this

"meaning-full"

urface

to

decipher

the world-Book.

Last of

all,

there

s the

forbidding

heme

of

mediation,

f the

universal

mediation

of discourse. Here

it

is

simply

matter

of

retrieving

he

movement

of a

logos

so as

to

permit

consciousness to

".

.

.

deploy

all

the

rationality

n

the

world"

(p.

228).

This

is

a

subtle denial of

the

reality

f

discourse

ince,

nstead

of

putting

iscourse

tself n the

center

of

analytical ctivity,

ne

finds here

ogos,

as

a discourse

lready,

nd

forever, ronounced: "Discourse is no longermore than the shim-

mering

f

a truth bout to be

born n

its own

eyes

.

."

(p.

228).

As

Foucault

himself tresses

igorously,

n each case

philosophy

oes

nothing

but

suppress

he

reality

f discourse

by

means

of a

game-

specifically,

game

of

signs:

"Discourse thus nullifies

tself,

n

reality,

in

placing

tself

t the

disposal

of the

signifier"

p.

228).

He

adds that

at the

present

ime there

s not

only

a

simple

veneration f discourse

which

pretends

o

liberate

t but

also a

logophilia.

But,

as

he

hastens

o

add,

underneath

his

apparent

ogophilia

a

sort

of

fear

hides

furtively,

a

very

real

logophobia Specifically,

t is a fear of ". ..

everything

that could

possibly

be

violent,

discontinuous,

uerelous,

disordered

even and

perilous

n

it,

of the

ncessant,

isorderly

uzzing

of

discourse"

(p.

229).

In

order

to

analyze,

and

perhaps

mitigate,

his

fear n

all

its condi-




6/16

LIBERATION OF

DIFFERENCE

123

tions,

one

must

make,

according

to

Foucault,

three

methodological

decisions:

".

. .

to

question

our will

to

truth;

o

restore o discourse

ts

character s an event; to abolish the sovereigntyf the signifier" p.

229).

This

form

f

analysis

proposed

by

Foucault

is,

clearly,

pposed

point

by

point

to the

traditional

onstraints

perating

n discourse nd

to a structural

pproach:

"...

the

analysis

of

discourse hus

under-

stood,

does not reveal the

universality

f a

meaning,

but

brings

to

light

he

action of

mposedrarity,

ith

fundamental

ower

of affirma-

tion.

Rarity

nd

affirmation;

arity,

n

the ast

resort,

f affirmation-

certainly

ot

any

continuous

utpouring

f

meaning,

nd

certainly

ot

any monarchyof

the

signifier" p. 234, my italics).

It

is therefore

necessary

o detach oneselffrom

every

notionof a

primary

dentity;

liberate oneself

from

any

idea

of an

original logos

as

founder

of

meaning

and from

the constraints f

representation

y

divorcing

oneself,

finally

and most

importantly,

rom the

Hegelian system

and

its

concept

of

totality.

In

short,

one must

change

the

point

of

attack,

the

position

of

analysis,

nd become

situated

at the level

of

the

game,

or better

yet,

n

the entire

theater

of

difference.

One

should

no

longer

peak

of a

repetition

f

identities

nd

resemblances;

one should iberatediscourse, iveback to itthereality f tspractice-

as

a

real

event.

This can

be

accomplished

by becoming

aware

of

differences,

y

seeing

n

discursive

ctivity

ot

ust

a

game

of

representa-

tion,

but

rather

repetition

f

difference.

We

must

study

that

which

makes

any

discourse

ifferent

rom ll

others,

nd

it

is

essential hat we

show what

constitutes

he

difference

f

different

iscursive

practices

in order o

measure heir

power

of affirmation.t

is therefore

ecessary

to

engage

n

an

analytical

practice

which

s

totally

pposed

to

any

and

all

analyses

of

representation,

y taking

part

in a

very

real

struggle

againstsuch analyses. In orderto study he "conditions fpossibility"

of

discourse,

we must have an anticriticaldiscourse.

The discourse

of

Foucault,

as well as that of

Deleuze,

seemsto me to be

exactly

hat:

a

counterdiscourse

which

liberates

difference.

It

is

essential

o

define

briefly

hat

they

mean

by

difference,

epeti-

tion,

multiplicity,

nd

intensive eries.

Then

we

might

be

able

to

analyze

another

orm f counterdiscourse:

literary

iscourse

pposed

at

every

evel

to

the

dentity

f

an

author,

o the

repetition

f the

same,

and to

representation-an

antiliterature

hich

destroys

t

every

mo-

mentall

concepts

f

totality,

literary

iscoursewhich

extends,

t least

in

the

French

novel,

fromProust

(the

originator

f this

"machine"?)

to Beckett

who

is

indeed the

one who

goes

the

farthest,

he one

who

never

tops

going

as far

as

possible

n that

impossible irection).

Fol-

lowing

Nietzsche's

philosophical

discourse,

his

anti-literary

iscourse




7/16

124

NEW

LITERARY

HISTORY

also sets

itself

against

the

original

and

universal

ogos-to

become

ANTI-LOGOS.6

II.

Liberation of

Difference:

A Tool of

Affirmation

As

Deleuze

states

n

L'Anti-Oedipe,

it was Maurice

Blanchot who

posed

the

problem

t the

level of

the

literary

machine."

7

How does

one conceive

fragments

hich

are

joined

by

a relation

f differentiation

without

any

reference o

an

original

totality? Obviously,

an idea of

multiplicity

s

needed,

an

affirmative

hought

rreducible

o a

unity.

In other words

(and

keeping

n mind what Foucault

perceived

as a

fearof the

reality

f

discourse),

what

exactly

re the

forceswhich

move

under the

repetition

f the

same?

According

to

Deleuze,

"the

art of

the

contemporary

ovel revolves

round

difference nd

repetition."8

But

what

exactly

does Deleuze

mean

by

repetition

nd

difference?

He

states his

position

on

repetition

t the

outset of

Difference

t

repe'tition:

Repetition

s

a

behavior,

ut in terms

f

somethingnique

and

singular,whichhas neither ikeness or

equivalence.

And

perhaps

this

repetition

as external

onduct echoes

in turn

a

more

secret

vibration,

n

inner

repetition

ven more

profound

n its

generatingingularity.

estivals

ave

no other

apparent paradox:

to

repeat

an

event

which is

"irricom-

men

able"

(un-beginnable).

t is

not

a matter

f

adding

a second

and

a

third

ime

to

the

first,

ut rather

f

raising

he

first

imeto the

"nth"

power.9

The

point

of

departure

s therefore

ingularity

tself,

n

opposition

o

thenotionof "primarydentity"n representationaliscourse. Strictly

speaking,

representation

s a

type

of

repetition-a

repetition

f

the

same,

of

identity,

f likeness.

Repetition

can

always

be

represented.

But

"pure"

repetition

s

practiced

against

all

law,

it is

transgression.

It was

the

man

of

duty

and

honor who invented

the

ordeal

of the

repetition

f

the same

(and

of

good),

and

it

is

against

these

concepts

of

good

and

the

same,

and

also

against

generality habit

and

repre-

sentation)

that

repetition

unctions.

In

opposing repetition

o

gen-

6

Gilles

Deleuze,

Proust and

Signs,

tr. Richard Howard

(New

York,

1972);

see

the

chapter

"Anti-Logos."

7 L'Anti-Oedipe, p. 50.

8

Diffdrence

t

rdpetition,

Introduction," my

translation.

9

Diffe'rence

t

rdpitition,

p.

8.

My

translations-further

referenceswill

appear

in the text

as

page

indications.




8/16

LIBERATION OF DIFFERENCE

125

erality,

n

setting

up repetition

gainst

habit and

the

peculiarities

f

memory,

ne

sees that

forgetting

L'OUBLI)

becomes a

positive

orce

-in fact,one forgets ecause one repeats. When we speak of repre-

sentation,

we

are also

speaking

of

mediation:

repetition

perates

n

order to

break

through

his

obstruction:

"it is a matter

of

producing

...

a movement

apable

of

exciting

he

mind

beyond

ll

representation;

of

nventing

ibrations

nd intensities"

p. Io).

Hegel's

dialectics,

ays

Deleuze,

depends

on "bare"

repetition,

repetition

f

surfaces

nd the

same:

hence a

representation

hich

blocks

difference. here

are,

then,

at

least two

types

of

repetition:

bare

repetition,

f

the

same

(where

it

is

a

matter

f

the

identity

f

concepts-a

static and

negativerepeti-

tion),

and "dressed"

repetition

where

it is a

question

of masks and

simulacrums),

a

repetition

f difference

hich

is

affirmative

nd

dy-

namic.

When

Hegel

speaks

of the

resolution

f

contradictions,

f the

nega-

tion of differences

n orderto rise

above

them,

he

is

at the

same

time

referring

o the

religious oncept

of

union:

"Here

is

union,

n

which

the differencesf thesecharacteristicsre

done

away

with

...

."

Who

can

deny

the

fundamentally eligious

(faithful)

nature of

Hegel's

dialectics? For him, resolution f contradictionsdifferences) eems

to

be

achieved

in

a

religious

way,

through worship

(mediation).

Essentially,

hen,

is

it

not

indeed

possible

that

the

whole

notion of

resolving

contradictions

those

annoying

differences )

n order to

reach a

synthesis-above

differences-and to

reach the

totality

f the

ALL

is,

in its most

profound

regions,nothing

ess

than the nihilistic

representation

f the Christian

movement

f the

negation

f differences

(as

in the

Trinity,

nd

especially

he

contradictory

tatus of

the

Son,

Christ,

who

cannot

achieve a

union

with

God

except

by

his own

nega-

tion-through death ), a negation broughtabout by the totalizing

action

of faith?

The ruse of

Christianity,

hich

is also

Hegel's

ruse,

takes the

form

of a mathematical "miracle": make ONE out of

THREE,

rise

bove

DIFFERENCES

to UNITY If

such

be the

case,

is it not

also

possible

that

all

dialectics,

by

their

very

form,

bear the

weight

f this

religious tamp-the

stamp

of FAITH in

a

totality

bove

multiplicity,

ingularities,

nd differences? o

combat

this

nihilistic

faith,

ne needsa

thought

f

ntensity

nd

multiplicity,

thought

which,

instead

of

looking

for

a common denominator nder or

above

differ-

ences,

thinksdifference

differentially."

Referring

o

Deleuze's

own

discourse,

oucault

writes

n

"Theatrum

Philosophicum"

Critique [Nov. 1971])

:

"Let us

pervert ood

sense,

and

make

thought

lay

outside he ordered

category

f

resemblances,"

and

he

adds,

"One mustthink

hought

s

intensive

rregularity-dis-




9/16

I26

NEW LITERARY HISTORY

integration

f

the

subject."'1

It

is

not

a

question

here of the

"true"

thought

r of the "true"

analytical

method: rather t is

a

matter f a

thought, ow

possible

and unavoidable,which s intensive,nd of an

analysis

which liberates

differences.

n

short,

s Deleuze never

stops

repeating

fter

Nietzsche,

we must construct different HEATER

for

this new form

of

thought.

We

need different

asks and

gestures.

We must

develop

a

thought

which

goes beyond

contradictions,

eyond

good

and evil. Foucault

puts

t well:

To

liberate

ifference,

e

need a

thought

ithout

ontradictions,

ithout

dialectics,

without

egation:

a

thought

which

ays

yes

to

divergence;

n

affirmativehoughtwhose instruments disjunction; thought f the

multiple-of

dispersed

nd nomadic

multiplicity

hich

no

constraints

f

the Same

can

limit

r

regroup

.

.

that s

to

say [applicable]

to a multi-

plicity

f

discernible

oints

whichbecome

displaced

as

one

distinguishes

their

onditions,

nd

which nsists

nd

subsists

n

an

interplay

f

repeti-

tions.

("Theatrum

Philosophicum,"

.

899)

To

speak

of

difference

n

termsof contradictions

s

to undertake

a

violent

negation

of one of the

differences

hich

s

"contradictory,"

n

orderto reach a resolution. n so doing,one negatesthe entirenature

of differentiation

y

staying

within

both a

concept

of

totality

nd

the

limitsof

representation.

ou

do not

resolve

differences;

ou

analyze

their onditions nd

affirm

heir

eality.

When

dealing

with this first

epetition

of

the

Same),

where

dif-

ference

s static

and

subjected

to

identities,

e are in

a

theater

whose

movement

s

horizontal

nd

negative.

But in the

case of this

second

repetition,

hat

of

difference,

t is a

question

of a theaterof

intensity

and

dynamics.

Here,

the

strength

f

repetition

ies n

displacement

nd

disguise (displacementof sites and points of view, disguise of the

characters/actors

ith

masks

and

simulacrums),

nd the

power

of

dif-

ference

ests

n

divergence

nd

displacement,

where the center

for

the

repetitive

ct

shifts

onstantly.

Deleuze

states,

t the

end

of

Difference

t

repetition,

hat there

s,

however,

a

third

repetition,

repetition

hat

is

endless and

beyond

cycles-the

straight

ine

of

the

"empty

form of

time":

beyond

the

cycle

of

memory

nd

forgetting,

he death nstinct.

Beyond

bare

repeti-

tion and dressedrepetition, eyondthat which subjugatesdifference

and that

which

recognizes

t,

there s a

repetition

which makes the

difference,

nd

whose

power

s

destruction nd

selection.

The

highest

form

f

art, then,

ays

Deleuze,

would be that one which

plays

all of

Io

"Theatrum

Philosophicum,"

Critique, p.

898, my

translation.




10/16

LIBERATION

OF DIFFERENCE

127

these

repetitions imultaneously:

repetitions

f

habit,

repetitions

f

memory,

nd the

ultimate

repetitions

f death. Foucault

explains

the

event/death rillantly: "In an exemplaryway, death is the eventof

all

events,

meaning

at its

pure

state:

it

takes

place

in

the

anonymous

billowing

of

discourse;

t

is

that

which is

spoken

about,

has

already

happened

and

remains

indefinitely

uture,

reaching

everywhere

he

extremes

f

singularity.

The

meaning/event

s neutral

as

is

death"

("Theatrum

Philosophicum,"

.

891).

This

third

repetition

s

"pure,"

since

what is

repeated

s

repetition

tself.

Deleuze

brings

about

a

complete

reversal of

representation:

the

concepts

f

likeness nd identityxist,but not as primary

oundations.

To the

contrary,

hese

concepts

are

"secondary powers,"

always

re-

volving

round differences.

n

the

theater f

representation,

verything

rotates

round

the

same,

around

primary

dentity,

ecessity-that

of

the unconditioned

and

of death-and

totality.

But

in the theater

of

eternal

recurrencet is

always

a

question

of

the

famed

Nietzschean

throw-of-the-dice:

he

Dionysian

contemplation

f

all

possibilities

f

Chance

in one

throw,

he affirmation

f

the

return

f the

dice,

which

carries

with

t

necessity

the

necessity

f that

particular

ombination),

the affirmationf the identity f that combinationand, finally, he

affirmation

f the

same

(as

the act

of recurrence

tself),

where

the

return s

contained

n the

contemplation,

here

necessity

s

contained

in

chance,

where

dentity

nd the

one

and all

are contained n the

mul-

tiplicity

f all

possibilities.

Where,

astly, otality

xists

long

with

the

other

parts

and

multiple

fragments

f

this

machine

in the form of a

dice tumbler.

This

thought

of eternal

recurrence

s

clearly

opposed

radically

to

representation:

we

no

longer

have

necessity,

ameness,

likeness,

nd

totality

s

primary

owers,

but

rather

hance,

difference,

dissimilarity,nd multiplicity.Beneath representation,ternal recur-

rence

prepares

its

return:

beneath the

same,

difference

rembles;

beneath

totality,

multiplicity

f

fragments

re

ready

to

explode;

be-

neath

the

ntellect nd

Logos,

desire

and Pathos

rumblenow and

for-

ever-AND

NOT

THE

CONTRARY

Starting

with de

Sade,

and

his

violation,

his

rape

of

representation,

omething

ike

violence,

desire,

or

passion

stretches

tself ut under

all

discursive

ractice,

s the

condi-

tion

of

possibility

nd

necessity

f its

event.11

To

liberate discursive

activity,

e

must

go

even

furtherhan

de

Sade,

no

longer ust

represent-

ing "desire,"but also letting ll of the torrentshat Deleuze and Guat-

tari

term

machines-disirantes"

desiring-machines)

low

freely,

llow-

ing

desire

to

play

and

rejoice

in all of its

interplays

f

repetition

y

i The

Order

of

Things

(New

York,

197i).

See

chapters

on

representation,

and

the limits

of

representation the

discussions

of Don

Quixote

and

de

Sade).




11/16

I28

NEW

LITERARY

HISTORY

realizing

hat

this

s,

precisely,

esire's

difference. n

order

to

perform

a

radical

analysis,

n

analysis

f "war"

against

he

concept

of a

primary

Logos,we need an analytical nstrumentowerful noughto incorpo-

rate

within tself ll

actionsof

Pathos

(and

see these

actions

as

"path-

ologies");

we need a

"symptomology"-a

"schizo-analyse."12

The

name

for

such

a

method

s

not

important.

But

if one wants to

really

enjoy

modem

literary

ctivity

n

its status

as

a

counterdiscourse,

n

antiliterature,

n

antilogos

from

Proust

to

Beckett n

France),

then

one

needs

a

radical

mode of

thought

ifferent

rom

hosewhich clutter

current ritical

iscourses

wherethe criticnever

tops alking

f

totality,

meaning,

ignifier,

nd

signified-La

(Sainte)

Ecriture

3

In

speaking

f

Deleuze,

Foucault

says

hatthere s a mode of

thought

which is

genital, ggressive,

ffirmative,

nd

selective. Foucault him-

self,

of

course,

plays

a

fundamental

role in the

development

f this

"new"

thought.

As

Foucault

says,

this

ortof

analytical

hought

f the

struggles

f Pathos

against "logophobia"

must

take

into account

the

symptoms

f these

"pathologies,"

and

is

thus

a

sort

of

diagnosis:

"Diagnosis

understood his

way

does

not

establish

he

affadavit

f

our

identity

y

a

game

of

distinctions.

t

establishes he fact that we are

difference,

hat our reason

is

the

difference

f

discourses,

ur

historythe

difference

f

times,

ur self the

difference

f masks. It establishes

that

difference,

ar

from

being

the

forgotten

nd recovered

origin,

s

the

scattering

hat we

are

and that we

produce" (my

italics).14

On the basis

of

the

analytical

rgument resented

n the

preceding

pages,

we

might

now be able

to

leave the

purely

heoretical

erspective

and

apply

this

approach

to

literary

ext. We

shall

attempt

o

analyze

a

few scenes

of

Proust's

Remembrance

of

Things

Past,

in an effort o

grasp

the

fleeting roduction

f

differences,

ather han list

the static

representationfthesame.

III.

Antiliterature:

Kaleidoscopic

Difference

In orderto

examine

these

elements

f

chance,

multiplicity,

ntensive

series,

difference,

nd

repetition,

have chosen a scene

fromProust

which seems

to me

central o the whole Proustiandiscourse: the scene

of

the

group

of

young

girls

t

Balbec-beach.15

I2 L'Anti-Oedipe, p. 325-"Introduction &la schize-analyse."

13

For a

discussion

of this

concept

of

"6criture,"

see

the

works of

Jacques

Derrida,

especially

Ecriture et

la

difference,

d. de

Seuil

(Paris, 1972).

14

Foucault,

L'Archdologie

du

savoir

(Paris,

I969),

pp.

172-73, my

translation.

I5

All

quotations

from

Proust

will be from the

Scott Moncrieff

translation,

Re-

membrance

of

Things

Past

(New

York,

I934),

I. All further

eferenceswill

indi-

cate

page

within

parentheses

n

the text.




12/16


13/16

130

NEW

LITERARY HISTORY

further,

s far as

possible,

and

plunging

to the

depths

of

intensive

series-where

totality

s

laughed

at and

destroyed.

Following

this

scene,

there

s the

very

curious

scene

of

profanation,

repeating

gain

the action of

spitting

n

the

father.

This

new trans-

gressive

ct

is

the

violencewhich

forcesMarcel to

select,

recognize

dif-

ferences,

nd measurethe

distancesbetween

he

girls.

It

is

precisely

question

of their

ndependent

movement:

"They

could

not set

eyes

on an

obstacle

without

musing

themselves

y

crossing

t"

(p.

597)-

Seeing

an

eighty-year-old

an

waiting,

lone,

for his wife to

return,

one

of

the members

f

the

group

umps

over

him,

knocking

him over

"... to thegreat delight fthe othergirls, specially fa pair ofgreen

eyes

n

a

'dashing'

face,

which

expressed,

or

that

bold

act,

an

admira-

tion

and

a

merriment

n

which seemedto

discern

traceof

timidity,

shamefaced nd

blustering imidity

hich did not

exist

n the

others"

(p.

599).

This

is

exactly

he

same sortof

timidity

nd

joy

(the

timidity

and

joy

of the

child/artist

t

play)

which

can be found

in

Vinteuil

and his

daughter-a timidity

owards

rules and

laws,

and the

joy

of

transgression.

hese

younggirls,

hisexotic

tribe

of

"Sapphists,"

mock

authority y

jumping

over it and

knocking

t down.

This

repeated

act of transgressions centralto the entireProustiandiscourse, dis-

course

directed

against

laws,

a

repetitive ractice

of

differentiation

which s

a

pure

act of

transgression.

he violence

of this

transgression,

as

elsewhere,

orces

he narrator o

perform

n act of mental

trans-

gression,

o

go

beyond

llusory

urfaces,

n order to think n terms

of

difference.

Many

critics ave

been

trapped

n the

myriad

f Proustian

surfaces,

never

risking

ransgression

hemselves

nd,

like

Swann

(the

artiste

manqu6),

also

never

arriving

t the

difference

f

this

discourse,

its

nature

of

antilaw,

antitotality,

nticontinuity,

nd anti-the

ame-

or, as Deleuze says,a veritableAnti-Logos: 8 theyhave failed to see

that

far

from

epresenting

continuity

n the

development

f the

novel

(and

literature n

general),

Proust

must be

seen as

a

break

with

a

whole

tradition,

discontinuity

ontemporary

with a new mode of

thought

nd

rendering

ntiliterature

ossible.

Forced

to establish he

real

differences

f these

girls

fter hisviolent

reversal f

totality

nd

authority,

arcel

selects

singular

point

which

will

place

him in

relationship

o the

group, tarting

new

series: the

singularity f those "two greeneyes." "By thistimetheircharming

features

ad ceased

to

be

indistinct nd

impersonal.

I

had dealt them

like

cards

into so

many

heaps

to

compose

.

..

the

big

one

who

had

jumped

over

the

old

banker"

(p.

598).

After

this first

ifferentia-

18

Ibid.,

"Anti-Logos."




14/16

LIBERATION OF

DIFFERENCE

131

tion,

he

focuses

on

those

green eyes,

and

says

of the

girl

whose

eyes

are

so

green:

"I

knew that

I

should

never

possess

this

young

cyclist f I did not possess also what therewas in her eyes" (p.

6oo).

This

selection,

this

choice,

is

the

pure

chance,

but

the dif-

ference of this new

series

is,

at

the same

time,

a

necessity.

Real

thought,

roust

never

ires

f

telling

s,

s

not

the

calm,

voluntary

move-

mentof

rationality,

ut

rather

lways

a

result f

a

violencewhich

forces

us

to

think-a

thought

which

grasps

the true

movement

f

repetition

and

the

displacement

of differences.The

girl

with

the

green

eyes

is

Albertine,

nd

the

series

Albertine/Marcel, herefore,

rows

out

of

this

violence,

his

ransgression,

his

overthrow

f

totalitarian

uthority.

As Deleuze shows,each series s

vertical,

xtratemporal,

nd intensive.

Such

is

obviously

he

case in

this series

which

explodes

n

the worlds

of Sodom and Gomorrah and

the

mystery

f

transexuality.

From

the

singularity

f

Albertine nd the

secret behind

these

green eyes,

which

remains naccessible

hroughout,

e travel

through

ther

eries,

but

not

n

a transcendental

ay

directed

ltimately

owards

unification,

synthesis,

r

totalization,

ut

rather,

s Deleuze

shows in Proust

and

Signs:

we travel

transversally,

rom one series

to

another,

without

ever

totalizing

hem:

"Jealously

s the transversal

f ove's

multiplicity;

travel,

he transversal

f the

multiplicity

f

places; sleep,

thetransversal

of the

multiplicity

f moments."

9

We travel

(if

we

accept

to follow Proust's

own

transgressive

ove-

ment,

rather

han

mposing

n illusion

of

totality

nto

t)

transversally,

from

he series

of Albertine o all

the other ove-series

joined

together

by

the

bond

of

ealousy),

to the series f the

sonata, and,

finally,

o the

series

f

profanation

t

Montjouvain.

Tired of

Albertine

nd

convinced

of the need to

break

up

with

her,

Marcel is terriblyoredwith her duringa trainrideback to Balbec.

To

pass

the

time,

he

speaks

of

music,

deliberately

cornful f

Albertine's

musical tastes.

She

inadvertently

sks

him

the

name

of the

piece

in

question,

and

he

responds

mockingly,

Vinteuil's

sonata."

Suddenly

everything

hanges.

All the Proustian

elements

re

forced back

into

motion

when she

says

that

not

only

does

she

know the

sonata,

but

she

knows

Mlle.

Vinteuil

somewhat,

and knows

Lea

very

well-the one

responsible

or

rediscovering

inteuil's

music.

Immediately,

he visions

ofthatnight t Montjouvain (whereL6a and Mlle. Vinteuilsexually

transgressed

he

"law

of

the

father")

reappear

in

his

mind,

and the

images

of

the

act

of

profanation

haunt

him

again.

Thus,

Albertine

stumbles,

otallyby

chance,

into this

other eries

(of

profanation

nd

19

Ibid.,

p.

I37-




15/16

132

NEW

LITERARY

ISTORY

transgression)

f which she is

already

and forever

part,

and

Marcel's

jealously

returns ntensified.He

decides

to

make

her

his

prisoner,

n

order to

deny

the unknownAlbertine

the

lesbian)

and the secretof

her

eyes,

o as

to

annihilateher

difference.But

this

s

impossible,

s

Marcel

will

learn,

and

his

failure,

s

well

as Albertine's

victory,

e-

establishes

difference

orever.

This

is

the last

step

in

Marcel's

"ap-

prenticeship,"

eading

him to

art: but

the

artist,

or

Proust,

s

the one

who

realizes,

s Marcel

must,

hatdifference

an never

be

subjugated,

made

"prisoner,"

r

possessed

by

a

totalizing

ct of

Logos,

and

must,

instead,

be revealed

and

affirmed. he

mystery

f

Albertine's

yes

will

never

be

solved, ust

as

the

mystery

f

Proust

(the

real

man, entering

into

the

realm

of death

through

his

writing)

remains

ntact-a

pure

difference.

Understood

n this

manner,

he Proustianworld

s a theater f

multi-

plicity,

ntensive

eries,

differences,

nd

repetitions.

verything

egins

with

ingularity,

hich eads

to

the

ntensive

evelopment

f

the essence

of

differentiation

orking

underneath

he

surface

of

things.

Proust's

thought perates

xactly

ike

a

kaleidoscope-Remembrance

of

Things

Past

is a

kaleidoscope:

a

multiplicity

f

forms

nd

colors

n constant

movement,ncessantly epeatingdifferentombinationswhich,at that

precise

moment

when

one fixes

the

image

to isolate a

single

series,

seems

to

be

whole.

But

this

totality

s

merely

ne

among many

(each

series

forming

ts

own

totality).

It is

only

one of

the

pieces

n

thisvast

machine

which

uggles

essences

nd substances-it

is

nothing

ut

one

element

mong

others,

ever

unified

n

one

last

movement.The failure

of

so

many

critics

o

see this

deeper

side

of Proust

s

perhaps

due

to a

prejudice,

and

a

fear-the

prejudice

of

Hegelian

totality

nd

the fear

of all that s discontinuous.To denytheprofoundly iscontinuous, if-

ferentiating

ature

of

Proustian discoursewould

be to

annihilate ts

difference,

hereby orcing

t into a

continuum,

nd

onto

a

shelf,

where

it does

not fit.

But

like

Nietzsche's,

roust's

hought

s

radically

ffirma-

tive

and

selective,

igorously

irected

gainst

the

concept

of

a

primary

logos,

and

he sees

Time

(history)

n

terms

of

difference,

isjunction,

discontinuity,

nd death:

"the

meaning

of the

word:

defunctus,"

s

Beckett oncludes

n

his Proust.

Proustian

thought

s

affirmative,

nd

his

discourse

s

in

opposition

o all

laws

of

totality

nd

moral restriction:

it s a counterdiscourse,n antiliterature.

By

restoring

o

this

literary

iscourse ts

status

as an

event and a

practice,

one

instantly

onstructs

powerful

machine

de

guerre"

to

oppose

the notion of

continuity,otality,

nd

representation-to

fight

against

ll that deniesthe

reality

f

discourse.




16/16

LIBERATION OF DIFFERENCE

133

In

so

doing,

we

allow the

series

to

flow from

the

voice of the

Unnamable20

that

shapeless

verbal

egg)

and,

by

setting

nto

motion

thiskaleidoscopicmachinewith tsperpetualreturn f a multiplicityf

different

orms,

olors,

nd

intensities,

e abandon

ourselves,

ow and

forever,

o the

chances of

the dice: the risk

f

chance

in

all

its

multiple

possibilities;

he risk

of

the

necessity

f difference

f

all that

returns;

the

risk,

inally,

f Death

and

its

silent,

ndless

repetition.

n

analyzing

literary

iscourse

his

way,

we

restore

eality

o what

I

have termed n

antiliterature: he

reality

f life

and of

death,

the

reality

f

a real

dis-

cursive

practice-historically

ifferent-which

s no

longer

ubjected

to

the

ominous

"monarchy

of the

signifier"

ut,

instead,

freed

as a no-

madic

anarchy

ofa

production

which s, n its ast nstance,difference.

STATE

UNIVERSITY

OF

NEW

YORK,

BUFFALO

20

For

a

fascinating

description

of

what

Beckett

might

be

saying

in L'Innom-

mable,

see

L'Anti-Oedipe

where Deleuze

and Guattari refer o

the notion

of

"corps

sans

organes"

as

the

voice-egg,

nd

production.

Toward Theory of Antiliterature

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