Torts Case Digests 13

7/29/2019 Torts Case Digests 13

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Sept. 22, 2011

IX: DAMAGESA. DEFINITION AND CONCEPTB. KINDS OF DAMAGES

1. ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORYSept. 29, 2011

2. MORAL

a. CONCEPT

b. PROOF AND PROXIMATE CAUSE

c. CASES WHERE ALLOWEDi. UNFOUNDED SUITS

ii. LABOR CASES

iii. TAKING OF LIFE

Oct. 06, 2011d. FACTORS IN DETERMINING

AMOUNT

PNB V CA (FLORES)266 SCRA 136 KAPUNAN; 1997 Jan 6

FACTS- Flores is a prominent businessman, licensed and engaged inthe real estate business, buying and selling houses and lots.Flores filed a complaint against PNB when the appellant bankrefused to honor his Manager's Checks worth P1 Millionbecause of the alleged shortage in appellee's payment to theeffect that he had to go back and forth the bank to encash saidchecks and that he lost a deal of a house for sale in BaguioCity worth P1 Million as he could not produce said amountwithheld by the appellant bank. Appellee Flores further testifiedas to the effect of the incident on his integrity as abusinessman.- Flores won in the suit and the LC awarded him P1M moraldamages andt P100,000.00 exemplary damages, but was laterreduced by the CA to P100,000.00 and P25,000.00respectively.- PNB appealed from the decision, believing that no or lower

amount of damages should be awarded to Flores. As adefense, PNB even attacked Flores character by alluding tohis alleged reputation as a gambler and big time casinoplayer. PNB asserted that Flores used the proceeds of themanagers check on the gaming table and not for purchase of ahouse.ISSUEWON the moral and exemplary damages should be reducedHELDNO- The SC even increased the moral and exemplary damagesawarded by CA by 50% (P200,000.00 and P50,000.00respectively).Ratio There is no hard and fast rule in the determination ofwhat would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each

case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.- Article 2217 of the Civil Code recognizes that moral damageswhich include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, seriousanxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moralshock, social humiliation and similar injury, are incapable ofpecuniary estimation.- As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Codeprovides that such damages may be imposed by way ofexample or correction for the public good. While exemplarydamages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they neednot be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled tomoral, temperate or compensatory damages before the courtmay consider the question of whether or not exemplarydamages should be awarded.

FULE V CA (CRUZ, BELARMINO)286 SCRA 698 ROMERO; March 23, 1998

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorariFACTS- Fule, a corporate secretary of the Rural Bank of Alaminos(the Bank) by profession and jeweler on the side, acquired a10-hectare property in Rizal. The former owner, Jacobe, hadmortgaged it to the Bank for a loan of 10k but it was laterforeclosed and offered for public auction upon his default.- Petitioner asked Dichoso and Mendoza (the Agents) to look

for an interested buyer, and found one in private respondentDr. Cruz. At the time, petitioner had shown interest in buying apair of emerald-cut diamond earrings from Dr. Cruz but nevercame to an agreed price. Subsequently, negotiations for thebarter of the jewelry and the property ensued; upon the requestof Dr. Cruz, it was found by Atty. Belarmino that no barter wasfeasible because the 1-year period of redemption had notexpired. To get over this legal impediment, petitioner executeda deed of redemption on behalf of Jacobe.- Petitioner arrived at Belarminos residence with the agents toexecute a deed of absolute sale while Cruz held on to theearrings. Petitioner issued a certification stating the actualconsideration of the sale was Php200k and not Php80k asindicated in the deed. Since the earrings were appraised atonly Php160k, the remaining 40k was to be paid later in cash.This was done apparently to minimize the capital gains tax thatpetitioner would have to shoulder. Petitioner headed for thebank to meet up with Cruz and pick up the earrings. Whenasked if the jewelry was ok, petitioner nodded to express hissatisfaction. Petitioner paid the agents $300 and some piecesof jewelry, but not half of the pair of earrings in question aspreviously promised.- Later that evening, petitioner arrived at Belarminos residencecomplaining the earrings were fake as confirmed by a tester.Petitioner accused the agents of deceiving him, which theydenied. He nonetheless took back the $300 and jewelry giventhem. After another failed testing, the petitioner reported thematter to the police where the agents also executed theirsworn statements.

- Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC to declare thecontract of sale over the property null and void on the groundof fraud and deceit. The lower court denied the prayer for a writof preliminary injunction over the deed as they found that thegenuine pair of earrings had been delivered by Cruz. The 2hours before petitioners complaint was consideredunreasonable delay, placing petitioner in estoppel. The Courtfurthered that all elements of a valid contract were present,namely a meeting of the minds, determinate subject matter,and price certain. As the earrings had been delivered and thecontract of absolute sale executed, the contract of barter orsale had been consummated.- The Court also finds that the plaintiff acted in bad, awardingCruz P300k as moral damages and P100k as exemplarydamages; Atty. Belarmino P250k as moral damages and

P150k as exemplary damages; and granting both P25k eachas attorneys fees and litigation expenses. A petition with theCA yielded the same result, hence this petition.ISSUEWON the TC erred in awarding damagesHELDNO- In the instant case, the TC awarded damages analogous tomalicious prosecution under Article 2219(8) of the NCC for thefollowing reasons:- The malice with which petitioner filed the case is apparent. Asan experienced jeweler who thoroughly examined the earringshimself and went so far as to sketch them earlier, it is illogicalthat he would fail to exert extra effort to check its genuineness


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at the precise moment of the exchange. His acts thus failed toaccord with what an ordinary prudent man would have done inthe same situation.- As an experienced businessman and banker, he was shrewdenough to bloat the propertys price from 25k to 75k only a fewdays after he had purchased it for a far lower cost, the value ofwhich still fell short of the diamond earrings price.- Also, it took him 2 hours of unexplained delay beforecomplaining the earrings were counterfeita period in whichanything could have happened while petitioner was inpossession of the jewelry.

- Given this, it would appear that the cause of action in theinstant case was contrived by the petitioner himself in hopes ofobtaining a favorable outcome in his complaint to take the realjewelry, return a fake, and get back the property. This is plainand simple, unjust enrichment. All that considered, thedamages prayed for were reasonably proportionate to thesufferings they underwent.- Petitioner filed a malicious and unfounded case all the whiledragging down private respondents, whose reputations hadbeen soiled by petitioners coming to court with unclean hands.Because of the falsity, malice and baseless nature of thecomplaint, defendants were compelled to litigate and are thusalso entitled to the awarding of attorneys fees under Article2208.Disposition decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. Dr. Cruz,however, is ordered to pay petitioner the balance of thepurchase price of Php40k

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC V CA (PANTEJO)275 SCRA 621 REGALADO; July 17, 1997

NATURE: Appeal by certiorariFACTS- On October 23, 1988, private respondent Pantejo, then CityFiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in Manila anddisembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to take hisconnecting flight to Surigao City. However, due to typhoonOsang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled.

- To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, PALinitially gave out cash assistance of P100.00 and, the next day,P200.00, for their expected stay of two days in Cebu. Pantejorequested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL'sexpense because he did not have cash with him at that time,but PAL refused. Thus, respondent Pantejo was forced to seekand accept the generosity of a co-passenger, an Engr. AndoniDumlao, and he shared a room with the latter at Sky ViewHotel with the promise to pay his share of the expenses uponreaching Surigao.- When the flight for Surigao was resumed, Pantejo came toknow that the hotel expenses of his co-passengers werereimbursed by PAL. At this point, Pantejo informed OscarJereza, PAL's Manager for Departure Services at MactanAirport and who was in charge of cancelled flights, that he was

going to sue the airline for discriminating against him. It wasonly then that Jereza offered to pay respondent Pantejo P300which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone, thelatter decline. Thereafter, PAntejo filed an action for damagesagainst PAL.- The RTC of Surigao City, rendered judgment against PAL,ordering the latter to pay Pantejo P300 for actual damages,P150,000 as moral damages, P100,000 as exemplarydamages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and 6% interest fromthe time of the filing of the complaint until said amounts shallhave been fully paid, plus costs of suit.- On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo,but with the exclusion of the award of attorney's fees andlitigation expenses.

ISSUEWON the lower courts erred in awarding damages in favor ofplaintiffHELDNO- It must be emphasized that a contract to transportpassengers is quite different in kind and degree from any othercontractual relation, and this is because of the relation whichan air carrier sustain with the public. Its business is mainly withthe travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comfortsand advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore

generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect ormalfeasance of the carrier's employees naturally could giveground for an action for damages.

- In ruling for Pantejo, both the RTC and the CA found thatPAL acted in bad faith in refusing to provide hotelaccommodations for Pantejo or to reimburse him for hotelexpenses incurred despite and in contrast to the fact that otherpassengers were so favored.Factors considered in computing damages> PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a commoncarrier to its passengers and in discriminating against Pantejo.It was even oblivious to the fact that PAntejo was exposed tohumiliation and embarrassment especially because of hisgovernment position and social prominence, which altogethernecessarily subjected him to ridicule, shame and anguish. Itremains uncontroverted that at the time of the incident, hereinrespondent was then the City Prosecutor of Surigao City, andthat he is a member of the Philippine Jaycee Senate, past Lt.Governor of the Kiwanis Club of Surigao, a past Master of theMount Diwata Lodge of Free Masons of the Philippines,member of the Philippine National Red Cross, SurigaoChapter,and past Chairman of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines,Surigao del Norte Chapter.- It is likewise claimed that the moral and exemplary damagesawarded to respondent Pantejo are excessive andunwarranted on the ground that respondent is not totallyblameless because of his refusal to accept the P100 cashassistance which was inceptively offered to him. It bears

emphasis that respondent Pantejo had every right to makesuch refusal since it evidently could not meet his needs andthat was all that PAL claimed it could offer.- His refusal to accept the P300 proffered as an afterthoughtwhen he threatened suit was justified by his resentment whenhe belatedly found out that his co-passengers were reimbursedfor hotel expenses and he was not. Worse, he would not evenhave known about it were it not for a co-passenger whoverbally told him that she was reimbursed by the airline forhotel and meal expenses. It may even be said that theamounts, the time and the circumstances under which thoseamounts were offered could not salve the moral woundsinflicted by PAL on private respondent but even approximatedinsult added to injury.- The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent

ineludibly makes the former liable for moral damages underArticle 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code.

Such inattention to and lack of care by petitioner airline for theinterest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmostconsideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount tobad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moraldamages.- Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich aplaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awardedonly to allow the former to obtain means, diversion, oramusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering hehas undergone due to the defendant's culpable action andmust, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.However, substantial damages do not translate into excessive


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damages. Except for attorney's fees and costs of suit, it will benoted that the Court of Appeals affirmed point by point thefactual findings of the lower court upon which the award ofdamages had been based. We, therefore, see no reason tomodify the award of damages made by the trial court.- Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we areconvinced that the awards for actual, moral and exemplarydamages granted in the judgment of respondent court, for thereasons meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained in itsdecision, are just and equitable. It is high time that thetravelling public is afforded protection and that the duties of

common carriers, long detailed in our previous laws andjurisprudence and thereafter collated and specificallycatalogued in our Civil Code in 1950, be enforced throughappropriate sanctions.

VALENZUELA V CA253 SCRA 303 KAPUNAN; February 7, 1996(Ulit: Persons Liable, Employers)

CASE FACTSPlaintiffs version:Plaintiff, Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue MitsubishiLancer with Plate Number FFU 542 at around 2:00 in themorning of June 24, 1990 along Aurora Blvd going towardsManila. Noticing something wrong her tires, she stopped at alighted place and asked the people to verify her flat tire and toask help if needed. She parked her car along the sidewalkturning on her emergency lights. Plaintiff was standing at theleft side of the rear of her car when she was suddenly bumpedby a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li.The impact caused her to be thrown against the windshield ofthe car of Mr. Li destroying it in the process, after which she fellon the ground.When plaintiff was pulled out, it was found that her left leg wassevered up to the middle of her thigh with only some skin andmuscle connected to the rest of her body. Amputation wasperformed on her leg. She was also confined in UERM for 20days and eventually fitted by an artificial leg. The plaintiff sued

for moral damages amounting to a million pesos and otherrelated expenses.Defendants version:The defendant, Richard Li, denied the allegations of negligencestating that he did not see the plaintiff due to temporaryblindness. According to his statement, he was traveling alongAurora Blvd. at 55kph when another car coming from theopposite direction traveling at 80kph caused his blindness bythe cars full bright lights. He further stated that the plaintiffscar was not parked properly (no parking lights or early warningdevice) and the cars midnight blue color and the areas poorlightning disabled him from noticing the car. Also addressed inthe complaint is the cars registered owner, AlexanderCommercial. The defendants counterclaimed for damages,asserting that the plaintiff was reckless as she was not a

registered driver.Statements of Witnesses: PFC Felix Ramos (Police Investigator) prepared the

vehicular accident report and sketch of the cars involved inthe accident. Did not exactly state in his report how near theplaintiffs car was to the sidewalk. He also could notremember other details such as whether there was indeed anearly warning device.

Rogelio Rodriguez (witness for the plaintiff) supported thestatement of Ms. Valenzuela stating that the complainant didindeed step out of her car and opened the trunk. He also sawthe car of the defendant hit the plaintiff. He even further addedthat the defendant was under the influence of liquor. Hededuced this by the smell of the defendant.

DECISION OF THE COURTS The lower trial courts ruled, The defendant Richard Li is

guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages underArticle 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise heldAlexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer, jointly andseverally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. Thelower court also ordered the guilty party to pay Ma.Lourdes Valenzuela several indicated sums representingdamages.

The defendant filed for a New Trial and Reconsiderationciting evidence/testimony, which they believe the LowerCourts, might have considered in making their decision.Their motion was denied compelling them to elevate theircase to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals alsosupported the rulings of the lower court. However, itabsolved Alexander Commercial from being liable andabridged the amount of moral damages from P1,000,000to P500,000.

Both parties then filed before the Supreme Court, twoseparate petitions. The plaintiff questioned the decision ofthe Court of Appeals on absolving Alexander Commercial,Inc. from its liability and the reduction of actual and moraldamages. The defendant on the other hand, stated that heshould be released from liability because the accident wascaused by the plaintiffs own negligence. He then added

that if the court should find him guilty of negligence, suchnegligence should be reduced due to the negligence ofValenzuela.

The Supreme Court also reinstated the decision of theRegional Trial Court. Alexander Inc. is again liable andmoral damages were restored to the original P1,000,000.

The high court ruled that the defendant was negligent.They described negligence as conduct of which createsan undue risk of harm to others. Richard Li was negligentas proved by evidence presented in court: he was drivingat a fast speed on a slippery road under the influence ofliquor. As a licensed driver, he should not be driving at afast speed on a slippery road under the influence of liquor.By doing so, he posed undue risk of harm to theunsuspecting public.

The employer, Alexander Inc., was liable under theconcept of pater familias, which notes that liabilityultimately falls upon the employer for his failure to exercisethe diligence of a good father of the family in the selectionand supervision of his employees.

SUMALPONG V CA (PEOPLE)268 SCRA 764 FRANCISCO, February 26, 1997

NATURE: Petition for reviewFACTS- Sumalpong shot the victim Ramos after the former slappedthe latters wife. Before this, Sumalpong called upon thespouses then inquired regarding the identity of those whostoned his house, then accused Ramos of stoning his house.Ramos wife, Leonarda, remarked that he should first confirmthe information he received before accusing anyone, then afterthis Sumalpong shot Leonarda at the back of her head (thoughapparently, Leonarda was not harmed) then Ramos rushedtowards Sumalpong who then shot Ramos twice but missed.They wrestled and in the act, Sumalpong bit on Ramos ear,causing its mutilation.- TC: Sumalpong convicted of attempted homicide. Ramosawarded with P 16,800.00 for the loss of his crops due to hisfailure to attend to his farmwork because of the injuries inflictedupon him by the petitioner, P2,000.00 for hospitalizationexpenses, and P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.


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- CA: affirm conviction, removed award for loss of crops andhospitalization expenses, increased moral damages toP10,000.00, and awarding nominal damages in the sameamount.ISSUEWON the increase in moral damages is warrantedHELDYES- Anent the increase in the amount of moral damages awarded,suffice it to state that the nature of the injuries and the degreeof physical suffering endured by the complainant warrants the

same. The tragic incident caused a mutilation of complainant'sleft ear and a permanent scar on his right forearm. Theseinjuries have left indelible marks on the complainant's body andwill serve as a constant reminder of this traumatic experience.(more discussion on the modification of amount of nominaldamages and moral damages when it was not the issueappealed, rationalization for deletion of actual andcompensatory damages)Disposition the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals ishereby AFFIRMED in toto.

LOPEZ V PAN AM WORLD AIRWAYS16 SCRA 431 BENGZON; March 30, 1966

FACTS- Sen Fernando Lopez, his wife, his son-in-law, and hisdaughter made reservations, through their agency, for firstclass accommodations in the Tokyo San Francisco flight ofPAN-AM. PAN-AM's SF head office confirmed thereservations. First class tickets were subsequently issued, withthe total fare having been fully paid before this.- As scheduled, they left Manila and as soon as they arrived inTokyo, they contacted PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding theiraccommodations. For the given reason that the first class seatswere all booked up, PAN-AM's Tokyo office informed them thatthey could not go in that flight unless they took the tourist class.Due to pressing engagements in the US, they wereconstrained to take PAN-AM's flight as tourist passengers.

- Sen Lopez filed suit for damages alleging breach of contractsin bad faith by defendant out of racial prejudice againstOrientals. He asked for P500T actual and moral damages,P100T exemplary damages, P25T attorney's fees plus costs.- PAN-AM asserted that its failure to provide first classaccommodations to plaintiffs was due to honest error of itsemployees. It interposed a counterclaim for atty's fees of P25T.- CFI Rizal decision: in favor of plaintiff and granted (a) P100T,moral damages; (b) P20T, exemplary damages; (c) P25T,atty's fees, and costs of the action.- Plaintiffs filed MFR asking that moral damages be increasedto P400T and for 6% interest per annum on amount to begranted.- CFI modified decision: (a) P150T, moral damages; (b) P25T,exemplary damages; with legal interest on both from date of

filing of complaint until paid; (c) P25T, atty's fees; and costs ofthe action.- Both appealed: PAN-AM contended that there was NO badfaith; Lopez et al wanted a total of P650T as award fordamages.ISSUES1. WON there was bad faith on the part of PAN-AM2. WON the amount of damages should be increasedHELD1. YESReasoning- Defendant through its agents first cancelled plaintiffs,reservations by mistake and thereafterdeliberately andintentionallywithheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent such

information. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing firstclass tickets in the conviction that they had confirmedreservations, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfullyand knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breachits contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minutecancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it turnedout in this case. Bad faith means a breach of a known dutythrough some motive ofinterestor ill-will.- At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by thedefendant, there would at least be negligence so gross andreckless as to amount to malice or bad faith.

2. YESRatio Moral damages are recoverable in breach of contractswhere the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art.2220). Exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed byway of example or correction for the public good, in breach ofcontract where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner (Art. 2229, 2232). Awritten contract for an attorney's services shall control theamount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to beunconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138, ROC).- Factors in determining Amount for Moral Damages: Theamount of damages awarded in this appeal has beendetermined by adequately considering the official, political,social, and financial standing of the offended parties on onehand, and the business and financial position of the offenderon the other. The present rate of exchange and the terms atwhich the amount of damages awarded would approximatelybe in U.S. dollars has also been considered.(a) MORAL DAMAGES- As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of itscontracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation,wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. It maynot be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it ishumiliating to be compelledto travel as such, contrary to whatis rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking.- Sen Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore.International carriers like defendant know the prestige of suchan office. For the Senate is not only the Upper Chamber of the

Philippine Congress, but the nation's treaty-ratifying body. Hewas also former Vice-President of the Philippines. (MD =P100T)- Mrs. Maria Lopez, as wife of the Senator, shared his prestigeand therefore his humiliation. In addition she suffered physicaldiscomfort during the 13-hour trip; her reason for going to theUS was actually for medical check-up and relaxation. The factthat the seating spaces in the tourist class are quite narrowerthan in first class will suffice to show that she indeedexperienced physical suffering during the trip. (MD = P50T)- Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling asimmediate members of the family of Sen Lopez. Even if theyinitially wanted to change their seat reservations from first classto tourist class, they eventually paid for first class seats.Hence, they also suffered social humiliation. (MD = P25T each)

(b) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES- In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amountas to effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the futureby defendant or other airlines. (ED = P75T)(c) ATTORNEYS FEES- Record shows a written contract of services wherein plaintiffsengaged the services of their counsel Atty. Francisco andagreed to pay the sum of P25T upon the termination of thecase in the CFI, and another P25T if case is appealed to theSC. This is reasonable considering the subject matter of thepresent controversy, the professional standing of the attorneyfor plaintiffs-appellants, and the extent of the service renderedby him.


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Disposition Judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED soas to award in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, thefollowing:

(1) P200T as moral damages, divided among plaintiffs;(2) P75T as exemplary or corrective damages;(3) Interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on the moraland exemplary damages, from date of amended CFIdecision, until said damages are fully paid;(4) P50T as attorney's fees; and(5) Costs of action. Counterclaim dismissed.

PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V CA (SPS CHUA)MELO; September 17, 2001

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision andresolution of the CAFACTS- Sometime in April, 1982, respondent Salvador Chua wasoffered by Mr. Jimmy Rojas, manager of Producers Bank of thePhilippines, to transfer his account from Pacific BankingCorporation to herein petitioner bank.- Respondent spouses opened and maintained substantialsavings and current deposits with, and likewise obtainedvarious loans from petitioner bank, one of which was a loan forP2,000,000.00 which was secured by a real estate mortgageand payable within a period of three (3) years or from 1982 to1985.- On January 20, 1984, private respondents deposited withpetitioner bank the total sum of P960,000.00, which was dulyentered in private respondents' savings account passbook.- Petitioner bank failed to credit this deposit due to the fact thatits Branch Manager absconded with the money of the bank'sdepositors.- Consequently, petitioner bank dishonored the checks drawnout by private respondents in favor of their various creditors onthe ground of insufficient funds, despite the fact that at thattime, the balance of private respondents' deposit was in theamount of P1,051,051.19.- Private respondents requested for copies of their ledgers

covering their savings and current accounts, but petitionerbank refused.- Private respondents instituted on January 30, 1984 an actionfor damages against petitioner bank- On the other hand, petitioner bank filed with the City Sheriff ofBacolod a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate- Private respondents filed a complaint for injunction anddamages, alleging that the petition for extrajudicial foreclosurewas without basis and was instituted maliciously in order toharass private respondents.- On April 26, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision on thelatter case, in favor of the spouses Chua, awarding the sum ofP2,000,000.00 as moral damages, and the sum ofP250,000.00 as exemplary damages, among others.- On October 31, 1991, upon appeal by petitioner bank, the

Court of Appeals modified the decisionone of the changeswas the award of the sum of P500,000.00 as moral andexemplary damages.- Petitioner moved for a consideration but the same wasdenied, hence, this petition

ISSUEWON the petitioner bank is liable for moral damages

HELD: YES- Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded without proofof pecuniary loss. In awarding such damages, the court shalltake into account the circumstances obtaining in the case andassess damages according to its discretion.

- As borne out by the record of this case , private respondentsare engaged in several businesses, such as rice and corntrading, cement dealership, and gasoline proprietorship. Thedishonor of private respondents' checks and the foreclosureinitiated by petitioner adversely affected the credit standing aswell as the business dealings of private respondents as theirsuppliers discontinued credit lines resulting in the collapse oftheir businesses.- In the case ofLeopoldo Araneta vs. Bank of America, it washeld that: "The financial credit of a businessman is a prizedand valuable asset, it being a significant part of the foundation

of his business. Any adverse reflection thereon constitutessome financial loss to him."- The damage to private respondents' reputation and socialstanding entitles them to moral damages. Article 2217, inrelation to Article 2220, of the Civil Code explicitly provides that"moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, woundedfeelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury."- Obviously, petitioner bank's wrongful act caused seriousanxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation to privaterespondents for which they are entitled to recover moraldamages in the amount of P300,000.00 which we deem to bereasonable.Disposition The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmedwith modification only as to the award of damages

e. WHO MAY RECOVER

STREBEL V FIGUERAS96 PHIL 321 CONCEPCION; December 29, 1954

FACTS- Strebels side: As a lessee of a lot situated in Santa Mesa,Manila, plaintiff Strebel subleased part thereof to the StandardVacuum Oil Company; that the latter constructed thereon aMobilgas Station which was operated by Eustaquio & Co., apartnership organized by said plaintiff and one PrimoEustaquio, that, "out of spite and with a view to the eventual

acquisition of the said property for himself and his men,"defendant Jose Figueras "tried all he could to built a drainagethrough" the aforementioned property; that, in order toaccomplish this purpose, and, using his official and politicalinfluence, defendant Figueras, then Under-Secretary of Labor,caused. his co-defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an AssistantCity Fiscal of Manila, to prepare an opinion which was signedby the City Fiscal, holding that the City of Manila has a right toconstruct said drainage, and, to this effect, make the necessaryexcavations at the boundary line of said lot leased to Strebeland the lot belonging to Figueras- Plaintiff Strebel also claims that defendant Figueras "bymaking use of his official and political connections," was ableto induce the Secretary of Justice to transfer temporarily, fromthe Bureau of Immigration to the Bureau of Prisons, one Dr.Manuel Hernandez, the husband of plaintiff's step daughter;- Plaintiff asked Secretary Nepomuceno to mediate betweenthem and Under-Secretary of Labor to forget about past familyproblems.- Plaintiff later on claims that Figueras still didnt forget aboutthe past and "making use of his official and political influence,"and with the cooperation of his former secretary, defendantCornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, as wellas "in connivance with the Director of Labor" which office wasthen held by defendant Felipe E. Jose, "and other employeesin the Department and Bureau of Labor," defendant Figuerassucceeded in securing the institution, against plaintiff Strebel,and his partner, Primo Eustaquio, of Criminal Case No. 11005of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for allegedly compelling


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several employees to work more than eight (8) hours a day, inviolation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, in relation toCommonwealth Act No. 303, although before the filing of theinformation "the defendants collectively and singly knew thatthe allegations therein are false;" that said criminal case wassubsequently dismissed by the Court of First Instance ofManila for failure of the prosecution "to establish even a primafacie case against the accused";- Through the foregoing series of acts, the defendants have"caused moral and mental suffering to the . . . plaintiff, his wife,and his entire family, and damage to his business in the

amount of P15,000.00 besides actual damages in the amountof P1,500.00 paid to his attorney in defending himself from themalicious charge,"

ISSUEWON Plaintiff may recover damages for moral and mentalsuffering

HELD: NO- The plan to built said drainage was seemingly abandonedbefore plaintiff's property rights could be violated. There wasnothing wrong, either legally or morally, in the desire ofFigueras to seek an outlet for the water coming from hisproperty. On the contrary, it is required by the elementaryprinciples of health and sanitation. Besides, there is noallegation that any lot other than that of plaintiff Strebel wasbetter suited for the purpose.

Neither could he have any arising from the assignment ofhis wife's son-in-law from the Bureau of Prisons - to which hehad been previously assigned temporarily to the Bureau ofImmigration, for1.The authority of the Secretary of Justice to make theassignment in question and the validity thereof, under saidlegal provision, are submitted. Hence, it is not claimed that saidofficer may be held civilly liable for the aforementionedassignment. This being the case, how can such responsibilitybe exacted from Figueras who, it is urged, merely instigatedsaid assignment?2.Even if we assumed the act complained of to be wrong or to

have caused injury, the right of action hypotethically resultingtherefrom, if any on which we need not, and do not, expressany opinion would have accrued in favor of Dr. Hernandezwho is not a party in the present action not plaintiffherein.- "As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental sufferingresulting from bodily injuries is restricted to the person who hassuffered the bodily hurt, and there can be no recovery fordistress caused by sympathy for another's suffering, or forfright due to a wrong against a third person. So the anguish ofmind arising as to the safety of others who may be in personalperil from the same cause cannot be taken into consideration.- '. . . damages are not recoverable for fright or shock evenwhen sustained as result of wilful act, unless such act wasdirected toward person or property or person seeking recovery;

hence plaintiff is not entitled to recover against administratrix ofsister's murderer for fright or shock caused by viewingmutilated body of murdered sister. The rule on this point, asstated in the American Jurisprudence, is: "Injury or Wrong toAnother. In law mental anguish is restricted as a rule, tosuch mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury orwrong to the person himself, as distinguished from thatform of mental suffering which is the accompaniment ofsympathy or sorrow for another's suffering or which arisesfrom a contemplation of wrongs committed on the personof another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wifecannot recover for mental suffering caused by his or hersympathy for the other's suffering." It should be noted thatplaintiff is not even related to Dr. Hernandez. The latter's wife

is a daughter of Mrs. Strebel by a previous marriage. HenceDr. Hernandez is merely related by affinity, not to Strebel, butto a relative by affinity of said plaintiff.- Another allegation made by plaintiffs in arguing their cause ofaction to recover damages, they said that "with a view tofurther injuring" him "and besmirching his good name in thecommunity and waging a cleavage in the harmonious relationbetween Eustaquio & Co. and its laborers," defendants FelipeE. Jose and Cornelio S. Ruperto issued a press statement tothe effect that plaintiff Strebel and his partner, Eustaquio hadflagrantly violated the provisions of the Eight-Hour Law and

that said Criminal Case had been dismissed by the court on aflimsy ground; and that this statement had "caused moral andmental suffering to the herein plaintiff and damage to hisbusiness in the amount of P5,000.00," The Supreme Courtsaid that this news item mentions, neither the number of thecase referred to, nor the names of the persons accusedtherein. Moreover, it merely contains a criticism of the actiontaken by the court. The reference, therein imputed to theDirector of Labor, to the flagrant violation of the eight-hourlabor law by the accused, was a mere reiteration of the theoryof the Bureau of Labor, which the prosecution had adopted byfiling the information in said case. Being a matter of courtrecord, which had been taken up at the hearing held publicly,and settled in a decision already promulgated, said theory wasopen for public consumption, and, hence, an allusion thereto orstatement thereof, in order to justify said criticism , is notactionable.- As regards the malicious prosecution point raised by Strebel,by specific mandate ofArticle 2219 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines, however, moral damages may not berecovered in cases of crime or tort, unless either results orcauses "physical injuries," which are lacking in the case atbar.Although the same article permits recovery of saiddamages in cases of malicious prosecution, this feature of saidprovision may not be availed of by the plaintiff herein,inasmuch as the acts set forth in the complaint took place in1949, or before said Code became effective (laws shouldnthave retroactive effect).

ABS-CBN V CA (REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP, VIVAFILMS) DAVIDE; January 21, 1999

FACTS- ABS-CBN, by virtue of contract with VIVA, had an exclusiveright to exhibit some Viva films. ABS-CBN had a right of firstrefusal. VIVA gave ABS-CBN 3 packages (36 titles) to choosefrom. VP for ABS Charo Santos-Concio wrote VIVA that theyare not accepting the list because there were only 10 titlesthere that they could potentially purchase. ABS asked foranother list, saying they had quite an attractive offer to make.- VIVA gave ABS a new list: 52 original movie titles (neverbefore aired on TV) and 104 reruns. VIVAs proposal wasP60M (P30M cash, P30M TV spots) for 52 originals and 52

reruns.- Del Rosario (VIVAs rep) and Eugenio Lopez III had a mtg rethis in Tamarind Grill Restaurant. Accdg to ABSCBN, the mtgculminated in Del Rosario accepting ABSCBNs offer of P35Mfor 52 of the films VIVA was selling for P60M plus Maging SinoKa Man.- VIVA said this wasnt their agreement and that they refuse tosell anything less the 104-movie package for P60M. In themeantime, RBS bought the 104-film package (which includedMaging Sino Ka Man) for P60M. There were ads in thenewspapers for the airing of the movie on Channel 7.- ABSCBN filed a case in RTC to enjoin RBS from airing 14VIVA films, including Maging Sino Ka Man. RTC granted a


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preliminary injunction; but lifted the same after RBS put up acounterbond.- ABSCBN filed a petition in the CA to challenge the RTCdecision. CA granted TRO, but eventually dismissed

ABSCBNs petition and made them pay for actual, moral andexemplary damages and attys fees to RBS, and attys fees toVIVA.

ISSUEWON RBS may recover damages from ABSCBN

HELD: NOACTUAL DAMAGES- Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled tocompensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary losssuffered by him as he has duly proved. The indemnificationshall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, butalso that of the profits that the obligee failed to obtain. Incontracts and quasi-contracts the damages which may beawarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted with goodfaith or otherwise. In case of good faith, the damagesrecoverable are those which are the natural and probableconsequences of the breach of the obligation and which theparties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at thetime of the constitution of the obligation. If the obligor actedwith fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall beresponsible for all damages which may be reasonablyattributed to the non-performance of the obligation. In crimesand quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damageswhich are the natural and probable consequences of the act oromission complained of, whether or not such damages havebeen foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by thedefendant.- Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss orimpairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary orpermanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff'sbusiness standing or commercial credit.- RBS claims actual damages based on Arts 19-21 for theinjunction for having to put up a counterbond. The SC said thatsince ABS had not posted a bond and was in fact still

challenging it, RBS didnt have to put up the counterbond.- RBS also claims actual damages for the advertisements forthe airing of Maging Sino Ka Man. The SC said that ABS isnot liable for lack of sufficient basis. The prelim injunction waslifted by RTC upon RBS paying the counterbond, and not onany legal and factual basis.

ATTYS FEES- As regards attorney's fees, the law is clear that in theabsence of stipulation, attorney's fees may be recovered asactual or compensatory damages under any of thecircumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.- The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recoveredas part of damages because of the policy that no premiumshould be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to beawarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court

to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual,legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant iscompelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses toprotect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awardedwhere no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in aparty's persistence in a case other than an erroneousconviction of the righteousness of his cause.MORAL DAMAGES- Moral damages are in the category of an award designed tocompensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not toimpose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant toenrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but toenable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, oramusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he

has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits ofthe possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should beproportionate to the suffering inflicted.- The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of acorporation because, being an artificial person and havingexistence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, noemotions, no senses. It cannot, therefore, experience physicalsuffering and mental anguish which can be experienced onlyby one having a nervous system. The award for damages mustbe set aside, since RBS is a corporation.EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

- These are imposed by way of example or correction for thepublic good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, orcompensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminalcases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committedwith one or more aggravating circumstances; in quasi-delicts, ifthe defendant acted with gross negligence; and in contractsand quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton,fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.- The claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based oncontract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. The claims formoral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.- Arts 19-21 have at their very core the common element ofmalice or bad faith. Such intentional design to do a wrongfulact must be proved by evidence. Here, ABSCBN was honestlyconvinced of the merits of its cause after it had undergoneserious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of adraft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of anaction does not per se make the action wrongful and subjectthe actor to damages, for the law could not have meant toimpose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result froma person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.Disposition Petition Granted. CA decision reversed, except tounappealed award of Attys damages of Viva Films.

NPC v PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC369 SCRA 629 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; Nov 20, 2001

NATURE: Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside thedecision of the Court of AppealsFACTS- The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issuedinvitations to bid for the supply and delivery of 120,000 metrictons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired ThermalPower Plant in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp BrothersOceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed toparticipate as one of the bidders. After the public bidding wasconducted, PHIBRO's bid was accepted. NAPOCOR'sacceptance was conveyed in a letter. PHIBRO sent word toNAPOCOR that industrial disputes might soon plagueAustralia, the shipment's point of origin, which could seriouslyhamper PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal. PHIBROagain apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia,

particularly informing the latter that the ship owners therein arenot willing to load cargo unless a "strike-free" clause isincorporated in the charter party or the contract of carriage. Inorder to hasten the transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed toNAPOCOR that they equally share the burden of a "strike-free"clause. NAPOCOR refused.- Subsequently, PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR aconfirmed and workable letter of credit. Instead of deliveringthe coal on or before the thirtieth day after receipt of the Letterof Credit, as agreed upon by the parties in the July contract,PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on November 17, 1987- Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once moreadvertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal plant.PHIBRO participated anew in this subsequent bidding. On


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November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO'sapplication for pre-qualification to bid for not meeting theminimum requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO foundthat the real reason for the disapproval was its purported failureto satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for damages due to the delayin the delivery of the first coal shipment.- This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages withapplication for injunction against NAPOCOR with the RegionalTrial Court, Branch 57, Makati City. In its complaint, PHIBROalleged that NAPOCOR's act of disqualifying it in the October1987 bidding and in all subsequent biddings was tainted with

malice and bad faith. PHIBRO prayed for actual, moral andexemplary damages and attorney's fees.- In its answer, NAPOCOR averred that the strikes in Australiacould not be invoked as reason for the delay in the delivery ofcoal because PHIBRO itself admitted that as of July 28, 1987those strikes had already ceased. And, even assuming that thestrikes were still ongoing, PHIBRO should have shouldered theburden of a "strike-free" clause because their contract was "Cand F Calaca, Batangas, Philippines," meaning, the cost andfreight from the point of origin until the point of destinationwould be for the account of PHIBRO. Furthermore, NAPOCORclaimed that due to PHIBRO's failure to deliver the coal ontime, it was compelled to purchase coal from ASEA at a higherprice. NAPOCOR claimed for actual damages in the amount ofP12,436,185.73, representing the increase in the price of coal,and a claim of P500,000.00 as litigation expenses.- Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court decidedin favor of PHIBRO. Unsatisfied, NAPOCOR elevated the caseto the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered aDecision affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional TrialCourt.

ISSUEWON PHIBRO is entitled to damages

HELD: NO- NAPOCOR was not bound under any contract to approvePHIBRO's pre-qualification requirements. In fact, NAPOCORhad expressly reserved its right to reject bids. And where the

government as advertiser, availing itself of that right, makes itschoice in rejecting any or all bids, the losing bidder has nocause to complain nor right to dispute that choice unless anunfairness or injustice is shown.- Owing to the discretionary character of the right involved inthis case, the propriety of NAPOCOR's act should therefore bejudged on the basis of the general principles regulating humanrelations, the forefront provision of which is Article 19 of theCivil Code which provides that "every person must, in theexercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, actwith justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty andgood faith." Accordingly, a person will be protected only whenhe acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when heacts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts withnegligence or abuse. 3

- NAPOCOR's act of disapproving PHIBRO's application forpre-qualification to bid was without any intent to injure or apurposive motive to perpetrate damage. Apparently,NAPOCOR acted on the strong conviction that PHIBRO had a"seriously-impaired" track record. NAPOCOR cannot be faultedfrom believing so. We cannot fault NAPOCOR if it mistookPHIBRO's unexpected offer a mere attempt on the latter's partto undercut ASEA or an indication of PHIBRO's inconsistency.The circumstances warrant such contemplation.- One who acted pursuant to the sincere belief that anotherwillfully committed an act prejudicial to the interest of thegovernment cannot be considered to have acted in bad faith.Bad faith has always been a question of intention. It is thatcorrupt motive that operates in the mind. As understood in law,

it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating withfurtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill-will orfor ulterior purpose. While confined in the realm of thought, itspresence may be ascertained through the party's actuation orthrough circumstantial evidence. The circumstances underwhich NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's pre-qualification tobid do not show an intention to cause damage to the latter. Themeasure it adopted was one of self-protection. Consequently,we cannot penalize NAPOCOR for the course of action it took.NAPOCOR cannot be made liable for actual, moral andexemplary damages.

- Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amountof loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually beproven with reasonable degree of certainty, premised uponcompetent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actualamount thereof. A court cannot merely rely on speculations,conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount ofdamages. Thus, while indemnification for damages shallcomprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but alsothat of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain, it isimperative that the basis of the alleged unearned profits is nottoo speculative and conjectural as to show the actual damageswhich may be suffered on a future period.- The award of moral damages is likewise improper. Toreiterate, NAPOCOR did not act in bad faith. Moreover, moraldamages are not, as a general rule, granted to a corporation.While it is true that besmirched reputation is included in moraldamages, it cannot cause mental anguish to a corporation,unlike in the case of a natural person, for a corporation has noreputation in the sense that an individual has, and besides, it isinherently impossible for a corporation to suffer mentalanguish.- Neither can we award exemplary damages under Article2234 of the Civil Code. Before the court may consider thequestion of whether or not exemplary damages should beawarded, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,temperate, or compensatory damages.- This Court has also laid down the rule that in the absence ofstipulation, a winning party may be awarded attorney's feesonly in case plaintiff's action or defendant's stand is so

untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. Thiscannot be said of the case at bar. NAPOCOR is justified inresisting PHIBRO's claim for damages.

3. NOMINAL

Article 2221, CC.Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of theplaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose ofindemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

Article 2222, CC.The court may award nominal damages in every obligationarising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or in everycase where any property right has been invaded.

Article 2223, CC.The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude furthercontest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, asbetween the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs andassigns.


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VENTANILLA V CENTENOPADILLA; January 28, 1961

NATURE: APPEALFACTS- Ventanilla instituted this action to recover damages againsthis lawyer, Atty. Centeno for neglecting to perfect within thereglementary period his (V) appeal from an adverse judgmentrendered by the CFI of Manila.- TCs facts showed that the required appeal bond was not filedby Atty. Centeno. The fact that the record on appeal was

admitted for filing is the best evidence that Atty. Centeno hadnot in fact filed any appeal bond. The record on appeal wasdisapproved because it was filed out of time and no appealbond had been filed by the plaintiff.- TC: rendered judgment in favor of V; ordered Centeno to payV the sum of P200 as nominal damages and the costs.- V appealed to the CA which certified the case to this Court onthe ground that only questions of law are raised. The defendantdid not appeal.ISSUEWON TC erred in not ordering the Centeno to pay him actualor compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, andexemplary or corrective damages; in ordering that only thesum of P200 be paid to him, and not P2,000 as nominaldamages; and in not ordering that the sum of P500 asattorney's fee be paid as well.HELD: NOReasoning

AS REGARDS ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES:- V is not entitled to such damages as his basis is highlyspeculative.- A2199 NCC provides:

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled toan adequate compensation only for such pecuniary losssuffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensationis referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

- Malonzo vs. Galang: He who claims actual or compensatorydamages must establish and prove by competent evidenceactual pecuniary loss.

- Ventanillas allegation that by Centenos negligence in notpaying the appeal bond of P60, V lost his chance to recoverfrom the defendants therein the sum of P4,000 and moral andactual damages, which V could have recovered if the appealhad duly been perfected, indicates that his claim for actual orcompensatory damages is highly speculative.

AS REGARDS MORAL DAMAGES:- Since the VENTANILLAS cause of action for recovery ofmoral damages is not predicated upon any of those specificallyenumerated (under A2219, Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219)TC did not err in declining to award moral damages to him-V claims that he suffered mental anguish upon learning thathis appeal had not been perfected within the reglementaryperiod due to the Centeno's negligence; serious anxiety upon

learning that his adversary had won by a mere technicality;besmirched reputation for losing the opportunity to substantiatehis claim made while testifying in open court that he wasentitled to collect the sum of P4,000 and damages from thedefendants in civil No. 18833; and wounded feelings for theCentenos failure to remain faithful to his client and worthy ofhis trust and confidence. (SEE A2217, 2219 AND 2220 NCC)-Malonzo vs. Galang:

. . .Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causingphysical injuries," as an instance when moral damages maybe allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts notresulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs.Figueras, G.R. L-4722, Dec. 29, 1954), excepting, of course,the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and

in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapteron human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).

CONCERNING TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES:- Considering that he is not entitled to actual or compensatorydamages but has been awarded nominal damages by the TC,such award precludes the recovery of temperate or moderatedamages, and so TC did not err in refusing to award temperateor moderate damages to the Ventanilla

AS REGARDS EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES:- It cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the court willdecide whether or not they should be adjudicated, if the

defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressiveor malevolent manner. TC didnt err in not giving any.NOMINAL DAMAGES- Considering the circumstances and the degree of negligencecommitted by ATTY CENTENO in not depositing on time theappeal bond and filing the record on appeal within theextension period granted by the court, which brought about therefusal by the TCto allow the record on appeal, the amount ofP200 awarded by the TC to VENTANILLA as nominaldamages may seem exiguous.- Nevertheless, considering that nominal damages are not forindemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication orrecognition of a right violated or invaded; and that even if theappeal in civil case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it wasnot an assurance that the appellant would succeed inrecovering the amount he had claimed in his complaint, theamount of P2,000 the appellant seeks to recover as nominaldamages is excessive.- A2221 of NCC provides:

Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of theplaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by thedefendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not forthe purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any losssuffered by him.

- A2216; Del Castillo vs. Guerrero[1960]: The assessment ofnominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, accordingto the circumstances of the case.

AS REGARDS ATTORNEY'S FEES:- since the V's claim does not fall under any of those

enumerated in A2208 NCC, the V may not be compelled tosatisfy it.Disposition TCs judgment affirmed

ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY V CFI AND MILLANMUOZ-PALMA; October 30, 1978

FACTS- Robes-Francisco Realty sold to Millan a parcel of land. Millancomplied and paid. She made repeated demands to executefinal deed of sale and for issuance to her of TCT over the lot.Parties executed deed of absolute sale. But corp failed tocause issuance of TCT because title was included amongproperties of corp mortgaged to GSIS to secure an obligation.

Hence, a complaint for specific performance and damages.ISSUEWON Robes-Francisco is liable for damagesHELD : YES- Robes-Francisco is guilty of delay, amounting to non-performance. It is liable for damages under Art 1170 of CC.- But Robes-Francisco contends that Millan is bound by termsof provision and cant recover more than what is agreed upon.This argument is devoid of merit. We would agree if the clausewere to be a penal clause. But this clause doesnt convey anypenalty.- Unfortunately, vendee submitted her case below withoutpresenting evidence on actual damages suffered by her.- But it is obvious that right of vendee was violated by petitioner


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and this entitles her at least to NOMINAL DAMAGES.- NOMINAL DAMAGES are not for indemnification of losssuffered but for vindication or recognition of a right.- NOMINAL DAMAGES are damages in name only and not infact, and are allowed simply in recognition of a technical injury.- P20,000.00 is excessive. The admitted fact that petitionercorporation failed to convey a transfer certificate of title torespondent Milian because the subdivision property wasmortgaged to the GSIS does not in itself show that there wasbad faith or fraud. Bad faith is not to be presumed. Moreover,there was the expectation of the vendor that arrangements

were possible for the GSIS to make partial releases of thesubdivision lots.

PEOPLE V GOPIO346 SCRA 408 MENDOZA; November 29, 2000

NATURE:Appeal from Decision of RTCFACTS- Princess Millano, 10 years old, went to Agustin Gopios storeto buy cooking oil. However, it was closed. As Millano wasabout to leave, Gopio called her. When she came near him, heseized her, brought her inside his empty house, brought her tohis bedroom and raped her. As she would not stop crying, heeventually let her go.- The victim rushed home. Although she felt intense pain andwas actually bleeding, she did not inform her mother of whathappened to her.- Victim related that she was molested by Gopio in 2 otheroccasions in the same year. The first happened when she wentto her godsisters house and found the accused playing cards.She was about to leave when she saw her godsisters brothercrying inside the room. She went inside and the accusedfollowed him, locked the door and caressed her private parts.The second instance was when the accused followed her onher way to her grandfathers house to get the pail requested byher aunt.- The victim did not confide to her family about these incidentsbecause she was very afraid of accused-appellant and of what

her parents would do to her. Likewise, the victim wasashamed and worried that her friends would spread the newsregarding her unfortunate experience.- Victims mother testified about victims age. She also said thatafter the incident, her daughter became inattentive andwithdrawn. Her daughters grades even dropped.Subsequently, she brought the victim to the Municipal HealthCenter because the latter has been experiencing navel pains.This is when she discovered that her child got raped. Shepresented receipts covering medical, transportation, food, andother expenses which she allegedly incurred on account of theincident.- Gopio denied allegations and said that he was in Novalichesin May and June 1995 to sell fish. He claims that there wasanimosity between their families which started when she failed

to bring along victims mother to the market to sell fish.- RTC found Gopio guilty of statutory rape and ordered him topay P3,727 as actual damages and P30,000 as moraldamages.

ISSUES1. WON accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonabledoubt2. WON award of damages was correct

HELD1. YES- On alibi: Victim positively identified accused-appellant as theperpetrator of the crime and categorically testified that she had

been raped by accused-appellant. When a rape victimstestimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigidcross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies orcontradictions in its material points, the same must be given fulfaith and credit.- On victims failure to immediately report incident: The victimsdelay in reporting the offense is not an indication of afabricated charge. Victim feared that accused-appellant wouldhurt her and her family and that her friends would spread thenews about her plight. Had it not been for that medicalexamination, the victim would not have told them about the

rape committed by accused-appellant. This explains the delayin reporting the crime in this case.- On failure of the information to indicate the approximate timeof the commission of the offense: The phrase in theinformation, that sometime in 1995. . . has sufficientlyapprised accused-appellant of the crime which he allegedlycommitted in 1995. It bears stressing that, in the case of rape,the date of commission is not an essential element of theoffense, what is material being the occurrence thereof and notthe time of its commission. In any event, it is now too late inthe day to question the form or substance of the informationbecause when he entered his plea at his arraignment,accused-appellant did not object to the sufficiency of theinformation against him.- On irregularity of arrest: He failed to raise objections to hisarrest at the earliest possible opportunity. The record showsthat he voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty when he wasarraigned, thereby waiving his right to question any irregularityin his arrest.

2. NO- The award of actual damages must be deleted in the absenceof proof required by Art. 2199 of the Civil Code. To be entitledto actual and compensatory damages, there must becompetent proof constituting evidence of the actual amountthereof, such as receipts showing the expenses incurred onaccount of the rape incident. In this case, only the laboratoryfee issued by the hospital amounting to P350 was dulyreceipted. The rest of the documents were merely a doctors

prescription and a handwritten list of food expenses.- Nevertheless, under Article 2221 of the Civil Code,nominal damages are adjudicated in order that the right ofthe plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by thedefendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for thepurpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered byhim. As has been held, whenever there has been aviolation of an ascertained legal right, although no actualdamages resulted or none are shown, the award ofnominal damages is proper.

In this case, the victims family

clearly incurred medical expenses due to the rape committedby accused-appellant. The victim suffered from pains in hernavel which required her physical examination. An award ofP2k as nominal damages is thus appropriate under thecircumstances.

- Based on current rulings, the award of moral damages shouldbe increased to P50k irrespective of proof thereof.- In addition, the victim is entitled to the award of P50k as civilindemnity which must be given even if there is neitherallegation nor evidence presented as basis therefore.

Disposition RTC decision modified. Accused-appellant isordered to pay the victim the amounts of P2k by way ofnominal damages, P50k as moral damages, and the additionalamount of P50k as civil indemnity, plus the costs of the suit.


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ARMOVIT V CA (NORTHWEST AIRLINES)184 SCRA 476 GANGAYCO; April 20, 1990

FACTS- In October 1981, Dr. Herman Armovit and his family decidedto spend their Christmas holidays with relatives and friends inthe Philippines so they purchased from Northwest Airlines 3round trip airline tickets from the US to Manila and back, plus 3tickets for the rest of the children, though not involved in thesuit. Each ticket of the petitioners which was in the handwritingof Northwests tickets sales agent contains the following entry

on the Manila to Tokyo portion of the return flight:"from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002, date 17 January, time10:30 AM Status, OK"- On their return trip from Manila to the US scheduled onJanuary 17, 1982, they arrived at the check-in counter of theairline at the Manila International Airport at 9:15 in the morning,which is a good one hour and fifteen minutes ahead of the10:30 AM scheduled flight time recited in their tickets. Theywere rudely informed that they cannot be accommodatedinasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 am was alreadytaking off and the 10:30 AM flight time entered in their planetickets was erroneous.- Previous to the date of departure Armovit re-confirmed theirreservations through their representative Ernesto Madriagawho personally presented the 3 tickets at the airlines RoxasBoulevard office. The departure time in the 3 tickets was notchanged when re-confimed. Their names appeared in thepassenger manifest and confirmed as Passenger Nos. 306,307, and 308, Flight 002.- Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of thebump-off he will not be able to keep his appointments with hispatients in the US. They suffered anguish, wounded feelings,and serious anxiety day and night of January 17th until themorning of January 18th when they were finally informed thatseats will be available for them on the flight that day.- The RTC ruled in favor of the Armovits and orderedNorthwest to pay actual (P1,300), exemplary (P1,100,000) andmoral (P1,100,000) damages as well as attorneys fees. TheCA affirmed but eliminated the moral damages on the ground

that petitioners did not take the witness stand to testify on theirsocial humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, and that thebreach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent. It alsoreduced the exemplary damages to P170,000. Armovitsmotion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUEWON the CA erred in deleting the award of moral damages

HELD1. NO.Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different inkind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this isbecause of the relation which an air carrier sustains with thepublic. Its business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites

people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. Thecontract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relationattended with a public duty, Neglect or malfeasance of thecarrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an actionfor damages Passengers do not contract merely fortransportation. They have the right to be treated by the carrier'semployees with kindness, respect, courtesy and dueconsideration. They are entitled to be protected againstpersonal misconduct, injurious language, indignities andabuses from such employees. So it is that any rude ordiscourteous conduct on the part of employees towards apassenger gives the latter an action for damages against thecarrier. [Citing Air France v Carrascoso]

Reasoning- The gross negligence committed by Northwest in theissuance of the tickets with entries as to the time of the flight,the failure to correct such erroneous entries and the manner bywhich petitioners were rudely informed that they were bumpedoff are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and establishthat Northwest committed a breach of contract which entitlespetitioners to moral damages.- The CA observed that the Armovits failed to take the witnessstand and testify on the matter. It overlooked however, thattheir failure to appear in court to testify was explained by them.

The assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August21, 1983 following the year they were bumped off causedturmoil in the country. This turmoil spilled over to the year 1984when they were scheduled to testify. However, the violentdemonstrations in the country were sensationalized in the U.S.media so they were advised to refrain from returning to thePhilippines at the time.- Nevertheless, Atty. Raymund Armovit, brother of Dr. Armovit,took the witness stand as he was with the petitioners from thetime they checked in up to the time of their ultimate departure.He was a witness when the check-in officer rudely informed theArmovits that their flight had already taken off, while Dr.Armovit remonstrated that their tickets reflected their flight timeto be 10:30 AM; that in anger and frustration, Dr. Armovit toldthe said check-in-officer that he had to be accommodated thatmorning so that he could attend to all his appointments in theUS; that Jacqueline Armovit also complained about not beingable to report for work at the expiration of her leave ofabsence; that while the Armovits had to accept Northwest'soffer for hotel accommodations at the Philippine Village Hotelso that they could follow up and wait for their flight out ofManila the following day, they did not use their meal couponsbecause of the limitations thereon so they had to spend forlunch, dinner, and breakfast in the sum of P1,300 while waitingto be flown out of Manila; that Dr. Armovit had to forego theprofessional fees for the medical appointments he missed dueto his inability to take the January 17 flight; that the petitionerswere finally able to fly out of Manila on January 18, 1982, butwere assured of this flight only on the very morning of that day,

so that they experienced anxiety until they were assured seatsfor that flight.- No doubt Atty. Raymund Armovit's testimony adequately andsufficiently established the serious anxiety, wounded feelingsand social humiliation that petitioners suffered upon havingbeen bumped off. However, considering that Northwest tookcare of their accommodations while waiting and boarding themin the flight back to the US, the following day, the Court findsthat the petitioners are entitled to moral damages in theamount of P100,000 each.- To provide an example for the public good, an award ofexemplary damages is also proper. The award of the CA isadequate. Nevertheless, the deletion of the nominal damagesby the CA is well-taken since there is an award of actualdamages. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or

compensatory damages.

Disposition Petition is granted. The judgment of the CA ishereby modified such that Northwest shall pay the following:(a) actual damages in favor of Dr. Armovit in the sum of P1,300with interest at the legal rate from January 17, 1982;(b) moral damages at P100,000 and exemplary damages andP100,000 in favor of Dr. Armovit;(c) moral damages of P100,000 and exemplary damages ofP50,000 in favor of Mrs. Dora Armovit;(d) moral damages of P100,000 and exemplary damages in theamount of P20,000 in favor of Miss Jacqueline Armovit; and(e) attorney's fees at 5% of the total awards, plus the cost ofsuit.


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4. TEMPERATE

Article 2224, CC.Temperate or moderate damages, which are more thannominal but less than compensatory damages, may berecovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss hasbeen suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of thecase, be provided with certainty.

Article 2225, CC.Temperate damages must be reasonable under thecircumstances.

PLENO V CA (PHILIPPINE PAPER PRODUCTS INC ET AL)307 SCRA 675 GUTTIERREZ JR; May 9, 1988

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari of CA decision which modifiedthe CFI decision in a vehicular accident case and reduced byone half the award for temperate damages, moral damages,and attorneys fees from P430,000 to P215,000. the awards foractual damages in the amount of P48,244 and exemplarydamages in the amount of P50,000 were affirmedFACTS

- Philippine Paper Products is the owner of a delivery truck,and one of their drivers, Florante de Luna, in a reckless andimprudent manner, by driving the vehicle at a great speed,without taking any precautions to avoid accidents, hit, bumped,and sideswiped plaintiffs Volkswagen Delivery Van, driven byplaintiff, causing the Van to swerve and ram into the rear partof another truck- As a result of the accident, plaintiff was hospitalized, sufferedinjuries affecting his brain, acted beyond normalcy at times- Petitioner questioned the set off since there was no call ornotice for the payment of the unpaid subscription, and that thealleged obligation is not enforceable.- The NLRC held that a stockholder who fails to pay hisunpaid subscription on call becomes a debtor of thecorporation and that the set-off of said obligation against the

wages and other due to petitioner is not contrary to law,morals, public policyISSUES1. WON the employer's liability in quasi-delict is subsidiary2. WON the appellant court was correct in reducing the amountof damages awarded to the petitionerHELD1. NOReasoning- We sustain the view of the petitioner that the ability of anemployer in quasi-delict isprimaryand solidaryand notsubsidiary. This, we have ruled in a long line of cases.2. NOReasoning- The Court of Appeals affirmed the awards of damages.

Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the appellate court reduced theamount of temperate and moral damages as well as theamount of attorney's fees on the ground that the awards were"too high" .The award of temperate damages was reduced bythe appellate court on the ground that the amount ofP200,000.00 is rather "too high" especially considering the factthat the driver De Luna is a mere driver and defendant-appellant Corporation is only subsidiarily liable thereof. Theaward was reduced to P100,000.00.- The award of temperate, moral, and exemplary damages aswell as attorney's fees lies upon the discretion of the courtbased on the facts and circumstances of each case.

- The court's discretion is, of course, subject to the conditionthat the award for damages is not excessive under theattendant facts and circumstance of the case.- Temperate damages are included within the context ofcompensatory damages.- In the case of moral damages, the yardstick shaould be thatthe "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalouslyexcessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of passion,prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. The actuallosses sustained by the aggrieved parties and the gravity ofthe injuries must be considered in arriving at reasonable levels

- The lower court's awards of damages are more consonantwith the factual circumstances of the instant case.1 The trialcourt's findings of facts are clear and well-developed. Eachitem of damages is adequately supported by evidence onrecord. On the other hand, there are no substantial reasonsand no references to any misimpressions of facts in theappellate decision. The Court of Appeals has shown nosufficient reasons for altering factual findings which appearcorrect. We, therefore, affirm the lower court's awards ofdamages and hold that the appellate court's reduction of theamounts of temperate and moral damages is not justified.However, we modify the award of attorney's fees toP20,000.00 which we deem to be just and equitable under thecircumstances.Disposition instant petition is GRANTED. The questioneddecision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of theCourt of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) in Civil Case No. 16024is AFFIRMED in all respects, except for the award of attorney'sfees which is reduced to P20,000.00.

PEOPLE V SINGH360 SCRA 404 BUENA; J une 29, 2001NATUREAppellants Balwinder, Malkit, Mohinder and Dalvir, allsurnamed Singh, were convicted of the crime of Murder inCriminal Case No. 8683 for killing Surinder Singh, andFrustrated Murder in Criminal Cases No. 8682 for stabbingDilbag Singh. Each of them were sentenced to suffer the

penalty ofreclusion perpetua for murder, and the indeterminatepenalty of 8 years and one (1) day of prision mayor asminimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusiontemporal as maximum for frustrated murder.

1 The trial court based the amounts of damages awarded to the petitioner on the following circumstances:Coming now to the damages suffered by plaintiff Maximo Pleno, it is not controverted that Pleno was hospitalizedfor about five months beginning December 21, 1971, the day of the incident, up to May 9, 1972. While in thehospital, he underwent several major operations on his legs and in spite of Id operations, a deformity still resultedand that his left leg is shorter than the right. The medical expenses, hospital bills and doctor's fees were properlyexhibited and not rebutted by defendants. This being the case, actual expenses of P48,244.08 may be awarded.As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is n o doubt that Pleno is an enterpreneur and the founder ohis own corporation, the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. It appears also that he is an industrious and resourcefuperson with several projects in line and were it not for the incident, might have pushed them through. On the day othe incident, Pleno was driving homeward with geologist Langley after an ocular inspection of the site of the MayonCeramics Corporation. His actual income however has not been sufficiently established so that this Court cannoaward actual damages, but, an award of temperate or moderate damages may still be made on loss or impairmentof earning capacity. That Pleno sustained a permanent deformity due to a shortened left leg and that he also suffersfrom double vision in his left eye is also established. Because of this, he suffers from some inferiority complex andis no longer active in business as well as in social life. In similar cases as in Borromeo v. Manila Electric RailroadCo., 44 Phil 165; Cordage, et al. v. LTB Co., et al., L-11037, Dec. 29,1960, and in Araneta, et al. v. Arreglado, et al.,L-11394, Sept. 9, 1958, the proper award of damages were given.There is also no doubt that due to the incident, Pleno underwent physical suffering, mental anguish, fight, severarudety and that he also underwent several major operations. As previously stated, Pleno is the founder of MayonCeramics Corporation, manufacturer of the now famous Crown Lynn ceramic wares. He is a mechanical engineeand the topnotcher of the professional examination for mechanical engineering in 1938. From the record, most if notall of his children excelled in academic studies here and abroad. The suffering, both mental and physical, which heexperienced, the anxiety and fright that he underwent are sufficiently proved, if not patent. He is therefore entitled tmoral damages. Pleno is also entitled to exemplary damages since it appears that gross negligence was committedin the hiring of driver de Luna. In spite of his past record, he was still hired by the corporation. As regards de Luna,the very fact that he left the scene of the incident without assisting the victims and without reporting to theauthorities entitles an award of exemplary damages, so as to serve as an example that in cases of accidents of thikind, the drivers involved should not leave their victims behind but should stop to assist the victims or if this is notpossible, to report the matter immediately to the authorities. That the corporation did not also report the matter tothe authorities and that their lawyer would attempt to bribe the police officers in order that the incident would be kepta secret shows that the corporation ratified the act of their employees and such act also shows bad faith. Hence, Idcorporation is able to pay exemplary damages.The award of attorney's fees is also proper in this case considering the circumstances and that it took more thanfive years of trial to finish this case. Also, plaintiffs counsel prepared lengthy and exhausive memorandum. (pp- 48-50, Amended Joint Record on Appeal)


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FACTS- Dilbag Singh, private complainant for frustrated murder inCriminal Case No. 8682, recounts that on November 26, 1993,at around 7:30 in the morning while he was cleaning hismotorbike in front of the Mendiola Apartment in BarangayCanlalay, Bian, Laguna, Dalvir, Balwinder, Gurmok, Jarnail,Amarjit, Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip- all surnamed Singh-JohanderSingh Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived, shouting foulremarks in their native language and demanding SurinderSingh to come out of the apartment. When Surinder Singhcame out of his apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab him but

Surinder Singh was able to move away. Dalvir Singh told hiscompanions to hold Surinder Singh as he will kill him.Thereafter, Dial Singh and Johinder Singh each held the rightand left arms of Surinder Singh, with Kuldip Singh pushingSurinder Singh on his back. Dalvir Singh then stabbed SurinderSingh, hitting him on the right side of his stomach, and causinghim to fall on the ground. Dial Singh remarked that SurinderSingh failed to give money and if others will likewise refuse, thesame fate will befall them. As Surinder Singh tried to get up,Malkit Singh Dhillon and Jarnail Singh started hitting him withlead pipes all over his body, while Johinder Singh and DialSingh punched and kicked Surinder. Amarjit Singh, who washolding a gun, warned everyone not to help Surinder Singh orelse he will shoot. Thereat, when all these things were goingon, private complainant Dilbag Singh tried to stop them butBalwinder Singh stabbed him on the left side of his back.Gurmok Singh likewise stabbed him with a bolo, but he was nothit as he was able to move to one side. After that, the ten (10)accused Indians left.Dilbag Singh and Surinder Singh, both injured, were brought tothe Perpetual Help Hospital, Bian, Laguna, by JaswinderSingh, Johinder Singh Gill, Balwinder Singh Gill and AlwanSingh, for treatment. There, Surinder Singh was pronounceddead on arrival.- The events, according to appellants, happened in this wise.Appellant Dalvir Singh testified that on November 26, 1993, ataround 7:30 in the morning, he was conducting his buy and sellbusiness along Brgy. Canlalay, Bian, Laguna. While collectingfrom his customers, he was accosted by Jaswinder, Dilbag and

Surinder Singh to stop at the corner of the street. When hestopped, he alighted from his motorcycle. Jaswinder, Dilbagand Surinder Singh accused him of squealing their status tothe immigration authorities. Then, Jaswinder Singh punchedhim. Appellant Dalvir Singh retaliated by slapping JaswinderSingh afterwhich, Jaswinder Singh, went inside his apartmentto get a pipe. When Surinder Singh was about to stab him, hewrestled the knife from him and, in the process, privatecomplainant Dilbag Singh was stabbed on his back with thesame knife. As Dalvir Singh grappled for the possession of theknife from Surinder Singh, both of them fell down, with himlanding on top of Surinder Singh and that was the time whenSurinder Singh was stabbed on the right portion of hisstomach. Then, Surinder Singh lost his grip and appellantDalvir Singh was able to get hold of the knife. Appellant Dalvir

Singh was so nervous that he left the place on his motorcyclewhile holding the knife. He threw the knife along the highway ofBian, Laguna.- After trial, appellants were convicted of the crime charged,thus

"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused Balwinder Singh, MalkitSingh Dhillon, Mohinder Singh, Dalvir Singh and Dial Singhhaving been established beyond reasonable doubt of thecrimes of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 8282 andmurder in Criminal Case 8683 defined and penalized inArticles 248 and 250 of the Revised Penal Code, this Courthereby sentences them (except Dial Singh who died duringthe presentation of defense evidence on the main case) asfollows:

"Criminal Case No. 8682:"1. each to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonmentof from eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayorasminimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day ofreclusiontemporalmaximum;"2. jointly and severally, to pay private complainant DilbagSingh the amounts of P16,000 representing hishospitalization and medical expenses, and P30,000 for andas attorneys fees; and"3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit."Criminal Case No. 8683:

"1. each to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua;"2. jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of Surinder Singhthe following sums:a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;b) P41,500.00 representing funeral, wake and transportationexpenses;c) P5,760,000.00 for lost earnings/income;d) P400.00 for hospitalization expenses;e) P50,000.00 for moral damages; andf) P500,000.00 for and as attorneys fees; and"3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit."Since accused Jarnail Singh, Gurmok Singh, Amarjit Singh,Johinder Singh and Kuldip Singh have remained at-large todate, in order not to clog the docket of this court, let therecords of these two cases be sent to the files and warrantbe issued for their immediate arrest.

ISSUEWON the court a quo erred in award

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