Tobacco Primer - C S

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  • DISCLOSURE APPENDIX AT THE BACK OF THIS REPORT CONTAINS IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES, ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS, AND THE STATUS OF NON-US ANALYSTS. US Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.

    CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES RESEARCH & ANALYTICS BEYOND INFORMATION

    Client-Driven Solutions, Insights, and Access

    24 March 2014

    Europe

    Equity Research

    Consumer Staples (Tobacco)

    Tobacco THEME

    Industry primer We transfer coverage of Philip Morris International (maintain Neutral, TP

    US$85), British American Tobacco (downgrading to Neutral, new TP

    3,500p) and Imperial Tobacco (maintain Outperform, new TP 2,700p) to our

    European Consumer Staples team.

    After a decade or more of little/no volume growth, the past five years have

    seen global tobacco volumes (ex. US/China) decline. Most markets have

    seen growth rates slow meaningfully; the global declines in each of the past

    five years have been worse than in any of the previous 10.

    Several reasons can explain this, some of which are cyclical (pressure on

    disposable incomes, increased unemployment) while some might be

    considered more structural (illicit trade, renewed focus from authorities,

    higher excise duty hikes, advances in new technology).

    The higher rates of excise duty are, however, a double-edged sword. While

    this puts pressure on market volumes, it is price that has always been the real

    driver of industry margins/returns. The industry has been able to take

    advantage of government-induced inflation, which has been highly profitable.

    The past few years have also seen the highest levels of pricing by the industry.

    Thus the past five years have been characterised by weaker volumes, but

    the higher pricing has helped industry margins up to record levels; the

    industry has seen particularly strong increases in margins.

    We believe the markets will return to their previous, rather more steady

    declines (rather than the steeper falls of late), although not for a year or so.

    Then there is new technology. The media coverage far outweighs the reality

    e-cigarettes are still a very small part of the market and data show a

    levelling-off in sales recently. Many smokers have been willing to try the

    products, but technology still has a long way to go for e-cigarettes to have a

    big impact on tobacco sales. That is not to dismiss the threat/opportunity it

    could undermine the current brand franchises like any new technology but

    we believe the tobacco giants will dominate the new industry whatever its

    size. Industries in long-term decline also have a habit of consolidating,

    especially when integration yields major benefits. Press reports suggest

    some US consolidation is possible (FT 03/03/14). In due course we expect

    the Big 4 global players (PMI, BAT, IMT, JT) could become the Big 3.

    Figure 1: Tobacco: Ratings and TPs Rating Ticker CCY Share price Target price Up-/downside 2014 PE EV/NOPAT Div yield

    British American Tobacco NEUTRAL BATS.L GBp 3215 3500 9% 15.4x 15.1x 4.5%

    Imperial Tobacco OUTPERFORM IMT.L GBp 2418 2700 12% 11.5x 14.1x 5.4%

    Philip Morris International NEUTRAL PM USD 80.4 85.0 6% 15.6x 17.5x 4.7% Source: Credit Suisse estimates

    Research Analysts

    Jimmie Bork

    44 20 7883 9941

    [email protected]

    Charlie Mills

    44 20 7888 0325

    [email protected]

    Pieter Vorster

    27 11 012 80 64

    [email protected]

    Nicolas Sochovsky

    44 20 7883 8075

    [email protected]

    Alex Molloy

    41 44 333 05 83

    [email protected]

    Sanjeet Aujla

    44 20 7888 0353

    [email protected]

    Kieran McGrath

    44 20 7888 9216

    [email protected]

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 2

    Key charts: The story in brief Figure 2: Market volumes have deteriorated since 2008 Figure 3: but pricing has been strong

    -5%

    -4%

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    2013

    TMA Euromonitor Top 4 tobacco

    -4%

    -2%

    0%

    2%

    4%

    6%

    8%

    10%

    Retail sales (cc) Volumes Pricing

    Source: Euromonitor, Company data, TMA Source: Company data, Thomson Reuters

    Figure 4: Price/volume relationship consistent with

    history

    Figure 5: Pricing always better for industry margins

    1999

    20002001

    2002

    2003

    200420052006

    20072008

    2009

    2010

    2011

    2012

    R = 0.8444

    -2.5%

    -2.0%

    -1.5%

    -1.0%

    -0.5%

    0.0%

    0.5%

    1.0%

    1.5%

    2.0%

    0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%

    Vo

    lum

    e g

    row

    th

    Price/mix (constant currency)

    Elasticity 0.3-0.5

    15.0%

    20.0%

    25.0%

    30.0%

    35.0%

    40.0%

    Source: Euromonitor (Cigarette + OTP) Source: Aggregated margin of BAT, IMT, PMI and JT

    Figure 6: e-cigarette sales look to be maturing (US data) Figure 7: Declining industries consolidate

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    Jul 1

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    Aug

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    Feb

    14

    Retail sales (m USD) Volume (m units, RHS)

    50%

    55%

    60%

    65%

    70%

    75%

    80%

    2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

    Top 4 tobacco % international market (ex China, USA)

    JT: Gallaher

    IMT: Altadis

    BAT: STG, Tekel

    PMI: Fortune

    Source: AC Nielsen data for the US Source: Euromonitor

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 3

    Table of contents Key charts: The story in brief 2 New world, new reality? 4

    Background 4 So what has happened to industry volumes? 7

    1: Increased levels of unemployment 9 2: Decline in disposable incomes 10 3: Excise duties have risen at a faster rate in the past four years 11 4: Illicit trade has increased significantly 12 5: The rise of e-cigarettes 14

    New technology 15 Availability 16 Technology 16

    What comes after e-cigarettes? 18 Regulation 19 Tax 19 US market the test market for e-cigarettes? 20

    Will tobacco companies win this market? 21 Profitability 22 Summary 22

    Prospects where to from here? 24 Economic indicators improve? 24 Excise duty pressures 24 Illicit trade a structural issue 27 Credit Suisse outlook 27

    Industry consolidation 28 Possible US/China entry? 31

    China 31 US 31

    Possible Top 4 merger? 32

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 4

    New world, new reality? Has the long-term dynamic of the tobacco industry gone through a structural change?

    Or a blip?

    Are e-cigarettes pivotal for the industry?

    We think that based on the past five years trading alone, the first is a reasonable question

    to ask. Market volumes/pricing over this period are in stark contrast to the preceding

    years. New technology (e-cigarettes) validates this question further. History is generally a

    good guide to the future in consumer staples, but is it thus for the tobacco industry?

    Background

    It is surely not courting controversy to declare that smoking tobacco is perceived as a

    dying habit, be that a statement on the health implications, or simply a comment on

    consumer trends.

    Historically, the global market (and here we exclude the US and China) was actually

    showing little or no growth depending on which data source one preferred to use.

    Euromonitor shows small growth, TMA a small decline, while for the Top 4 tobacco

    companies, organic growth was slightly better. We exclude China and the US for two

    reasons:

    The sheer size of the Chinese market (almost half of global volumes) distorts the

    international market.

    The three major international producers, which are the subjects of this report, do not

    operate in either of these countries.

    Since the financial crisis, all sources agree that volume growth has been c2% lower than

    before. At the same time pricing has been higher than ever before. It might reasonably be

    argued that not much has changed a slightly higher pricing more than offsetting the

    weaker volumes. However, there is more to it than that.

    It is important to recognise at the outset that pricing relates to retail prices (including

    retailer mark-up and excise duty), not the manufacturers' selling prices.

    Figure 8: Global market (excl. China and US) volume

    growth, 2000-2013

    Figure 9: Growth in tobacco market (retail selling prices)

    -5%

    -4%

    -3%

    -2%

    -1%

    0%

    1%

    2%

    3%

    2000

    2001

    2002

    2003

    2004

    2005

    2006

    2007

    2008

    2009

    2010

    2011

    2012

    2013

    TMA Euromonitor Top 4 tobacco

    -4%

    -2%

    0%

    2%

    4%

    6%

    8%

    10%

    Retail sales (cc) Volumes Pricing

    Source: Euromonitor, TMA, company data Source: Euromonitor

    Since 2008 industry volume

    growth has slipped by

    200bps.

    Weaker volumes. but

    higher pricing has kept

    organic growth at similar

    levels

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 5

    The role of price in this industry is crucial to not just the manufacturers, but also to retailers

    and especially governments. Declining volumes have not proved an impediment to the

    tobacco companies' growth (their EPS comfortably exceeding that of other staples over

    the past decade). Although industry consolidation has played a part (we discuss this again

    later in the report), it is the unique selling architecture of the industry that drives the top

    line (as we see above) and also (importantly) profits.

    Figure 10: Global revenues (ex. China and the US) industry has defended its share of

    the profit pool by keeping the same proportion of retail sales over time

    66%66%

    67%

    12%

    12%

    11%

    22%

    22%

    22%

    0

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    300

    350

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    450

    2005 2008 2012

    Taxes Trade Manufacturers

    $413bn

    $294bn

    +6-7% organic CAGR

    $361bn

    Source: PMI data

    As governments raise tobacco taxes, the industry typically matches them with price

    increases of its own this is a generalisation, but over the past eight years as the value of

    the market has risen 6-7% per annum, the industry's take of the final selling price has not

    changed, according to data presented by PMI.

    As the manufacturers take is only c20% of the final selling price, a 5% rise in price by the

    producer only equates to a 1% rise for the final customer, all else being equal a novel

    feature for tobacco among staples companies. Even in spirits the manufacturer has a little

    over half of the final retail selling price.

    Figure 11: Net sales as a % gross sales suggests that retail pricing has been marginally

    more than the manufacturer's pricing

    30%

    32%

    34%

    36%

    38%

    40%

    42%

    44%

    2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

    PMI BATS

    Source: Company data. Gross sales are net of sales/promotional incentives. Net sales also exclude excise

    Pricing has always been the

    key metric in this industry

    The tobacco industry has

    been adept at raising prices

    to pass on excise price

    increases

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 6

    The accounts of the major tobacco companies tell a slightly different story. Consider the

    net revenue (i.e. ex taxes) as a percentage of the gross revenue (i.e. including taxes) of

    the major players over the past eight years. Geographic trends/mix, acquisitions and

    restrictions on trade promotion will have played a part, but both BAT and PMI have seen

    their net sales fall as a percentage of gross sales (so taxes have gone up more than

    manufacturers' selling prices). We exclude IMT due to significant M&A (notably Altadis)

    distorting the comparatives (Figure 12).

    The correlation with government excise duty increases has meant that industry pricing has

    been, and looks set to remain, strong. For the three large Europe-based companies, price

    has averaged 5% per annum for the past eight years (and over 6% for the past four years)

    against, by way of illustration, just over 2% for other staples sectors.

    Figure 12: Price a greater contributor to top line growth for tobacco relative to staples

    0.0%

    1.0%

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    3.0%

    4.0%

    5.0%

    6.0%

    7.0%

    8.0%

    9.0%

    2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

    Staples Tobacco Staples average Tobacco average

    Source: Company data (IMT, BATS, PMI), Credit Suisse research

    Price is not only the single largest contributor to top-line growth, but it also accounts for

    over 100% of the profit growth. PMI each year breaks out the components of its profit

    growth below we simply aggregate the past seven years' data to illustrate the

    importance of price to PMI, the industry leader.

    Figure 13: Tobacco profit growth it's all in the price PMI case in point

    8,350

    13,493

    11,394

    506

    1,958

    2,763

    1,024

    5000

    7000

    9000

    11000

    13000

    15000

    17000

    19000

    21000

    2006 EBIT Price Mix Volume Investment FX, M&A, other 2013 EBIT

    PM

    I E

    BIT

    contr

    ibution (

    US

    Dm

    )

    220% of

    profit growth

    Source: Company data

    Raising prices with

    government price hikes has

    been highly remunerative for

    the tobacco industry

    Price the key driver of profits

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 7

    So the past five years may have been characterised by weak volumes and higher prices,

    but it is the latter that is more important to profits. For all the pressures on volumes

    industry margins have proved particularly strong over the same period, the increases far

    outstripping what had come before.

    Figure 14: Aggregated margin of the Top 4 tobacco companies

    15.0%

    20.0%

    25.0%

    30.0%

    35.0%

    40.0%

    45.0%

    "Big 4"

    "Big 4" ex JT

    Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

    While we believe the market is aware of the facts, it is important to set the ground rules

    and the extent to which this industry relies on price.

    However, pricing is a double-edged sword, while it is (very) good for profits, it can, and

    does, put continued stress on industry volumes. Each price hike or excise increase is

    accompanied by another lurch-down in consumption industry volumes. The elevated

    pricing of the past four years, as excise duties have picked up, has put additional stress on

    cigarette volumes (Figure 9).

    So what has happened to industry volumes?

    Figure 8 and Figure 9 indicate that the level of pricing has gone up more, and so volumes

    have suffered. However, this is only a part of the picture. A closer look at the volume

    softness points to EEMA and EU (Figure 16 shows the volume trend pre-2008 vs post-

    2008). Growth rates in Asia-Pac and the Americas have not really changed.

    Price elasticity very

    apparent so past five

    years has meant the

    weakest volumes

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 8

    Figure 15: Price versus volume for tobacco: elasticity is in

    line with historical rates (0.3-0.5)

    Figure 16: Notable deterioration in EEMA and EU regions

    1999

    20002001

    2002

    2003

    200420052006

    20072008

    2009

    2010

    2011

    2012

    R = 0.8444

    -2.5%

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    Vo

    lum

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    row

    th

    Price/mix (constant currency)

    Elasticity 0.3-0.5

    EU

    EEMA

    AsiaPac*

    Americas*

    -7%

    -6%

    -5%

    -4%

    -3%

    -2%

    -1%

    0%

    1%

    2%

    3%

    -5% -4% -3% -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%

    Vo

    lum

    e gr

    ow

    th 2

    008-

    2012

    (C

    AG

    R)

    Volume growth 1998-2008 (CAGR)

    Deteriorated

    Improved

    Source: Euromonitor (Cigarettes + OTP) Source: Company data, Euromonitor. *Excludes China and USA

    That is not to say all markets are in decline big markets such as Indonesia and India

    have grown in the low-to-mid single digits over the past five years. However, increasing

    health concerns together with the ever-tightening government clampdowns (be it taxes,

    packaging and labelling restrictions, smoking bans in public places, health warnings or

    consumer education) have set the overall industry in long-term structural decline. The

    trend in each case is well set as authorities continue to tighten legislation/tax.

    Figure 16 showed the change in growth rate by broad region, but the same message can

    be found by looking at the top 30 countries (by market size/volume) again showing the

    generally deteriorating growth rates of the past five years (2008-13) versus that seen in

    the five years previously (2003-08).

    Some markets are still

    growing despite the

    health/economic pressures

    Most markets have slowed

    in the past 4-5 years

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 9

    Figure 17: Top 30 volume markets (ex China/USA) South and Eastern Europe volumes deteriorated in 2008-13

    Russia

    Indonesia

    Japan

    IndiaPhilippines

    Brazil

    Turkey

    South Korea

    Ukraine

    Germany

    Egypt

    Italy

    Vietnam

    Pakistan

    Spain

    Poland

    France

    Argentina

    UK

    Thailand

    Taiwan

    Mexico

    Canada

    UAE

    Romania

    S Africa

    Saudi Arabia

    Kazakhstan

    Algeria

    -12%

    -10%

    -8%

    -6%

    -4%

    -2%

    0%

    2%

    4%

    6%

    8%

    -10% -8% -6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%

    Vo

    lum

    e g

    row

    th (

    CA

    GR

    2008-1

    3)

    Volume growth (CAGR 2003-08)

    Improved relative

    to 2003-08 trend

    Deteriorated relative

    to 2003-08 trend

    Source: TMA, 2008-12 where 2013 data is not available yet (e.g. Vietnam, Pakistan, Thailand, Taiwan, UAE, Romania, S Africa, Saudi Arabia)

    We suggest there are five macro factors at work here:

    1: Increased levels of unemployment

    Below we show the change in unemployment in these two key regions (EU and EEMA),

    comparing the rate in 2012 with that in 2008 (there has been an increase in unemployment

    in virtually every market).

    Similarly, the market growth rates have deteriorated (comparing the growth rate pre 2008

    with that seen post 2008).

    Put simply, unemployment has gone up and the market growth rates have slowed (most

    countries lie in the bottom right-hand quadrant of Figure 18 and Figure 19).

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 10

    Figure 18: Deterioration in EU cigarette volume growth

    (2008-2012 v 1998-2008) versus change in unemployment

    (2012 v 2008)

    Figure 19: Deterioration in EEMA volume growth (2008-

    2012 v 1998-2008) versus change in unemployment (2012

    v 2008)

    Austria

    Belgium

    Denmark

    Estonia

    Finland

    FranceGermany

    Greece

    IrelandItaly

    Latvia

    Lithuania

    NetherlandsNorway

    Poland

    Portugal

    Spain

    Sweden

    Switzerland

    United Kingdom

    -16%

    -12%

    -8%

    -4%

    0%

    4%

    -3% 0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 15% 18%

    Ch

    an

    ge in

    vo

    lum

    e g

    row

    th (

    '98

    -'0

    8 v

    s '0

    8-'

    12

    )

    Change in unemployment rate (from 2008 to 2012)

    Russia

    Turkey

    Ukraine

    Egypt

    Iran

    Romania

    Kazakhstan

    Algeria

    Saudi

    ArabiaSouth

    Africa

    Czech

    Nigeria

    Morocco

    Serbia

    Azerbaijan

    Tunisia

    Hungary

    Bulgaria

    Israel

    Slovakia

    Croatia

    Georgia Slovenia

    Lithuania

    Estonia

    Latvia

    Bosnia

    Macedonia

    -25%

    -20%

    -15%

    -10%

    -5%

    0%

    5%

    -3% 2% 7% 12%

    Change in v

    olu

    me g

    row

    th (

    '98-'

    08 v

    s '08-

    '12)

    Change in unemployment rate (from 2008 to

    2012)

    Source: Euromonitor, IMF Source: Euromonitor, IMF

    2: Decline in disposable incomes

    The decline in real disposable incomes in Europe has been a reasonable indicator for

    overall cigarette volume growth/declines in Europe (Figure 20).

    Figure 20: EU Pressure on disposable incomes has hit cigarette volumes

    -3%

    -2%

    -1%

    0%

    1%

    2%

    3%

    4%

    -10%

    -8%

    -6%

    -4%

    -2%

    0%

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    4%

    Q1 0

    0

    Q4 0

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    Q3 0

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    Q3 0

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    Q2 0

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    Q2 1

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    Q1 1

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    Q4 1

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    Q3 1

    3

    EU indsutry volumes (12m rolling) EU real disposable incomes (RHS)

    Source: EU market volumes as indicated by PMI, Disposable incomes as estimated by Oxford Economics

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 11

    3: Excise duties have risen at a faster rate in the past four years

    Whether it is a new-found zeal on health concerns, or tighter fiscal budgets and the need

    to find more income, or indeed a combination of these either way European countries

    have all been increasing their levies on the tobacco industry at a higher rate over the past

    four years than previously. The European Union gives numbers that support this notion,

    notably over the past three years.

    Figure 21: Selling prices and excise per 1000 sticks in the

    EU

    Figure 22: % increase in excise duty across the EU for

    tobacco products

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    Prices (EUR per '000 stick) Excise

    EU expansion

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    3.0%

    4.0%

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    6.0%

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    8.0%

    9.0%

    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

    Source: Credit Suisse research based on EU releases Source: Credit Suisse research based on EU releases

    The same can be said for the EEMA region although we do not have uniform data from

    the EU, we can see that the percentage of the selling price accounted for by excise duty

    has risen significantly in the major markets across the region over the past four years

    (Figure 23).

    Figure 23: Excise duty as a % of the selling price for major markets in the EEMEA region

    0.0%

    10.0%

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    30.0%

    40.0%

    50.0%

    60.0%

    70.0%

    80.0%

    90.0%

    2008

    2012

    Source: Credit Suisse research based on Euromonitor data

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 12

    Fine-cut, or roll-your-own (RYO), has historically offered some growth, although this has

    also slowed sharply. RYO has historically enjoyed preferential excise tax treatment in most

    European countries, although this is beginning to be eroded.

    In 2012, lost excise tax on cigarettes outweighed the increase in tax revenues collected

    from growth in fine-cut products in a number of big European markets, notably Italy and

    Spain where authorities increased excise on fine-cut tobacco in Q4 '12 and Q2 '13,

    respectively.

    Figure 24: Pressure on tax revenues as fine-cut no longer

    offsets declining cigarette excise

    Figure 25: Growth in fine-cut (RYO) slowing as tax gaps

    close (e.g. Spain, Italy)

    -600

    -400

    -200

    0

    200

    400

    600

    800

    1,000

    2009 2010 2011 2012

    Change in tobacco excise revenues (m euro)

    Spain Italy Germany

    -1%

    0%

    1%

    2%

    3%

    4%

    5%

    6%

    7%

    8%

    EU RYO vol growth

    Significant excise increases on fine cut tobacco (e.g.

    Italy, Spain)

    Source: The European Commission, Credit Suisse research Source: Euromonitor, Company data

    Fine-cut tobacco volumes in Europe have been roughly flat since the excise increases,

    which have put prices more in line with cigarettes in these markets (Figure 25).

    4: Illicit trade has increased significantly

    The illicit trade has been a persistent thorn in the side for both the tobacco industry and

    governments. It accounts for ~10% of cigarette volumes in the past decade but has

    increased sharply over the past four years coinciding with the weaker industry volumes.

    Arguably, the factors highlighted above have themselves all contributed to this increase.

    The drivers behind the illicit trade are in general;

    Tax differentials between countries, which make it attractive to move volumes from

    low-excise countries across borders.

    What represents the interest of one country might not represent the interest of

    another collecting excise taxes and stemming the illicit trade in Country A versus

    profits and employment in Country B.

    There are frequently strong local, often political, interests in the ownership of the illegal

    exporters.

    Excise duty represents a large proportion of the selling price of tobacco, rendering a

    significant opportunity to the illegal trade that avoids such duty. The fines are small

    compared with the profits that can be achieved.

    Price increases are a fundamental part of the tobacco industry structure there is

    persistent pressure on pricing, particularly at times of lower disposable incomes and

    higher unemployment.

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 13

    Not all sources agree on the extent of contraband/illicit trade, which is hard to measure.

    Euromonitor puts the figure at 12% globally, while KPMG, in a specially commissioned

    report, puts the figure at 11% in the EU.

    Figure 26: Global illicit trade as a % of market (ex China

    and US) volume

    Figure 27: Contraband and counterfeit share of EU

    market volume

    0%

    2%

    4%

    6%

    8%

    10%

    12%

    14%

    19

    98

    19

    99

    20

    00

    20

    01

    20

    02

    20

    03

    20

    04

    20

    05

    20

    06

    20

    07

    20

    08

    20

    09

    20

    10

    20

    11

    20

    12

    20

    13

    0.0%

    2.0%

    4.0%

    6.0%

    8.0%

    10.0%

    12.0%

    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

    Source: Euromonitor to 2012, Credit Suisse estimate 2013 Source: KPMG

    Not surprisingly, the penetration of illegal products into the total tobacco market has a

    strong economic sensitivity with the illegal trade increasing when the consumer is under

    increased pressure. We illustrate the point by comparing the percentage of illicit trade with

    unemployment rates (1yr lag) in countries with high unemployment (Figure 28).

    Figure 28: Illicit penetration sensitive to changes in unemployment (for countries with

    unemployment rates above 8%)

    6%

    7%

    8%

    9%

    10%

    11%

    12%

    13%

    14%

    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

    Illicit % total consumption Unemployment rate (1 year lag)

    R^2 = 0.89

    Source: Euromonitor, KPMG, IMF Note : No 2013 data available yet

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 14

    The regions where illicit trade has stepped up are EEMA (in particular) and western

    Europe consistent with some of the market data illustrated above (Figure 16) showing

    that volumes have been weakest in these regions.

    Figure 29: Illicit increase across regions Figure 30: Acceleration mainly driven by MEA and W EU

    6.0%

    3.0% 2.8%

    1.9%

    1.1%

    0%

    1%

    2%

    3%

    4%

    5%

    6%

    7%

    MEA W Europe Asia Americas E Europe

    Increase in illicit penetration (2007-12)

    4%

    6%

    8%

    10%

    12%

    14%

    20

    04

    20

    05

    20

    06

    20

    07

    20

    08

    20

    09

    20

    10

    20

    11

    20

    12

    Global illicit penetration

    W Europe

    MEA

    Source: Euromonitor Source: Euromonitor

    5: The rise of e-cigarettes

    e-cigarettes may have only taken a modest share of the total tobacco market, but their

    coverage in the media has been high. The press has regularly reported on the size,

    growth, implications, penetration and potential of this market. We discuss this in more

    detail in the following section.

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 15

    New technology In contrast to the market issues explored previously, the threat (or opportunity) from new

    technologies can be considered more structural in nature. Reduced-risk products are still

    only a modest part of total tobacco consumption. e-cigarettes today account for roughly

    0.3% of global volumes, with 1-2% penetration rates in a couple of markets (Figure 32),

    but growth has been exponential.

    The category has attracted considerable attention over the past two years as e-cigarettes

    receive extensive publicity and impressive distribution in a number of developed markets.

    The US is probably the best test-case region given its early adoption of e-cigarettes and

    the detailed market data available here to help track the industry (Figure 31).

    Figure 31: US sales: e-cigarettes established as the preferred tobacco "alternative"

    0

    200

    400

    600

    800

    1000

    1200

    1400

    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e

    US

    Sale

    s (

    $m

    )

    Snus e-cigarettes

    Source: Snus based on Reynolds and Swedish Match, e-cigarettes based on PMI presentation (Nov 2013)

    We will look more closely at the US later, but first provide some background information:

    The potential for new technologies should be reviewed on the basis of four key factors:

    Availability: thus far e-cigarettes have mainly been launched in Europe and North

    America.

    Regulation: There is currently no consensus on how to regulate reduced-risk

    products with country and government/health lobby attitudes ranging from highly

    favourable to advocating an outright ban on e-cigarettes. or regulating them as a

    medicine.

    Tax: thus far there is no consensus on how to categorise them. Should they be taxed?

    At what rate? If they are to make a meaningful dent in tobacco sales, a considerable

    loss of revenue to the various exchequers would ensue.

    Technology: formulation challenges remain; the e-cigarette experience does not fully

    mimic that of smoking a cigarette in the eyes of the consumer and hence full adoption

    has remained low.

    e-cigarettes a lot of media

    attention, but still very small

    in global terms

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 16

    Availability

    e-cigarettes have been launched mainly in Europe and the US. Penetration rates remain

    low (under 2% of the tobacco and related products market), with global retail sales around

    $2-3bn compared with c$780bn for the total tobacco category.

    The increasing involvement of the global tobacco manufacturers might change the

    landscape, but thus far launches have been in relatively wealthy countries with high

    tobacco taxes.

    Figure 32: e-cigarette as a % of total market remains small thus far (2013 data)

    0.0%

    0.2%

    0.4%

    0.6%

    0.8%

    1.0%

    1.2%

    1.4%

    1.6%

    USA W Europe Global

    e-cigarettes % of volumes

    Source: BAT survey (CMD 2013)

    Currently, margins on e-cigarettes for retailers are large (and small on tobacco). Little

    surprise then that the new technology is afforded significant shelf space, over and above

    its share of sales.

    Technology

    Surveys of smokers show high awareness and trial of e-cigarettes; however, thus far trial

    rarely leads to regular, or exclusive, use of e-cigarettes (Figure 33).

    Figure 33: Low conversion to exclusive use of e-cigarettes

    94%

    23%

    5%N/A

    100%

    41%

    11%

    N/A

    75%

    35%

    10%2%

    0%

    10%

    20%

    30%

    40%

    50%

    60%

    70%

    80%

    90%

    100%

    Awareness Trial Regular use Exclusive use

    CDC survey (USA) Oct '11 CDC May '13 BAT survey (EU & USA) Sep '13

    Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Company data

    Thus far only really seen in

    developed markets

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 17

    Lorillard (the US market leader in e-cigarettes) claimed at its recent Capital Markets Day

    that awareness was now close to 100%, 43% had trialled the product and that there was

    26% repeat usage based on survey data.

    The low conversion suggests that the consumer does not think e-cigarettes are a

    substitute for the feel and flavour of cigarettes. Reasons for the slow or low uptake

    of e-cigarettes voiced by users include:

    The technology does not match the nicotine delivery profile. A traditional cigarette

    delivers a fast and high concentration of nicotine to the bloodstream. This contrasts

    with e-cigarettes where the uptake is slower and not as impactful (Figure 34).

    Figure 34: Cigarettes still the better option for nicotine delivery

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    12

    14

    16

    18

    20

    0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

    Nic

    otine b

    lood c

    oncentr

    ation

    Time (minutes)

    Cigarettes e-cigarettes

    Source: Data from PMI Capital Market Day (2012)

    The new technology lacks the 'bite' of a traditional cigarette. The burning or kick

    sensation from inhaling smoke is absent in an e-cigarette.

    Taste is still an issue with many consumers

    and it would appear that the satisfaction and finite nature of a single cigarette is not

    matched.

    So while consumers are showing a willingness to try an alternative nicotine delivery

    mechanism, the current technology is still found to be lacking. Not all e-cigarette users are

    those who are looking to give up smoking and some are using the new technology in place

    of other more traditional quitting methods gums, patches, prescription drugs, hypnosis, etc.

    AC Nielsen research for the UK from 2013 showed 47% of those who tried e-cigarettes did

    so as a part of their NRT (nicotine replacement therapy), but that 53% were trying the

    product in its own right.

    The reasons given for trying e-cigarettes again we draw on AC Nielsen's study in

    the UK are all related to reductions in tobacco intake or as a substitute to traditional

    forms of nicotine intake.

    Smokers seem willing to try,

    but the experience appears

    to fall short

    e-cigarettes used mainly by

    those trying to quit? No

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 18

    Figure 35: What are the benefits of e-cigarettes (UK sample)

    0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

    Point of entry

    Complement existing habit

    Price

    Convenience

    Instead of patches

    Harm reduction

    Route to reduce intake

    Doesn't make me smelll

    Alternative to smoking

    Source: AC Nielsen study in the UK (2013)

    We note that price was not one of the main factors highlighted in Nielsen's survey, despite

    the price differential between e-cigarettes and normal cigarettes a topic that might be

    tested if taxes start to be imposed on this burgeoning category.

    What comes after e-cigarettes?

    New technologies are being developed by the major tobacco manufacturers. PMI and BAT

    are making steady progress on different technology platforms, including heat-not-burn.

    Initial consumer trials of PMI's heat-not-burn product have indicated a more favourable

    consumer experience and willingness to adopt the product (Figure 36). Perhaps the closer

    proximity to a traditional cigarette widens the appeal of reduced-risk products.

    US start-up Ploom has already introduced a product that heats small pods of real tobacco.

    The product was introduced in the US in 2012 and was launched in Austria (May 2013)

    and Japan (Dec 2013) through Ploom's partnership with Japan Tobacco.

    PMI and BAT aim to launch heat-not-burn products within the next few years. PMI

    estimates that the market could be 30-50bn units, with profitability in line with cigarettes

    (Figure 37). An assertion that would be highly sensitive to the eventual regulation and

    taxation of reduced-risk products, in our view, for which there is currently no consensus.

    Figure 36: Promising consumer tests Survey data from CDC and initial PMI test results

    Figure 37: PMI expects profits in line with cigarettes Profit per '000 unit (USD)

    0%

    10%

    20%

    30%

    40%

    50%

    60%

    70%

    80%

    Japan sample Italy sample US market

    PMI's platform 1 (heat-not-burn) E-cigarettes

    Purchase intention Adoption

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    25

    30

    PMI cigarettes PMI EU region Platform 1

    Profit per '000 unit (USD)

    Source: CDC, PMI (CAGNY '14) Source: Company data, Management estimates (CAGNY 2014)

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 19

    Regulation

    Right at the heart of regulating reduced-risk products is a major conflict; indeed it is a

    clash that exists throughout the industry. Health versus taxes. While encouraging the

    uptake of the apparently more healthy (or less unhealthy?) e-cigarette may be positive for

    the health of the nation, it does, as things currently stand, mean a considerable drop in the

    excise takings of a country if consumers switch. Should e-cigarettes be subject to excise

    duty or not?

    Should the numerous restrictions on cigarette advertising, smoking in public places,

    retailing etc. apply to e-cigarettes as well? What is clear is that there is no consensus right

    now. The debate continues in the media, and countries are all taking very different lines.

    Here are a list of examples, by no means exhaustive, but illustrative of the different

    direction many are taking:

    Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil (with a large tobacco industry), Turkey, Singapore: ban on

    e-cigarette sales

    South Korea: internet sales banned

    Australia: online purchase (imports) for personal consumption allowed

    World Health Organisation: Advise strongly against use of e-cigarettes

    Canada: health authorities issued warnings against use of e-cigarettes

    Malaysia: requires a prescription and only sold through pharmacies

    Romania: considered as medicinal product

    Italy: has implemented excise taxes on e-cigarettes

    The EU: has proposed legislation to allow member states to determine most aspects

    of regulation with some restrictions on nicotine content and product standards

    The US: few restrictions, but with variations by state. e-cigarettes are included under

    existing smoking bans in over 100 cities (e.g. New York, Boston and Seattle)

    Tax

    Just as there is no accord on regulating e-cigarette usage, so there is no consensus on tax.

    If the new technology is to have a meaningful impact on the sales of cigarettes there will

    be an ensuing loss of excise duty to the various exchequers. This needs to be weighed

    against the health implications should regulators not encourage consumers towards the

    healthier option?

    We think that a tax will be applied to e-cigarettes, albeit at what rate and what structure

    remain to be seen.

    Thus far the only two major countries to have implemented taxes on e-cigarettes are:

    Italy the same level of tax as roll-your-own

    Latvia the same tax as standard cigarettes

    In the US, Minnesota is thus far the only state to have implemented a tax on e-cigarettes

    (at 95% of the wholesale price), although others are considering it. We think 2014 is likely

    to see significant developments on this front.

    To ban/restrict or not to

    ban/restrict?

    Tax structure yet to evolve

    on the new technology

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 20

    US market the test market for e-cigarettes?

    The US market is certainly the most advanced when it comes to the e-cigarette category.

    From a base of under $10m in 2007, sales are estimated to have reached over $1bn in

    2013, almost double that recorded in 2012 (Figure 31).

    Sales are increasing at a rapid rate and the established tobacco manufacturers (Altria,

    Reynolds and Lorillard) have all launched their own versions of the product.

    Lorillard acquired e-cigarette maker blu at the beginning of 2012 and has quickly

    established itself as the market leader (Figure 38).

    Figure 38: Lorillard's blu brand now ~50% share in retail Figure 39: Growth has moderated in the past few

    quarters, despite distribution expansion

    0%

    10%

    20%

    30%

    40%

    50%

    60%

    $0

    $10

    $20

    $30

    $40

    $50

    $60

    $70

    Q2 12Q3 12Q4 12Q1 13Q2 13Q3 13Q4 13

    LO e-cigarette net sales (m USD) Mkt share

    $0

    $100

    $200

    $300

    $400

    $500

    $600

    Q2 12 Q3 12 Q4 12 Q1 13 Q2 13 Q3 13 Q4 13

    Retail sales ($m 12m trailing, implied from LO mkt share)

    Source: Company data, management estimates of retail market share Source: Company data

    Taking Lorillard's reported e-cigarette sales and its management's estimates of its own

    market shares over the past 12 months would imply market growth has been moderating

    in the past couple of quarters (Figure 39). Lorillard claimed at Q4 that increased

    distribution in previous quarters had exaggerated growth rates and that volumes were flat

    in Q4 (with prices coming down).

    Numbers from AC Nielsen (measuring retail sales in four-week periods) show sales

    peaking midway through 2013, and declining month-on-month since then (and unit sales

    remaining broadly flat). Notable too are the big jumps in January every year as consumers

    try to break the smoking habit.

    Numbers from Reynolds Capital Markets Day also suggest that e-cigarette's share of the

    cigarette market is moderating (Figure 41) perhaps an indication of low repeat

    purchases as some surveys have suggested.

    New technology threat?

    Recent data point to a

    market past its peak have

    e-cigarettes burnt out?

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 21

    Figure 40: Monthly e-cig sales level off in US retail Figure 41: and penetration stabilises

    0

    1

    1

    2

    2

    3

    3

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    12

    14

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    Sep 1

    1

    Oct

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    Dec

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    Feb 1

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    Jul 1

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    Feb 1

    4

    Retail sales (m USD) Volume (m units, RHS)

    0.0%

    0.1%

    0.2%

    0.3%

    0.4%

    0.5%

    0.6%

    0.7%

    0.8%

    0.9%

    1.0%

    Oct

    -12

    Nov-

    12

    Dec-

    12

    Jan-1

    3

    Feb-1

    3

    Mar

    -13

    Apr-

    13

    May

    -13

    Jun-1

    3

    Jul-13

    Aug-1

    3

    Sep-1

    3

    Oct

    -13

    Equivalent share of total cigarettes

    Source: AC Nielsen Source: MSAi shipments to retail (from RAI CMD 2013)

    Will tobacco companies win this market?

    It might be argued that the tobacco companies are best placed to win in the e-cigarette

    marketplace given their distribution strengths, marketing expertise and scale. Bulls might

    highlight that the leaders in the US e-cigarette are the leading tobacco companies which

    is true, but the share of e-cigarettes is not the same as their share of tobacco currently.

    Figure 42: US market shares of e-cigarettes and cigarettes (%)

    Market share of cigarettes Market share of e-cigarettes

    Lorillard 10 46

    Altria 57 0

    Reynolds 27 0

    Fin Brand 20

    NJoy 11

    Others 6 13

    Total 100 100

    Source: AC Nielsen, 12m trailing based on February 2014 release

    This is a matter of timing, and phase of development: Altria and Reynolds only very

    recently entered the market; so their success will need to be monitored. Does being a

    large tobacco company offer a big advantage? It would appear so:

    Lorillard: has taken blu's market share from 11% when it was acquired (April 2012) to

    46% today.

    Reynolds launched VUSE in Colorado in July 2013, and by October it claimed to

    account for 61.6% of the e-cigarette market in the state.

    Figure 43: Tobacco companies' entry into e-cigarettes

    Date Venture

    Imperial Tobacco 2013 Bought Dragonite Intl for $75m

    BAT 2012 Bought a UK start up in 2012, launched Vype in the UK in 2013

    PMI 2014 Building a $500m plant in Italy and expects to enter the market in 2014/15

    Lorillard 2012 Acquired blu in the US for $135m, now the market leader

    Reynolds 2013 Launched VUSE in Colorado in 2013

    Altria 2013 Launched Mark Ten in two states. Bought Green Smoke in 2014 for $110m

    Source: Company releases

    New technology

    opportunity?

    Being a major tobacco

    incumbent appears to be a

    significant advantage in the

    e-cigarette market

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 22

    Profitability

    Another important consideration is the profitability of this new technology. If it is to make

    significant inroads into the traditional tobacco trade, what are the implications for profits?

    To simply look at the margins is misleading in our view and we think it is better to look at

    the implied profit per pack of cigarettes or cigarette equivalents.

    Figure 44: Profit per pack of cigarettes (or equivalent) for leading names ($/pack of 20)

    0.00

    0.10

    0.20

    0.30

    0.40

    0.50

    0.60

    0.70

    0.80

    0.90

    1.00

    Lorillard Altria Reynolds LO Blu Vapor

    Corp

    PMI Imperial BAT

    Source: Credit Suisse estimates based on latest available company releases

    The Lorillard numbers reported for blu, or indeed the results of the public company Vapor

    Corp (both US), imply profits lower than the tobacco companies in the US, but higher than

    their European counterparts on an equivalent basis.

    It is perhaps a little early to draw definitive conclusions as such a nascent technology has

    yet to settle down in price and the tax structures have yet to be put in place. With barriers

    to entry so low, we would expect price erosion and/or competition to lower the current

    returns.

    Summary

    e-cigarettes remain a small part of the global tobacco market owing partly to

    availability, regulation and limitations of the current technology.

    Interest is high and a large number (over a third) of smokers seem willing to try the

    new technology

    however, thus far e-cigarettes have not been able to match the experience of a

    cigarette for the consumer.

    Other technologies are emerging; more promising products are being developed by

    established cigarette manufacturers. The UK market leader commented that the group

    is on its 10th-generation product today versus three years ago (e-lites). Technology is

    improving at a rapid pace.

    If the technology can match the experience of the 'real thing', then reduced-risk

    products could go a long way.

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 23

    There is no consensus on regulation yet: a number of markets have banned e-

    cigarettes (e.g. Indonesia, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Lithuania, Egypt, GCC,

    Iran and Norway).

    Current regulation gives e-cigarettes an advantage in a number of markets, but

    regulation is emerging and further penetration is likely to result in more restrictions on

    marketing, points of sale, age limits, etc. Note that the UK has just banned sales to

    under 18s.

    Nor has there been any accord on excise duty

    e-cigarettes have experienced rapid growth in the US over the past two years, with a

    proliferation of brands available in the market. However, launches by tobacco

    manufacturers such as Lorillard and Reynolds have achieved market leadership in the

    segment after a relatively short period in the market. Current incumbents have a

    significant advantage based on the US experience.

    There are signs that growth of e-cigarette sales has moderated and share of the

    cigarette market (on an equivalent basis) is stabilising in the US, even declining. A

    pause for breath, or an indication of a technology shortfall?

    e-cigarettes may be an opportunity for revenue, but we see them as a threat to

    industry profitability.

    A final thought traditional terminal growth for a tobacco company in a DCF might be

    zero or even negative. Do e-cigarettes give tobacco valuation a terminal growth?

    We believe the greater threat, however, is to the brand equities of the tobacco companies.

    While they may well embrace the new technology and build their own e-cigarette brands,

    the barriers to entry are low. The tobacco companies have a built-in advantage with

    distribution, but what value then to ascribe to Marlboro (ranked the 8th most valuable brand

    in the world by CNN and Millward Brown*)? The brand value destruction wrought by e-

    cigarettes (if the new technology gets to the required level) could be significant. Years of

    brand building could count for little. There is no other consumer staple where this risk

    exists.

    (*) Interestingly Interbrand no longer recognises Marlboro as being in the top 100 after

    being ranked 9th 10 years ago

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 24

    Prospects where to from here? The higher volume declines over the past five years are, in our view, due to:

    (1) Increased levels of unemployment

    Reductions in disposable incomes

    Increased levels of excise duty/price hikes

    All leading to, and further exacerbated by increased levels of illicit trade

    Growth in e-cigarettes and new technology (given e-cigarettes are still under 0.5% of

    the market their impact has perhaps been rather less than the column inches

    dedicated to them in the world media)

    Economic indicators improve?

    On the first two trends there are macro forecasts that might offer some encouragement;

    both unemployment levels (Figure 45) and disposable incomes (Figure 46) are forecast by

    most economists to improve over the next few years (at least in the EU, which has been

    one of the weakest regions).

    Figure 45: EU unemployment expected to stabilise in

    2014

    Figure 46: and disposable incomes improve

    7%

    8%

    9%

    10%

    11%

    12%

    13%

    Oxford Econ IIF IMF

    -3%

    -2%

    -2%

    -1%

    -1%

    0%

    1%

    1%

    2%

    2%

    3%

    3%

    -12%

    -10%

    -8%

    -6%

    -4%

    -2%

    0%

    2%

    Q2

    07

    Q4

    07

    Q2

    08

    Q4

    08

    Q2

    09

    Q4

    09

    Q2

    10

    Q4

    10

    Q2

    11

    Q4

    11

    Q2

    12

    Q4

    12

    Q2

    13

    Q4

    13

    EU volumes EU real disposable incomes (RHS)

    Source: IMF, IIF, Oxford Economics Source: Oxford Economics

    Excise duty pressures

    On excise duty the position is less clear. A few countries have a long-term explicit agenda

    clearly laid out: e.g:

    UK 2% price increases over UK inflation

    Brazil 8% and 5% pass-on pricing over the next two years

    Russia tax increases, which will push retail prices up by 15-20% p.a. over next three

    years

    Australia 12.5% per annum tax increase over the next three years

    Philippines 15-20% and 3-6% price increases p.a. on economy and premium

    brands, respectively, over the next five years.

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 25

    However, these are the minority. In general excise duty varies widely by country. If we

    compare the average price in the 50 biggest markets (by volume) and see the tax

    component in the selling price, the range varies from a $10 tax per pack (20 sticks) in the

    UK and Australia to 10 in some countries. These numbers should be interpreted with

    some care, as there is also a difference in quality from country to country.

    Figure 47: Average price per pack (20) in countries split between tax and "other"

    0

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    ombi

    a

    Ukr

    aine

    Egy

    pt

    Vie

    tnam

    Tun

    isia

    Indo

    nesi

    a

    Nig

    eria

    Kaz

    akhs

    tan

    Phi

    lippi

    nes

    Tax component (USD per pack) Net sales

    Source: Credit Suisse research based on TMA data

    The concern here is the sheer volume of excise duty that some countries are missing out

    on. Consumers' ability to pay from one country to the next will vary greatly, so a more

    meaningful picture might be drawn by comparing the price of a cigarette to disposable

    income or as a percentage of the average hourly wage, as we highlight in Figure 48.

    Figure 48: Packet of cigarettes expressed as a % of the average hourly wage

    0%

    10%

    20%

    30%

    40%

    50%

    60%

    2000

    2008

    2012

    Source: OECD database, TMA

    A quick scan of some of the largest markets shows that the real cost of a packet of

    cigarettes has risen, and continues to do so in every market.

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 26

    In part this reflects the economic backdrop where average wage inflation has slowed (or

    gone into reverse given the unemployment backdrop). However, it is striking that if we

    compare the increase in the cost of a packet of cigarettes as a percentage of the hourly

    wage (2008-12 versus 2000-08) versus the change in volume growth, all the countries with

    high price pressure lie in the bottom right-hand quadrant (i.e. the pace of cigarette inflation

    has accelerated, as has the rate of decline in consumption).

    Figure 49: Increase in rate of tobacco inflation (as % hourly wage) has led to an increase rate of decline in consumption

    AustraliaUK

    Canada

    Netherlands

    France Germany

    Belgium

    USAItaly

    Austria

    Japan

    SpainGreece

    Czech

    Poland

    HungaryKorea

    -20%

    -15%

    -10%

    -5%

    0%

    5%

    10%

    -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%

    Change in v

    olu

    me g

    row

    th r

    ate

    (00-0

    8 v

    s 0

    8-

    12)

    Change in rate of price pressure (pack % hourly wage) 2000-08 vs 2008-12

    Source: TMA, OECD database

    Excise duty increases on tobacco have consistently been above other indulgences (Figure

    50), leading to large increases in relative pricing.

    Figure 50: UK retail price indices for beer, tobacco, wines/spirits, etc

    0

    50

    100

    150

    200

    250

    300

    350

    400

    450

    500

    1990

    1991

    1992

    1993

    1994

    1995

    1996

    1997

    1998

    1999

    2000

    2001

    2002

    2003

    2004

    2005

    2006

    2007

    2008

    2009

    2010

    2011

    2012

    Soft drinks confectionery beer

    tobacco Wine & Spirits RPI

    Source: ONS

    We do not have the data for all countries but the UK is illustrative over the past 20 years

    tobacco prices are up over 350% versus under 100% for the RPI, with not dissimilar

    numbers for beer, wines and spirits.

    Has tobacco reached an

    inflection point in the

    historical pricing model?

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 27

    Illicit trade a structural issue

    There are continuing actions to limit the illicit trade, which include:

    Funding and intelligence gathering for government agencies (e.g. European Anti-

    Fraud Office, Interpol, and Customs agencies).

    Legislation to create deterrents and improve enforcement.

    Regulate sale of essential materials used in cigarette manufacturing (e.g. chemicals,

    machinery, paper, etc.).

    Pressure on known supplier countries to lower production quotas (e.g. Belarus).

    Implementing measures to stem the illicit trade at its source is likely to remain a major

    challenge for the industry, but progress is being made significant revenues can be lost if

    this is allowed to persist. However, as we highlighted earlier the following factors make the

    illicit trade attractive to some:

    Low penalties

    Conflicts of interest between exporting and importing countries

    Political interests

    Large tax discrepancies that continually increase

    It is hard for us to see how a meaningful reduction will be seen in the illicit trade.

    We also note that four years of a high level of illicit trading has left the consumer familiar

    with the concept of buying cheap illegal cigarettes. We think it is less of a concern to the

    public than it might have been.

    Credit Suisse outlook

    Overall our outlook for the next 3-5 years are that:

    The macro drivers for the industry should improve somewhat and volumes are likely to

    recover but not to previous levels. We see continued pressures on smoking and no

    let-up from the health and government lobbies. We assume volumes will continue to

    decline.

    The Illicit trade will remain a problem in our opinion the price gaps are simply too

    large and consumers have learnt to buy illicit tobacco. Supply routes are well

    established and prevailing conflicts between countries are too numerous for this to

    materially close.

    New technology and e-cigarettes are likely to remain an important but modest new

    avenue for the industry. A material change in technology could change this.

    Declining industries have a habit of consolidating and tobacco has a strong history in

    this regard. Assets are declining and we believe we are getting closer to the possibility

    that there may be some consolidation among the majors.

    No material reverse in

    quantum of illicit trade

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 28

    Industry consolidation Much like its brewing counterpart, the global tobacco industry has been consolidating for a

    number of years. Over the past decade the market share (world ex US and China) of the

    top four names has gone from about 60% to almost 80%.

    Figure 51: Top 4 tobacco companies comprise almost 80% of the international market

    50%

    55%

    60%

    65%

    70%

    75%

    80%

    2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

    Top 4 tobacco % international market (ex China, USA)

    JT: Gallaher

    IMT: Altadis

    BAT: STG, Tekel

    PMI: Fortune

    Source: Euromonitor

    With large synergies gained, and modest multiples paid, we think this process has helped

    fuel the outperformance in earnings growth seen in tobacco (versus other staples).

    However, future opportunities for further consolidation are beginning to look rather

    limited in Europe and Latin America markets are dominated by the Big 4 (PMI, BAT,

    Imperial Tobacco and Japan Tobacco). A few isolated possibilities remain in EEMA and

    Asia (Figure 52) these are either state-owned assets, or predominately domestic

    operations, e.g. in Indonesia, Korea, Vietnam, Egypt, Iran, Bangladesh and Thailand.

    Figure 52: Still some options in Asia and EEMA

    4%

    18%

    42%

    10%

    0%

    5%

    10%

    15%

    20%

    25%

    30%

    35%

    40%

    45%

    EU EEMA Asia (ex China) Americas (ex USA)

    Market share not held by Big 4 tobacco

    Source: Company data

    Consolidation has been a

    key plank of industry

    development

    but there are fewer

    opportunities around now

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 29

    Figure 53: Global Tobacco landscape market shares of the Big 4 tobacco companies

    Volumes (bn) Growth '07-12 PMI BATS JT IMT Other Other Companies

    Europe 520 -5% 38% 20% 17% 21% 4%

    Germany 83 -1% 36% 19% 4% 26% 15% Private label

    Italy 79 -3% 53% 23% 21% 3% 0%

    Spain 57 -10% 31% 12% 20% 28% 9%

    Poland 52 -6% 36% 29% 10% 23% 2%

    France 52 -1% 40% 16% 17% 23% 5%

    UK 43 -3% 7% 7% 39% 45% 1%

    Greece 23 -9% 37% 19% 13% 12% 20% Karelia, STG

    Czech 21 -2% 42% 20% 7% 14% 17%

    Austria 14 1% 35% 6% 33% 19% 6%

    Netherlands 12 -3% 32% 27% 16% 11% 14%

    Hungary 12 -6% 38% 37% 5% 13% 8%

    Belgium 11 -1% 30% 32% 11% 16% 11%

    EEMA 1235 -1% 25% 22% 23% 12% 18%

    Russia 370 1% 26% 21% 37% 9% 7% Donskoy, KT&G

    Turkey 99 -4% 46% 22% 26% 4% 2% European tobacco

    Ukraine 83 -9% 32% 17% 28% 22% 1%

    Egypt 78 -2% 17% 8% 0% 0% 75% Eastern Co

    Iran 56 0% 0% 14% 32% 0% 55% Iranian Tobacco, KT&G

    Belarus 33 12% 0% 16% 22% 2% 60% Neman Tobacco

    Romania 31 -1% 19% 50% 23% 0% 8%

    Kazakhstan 30 0% 47% 7% 43% 3% 0%

    Algeria 30 4% 40% 1% 3% 11% 45% SNTA

    Saudi Arabia 26 6% 62% 15% 0% 9% 14%

    South Africa 22 -2% 3% 86% 4% 0% 7%

    Nigeria 17 1% 2% 80% 10% 7% 1%

    Morocco 16 1% 9% 0% 2% 81% 8%

    Serbia 15 -9% 51% 19% 7% 0% 23% Adris Grupa, Monus, Karelia

    Azerbaijan 14 4% 0% 27% 25% 29% 19% European tobacco

    Tunisia 14 -2% 15% 0% 2% 1% 83% RNTA, MTK

    Uzbekistan 13 5% 4% 92% 1% 1% 2% KT&G

    Bulgaria 9 -15% 13% 13% 0% 0% 74% Bulgartabac, Karelia

    Asia 1196 1% 27% 16% 12% 3% 42%

    Indonesia 303 5% 36% 8% 0% 0% 56% Gudang, Djarum

    Japan 197 -6% 28% 13% 60% 0% 0%

    India 102 0% 12% 8% 0% 0% 80% ITC

    Philippines 102 2% 85% 1% 6% 0% 8% Mighty

    Vietnam 83 4% 2% 31% 1% 10% 56% Vinataba

    Korea 89 -1% 19% 12% 7% 0% 62% KT&G

    Bangladesh 75 - 0% 44% 0% 0% 56% Dhaka, Abul Khair, Nasir

    Pakistan 64 -2% 47% 49% 0% 0% 5%

    Thailand 39 3% 22% 2% 0% 0% 76% Thailand Tobacco Mono

    Taiwan 36 -4% 0% 8% 39% 12% 42% Taiwan Tobacco & Liquor

    Australia 19 -3% 38% 42% 0% 19% 1%

    Malaysia 14 -4% 12% 63% 20% 0% 6% AKJ Marketing

    Americas 298 -3% 38% 49% 4% 0% 10%

    Brazil 87 -5% 17% 64% 0% 0% 19%

    Argentina 43 1% 75% 25% 0% 0% 0%

    Canada 32 2% 34% 51% 15% 0% 1%

    Mexico 34 -6% 74% 26% 1% 0% 0%

    Colombia 15 -5% 51% 49% 0% 0% 0%

    Chile 14 1% 4% 96% 0% 0% 0%

    Venezuela 11 -3% 8% 92% 0% 0% 0%

    USA 287 -5% 0% 0% 0% 3% 97% Altria, Reynolds, Lorillard

    China 2500 4% 0% 1% 0% 0% 99% CNTC Source: Company data, Euromonitor. Asia excludes China, Americas excludes USA

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 30

    Declining cigarette volumes in mature markets and economies of scale across the

    production and supply chain have, in our view, made tobacco an industry with scope for

    consolidation over time.

    Figure 54: M&A multiples average 12.8x on EV/EBITDA (LTM)

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    25

    30

    RJR

    Au

    stri

    a Ta

    bak

    Imas

    co

    Au

    stra

    lasi

    an B

    ran

    ds

    Seit

    a

    Co

    rp H

    aban

    os

    Ligg

    et-D

    uca

    tt

    Tab

    acco

    r

    Au

    stri

    a Ta

    bak

    San

    ta F

    e

    Re

    emts

    ma

    Re

    gie

    de

    s Ta

    bac

    DN

    I

    Ente

    Tab

    acch

    i Ita

    lian

    i

    Etin

    era

    Logi

    stic

    s

    Bal

    kan

    Sta

    r

    Co

    ltab

    aco

    Sam

    po

    ern

    a

    STG

    Co

    nw

    oo

    d

    Gal

    lah

    er

    Laks

    on

    Co

    mm

    on

    wea

    lth

    Alt

    adis

    Joh

    n M

    idd

    leto

    n

    Logi

    sta

    Teke

    l

    Ho

    use

    of

    Pri

    nce

    Ro

    thm

    ans

    US

    ST

    Be

    nto

    el I

    nve

    stam

    a

    Me

    xico

    Min

    ori

    ty

    Ara

    b T

    A

    EV/EBITDA multiple (LTM) Weighted average

    1999-2000 2004-20062001-2003 2007-2008 2009->

    Source: Company data, Thomson Reuters

    Takeover multiples in tobacco have been relatively stable averaging roughly 13x

    EV/EBITDA (LTM) (Figure 54). The bulk of these transactions have been private assets

    taken over by larger public tobacco companies. However, the more notable examples of

    consolidation between public companies (e.g. Sampoerna, Altadis and UST) have been

    done with bid premiums of roughly 30% to the share price (Figure 55).

    Figure 55: Bid premium to share price (at close prior day)

    0%

    10%

    20%

    30%

    40%

    50%

    60%

    Sampoerna(PMI)

    Conwood (RAI) Altadis (IMT) Rothmans (PMI) US ST (Altria)

    Bid premium to share price (close) Average

    Source: Thomson Reuters

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 31

    So what is next? If M&A is to remain a possibility we believe it is a choice between:

    Selecting one of the remaining assets identified in Figure 53

    Buying minorities in emerging markets (e.g. ITC, Souza Cruz, BAT Malaysia, etc.)

    Entering (or re-entering) the US (we assume China will remain closed)

    The Top 4 becoming the Top 3

    Possible US/China entry?

    Throughout this report we have largely ignored the US and Chinese market because of the

    limited direct exposure of the international tobacco companies. The two markets account

    for almost 40% of global retail sales combined (2013 data), a considerable profit pool for

    the industry.

    China

    The Chinese market is a state monopoly operated by the China National Tobacco

    company- CNTC- (in a rare public disclosure net income was reported to be over $18.6bn

    in 2010 and delivering over $110bn in annual tax revenues) the largest tobacco

    company in the world. The international names all have indirect access to the market

    through licence agreements or JVs with CNTC, but remain an insignificant proportion of

    the market.

    International involvement is likely to remain limited and is at best a long-term option.

    Announcements following the Communist Party's Third Plenum (Q4 2013) suggest that

    there are no immediate plans to overhaul industries with entrenched state-owned

    enterprises (SEOs) and tobacco remains a good fit for a government seeking to extract

    higher dividend payments from state-owned companies to help public finance.

    US

    The US market is dominated by three domestic companies (Altria, Reynolds and Lorillard)

    with some degree of indirect exposure from the international tobacco companies.

    Figure 56: US market shares in tobacco (2013) Figure 57: US market growth of cigarettes (volume)

    Lorillard

    9%

    Altria

    58%

    Reynolds

    27%

    IMT

    2%

    Vector

    2%

    Others

    2%

    -10%

    -9%

    -8%

    -7%

    -6%

    -5%

    -4%

    -3%

    -2%

    -1%

    0%

    Source: AC Nielsen Source: TMA

    PMI was spun off from Altria in March 2008. There are some agreements between the

    two entities such as a strategic agreement to commercialise NGPs (next-generation

    products) in the US and abroad. There are agreements also on brands, extensions,

    marketing and positioning. Having split the company five years ago, it would be a volte

    face to merge, while any other interest in the US is prohibited as a party of the original

    de-merger.

    China a state monopoly,

    unlikely to change any time

    soon

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 32

    Imperial Tobacco has a small position in the US following the acquisition of

    Commonwealth (April '07), but remains a distant number 4 with a ~3.5% market share

    (same as in 2007). Imperial lacks the financial capacity to buy its way into the Top 3

    (e.g. acquire Lorillard) and management has abandoned the ambition to compete

    across the whole market (it now chooses to concentrate its efforts on the 21 states

    where it has a more meaningful presence). A merger of equals with Lorillard would

    enable Imperial to compete more effectively and give Lorillard distribution in Europe to

    launch e-cigarettes. However, this seems unlikely following Lorillard's acquisition of

    UK-based e-cig maker SKYCIG (Oct '13

    The most speculated upon push into the US will likely remain BAT buying out the

    remaining stake in Reynolds (04/03/2014). BAT currently owns a 42% stake in the

    company following the merger of B&W's US tobacco business and RJ Reynolds in

    2004. The transaction came with a clause limiting BAT's ownership to 42% for 10

    years, which is due to expire in July 2014. The structure indemnified BAT from any US

    litigation risk at a time when this was a much greater concern for the industry and

    investors, but these risks have since subsided.

    Press reports (notably the FT 03/03/2014) suggest that Reynolds in the US may bid

    for or merge with Lorillard.

    Possible Top 4 merger?

    The one possible outstanding piece of consolidation is a merger/takeover within the Top 4.

    Most permutations would be fraught with anti-trust issues; however, a joint break-up of

    Imperial (the smaller of the Top 4) would be feasible and is a possibility that has been

    widely discussed in the media and by the industry over the years. We try to illustrate this

    using a traffic light system in Figure 58, with red indicating a serious issue, and green

    where we believe there are no serious concerns.

    Interpreting our table:

    A combined share of under 25% is fine (green) that is to say the deal should be able

    to go through even if some remedies are required.

    If one of the parties in the combination has less than a 5% share then that is fine

    (green).

    A combined share of 25-40% may constitute a a problem, but may get through, maybe

    with some modest disposals (orange).

    Everything else is red (serious anti-trust issues that would require a brand disposal).

    Mergers among the Big 4

    are fraught with anti-trust

    issues

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 33

    Figure 58: Market share implications by region of a potential Imperial Tobacco takeover

    by one of the other three large players

    IMT vols IMT share PMI+IMT BAT+IMT JT+IMT

    Europe 109 21%

    Germany 22 26% 62% 45% 30%

    Italy 2 3% 56% 26% 24%

    Spain 16 28% 59% 40% 48%

    Poland 12 23% 59% 52% 33%

    France 12 23% 62% 38% 40%

    UK 19 45% 52% 52% 84%

    Greece 3 12% 48% 31% 25%

    Czech 3 14% 56% 34% 21%

    Austria 3 19% 55% 26% 53%

    Netherlands 1 11% 43% 38% 27%

    Hungary 2 13% 51% 50% 18%

    Belgium 2 16% 46% 48% 27%

    EEMA 148 12%

    Russia 34 9% 36% 30% 46%

    Turkey 4 4% 49% 26% 30%

    Ukraine 18 22% 54% 39% 50%

    Belarus 1 2% 2% 18% 24%

    Kazakhstan 1 3% 50% 10% 46%

    Algeria 3 11% 51% 12% 14%

    Saudi Arabia 2 9% 71% 24% 9%

    Nigeria 1 7% 8% 87% 17%

    Morocco 13 81% 90% 81% 83%

    Azerbaijan 4 27% 27% 55% 50%

    Tunisia 0 1% 16% 1% 2%

    Uzbekistan 0 1% 5% 93% 2%

    Asia 36 3%

    Vietnam 9 10% 12% 41% 11%

    Taiwan 4 12% 12% 20% 50%

    Australia 4 19% 57% 61% 19%

    New Zealand 0 20% 26% 92% 20% Source: Credit Suisse estimates based on TMA data (Tobacco Merchants Association)

    Although this is a fairly subjective assessment it shows the major problems faced in

    several markets and that some divestitures could be forced on any would-be consolidator.

    This would throw up the thorny issue of cross-ownership of brands. This is never a

    satisfactory state of affairs for any brand owner, but is not unheard of: for example, when

    JT bought Gallaher various brands were licensed out in regions of overlaps.

    Benson & Hedges: BAT has the brand in most of Asia, and MEA. JT owns the brand in

    the EU, Philippines and Thailand; PMI holds the brand in Canada

    Peter Stuyvesant, again BAT (Europe, Africa, New Zealand), Imperial Tobacco

    (Australia, Germany), PMI (Canada)

    Furthermore some brands are licensed by their owners to other producers:

    Imperial: Davidoff is licensed to KT&G in Korea (strategic alliance)

    Imperial: Gauloises and Gitanes are licensed to BATS in Switzerland and

    Liechtenstein

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 34

    Imperial: Gauloises and other brands are licensed to BATS in the Netherlands

    Imperial: Gitanes licensed to BATS in Argentina

    Imperial: Davidoff and West are licensed to PMI in Mexico

    BATS, PMI and JT: Brands licensed to CNTC in China and CNTC brands licensed to

    internationals

    BATS: License all brands to state monopoly in Algeria, Iran and Egypt

    PMI: Marlboro was licensed to JT in Japan (1972), but bought back (in 2005)

    PMI: License manufacturing of Marlboro to Imperial in Morocco

    PMI: License all brands to state monopoly in Egypt and Algeria

    Thus, while anti-trust problems exist, and are significant, they are not insurmountable, in

    our view.

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 35

    Companies Mentioned (Price as of 20-Mar-2014)

    Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI.BR, 72.87) Beiersdorf (BEIG.DE, 69.65) British American Tobacco (BATS.L, 3214.5p, NEUTRAL, TP 3500.0p) Carlsberg (CARLb.CO, Dkr522.0) Danone (DANO.PA, 49.44) Diageo (DGE.L, 1791.5p) Gudang Garam (GGRM.JK, Rp45,450) Heineken (HEIN.AS, 46.32) Henkel (HNKG_p.F, 76.5) ITC Ltd (ITC.BO, Rs355.9) Imperial Tobacco (IMT.L, 2418.0p, OUTPERFORM, TP 2700.0p) Japan Tobacco (2914.T, 3,030) KT&G Corp (033780.KS, W79,000) L'Oreal (OREP.PA, 116.35) Nestle (NESN.VX, SFr64.55) Oriflame Cosmetics (ORIsdb.ST, Skr152.7) Pernod-Ricard (PERP.PA, 80.39) Philip Morris International (PM.N, $80.43, NEUTRAL, TP $85.0) Reckitt Benckiser (RB.L, 4846.0p) SABMiller (SAB.L, 2802.5p) Souza Cruz (CRUZ3.SA, R$21.24) Swedish Match (SWMA.ST, Skr204.9) Unilever (UNc.AS, 27.81)

    Disclosure Appendix

    Important Global Disclosures

    The analysts identified in this report each certify, with respect to the companies or securities that the individual analyzes, that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his or her personal views about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of his or her compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report.

    3-Year Price and Rating History for British American Tobacco (BATS.L)

    BATS.L Closing Price Target Price

    Date (p) (p) Rating

    04-May-11 2653.50 2740.00 N

    28-Jul-11 2857.00 2900.00

    15-Sep-11 2755.50 3030.00 O

    18-Nov-11 2888.00 3080.00

    27-Feb-12 3159.00 3250.00

    20-Apr-12 3244.00 3400.00

    23-Oct-12 3164.00 3430.00

    04-Jan-13 3174.50 3380.00

    28-Feb-13 3434.50 3600.00

    25-Apr-13 3591.00 3800.00

    27-Jun-13 3439.00 3700.00

    12-Dec-13 3142.50 3550.00

    * Asterisk signifies initiation or assumption of coverage.

    N EU T RA L

    O U T PERFO RM

    3-Year Price and Rating History for Imperial Tobacco (IMT.L)

    IMT.L Closing Price Target Price

    Date (p) (p) Rating

    25-Mar-11 1896.00 2330.00 O

    11-May-11 2197.00 2420.00

    13-Jun-11 2056.00 2350.00

    18-Nov-11 2275.00 2500.00

    01-Mar-12 2534.00 2660.00

    01-May-12 2556.00 2700.00

    05-Nov-13 2382.00 2600.00

    * Asterisk signifies initiation or assumption of coverage.

    O U T PERFO RM

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 36

    3-Year Price and Rating History for Philip Morris International (PM.N)

    PM.N Closing Price Target Price

    Date (US$) (US$) Rating

    26-Apr-11 67.59 72.00 O

    22-Jul-11 72.11 77.00

    18-Nov-11 73.09 79.00

    10-Feb-12 80.44 85.00

    03-Apr-12 88.98 90.00 N

    12-Feb-14 78.44 85.00

    * Asterisk signifies initiation or assumption of coverage.

    O U T PERFO RM

    N EU T RA L

    The analyst(s) responsible for preparing this research report received Compensation that is based upon various factors including Credit Suisse's total revenues, a portion of which are generated by Credit Suisse's investment banking activities

    As of December 10, 2012 Analysts stock rating are defined as follows:

    Outperform (O) : The stocks total return is expected to outperform the relevant benchmark*over the next 12 months.

    Neutral (N) : The stocks total return is expected to be in line with the relevant benchmark* over the next 12 months.

    Underperform (U) : The stocks total return is expected to underperform the relevant benchmark* over the next 12 months.

    *Relevant benchmark by region: As of 10th December 2012, Japanese ratings are based on a stocks total return relative to the analyst's coverage universe which consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector, with Outperforms representing the most attractiv e, Neutrals the less attractive, and Underperforms the least attractive investment opportunities. As of 2nd October 2012, U.S. and Canadian as well as European ratings are based on a stocks total return relative to the analyst's coverage universe which consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector, with Outperforms representing the most attractive, Neutrals the less attractive, and Underperforms the least attractive investment opportunities. For Latin Ame rican and non-Japan Asia stocks, ratings are based on a stocks total return relative to the average total return of the relevant country or regional benchmark; Australia, New Zealand are, and prior to 2nd October 2012 U.S. and Canadian ratings were based on (1) a stocks absolute total return potential to its current share price and (2) the relative attractiveness of a stocks total return potential within an analysts coverage universe. For Australian and New Zealand stocks, 12 -month rolling yield is incorporated in the absolute total return calculation and a 15% and a 7.5% threshold replace the 10-15% level in the Outperform and Underperform stock rating definitions, respectively. The 15% and 7.5% thresholds replace the +10-15% and -10-15% levels in the Neutral stock rating definition, respectively. Prior to 10th December 2012, Japanese ratings were based on a stocks total return relative to the average total return of the relevant country or regional benchmark.

    Restricted (R) : In certain circumstances, Credit Suisse policy and/or applicable law and regulations preclude certain types of communications, including an investment recommendation, during the course of Credit Suisse's engagement in an investment banking transaction and in certain other circumstances.

    Volatility Indicator [V] : A stock is defined as volatile if the stock price has moved up or down by 20% or more in a month in at least 8 of the past 24 months or the analyst expects significant volatility going forward.

    Analysts sector weightings are distinct from analysts stock ratings and are based on the analysts expectations for the fundamentals and/or valuation of the sector* relative to the groups historic fundamentals and/or valuation:

    Overweight : The analysts expectation for the sectors fundamentals and/or valuation is favorable over the next 12 months.

    Market Weight : The analysts expectation for the sectors fundamentals and/or valuation is neutral over the next 12 months.

    Underweight : The analysts expectation for the sectors fundamentals and/or valuation is cautious over the next 12 months.

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    Credit Suisse's distribution of stock ratings (and banking clients) is:

    Global Ratings Distribution

    Rating Versus universe (%) Of which banking clients (%)

    Outperform/Buy* 43% (53% banking clients)

    Neutral/Hold* 40% (50% banking clients)

    Underperform/Sell* 14% (45% banking clients)

    Restricted 2%

    *For purposes of the NYSE and NASD ratings distribution disclosure requirements, our stock rat ings of Outperform, Neutral, and Underperform most closely correspond to Buy, Hold, and Sell, respectively; however, the meanings are not the same, as our stock ratings are determined on a relative basis. (Please refer to definitions above.) An investor's decision to buy or sell a security should be based on investment objectives, current holdings, and other individual factors.

  • 24 March 2014

    Tobacco 37

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    Price Target: (12 months) for Imperial Tobacco (IMT.L)

    Method: Our target price is derived using an APV with a 7year explicit forecast and a 8 year fade to a terminal growth rate of 0% and 50bps margin expansion per annum. We use a 8.5% cost of equity, 5.5% cost of debt and a 22% tax rate.

    Risk: In addition to the risks of higher taxation, tougher regulation and volume decline in the developed world that all tobacco stocks face, the company-specific risks include: (a) deteriorating trading conditions in its key profit pools (UK, Germany, Spain, France and the US), (b) implementation of plain packaging in UK, (c) US federal excise tax hike, (d) taxation changes in fine cut tobacco, reducing and eliminating its tax advantage relative to cigarettes sooner than we expect, (e) potential liabilities from the investigation of the Office of Fair Trading in the UK market, and (f) reduced risk products achieve mainstream appeal (up-/downside risk)

    Price Target: (12 months) for Philip Morris International (PM.N)

    Method: Our target price of US$85 is derived using APV, with a 7yr explicit forecast period and an 8yr fade to a terminal growth rate of 0.5% and 50bps of margin expansion per annum driven by pricing. We use an 8.5% cost of capital, a 4.5% cost of debt and a 29.3% tax rate. Our target price implies the shares will maintain a current 12m fwd PE of 15x.

    Risk: Risks to PM's achievement of our target price are: (1) the secular decline of the cigarette industries in developed countries, (2) Illicit product taking share from the legitimate trade (3) the potential for increased future regulation and taxation of cigarettes worldwide, (4) the significant dependence on the Marlboro brand, (5) increasing intolerance of smoking, (6) the volatility of earnings as a result of currency fluctuations (USD), and (7) reduced risk products achieving mainstream appeal (up-downside risk)

    Price Target: (12 months) for British American Tobacco (BATS.L)

    Method: We use an APV with an 8.5% cost of equity capital, 5% cost of debt, a 7-year explicit forecast window and an 8-year fade to 0.5% terminal

    growth. Our target price implies that BAT shares will sustain a forward P/E multiple of roughly 15x in 12 months time