TOPIC 4 A COMPANY AS A CORPORATE ENTITY …sydney.edu.au/lec/subjects/associations/notes/Winter...

Law of Assoociations - © JV Gooley – June 2011

TOPIC 4

A COMPANY AS A CORPORATE ENTITY

EFFECT OF REGISTRATION OF THE COMPANY Why incorporate or form a company? The reasons for and against the incorporation of a business into a company are varied. Section 112 of the Corporations Act lists the types of companies that can be registered under that Act. Those companies are as follows:

proprietary companies - limited by shares or unlimited with share capital;

public companies - limited by shares; limited by guarantee; unlimited with share capital; or no liability companies. With respect to no liability companies, note section 112(2), (3) and (4) and the need for the relevant constitution requiring that the sole object of the company be for “mining purposes” (defined in section 9).

With respect to proprietary companies, note section 113 of the Corporations Act.

One of the most important prohibitions contained in the Corporations Act in this regard is set out in section 115. That section precludes a person from participating in the formation of a partnership or association that has an object gain for itself or for any of its members; and has more than 20 members unless the partnership or association is incorporated under an Australian law. Note the prohibition in section 116 of the Corporations Act. Steps in registering a company You should note Part 2A.2 of the Corporations Act beginning at section 117. Once an application is lodged under section 117 ASIC may give the company an ACN and register the company and issue a certificate setting out the matters contained in section 118(1)(c). ASIC must keep a record of the registration. In relation to names note Part 2B.6 of the Corporations Act beginning at section 147. However, note the need for a company to exhibit its name: section 144. In particular, note the need to have “Limited”, “No liability” or “Proprietary” as part of the name: (section 156) unless sections 150 or 151 apply. In relation to change its name to see section 157 and 157A. A company comes into existence on registration: section 119.


With respective jurisdiction of registration note section 119A. A company must have at least one member: section 114. A person becomes a member, director or company secretary on registration if the person is specified in the application with their consent: section 120. Note also sections 121 and 122 dealing with registered office and expenses in promoting and setting up the company. Finally, a company may have a common seal (section 123) and this aspect is important when dealing with the application of sections 127 and 129 which is covered in Topic 8 in this course. Advantages of registration Registration of a company brings with it a number of advantages. Some of these are: (a) Separate legal personality Upon incorporation the company becomes a new and independent legal entity. It is completely separate from the subscribers who formed it and from those who manage it. A creditor can generally only sue the company, not its members, to recover damages. However exceptions exist to this latter point and these are outlined later in this Topic. (b) Limited liability If the company is one limited by shares (defined in section 1070A), then section 516 of the Corporations Act provides that a member's liability is limited to the amount unpaid, if any, on these shares. This can be contrasted with a partnership where there is, except for limited liability partnerships, unlimited liability and therefore all the assets of a partner are vulnerable in the event of default by another partner. The extent of a member's liability depends on the type of company as provided in section 112 of the Corporations Act. It should be noted that limited liability applies only to members. A company does not enjoy limited liability in its dealings with outsiders. (c) Flexibility When drafting up the company's constitutional documents

1, it is possible to give

directors and shareholders various combinations of rights. For example, it is possible to have differing voting rights and varied entitlements to dividends and the division of powers between members and shareholders can be established. It should be noted that a private company, known as a proprietary company, has some restraints

1 "Constitution" is defined in sec 9.


imposed on its flexible structure. Some of these restraints are set out in sections 113(1) and (3) of the Corporations Act. (d) Perpetual succession A company will continue as a legal entity regardless of the death or changing circumstances of its members. It does not exist for a specific period of time. (e) Transferability and transmissibility of shares Shareholders in companies often have flexibility in being able to transfer or assign their shares to other parties. In such cases a transfer will occur when the ownership of the share passes from one shareholder to another resulting in the transferee becoming a member of the company after registration of the transfer. However, companies can impose restrictions on the ability to transfer shares and this is common with respect to proprietary companies. In this regard section 1072G provides for a replaceable rule that directors may refuse to register a transfer of shares in the company for any reason. Similarly transmission of shares is possible where a shareholder dies, becomes incapable through incapacity or becomes bankrupt. In such cases the shares vest in the deceased shareholder's personal representative or the Official Trustee in bankruptcy. (f) Imputation of taxation Companies are able to impute the tax they have paid back to shareholders. This ability means that the same revenue is not taxed twice and that an individual can receive dividends which may not attract any further tax. (g) Power to acquire, hold and dispose of property A company being a separate legal entity can own property. This property is not owned by the members as they only own shares in the company. In Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619, Macaura owned a timber yard. He had an effective insurance policy to cover the destruction of any timber by fire. He subsequently formed a limited company in which he was a substantial shareholder and assigned the timber to the company, the purchase money for the timber remaining owing to him. He did not assign the insurance policy to the company, nor did the company take out its own policy. A fire destroyed the timber. The insurance company's refusal to pay the claim made by Macaura was upheld by the court. The limited company, considered by law to be a legal entity separate to its


shareholders, had an insurable interest in the timber but had no policy. Macaura had a policy, but he had no insurable interest in the timber: all he had was a debt owing to him by the company

2.

Also changes in membership of the company have no effect on the ownership of the company's assets. (h) Capability of suing and being sued As a company is a separate legal entity it may sue to enforce rights and it may be sued by others. Importantly, members in some instances may sue on behalf of the company. This latter aspect will be dealt with in Topic 7 under the headings, “Members

Remedies” and “Derivative Actions”. (i) Privilege against self-incrimination Historically courts have preceded on the basis that a corporation could claim privilege against self-incrimination. This was clearly an advantage. However since the recent decision in Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1994) 68 ALJR 127 this position is no longer clear. In this case Caltex was the holder of a licence under the State Pollution Control Commission Act 1970 (NSW) to discharge waste into the ocean. The Environmental Protection Authority prosecuted Caltex for discharging oil and grease into the ocean in breach of its licence. The Authority subsequently served Caltex with a notice under the Clean Waters Act 1970 (NSW), sec 29(2)(a) requiring it to produce certain documents relating to its discharge of waste. Caltex objected to the validity of the notice and the Authority then issued a notice to produce under the Land and Environment Court Rules 1980 (NSW). Caltex sought to have the notices set aside on the basis that a production could incriminate them. The trial judge held that the privilege against self incrimination did not apply to corporations but the New South Wales Court of appeal allowed the appeal. The High Court held however, by majority, that the privilege was not available to corporations. 1. Disadvantages of registration As opposed to these advantages in incorporating a company, there are a certain

2 Now sections 16 and 17 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) require only that the claimant

suffer a "pecuniary or financial loss" through the destruction of, or damage to, the insured property.

So long as this interest exists as at the date of the loss, the claimant is not barred from claiming

on the policy by reason only of not having a legal or equitable interest in the property. It thus

seems that if the circumstances of Macaura's case were repeated today, the claimant would be

successful.


number of disadvantages. For example:- (a) Limitations on shareholders bringing proceedings on behalf of the

company There are procedural difficulties for shareholders to bring a court action on their own behalf and on behalf of their company. Historically, the so-called rule in Foss v Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461 was illustrative of such a problem. In that case two shareholders brought an action on behalf of themselves and all other shareholders against the directors, solicitor and architect of their company. They alleged that the defendants had fraudulently misapplied company property and that the board was not properly constituted. The defendant's argued that the plaintiff's plea, even if proved, did not entitle them to succeed. The Court held that the injury of which the plaintiff's complained of was not an injury to themselves but to the company. Therefore the company should sue in its own name. According to Wigram VC: "It was not, nor could it successfully be, argued that it was a matter of course

for any individual members of a corporation thus to assume to themselves the right of suing in the name of the corporation. In law the corporation and the aggregate members of the corporation are not the same thing for purposes like this; and the only question can be whether the facts alleged in this case justify a departure from the rule which, prima facie, would require that the corporation should sue in its own name and in its corporate character, or in the name of someone whom the law has appointed to be its representative."

Now this area is governed by section 236 – 242 of the Corporations Act which is covered in Topic 7 under the headings, “Members Remedies” and “Derivative Actions”. (b) Limited role that shareholders have in management A company often has a separation of powers between management and shareholders. According to Samuels JA., in Winthrop Investments Ltd v Winns Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 666 at 683: "...[T]he shareholders may have, ultimate control, because they can alter the

articles or remove the directors: but they cannot interfere in the conduct of the company business where management, as here, is vested in the board ... they have no general power to transact the company's business, or to give effective directions about its management."

The main decision in this area is Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd v

Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34. In this case an article gave power of management to directors "...subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by extraordinary resolutions." A further article gave the board power to sell property


owned by the company on terms it thought fit. Shareholders at a meeting purported by ordinary resolution to direct the board to sell property and the board refused and relied on the articles. The Court held that unless an extraordinary resolution was passed, as provided for in the articles, the shareholders could not ignore the articles and give directions

3.

(c) The ever-increasing penalty provisions applying to the defaulting officer

and director (d) Fees and paperwork associated with compliance Under the Corporations Act there are a number of returns to be completed and some of these require filing fees, for example, filing of the Annual Return. There is also paperwork associated with meetings, accounts, and registers and there may be a need for auditors or at least accountants. These bureaucratic requirements may be seen as disadvantages to proprietors of businesses. THE COMPANY AS A SEPARATE LEGAL ENTITY A company is an artificial legal entity which enjoys rights and is subject to duties and obligations. It comprises a number of members, both natural and non natural persons. The company is also a separate legal entity and can have limited liability. Separate legal personality was firmly established in Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. Salomon had traded on his own as a leather merchant and shoe manufacturer for over thirty years. While his business was solvent he formed a company called "Aron Salomon and Company Limited" and sold his business to this company. The Companies Act 1862 (UK) required seven subscribers and Salomon, his wife and five children each subscribed one share to satisfy the statute. Salomon valued his business at 39,000 pounds which appeared to be an inflated figure. However instead of taking cash for the sale of the business, Salomon took 20,000 fully paid one pound shares in addition to debentures to the value of 10,000 pounds. These debentures were secured by a floating charge. The balance of the purchase price remained as an unsecured debt. Soon after the company came into financial difficulties and needed an injection of funds. In response, Salomon borrowed 5000 pounds from Broderip which he advanced to the company. To obtain this loan, Salomon had his debentures cancelled and reissued to Broderip, but on terms that he should obtain a residual benefit after the debt was discharged. Payments to Broderip fell into arrears and Broderip enforced his security. The company's liquidation followed. After Broderip was paid, there remained a balance of

3 See also NRMA v Parker (1986) 4 ACLC 609.


indebtedness secured by the debentures. Salomon claimed his reversionary entitlement. However if this claim was satisfied there would be no funds left to pay out the other unsecured creditors. The liquidator attempted to resist the claim by arguing that the debentures were invalid on the ground of fraud. At first instance, Vaughan Williams J

4, held that the company was merely acting as

Salomon's nominee and agent and therefore Salomon as principal had to indemnify the company's creditors personally. On appeal, the Court of Appeal in rejecting Salomon's appeal, held that Salomon was a trustee for the company which was his mere shadow. Salomon appealed to the House of Lords which rejected the lower courts' rulings. According to Lord MacNaghten

5:

"The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the

Memorandum and, although it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act. That is, I think, the declared intention of the enactment".

Lord Watson emphasised

6 that the creditors of the company could have searched the

Companies Register to ascertain the names of the shareholders and the number of shares which they held. However the failure to do this should not impute a charge of fraud against Salomon. Lord Herschell

7 looked at the intention of the statute in that it sought to protect

shareholders by limiting their liability. Lord Halsbury LC had a similar view. According to his Lordship there was no right to add to the requirements of the statute, nor to take from the requirements which had been enacted. "The sole guide must be the statute itself." Once a person was a shareholder they were shareholders for all purposes and the statute was silent as to the extent or degree of interest which had to be held by the individual corporators. Importantly Lord Halsbury added an important qualifier to the immutability of the separate legal entity doctrine. His Lordship said; "I am simply here dealing with the provisions of the statute, and it seems to me

to be essential to the artificial creation that the law should recognise only that artificial existence - quite apart from the motives or conduct of individual corporators. In saying this, I do not at all mean to suggest that if it could be

4 [1895] 2 Ch 323.

5 [1897] AC 22 at 51.

6 [1897] AC 22 at 40.

7 [1897] AC 22 at 45.


established that this provision of the statute to which I am adverting had not been complied with, you could not go behind the certificate of incorporation to show that a fraud had been committed upon the officer entrusted with the duty of giving the certificate and that by some proceeding in the nature of scire facias you could not prove the fact that the company had no legal existence. But short of such proof it seems to me impossible to dispute that once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself and that the motives of those who took part in the promotion of the company are absolutely irrelevant in discussing what those rights and liabilities are..."

From this judgment by the House of Lords the concept of "a company" was seen as a legal entity in its own right. The very heart of separation and independence from those involved in the company's management and structure was established as a result of Salomon's case. If creditors dealt with the company it was to the latter to which

recourse had to be made, not to those who were behind the entity. Over time this traditional perception would be severely eroded. Recent illustrations of the principle in Salomon's case appear in Lee v Lee's Air Farming [1961] AC 12 and Industrial Equity

Ltd v Blackburn (1977) 52 ALJR 89. In Lee v Lee's Air Farming (1961) AC 12, Lee formed a company, Lee's Air Farming Ltd, to carry on the business of aerial top-dressing. Lee held all the shares except for one which was held by his solicitor. Lee was governing director of the company and employed as its chief pilot. Lee was killed while working for the company when an aeroplane crashed. His widow sued under the company's workers' compensation insurance. The New Zealand Court of Appeal rejected the claim on the basis that since Lee was the governing director of the company, he could not also be its employee. His widow appealed to the Privy Council. The Court held that the company was a separate legal entity. According to Lord Morris: "A contractual relationship could only exist on the basis that there was

consensus between two contracting parties. It was never suggested (nor in their Lordships' view could it reasonably have been suggested) that the company was a sham or a mere simulacrum. It is well established that the mere fact someone is a director of a company is no impediment to his entering into a contract to serve the company. If, then, it be accepted that the respondent company was a legal entity their Lordships see no reason to challenge the validity of any contractual obligations which were created

between the company and the deceased." Lord Morris also said: "Always assuming that the company was not a sham then the capacity of the

company to make a contract with the deceased could not be impugned merely because the deceased was the agent of the company in its negotiation. The


deceased might have made a firm contract to serve the company for a fixed period of years. If within such period he had retired from the office of governing director and other directors had been appointed his contract would not have been affected. The circumstance that in his capacity as a shareholder he could control the course of events would not in itself affect the validity of his contractual relationship with the company. When, therefore, it is said that `one of his first acts was to appoint himself the only pilot of the company', it must be recognised that the appointment was made by the company, and that it was none the less a valid appointment because it was the deceased himself who acted as the agent of the company in arranging it. In their Lordships' view it is a logical consequence of the decision in Salomon's case that one person may function in dual capacities."

In Industrial Equity v Blackburn (1977) 52 ALJR 89, the High Court refused to treat a subsidiary company as merely part of its holding company for the purposes of determining the profits of the holding company because of the separate legal entity concept. In this case the question arose "whether in ascertaining the amount of profits available for distribution by a holding company by way of dividend, it is correct to look at the profit of the holding company itself or to the group profit as disclosed by the consolidated accounts." The court held that it was correct to do this. According to Mason J: "However, it can scarcely be contended that the provisions of the Act operate to

deny the separate legal personality of each company in a group. Thus, in the absence of contract creating some additional right, the creditors of company A, a subsidiary company within a group, can look only to that company for payment of their debts. They cannot look to company B, the holding company, for payment."

It should be noted that the provisions contained in sec 588V-588X of the Corporations

Law allows a liquidator to recover compensation from a holding company where its subsidiary has been involved in insolvent trading. This is discussed later in this Topic. MITIGATING THE RIGOUR OF THE SEPARATE LEGAL ENTITY DOCTRINE Once it was acknowledged that a company enjoyed a separate and legal existence apart from its members, another consideration needed to be dealt with, namely the rights of creditors. The fact that many companies were incorporated with limited liability further entrenched the notion that creditor's rights were limited. If creditors dealt with this separate legal entity in which members had limited liability, then any recourse which they may have had would be to the company itself. Thus the separate legal entity doctrine was a two-edged sword. On the one side the rights of members were limited and on the other side, a creditor practical ability to seek redress was limited. Courts and the legislature then had to balance these respective rights to prevent abuse. A starting point to analysing the quest for a balance can be found by examining the chequered history of limited liability in the corporation confine.


Limited liability found its inception with regards to companies in 1854 in the Limited

Liability Act8. The justification for its inception can be found in arguments conveniently

summarised by Farrar9 as follows:

limited liability allowed small capital to be turned to profitable employment;

it was a question of free trade against monopoly;

unlimited liability was impracticable and impeded work such as railways, canals

and docks;

unlimited liability prevented prudent men from becoming members of companies which were consequently being formed by the rash and reckless.

Interestingly, there were a number of arguments against the introduction of limited liability

10. Some of these arguments were:

limited liability was not a privilege to be given to partners but it was a right to be

taken from creditors; it encouraged people to trade beyond their means;

it led to speculation and fraud;

there was adequate capital available without it.

Up until the passing of the Limited Liability Act 1854, a form of limited liability existed in a practical sense in particular circumstances. For instance, it was common for clauses to be included in deeds of settlement and prospectuses

11 which limited the liability of

those behind the scheme. According to Gower12

: ..."[U]nlimited liability, though a danger to the risk taker, was often a snare and

a delusion rather than a protection to the public and no handicap at all to the dishonest promoter. The difficulties of suing a fluctuating body and the even greater difficulties of levying execution made the personal liability of the members largely illusory. Moreover, the investor was supposed to become a member by signing the deed of settlement and until he did so his identity would not be known by the creditors. But in fact `stags' would deal in allotment letters or scrip certificates to bearer without signing the deed and often before any

8 18 & 19 Vict. c133. This Act was repealed soon after and later incorporated in the Joint Stock

Companies Act 1856.

9 Farrar, J.H., Company Law, Butterworths 1985 ed. London, at 18.

10 Farrar, J.H., Company Law, Butterworths 1985 ed. London, at 18.

11 Such limiting clauses were held to be ineffective from 1854.

12 Gower LCB, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law 4th ed. 1979, Stevens & Sons London

at 36.


formal deed was in existence, and dishonest promoters, who alone might be under any legal liability, might disappear with the subscription moneys."

Despite these convenient ways of introducing limited liability and the arguments against it, Government intervention was not far away and the introduction of statutory limited liability was a by-product of such intervention. The form of this limited liability introduced by the Limited Liability Act 1854 was, however, subject to certain qualifications and it could be argued that right from the beginning, limited liability as it applied to companies was not going to be absolute. The qualifications to enjoying limited liability were built into this initial legislation. For example: the company needed to have at least 25 members holding 10 pound shares of

which 20% had been paid up; three-quarters of the company's capital needed to have been subscribed;

the word "limited" was to have been included as part of the company's name;

directors of such limited liability companies were personally liable when they

paid a dividend knowing the company to be insolvent or made loans to the members;

the company had to wind up if three-quarters of the capital was lost.

The Limited Liability Act 1854 was soon repealed and later its provisions were incorporated in the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. This latter Act allowed incorporation with limited liability with minimal restrictions and it removed most of the qualifications contained under the 1854 Act mentioned above, although directors were still to be liable for payment of dividends when the company was insolvent. In fact, all that was necessary to incorporate was for a minimum of seven persons to sign and register a memorandum of association. According to Gower

13:

..."[T]he legislature had adopted Lord Bramwell's recommendations and

accepted his view that those who dealt with companies knowing them to be limited had only themselves to blame if they burnt their fingers. The mystic

word `Limited' was intended to act as a red flag warning the public of the perils which they faced if they had dealings with the dangerous new invention." [bold added]

The question which can be asked is whether the colour of this `red flag' has faded? Historically, creditors have been precluded from recovering from shareholders or directors an amount in excess of the unpaid amounts on their shares, yet both the courts and the legislature have widened the gaps in the corporate veil. As mentioned

13 Gower LCB, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law 4th ed. 1979, Stevens & Sons London

at 48.


at the beginning of this Chapter a number of situations now exist whereby directors and others who take part in management of a corporation will be personally liable for debts incurred by the company. This liability may be exclusive personal liability or concurrent liability with the company. Whatever the liability, the distinct legal personality pronounced in Salomon's case

14 by the House of Lords has been shown,

on occasions, not to be an immutable principle. Both the legislators and the courts lift the corporate veil and seek out the realities of the situation. They may deny the usual legal consequences of incorporation and of the red flag. Further legislation directly imposes personal liability upon management. Limited liability is not sacrosanct and the principle in Salomon's case no longer rules. Since the decision in Salomon's case there has been a steady stream of common law decisions and legislative enactments which have eroded the immutability of the separate legal entity doctrine and have thus exposed officers to personal liability to a company's creditors. These decisions and enactments are conveniently seen as ways to `lift or pierce the corporate veil'

15.

According to Easterbrook and Fischel, "piercing seems to happen freakishly ... like lightning, it is rare, severe and unprincipled."

16 But this so called freakish happening

has occurred on a number of grounds. Farrar notes that17

: "... [I]t is difficult to rationalise the cases except under the broad, rather

question-begging heading of policy and by describing the main categories under which they fall. These are:

agency;

fraud;

group enterprises;

trusts;

enemy;

14 [1897] AC 22.

15 In Qintex Australia finance Ltd v Schroders Australia Ltd (1991) 9 ACLC 109, Rogers CJ

suggested that the whole issue of the separateness of the corporate legal entity be re-examined in

the light of the so-called tension between the realities of commercial life and the applicable law.

Although his Honour in the case at hand had to determine which company in the Qintex group of

companies should be able to claim the benefit of the contract entered into, a number of more

general remarks were made concerning the separate legal entity doctrine. According to his

Honour, (at p 111) it may be desirable "for Parliament to consider whether this distinction between

the law and commercial practice should be maintained. This is especially the case today when the

many corporate collapses of conglomerates occasion many disputes."

16 Easterbrook FH and Fischel DR., Limited Liability and the Corporation, (1985) Uni of Chicago Law

Review 7 at 89.

17 Farrar JH., Company Law, 1985 ed, Butterworths, London at 57. This categorisation was

accepted by Young J, in Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 467 at

474.


tax;

the Companies Act itself." We will now analyse some of these grounds under the convenient headings of "common law" and "statute". (1) Common Law (a) Fraudulent use of the corporate form Lord Halsbury in Salomon's case acknowledged that the corporate veil will not protect a fraudulent person hiding behind the corporate structure. Illustrative of this is the decision in Gilford Motors Co Ltd v Horne [1933] 1 Ch D 935.

In this case the defendant was employed under a service contract as managing director of the plaintiff company. As part of this contract he was forbidden, when ceasing his employment with the company, from taking away the plaintiff's customers. The defendant left the plaintiff company, formed a competitive business and a company in which he was one of three shareholders. The new company solicited the plaintiff's customers and the plaintiff sought an injunction restraining this conduct. The defendant argued that he was not soliciting customers of the plaintiff and that if there was any solicitation, it was from a separate legal entity, namely the new company which had no contract with the plaintiff. This argument was rejected by the Court. According to Lord Hanworth MR

18, the new company was a "mere cloak or sham" for

the defendant, its purpose was to enable the defendant to engage in a business in breach of the covenant contained in his contract with the plaintiff. In Re FG (Films) Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 483, an American company owned most of the shares in an English company and exercised control over it. The American company financed and produced a film in India and then caused the English company to apply for a subsidy under the Cinematograph Films Act 1938 (UK). A subsidy would have been paid if the film was made by a British film maker. It was held that no subsidy should be paid as the British company had acted as a mere nominee and agent of the American company. According to Vaisey J

19:

"[T]he British company's intervention in the matter was purely colourable. They

were brought into existence for the sole purpose of being put forward as having undertaken the very elaborate arrangements necessary for the making of this film and of enabling it to qualify as a British film."

Similarly in Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832, Lipman agreed to sell land to Jones. Before completion of the contract, Lipman transferred the land to a company of which

18 [1933] 1 Ch D 935 at 956.

19 [1953] 1 WLR 483 at p 486.


he and a clerk employed by his solicitors were the only shareholders and directors. Jones brought an action for specific performance of the contract against both Lipman and the company. The Court held that the company was a sham and ordered specific performance of the contract. According to Russell J: "The defendant company is the creature of the first defendant, a device and a

sham, a mask which he holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition

by the eye of equity." In Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd (1992) 10 ACLC 3052, Creasey worked for Breachwood Welwyn Ltd as its general manager pursuant to a written contract. This company carried on the business of a garage trading in cars from premises owned by Breachwood Motors Ltd. F and S were the shareholders and directors of both these companies. In 1988, Creasey was dismissed by Breachwood Welwyn Ltd and he claimed damages for wrongful dismissal against this company. In November 1988, Breachwood Welwyn Ltd ceased trading and in December 1988 Breachwood Motors Ltd took over its business and continued its operations under the same trading name. This takeover was carried out without regard to the separate entity of Breachwood Welwyn Ltd and the interests of its creditors, especially Creasey, if his claim for wrongful dismissal were to succeed. As a result of the actions of F, S and Breachwood Motors Ltd, Creasey found himself with a judgement against Breachwood Welwyn Ltd, an insolvent company, the assets of which had been removed to Breachwood Motors Ltd. Breachwood Motors Ltd refused to meet any part of the judgement. One of the questions which had to be decided was whether the corporate veil could be pierced? The Court held that the corporate veil could be pierced. Nothing could justify F and S's conduct in deliberately shifting Breachwood Welwyn Ltd's assets and business into Breachwood Motors Ltd in total disregard of their duties as directors and shareholders. This meant that Breachwood Motors Ltd were liable for the liability of Breachwood Welwyn. (b) Agency In some circumstances a company may act as an agent for others, for example, shipping agents or investment brokers. Moreover, it is possible for a company to act as the agent for its own shareholders. This may be done by express contract or impliedly. In Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corp [1939] 4 All ER 116, Birmingham Corporation, a local council, compulsorily acquired premises owned by the Birmingham Waste Co. Ltd. This company was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Smith,


Stone & Knight Ltd. Indeed, of the 502 issued shares in the waste company, 497 were held by Smith, Stone & Knight and the other 5 were held on its behalf. The Waste Company had no staff, no separate books of account and on the evidence it was treated like one of Smith, Stone & Knight's departments. Accordingly a claim for compensation for loss of business was made by Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. Birmingham Corporation argued that Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. could not succeed because the loss had been sustained by the waste company - a separate legal entity. The Court held that compensation was payable as the Waste Company was carrying on no business of its own but was in fact carrying on the Smith, Stone & Knight business as agent for them. Atkinson J held that the following six factors must be proven in order to show the requisite agency relationship and thus be able to lift the corporate veil: Profits of the subsidiary must be treated as profits of the holding company;

Those conducting the subsidiary's business must be appointed by the holding

company; The holding company must be the head and brain of the trading venture;

The holding company must be in control of the venture and must decide what

capital should be spent and what should be done; The profits made by the subsidiary's business must be made by the holding

company's skill and direction; and The holding company must be in constant and effective control.

This decision was adopted in Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd & ors (1987) 5 ACLC 467. In this case a dispute occurred between major competitors in a concreting industry. Hi-Quality Concrete (Holdings) Pty Ltd was the holding company for a large group of companies, known as the Hi-Quality group. This group was under the control of Messrs Hargreaves, Ward and Armstrong. Hi-Quality Concrete (NSW) was part of this group and was a fully-owned subsidiary of the holding company. In 1982 Hargreaves, Ward and Armstrong together with Hi-Quality Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd and Hi-Quality Concrete (Holdings) Pty Ltd entered into a deed with the plaintiff. In the deed "Hi-Quality" was defined as Hi-Quality Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd. In 1985 the holding company entered into transactions which were alleged to be in breach of this deed. The other members of the group denied any breach of the agreement on the basis that they were not parties to the 1985 transactions and that the holding company was not a party to the 1982 deed. The Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the specific provision defining "Hi-Quality" meant that the holding company was specifically excluded from the promises


in the 1982 deed and therefore could not be in breach of the deed. Young J acknowledged the separateness of the legal entities involved and held that on the facts there could be no imputation of the promise by the subsidiary to the holding company. In other words the corporate veil could not be lifted. Importantly the court could not infer an agency agreement, nor could they find a partnership between the companies in the group or a sham or a facade

20. Further there was "no question of a

corporation being formed for the sole purpose or for the dominant purpose of evading ... a contractual or fiduciary obligation."

21

According to Young J

22, the corporate veil would not be lifted when it appears that

"there was a good commercial purpose for having separate companies in the group performing different functions even though the ultimate controllers would very naturally lapse into speaking of the whole group as `us'." This issue was also examined in Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1987) 7 ACLC

841. In this case Briggs suffered from a medical condition allegedly caused by negligence of his employer. His employer was a subsidiary of the defendant. In an action against both his employer and its holding company, one argument which had to be addressed was whether the corporate veil could be lifted so as to find the holding company liable. The New South Wales Court of Appeal admitted to the possibility of the veil being lifted and remitted the case back for determination. (c) Groups of companies Companies may form part of a group of companies where for example, they operate with a holding company and subsidiaries. On occasion, courts will regard the entities as one. In DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council

[1976] 1 WLR 852, three companies in a group of food distributors were treated by the court as one

23. In this case one company, D.H.N. Food Distributors [DHN], owned

and controlled a business of importing and distributing groceries. It operated out of a warehouse which was owned by a subsidiary, called Bronze Investments Ltd. Vehicles which were used in the business were owned by another subsidiary, D.H.N. Food Transport Ltd. DHN held all the shares in both the subsidiaries and the companies had common directors. In 1969 the local council, known as Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, made a compulsory purchase order so as to acquire the land on which was built the warehouse. DHN was unable to relocate and the business subsequently closed down. On the issue of compensation, there were two factors to consider. First, the value of

20 (1987) 5 ACLC 467 at 476.

21 (1987) 5 ACLC 467 at 477.

22 (1987) 5 ACLC 467 at 476.

23 Indeed Lord Denning described the case as the "three in one". Three companies in one or

alternatively as the "one in three". One group of three companies. See [1976] 1 WLR 852 at 857.


the land and secondly compensation for disturbance in having the business closed down. On the first issue, the council offered and paid an agreed sum to Bronze Investments Ltd. However with regards to the "disturbance value", the council argued that none was payable as Bronze Investments were not disturbed. The council admitted that both DHN and DHN Food Distributors Ltd were disturbed, however they argued that those two companies were not entitled to any compensation at all because they had no interest in the land. The council argued that DHN was only a licensee of Bronze Investments Ltd. Under the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (UK) if a person has no greater interest than a tenant from year to year in the land, then he is only entitled to compensation for that lesser interest. As a licensee can be evicted on short notice, the compensation payable to DHN would be negligible. The English Court of Appeal treated the companies as one economic entity and following from this, DHN could be treated as owner of the property and was thus entitled to compensation for disturbance to its business

24. According to Lord

Denning25

: "We all know that in many respects a group of companies are treated together

for the purpose of general accounts, balance sheet, and profit and loss account. They are treated as one concern. Professor Gower in Modern Company Law (3rd ed., 1969), p 216 says: ... `there is evidence of a general tendency to ignore the separate legal entities of various companies within a group, and to look instead at the economic entity of the whole group.' This is especially the case when a parent company owns all the shares of the subsidiaries - so much so that it can control every movement of the subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are bound hand and foot to the parent company and must do just what the parent says ... They should not be treated separately so as to be defeated on a technical point. They should not be deprived of the compensation which should justly be payable for disturbance. The three companies should, for present purposes, be treated as one, and the parent company DHN should be treated as that one

26."

Lord Goff also believed that this was a case in which one was entitled to look at the realities of the situation and to pierce the corporate veil. In his Lordship's opinion

27:

"I would not at this juncture accept that in every case where one has a group of

companies one is entitled to pierce the veil, but in this case the two subsidiaries were both wholly-owned; further they had no separate business operations

24 For a discussion on this point see Re Securitbank Ltd [1978] 1 NZLR 97 at 133 and Industrial

Equity Ltd v Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 567.

25 [1976] 1 WLR 852 at 860.

26 The decision in DHN was approved in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas

Commerce International Bank Ltd [1983] QB 84. However the case was distinguished in Woolfson

v Strathclyde Regional Council (1978) 38 P & CR 521. Lord Keith of Kinkel at 526 expressed

doubt as to whether the decision in DHN correctly applied the principle that it is appropriate to

pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist indicating that it is a mere facade

concealing the true facts.

27 [1976] 1 WLR 852 at 861.


whatsoever; third, in my judgment, the nature of the question involved is highly relevant, namely, whether the owners of this business have been disturbed in their possession and enjoyment of it."

An Australian illustration of this "group enterprise" circumstance occurred in Hobart Bridge Co Ltd (in liq) v Commissioner of Taxation (1951-52) 25 ALJ 225. In this case the appellant was granted a franchise to build a bridge across the Derwent river in Tasmania. The company's source of revenue was to include profit from the subdivision and sale of land adjacent to the bridge. The promoter had secured options over the land and a subsidiary company was formed to purchase it. The appellant held approximately nine-tenths of the shares in the subsidiary. No sales of land were made by the subsidiary, however some preparatory work was done. An Act was passed whereby the government acquired all the undertaking of the appellant and later they acquired all of the shares in the subsidiary company. By the share transactions the appellant made a substantial profit. The respondent treated this profit as assessable income earned pursuant to a profit-making scheme of which the subsidiary was the "collecting medium". The High Court rejected this and held that the subsidiary was not to be deemed the medium or machinery for a scheme. There was to be no lifting of the corporate veil simply because the formation of the subsidiary reduces tax liability. The subsidiary had a real existence and a valid reason for its incorporation. Kitto J referred

28 to the judgment of Lord Sumner in Gas Light Improvement Co v

Inland Revenue Commissioners29

where his Lordship stated: "It is said that all this was `Machinery' but that is true of all participations in

limited liability companies. They and their operations are simply the machinery, in an economic sense, by which natural persons, who desire to limit their liability, participate in undertakings which they cannot manage to carry on themselves, either alone or in partnership, but, legally speaking, this machinery is not impersonal though it is inanimate. Between the investor, who participates as a shareholder, and the undertaking carried on, the law interposes another person, real though artificial, the company itself, and the business carried on is the business of that company, and the capital employed is its capital and not in either case the business or the capital of the shareholders. Assuming, of course, that the company is duly formed and is not a sham (of which there is no suggestion here), the idea that it is mere machinery for effecting the purposes of the shareholders is a layman's fallacy. It is a figure of speech, which cannot

alter the legal aspects of the facts." In Qintex Australia Finance Ltd v Schroders Australia Ltd (1991) 9 ACLC 109, Rogers CJ suggested that the whole issue of the separateness of the corporate legal entity be re-examined in the light of the so-called tension between the realities of commercial

28 (1951-52) 25 ALJR 225 at 228.

29 [1923] AC 723 at 740-741.


life and the applicable law. Although the court in the case at hand had to determine which company in the Qintex group of companies should be able to claim the benefit of the contract entered into, a number of more general remarks were made concerning the separate legal entity doctrine. According to Rogers CJ it may be desirable

30:

"... [F]or Parliament to consider whether this distinction between the law and

commercial practice should be maintained. This is especially the case today when the many corporate collapses of conglomerates occasion many disputes."

In Briggs v James Hardie Co Pty Ltd (1989) 7 ACLC 841 Rogers AJA noted that complete domination or control over a subsidiary may not by itself lead to the corporate veil being lifted. Further the judge suggested

31 that different considerations

should apply when this veil is to be lifted in tortious situation as compared with actions based in contract and taxation. 2. Statute - Corporations Act Under the Corporations Act there are numerous illustrations of personal liability attaching to management despite the company structure being in existence and perhaps being the entity which contractually dealt with a third party. (a) Section 183 Promoters who enter pre-registration contacts

32 may incur personal liability to those

with whom they dealt on behalf of a non-existent entity, irrespective of any contractual intention. This is due to the operation of section 131of the Corporations Act. Bay v

Illawong Stationery Pty Ltd (1986) 4 ACLC 429. See also sections 711, 728 and 729. (b) Section 153 This section requires a company to set out its name on all its public documents and negotiable instruments. It is a strict liability offence for breach. In an English case, Jenice Pty Ltd v Dan (1994) 12 ACLC 3209 a company's cheques bore the name "Primkeen Limited" when its name was "Primekeen Ltd". A cheque which was later dishonoured was issued and signed by a director and the payee attempted to make the director liable. The Court held that the director was not liable. The company's name was mentioned notwithstanding the typographical error. This was different from

30 (1991) 9 ACLC 109 at 111.

31 (1989) 7 ACLC 841 at 863. This was also the view of Lord Goff in DHN Food distributors v Tower

Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852.

32 Courtney, W., “Failed Pre-registration Contracts and the Statutory Remedy”, (2007) 25 C & SLJ

226.


omitting the whole name. (c) Sections 588G-588Z (Insolvent Trading) When a company has a liquidity crisis its directors need to take special care in their dealings with those outside the company and, as part of this practice, directors need to consider their company's ability to pay all its debts as and when they become due. This is particularly so when the company is in financial difficulty or where some form of financial management structure is in place. If a reasonably competent director would conclude that the company lacks the capacity to repay its obligations or would lack that capacity after incurring the debt, they should not cause the company to incur further debts, otherwise they risk being found personally liable. Division 3 of Part 5.7B of the Corporations Act contains the current Commonwealth

provisions which regulate the practice known as “insolvent trading” as it applies to corporations. The relevant sections within that Part, ss 588G – 588Y commenced operation on and from the 23 June 1993. These sections were designed to replace the insolvent trading provisions that are contained in ss 592-593 of the Corporations

Act33

. However, these latter provisions continue to apply to debts incurred prior to 23 June 1993 in circumstances amounting to insolvent trading. The heading to Division 3 of Part 5.7B of the Act is titled, “Director‟s Duty to Prevent

Insolvent Trading”. That heading is regarded as part of the Corporations Act in consequence of the operation of s 109D. As has been seen in the context of other forms of association, insolvent trading has also been regulated where that conduct occurs in respect of co-operatives and incorporated non-profit associations. There is no equivalent to insolvent trading at common law. The elements of the regulation of this activity is set out below. The obligation to prevent a company incurring a debt in the circumstances set out in s 588G(1) of the Corporations Act Section 588G(2) of the Corporations Act imposes a duty upon directors to prevent a company from incurring a debt in the circumstances set out in s 588G(1) of that Act.

33 It should be noted that ss 592(6) and 593(2) of the Corporations Act also deals with conduct

known as fraudulent trading. These provisions have not been replaced and this means that these

parts of ss 592 and 593 are still operative in regards to fraudulent trading notwithstanding that the

debts were incurred after the 23 June 1993. However, with regards to insolvent trading, a

preliminary issue of ascertaining the date the debt was incurred must be made. If debts were

incurred after 23 June 1993 in these circumstances ss 588G - 588Y will apply. For debts incurred

prior to this date in similar circumstances, ss 592(1)-(5),(7),(8), 593(1) and (4)-(8) apply as long as

s 589 is satisfied.


Section 588G(1) applies if: (a) a person was a director of a company at the time when the company incurs a debt;

and

(b) the company is insolvent at the time, or becomes insolvent by incurring that debt, or by

incurring at that time debts including that debt; and

(c) at that time, there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company is

insolvent, or would so become insolvent, as the case may be; and

(d) that time is at or after the commencement of the Corporations Act.

For the purposes of s 588G, if a company takes action set out in column 2 of the following table, it incurs a debt at the time set out in column 3: s 588G(1A).

When debts are incurred [operative table]

Action of company When debt is incurred

1 paying a dividend when the dividend is paid or, if the company has a constitution that provides for the declaration of dividends, when the dividend is declared

2 making a reduction of share capital to which Division 1 of Part 2J.1 applies (other than a reduction that consists only of the cancellation of a share or shares for no consideration)

when the reduction takes effect

3 buying back shares (even if the consideration is not a sum certain in money)

when the buy-back agreement is entered into

4 redeeming redeemable preference shares that are redeemable at its option

when the company exercises the option

5 issuing redeemable preference shares that are redeemable otherwise than at its option

when the shares are issued

6 financially assisting a person to acquire shares (or units of shares) in itself or a holding company

when the agreement to provide the assistance is entered into or, if there is no agreement, when the assistance is provided

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s9.html#constitution

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s601waa.html#cancel


When debts are incurred [operative table]

Action of company When debt is incurred

7 entering into an uncommercial transaction (within the meaning of section 588FB) other than one that a court orders, or a prescribed agency directs, the company to enter into

when the transaction is entered into

By failing to prevent the company from incurring the debt, the person contravenes s 588G if: (a) the person is aware at that time that there are such grounds for so

suspecting; or (b) a reasonable person in a like position in a company in the company's

circumstances would be so aware: s 588G(2). Section 588G(2) is a civil penalty provision

34.

Further, a person commits an offence if: (a) a company incurs a debt at a particular time; and

(aa) at that time, a person is a director of the company; and

(b) the company is insolvent at that time, or becomes insolvent by incurring that

debt, or by incurring at that time debts including that debt; and

(c) the person suspected at the time when the company incurred the debt that the company was insolvent or would become insolvent as a result of incurring that debt or other debts (as in paragraph (1)(b)); and

(d) the person's failure to prevent the company incurring the debt was dishonest: s 588G(3).

For the purposes of an offence based on s 588G(3), absolute liability35

applies to paragraph (3)(a): s 588G(3A). For the purposes of an offence based on s 588G(3), strict liability

36 applies to paragraphs (3)(aa) and (b): s 588G(3B).

The provisions of Division 4 of Part 5.7B are additional to, and do not derogate from, Part 9.4B as it applies in relation to a contravention of s 588G: s 588G(4).

34 See s 1317E(1).

35 For absolute liability, see section 6.2 of the Criminal Code.

36 For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s9.html#company

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s761a.html#person





http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s9.html#civil_penalty_provision


http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s9.html#offence



http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s9.html#director



http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s9.html#insolvent









http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s9.html#offence_based_on

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s1371.html#liability

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s9.html#offence_based_on


http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s1371.html#this_part

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s1317e.html




According to para 1229 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992, which inserted these provisions:

A court would be expected to look at two separate issues when considering whether the duty had been breached. The first matter would be what circumstances that particular company was in, including the size of the company, the type of the company, the nature of its enterprise, the provisions of its articles, the composition of its board and the distribution of work between the board and other officers. The second matter that a court would be expected to look at would be, in the light of the circumstances referred to, what would a reasonable person in the position of director normally be expected to do to ensure that he or she would be aware of any insolvency problem. In

particular a court might expect the following:

that directors of a large company would ensure that among their number there should be one or more who are talented in the field of corporate financial management;

that directors of a large company should read, be able to understand and seek any necessary clarification of the key financial information put before the board, such as a balance sheet and a profit and loss statement;

that the board ensure that appropriately skilled people are engaged to carry out the company's accounting functions;

that the board would require relevant accounting information to be supplied ahead of regular board meetings at which key financial decisions are to be made, and that, where a significant borrowing is to be undertaken, the management should supply the board with a statement of the company's current financial position as well as the particulars of the way in which the principle, interest and other charges are to be serviced over the anticipated term of the loan;

that the board make arrangements for monitoring the use of any authorisation granted in relation to the use of the company seal, the entering into contracts with financiers or the signing of cheques and bills of exchange; and

where the nature of the business may expose the company to a high risk of sudden liquidity restriction, or the company is known by the director to be in a delicate financial position, that extra care and more rigorous safeguards may be adopted.

Importantly, there is nothing in sec 588G which necessitates the winding up of the company as a precondition to activating the section. However, it can be argued that


the heading to Part 5.7 (including Part 5.7B in which ss 588G - 588Y are located) makes it clear that s 588G is part of particular legislation concerned with the recovery of property or compensation after a winding up has begun. Furthermore, some of the sections related to s 588G, such as ss 588M and 588R, reinforce the view that they operate only where the company is being wound up. In contrast, other related sections such as ss 588J and 588K, are not expressed to be contingent upon winding up occurring, and it is arguable that these particular sections are not confined to winding up situations. Elements of section 588G Element One – was a person a director?

Section 588G(1) requires proof that a person was a director at the time when a company incurs a debt. In this regard, the definition of “director” contained in s 9 needs to be kept in mind. This definition, includes directors who are properly appointed, defacto directors and, possibly, shadow directors: see Taylormaid Marine

Industries Pty Ltd v Beaurepaire & Ors (1987) 5 ACLC 253; 3M Australia Pty Ltd v

Kemish (1986) 4 ACLC 185. In relation to shadow directors, it was argued in Buzzle

Operations Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 233 that s 588G did not apply to shadow directors. A final conclusion in that case was not given on the issue: see [2010] NSWSC 233 at [232] – [237]. The definition also includes alternate directors: see Playcorp Pty Ltd v Shaw & ors (1993) 11 ACLC 641. Unlike predecessor insolvent trading provisions

37, s 588G is not expressly drafted to

apply to “persons who take part in management” unless they are directors in the sense used in s 9. Under the earlier extended application of the provisions, executive officers such as the company secretary, financial controllers and "in house" legal advisers could have been caught if they took part in management in the relevant sense: see Holpitt Pty Ltd v Swaab & ors (1992) 10 ACLC 64. Element Two - the company must have incurred a debt Another requirement is that the company must have incurred a debt. This involves an examination of two requirements. First, what qualifies as a “debt” for the purposes of the section and, secondly what is involved in the “incurring” of a debt. The meaning of `debt' The meaning of the word “debt” is not defined in the legislation. However it has been interpreted to bear its ordinary technical meaning as something recoverable by an action for debt and thus must be ascertained or capable of being ascertained: Hussein v Good (1990) 1 ACSR 710. In Deputy Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v

37 See, for example, s 592 of the Corporations Act.


Abbott & Anor (1980) CLC 40-667 it was held at 34,430 that:

The word `debts' means something recoverable by an action for debt and nothing can be recovered in an action for debts except that which is ascertained or can be ascertained.; see Ogden's Ltd v Weinberg (1906) 95 L.T. per Lord Davey at p.567.

Therefore, a “debt” refers to an obligation for the payment of money or money’s worth and there is authority to suggest that the obligation must be for an ascertained liquidated sum: 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Watt (1984) 9 ACLR 503. This view was accepted in relation to one of the statutory predecessor sections to s 588G and followed by Master Seaman in Jelin Pty Ltd v Johnstone & Anor (1987) 5 ACLC 463. The word “debt” is used in its ordinary sense: see 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Watt & Anor; NEC Home Electronics Australia Pty Ltd v White & Anor (1984) 2 ACLC 621 and does

not include all debts which may eventually be provable in the winding up of a company: Box Valley Pty Ltd v Kidd [2006] NSWCA 26 at [14]. Further, in Fliway

transport Pty Ltd v Soper (1988) 21 NSWLR 19; 14 ACLR 690; 7 ACLC 129, it was held that for a debt to fall due it must at least be recoverable by legal action. Importantly, it has been held that a “debt” for the purposes of the insolvent trading provisions includes a quantum meruit liability: Edwards v Australian Securities and

Investments Commission [2010] 76 ACSR 369 at [2] and [80 and following]. However, claims for: unliquidated damages: Jelin Pty Ltd v Johnstone & Anor (1987) 5 ACLC 463;

Box Valley Pty Ltd v Kidd [2006] NSWSCCA 26 at [61]; New Cap Reinsurance

Corp Ltd (in liq) v Grant (2008) 221 FLR 164; 68 ACSR 176;

a potential liability for damages: Reed International Books Australia v King (1993) 11 ACLC 935 at 938;

outstanding interest: BL Lange & Co v Bird (1991) 9 ACLC 1015;

taxes, which are due and payable and which may even be deemed to be debts owing to the crown: Castrisios v McManus; McManus v Castrisios (1991) 9 ACLC 287; Hall v Poolman (2007) 215 FLR 243; 65 ACSR 123.

have been held not to be “debts” for the purposes of the insolvent trading provisions: s 588G. However, claims for outstanding workers compensation premiums have been held to be debts within the meaning of those provisions: State Government Insurance Corp v. Pollock (1993) 11 ACLC 839. Also, quantum meruit claims have been held to be debts: Edwards v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] NSWCA 424 at [1], [2] – [5] and [80] – [88]. Finally, the fact that a company's liability to pay a debt has been extinguished (subject to proofs of debt) upon a winding up, does not


mean that directors will avoid liability as creditors have a vested right to sue the officer: see Ross McConnel Kitchen & Co. Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ross & Ors (1985) 5 ACLC 326 at 329. Contingent debts have presented special problems. In CAC v Shapowloff (1974) CLC 27,964, the defendant, by telephone, allegedly ordered 5,000 shares from a broker on behalf of his company. The terms were that the company would pay for them only when the broker received the scrip. In other words, the liability remained contingent until the scrip was received. The broker obtained these shares in 29 transactions and 29 contract notes were forwarded to the company. The shares were not paid for and the company was wound up. The defendant was charged with knowingly being a party to contracting a debt provable in the winding up of that company having, at the time the debt was contracted, no reasonable or probable ground of expectation of the company being able to pay. A declaration was sought from the Supreme Court. Before any evidence was taken in the Supreme Court, the matter was referred to Jacobs P in the Court of Appeal, who at 27,977 declared that, as to the meaning of the word “debt” in the section:

where a series of contracts is made from time to time which result in a liability on behalf of the company to pay in respect of each of them, then each such liability constitutes a debt; and the time when each such debt is contracted is the time when each respective liability arises, and not the time or times when the balance is declared or computed.

It was held that contingent debts should be included within the meaning of the word "debt", and that liability arose when the contract notes were delivered to the company. Notwithstanding these comments on contingent debts, it appears that some divergence of opinion developed in relation to whether contingent debts are "debts" within the meaning of the insolvent trading provisions. In Hussein v Good (1990) 8 ACLC 390. In the defendant, a director of a clothing retail company, ordered a range of clothing from the plaintiff, a manufacturer. The date of delivery was originally to be March 1988 but this, by agreement, was changed to 3 May 1988. Payment was to be made upon delivery. Part of the total goods were delivered on 3 May 1988 but no payment was made. A few days later money was collected by the plaintiff, however one of the cheques used for payment was dishonoured. Before notice of dishonour was given, the remainder of the goods were delivered. No further payment was made. On 16 May 1988 the defendant's accountant advised the defendant to put the company into voluntary liquidation. The company was placed under the control of a liquidator. The company was placed under the control of a liquidator. The plaintiff claimed against the defendant pursuant to s 556 of the Companies Code (a statutory predecessor to ss 588G and 592).


The Court held that the date to determine whether there were reasonable grounds to expect that the company could not pay all its debts as and when they became due was in May 1988 and that, at that date, the defendant did not expect the debt would be paid. A debt, it was held (at 397), meant "what is owed, state of owing something". Here nothing was owed until the delivery of the manufactured garments. According to Southwell J at 397, Shapowloff was distinguishable from the present case:

I see some difficulty in drawing an analogy between the particular circumstances surrounding transaction between a purchaser of shares and his agent, the broker, where the creation of a contingent liability can usually be expected to become a present indebtedness very quickly, perhaps upon the same day, and a case where, as in the present case, a trader in goods places an order with a manufacturer in circumstances where any contingent liability, if there was one, would not become a present indebtedness until some months thereafter.

The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the date on which the debt was incurred was November 1987, when the goods were ordered. In Hawkins & ors v Bank of China (1992) 10 ACLC 588, it was held that "debts" can include a contingent liability

38. According to Gleeson CJ at 595:

`Debt' is capable of including a contingent liability ... Dictionaries define `debt' as a liability or obligation to pay or render something. Such a liability may be

conditional as well as present and absolute.

See also Box Valley Pty Ltd v Kidd & Anor [2006] NSWCA 26 at [15] and [69]. The meaning of “incurring a debt” Predecessor legislation to s 588G covered situations where the defendant was knowingly a party to the contracting of a debt by the company. For example:

the purchase of shares via a telephone order: Shapowloff v Dunn (1981) ACLC 33,127

purchase of goods and services: Deputy Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Abbott & anor (1980) CLC 40-667, DeRossi v Hamilton (1982) 7 ACLR 40, and Flavel v Day (1985) 3 ACLC 320;

entering into contracts to help build project homes: Southern Highlands

Building Co. Pty Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act (1979) ACLC 40-516; arranging for advances to be made to the company.

38 (1992) 10 ACLC 588 at 595. Kirby P also agreed at 599 with this conclusion.


The question is, is s 588G restricted to debts which have been contracted? The answer to that question must be no and, as the section is clearly broad enough to include situations where a company may still have been regarded as incurring a debt notwithstanding that it may not be due to a legally enforceable contract (or indeed any contract) but in consequence of the application of equitable principles such as unjust enrichment or equitable estoppel: see also Metal Component Industries Pty Ltd (in liq)

v Clark & Anor (1980) ACLR 862. In Standard Chartered Bank v Antico (1995) 131 ALR 1 Hodgson J stated at 57 that:

a company incurs a debt when, by its choice, it does or omit something which, as a matter of substance and commercial reality, renders it liable for a debt which it otherwise would not have been liable.

Further, in ASIC v Plymin (No 1) (2003) 46 ACSR 126 Mandie J noted the following at 247:

the weight of authority shows that a debt can be incurred when the contract giving rise to the debt is entered into, even if contingencies affect the debt or the debt is a future debt. In the case of a future debt, it may be incurred at the time of entering the contract if it is then an ascertained or an ascertainable amount. By the same token, a debt may in appropriate circumstances be incurred within the meaning of the section at a time later than the entry of the contract under which the debt arises or may arise. Although it is necessary to consider the terms of the relevant contract, the question when the debt is incurred within the meaning of this section does not depend on strict legal analysis but turns on when, in substance and commercial reality, the company is exposed to the relevant liability.

Also, in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edwards (2005) 220 ALR 148; 54 ACSR 583; [2005] NSWSC 831 it was stated that incurring, a debt involves any "act, omission or other circumstance which causes the company to owe the debt.” The problem with ascertaining whether a debt has been incurred has been confronted by the courts. In Jelin Pty Ltd v Johnson & Anor (1987) 5 ACLC 463, the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant because it had been deprived of a judgment debt. This judgment debt was given by the Federal Court in relation to mis-leading statements made by servants of the company. The plaintiff submitted that the relevant debt was incurred either when the plaintiff introduced funds into the business on the faith of the misleading statements of the servants or agents, or when the Federal Court gave its judgment. Master Seaman QC said at 465 that neither on the day on which the misrepresentations were made, nor on the day when judgment was given by the court awarding damages, nor on any day between these two days, did the company `incur a debt'. A similar conclusion was reached in relation to a liability to pay taxation: see Castrisios


v McManus; McManus v Castrisios (1991) 9 ACLC 287 at 296. In Hawkins & ors v Bank of China (1992) 10 ACLC 588 it was held that the giving of guarantee constituted the incurring of a debt. The liability incurred under the guarantee was to pay an already-accrued sum which was a liquidated amount. Even though it was unusual to say that the company may not have incurred a debt at the time when it had given the guarantee, nevertheless, according to Gleeson CJ and Sheller JA, it was proper to say that the company incurred a debt to the bank at some stage. Gleeson CJ noted at 595:

The words ìncurs' and `debt' are not words of precise and inflexible denotation. Where they appear in sec 556 they are to be applied in a practical and commonsense fashion, consistent with the context and with the statutory purposes ... the word ìncurs' takes its meaning from its context and is apt to describe, in an appropriate case, the undertaking of an engagement to pay a sum of money at a future time, even if the engagement is conditional and the amount involved is uncertain. Once it is accepted that `debt' may include a contingent debt then there is no obstacle to the conclusion that, in the present context, a debt may have been taken to have been incurred when a company entered a contract by which it subjected itself to a conditional but unavoidable obligation to pay a sum of money at a future time.

Kirby P adopted a similar view and held at 598 that:

The act of ìncurring' happens when the corporation so acts as to expose itself contractually to an obligation to make a future payment of a sum of money as a debt. The mere fact that such a sum of money will only be paid upon a future contingency does not make the assumption of the obligation any less ìncurring' a `debt'.

Associated with ascertaining whether a company has incurred a debt is the concomitant task of being able to specify the particular time when the debt was incurred. In Russell Halpern Nominees Pty Ltd v Martin & Anor (1986) 4 ACLC 393 the plaintiff company agreed to lease premises to two other companies. Rent was not received and it was found that immediately before and at the time of entering into the agreement for lease, both tenants were unable to pay their debts as and when they fell due. A writ based upon a former insolvent trading provision (s 556 of the Companies Code) was struck out on the basis that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The Supreme Court, by majority, dismissed the appeal. According to Burt CJ at 396:

whatever the expression ìncurs a debt' might mean, it is clearly descriptive of an act which when done by the company in the stated circumstances exposes a director of the company and a person who took part in the management of


the company when the debt was incurred, [sic] when the act was done, to a criminal liability. The incurring of the debt by the company in the stated circumstances is the act which constitutes the offence created by the subsection and that act is done at a particular and identifiable point of time, [sic] `when the debt was incurred.' ... To hold otherwise would be to say that if a company when in all respects financially sound were to enter into a lease for a term of years and at some time thereafter and for reasons which could not be anticipated it were to fall on bad times and be unable to pay its debts, the directors would thereafter and on every rent day within the remainder of the term be guilty of an offence for the reason that on the rent day the company

`incurs a debt'. I am unable to accept that. Element Three - “Insolvent” at the time of the incurring the debt or becomes insolvent The definition of “insolvency” is an integral part of the application and operation of the insolvent trading provisions that are contained in ss 588G – Y of the Corporations Act. Liability is not triggered under those provisions unless the corporation is insolvent at the time the particular debt was incurred, or became insolvent by incurring that debt or by incurring at that time debts including that particular debt: s 588G(1)(b).

Prior to 23 June 1993, there was no definition of solvency or insolvency in the Corporations Act. However, s 95A now provides the following definitions of both solvency and insolvency. Section 95A(1) provides that a person is deemed solvent, “if and only if, the person is able to pay all the person’s debts as and when they become due and payable.” In contrast, s 95A(2) provides that a person who is not solvent is insolvent. According to Pollard

39, those definitions represent:

a particularly important reform … in relation to Part 5.7B because it refines and partly codifies the complex law surrounding the situation which arises when a company is insolvent.

It has been suggested that the definition contained in s 95A involves a cash flow test rather than a balance of assets over liabilities test: Leslie v Howship Holdings

Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 459. This suggestion was accepted as correct by Prior J in Powell v Fryer (2000) 18 ACLC 480 where, his Honour stated the following at 482:

The commercial solvency of the company is not proved by merely looking at its accounts and making a mechanical comparison of its assets and liabilities. Insolvency is a question of fact falling to be decided as a matter of commercial reality in the light of all the circumstances with things being

39 Pollard SM., “Fear and Loathing in the Boardroom: Directors Confront New Insolvent Trading

Provisions” (1994) 22 ABLR 392.


viewed as it would by someone operating in a practical business environment. The statutory focus is on solvency, not liquidity. Thus it is appropriate to consider the terms of credit or financial support available to the company with which to defray any debts owed to creditors. The question is not to be answered merely by looking at the financial statements.

Similar views were expressed in Hall v Poolman (2008) 65 ACSR 123 and in Lewis v Doran (2004) 50 ACSR 175. See also Australian Securities and Investments

Commission v Plymin [2003] VSC 123; (2003) 46 ACSR 126 at [209] where Mandie J held that s 95A of the Corporations Act provides a “cashflow test” of insolvency which his Honour described as follows:

The cashflow test provides that a company is insolvent when it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due. It is of no consequence, under this test, that assets exceed liability. The important point is: can the company pay its way in carrying on its business? The court, in examining whether a company is suffering cashflow insolvency, will consider whether the Company is actually paying its debtors.

The definition of insolvency contained in s 95A can be contrasted with definitions of insolvency that have been used in relation to Bankruptcy and other insolvency legislation where emphasis had been placed on whether a debtor could pay their debts “from his own monies”: see, for example, s 122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and s 451 of the Companies (NSW) Code 1981. Further, it is noteworthy that the Exposure Draft Bill to the Corporate Law Reform Bill (Cth), published in February 1992, defined insolvency as a debtor’s inability to pay his or her debts as they became due and payable “from his or her own money”. This aspect subsequently led Palmer J, in Lewis v Doran (2004) 50 ACSR 175, to state at 193-194 that:

it is legitimate to assume that the inclusion of those words was intended to convey that the case law which had developed around those words in prior

insolvency legislation was to continue to be applicable. This made relevant the earlier judicial interpretation of the meaning of insolvency legislation which contained the words, “from his or her own money” or “from his own monies”, and, accordingly, the interpretation of that other legislation has had some influence over what is required to be satisfied so as to prove solvency. Pursuant to this interpretation, the following principles have developed:

a debtor’s ability to pay debts “from his own monies”, included an ability to raise money by its sale, pledge or mortgage of his assets: Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666;

money obtained by unsecured borrowings is not regarded as the debtor’s “own money”: Armour; Ex parte Official Receiver v Commonwealth Trading

Bank (1956) 18 ABC 69 at 74; Kyra Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq) v National Australia Bank Ltd (1986) 4 ACLC 400 at 405; Norfolk Plumbing Supplies Pty


Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 6 ACSR 61 at 615. However, the words, “from his own monies” never found their way in what later was enacted a s 95A. This omission has led courts on a different line of inquiry. In Southern Cross Interiors Pty Ltd (in liq) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 39 ACSR 305; (2001) 53 NSWLR 213 Palmer J at [54] summarised the law in this area by setting out the following principles

40:

i) whether or not a company is insolvent for the purposes of CA ss.95A, 459B, 588FC or 588G(1)(b) is a question of fact to be ascertained from a consideration of the company‟s financial position taken as a whole: Sandell v Porter, Pegulan Floor Coverings Pty Ltd v Carter (1997) 24 ACSR 651 and Powell v Fryer;

ii) in considering the company‟s financial position as a whole, the Court

must have regard to commercial realities. Commercial realities will be relevant in considering what resources are available to the company to meet its liabilities as they fall due, whether resources other than cash are realisable by sale or borrowing upon security, and when such realisations are achievable: Sandell v. Porter, Taylor v. ANZ, Newark and Sheahan v. Hertz.

iii) in assessing whether a company‟s position as a whole reveals

surmountable temporary illiquidity or insurmountable endemic illiquidity resulting in insolvency, it is proper to have regard to the commercial reality that, in normal circumstances, creditors will not always insist on payment strictly in accordance with their terms of trade but that does not result in the company thereby having a cash or credit resource which can be taken into account in determining solvency: Bank of Australasia v. Hall [1907] HCA 78; (1907) 4 CLR 1514, at 1528; Norfolk Plumbing at 615; Taylor v ANZ at 784; Guthrie v. Radio Frequency Systems Pty Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 572, at 575;

iv) the commercial reality that creditors will normally allow some latitude in

time for payment of their debts does not, in itself, warrant a conclusion that the debts are not payable at the times contractually stipulated and have become debts payable only upon demand: Antico at 331; Hall v Aust-Amec (supra); Melbase (supra) at 199; Carrier (supra) at 253; Cuthbertson & Richards Sawmills Pty Ltd v Thomas (supra) at 320; Lee Kong (supra) at 112;

v) in assessing solvency, the Court acts upon the basis that a contract

debt is payable at the time stipulated for payment in the contract unless there is evidence, proving to the Court‟s satisfaction, that:

40 Although Palmer J’s decision in that case was overturned on appeal, it was done so on grounds

not impacting on the statements quoted.


• there has been an express or implied agreement between the company and the creditor for an extension of the time stipulated for payment; or

• there is a course of conduct between the company and the creditor sufficient to give rise to an estoppel preventing the creditor from relying upon the stipulated time for payment; or

• there has been a well established and recognised course of conduct in the industry in which the company operates, or as between the company and its creditors as a body, whereby debts are payable at a time other than that stipulated in the creditors‟ terms of trade or are payable only on demand:

vi) it is for the party asserting that a company‟s contract debts are not payable at the times contractually stipulated to make good that assertion by satisfactory evidence: Powell v Fryer (supra) at 600; Melbase (supra); Cuthbertson & Richards Sawmills Pty Ltd v Thomas (supra).”

Later, in Lewis v Doran (2004) 50 ACSR 175, Palmer J reiterated the above views by stating at 198 - 199:

I think that I must approach the application of s.95A [of the Corporations Act] with two considerations in mind. First, the words of s.95A must be construed as they stand, without addition or subtraction. Second, the law both before and after the enactment of s.95A is unequivocally and emphatically clear that insolvency is, first and last, a question of fact “to be ascertained from a consideration of the company‟s financial position taken as a whole. In considering the company‟s financial position as a whole, the Court must have regard to commercial realities. Commercial realities will be relevant in considering what resources are available to the company to meet its liabilities as they fall due, whether resources other than cash are realisable by sale or borrowing upon security, and when such realisations are achievable... In my opinion, the omission of the words “from its own monies” from the definition of insolvency in s.95A now leaves the Court free to determine the question of retrospective insolvency free of a qualification which might well be appropriate to determine only prospective insolvency. The omission leaves the Court free to determine insolvency, whether retrospective or prospective, as a question of commercial reality having regard to the particular facts of the

case.

Finally, his Honour concluded in Lewis v Doran at 200 in the following way:41

41 This was confirmed on appeal: see Lewis (as liquidator of Doran Constructions Pty Ltd) v Doran

(2005) 219 ALR 555; 54 ACSR 410. Special leave to appeal was refused by the High Court.

The case was also approved in Reynolds v Neumedix Biotechnology Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 302.


I conclude that section 95A of the Corporations Act has changed the pre-existing law as to the definition of insolvency as stated in cases such as Sandell v Porter, and that it is no longer necessary in order to assess solvency to ascertain whether the company is able to pay all of its debts “from its own monies”, in the sense discussed in those cases. In my opinion, section 95A requires the Court to decide whether the company is able, as at the alleged date of insolvency, to pay all of its debts as they become payable by reference to the commercial realities. If the Court is satisfied that as a matter of commercial reality the company has a resource available to pay all its debts as they become payable that it will not matter that the resource is an unsecured borrowing or a voluntary extension of credit by another party.

Therefore it is the case that all cash resources available to a company including ability to borrow are to be taken into account when assessing solvency: see Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699. This should mean that:

promises of financial support: see Dunn v Shapowloff [1978] 2 NSWLR 235; unsecured borrowings or voluntary extensions of credit; anticipated proceeds of an underwritten equity raising,

should be taken into account in assessing solvency.

It is to be noted however that the "commercial realities approach" referred to by Palmer J in Southern Cross Interiors Pty Ltd (in liq) v Deputy Commissioner of

Taxation and in Lewis v Doran has been subsequently emphasised: see Emanuel Management Pty Ltd v Foster's Brewing Group Ltd (2003) 178 FLR 1, [2003] QSC 205; Powell v Fryer (2001) 159 FLR 433; 37 ACSR 589; [2001] SASC 59; McLellan, in the matter of The Stake Man Pty Ltd v Carroll [2009] FCA 1415; [2010] 76 ACSR 50 at [124].

A temporary lack of liquidity does not mean that there is insolvency: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Plymin [2003] VSC 123; (2003) 46 ACSR 126 at [209] In Re United Medical Protection Ltd (prov liq appt) [2003] NSWSC 1031; (2003) 47 ACSR 705 at 718 it was stated that the following points emerge from the decision of Mandie J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Plymin [2003] VSC 123; (2003) 46 ACSR 126 at [209]:

whether or not a company is insolvent ... is a question of fact to be

ascertained from a consideration of the company‟s financial position taken as a whole”, and is a question to which „[c]ommercial realities will be relevant”: Southern Cross Interiors Pty Ltd (in liq) v DCT [2001] NSWSC 621; (2001) 53 NSWLR 213 at 224; [2001] NSWSC 621; 188


ALR 114 at 124-5; [2001] NSWSC 621; 39 ACSR 305 at 316-17 per Palmer J;

it is useless to say that if its assets are realised there will be ample to pay 20 shillings in the pound: this is not the test. A company may be at the same time insolvent and wealthy”: Re Tweed Garages Ltd [1962] Ch 406 at 410 per Plowman J;

it is thus of no consequence, of itself, that assets exceed liabilities, the important point being whether the company can pay its way in carrying on its business”: see A R Keay, “The insolvency factor in the avoidance of antecedent transactions in corporate liquidations” (1995) 21 Monash Univ LR 305 at 307);

the question is not whether the debtor would be able, if time were given to him, to pay his debts out of his assets, but whether he is presently able to do so with moneys actually available”: Bank of Australasia v Hall [1907] HCA 78; (1907) 4 CLR 1514 at 1528 per Griffith CJ;

It is the debtor‟s inability, utilising such cash resources as he has or can command through the use of his assets, to meet his debts as they

fall due which indicates insolvency”: Sandell v Porter [1966] HCA 28; (1966) 115 CLR 666 at 670 per Barwick CJ;

If, as a matter of substance, the company is not able to pay its debts as they become due, the circumstance that the relevant creditors may give the company some time before they actually seek to enforce their remedies, and the company may well be able to pay them out given

that time, will not negative the application of the section”: Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (Nos 1 & 2) [1995] NSWSC 31; (1995) 38 NSWLR 290 at 331 per Hodgson J;

for the purpose of assessing insolvency, a contractual debt is taken to be payable at the time stipulated for payment in the contract, unless there is evidence of an express or implied agreement between the company and creditor for extension of time, or a course of conduct sufficient to give rise to an estoppel against the creditor, or an established practice in the industry or between the company and its creditors whereby debts are taken to be payable at some other time than provided for in the contract: Southern Cross Interiors at NSWLR 225; ALR 125; ACSR 317.

See also McLellan, in the matter of The Stake Man Pty Ltd v Carroll [2009] FCA 1415; [2010] 76 ACSR 50 at [106]. The test of insolvency as it applies in the context of s 588G is therefore directed towards assessing whether a corporation is insolvent at the time:


it incurs a particular debt; or

because it incurs a particular debt it will become insolvent; or

because it incurs other debts with that particular debt,

after taking into account the “commercial realities” that the company finds itself in including,

what resources are available to the company to meet its liabilities as they fall due and

whether resources other than cash are realisable through sale or otherwise or whether it can

borrow. Included as part of this analysis is ascertaining the point in time when such

realisations would be possible.

Further, a question may arise if a creditor allows a debtor corporation to depart from the contractual terms which exist between them and allows a debtor a period of time or grace in which to pay for example, by varying normal trading terms from 30 to 90 days. Such an allowance could have an influence on whether or not the debt has become due to be paid for the purposes of insolvent trading: see Pioneer Concrete

Ltd v Ellston (1985) 10 ACLR 289 at 301. It could also affect whether the company is regarded as being insolvent at the relevant time: see Re Newark Pty Ltd (in liq) [1993] 1 Qd R 409. Thus the actual relationship and dealings between a creditor and a debtor company may need to be examined: see Southern Cross interiors Pty

Ltd (in liq) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 39 ACSR 305; (2001) 53 NSWLR 213 and Manpac Industries Pty Ltd v Ceccattini (2002) 20 ACLC 1304.

In assessing insolvency, the courts have, on occasions, emphasised the following factors: see Dunn v Shapowloff (1977-78) CLC 30,141, Pioneer Concrete v Ellston (1985) 10 ACLC 289 and CAC v Karounis (1985) 3 ACLC 410;

the company's assets and liabilities and the nature of them;

the nature and circumstances of the company's activities;

the cash expected to be available at the particular time will be relevant;

whether the company could be expected to pay the debt by borrowing;

whether, if it must realise assets to obtain the money to pay the debt, it can be expected to do this by the relevant time and at what price;

whether what it will have to do in paying and being able to pay the debt will

involve the company or its officers in voidable transactions, improper preferences or breach of obligations under the general law or relevant legislation;

whether any promises have been made (legally binding or not) to provide

money or financial assistance, by loan, subscription for share capital or by the provision of a guarantee;


the adequacy of such funds to ensure payment of all debts at the proper time;

a promise to lend and the reliability of such a promise; creditor's arrangements

extending time for payment - at least reasonably leading to an expectation on the part of the defendant that a time extension has been given;

decisions by creditors to alter trading terms, for example C.O.D., limits on indebtedness;

factoring of trade debts;

reasonable expectation by management of increased sales and reduced overheads;

profit and loss accounts and balance sheets which have been prepared close to the relevant time. This will be especially so if the accounts disclose an excess of liabilities over assets or repeated losses;

documents which have been obtained from the company which show the company's true value;

whether the company has failed to observe any overdraft limit;

whether the company's banking records show evidence of cheques being marked "present again" or are otherwise dishonoured;

the company's conduct in relation to particular debts such as worker's compensation and group tax;

whether a director shows a complete indifference as to whether or not the creditors would be paid.

In considering these factors the court may use evidence of experts who can review the material which would have been available to managers

42. However, where such

expert evidence is unavailable, the court will assess the situation from the standpoint of a reasonable director of ordinary competence. More recently, in ASIC v Plymin (No 1) (2003) 46 ACSR at 386 the following indicators of insolvency were identified:

(a) continuing losses;

(b) liquidity ratios below 1;

(c) overdue Commonwealth and State taxes;

42 See Foster J's comments in 3M Pty Ltd v Kemish (1986) 4 ACLC 185 at 198.


(d) poor relationship with primary bank, including inability to borrow further funds;

(e) no access to alternative finance;

(f) inability to raise further equity capital;

(g) suppliers placing the company on cash- on-demand terms, or otherwise demanding

special payments before resuming supply;

(h) creditors unpaid outside trading terms;

(i) issuing of post-dated cheques;

(j) dishonoured cheques;

(k) special arrangements with selected creditors;

(l) solicitor’s letters, summonses, judgments or warrants issued against the company;

(m) payments to creditors of rounded sums which are not reconcilable to specific

invoices;

(n) inability to produce timely and accurate financial information to display the

company’s trading performance and financial position, and make reliable forecasts.

Rebuttable presumptions of insolvency

As can be seen from the above analysis, a difficulty in finding directors liable under the insolvent trading provisions is proving insolvency at the relevant time in the way understood pursuant to s 95A. Access to a debtor company’s accounting records may be difficult for a creditor and, even if the records are produced to the creditor (for example, through pre-trial discovery or directly from a liquidator), those accounting records may be inadequate to demonstrate insolvency at the relevant time for the purposes of triggering the application of s 588G(1). According to the Australian Law Reform Commission in its General Insolvency Inquiry

43, in many

situations,

the liquidator is a stranger to the past business operations of the company, and is often confronted with considerable difficulty in affirmatively establishing that a company was insolvent at a time prior to the winding up, even though there may be every indication that this was the case.

In order to overcome this problem and to assist in determining whether or not a company was insolvent at the time a debt is incurred or becomes insolvent by incurring that debt or by incurring at that time debts including that debt, ss 588E(3) and 588E(4) of the Corporations Act are of assistance in some situations. These

43 See Report number 45, volume 1 (1988), [290].


sections contain rebuttable presumptions of insolvency and, if applicable, reverse the onus of proof such that it will be up to the company to prove it was solvent at the relevant time. Thus, demonstrable proof of actual insolvency at a particular time may only need to demonstrated if the statutory presumptions of insolvency are unable to be relied upon or are able to be rebutted.

Section 588E(3) provides that if:

(a) the company is being wound up; and

(b) it is proved, or because of subsection (4) or (8) it must be presumed, that the company was insolvent at a particular time during the 12

months ending on the relation-back day (bold added);

it must be presumed that the company was insolvent throughout the period beginning at that time and ending on that day.

Section 588E(4) provides that (subject to subsections (5) to (7)), if it is proved that the company:

(a) has failed to keep financial records in relation to a period as required by subsection 286(1); or

(b) has failed to retain financial records in relation to a period for the 7 years required by subsection 286(2);

The company is to be presumed to have been insolvent throughout the period.

Section 588E(9) provides:

A presumption for which this section provides operates except so far as the contrary is proved that the purposes of the preceding concerned.

Section 9 of the Corporations Act defines "relation-back day", (referred to above in s 588(3)(b)) in relation to a winding up of a company or Part 5.7 body, as meaning: (a) if, because of Division 1A of Part 5.6, the winding up is taken to have begun

on the day when an order that the company or body be wound up was made - the day on which the application for the order was filed; or

(b) otherwise - the day on which the winding up is taken because of Division 1A of Part 5.6 to have begun.

Division 1A of Part 5.6 of the Corporations Act sets out when a winding up is taken to begin. Section 513A within that Division deals with a winding up ordered by the Court under ss 233, 459A, 459B or 461. Section 513B within that Division however deals with a voluntary winding up and relevantly provides that where a company resolves by special resolution that it be wound up voluntarily, the winding up is taken to have begun or commenced:


“if, immediately before the resolution was passed, the company was under administration – on the section 513C day in relation to the administration.” (underlining added) (section 513B(b))

The “section 513C day” in relation to an administration of a company is the day on which the administration begins (see s 513C(b)). Therefore, under the presumption in s 588E(3), where it is proved that a company which is being wound up was insolvent at a particular time during the 12 months prior to the relation-back day, it is presumed that the company was insolvent from that time until the relation-back day. Element Four - Reasonable grounds for suspecting the company was insolvent or would become insolvent as a result of the transaction It is an essential element of the application of s 588G(1) that there exists reasonable grounds for a director suspecting the company was insolvent or would become insolvent as a result of the transaction. This component raises issues concerning the meaning of “reasonable grounds” and “suspecting”. (i) "Reasonable grounds” The issue of whether or not there existed reasonable grounds for a director of a company suspecting that the company was insolvent or would become insolvent as a result of the transaction, is determined objectively

44: see Powell v Fryer (2001) 37

ACSR 589. In that case, Olsson J (with whom Duggan and Williams JJ agreed) stated the following at [76] - [77]):

The state of knowledge of a particular director and any assessment which he may have made as to the ability of the company to pay its debts is irrelevant. The court must make its own judgment on the basis of facts as they existed at the relevant time and without the benefit of hindsight. By reason of section 588G(2)(b) it is sufficient that a reasonable person in a like position in a company in the company's circumstances would be so aware. Regard is to be had to the facts and circumstances that the director ought to have known, as well as to the facts and circumstances that were actually known to him: Credit Corp Australia Pty Ltd v Atkins (1999) 30 ACSR 727 at 769.

See also Hall v Poolman (2008) 65 ACSR 123 and Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd

44 A number of cases have reiterated this view. Shapowloff v Dunn (1981) ACLC 33,127 at 33,133 -

33,134; Pioneer Concrete Pty Ltd v Ellston (1985) 10 ACLR 289 at 301; 3M Australia Pty Ltd v

Kemish (1986) 4 ACLC 185 at 187 and 191; Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 8

ACLC 827 at 831; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich & Ors (1991) 9 ACLC 946 at 953;

State Government Insurance Corp v Pollock (1993) 11 ACLC 839 at 846; Rema Industries &

Services Pty Ltd v Coad (1992) 10 ACLC 530 at 536-537; Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd v Kurda

(1992) 10 ACLC 773 at 775.


v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699; [1997] FCA 399. Continuing in business at the risk of creditors or taking no steps to save the company from insolvency (Deputy Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Caratti (1980) ACLC 40-660 at 34,158), when the person knows that there is no objectively reasonable expectation of the company being able to meet its obligations, could bring about personal liability of directors. This will be despite the fact that the director is working long hours so as to rehabilitate the company and that the reasons for the collapse of the company's business were substantially beyond their control: Southern Highlands

Building Co. Pty Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act (1979) CLC 40-516. In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich (1991) 9 ACLC 946, Eise was the honorary and part-time chairman of the National Safety Council of Australia Victorian Division (NSC), a non-profit company limited by guarantee. Friedrich was the chief executive officer of the NSC. The State Bank of Victoria lent money to the NSC at a time when the NSC’s liabilities exceeded assets. However, the NSC's accounts showed an excess of assets over liabilities. This was due to the alleged fraudulent activities of Friedrich. The annual accounts for two successive financial years were the subject of qualified auditor's reports which Eise had not seen, and the directors' reports had been signed by Eise on the day of the annual general meeting and were purportedly approved by the board. In fact, the board had not considered the matter. Subsequently, the State Bank lent large sums of money to the NSC and through its legal successor, the Commonwealth Bank, lodged a claim against each member of the NSC board pursuant to a predecessor insolvent trading provision to s 588G(1) (ie s 556(1) Companies Code 1981. All of the directors except Eise settled with the bank. One of the three issues in contention was whether immediately before the time when each of the debts were incurred there were reasonable grounds to expect

45 that the

company would not be able to pay all its debts as and when they became due.46

According to the Victorian Supreme Court, the existence of "reasonable grounds" for the purposes of the relevant insolvent trading provision (ie s 556(2) of the Companies Code) is to be determined by a wholly objective test. Tadgell J stated at 954, that "the sub-section does not require proof that anyone would not have reasonable grounds to expect and it does not refer to the defendant's state of knowledge." The Judge added at 955 that:

the plaintiff must prove facts which, immediately before the time when the company incurred the relevant debt, gave a person seeking properly to perform the duties of a non-executive director of that company reasonable grounds to say: `I expect that the company will not be able to pay all its debts as and when

45 It should be noted that s 556 of the Companies Code used the word, “expect”. The provision in s

588G(1) uses the word “suspecting”.

46 The other two issues in contention were, first, whether at the time when the debts were incurred

Eise did not have reasonable cause to expect that the company would not be able to pay all its

debts as and when they became due (s 556(2)(b)(i)); and, secondly, whether Eise could obtain

relief under s 535(1) of the Companies Code.


they become due'. The situations where a director would not have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company was insolvent or would become insolvent as a result of the transaction, can be summarised as follows: 1. Where the director has not adverted to the matter and there exists an objective

belief that there are no reasonable grounds for so suspecting.

2. Where the director has a subjective suspicion that the company is or would become insolvent as a result of the transaction, but there is no objective ground for this suspicion.

3. Where the director does not care whether the debt will be paid but there was no objective ground for suspecting insolvency at the relevant time.

(ii) "Suspecting" In addition to the requirement of "reasonable grounds", there must be at the time the debt is incurred, reasonable grounds for “suspecting” that the company was insolvent or would become insolvent as a result of the transaction. Previous legislation used the word, “expect”, in the context of whether the company could pay its debts as and when the debts become due. To determine whether such a requisite expectation existed, courts looked at factors pointing to the company's ability to pay which were present when the debt was entered into. `Expectation' was equated with `prediction' - in particular a `prediction' of the future ability of the company to be able to pay its debts. However, as indicated, s 588G(1) uses the word, “suspecting” and in a different way to some of the predecessor legislation. According to Kitto J in Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266; 40 ALJR 13 at 303:

A suspicion that something exists is more than a mere idle wondering whether it exists or not; it is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust, amounting to `a slight opinion, but without sufficient evidence' ... Consequently, a reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence.

Kitto J’s comments were accepted by Palmer J in Hall v Poolman (2008) 65 ACSR 123 where, his Honour held at [234], that a suspicion of insolvency falls somewhere between a belief that insolvency exists

47, on the one hand, and a mere wondering

whether it exists, on the other. Suspicion is a positive feeling of apprehension, an admittedly tentative belief, without sufficient evidence to form a concluded and

47 See also Green in his capacity as liquidator of Arimco Mining Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd

(2008) 67 ACSR 398.


supportable opinion. Associated with demonstrating whether there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company is insolvent or would so become insolvent, s 588G(2) provides for two alternate ways in which a director can be found to have had the requisite suspicion. First, actual awareness, that is, if the director is aware at that time that there are such grounds for so suspecting (s 588G(2)(a)); Second, where a reasonable person in a like position in a company in the company’s circumstances would have been so aware (s 588G (2)(b)).

The test set out in s 588G(2)(a) is a subjective test whereas the test set out in s 588G(2)(b) is an objective test. This means that even if it cannot be established that the director had actual awareness of reasonable grounds for suspecting insolvency, the director may still be liable if a reasonable person in their position in the company’s circumstances would have been aware. Whether a reasonable person in the director’s position would have been aware is assessed by the objective standard of a director of ordinary competence.: McLellan, in the matter of The Stake Man

Pty Ltd v Carroll [2009] FCA 1415; [2010] 76 ACSR 50 at [144]. In Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699 Einfeld J stated at 703:

[the test is] one of objectively reasonable grounds which must be judged by the standard appropriate to a director of ordinary competence… Questions of knowledge of and participation in the incurring of the relevant debt are now relegated to the status of factual matters which may arise should the directors seek to establish one of the statutory defences afforded by the legislation. The establishment of liability is therefore not contingent on elements personal to the respondents.

Later, in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Plymin (No 1) (2003) 175 FLR 124; 46 ACSR 126, Mandie J held at [426]:

What s 588G(2)(a) requires is proof of a subjective awareness by the director of grounds, whether or not the director had a "subjective suspicion" of insolvency, which grounds may be objectively be characterised as "reasonable grounds" for suspecting such insolvency.

Further, Mandie J in Plymin (No 1) stated at [325] that:

It would seem to follow ... the essence of a failure by a director to prevent a company from incurring a debt is a failure by that director to take all reasonable steps within his power to prevent the company from incurring such debt. The effect of the provisions, shortly stated, is that if the requirements of s 558G(1) are proved in circumstances where either subsection (a) or subsection (b) of s 588G(2) is also proved, a director will be taken to have failed to prevent the company from incurring the debt, unless it is proved that the director- took all reasonable steps to prevent the company from incurring the debt.


In Elliott v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 10 VR 369; 48 ACSR 621 the Victorian Court of Appeal held the following in relation to s 588G(2) at [116]:

It is in our view clear that the effect of s 588G(2) is that a director contravenes the section "by not preventing" or "by failing to prevent" a company from incurring a debt, and that a director will be taken to have so failed if debts are incurred by a company at a time when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company is insolvent.

The Court, in Elliot, held at [117] that s 588G(2) does not require proof that an individual director failed in his or her duty to take a step which would have been effective to prevent the company incurring the debt.

Also, the inclusion in s 588G(2)(b) of the expression, “in a like position in a company in the company’s circumstances” allows the court to have regard to a wide range of factors including, the company’s size and type of business conducted; the make-up of the company’s board of directors; whether the particular director was an executive director or a non-executive director; whether the board delegated responsibilities; and any professional qualifications or expertise held by the particular director: see Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich (1991) 5 ACSR 115.

As indicated above, the time that the awareness of the director is assessed is immediately before the particular debt was incurred: Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty

Ltd v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699: 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Kemish (1986) 10 ACLR 371; 4 ACLC 185. Defences available to directors As part of the statutory provisions, four defences are potentially made available to directors who are accused of insolvent trading. These are:

if at the time when the debt was incurred the person had reasonable grounds to expect and did expect that the company was solvent at that time and would remain solvent even if it incurred that debt: (s 588H(2));

where the director believed on reasonable grounds that a competent and reliable subordinate was monitoring the company's solvency and keeping the director informed: (s 588H(3));

if a director, at the time the debt was incurred, did not take part in management because of illness or some other good reason, then a defence will be established: (s 588H(4));

where a director takes all reasonable steps to prevent the company incurring the debt, a defence will be made out: (s 588H(5)).


Taking each of the defences in turn: Section 588H(2) It is a defence if it is proved that, at the time when the debt was incurred, the person had reasonable grounds to expect, and did expect, that the company was solvent at that time and would remain solvent even giving incurred that debt and any other debts that it incurred at that time. Thus, if it is found that a director was aware during the relevant period that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company was insolvent and that a reasonable person in a like position in a company in the company’s circumstances would be so aware, the question is, how does s 588H(2) become invoked? The fact that a director may have had a “suspicion” of insolvency does not answer the question whether he or she had an “expectation” that the company was solvent throughout the relevant period. There are therefore two essential elements to establishing that defence: First, the requirement that there be reasonable grounds to expect the company will remain solvent notwithstanding that it was insolvent; and, second that the director did, in fact, have that expectation. In determining whether a director had reasonable grounds to expect the company was solvent, an objective standard is applied to the facts known to the defendant. As mentioned earlier, the word “expect” is taken to mean a higher degree of certainty than a mere hope possibility or suspicion: 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Kemish (1986) 10 ACLR 371; 4 ACLC 185. According to Goldberg J in McLellan, in the matter of The Stake Man Pty Ltd v

Carroll [2009] FCA 1415; [2010] 76 ACSR 50 at [169]:

It is apparent from the statutory scheme, and in particular, ss 588G and 588H of the Act, that a director can, at one and the same time, have a “suspicion” of insolvency and also an “expectation” of solvency. Reasonable grounds for “suspecting” that a company is insolvent does not require the same degree of satisfaction as is required to determine if a director has reasonable grounds “to expect” solvency. The distinction was explained succinctly in Tourprint International Pty Ltd v Bott (1999) 32 ACSR 201 at 215:

“[67] “Expectation”, as required by s 588H(2), means a higher degree of certainty than “mere hope or possibility” or “suspecting”: 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Kemish (1986) 10 ACLR 371 at 378; Dunn v Shapowloff [1978] 2 NSWLR 235 at 249; (1978) 3 ACLR 775. The


defence requires an actual expectation that the company was and would continue to be solvent, and that the grounds for so expecting are reasonable. A director cannot rely on a complete ignorance of or neglect of duty (Metal Manufacturers Ltd v Lewis (1986) 11 ACLR 122 at 129) and cannot hide behind ignorance of the company‟s affairs which is of their own making or, if not entirely of their own making, has been contributed to by their own failure to make further necessary inquiries: Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 2 ACSR 405; Morley v Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd [1993] 1 VR 423; (1992) 8 ACSR 305.”

See also Metropolitan Fire Systems Ply Ltd v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699 at 703. A director will not have reasonable grounds to expect that the company is solvent, if they if do not act with appropriate care and skill in actually assessing solvency. This may mean becoming familiar with the company’s financial position and with the company’s dealings with trade creditors. Turning a blind eye to financial and trading matters should mean that directors have no reasonable basis to expect solvency: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Plymin (No 1) (2003) 175 FLR 124; 46 ACSR 126. Relevant to this issue is the judicial consideration of the statutory defences that were applicable to the predecessor insolvent trading provisions. Illustrative in that regard are the provisions set out in s 592(2) that apply to debts incurred before 23 June 1993. In that section, two defences are provided. First, if the debt was incurred without the relevant person’s authority or consent or second, if at the time when the debt was incurred, those persons did not have reasonable cause to expect that the company would not be able to pay its debts, the director (or person who took part in management) will have a defence to insolvent trading. Some of the judicial treatment of those defences is relevant to s 588H. In Metal Manufactures Ltd v Lewis (1988) 6 ACLC 725, Mr and Mrs Lewis were the only directors of Primary Metals and Resources Pty Ltd (the company). In September 1993 the company had agreed to buy goods from the plaintiff and later it breached this contract, resulting in an award of damages being made against it. However, in September 1984, Primary Metals and Resources Pty Ltd was ordered to be wound up. The plaintiff thereupon alleged that Mr and Mrs Lewis had engaged in insolvent trading and brought proceedings pursuant to s 556 of the Companies (NSW) Code which was in similar terms to s 592 of the Corporations Act. Mr and Mrs Lewis were the only directors of the company. Mr Lewis was its managing director and it was he who entered into the contract on behalf of the company with the plaintiff in his capacity as managing director. The court noted that it was not clear how or when Mr Lewis became managing director. At the time the contract was made the company could not pay its debts, but at no stage was Mrs Lewis involved in the day to day running of the business and was, in fact, only regarded as a "director for signing purposes only". Mrs Lewis had no knowledge of the particular debt to the plaintiff and,


whenever she made inquiries with Mr Lewis about possible difficulties of the company, she was told not to concern herself. In particular, Mrs Lewis did not know or even address the issue of whether the company could pay its debts. Mr Lewis did not contest liability under s 556 of the Companies (NSW) Code and consented to the judgment, however Mrs Lewis sought to invoke either of the statutory defences. She was successful in applying the first defence (that is, that the debt was incurred without her authority or consent) but not successful in relation to the second defence (that is, because she was unable to show that she did not have reasonable cause to expect that the company would not be able to pay its debts). The plaintiff appealed against the trial judge’s finding that the first defence was successfully invoked

48. The New South Wales Court of Appeal, in a two to one

majority, dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. Kirby P was in dissent. The question arose as to the liability of silent directors for contracts entered into by a managing director of their company. The trial judge, Hodgson J, held that the first defence (contained in s 556(2)(a)) would be satisfied if a defendant proved first, that they did not participate in the incurring of the debt; and, secondly, that none of the actual participants in incurring the debt had the defendant's express or implied authority or consent to incur the debt: Metal Manufactures Ltd v Lewis (1986) 4 ACLC 739. On the issue of "inaction" by a defendant, the judge said that, if a defendant's inaction implies authority or consent, then the defence is not available; however this was not the case here. In the New South Wales Court of Appeal, McHugh JA described the giving of consent by a director as equivalent to the signifying of `approval or assent' to the incurring of debt whether that is done expressly or by implication. Furthermore, his Honour described the concept of "authority" as involving both the knowledge or reason to suspect that a debt would be incurred and the power to prevent it from being incurred. Integral here was view was that "authority", had to relate to the specific debt incurred and not merely be an authority to incur debts generally. On this view, knowledge or reason to suspect that a particular debt would be incurred had to be disproved on this view. Here it was said that Mrs Lewis could not have assented and, furthermore, she had no power to prevent the debt from being incurred. Mahoney JA held that the word "without" in s 556(2)(a) did not mean that Mrs Lewis had to forbid the making of the contract. What the word meant, his Honour said, was simply "the absence of the relevant authority or consent": (1988) 6 ACLC 725 at 732. Importantly, the judge rejected the view that liability could attach to a person simply because they let someone else act as managing director and that, therefore, anything which the managing director did was done with that other person's authority or consent. In these circumstances Mrs Lewis did not consent or give her authority to the incurring of the debt. Although in Metal Manufactures Ltd the interpretation of the second defence

48 On appeal, the only question raised was the application of the first defence.


(contained in s 556(2)(b) of the Companies Code) was argued in detail before the trial judge, it was not argued on appeal. At first instance Hodgson J held that, in determining whether a defendant has made out a reasonable cause within the meaning of the the second defence, it was relevant to consider facts and circumstances known to the defendant and also facts and circumstances which, by reason of the defendant's duties, ought to have been known to the defendant. His Honour pointed out that in determining a defendant's state of knowledge

49:

[O]ne can have regard to matters such as illness and absence of a person in order to decide whether or not he has reasonable cause to expect something, but I do not think one can have regard to a person's complete ignorance of his duties as a director of a company and his complete neglect of such duties.

The latter remarks are apt for s 588H(2) and (4). In contrast to Metal Manufactures Ltd, is the Victorian Supreme Court decision in Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 8 ACLC 827. In this latter case, the critical question again was whether a silent director who leaves the conduct of the business entirely to another director can make out the statutory defences to insolvent trading (relevantly contained in ss 556(2)(a) and (b) of the Companies Code. The facts of Morley's case were as follows. KM Trading Pty Ltd was a small family company which ran tobacco kiosks in Melbourne. For the first twenty years of the company's existence it was controlled by Keith Morley, the company's governing director who was appointed pursuant to the company’s constitution. However, in 1978, Ian Morley, Keith Morley's son, took over management of the business temporarily at the request of Mrs Morley, Ian Morley's mother. Keith Morley died in 1979 and soon afterwards there was an informal meeting between Mrs Morley, Ian Morley, and his sister Jan Sloan. These three were now the only shareholders and directors of the company, with Mrs Morley holding the majority of shares. At the request of Mrs Morley and her daughter, Ian Morley was asked to take control of the management of the company. Ian Morley agreed to this. Neither Mrs Morley nor her daughter involved themselves in the day to day running of the business, and Ian Morley did not keep them informed or provide them with annual reports. Ian Morley continued to run the business until the company was placed in liquidation in 1988. Mrs Morley signed some returns, including the annual return and she made a directors' statement. At some stage while her son was in control Mrs Morley also signed a guarantee to the bank so as to secure overdraft facilities for the company. No directors' meetings were held and no formal dividends were paid, although for a period of time Mrs Morley did receive $300 per week, described as her “living expenses”. Mrs Morley knew that the company sold tobacco and like products to customers and that suppliers of these products sometimes extended time for the company to pay. She saw no invoices, statements or books of account and she did not ask to be provided with relevant financial information. As a result she was unaware of the company's inability to pay its debts.

49 (1986) 4 ACLC 739 at 749.


A supplier of tobacco products supplied goods to the company at a time when the company was insolvent and this supplier was owed in excess of $165,000. This amount was still outstanding when the company went into liquidation. The supplier instituted proceedings against Mrs Morley for the recovery of this amount under the insolvent trading provisions contained in s 556 of the Companies Code. Mrs Morley sought to avoid liability by reliance upon each of the statutory defences in s 556(2). Success in either would enable her to escape responsibility for the debt. The trial judge found that neither defence was made out. Ormiston J stated at 848: The conclusions I have reached may be summarised as follows. Where:

(1) a director, such as the defendant, takes no effective part in the management of a company which continues to trade while insolvent and, in particular, that director does not seek to obtain regular trading accounts of the company; and

(2) that director has participated in the conferring of general authority upon

an executive director, employee or agent incurs debts to a creditor on behalf of the company in the course of the insolvency;

then the director will have committed an offence and may be liable to that creditor for those debts of the company pursuant to s.556(1) of the Code and is not entitled to rely on any of the defences under s.556(2). In the context of this section, which requires proof of want of `authority', the authority in question is that which is conferred by the act of one or more directors, whether participating in the grant of the company's authority as a member of the board of directors or in his role as managing or executive director. If a director did not so participate in the conferring of authority, whether express or implied, only then can it be said that the particular debt was incurred `without his express or implied authority'. To conclude otherwise would ignore the realities of the day-to-day management of companies.

The judge noted that Ian Morley had not been appointed managing director pursuant to the company’s constitution, that Mrs Morley had power to determine her son's employment and knew that in the ordinary course of his duties her son was incurring debts of the very nature which were now under consideration. Ian Morley, it was held at 841, had no more power than any other member:

of the board who had the functions of management delegated to him by his fellow directors. He held no formal office under the articles and was dependent upon the continuation of the authority informally given by the other two directors. They were therefore jointly responsible and thus acted for this purpose as joint `principals'. If either of these directors, including Mrs Morley, changed their minds and acted accordingly to withdraw his authority, his

authority would thereupon cease.


In these circumstances she gave authority to her son to incur the debts

50.

In relation to the second defence ( s 556(2)(b)), the question of a director's reasonable cause of expectation was, according to the court, related to the extent of the inquiries that the director has made and should have made about the company's solvency. Ormiston J made it clear that director's should not be able to hide behind ignorance of the company's affairs which are of their own making, or, which has been contributed to by their failure to make further necessary inquiries. The judge went on to state that, although directors are not required to be omniscient, each director is expected to take a diligent and intelligent interest in the information either available to them or which they might with fairness demand from the executives or other employees and agents of the company The Appeal division of the Supreme Court of Victoria agreed with this finding: (1992) 10 ACLC 1233. Mrs Morley gave her implied consent, and therefore could not avail herself of either of the two defences. A similar decision occurred in Group Four Industries Pty Ltd v Brosnan (1992) 10 ACLC 1437. In this case, Mr and Mrs Brosnan, were the only shareholders and directors of a company called Madras Pty Ltd (Madras) which acted as the trustee for the Brosnan Family Trust. The trust was a trading trust and its business was the sale and distribution of air conditioners. The plaintiff supplied air conditioning equipment between November 1985 and March 1986 to Madras and at the end of that period, a balance of approximately $72,000 was owing to the plaintiff. Madras was wound up in April 1987. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants were jointly and severally liable for the amount by virtue of the insolvent trading provisions that were contained in s 556 of the Companies (SA) Code. At the time of these purchases from the plaintiff, Madras was insolvent. The trial judge

51 found that Mr Brosnan was liable for payment of the debt but dismissed the

case against Mrs Brosnan. The plaintiff appealed against this and the full court of the South Australian Supreme Court allowed the appeal. Mr Brosnan ran the company, although there was no formal appointment of him as managing director. He appeared to just take de facto control. Mrs Brosnan was sometimes involved in taking delivery of goods, signed some cheques and did occasional banking. Every year she signed the company's annual return. Although Mrs Brosnan knew that the company was having financial difficulties at the time it incurred the debt to the plaintiff, she claimed that she did not know that it was insolvent at that time. The full court approved of Morley's case and held that she could avail herself of the

50 Ormiston J distinguished Metal Manufactures on this point because in that case Mr Lewis was the

managing director and there was no evidence that Mrs Lewis appointed or participated in the

appointment of him.

51 (1991) 9 ACLC 1181.


first defence (contained in s 556(2)(a)) as she had consented to her husband incurring the debt. According to Olsson J, Mrs Brosnan had to show that she bore no relevant responsibility for the authority given to incur the debt, and this could only be shown if the director did not participate as a member of the board, or as managing or executive director, in the conferring of authority upon the person who incurred the debt. Debelle J noted that she took no step to attempt to prevent the incurring of the debt and, by acquiescing, she gave implied authority or consent. In addition, Mrs Brosnan was found not to be able to not rely on the second defence (contained in s 592(2)(b)) and emphasis was placed upon what a director ought to know, concluding that the facts which were known to Mrs Brosnan would have led any reasonable, intelligent person of average competence to suspect that all was not well with the company and to seek information. According to Olsson J "she was not entitled merely to sit back in self-imposed ignorance and then to seek relief based on that ignorance." Each of the decisions in Lewis, Morley and Brosnan‟s cases can be used to assist in the interpretation of the relevant statutory defences contained in s 588H of the Corporations Act. In Poolman v Hall. In that case Palmer J held:

The law recognises that there is sometimes no clear dividing line between solvency and insolvency from the perspective of the directors of a trading company which is in difficulties. There is a difference between temporary illiquidity and “an endemic shortage of working capital whereby liquidity can only restored by a successful outcome of business ventures in which the existing working capital has been deployed”: Hymix Concrete Pty Ltd v Garritty (1977) 2 ACLR 559, at 566; Re Newark Pty Ltd (in liq); Taylor v Carroll (1991) 6 ACSR 255. The first is an embarrassment, the second is a disaster. It is easy enough to tell the difference in hindsight, when the company has either weathered the storm or foundered with all hands; sometimes it is not so easy when the company is still contending with the waves. Lack of liquidity is not conclusive of insolvency, neither is availability of assets conclusive of solvency: Expo International Pty Ltd (in liq) v Chant [1979] 2 NSWLR 820, at 837. Where a company has assets which, if realised, will pay outstanding debts and will enable debts incurred during the period of realisation to be paid as they fall due, the critical question for solvency is: how soon will the proceeds of realisation be available. Bearing in mind the commercial reality that creditors will usually prefer to wait a reasonable time to have their debts paid in full rather than insist on putting the company into insolvency if it fails to pay strictly on time, I think it can be said, as a very broad general rule, that a director would be justified in “expecting solvency” if an asset could be realised to pay accrued and future creditors in full within about ninety days.


The position becomes murkier the less certain are the outcomes. The market value of the asset may not be ascertainable until the market is tested, so that it is not certain that the realisation will pay in full both existing debts and those to be accrued during the realisation period. The time at which the proceeds of realisation become available may depend upon the state of the market and the complexity of the transaction. There comes a point where the reasonable director must inform himself or herself as fully as possible of all relevant facts and then ask himself or herself and the other directors: “How sure are we that this asset can be turned into cash to pay all our debts, present and to be incurred, within three months? Is that outcome certain, probable, more likely than not, possible, possible with a bit of luck, possible with a lot of luck, remote, or is there is no real way of knowing? If the honest and reasonable answer is “certain” or “probable”, the director can have a reasonable expectation of solvency. If the honest and reasonable answer is anywhere from “possible” to “no way of knowing”, the director can have no reasonable expectation of solvency. If the honest and reasonable answer is “more likely than not”, the director runs the risk that a Court will hold to the contrary in an insolvent trading claim. If the honest and reasonable answer is “no way of knowing yet, we need more information”, the director must then ask: “How long before we have the information so that we can give a final answer?” If the honest and reasonable answer to that question is: “By a definite date which will not extend the realisation period (if there is to be one) beyond three months”, the director may reasonably say: “Let‟s wait until then before deciding”. If the honest and reasonable answer is “there is no way of knowing yet when we will have the information to make a decision”, the director must say: “Then there is no way that we can now have a reasonable expectation of solvency and there is no way we can reasonably justify continuing to trade without knowing when we will know whether the company is insolvent. Call the administrators”. By this series of questions and answers I do not mean to lay down some pro forma test of directors‟ liability for insolvent trading. Each case depends on its particular facts. These questions and answers merely serve to illustrate that when a company is struggling to pay its debts, the directors must face up to the issue of insolvent trading directly and with brutal honesty: they must not shirk from asking themselves the hard questions and from

acting resolutely in accordance with the honest answers to those questions.


Section 588H(3)

The defence contained in s 588H(3) allows a director to escape liability under the insolvent trading provisions if he or she expected that the company was solvent at the time the debt was incurred as a result of relying on information provided by a competent and reliable person who was responsible for providing information pertaining to the solvency of the company. According to the Australian Law Reform Commission

52, the defence is intended to

encourage directors to ensure that proper and adequate financial management systems are in place and thus promote legal compliance. This defence has a number of elements: First it must be shown that that the director expected that the company was solvent at the time the debt was incurred; Second, that this expectation was as a result of relying on information provided by a competent and reliable person; Third, the competent and reliable person must be a person who was responsible for providing information pertaining to the solvency of the company. If the person who is relied upon does not have access to sufficient information in relation to the solvency of the company, then no defence will be made out: Manpac

Industries Pty Ltd v Ceccattini [2002] NSWSC 330 at [54]. Section 588H(4)

In order for this defence to be satisfied it must be shown that the director, at the time the debt was incurred, did not take part in management and that this lack of participation was due to illness or was for some other good reason: see Metal Manufactures v Lewis (1986) 4 ACLC 739 at 749. Section 588H(5)

In order for this defence to be satisfied it must be shown a director has taken all reasonable steps so as to prevent the company incurring the debt. In determining whether a defence under s 588H(5) has been proved, the matters to which regard is to be had include, but are not limited to: (a) any action the person took with a view to appointing an administrator of the

company; and

52 Australian Law Reform Commission, General insolvency Inquiry (1988), Vol 1, [307].


(b) when that action was taken; and

(c) the results of that action: s 588H(6). Holding company liability Liability for insolvent trading is also imposed upon holding companies where such trading is committed by subsidiaries

53. Where a holding company permits one of its

subsidiaries to trade while insolvent, then the subsidiary's liquidator may be able to recover from the holding company amounts equal to the amount of loss or damage suffered by the unsecured creditors of the subsidiary. Pursuant to Division 5 of Part 5.7B of the Corporations Law, a company contravenes sec 588V if: (a) the corporation is the holding company of a company at the time when the

company incurs a debt; and

(b) the company is insolvent at that time, or becomes insolvent by incurring that debt, or by incurring at that time debts including that debt; and

(c) at that time, there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company is insolvent, or would so become insolvent, as the case may be; and

(d) one or both of the following subparagraphs applies:

(i) the corporation, or one or more of its directors, is or are aware at that time that there are such grounds for so suspecting;

(ii) having regard to the nature and extent of the corporation's control over the company's affairs and to any other relevant circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that:

(A) a holding company in the corporation's circumstances would be so aware; or

(B) one or more of such a holding company's directors would be so aware; and

(e) that time is at or after the commencement of this Act.

However, despite the contravention of s 588V, a corporation is not guilty of an offence. Section 588W(1) provides that where:

53 Liability of a holding company for the insolvent trading of a subsidiary is set out in sec 588V of the

Corporations Law. Recovery of compensation is contained in ss 588W and 588Y.


(a) a corporation has contravened section 588V in relation to the incurring of a

debt by a company; and

(b) the person to whom the debt is owed has suffered loss or damage in relation to the debt because of the company's insolvency; and

(c) the debt was wholly or partly unsecured when the loss or damage was suffered; and

(d) the company is being wound up; the company's liquidator may recover from the corporation, as a debt due to the company, an amount equal to the amount of the loss or damage. This is, however, as long as the proceedings are begun within 6 years after the beginning of the winding up: s 588W(2) Holding company defences

For the purposes of proceedings under section 588W, a holding company may be able to invoke one or more of the defences set out in s 588X. These defences are: A. It is a defence if it is proved that, at the time when the debt was incurred, the

corporation, and each relevant director54

(if any), had reasonable grounds to expect, and did expect, that the company was solvent at that time and would remain solvent even if it incurred that debt and any other debts that it incurred at that time: s 588X(2);

B. Without limiting the generality of s 588X(2), it is a defence if it is proved that, at the time when the debt was incurred, the corporation, and each relevant director (if any):

a. had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe:

(i) that a competent and reliable person was responsible for providing to the corporation adequate information about whether the company was solvent; and

(ii) that the person was fulfilling that responsibility; and

b. expected, on the basis of the information provided to the corporation by

the person, that the company was solvent at that time and would remain

54 "relevant director" means a director of the corporation who was aware as mentioned in s

588V(1)(d)(i).


solvent even if it incurred that debt and any other debts that it incurred at that time.

C. If it is proved that, because of illness or for some other good reason, a

particular relevant director did not take part in the management of the corporation at the time when the company incurred the debt, the fact that the director was aware as mentioned in s 588V(1)(d)(i) is to be disregarded.

D. It is a defence if it is proved that the corporation took all reasonable steps to prevent the company from incurring the debt.

Consequences of insolvent trading Directors liable to compensate the company If it is the case that s 588G has been satisfied and that none of the defences in s 588H are applicable, the court may, if satisfied that: (a) the person committed the contravention in relation to the incurring of a debt

by a company; and

(b) the debt is wholly or partly unsecured; and

(c) the person to whom the debt is owed has suffered loss or damage in relation to the debt because of the company's insolvency;

order the first-mentioned person to pay to the company compensation equal to the amount of that loss or damage: s 588J(1). An amount paid to a company under section 588J, 588K, 588M or 588W is not available to pay a secured debt of the company unless all the company's unsecured debts have been paid in full: s 588Y(1). Further, where: (a) under ss 588J or 588K, or in proceedings under ss 588M or 588W, a court

orders a person to pay to the company compensation, or an amount, equal to the amount of loss or damage suffered by a person in relation to a debt because of the company's insolvency; and

(b) the court is satisfied that, at the time when the company incurred the debt, the person who suffered the loss or damage knew that the company was insolvent at that time or would become insolvent by incurring the debt, or by incurring at that time debts including the debt, as the case requires;

the court may order that the compensation or amount paid to the company is not available to pay that debt unless all the company's unsecured debts (other than debts to which orders under this subsection relate) have been paid in full: s 588Y(2).


Section 588Y(2) does not apply in relation to proceedings under s 588M in relation to the incurring of a debt by a company if the proceedings are begun by a creditor of the company (as provided for in Subdivision B of Division 4): s 588Y(3). Finally, s 588Y(2) does not apply in relation to a liability that is taken to be a debt because of s 588F. A company's liquidator may intervene in an application for a civil penalty order against a person in relation to a contravention of s 588G(2): s 588J(2). A company's liquidator who so intervenes is entitled to be heard only if the court is satisfied that the person committed the contravention in relation to the incurring of a debt by that company and, only on the question whether the court should order the person to pay compensation to the company. For the purposes of this section “Court” is defined in s 58A as the Federal Court or the Supreme Court of a State or Territory or the Family Court of Australia. Criminal penalty If a court finds a person guilty

55 of an offence under s 588G(3) in relation to the

incurring of a debt by a company and, the court is satisfied that:

(i) the debt is wholly or partly unsecured; and

(ii) the person to whom the debt is owed has suffered loss or damage in relation to the debt because of the company's insolvency;

the court may (whether or not it imposes a penalty) order the first-mentioned person to pay to the company compensation equal to the amount of that loss or damage: s 588K An order to pay compensation that a court makes under ss 588J or 588K may be enforced as if it were a judgment of the court: s 588L. Recovery of compensation Section 588M provides that where: (a) a person (a director) has contravened s 588G(2) or (3) in relation to the

incurring of a debt by a company; and

(b) the person (the creditor) to whom the debt is owed has suffered loss or damage in relation to the debt because of the company's insolvency; and

55 Section 73A defines when a court is taken to find a person guilty of an offence.


(c) the debt was wholly or partly unsecured when the loss or damage was suffered; and

(d) the company is being wound up; whether or not: (e) the director has been convicted of an offence in relation to the contravention;

or

(f) a civil penalty order has been made against the director in relation to the contravention.

the company's liquidator may recover from the director, as a debt due to the company, an amount equal to the amount of the loss or damage: s 588M(1) and (2). In addition, the creditor may, as provided in Subdivision B but not otherwise, recover from the director, as a debt due to the creditor, an amount equal to the amount of the loss or damage: s 588M(3): see Box Valley Pty Ltd v Kidd & Anor [2006] NSWCA 26 at [53] Proceedings under s 588M may only be begun within 6 years after the beginning of the winding up: s 588M(4). Sections 588J, K and M have effect in addition to, and not in derogation of, any rule of law about the duty or liability of a person because of the person's office or employment in relation to a company. Further, those sections do not prevent proceedings from being instituted in respect of a breach of such a duty or in respect of such a liability: s 588P. An amount recovered in proceedings under s 588M is to be taken into account in working out the amount (if any) recoverable in: (a) any other proceedings under that section in relation to the incurring of the

debt; and

(b) proceedings under s 596AC in relation to a contravention of s 596AB that is linked to the incurring of the debt: s 588N.

Creditors may seek recover pursuant to subdivision B. Relevant in that regard are sections 588R, S, T and U. Section 588R(1) enables a creditor of a company that is being wound up and who has the written consent of the company's liquidator, to begin proceedings under s 588M in relation to the incurring by the company of a debt that is owed to the creditor. Section 588M(1) has effect despite the contents of s 588T and is subject to s 588U: s 588R. Sections 588T and U are set out below.


Pursuant to s 588S, after the end of 6 months beginning when a company begins to be wound up, a creditor of the company may give to the company's liquidator a written notice: (a) stating that the creditor intends to begin proceedings under s 588M in relation

to the incurring by the company of a specified debt that is owed to the creditor; and

(b) asking the liquidator to give to the creditor, within 3 months after receiving the notice:

(i) a written consent to the creditor beginning the proceedings; or (ii) a written statement of the reasons why the liquidator thinks that

proceedings under s 588M in relation to the incurring of that debt should not be begun.

See Box Valley Pty Ltd v Kidd & Anor [2006] NSWCA 26 where the liquidator consented to proceedings. Where a notice is given under s 588S, the creditor may begin proceedings in a court under s 588M in relation to the incurring by the company of the debt specified in the notice if: (a) as at the end of 3 months after the liquidator receives the notice, he or she

has not consented to the creditor beginning such proceedings; (s 599T(a)) and

(b) on an application made after those 3 months, the court has given leave for the proceedings to begin: s 588T(2)(b).

If during those 3 months, the liquidator gives to the creditor a written statement of the reasons why the liquidator thinks that such proceedings should not be begun and the creditor applies for leave under s 588T(2)(b) then the creditor must file the statement with the court when so applying and in determining the application, the court is to have regard to the reasons set out in the statement: s 588T (3). An important qualifier to a creditor’s ability to bring proceedings under s 588M is to be found in s 588U(1). That section prohibits a creditor of a company that is being wound up from beginning proceedings under s 588M in relation to the incurring of a debt by the company if: (a) the company's liquidator has applied under s 588FF in relation to the debt, or

in relation to a transaction under which the debt was incurred; or

(b) the company's liquidator has begun proceedings under s 588M in relation to the incurring of the debt; or


(c) the company's liquidator has intervened in an application for a civil penalty order against a person in relation to a contravention of s 588G(2) in relation to the incurring of the debt.

Section 588U(1) has effect despite ss 588R and 588T: s 588U(2).

TOPIC 4 A COMPANY AS A CORPORATE ENTITY …sydney.edu.au/lec/subjects/associations/notes/Winter...

Documents

Transcript of TOPIC 4 A COMPANY AS A CORPORATE ENTITY …sydney.edu.au/lec/subjects/associations/notes/Winter...