i

TITLE PAGE

NATIONAL INTEREST AND CONDUCT OF NIGERIA’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS UNDER GENERAL IBRAHIM

BABANGIDA’S ADMINISTRATION

BY

UDE-UMANTA VICTOR CIIIBUEZE PG/M.SC/09/50946

BEING A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR TILE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARI) OF MASTER

OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (POLITICAL ECONOMY) UNIVERSITY OF

NIGERIA, NSUKKA

SUPERVISOR: DR; A.M. OKOLIE

MARCH, 2011.

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DEDICATION

To Hon Michael A. Ude-Umanta, Princess Chinwe Ude-Umanta, Prince

Arthur Ude-Umanta and Prince Ude-Umanta Victor (Jr).

And

In living memory of my father and mother His• Royal Majesty Eze-

UdeUmanta/Ugoeze Ada Ude-Umanta.

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APPROVAL PAGE

This project has been supervised and approved for the department of political science,

University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

…………………….. ……………………………

Dr. A. M. Okolie Prof. Obasi Igwe

Supervisor Head of Department

……………………. …………………………….

External Examiner Prof. E. O. Ezeani

Dean Faculty of Social Science

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this study is the original work of Ude-Umanta Victor Chibueze,

with registration number PG/M.Sc./09/50946. Being a thesis submitted to the department

of political science in the partial fulfillment for the requirement for the award of Master

of Science Degree in Political Science

…………………………

Dr. A. M. Okolie

Supervisor

………………….. ……………………

Prof. Obasi Igwe Prof. E. O. Ezeani

Head of Department Dean Faculty of Social Science

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very grateful to the Most High God for his tremendous mercy to me, through out

this period of study.

I greatly appreciate the wealth of intelligence, patience and persuasion I enjoyed from my

supervisor Dr. A.M. Okolie, I remain very grateful to him. The tremendous contributions

of my lecturers, family members and loved ones can not be under played, such as my

Head of Department Prof. Obasi Igwe, Prof. Jonah Onuoha, Prof Ikejian Clarck, Dr. F.

Ifesihachj, Mr. C. Ezeibe, Mr. Albert, Mr. R. Adibe, Mr. Ezemah of Nnamdi Azikwe’s

Lib. University of Nigeria Nsukka, Commerade F. Chilaka of CAST, Ejike (AKA:

Soludo) and other senior colleagues and immediate colleagues of PG/M.Sc/09 of political

science.

I am mostly indebted to Sister Chinwe Ude-Umanta, Hon. Michael Ude-Umanta,

Arthur Ude-Umanta, Mrs. Victoria Okadi, Mrs. Codellia Chukwu, Eucharia

Anoke, Litle Mum Miracle Okadi, Ude-Umanta Victor (Jr), Agu Nwlfi,

Christopher Ubuku, and the Ude-Umantas who contributed positively or

negatively to proof the reality of this study. Worthy to mention here, are my good friends

Mr. Christian Ukaonu, Oluchi Chukwudi, Ifeanyi Asogwa, Nneka Oji, Macelina Omeh,

Ebere Ugwuoke, Pastor James of Christ Paradise church Ajuona, Chinye Omeje, Amaka,

Chinedu, Angella Onu and the entire members of 30 rooms Ajuona, Sandra Nwosu and

the Prof of Mega Speed Tech. Odim gate.

Ude-Umanta,V.C.

PG/M.Sc/09/5 0946

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Abstract

This study examines the different out lines of Nigeria’s national interest by

successive Nigeria’s governments; focusing on national interest and conduct

of Nigeria’s military regime. It proceeds from two research questions on,

was General Babangida’s self succession project implicated in the conduct

of Nigeria’s external relations and was class interest implicated in Nigeria’s

external engagement within the period in question. Using Marxist

instrumentalist theoretical model as our analytical tool, and applying

qualitative descriptive analytical method and observational method of data

collection, our two hypothesis drawn from the research questions thus, that

self succession project of the political leadership was implicated in the

conduct of Nigeria’s external relations and that the advancement of class

interest tend to inform Nigeria’s diplomatic relations and Babangida’s

regime are properly validated. It is equally, our argument in this study that

state in capitalist society, including Nigeria serves or promotes the interest

of the capitalist class, especially that of the ruling class. The findings of this

work has been fashioned by the character of Nigeria’s political economy,

which is fragile in conjunction with the structure imposed by

underdevelopment and capitalist society as a result of the linkages with

international dependency. Therefore, self-succession project of the political

leadership and class interest informed Nigeria’s diplomatic relation under

General Babangida’s administration. We hence, recommends the needs for

political resurgence, re-orientation of the Nigerian citizens life, involving

experts in the foreign policy making and implementation, also to safeguard

the present civilian regime type and to gear Nigeria’s policies and foreign

policy towards the fundamental needs and problems of Nigerian citizens.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page

Approval Page

Certification

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Abstract

Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Statement of the Problem

1.3 Objective of the Study

1.4 Significance of the Study

1.5 Literature Review

1.6 Theoretical Framework

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1.7 Hypothesis

1.8 Method and Source of Data Collection

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1 Origin and Emergence of Nigeria’s External Relations

2.2 Internal Structure and External Influence in Nigeria’s External Relations

2.3 The Impediments of the Conduct of Nigeria’s External

Relations

CHAPTER THREE: BABANGIDA AND EXTERNAL

POLICY AGREEMENT 59

3,1 Political Appraisal of National Interest and Conduct of

Nigeria’s External Relations under Babangida 59

3.2 Trend for Africa as the Centre Piece of Nigeria’s Foreign

Policy 72

3.3 The Management of Decision Making in External Relations 80

CHAPTER FOUR 89

4.1 National Interest and Capitalist Penetration in Nigeria Nation 89

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4.2 Democratization and Decision Making in Nigerian Foreign

Policy 101

4.3 The Political Process and Foreign Policy Institution 109

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION ANI RECOMMENDATIONS 121

5.1 Conclusion 121

5.2 Recommendations 126

Bibliography 130

1

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Nigeria’s national interest therefore started from the inception of

Nigeria’s political independence. Here, it is right for us to know what is

national interest. National interest, according to Padelford et al (1976) is

centered on the core value of the society, which include, the welfare of the

nation, the security of its political beliefs, national way of life, territorial

integrity and self preservation. Morgenthau (1952), asserted that national

interest is determined by the political traditions and the total cultural context

with which a nation formulates its foreign policy. Also Akinboye (1999)

while citing Ogwu (1986) posits that the main policy instrument in the

conduct of foreign policy, is invariably the promotion and the pursuit of

national interest. Thus national interest refers to the totality or the aggregate

of interest of individuals and groups within a given nation state. Morgenthau

(1973) in his master piece, Politics Among Nations, asserted that no nation

can have true guide as to what it must do and what it needs to do in foreign

policy without accepting national interest as a guide.

Therefore, foreign policy which is embedded in national interest, according

to Karl Deutsch (1945) is the search for the preservation of a country’s

2

independence, security, the pursuit and the protection of its economic

interest. While Rodeel (1957) sees it as, involving the formulation and the

implementation of a group of principles which shape the behaviour pattern of a

state, while negotiating with other states to protect or further its vital interest. Also

Frankel (1968) feels foreign policy is consisting of decisions and actions which

involves to some appreciable extent relationship between one sate and anOther.

Yet Nnoli (1978) posits it as a nation’s reactions to the external environment

involving the organization of both domestic and external relations.

According to Okolie (2009) as an act of internationalizing domestic resolve

foreign policy is used by constituent states to articulate and project the national

interest of the given state. It is therefore the frame work through which the state

responds to both domestic and international demands and

challenges. --

In a more empirical and concise depiction of national interest, Babangida reduced

the meaning to “national security interest, arguing that nation’s security has many

ramification at the core of which the ultimate imperative that the sate survive and

be able to protect internal core valves from external threats (Akindele and Ate

1986: 12-22) Nweke (1988; 1-5) Aluko (1981) and Okolie (2009) tend to see the

core as the security and economy of survival of the state. According to Okolie

(2009:12) national interest refers to national security concern. It entails not

only national survival but basically state survival for the protection and

3

advancement of internal values from external threats.

Such interest as core interest and values all correspond to the interest of the

state as a whole, none the less in the majority of cases foreign policy

decisions are not concerned with matters directly related to routing matters

(middle range objectives). Thus as noted by Ojo et al (1985:44) it is over

routing matters of this kind that class interests tend to have decisive

influence in policy making implementation. National interest and conduct of

Nigeria’s external relations under General Ibrahim Babangida’s

administration form the central focus of this researcher. We tent to X-ray the

conduct of various Nigerian leaders and as such the principal focus on

Babangida’s regime diplomatic affairs whether it reflected national interest

or class interest.

1.2 Statement of the Problem:

The several different outlines of our national interest by successive

government in Nigeria, have a tremendous deal of doubtful authenticity

among the unformatted Nigerian citizens. Since the independence of Nigeria

in 1960, to the present day government every government claims to pursue

national interest in its external relations.

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‘While in actuality what it tend pursuing is class interest or selfish interest.

According to Igwe (2007:282) So long as the state remains the class society

that its national interest will continue to be the interest of the ruling class.

According to Orizu (1996) the Nigerian’s external policy since

independence has been flawed owing to lack of knowledgeable leadership in

external relations.

Despite enormous writings on national interest, foreign policy and

external relations, there still exist some gap, lapse and unanswered questions

by scholars and policy makers, to which this research hope to address and

therefore add to the policy making implementation body of knowledge. And

debate towards finding a viably inbuilt mechanism which can effectively

assist in conducting the national interest and Nigeria’s external relations.

Thus, there are two major strands of analysis which will help to explain our

problematique: The first is whether class interest, under General

Babangida’s administration was implicated in the conduct of Nigeria’s

external engagements. This implies the ways he implemented or conducted

Nigeria’s external relations. Secondary, whether General Babangida’s self

succession project was implicated in the conduct Of Nigeria’s external

relations. These problems are the central concern of this very research and

can be specifically stated in the form of these research questions:

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(1) Was General Babangida’s self-succession project implicated in the

conduct of Nigeria’s external relations?

(2) Was class interest implicated in Nigeria’s external engagement under

General Babangida’s administration?

1.3 Objective of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to analyze and evaluate national interest

and conduct of Nigeria’s external relations under General Ibrahim

Babangida’s administration. The anlysis is to be use as a basis for the

assessment of the Nigeria’s external policy objectives. The objectives of the

study are thus:

1. To determine if General Ibrahim Babangida’s self-succession project was

implicated in the conduct of Nigeria’s external relations.

2. To ascertain whether class interest was implicated in Nigeria’s external

engagement under General Babangida’s administration.

1.4 Significance of the Study

Categorically, the significance of this study will concentrate on:

1. Theoretical significant, and

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2. Practical or empirical significant.

At the theoretical level therefore, the study will provide scholars and policy

makers with the idea and knowledge to understand the debilitating damage

and various dimensions selfish interest and class interest have manifested in

the conduct of Nigeria’s external relations. Hence the contribution of this

study will not only consolidate the existing body of knowledge in our

discipline, but also will tend to serve as a veritable reference material to

students, academics and researchers who are of interest on this very issue.

Also equally serve as a good reading material for those who desire and or

ascribes to enrich their knowledge.

In the empirical or practical perspectives, the value of this study will

first provide Nigerian’s with the fundamental reliability and the

understanding of the unabated nature of capitalist class interest and selfish

interest through the ruling capitalist class, on the conduct of Nigeria’s

external relations. Secondary, this study will serve as a basis for building

structures that will promote additional checks and balances along side other

existing structures. Finally, when implemented, this study would have

suggested to the Nigerian government ways forward for conducting popular

external relations and or foreign policy. Also it will offer guide to

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government decision makers, diplomats states and non state actors, by

providing deep explanation for vulnerability of Nigeria’s foreign policy and

or external relations to both internal and external class or classes’ pressure

and influences on the conduct of Nigeria’s external relations.

1.5 Literature Review

For the purpose of accommodating, the variable of the hypotheses,

contained in this research, the literature review will be divided into two,

thus, the first term is to revisit and evaluate the contribution made by

different scholars, personalities, intellectuals and external policy experts on

the subject national interest and conduct of Nigeria’s external relations, and

secondly the historical foundations of Nigeria’s external relations

pertinently, their ideas, thoughts and reflections, will tremendously assist in

exposing issues that have been tackled and others not yet tackled. Also the

analysis might equally project a basis for a critical writing and valid

assessment of the crisis of national interest in Nigeria’s external relations.

External policy according to Wittkopt, et al (2003:4) cited in Okolie

(2009:3) embraces the goals that nations’ officials seek to attain abroad, the

values that gives rise to those objectives and the means or instruments used

to pursue them.

8

Foreign policy deals with the relations between sovereign actors in the

international system. Thus foreign policy objectives can be understood as a

range of intended actions as well as a set of strategies adopted by some

sovereign actors, with express purpose of influencing the behavour of other

sovereign within the international system (Ogwu, 2006:6).

The citations stated above, according to Okolie (2009) are germane,

revealing and instructive. The international arena is replete with states and

international actors and or persons that reflect and project similar and

diversifying and splashing interests. These interest are largely routed on a

sheared societal goals, vision, contending alternatives and aspirations and

indeed material consolidation and reproduction.

Hence external relations or external policy as an act of internalizing

domestic resolve is used by constituent states to articulate and project

national interest of a given state. It is therefore the frame work through

which the states respond to both domestic and international demands and

challenges. Every society, nation-state, has what is her values, needs

expectations Therefore those things a country or a given society value, is her

interest.

Hence from the attainment of independence in 1960, Nigerian leaders from

Aihaji Tafawa Belewa to the present day government of Dr. Goodluck

9

Jonathan tend to claim that their external relations reflects national interest.

According to Gambari (1980) Nigeria’s foreign policy making process in the

early 1960’s exhibited fear of strength of the foreign policy machineries and

process in older states but had many weaknesses of the new independence

states. It is in place to state, that the foreign policy of Nigeria on her external

relations in 1 960s was more of respect for sovereignty of Nations, and

mostly colonial heritage such as common wealth among others.

Some scholars are of the view that since independence, the conduct of

Nigeria’s external relations has revealed to be faulty, by responding more to

class or group interest According to Akinyemi (1990) Commonwealth

formed a structural device within the international environment exerted

considerable pressures on new nations and their leaders in their national

interest and their external policies.

Therefore, the extent to which General Babangida’s administration

made Africa the central piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy was not welcomed

by many Nigerians. When Nweke (1988) in his precise contribution

informed Nigerians external policy makers against pursuing a globalist

foreign policy. In attempt to stop General Babandida’s extravagant

diplomatic relations, such as sponsoring ECOMOG to truncate Liberia’s war

or saving Charles Taylor; curbing of apartheid in South Africa and other

10

economic diplomacy such as International Monitoring Fund (IMF) and

Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) initiatives. To Nweke the pursuit

of globalism is a costly pursuit of illusion, since Nigeria has not have its

multilateral programs with the great powers due to her industrial and

technological inferiority and of external policy without ideology. According

to Aluko (1990) it is unrealistic to advocate that Nigeria should play a big

brother role in Africa, just as the United States of America has assumed in

the western hemisphere or globally, because Nigeria has neither the capacity

nor such resources for such a role. Most of General Babangida’s diplomatic

move tended to be class oriented and or selfish interest. Even his structural

adjustment program (SAP) which the IMF, According to Onuoha (2008:21)

indicated his intention to give the regime a loan to revamp and sustain the

economy with condition that will continue with the reform. Onuoha noted,

that being afraid of the reaction of the nationalists, the General Babangida’s

administration carried the masses along by organizing public debates on

whether the country should accept the loan or not. Not withstanding that the

verdict of the masses was no, he went ahead and accepted it.

Historical Foundations of Nigerians External Relations

11

The assumption of sovereign state of Nigeria in 1960, was soon

accomplished by the demanding and inevitable task of formulating external

policy for external relations for new Nigeria. At this scenario, of this

demand, was the ueriod of international crisis according to Ray Ofoegbu and

Chibuzo Ogbuagu. Thç Nigerian quest for foreign policy was the crisis

period of cold war, big powers interested in Africa, decolonization and all

these had impact on the Nigeria choice of action in external policy.

As argued by Ogbuagu and Ofoegbu the prevailing international crisis

influenced the making of Nigerian external policy. The new nation of

Nigeria just emancipated from the shackle of British colonialism and lacking

the consolidation of state power, coupled with the crisis of international

capacity could neither disregard the global order, nor cope with task

pursuing external policy objective.

In furtherance, Gambali (1980) posited this claim, thus, “Nigerian

extemal policy making process in the early 1 960s exhibited fear of the

strengths of the external policy machinery and process in order states, but

had many of the weakness of the newly independence states”. He stipulated

that Nigeria had never committed herself with a radical external policy that

reflected her fundamental problems. Akinyemi (1990) noted that “common

wealth formed a structural device, within the international environment that

12

exerted considerable pressures on new nations and their leaders, in national

interest and her external policy” given our colonial heritage, some scholars

are of the view that, since independence, the conduct of Nigeria’s external

relations has reveled to be faulty, by responding more to class or group

interest than the claimed national interest. Between 1962 and 1964, the

Nigerian House of representative was plunged into a controversial debate on

the issues of external relations.

Hon Abii in 1962, moved a motion on establishing parliamentary

committee on external relations, which the House in April 1962 and March

1964, debated two privilege members motion, calling on the government to

establish forth with a parliamentary committee, on external relations as such,

would examine matters connected with foreign affairs any matter that may

be referred to it by the minister of external affairs or the Nigerian Prime

Minister. Hon Abii noted that the issue of external relations should be

matters for the people to consider, weigh and make recommendation and not

lefi to one man, group or class to decide. He supported this committee, on

the grounds that some opposition members go out and give bad

interpretation of the

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• country’s budget. Aihaji Aminu Kano supports the view of getting spokes

man on external relations arising from functional specialization. Hence, the

attitude, reaction of the country on external relations will rely on the

committees (Olugbade, 1962). The minister of external affairs, Hon. Jaja

Nwachukwu, reversed and rejected the motion, in his opinion, it will amount

to shifting the duty and conduct of the external affairs from the Cabinet to the

House of Representative.

Moreover, Jaja Nwachukwu, also dismissed a similar parliamentary

committee on external relations on 17th March, 1964 by Mallam Yerima Balla, the

Minister opined, that it would not be in the interest of Nigeria for external

relations to be conducted on the floor of the House of Representatives.

Gana (1990) made statement that was inextricably, connected to Professor

Akinyemi’s postulation, when he noted that “the foundation of Nigerian

incoherent and pro-west external policy between 1960 and 1965 was marked by

the contradiction between the alliance of the nation petty-bourgeoisie and federal

barons, represented by the Northern People’s Congress.

On issuing guides for Nigerian external policy, Nigeria Institute of International

Affairs (NIIA) in Lagos, on the •l 5th December, 1996, General Sani Abacha, the

Head of the state, stated thus, “national interest, peace, security and mutual co-

operation will form the basis of Nigerian foreignpolicy”. Suffice to say that, Gen

Abacha’s speech had little or nothing to add, but a mere continuation of the

14

philosophy and orientation of Nigeria’s external policy. The core concern of

scholars of external relations is what constitutes national interest and now do

nations go about the actualization of those interests. Hence, given the very

nature of the concept of national interest it portrays enormous deal of

obscurity and ambiguity, especially in relation to the manipulation of the

concept by different states. This results to the flux in meaning of the concept

of national interest and evidence has exhibited that his attributes cuts across

the globe and affects African states, the rest of the third world countries and

even the western countries of Europe and America as well.

Clinton (1998), ex-president of America, argued “that confusion over the

meaning of national interest and its uses as justification for state action

arises from lack of conceptual clarity”. Firstly, national interest as the

common good of the national society, and secondly, national interest as the

discrete object of value over which states bargain in world politics. In

furtherance, he opines that policies which are sensitive to both meanings can

provide the best guide to ethical state conduct. In the opinion of Clinton,

national interest can be refined as the overall common good of the entire

society. The society is simply a frame work, for interaction with competitive

smaller interest group which forms the real deal of politics. Therefore, the

15

society or community is so broad and diverse, that it becomes hard to locate

or find where their good or interest lies.

Based on this argument, people claim that national interest does not

have normative implication. The common interest assumes that society need

not maintain the sort of value neutrally that precludes an autonomous public

good and thereby makes public policy the resultant of interplay among

private interest. The recognition of the common good does not rule out

diversity or make scattered centers of power illegitimate or subject to state

control. The national interest then refers to the general regulative principles

of diplomacy which posits the common good of the society in its relation

with other national units as the end of the national interest by maintaining or

elevating the state’s power. The conceptual interpretation of national interest

among African scholars posses a lot of discrepancy.

According to Igwe (2007:282), national interest refers to “whatever may•

promote the realization of the objectives of the state, and its raison d et al as

defined by the ruling class. In furtherance, he stress that national interest

also are equated to the ultimate aims themselves, making them both goal and

means of attaining it. Therefore, the national interest is the ultimate purpose

of the state. The national interest of a state may either correctly reflect the

aspirations of the generality of its people or be in conflict with them.

16

Depending on the objectives, social condition, nature and character of the

dominant ruling classes. Generally, however, so long as the state remains the

class society, that the national interest will continue to be the interest of the

ruling class even as from time to time there will be incidental benefits for the

citizens to justify the frequent call upon them for collective defense. Hence,

in societies in which public political affairs and governmental institution are

organized the interest of a minority or exploiting class, the national interest

that will emerge would actually be an expression of the will. Not of the

masses but of the minority governing class.

Palmerstson (1784-1865), gave a very famous expression to this view,

when he stated that, “nation have neither permanent enemies nor permanent

friends, but only permanent interests which portrays that any principle may

be jettisoned and expediency, justified it they promote the national interest

of a state.

The view of Echezona (1992) tends to conform with that of Obasi

Igwe, when he stated that “National interest is ideological, for an advance

capitalist state like United States it could be imperialism”. He advocates that

Africa cannot be in Nigeria’s national interest, as the Libya case has proven,

because we have no means, except morally, which did not even use this time

17

to back up other competing interest in an anarchical world. Moreover, he

opined that our national interest is defined inwards arid not outwards. Those

things you defend internally, your own sovereign independence are the

things you defend morally, externally, to make yourself credible or else it

will be a sign of intellectual poverty of a state. Nigeria he argued should stop

globalist external policy and its artificial glorification, since actually we are

giving up ourselves as autonomous participants in international politics.

National interest is a coordinated domestic and foreign policies that are

symbiotically integrated package of response to the problems and needs of

any society”. Akindele (1990) noted that national interest -are largely

domestically rooted and defined, the implication of some of them is in many

countries dependent upon external influence. Constraints and conditionality,

if foreign policy is to be used to promote and advance the core value of

economic well-being, security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a

nation, it has to evolve from and reflect the domestic realities and needs with

responsive adaptation to it, are bound to be unrealistic and short-sighted.

According to Adeyemi (1988), “since independence, successive Nigerian

government has justified Nigeria’s national interest on moral ground”. This

explains why Nigeria’s external policy decision makers refuse to go to war

18

or intervene militarily in a situation where the vital interest of the country is

at stake.

Recently, some nationalist have condemned the Nigeria’s external

policy, and external relations on the ground that changes are required to suit

the contemporary national and international social and political order as

against the preliminary outline of 1960s. The senate president in the first

republic is prominent among them. According to Orizu (1996), “Nigeria’s

external policy since independence has been flawed owing to lack of

knowledge leadership in external relations”. He maintained that Nigeria

should have adopted an inside out policy of first consolidating economic

power and socio-political stability before a high profile leadership role in

Africa. Despite the fact, that senator Orizu did not advocate his philosophy

when he was the senate president, but his idea calls for urgent attention, to

elevate the economic, political and socio-cultural of the nation.

According to Osuntokun (2008:1) the national interest are clearly

stated in the preamble to the Nigerian constitution. In summary, these

interest include the building of an egalitarian, democratic, secure, self

reliant, fair and just society-where all enjoy the basic freedoms under

democratic governance.

19

Utilitarianism, English-developed school of thought from the mid

1700s, within a general mechanic theory of the state--- Views the sole

justification for the existence of the state only in term of human instrument

for promoting human objectives; namely the greatest good (or happiness) of

the greatest number”. Jeremy Bentham and John Staurt mill, also David

Hume (1711-76) Joseph priestly (1733-1804) and Francis Hutcheson (1694-

1746) among others, tend to agree with the above scholars, when they seem

to answer the question, “what is good and the origin of state, which

stipulates that the good life is that which is pleasurable and this pursuit of

such pleasure is embedded in man. (Igwe 200 1:460-461). Therefore. the

national interest should in essence pursue the people’s interest. According to

Osuntokun (2008:4) democracy as our national interest is not just because it

is the ideal, it also has security implications. Democracies historically do not

fight against each other; it follows that if all countries in our region are

democratic, then the fear of one or gang up of several others embarking on

aggression against a democratic Nigeria would be reduced to the barest

minimum.’ Democratic governance has therefore, both domestic and

external implications. Without freedom, people and nation would be able to

fully realize their potentialities and an undemocratic country whose leader

was not elected may sometimes want to use aggression abroad to cover

20

domestic inadequacies at home. Democratic governance is therefore

insurance against this possibility. Nigeria felt so strong about the need for

democratic governance in our region.

In furtherance, he stated that a system of government acceptable to the

people and sensitive to their needs must of necessity be in their national

interest when Benjamin Franklin and Thomas in 1776, wrote that

government all-over the world are set up for the purpose of liberty, freedom

and the pursuit of happiness and that, when governments become destructive

of these aims, It is the duty of the governed to overthrow such a government

and to set up, a new one in its place. All these reflect the philosophical

teaching of John Locke, found in his treaties on civil government.

Osuntokun (2008:3) opined that “the Nigerian experience where there is no

internal democracy in the parties or democracy at elections times present a

challenge which all citizens must confront frontally”. The gestation period of

what Abrahim Lincoln in 1861 called the Government of “the people by the

people fOr the people”. He further noted that what we have today as our

national interest is “the principle of uniformity or uniform development and

appropriate revenue distribution. The new doctoring has lead to agitation by

oil producing states, of the federation find the appropriate revenue structure

that would take into consideration the fact that oil is a wasting asset, the

21

need for rapid development of oil producing states, the overall development

of the country, the need to enhance the abused environment of the oil

producing states is at the centre of the militants struggle in the Niger Delta

cum national interest. Therefore the debate on fiscal federalism as thus,

became critical issue in Nigeria of federalism.

It obvious that every country of the world sees national security as national

interest, Nigeria is not different therefore, security and peace should not be

confused with “absence of war”, and security has many dimensions. There is

struggle security which can be expressed in military terms as ability to resist

inversion and to overwhelm enemies or group of enemies and to be able to

defeat them in detail. This type of security will require having necessary

forces equipment men and material to deploy in times of defense. External

defense cannot also be divorced from internal security. Thus there is a need

for a complement of forces necessary for external and internal security.

National Interest and Conduct of Nigeria External Relations, under

General Ibrahim Banbagida’s Administration

General Ibrahim Babangida, who took over from General Buhari,

constituted the all Nigerians conference on foreign policy, just about a year

in power in 1986 in Kuru close to Jos (Kalu, 1992). He stated what should

22

be Nigeria’s national interest, thus, “It is my view that a meaningful foreign

policy for Nigeria should be pursued with the content of our security

interest. Our foreign policy should focus on our capacity as a nation to

protect our internal value from external threats.

The external policy’s pronouncement of General Babandidaa

magneted the contributions of scholars and experts on international relations.

Professor Bolaji Akinyemi reacted, thus “it should be heartening to

Nigerians to observe tat the Nigerian political system has this time made it

possible for adversity, intellectuals, civil servants and people from the

private sectors to meet .and discuss openly and frankly the external of the

government. There was no hesitation in making criticism and in making

suggestions departing from agreed governniental policy. That there were

Nigerian voices rather than one Nigerian voice at the conference, should be

regarded as a sign of strength for the continuing vitality of a political system

of Nigeria. He is of the opinion that nation will only foster based on his

stipulations.

The reflection to what Nigeria’s external policy had been, Alcinyemi,

x-rays; the ideological complexion of the government and business elite

conforms with a realization that the sum of the policy continues effectively

23

to serve the interest of this class is by and large conservative unless and until

this ideological complexion changes in Nigerian foreign policy, it will only

lead to cosmetic job in his master piece, “politics among nations”

Morgenthau (1973) asserted most emphatically that “no nation can have

guide as to what it must do and what it needs to do in foreign relations

without accepting national interest as guide”.

Akinboye (1999), while citing Ogwu (1986) posits that the main

policy instrument in the conduct of external relations is invariably the

promotion and pursuit of national interest. Thus, national interest refers to

the totality or aggregate of interest of individuals and groups with a given

nation-state. Hence, the democratic moves of Babangida’s administration in

the external relations could be seen as a preliminary gerrymandering to gain

proper legitimacy and support of people. The regime of General Babangida

attracted the highest and fundamental contribution by scholars regarding her

external policy. Timothy (1990) posits that “Nigeria foreign policy should

concentrate on the quest to balance ends by means, than the identification of

good goals”. He identified the radical perspective on Nigerian external

relations and stipulated that Nigeria is not an African great power by an

intermediary between center and periphery which mediate between Africa

and the world. He further stated that the external foreign policy makers focus

24

attention not on national capability but on the character of Nigerian political

economy, which is controlled by a collation local or private capital and state

capital within the foreign capital occupying a dominant position. To him, the

Nigerian external policy makers are concern in explaining the nature and

bases of Nigerian National interest not in delineating its scope.

Ikeke Fune Eluemunor, (foreign policy analyst) elaborates Babangida’s

philosophy on external relations. Thus, Babandida’s regime is ideologically

impoverished in external policy. He concludes the regimes, thus, “we are

guided in part, by the ideas that are relevant to another world and as a few

result, and we do many things that are unnecessary, some that are unwise

and a few that are insane, while some are threat to national interest itself’.

Most of the scholar writings in Nigerian external policy, has little or nothing

to commend both of Babangida regime and the previous government in the

field of our foreign policy. But to Abubakar (1990), “Nigeria should re-

evaluate the internal as well as the external limits of her power resources in

the light of this re-assessment; define more precisely her attainable goals’. It

is believed that this strategy forms the fundamentals, for the pursuit of a

viable external policy in Nigeria.

Babangida’s conduct of Nigeria external relations, made impact in the

Middle East and Liberia in external policy area. In the Middle East,

25

Babangida re-established diplomatic relation with Israel in 1992, this

facilitated arid necessitated the argument, decisions between Israel and

Palestine that in 1993, Israel transferred Gaza strip Golan height back to

Palestine in 1994.

He was in the vanguard of liberation struggle and decoloniation

encouraged by Kiark in his bid to dismantle apartheid in South Africa by

allowing him to visit Nigeria in 1993; despite the criticism of the visit, but

the objective was to encourage de Klark and assure him of Nigeria’s support.

Akinbolola ayo (analyses) noted “the peaceful transition to majority rule in

South Africa, further aids to the area of foreign policy pursuit.”

General Babandida’s also call attention to non-alignment of global peace

keeping mostly in Africa. The Liberia’s peace keeping is attributed to

Babangida’s external policy philosophy, this was, tantamount to the

formation of ECOMOG that contained the out break of war in Liberia as the

peace keeping force.

Demerits in the Conduct of Nigeria’s External Relations

The greatest deficiency associated with conduct of Nigeria’s external

relations or policy lies on its tremendous demerits. The high level of

ignorance in many of the past and preset Nigeria’s head of state and or

26

government contributed immensely to the operation of weak and porous

external relations. Most of leaders are not aware of what it meant to conduct

virile external relations. Tunde Adeniran in his advice to the government

opines.

Today the making and execution of external policy area of he political

function of a state and miscalculations of errors can lead to consequences

more destructive than hydrogen bomb, while the successes can alleviate a lot

or liberate the capacity of millions of Nigerians populace.

The British authority often heap praises on the Nigeria’s conduct f true

democracy, given that latter is the former colony of British. This praises

were cherished by the Heads of Governments and attributed to non-

operating radical external policy, and or relations that may not benefit

Britain, (colonizing Power). The defunct Soviet Union, in 1963 condemned

the conduct of Nigeria’s external policy. According to V. Kudryavester, the

Nigeria political systems and external policy contains dangerous symptoms. He

asserted, thus “Nigeria is where power has been taken over by men brought in the

spirit of the western civilization and not by patriots to make any sacrifice for the

future of their people”.

Therefore, the influence of colonial experience is the beginning of the

demerits of not only our national interest but also the conduct of external relations

27

of Nigeria. Which linger till date. Amuwo (1980) noted “The foreign policy

conduct of successive civil and military administration in Nigeria has been such

that the country’s interest coincided more often than not, with imperialist interest”

He asserted that Nigeria external policy goals or objective have world and regional

centered. Idang (1986) portrays, that “Nigeria’s external policy is not a product of

her intellectual experts, neither a consideration of public opinion, since it is devoid

of Nigeria’s domestic process while Nigeria National interest is more of that of he

actors”.

Idang’s view is widely accepted by scholars nationally, while many equated

the knowledge capacity and experience of most of our actors in the field of

external relations to naught. In forging ahead this crificism and conUbutions to

Nigeria’s External policy or relations Aluko (1990) posits, :It is unrealistic

to advocate that Nigeria should play a big brother role in Africa just as the

United of America has assumed in the western hemisphere and or globally,

because, Nigeria has neither the capacity nor the resource for such a role”.

In same vain, Aforka Nweke in his precise contribution, by informing

Nigeria’s external policy makers against pursuing a globalist foreign policy.

HE forwarded thus, “The pursuit of globalism is a costly pursuit of an

illusion, since Nigeria cannot hold its multilateral programs with the great

powers, because of her industrial and technological inferiority and of

external policy without ideology” He is of the opinion that, Nigeria should

28

meet the welfare needs of her citizens first, before issuing assistance to

needy African state. He asserted that Nigeria should pay more priority to her

internal and domestic problems and little to external issues.

A more major deficiency of Nigeria has no foreign policy was postulated by

Echezona (1987) he noted, that “Nigeria has no foreign policy tradition in

the sense that we do not have external policy frame work from which the

policy radiates”. To him, the Nigeria’s external policy institutions are not

appropriately utilized by the government both past and present.

Hence it is our own view to assert the very deficiency of Nigeria’s

external policy is largely influenced by colonialism and professional experts

in external policy conduct, cum external relations. Also agree with Padelford

et al (1976) and other Africa scholars, who noted that “National interest are

centered on core values of the society, which include the welfare of the

nation, the security of the political beliefs national way of life, territorial

integrity and self presentation”

Therefore, there is a complete neglect of domestic or internal

problems that could provide for the welfare of the people; the prevailing

scenario culminated to the conduct of our relations policy not around

national interest but class interest to the detriment of our country.

29

Indeed avalanche of literature exist on the national interest and conduct of

Nigeria’s external relations. Such scholars like Okolie (2009), Eke (2009),

Asobie (1998) and Nweke (2001) have enumerated the core principles of

Nigerian national interest and how they are being projected through series of

foreign policies initiated by our leaders. However, non of the scholars

captured or has adequately addressed the effect of the self or class interest of

our leaders which usually inform and lay beneath their so called national interest

on Nigeria’s relation with external environment are copiously missing and need to

be addressed in order to establish firmly the import of such personal or class

interest on the foreign initiation visa viz Nigeria’s conduct of external relations.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical frame work adopted in this research work is Marxist

instrumentalist model. According to Asobie (1990:38-39) on decision making

model revisited: And Analysis of the application of theories and models of foreign

decision making to the study of Nigerian foreign policy. In Olusanya and Akindele

(eds) the structure and process of foreign policy making and implementation in

Nigeria, 1960-1990 Lagos: NIIA Press. The two mostly commonly associated with

the instrumentalist model are, Ralph Miliband and William Domhoff.

This model begins with the assumption that it is the basic function of the state,

especially the state in the capitalist society, is to foster capitalist accumulation and

profit.

30

Both Miliband and Domhoff have tried to isolate, the process by which the

capitalist class uses the state as an instrument to promote and protect its class

interest. We have relied on William Domhoff, who has distinguished four

such processes thus:

1. Candidate selection, which involves filling the decision making roles with

persons of middle and upper class background.

2. The special interest process, which refers to lobbying by interest groups.

3. The ideological legitimization process, which takes the form of creating,

disseminating and enforcing a set of attitudes and values that favour the

ruling class.

4. The policy planning process, which involves the contribution of ideas and

the personnel to the executive branch of government or policy research

institution by major (capitalist) corporation and foundation and the making

of specific policy recommendation through special commission and task

forces, by capitalist organizations and associations.

Obviously, this model or philosophy influences tremendously,

national interest and conduct of Nigeria’s external relations. In Marxist

explanations of this theoretical model, the state in capitalist society including

Nigeria serves or promotes the interest of the capitalist class, especially that

31

of the ruling class. The Marxist instrumentalist model focuses attention on

the ruling class in Nigeria and how they use the state as an instrument to

actualize its collective interest. Therefore, the core of this model is that

(Nigeria) the state serves the interest of the ruling capitalist class, through

the direct participation of members of the ruling class in the state apparatus.

The instrumentalist model gives a lot of attention to the identification of the

connection between members of the ruling class and the key actors in the

external policy making institution in government. The chief motive of this

connection is to x-ray that policy both internal and external is formulated

and influencea by people at the helm of affairs.

1.7 Hypotheses

This study is therefore, predicated on these following hypothesis,

thus:

1. Self-succession project of the political leadership was implicated in the

conduct of Nigeria’s external relations.

2. The advancement of class interest tend to inform Nigeria’s diplomatic

relations under General Babangida’s regime.

32

1.8 Method and Sources of Data Collection

We shall rely on observation technique as our method of data

collection on national interest and conduct of Nigeria’s external relations,

under General Ibraliim Babangida’s administration. Hence we are constantly

observing ox noticing what is going on around us. According to Obasi

(1999:169J scientifically, observation is a purposefully planned and

systematically executed act of watching or looking at the occurrence of

events, activities and behaviours which constitute the subject or focus of

research or study.

Therefore, a scientific observation is one that directed to achieve a

research purpose as well as executed logically towards achieving this

purpose. According to Selltiz et al., (197:201) it is through observation that

also accurate descriptions and explanations of variables under study can be

achieved. To Obasi (1999) through observation of political phenomena

accurate description and explanation of such phenomena can be achieved,

secondly, through observation the historical strength and dynamics that is

particularly the how and why of things happening, of political phenomenon

are recorded and studied, thirdly, the observation can generate data which

can be used to support or disprove the findings made through other data

gathering techniques, and fourthly, observation can be used to firstly to

33

explore the nature of political phenomenon especially when not much has

been known of such phenomenon. Such exploration can be thereafter serve

as a spring board for further investigation of the phenomenon through the

survey method.

Secondary source were the major sources of data implored in this

research work. Secondly sources of data refers to a set of data gathered,

archives, either inform of document or survey, results and code books,

journals, magazines, newspapers and unpublished materials. Ikeagwu (1998;

211), Selitiz et al., (1977:31) identified the advantages of secondary source

of data to include that of economy.

Method of Data Analysis

In this study, qualitative descriptive analysis is adopted. Asika

(2006:118) noted that qualitative descriptive analysis essentially has to do

with summarizing the information gathered in the research verbally. As

noted above, we shall dwell principally on secondary sources of data.

Therefore, the adoption of the foregoing analytical method is in place.

34

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1 Origin and Emergence of Nigerian’s External Relations

The origin of Nigeria’s external relations which is embedded in external

Policy dated back to Nigerian independence. It is the nation - state by virtue of her

independence that enter into international or external relations.

By 1960’s political emancipation of Nigeria, her first direction was to stipulate its

position in the world.

The international political environment posed Nigeria with the demanding

task of formulating external policy, for the newly arrived nation. Initially, the

demand for external policy, which portrays our external relations, posed Nigeria

with two main problems, of which the country had no immediate panacea. The

tremendous incapacitation in foreign policy knowledge as well as necessary

elements that should fashion Nigeria’s external policy and also the sophisticated

international environment which Nigeria had to operate all together disorganized

the initial take off in formulating Nigeria’s foreign policy for its external relations.

According to Nweke (ed.) (1986), the first distinct phase of the evolution of

Nigeria’s foreign policy, is the period of the first administration in the country.

Akinyemi (1986) described the foreign policy of that period as being pro West.

Nigeria became independent in 1960, the year which was generally known as

35

anmus marabills. At independence, she joined the Commonwealth Countries and

the United Nations. The logic of the events and the colonial legacy, had both

largely, fore — ordained her initial external policy opinions. Thus, during the first

few years of independence, Nigeria maintained close relations, with the

commonwealth countries and Britain. But since the late l960s, she has assumed a

more vigorous posture in the world affairs, largely as result of great political and

economic changes that have taken place in the country, since the oil — boom that

started in the early 1 970s. This reflected the number of her diplomatic missions,

which rose from six in December 1960 to eighty two, January 1980, large number

for any country and perhaps more than any third world country has ever

maintained abroad (Aluko, 1981).

According to Omenma (2009) in Okolie (2009) (ed.), as a defining attribute

to statehood, Nigeria at independence, out lined its own foreign policy goals

different from the foreign policy of its ex — colonial power — the great Britain. In his

statement in the House of Representative on the conduct of external relations,

Alhaji Tafawa Belewa inter alia that: in formulating its policy for the conduct of

foreign affairs, the Federal Government recognizes that its primary duty, is to

promote and safeguard the interest of the federation and its citizens .We have

already declared our intention of a plan to join both the Commonwealth Countries

and United Nations. We consider it wrong for the Federal Government to associate

itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs.. .Very particular attention

36

will be devoted to adopting clear and practical policies with regard to Africa ....

Boundary created artificially by the European powers, should be respected and in

the interest of peace must remain the recognized boundaries .. In the United Nations

and any other way possible we shall direct our energies and influences to reach

solutions which will contribute to the peace of the nations and well — being of

mankind (House of Representative debate, 20 August 1960).

Suffice it to state that this foreign policy stand has never shifted significantly

from its original form under the successive governments of major General

Aguiyi Ironsi (1966), General Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975), General

Mohammed (1975- 1976), General Obasanjo (1976-1979), Aihaji Shehu

Shagari (1979— 1983), General Mohammadu Buhari (1984 — 1985), General

Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993), General Sani Abacha (1993-1998),

General Abubakar (1998-1999), Chief Obasanjo (1999-2007), Aihaji - Umaru

Musa Yar-Adua (2007- 2009) and Goodluck Jonathan (2009-date). According to

Okolie (2009: 47) (ed.), successive leadership of Nigeria has not shown utmost

difference and commitment to the foreign policy declaration of the Nigeria state

since independence.

The global crisis of socialist revolution by the defunct USSR that

abandoned united nations early fiflies returned to the organization before 1960, as

well as establishing international force, and militarily. The new move by USSR

created socio — cultural and ideological divide in the world politics. The general

37

international situation, were what faced Nigeria in the international environment

under which Nigeria’s external policy had to be formulated, which of - course

shaped the conduct of Nigeria’s external relations. This issue which had to be

processed however were peculiar to the period and made lasting impact on the

choices of action made by Nigeria, and on the principles which persuaded Nigeria

in relating with other nations. The cold war, big power’s interest in Africa,

decolonization — conundrum, pan African movement and European integration and

international crises in Vietnam, Middle East and that of Congo’s quagmires were

the very issues at hand.

The making of Nigeria’s external policy that adequately informed her

conduct of its external relations, emerged at the period of profound international

crises, ranging from cold war, antagonism between the United States of America

and the former USSR. The cold war perverted the existence of the United Nations

of that period. The cold war which lasted from the end of the Second World War

in 1945 and until .the Cuban missile crises in 1962, was the non shooting war, but

the use of polemics, and propaganda, were in place. This very crisis embraced vile

and hostile condemnation, while the major powers involved in this war,

established military bases and blocs, with severe restriction on trade between it,

which was imposed on its friends and allies. Each power group developed

destructive capabilities in the form of atomic and hydrogen bombs, between the

two supper powers became tightly closed.

38

Hence the features of the general level of international interaction at that

time of independence of Nigeria, created international tension, instability and

crisis in the world order .At this scenario of global crisis , safety under

commonwealth of nations, which was a harmonious grouping of people of all

races, creeds, colour and continents, and which provided a pool of intelligence on

the world, which left the new states with indispensable.

According to Ofoegbu and Ogbuagu (1978), Nigeria and other African

countries are posed with the problem of establishing objective relations with the

East and West. And by history of colonialism , Nigeria had much in common in

terms of language, education, legal and judicial practice and interpersonal relation

and life style of their leaders. They were culturally bound to the West and by

economic links of trade, aid and technology. This control from Great Britain and

the profit accruing from the ecomomics, they applied every possible means to

retain and maintain their colonies in Africa including Nigeria. The USSR was very

desirous of utilizing completely the anti — colonial sentiments in Africa. She then,

mapped out for Africa, thus, (1) her socialist doctrine which cares for the poor,

down trodden and the peasant, and (2) her boot — trap system of self reliance,

human right and the very need to overthrow the apartheid regimes in Africa.

Nigeria, along with other new independent countries in 1 960s in the international

system were concerned with strategizing how to relate to the big powers each of

which was intent on having its way in Africa, Out of which Nigeria had to

39

formulate her external policy, as base for its external relations. The prevailing

international crisis had substantial influence on the choice of decision, the elite

and the ideologies which Nigeria pursued in international politics, which in recent

times re — enforce itself continually.

2.2 Internal Structure and External Influence in Nigeria’s Exter.al

Relations

In recent times, it has become a conventional wisdom in external relations

in sharp contrast to the classical tradition, that the external relation of a country is

to a considerable and reasonable extent determined by its internal stricture. This

believe is jointly shared among scholars of Nigeria, per a good number, in the

study of external policy cum — external relations. According to Nweké (1986:33),

what determines the characteristic of Nigeria’s foreign policy is the total domestic

structure, which he identified as: cultural and historical forces, socio economic —

structure, institutional framework and processes, and class formation and relation.

Admittedly this eminent scholars postulation gives an insight into the processes of

foreign policy, especially in Nigeria. However, his conception of domestic

structure was inadequate to understanding the driving forces of Nigeria’s foreign

policy. This is because of his failure to recognize the influence of the international

political climate on the foreign policies of states. As a matter of fact, sovereign

states are subject of international law, and thus, influenced the events in

international politics. Despite this obvious pitfall, Nweke’s postulation has

40

become a conventional wisdom, and scholars have sought to solidif his argument

in both statistics and theoretical perspectives.

Agbu (2004- 5), Babawale and Saliu (1996 — 220), Imhaneahimhiro (1998 -

155), Eyetsemitan (1996 .198-199) Akindele (1986:155), among others, all share

similar position, that there is a congruent links between elements of domestic

imperatives and foreign policy out look of states including Nigeria. Despite their

obvious lack of inclusive appreciation of the foreign influence, the scholars no

doubt have contributed tremendously in revealing the web of coimection between

domestic exigencies and consistent outlook and or vibrancy of foreign policies,

especially in the developing states, such as Nigeria. Nevertheless, we hasten to

stress unequivocally, that the prevailing international climate or put simple, a

particular world order exerts equal if not an overwhelming influence on the trends

and transformations of foreign policy, especially in Nigeria’s external policy. At

this scenario, this study identifies three major drivers of Nigeria’s external

relations, since independence, these include, (a) the state of the economy (b)

leadership and (c) history and international climate. To Omenma (2009), the

economy has been identified and acknowledged as the lifebloQd of every state

foreign policy. It is the pivot upon which every other sectors of the state revolve.

The Nigerian economy is a product of colonial imperialism. This essentially

makes it to be weak and dependent in character. As a post colonial state, Nigeria at

independence inherited a state with weak economic base, and therefore, needed

41

foreign aid to embark on its domestic and foreign policies. Incidentally, this much

needed foreign economic assistance could only be sourced from its erstwhile

colonial masters. This implied that Nigeria had to adopt a pro — western foreign

policy orientation, contrary to its declared foreign policy of anti — colonialism and

anti — racialism. In the words of Akindele, the dependent character of Nigeria’s

economy create special problems for the conduct of her foreign relations, infact it

poses a severe limitation on achieving the foreign policy of liberating Africa from

all form of domination and exploitation. Consequently, successive leaders of the

country were compelled to soft pedal on mode of achieving her foreign policy

goals. Nevertheless, to demonstrate the link between the strong economic base

and the effectiveness of foreign policy, when in the early 1970 Nigeria’s economy

witnessed a wind fall from oil revenue, Nigeria began to pursue with utmost vigor

the realization of its external policy of Afro-centrism and good neighbour. These

include, (a)the facilitation of establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, (b) the signing

of Lome 1 convention, (c) hosting of festival of Art and culture in 1977, popularly

known as FESTAC 77, and (d) adoption of proactive policies and actions against

apartheid regime in south Africa among others. It was therefore, not surprising that

the Nigeria oil windfall was described in many quarters as, the day of golden age,

of Nigeria’s foreign policy. To Delaney (1983:164), the period between 1975 and

1985 characterized the era of activities and boldness in Nigeria’s external

relation. In any case with the advent of glut in the oil market and the acquisition

of alternative source of energy by Nigeria’s major buyers, Nigeria began to

42

experience dwindling economic fortunes and consequently embarked on foreign

policy holiday and a barrage of contradictions between 1980 and 1 990s. This era

of interlude or contradictions in Nigeria’s external relations illustrates vividly that

it is only with viable economy that a state could perform consistently. A case in

point is what Omojuwa (2004:184) describes as the period of expulsions of

citizens of other west Africa countries in 1983 and the closing of Nigeria’s land

boarders in 1985 not only in utter contradictions of its declared policy of

Afrocentrism and good neighbourliness, but also in utter violation of the

ECOWAS treaty for the peaceful movement of people and goods, geared towards

facilitating the goals of sub regional integration. Though this was done to check

the rampant smuggling and problem of security at the boarders. The major

compelling reason derives from the prevailing economic adversity in the country

at various times resulting in the adoption of certain unpopular and anti - people

policies such as the austerity measures and the structural adjustment

programme (SAP). In as much as a viable economy can possibly drive the

pursuit of foreign policy, there is still the need for it to be complemented by

astute leadership.

At fifty years of sovereignhood, Nigeria has witnessed a torrent of

leadership succession. Thus between 1960 and 2011, the country has been

ruled by thirteen Heads of state and presidents. They are Alhaji Abubakar

Tafawa Belewa (1960 - 1966), Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi (1966),

43

General Gowon (1966 -1976), General Mulitala Muhanimed (1975— 1976),

General Obasanjo (1976 – 1979), General Alhaji Shagari (1979-83), General

Buhari (1984 - 1985), General Ibrahim Babangida (1985- 1993), General

Sani (1998 - 1999), General Abdul Salami Abubadar (1998 - 1999), Chief

Obasanjo (1999— 2007) and Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar-Adua (2007 - 2009)

and Dr. Goodluck Jonathan (2010 - date).

A close examination of this leadership parade reveals that a military

officers, which implies that the type of in the country was dictatorial. This

definitely have a in the formulation and implementation of Nigeria’s

the pursuit of large number of political system peculiar external Nigeria’s

foreign policy has not been coherent, systematic and articulate. Rather, it I been

characterized by what Asobie (1980:60) referred to as, ‘the praguiat deal with —

issues — as they arise approach’ .This implies that Nigena’s external policy

orientation has been largely adhoc. in nature since independence.

Despite the military orientation of Nigeria’s external policy, successive Nigeria’s

external policy elite have also arrogated the domain of foreign policy making and

implementation exclusively to themselves. As Zartman (1970;130 — 143) noted that

the external policy system of Nigeria is highly centralized with the chief executive

(Head of state or head of Government) assisted sometimes by his foreign

44

ministers, playing the role , not just of the chief decision maker but in fact, often

the only decision maker.

Mackintosh (1964; 217) had earlier underscored this viewpoint, when he

asserted that Nigeria’s foreign policy has always been made by one man and his

advisers. The argument by the leaders is that the democratization of foreign policy

will give room for the killing or filibustering of basically good idea by the weight

of parliamentary votes and being sacrificed to nationality and technicality, the

political leaders choose to monopolize the foreign policy process. Invariably

foreign policy decision making in Nigeria.

In addition to the pursuit of survival being at the front burner of Nigeria ‘s

external policy, Nigeria’s position as one of the most populous and the largest

countries in the Continent of Africa makes her foreign policy elite to have an

overdrawn image of Nigeria’s greatness, and. informed by the Afrocentric posture

of Nigeria’s external policy. Most importantly however, is the historical fact of

colonial bondage. The harrowing experience of colonialism makes Nigeria’s very

conduct of external relations since 1960 to be geared towards the achievement of

freedom. As Oche and Dokubo (2004:12 — 13) argued; this encompassed the quest

for African unity, the attempt to bridge arbitrary division, and the fight against

colonialism. The policy of non alignment pursued by Nigeria was a means of

staying equidistant from both power blocs, and the support for international

organization was a means employed by Nigeria to enhance her strength through

45

numbers. Thus, the post independence international relations have been based on

fighting off the legacies of foreign hegemony and intervention.

A related factor that shapes Nigeria’s external relations, is the prevailing

international climate or world order. Being a product of external circumstance,

Nigeria continues to have a reflex action of the external situation. For example,

during the cold war, when Nigeria regained her sovereign statehood, the country’s

external policy was largely influenced by the prevailing ideological rivalry, so that

at one time, it was purely pro — western and at another pro - eastern, its external

policy was posed with the rival ideologies. Since the demise of the cold war,

Nigeria’s external policy orientation has been reflecting the neo liberal

philosophy. Thus it could be concluded that Nigeria’s foreign policy tend to be a

product of externality as it inevitably changes with the ever changing global order.

2.3. The Impediments of the Conduct of Nigeria’s External Relations

This thesis tend to portray that the character of Nigeria’s post colonial

economy resulting from the operation of exogenous capital restricting the freedom

of choices of Nigeria’s leaders in policy formulation and implementations, in their

external relations and Nigeria’s dependent on economic relationship with the

western powers has in effect narrowed the margin of choices open to her in the

conduct of inter - state politics

46

The nature of Nigeria’s economy has produced a situation of dependence

on the western nations and their institutions in the areas of grants and loans for

purpose of development which spills over into trade and technological

dependence. Nnoli, (1978) identified some factors that impinge on the external

relations and policy of African nations. He noted that although African nations

adopted the policy of violent struggle for the liquidation of apartheid, they are yet

to confront South Africa physically. He noted that. in a conventional military

struggle between the combined strength of the African states with South Africa,

the African States will still suffer humiliation. Given that in the light of

conventional military capabilities of independent African states and South Africa,

physical confrontation with South Africa will be unrealistic. South Africa has one

of the most attractive economics of the universe, but its tremendous resources are

spend on defence. That is to say, that it is suicidal, for Nigeria to attempt any

direct military confrontation with South Africa. Nnoli also identified the structural

linkages of African states to the West as a restraint on the latitude of African states

in making independent decision. He postulated thus, the more a state needs

another, the more it is dependent on it and lacks the flexibility to reorient its

economic relations as it deems it fit, therefore, it is susceptible, to economic

manipulation.

The integration of Nigeria economy with the developed capitalist

economies, under colonialism distorted Nigeria’s economy, and led to the

creation of new productive activities, which were based on the needs of external

47

capitalist nations of North America, Europe and Japan.

The pervasive external influence on the Nigeria ‘s economy acts as a restraint on

the freedom of choice open to her external policy elites for their companies, and

multinationals are effective tools in the hands of their respective home government

for destabilizing Nigeria, should she attempt an external policy - stance that will

discontinue their hegemonism in these African nations.

Nigeria’s technological retardation, which arises from underdevelopment; and

which is a consequence of her economic live, has acted and continued to act as a

limitation to the realization of her external policy goals and objectives in her

external relations. Following closely on the economic issue, we will examine the

armed forces of Nigeria, assess its strike capability and the effects of her level of

military preparedness and readness for the pursuit of Nigeria’s External relations

and policy objectives.

In international relations, certain values are compromised, while others

such as the defence and protection of countries’ territorial integrity, its people and

national independence, which are the main thrust of core values, are not or never

compromised. To maintain her values, countries would resort to war. Arising from

this then, is why does Nigeria compromise the violation of her territorial integrity

and the killing of her citizens by Cameroon (her neighbour) as x — rayed in

Cameroon - Nigeria boarder clash (the Bakassi case)?

48

National power, as Northadge (n.d.) has observed, is as a result of many

innumerable factors, made up of moblizable military powers, productivity of

industrial plants, the factors of human and material resources, the firmness of the

alliance system and the intangibility of prestige and the stage of technology. Given

the population and abundant raw materials of Nigeria, the people tend to delude

themselves that Nigeria is a powerful nation. These people see Nigeria as the

regional power of the continent, and as such ought to view herself in that

perspective.

The state power is not based on the availability of raw materials or large

population of a nation in modem international pcilitics. It is rather based more on

the level of technological development. Thus lending credence to Robert Carr and

Beinstem, when they stated that “natural resources and man - power are not value

to a nation in the technical capacity and expertise to utilize the resources. It is

quite bold to state that, Nigeria has not in any form demonstrated a

remarkable capacity for scientific experimentation and industrial progress.

Hence, imported technology is accrued to the little or low level productions

process that takes place in Nigeria, which the transactional corporations

bring into the country. Arms production requires a very sophisticated

technology and expertise, hence, in the industrialized societies much of the

research and production of military weapons is formed in the universities

and large business firms, including the government laboratories. In advanced

49

countries, research is given a priority by the government and its various

institutions. In the Nigerian case, the reverse is the case, scientists, engineers

and all those that are involved in research and development are not given

any sort of encouragement, which is tantamount, to the retardation and

stagnation in the development of Nigeria’s technology. Its effect on military

establishment is really quite retrogressive because, it is the finding that

forms the basis for the advancement of Nigeria’s weapon technology.

Nigeria relies heavily on external procurement of her military hardwares,

hence, she lack military technology to produce her weapon internally.

Okolo, (1982) noted that 95 % of these hardwares are externally shifted to

the country, while only 5% is domestically produced. Essentially, this

portrays that, although Nigeria has established and founded an ammunition

factory at Kaduna, the production level is noting to write home about.

Hence, if there is any course for alarm, Nigeria cannot rely on the factory for

her military hardwares in any form.

The scarcity of the spare parts and technical skills for equipment

repairs is therefore a direct consequence of the dependence on external

sources. The Nigerian leaders have a penchant for awarding contracts for

new supplies, instead of repairing the equipment which have broken down.

This is a strategy they have adopted in defrauding the nation.

50

The military establishment is not free from this fraudulent character, as,

Okoro (1982) argued, the nation’s inability to maintain equipment has

resulted in the grounding of equipment supplied by the Western capitalist, a

direct concomitant of Nigeria’s poverty of technology in her level of

economic development. There has been very little industrialization, with

emphasis on the building of light industrial plants that could be in the case of

war transform their productive capacity to the production of military

equipment, thereby maximizing the nation’s military power.

However, as we further an exploration of the constraints on Nigeria’s

external relations, It is necessary for us to examine the genesis of political

instability in the political system, the part played by the Nigerians elites in

fostering this instability through the unbridled struggle for the acquisition of

political power and the effects of this spectre of instability on the nation’s relation

with the external environment. Therefore, it has become rational for the Nigerian

masses to articulate ideas and opinions to argue, that Nigeria’s external policy, on

which external relations anchors lacks dynamism. This started from, Belewa’s

leadership of 1960 to 1966. The problems with most of the analysts, who makes

this sort of assertion is that, they tend to isolate external policy from domestic

politics and treat it as a distinct category having no relationship with the pattern of

elites formulation, regional, ethnic and cultural alignment in the nation. Hence,

Idang (1960) perceived that it is the direct manifestation of the dominant attitudes

51

and perception of society for one to accept the external policy of any country.

Since the Nigeria’s external relation during the first republic and after was a

reflection of the events in the Nigerian internal system.

Crisis marred the administration of the country, beginning from 1962, Nigeria was

bedeviled with crisis of high magnitude proportion, such as the western Nigeria’s

emergency crisis of 1962, the 1963 national census’ controversy, and the federal

election crisis of 1964, then came the western crisis of 1965. Put together the

above instances culminated into Nigerian civil war of 1966 to January 1970.

Following suit are the general election crisis of 1979, 1983and most recently, the

heated annulment of June 12 general election of 1993. While the masses believed

that,.the fate of June 12 cancellation will determine the Nigeria’s future political

history.

These political unrest, in the political system of the country, captured the

attention of Nigeria’s policy makers, to such an extent, that Nigeria’s ability of

playing a dominant role in the African sub — region was greatly minimized. The

situation was very tasking to the point that Nigeria’s diplomatic initiative in the

continent became enormously affected. Aluko (1981) stipulated that in early 1962,

Sir Abubakar Tafawabelewa had to cancel his visit to other states due to internal

political crisis.

The emergence of Nigeria’s diplomatic efforts declining in Africa started

from 1966 to 1970 and even beyond. This made the Nigeria’s leader focused more

52

on containing the political whirl wind caused by the break down in the political

system of the country. Although, it is a fact that our leaders now have more

freedom in dealing with the external environment without being unnecessarily

trammeled by the overwhelming political disorder. Thus, it will be foolhardy on

their part to neglect the heterogeneity of the society in the formulation,

implementation of government policy and conduct of Nigeria’s external relations.

The political instability in Nigeria political system, arising from military coup is

quite unhealthy for Nigerian diplomacy. This culminates to continuous shifts of

emphasis in Nigeria’s — Africa policy, without a rational appraisal of Nigeria’s

national interest. When the corrective regime comes to power, they try their

possible best to distance themselves from the policies of their predecessors, at

least to justify the coup. Consequently, the continuous, conflicts and instability

within the country has in various forms enhanced the maneuverability of Nigeria’s

external relations vis — a— vis the external environment.

In summarizing this section, we contend that the dispositions of the national elite

tend to pose the most tremendous constraints on Nigeria’s external relations and

policy. The enormous implication of the bourgeoisie penetration of social

formation of this country, is the creation of Nigeria’s bourgeosie, who have the

same ideology with the Europeans and Americans capitalist. The colonial system

of education was channeled towards the training of Africans to assist in the local

administration at the lowest cadres and the Europeans staff for the private firms.

53

The school system was structured towards producing those, who thought and

reasoned the same way with the colonialist. This reality X rayed by Walter

Roddey, in his book titled; “How Europe under developed Africa”, was the

product of this schools that took up the colonial officials positions in the federal

and regional bureaucracies at the eve of independence consequently, this group

was created and reproduced itself, through the colonial education. Imbued with

western ideas on development, this petty bourgeoisie have not only proved

themselves as the internal bulwark of imperialist domination, pillage and plunder

of the nation’s Economy, but also incapable of charting an autonomous course in

international politics in the country. In effect, they play the “errand boy” of the

West in the international order, even when our national interest would have

otherwise demanded. Base on all these, we are inclined to admit the hypothesis

that the orientation of Nigeria’s political leadership adversely affected the

formulation, implementation and the entire conduct of Nigeria’s External relations

which anchored its external policy.

54

CHAPTER THREE

BABANGIDA AN]) EXTERNAL POLICY AGREEMENT

3.1 Practical Appraisal of National Interest and Conduct of Nigeria’s

External Relations under Babangida

In this study, we intend to delve into the complication of examining and

placing value judgment on national interest, as articulated and projected by the

Babangida’s administration, this is in contrast to the proper discuss and

interpretation of the concept of national interest that may be handled in the

preceding chapter of this report. National interest in this context is subjected to the

political Era in question and it is geared to discover the extent the policies and

decisions of the Babagida’s administration has reflected a true national interest in

external relations.

The enormous ambiguity in national interest and conduct of Nigeria’s

external relations, attract the attention of General Ibrahim Babangida. In 1986,

therefore, general Babangida in relation to this constituted the all Nigerian

conference on foreign policy, to determine our external relations at Kuru in April,

1986. The target of this conference was to chart a new order for Nigeria’s foreign

policy and external relations. In his open address to the conference participants,

the then military president, General Ibrahim Babangida, stressed the very need to

define our national interest and hence, to place national security of Nigeria on top

55

of what are considered as representing that interest. Further more, he identified

what should be Nigeria’s national interest when he asserted that, it is my view that

a meaningful foreign policy for Nigeria should be pursued within the context of

our security interest. Our external policy should focus on our capacity, as a nation,

to protect our internal values from external threat, no matter what form the latter

may take or from what quarter they may appear. We must recognize that, even

though people want security for their national community; we should not forget

that the same people also want food and some level of comfort for themselves

(Babangida, 192:1-11).

The president stressed that national interest should not be seen solely as

national security interest of self presentation, self defence, or self survival, rather,

it should be conceived to include, the protection of ultimate values, such as

individual liberty and human welfare. In the analysis that followed, Babangida’s

views, scholars argued strongly against his declaration, positing that from history

of Nigeria’s foreign policy and external relations, what the dominant ruling class

pursue is contrary to the official pronouncement of the president, lending credence

to Nkurumah (1972:17), when he opined that every form of political power,

whether parliamentary, multi-party, one party or open military dictatorship,

reflects the interest of a certain class or classes in society. In the mean time, we

can not proof or disproof the claims of these scholars but while we subject the

popular foreign policies adopted by Babangida against the .supposed national

56

interest, then the out come will enable us to determine the result.

Therefore, it will serve the purpose of this writing to point out that outside national

security, that attract a wider acceptance, it will almost be unreasonable, while

talking on national interest to under rate some basic issues that include hunger,

poverty, diseases, medical care, unemployment, destitution and a political system.

That guarantees equalitarianism and human rights. These are some basic problems

bedeviling Nigerian citizens and our national interest must not only be rooted in

these problems, but also provide a panacea, an arbiter, a succor and or a solution to

them.

Prior to the administration General Babangida, predeccessors such as Aihaji

Shehu Shagari and General Mohamadu Buhari, in their foreign policy posture,

engaged in the expelling of citizens from other West African States as a measure

for checking currency trafficking and smuggling across the boarder. In 1983, the

Shagari’s administration expelled 2 million illegal West African aliens. Following

the experience of these aliens, the Nigerian land boarders was closed for two

years between 1984 and 1986 and General Buhari insisted that ECOWAS free

movement be postponed.

Following Frankel’s (1978:26-27) definition of foreign policy, shaped in

external relations as a range of actions as well as set of principles, influencing

these actions, taken with reference to external situations and factors. It is the

summation of thoughts, actions and principles on external affairs, taken by

57

decision- makers with the intention of achieving long-range goals and short term

objectives. General Babangida’s administrations at the onset, pursued a foreign

policy and external posture contrary to that of Shagari and Buhari. The Onus of

Babangida’s administration has been to atone for what he described as an aberrant

narrow mindedness of Nigeria’s foreign policy and relations Babangida, (1992). In

the determination that Nigeria’s economic fortunes should not be allowed to be the

principal of the country’s foreign policy posture. By this philosophy in the foreign

policy posture, General Babangida takes preliminary steps of derailment in the

pursuit of national interest. With this view, Bangida re-opened Nigeria boarders in

1986, his administration also indicated the willingness to commence the

implementation of the second phase of the protocol on free movement of persons

and sites of residence, in spite of the problem encountered in the implementation

of the first phase of, which accounts for the actions of the Shagari and General

Buhari regimes. At this scenario, the Babaginda’s regime was highly pre-

occupied not with what is good for Nigerian nation as a sovereign entity, but

with the legitimization of his seizure of state power both within and outside

Africa. .Omenma, (2009) noted that General Babangida in his bid to

maintain a leadership role in Nigeria in Africa, the regime initiated a

paradigm shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy from traditional political thrust to

that of economic diplomacy.

58

According to the then external affairs minister, major, General Ike

Nwachukwu, the policy thrust was designed to achieve a balance between

Nigeria’s political and economic concerns (Omowuhnii, in the Guardian, 11

march 1989:1). Under this new foreign policy thrust, all energies were

mobilized and directed towards, the diversification of Nigeria’s economic

base, expansion of its international market, attraction of new foreign loans

and foreign investments and the rescheduling and forgiveness of the nation’s

external debt (Omojuwa, 2004: 181). General Babangida’s administration

also spent billions of naira, towards the eradication of apartheid in South

Africa, aid to Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and for over five years

much more human and material resources were spent to aid liberation

movement in South Africa.

Omenma, (2009) stipulated that Babangida’s regime, in a way to solidify

the diplomatic fence-mending, reaffirmed Africa as the cornerstone of Nigeria’s

foreign policy by not only sending gift items to her neighbours and establishing

joint enterprises with them, but also setting up..in 1986 technical aid corps (TAC)

for needy African countries. Since its establishment, Nigeria has been sending its

citizens with technical skills and proficiency in various fields of endeavour, to

needy countries of Africa. Zambia, Sierra Leone among other African countries

are beneficiaries of this initiative. Beyond this, the country under this regime

59

played a major role in the establishment of the ECOWAS monitoring group

(ECOMOG) in August 1990. It was this military arm of the ECOWAS that

intervened in both the Liberian and sierra Leonean crisis. Thus the obvious pro-

western diplomacy of General Babangida’s administration seemed not to have

denuded Nigeria’s foreign policy of Afro centrism and good neighborliness.

(Omenma,in Okolie, 2009,ed).

On the diplomatic fronts, the Babangida’s administration initiated the

boycott of the 1986 common wealth games in Edinburgh in protest against

Britain’s continued to support the regime in Pretoria. His boycott succeeded, in

effect, in persuading the overwhelming proportion of the commonwealth

membership to follow its example. It initiated the resolution that was ratified at

the summit of African union (AU) in 1986, calling for total isolation of South

Africa including the proscription of landing, over flight and other facilities for

South African aircrafts and ships in African countries. The administration initiated

what was the clearly the most important outcome of the 18th summit of the non-

aligned countries in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1986. The establishment of African

firnd (action for resisting invasion, colonialism and apartheid fund), intended to

underwrite the creation of a strategic stock pile of relief materials for the front line

states in anticipation of the effect on them, of the imposition of economic

sanctions on South Africa by the international community.

Out of these initiatives and foreign policy posture, or external relations by General

60

Babangida’s regime, one can imagine the huge amount of naira spent to finance

the administration’s view of external relations. This not withstanding, none of

these initiatives is related to Nigeria’s national interest, neither does it have

concern for the biting problems facing the Nigerian people. Above all, while all

this huge amount of money is being wasted on problems of other countries, there

exists an absolute neglect of some national industries, such as the Ajaokuta still

company, Nkalagu cement factories among others, for lack of fund. The gradual

dilapidation of the nation’s universities, the retrenchment of workers due to

government inability to pay them and the continuation of gross unemployment all

of which are at centre of Nigeria’s national interest. In effect, Nigeria remains as

committed to its external policy principles and objectives today as ever. As the

foremost black nation in the world, Nigeria has acted in the international arena as

the spokes country of African unity and as a beacon of the black in Diaspora. Kalu

(1996:11), noted that the Babangida’s administration, on coming to power

declared support for the liberation movement of African countries, such as the

South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), then fighting for the

independence of Namibia, the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African

Congress (PAC) then in Exile got renewed financial support from the government.

Although oil did not have an appreciable impact on the Nigeria’s economy until

after the Nigeria’s civil war in 1970, there is no doubt that the country reaped

inmiense benefits from the OPEC led oil boom that spanned the decade after, the

war. With the established linkage between oil and Nigeria’s external policy, either

61

by providing necessary clout for its links, or acting as constraints to its

effectiveness, it is clear that when the oil industry sneezes; Nigeria’s foreign

policy catches cold. Moreover, there exist a relationship between the Nigeria’s

economic crisis which lies in the seed of economic weakness and dependency

sown under colonial arrangement, and the corrupt and unproductive character of

the indigenous ruling class, which often connived with external forces to

exploit the country. It was the oil sharks of 1978 and 1981 that exposed the

structural deficiencies in the economy, which brought it down into the

doldrums of crisis which Omenma (2009:56) noted that Nigeria began to

experience dwindling economic fortunes and consequently embarked on

foreign policy holidays and barrage of contradictions between 1980 and mid

1990s. The government of General Babangida offered a formidable

dimension in Nigeria’s economy as a strategy of external relations. Initially,

the administration accepted or adopted the IMF! World Bank package of

debt management and the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1988.

Apart from pushing Nigeria’s fate to the international credit institutions and

creditor nations, which undermined the nation’s autonomy through the

instrumentality of market mechanism, suffice it to say that, the

administration out of the deficiency of the dynamism of international

economic relations, freely accepted the structural adjustment programme

62

from the international economic institutions. Furthermore, the General

Babangida’s administration did not take cognizance of the issue of Nigeria’s

economic experts. Instead, he encouraged Nigeria’s foreign policy

formulator and state managers to remain in the good books of the country’s

creditors, no matter the cost.

In terms of national interest and Nigeria’s conduct of external

relations to advanced market economy countries, it translated into not doing

any thing to offend them or lead them to withdraw their support for Nigerian

programme of economic recovery (SAP), even if it entails the abandonment

of its vigorous African centered and politics oriented policy. It meant an

unabashed pro-west posture in the external relations, justified in the name of

economic expediency and economic development. Between 1980 and 1988

SAP provided the basis for enunciation of economic diplomacy as the new

tenet of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The Structural Adjustment Programme

(SAP) policy has remained the unchallenged hegemony of foreign oil

companies in Nigeria’s most strategic economic sector. Soremekun and Obi,

(1992), asserted that the beneficiaries of this nexus remain the external oil

investors, external credit institutions who collect about 40 percent of the oil

export earning as debt servicing fees, state managers and bureaucrats who

dispense of oil and oil revenue and the protégés. This has only subjected the

63

domestic oil prices to the market mechanism and the opening up of Nigeria’s

oil industry to foreign interests leaving the Nigerian economic crisis to foster

and deepened. This administrative posture, rather than strengthen Nigeria’s

capacity to pursue an automatic and vigorous foreign policy directed at its

economic emancipation from the hegemony of the forces of global

monetarism and liberation of popular forces in the ambience of popular

democratic movement. The oil weapon firmly in the hands of external oil

interest has continued to subvert and sap the conduct of Nigeria’s national

interest, in both domestic and external environment. In term of state oil

linkage with foreign policy, the present dependence character of the state

and the domination of oil must be transformed, to provide a firm basis for

autonomous and equitable national development and external relations that

serves the broad interest of Nigeria citizens. By implication, the SAP policy

undermined our national interest, instead of improving the lives of

Nigerians. In furtherance of this analysis, there is need to examine the

ECOWAS monitoring group; ECOMOG’s operation. The formation of

ECOMOG whose pact was signed in 1978 which was principally aimed at

averting any likely boarder clash that may put two or more member states

into confrontational hostility.

64

The ECOMOG pact, frowned at any inter-state conflict, and the

resolution of any inter-state conflict was to be carried out by the council of

arbitration and mediation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now

African Union (AU), the regional organization, whose objectives the

ECOWAS members who are also members of the AU, seem to be fhrthering.

The ECOMOG formation was faced by Liberian crisis, as a case in point, Eke

(2009:102) noted that the crisis in Liberia bordered mainly on internal political

factors of class struggle for power control between the indigenes and the America

Liberians who are regarded by the indigenous people as few men who have ruled

Liberia for over a century. Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe was accused of

conducting pseudo multi-party electron in 1985, through which he declared

himself winner to perpetuate himself in office. Ethnic hatred soon developed into

ethnic cleansing and destruction of the Americo-Liberian caste, the major actor -

Samuel Doe, Charles Taylor, and Prince Johnson struggled for the control of state

power. While Charles Taylor controlled over ninety percent (90%) of the country,

president Doe was quoted as having said that if he should loose the battle Charlse

Taylor would havc nothing left of Monrovia to rule. As the Liberian crisis ranges

on alliances were formed that found Ivory coast and Burkina Faso opposing the

Peace Keeping force, while Nigeria became the protagonist in fostering anc

sponsoring the Peace keeping force, by supplying men and material resources.

65

According to Eke (2009: 103) citing Gambari; Nigerians and their

well- wishers abroad expect the country to be a truly great nation, a pride of

Africa and the black race, and a key player in global affairs, this is the

ultimate challenge facing Nigeria. Nigeria as a regional power in West

Africa demonstrated that she is ready to back up its diplomacy with her

military might. More deeds than words to achieve the strategic interest, the

cost which would include, blood and money. As against Nigeria’s national

interest, General Babangida’s administration afforded a sacrifice of such

huge amount of money to Liberia, in an attempt of seeking recognition for

his regime, not minding that over fifty percent (50%) of Nigerians have no

job and cannot afford their three square meal. The stand of Nigeria on

ECOMOG may have also been informed by her worries that her rivals in the

continent; Libya for instance, was supporting Charles Taylor through

Burkina Faso. It could be recalled that when the Nigerian civil war broke out

in 1967, Cote d’ Ivoire joined France and supported Biafra. To worsen the

matter, Cote D’ Ivorie was supporting apartheid in South Africa. Hence,

Nigeria’s move in ECOMOG may have been informed by the need to curb

Ivorian Excesses in the sub-region.

On the basis of national interest, Babangida’s administration was very

extravagant and wasteful on her conduct of external relations, a case in point

66

was the wasteful expenses of both human and material resources in the

peace keeping in Liberia, which was an absolute negation. Throughout

General Babangida’s regime, more of his initiatives and foreign policy

posture did not reflect a move this junction, one is justified relations

conduct ran counter to solve the Nigeria’s domestic problems. At to claim

that General Banagida’s external to our national interest, having inclined or

committed his administration to personal interest or other countries interest

in total disregard to Nigeria’s national interest.

3.2 Trend For Africa as the Center Piece of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

An appraisal of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence reveals

successive regimes commitment and adoption of Africa as the center of

Nigeria’s foreign policy. In 1960, when Nigeria’s foreign policy was first

formulated, the then prime minister, Alhaji Tafawa Belewa stated; we

belong to Africa, and Africa must claim first our attention in our external

relations. According to Eke (2009:12), the prime minister stated that, Nigeria

hopes to work with African states for the progress of African territories to a

state of responsible independence.

67

The importance attached to this African concern was further attested

to by the prominence given to Africa in the objective of Nigeria’s foreign

policy, as outlined in the 1979 constitution of Federal republic of Nigeria,

section 19, which stipulated that, the Nigerian state, shall promote African

unity as well as the total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of

Africa. While there are sentimental elements in this Nigeria’s concern with

Africa, most of this concern is however, born out of hard realistic

assessment of Nigeria’s foreign policy ambitions and goals. On the

sentimental level, first is the fact of racial and cultural identity that binds

Nigeria to most of African states. The second reason is that of being a

member of the African shared experience of being formerly colonized and

cuffently developing countries. Furthermore, given Nigeria’s position in the

world; she can not but concern with the special political and economic state

of the continent. The element of reality emanates from two angles, the first is

the elementary foreign policy consideration that all states seek to promote

their interests and exert their influence in the most conducive environment

available. In this scenario this environment is naturally Africa, for the simple

reason that given the level of development of productive forces in the

economy and her military capability Nigeria can not be a world power at

least for now. However, when her size, population and economic resources

68

are placed side by side with those of other states in Africa, the potentials for

being a regional power becomes evident from this point of view. Therefore,

a major point in focus for Nigeria just as General Babangida argued, in a

sub- region of 16 countries where one out of three west Africans is a

Nigerian, Nigeria should not be a helpless spectator Nigeria is duty bound to

react and respond in appropriate manner necessary to avert disaster (

Olagunyi and Oyovbaira, 1991;272). Hence, of greater importance is that the

level of security in Africa and particularly Nigeria’s immediate neighbors

have a direct bearing on her own security. In a contemporary analysis of

international relations, this factor has no bases. In the first place, Nigeria

tend to pose mere potential power both in regional and international level,

since she is completely out of track in her ability to convert her potential

power to real power. Again the capitalist hegemony through their economic

institutions is in a decisive position to undermine growth and development

of Nigerian economy, while the ruling classes are strongly aligned to the

capitalist institution. The Nigerian government lacks the military capability

to thwart the intentions of the capitalist countries, whose military and

diplomatic virtue has undergone sophistication. With regards to security,

especially in the international environment, all African as well as third world

69

countries are usually defenseless within the confines of their individual

power.

International security for now is based on the interest and support of

the supper powers and the world powers are completely lacking in this

regard. In the view of this, there exists a better sense if the issue of

productive forces and African security be observed as a secondary factor in

the conduct of Nigeria’s external relations.

However, what have been the practical manifestation of this external

relations over the years, have been a tradition for regimes Nigeria has had,

since 1960. But the big question is, where does the pendulum swing to if the

cost and benefits of this concern with Africa are put on the balance? Since it

may be boring and time consuming to trace the history from independence, it

becomes necessary to attempt an answer to the above question through

examining of President Babangida’s approach to Africa as the centre piece

of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The history for the establishment of ECOMOG

to contain the political crisis in Liberia reveals it as the brain child of

president Babangida’s administration. The totality of what Nigeria wasted in

Liberia through Babangida, might be difficult to put down on paper, but in

brief, the minister of external affairs under General Sani Abacha asserted

70

that Nigeria has spent over $4 billion to finance ECOMOG in Liberia, plus a

good number of Nigerian soldiers who died (Ikimi, 1995). To justify the

waste of men and materials in Liberia, the Babangida’s administration

argued that if Nigeria should exits Liberia, its iron ore deposit would elude

Nigeria’s steel mill and benefit France. This may be convincing to a lay man but,

goes further to vindicate the intellectual and technological weakness of the regime

in foreign policy management, since the claim cannot be true. Moreover, Nigeria

has become almost incapable of exploiting her to convince the masses that the

economic waste is for the interest of the country. How would Babangida and his

successors apologize for the wasted Nigerian lives and wealth in Liberia, while

our infrastructures and our educational system almost collapse and a zero

technological development for lack of funds. Consequently, one can rightly assert

that Babangida’s approach to Africa as center piece of Nigeria’s external policy is

not only a continuation of the past regime but specifically a desire for personal

glorification against Nigeria’s national interest. According to Kalu (1996), in

April, 1986 at Kuru conference on Nigeria’s foreign policy, General Babangida’s

external minister Bolaji Akinyemi, made a speech which indicated Nigeria’s

direction in his opening address, he asserted that, there is no disputing the fact that

we have responsibilities to Africa, he portrays further that when we say that Africa

is the center piece of our foreign policy, we mean that Nigeria should identify with

and defend the legitimate interest of Africa collectively and each African states

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individually. Akinyemi submitted that it also means that Africa and African

states should identify with and defend Nigerian’s interest. Hence it is in

place and bold for one to ask, out of the Nigeria’s enormous waste in

African states, how many African states has responded even in the slightest

form to. the political and economic problems which Nigeria encountered.

Instead, some African countries have rained accusation on Nigeria of having

territorial ambition as witnessed in boundary disputes. Previously it was with

Chad, and Cameroon there after, even Charles Taylor of Liberia, ordered the

immediate withdrawal of Nigerian soldiers from Liberia as he assumed

power, with no respect to Nigeria. Suffice to put in an analysis of this

external relations by General Babangida, is an act of ideology misdirection,

as seen in Africa being the centre piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy has

earned us noting other than international insult as well as disregard for the

problems facing the Nigerian masses. If this administration had directed half

of the money spent in Liberia to tackle Nigeria’s unemployment, medical

care, industrialization, education among others, Nigeria would have been a

far better place for us all. The development of the Nigeria’s economy is

hardly anything better than that of most African countries. The development

of Nigeria’s economy therefore, depends on the West irrespective of the

incompatibility of their interest in African. A clear demonstration of this was

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seen in Nigeria’s He emphasized that even though the president occupied a

low profile in the conduct of foreign policy, the regular disbursement of

funds, which though may be justified on purpose in the overall foreign

policy agenda of the Federal republic of Nigeria. General Babangida’s

regime made the following economic aid announcement.

Nigeria’s aid to Africa 1985 to 1986 Bostwana and Zimbabwe

(reconstruction of 1986 houses destroyed and damaged by south

African Not specified forces Also 50 million naira to the frontline

states to be spread over a period of five years. It tends to be right to assert

that between 1986 and 1993, that General Babangida’s administration

must have spent a huge amount of money. Like

YEAR RECIPIENT AMOUNT N

MILLION

1985

Front line states and liberations

movement for

1986

10.0

1986 Zimbabwe and Botswana 5.00

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1986

1986

Cameroon(material aid for natural

disaster victims) 2.00

Equatorial

Guinea 0.50

in the past, Nigeria’s aid to other African countries still lack clear objective.

From the above, one can see that all successive Nigerian administration from

Aihaji Tafawa Belewa to General Babamgida and even the present day

government of Jonathan, in varying degrees have accepted the validity of aid

in the country’s African policy. It has also been shown that over the years,

economic assistance had depended on the sentiment and idealism of the

leadership, rather than on a coherent, well articulated, package and well

organized programme of economic assistance.

3.3 The Management of Decision Making in External Relations

Decision-making is a very crucial issue in the field of foreign Policy

making and implementation. The problems encountered by international

relations scholars, has in recent times been addressed by advance studies in

social sciences. Some of these problems include, characteristics of nations

especially in the form of national power and the specific behaviour of

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individuals acting on behalf of the nations, while researchers on national

power do not deny variation in individuals and groups in making foreign

policy decisions, which has a far reaching effects, they do not provide any

answer for the assessment of those effects, (Sills, international encyclopedia

of the social sciences, vols. 7, 8). Bmck and Sapin (1954), in their book

“Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics”,

identified the actions of nations as resulting from the way identifiable

decision-makers define the action situation. They asserted that decision

making behaviour takes place in a complex organizational setting and can be

accounted for by inter relations of clusters of variables.

Suffice to say that in most third world countries especially in Nigeria, these

organizations and domestic variables are disregarded through the

manipulations by the ruling class and interest groups. In advanced countries,

these variables are strictly adhered to. For example considering the United

States variables, they apply their scheme and cany out a joint decision to

intervene with military action in Korea in June, 1950. In the context of

Nigeria, Olusanya and Akindele (1990), in “The Structure of Policy Making

and Implementation in Nigeria 1960 to 1990”, noted that students of external

policy have always assumed that with the aid of skillful diplomacy and

dedicated leadership, a politically united country which possesses a

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prosperous economic base has greater capacity for pursuing an effective

foreign policy and influencing other states than a poor country, characterized

by persistence domestic instability. The makers of 1970 to 1974 external

policy plan as a political realistst accepted that material power exerts a

disproportionate influence on international; morality. Their perspective on

Nigeria’s external policy runs counter to those necessary back ground and

failed to evaluate Nigeria’s social, political and economic order that could have

fashioned the framing of our external relations.

The authors of the decision-making of the 1970 development plan were quite

flituristic and the outcome of their plans designed in assumptions. They x-rayed

the end of civil war as the beginning of Nigeria’s unity and considering the much

natural resources and potentials in manpower, material and money, the

government could lay a solid foundation for socio-economic revolution in black

Africa. They saw no reason why a country so reasonably endowed could not

achieve the goal of economic independence and the defeat of neocolonialist forces

in Africa, which for now is not even in sight. Throughout the world, it is generally

recognized that the making of foreign policy involves in the final analysis a few

individuals who have technical competence in a particular issue and or, but not

strictly observed in Nigeria’s situation. Echezona (1992:1-3), noted that, there had

been clamoring since the First World war that foreign policy should not be

shrouded in secrecy as the Nigerian case reveals. He noted that in United States,

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for example, the following groups are directly involved in the making of foreign

policy; the congress, the presidency, the cabinet and foreign policy bureaucracy. In

each of these institutions, there are hulls and pulls towards the making of the

decision. In the former Soviet Union, where the means of production has been

collectivized, you talk of the political bureau of the communist Party, the

supreme Soviet and the Soviet of the nationalities are all acting in the

interest of the state of the whole masses. In the case of Nigeria, Echezona

(1992), upheld that there has not been any clearly identified foreign policy

constituency in Nigeria since independence. The existence of strong pressure

groups with •diverse diplomatic views is quite factual, but to mediate

contradictory ideologies and views, there are equally no lasting institutions

that over-reach the various regimes that have spanned the fifty years of

Nigeria’s existence as a nation-state. The essential features of Nigeria’s

foreign policy making, since independence is instability and secrecy. The

colonial state was unstable, the post colonial state, or the neo-colonial state

mirrored in the dominance of foreign monopolies is worse than unstable. A

particular regime that comes along condemns the policies of the previous

regime, not even on its substance, as is the case in the capitalist societies.

The regimes are x-raying on the personalities that had piloted the previous,

just in an effort to legitiniise the new regime in the eyes of the populace. Our

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background study on decision making in external policy lead us to examine

General Babaginda’s administration in the management of decision making

as a case in point in Nigeria when analysed, x-rays the efficacy of decision

making in Nigeria’s foreign policy making and implementation. It is our

interest to focus attention on two major foreign policy decisions made by the

Babaginda’s administration. First is the boycott of the Edinburgh Common wealth

games in 1986, and Nigeria’s decision to become a full member of the

organization of Islamic conference (O.I.C.) in the same 1986. Since independence,

Nigeria has been committed to the use of sports as an instrument for attaining her

foreign policy objective. As a result of dissatisfaction of a prevailing international

politics, Nigeria boycotted many international games as a protest against her

interest in the international politics. Most outstanding of which is the slippery

decision of Babangida’s administration to boycott the Edinburgh commonwealth

games. Prior to this decision, Nigeria has boycotted the Montreal Olympics in

1978, over New Zealand sporting links.

The decision to boycott Edinburgh common wealth games came as an

internal-play of interest from Dodan Barracks, the federal Ministry of External

affairs, the Federal Ministry of Youths and Sports, the Nigerian National

Olympics Committee and the National Sports Commission as a connection

institutions. The decision to boycott the Edinburgh Conirnonwealth games was

underscored by the protracted strained relationship between Nigeria and Britain.

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Even before president Babangida’s regime, General Buhari’s regime has been

bitter with Britain over the grant of refuge to prominent politicians of the second

republic wanted in Lagos to answer for charges of large scale corruption and

fraud. Umaru Diko, the second republic minister of the transport is outstanding

among them. Babangida in 1985 sought to mend Britain’s — Nigeria relationship

through series of visit to North America and Europe by his minister of external

affairs minister, Bolaji Akinyenii, after which both countries appointed new high

commissioners to replace those that were recalled in the wake of Diko’s affair.

Shortly after this initial reconciliation, Margaret Thatcher, the then prime-minister

of Britain opposed world opinion agreement on sanctions against South Africa’s

racists government of which Nigeria was strongly behind to protest against British

South African policy, Akinyemi, recommended the boycott of Edinburgh

Commonwealth games.

The important issue about this decision is that it was an issue initiated and

concluded between Akinyemi and General Babangida. Both the Federal Ministry

of Youths and Sports, Nigerian National Olympic Committee and National Sports

Commission were not aware that such decision had been taken. Even the chief

press secretary to president Babangida, Duro Onabule, General David Jemibewon,

who was in charge of the athletes representing Nigeria dismissed the boycott news

as mere speculation, until they well unofficially informed that the boycott had

been confirmed by Dodan Barrack.. The Federal Ministry of Youths and

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Sports protested strongly at the failure of the ministry of external affairs to

consult their officials prior to the recommending a boycott.

The outstanding flaw in the process of the boycott decision is that Dodan

Barrack failed to consult other institutions and agencies whose course of

action is bound to affect. The worst of it all is that such decision is known to

them only after it has gotten to the public domain through the media. On the

issue of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Nigeria was for the first

time invited to attend their summit conference in September, 1969 in Rabat,

Morocco, the decision of the Nigeria’s government to alter Nigeria’s

participation in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) from an

observer status to full membership is a classic example of the office of a

head of government who is also the head of state, taking a specific foreign

policy decision, without actually involving his foreign affairs minister in the

final implementation of the preferred course of action. The issue of Nigeria’s

membership of O.I.C. came up during General Buhari’s administration and

he sent memorandum to the ministry of external affairs, requesting an advice

on the issue, the minister Ibrahim Gambari’s replied in a memorandum

against the alteration of Nigeria’s observer status in the Organization of

Islamic Conference, citing the provision in the 1979 constitution for the

maintenance of the secularity of the state.

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In General Babangida’s administration, both the provision of the

constitution and the advice from his external affairs minister, Bolaji Akinyemi

were undermined and Nigerian’s full membership in OIC was personally decided

and carried out by the president himself In a reply to the Dodan Baracks

memorandum the ministry of external affairs in a submission signed by Bolaji

Akinyemi, the then minister, of external affairs also argued against full

membership, in furtherance, he asserted that the Nigeria’s observer status should

be retained.

On January 1st 1986, the ministry of external affairs was instructed by

president Babangida, to arrange diplomatic cover for Nigeria’s delegation to the

second ministerial meeting to be led by Rilwanu Lukman. While Akinyemi was

already on a diplomatic shuttle to Western Europe and North America, to show-

case the 1986 budget and the government economic recovery plan. The delegation

after two days left Nigeria to Morocco, the Nigeria’s fonnal admission as full

member of OIC were covered by the journalist covering the conference. Nigeria’s

external policy decision making has been a secretive bureaucratic affairs,

restricted to the wishes and interest of the diplomats, politicians and or the

military officers in power, it is right to assert that if the OIC brouhaha was

deliberated openly, the decision could have been avoided. Given this

experience, it is in place to opine that president Babangida demonsfrated an

utmost disregard of necessary institutions and agencies, in foreign policy

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decision making and implementation. Hence, General Babangida’s

administration by-passed all democratic process, not only the foreign policy

decision making, but also in the whole gamut of political, economic and

social system of the country.

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CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 National Interest and Capitalist Penetration in Nigerian Nation

Bringing into focus the relationship between national interest and

capitalist penetration in Nigeria, is a landmark in the study of natienal

interest and conduct of Nigeria’s external relations. Historically, Nigeria did

not only emerged in the international environment at a time capitalism has

advanced and deeprooted, but also under the tutelage of colonial control of

the core capitalists countries of the West. Nigeria could not escape the

capitalist system she met from all indication. Hence, we will further the

emphasis on this very issue as this study progresses. It is vital to

conceptualise national interests.

The writings on national interest and the concept of national interest

per se, are that it is viewed as an aspect of international politics, rather than a

necessary part of domestic politics. It is fundamentally a link between

domestic and external relations. According to Obikeze and Obi (2003), it is

believed that countries engage in international politics in order to protect or

further their national interest. The total actions, means and processes through

which the national interests of a state are pursued constitute that states

foreign policy.

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In the international system, states are still the major actors and as such

has the primary responsibility to preserve and project the interest of its

people and those of other people, but this responsibility can not be achieved

if there is no consensus at the domestic level on the issue of national interest.

According to Morganthau (1952), national interest aimed at promoting

national image, prestige and respect both at home and abroad. In the

Nigerian case, the issue of national interest has been compounded, since the

post independence period. After the civil war that degenerated shortly after

independence, there exist severe tendency towards political instability,

cyclical economic crisis, chronic ethnic antagonism and loss of national

cohesion, all in the face of external aggression and intervention. Therefore,

our national interest in the mean time, must be considered not from the

narrow framework of Nigeria’s foreign policy, but from the broad

perspective of both domestic and international politics.

Nweke (1986:308), stipulated that the implication for national interest is that

if Nigeria do not approve the political arrangement of their society or of the

dictatorship, domination and exploitation of one class or ethnic group by

another, they have the right to revolutionizes, or radicalize the replacement.

National ideologies, philosophies and values calls for supreme sacrifice on

the part of the citizens on behalf of their country, and not until this is

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balanced by the protection, equality and justice he receives from the state.

National interest of Nigeria is problematic in definition, this is because

Nigeria is neither a nation in the literal sense of people sharing common

customs and related language, or in the philosophical sense of identity of a

common ancestry. Often our national interests have been presented as a

national aspirations’ catalogue. According to Aluko (1981), in his essay in

Nigeria’s foreign policy, the six following elements consist of Nigeria’s

national interest, thus:

I. self preservation of the country;

2. defense and maintenance of the country’s independence;

3. economic and social well-being of the people;

4. defense, preservation and protection of the ways of life, especially

their democratic values;

5. enhancement of the country’s standing and status in the world

capitals, especially in Africa; and

6. promotion of the world peace.

To Aluko, the first consist of the crucial interest which once at stake,

the country has to go to war. He stipulated that Nigeria’s capability for

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achieving them can only be constrained by forces generated by the internal

and external environment. Yet Frankel (1968) feels that the subject matter

can be defined as consisting of decisions and actions which involve to some

appreciable extent relationship between one state and another. He equates

the national interest with the sum total of all the national values defined as

the product of a nation’s culture, and the expression of its sense of cohesion.

National interest is a national ideology which is a key concept of external

relations. It can be narrowly defined based on the idea that the state and its

sovereignty must be preserved at all cost, or it can be broadly defined to include

the preservation of state independence, moral, religious and the altruistic

consideration that constitute the value system of the national community.

Okorie (2009:64), noted that Nigeria’s foreign policy, under general Buhari which

lasted for eighteen months (1st January 1984— 27th August, 1985) was virtually a

reincarnation of the foreign policy under Murtala and Obasanjo regime against the

West. For example the undiplomatic and crude mamer the regime adopted to

kidnap Nigeria’s political émigré, Alhaji Umaru Diko from England back to

Nigeria; beyond that, the regime toed the footpath of its predecessor, by

contravening the ECOWAS free movement treaty, when in 1985 it closed

Nigeria’s land boarders with the excuse of checking the problem of smuggling and

security that were rampant at the boarders.

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The regime also relaunched Nigeria’s deep commitment to the cause of

freedom and liberation struggle particularly in the then apartheid South Africa,

hence, his led some other Africa countries to recognize the Polisario government

in Western Sahara. In its blue print, General Buhari’s administration asserted, the

policy objective (external relations), is to safeguard Nigeria’s national interest,

promote the economic and social wellbeing of her citizens, enhance her image and

status in the world at large, defend the independence and territorial integrity of

African states and contribute to the promotion of world peace and security. It

is clear here, that the definition of national interest is not only scattered, but

also too broad and out of reality.

Nweke (1985:25) asserted that the irreducible core of Nigeria’s

national interest is national unity and security. He added that, this constitutes

the most valued interest, and is a problem of three inter-related dimensions

the ability to perceive and utilize the foundations and capabilities which

provides support and shape the means for national integration. And also for

the preservation and defense of national independence, resources and

territorial integrity, the actual provision of national unity, survival and

independence at any moment they are threatened, both from within and

external, involving the full use of our military strength and economic powers

and the ability to influence the shaping of international political and

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economic relations with which this highly valued interest must be achieved.

Other interest such as socio-economic development, welfare and equality of

the people, African unity, human equality and justice as well as world peace

and security are important, but secondary to the core or vital interest of

national unity and security. He also opined that economic strength, military

power and political cohesion are the foundations of core interest.

In contemporary external policy analysis, it is not only out of place,

but also a deficiency in this field of study to discuss national interest without

links to power. A time tested studies of the relationship of nations in the

international political system, portrays the concept, national interest as

power. The relationship between the two is such that the realist theory of

foreign policy has gone to the extent of postulating that the main signpost

that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of

international politics, is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.

Hence, politics whether domestic or international is the struggle for power,

since power is the major instrument for the realization of national interest.

At this scenario, national capabilities, economy, geography, politics,

ideology, population, military strength and preparedness, agro-industrial

infrastructure, government arid administration as well as international

strategic prestige become vital element in the definition of national interest.

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Power is thus, necessary though not sufficient condition for preserving

territorial integrity and national independence, and a state which ignores this

condition not only can not compete effectively in international politics but

also runs the risk of disintegration or complete extinction. The ideological

attachment to patriotism and nationalism, without a radical transformation of

the national power capabilities to give practical effection on their demand on

the part of the citizens, in times of crisis is self defeating.

In attempt to face the reality, we must define powers interims of our

ability both to foster national unity and survival and to effect desirable out

comes in the international political and economic relations, dominated by the

western capitalist states. The crude definition of power as the control over

the minds and actions of other peoples merges with the definition of politics

as struggle for power. In this sense power serves more as means of achieving

and maintaining national prestige than as an instrument for national unity,

survival and independence. For power properly defined is the ability to

effect and influence outcomes in war and peace. According to Obi

(2006:128) citing Chandra (1986:21) expounded that Morganthau’s theory

of power, which is based on political realism is based on three basic

assumptions. The first is that statesmen desire to pursue their national

interest, the second is that the interest of every nation lies in the expansion of

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its influence, while the third is that the state use their power or influence in

the protection and furtherance of their interests.

We had mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, that Nigeria’s emergence

in the international community, brought her into contact with the

international capitalism or if we like, capitalist penetration. In external

relations, we talk of superpowers, great powers, middle powers and small

powers, which in essence emphasize differences and similarities between

powers with regards to economic strength and military capability are

regarded as the two dominant bases of influence and penetration into the

third world by the capitalist states. This implies that countries that are more

advanced in these angles have the capacity not only directly or intangible to

interfere in the affairs of others, but also to shield themselves from such

interference. Other factors which determines the capacity of a state to

interfere in the affairs of another country, include, skills in diplomacy, ethnic

and socio-economic hegemonism and leadership which shares a common or

a given political ideology. Therefore, the structure and or pattern of

influence between two or more countries have tended to gravitate around

their relative strengths and weaknesses in this very angle. We can stipulate

the obvious fact that in the present day international political order, the

situation is one in which the industrialized capitalist countries, such as

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U.S.A, Britain, France and Germany and socialist states, such as former

USSR and china, command considerable influence and constitute by our

definition, influence as strong actors. The underdeveloped or developing

countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, by contrast have limited

freedom of action because they are internally weak in these respect and are

therefore subjected to considerable external influence in their domestic

affairs and in their international posture.

Nigeria as third world country with a large population provides for the

capitalist states a base for penetration. The form of penetration is through

intervention in the affair of a country, that show-case itself in various ways,

but majorly as has been made clear, through economic, political and military

penetration. The feature of each type, rather than. Their actual employment in the

great power relations with Nigeria is examined with a view to identify their danger

in the future Nigeria’s economic and political progress and prosperity. For the

purpose of this research, we shall limit our discussions on economic penetration;

hence it is the bases and paramount reason for other types of penetrations.

Economic penetration and domination of a nation — state can be achieved through

economic aid, trade, investment, currency support and economic war. Economic

aid differs from trade and investment, primarily because it involves governments

as actors. This distinction - notwithstanding the problems associated with them are

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subtle and often quite grave. The most subtle form of economic penetration is aid

which is given as a gift, grant or as loans. Gifts have been bestowed voluntarily

and without compensation by the capitalist powers, literal economist favour aid as

an engine of development, arguing that the assets of the donors decline by the

same amount that those of the recipient increase. This is not always the case

because the gifts represents surpluses in the capitalist donor countries. Sometimes,

the gifts comprise equipments that is outdated and no longer in tune with the pace

of development. It is only on the ground that the gifts consist of food or other

agricultural items that they may remain unusable and in that case, may depress

rather than increase or improve the assets of the recipients.

Similar problems are associated with loans. Capitalist countries use them as

an effective instrument of economic penetration and strangulations of

neocolonies. Strictly as a business investment in order to earn an interest.

They are aid only to an extent that the funds provided to the neo colonies are

priced at concessionary terms. Another way of making loans like aid is to

loan them with substantial grant elements which only removes the interest

on them or make then attract low interest rate without protecting the

recipients from the long-term effects of such loans on the economy.

It is necessary to mention that some loans are tied. Tied loans represent the

most serious problems. Loans with string attached have the deliberate

instrumental purpose of undermining the political and economic

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independence of the recipients. Conditions are laid down by the donor

countries and imposed on the potential recipients, usually the recipient

countries are required to spend the loans either on the purchase of foods in

the donor countries or on the payment of services for shipping and handling.

Politically, compliance is obtained by force.

The general aim is to weaken the economic foundations so as not only

to make life very difficult for the people but also to undercut the legitimacy

of the governments of the recipient states. Further more, such enterprise is

used not only for economic penetration and domination of neo-colony but

also shaping the character of the state, of leaders, of political and economic

choices and of attitude to change. The realization of Nigeria’s national

interest and capitalist penetrations into the country’s economic and political

structures has been posed to each other. The opposition is in turn out of the

fact that each has been designed and patterned to serve uncompromising

purposes, while the pursuit of objective national interest involves a dislodge

of all capitalist tentacles and solve the immediate problems of Nigerian

citizens, capitalist penetration has the sole target of financial repatriation

back to the metropolis through the exploitation of the indigenous economy.

In a paper delivered by Nwokeji titled ‘Understanding Nigerian Place in the

International system’ he emphasized that since there is no denying the fact

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that there is a global system, then we as Nigerian need the proper perception

of our place in that system, to understand the system and our place in it. If

then we speak of the global system or the international system, we must

clarify the sense in which the globe or the international is a system, is it

natural organic, mechanical or artificial construct. Whatever pattern it takes

Nigerian intellect should act well, our role in the homeostatic system so as to

perpetuate our continued preservation in that homeostatic state of being. On

the other hand, if the international system had been constructed by a group

of people or nations then it was done in pursuit of their purpose of which the

purpose was anchored around their own interest.

Nigeria in the world today, like many of the third world countries is a fixture

in the fabric of the global system. This system has been built by some

international architect to suit their architectural purpose. It may well be seen

that at the end of the day, Nigerian purpose and interest, like those of the

architect of the present order, may demand that unless the present system

changes through self-propelling transformation, we must change it

ourselves, even by violence. The basic structure of the system is division of

the world populations into bourgeoisie centres and the politician peripheries

of the third world which Nigeria is one.

In the case of Nigeria, the problem becomes more compounded in the sense

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that as the British began to withdraw, the emergent class structure had

established very well defined class interest in the immediate aftermath of

independence. The post-colonial statesmen, economic advisers and articulate

intellectuals contributed, even more than colonialism per Se, to our inability

to define and implement an autonomous foreign policy that reflected the true

national interest and aspiration of the people. Consequently, the way forward

is a total re-organization and reorientation of the citizens towards a genuine

national interest.

4.2 Democratization and Decision — making in Nigerian Foreign Policy

Schumpeter (1942), in his book ‘Pathbreaking Study’ explained democratic

method as that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which

individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive stmggle for the

people’s vote. Robert Dahi in his realistic democracy or polyarchy saw it as

contestation and participation. In other words, democratization is a way of

spreading and sharing responsibilities and diffusing the mobilization of discontent

with respect to democratic participation in the making and control of Nigeria’s

foreign policy. The central and problematic issue is how best to involve the

Nigerian public in foreign policy process and particularly how to solicit their

opinions for the shaping of the content, character; pre-occupation and direction of

that policy. This approach and direction on part of the government on the issue of

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foreign affairs is the centre of this writing as well as the democratization process

in Nigerian foreign policy affairs.

There is an outstanding difference in the structure of the foreign policy

process under the military regime when compared, with that of the civilian. The

difference lies on the structure of the executive and its legal relationship to other

portions or the foreign policy bureaucracy and to other group in the population

who may wish to influence the policy process. The military regimes as a tradition

has little or nothing to do with democracy and having ruled Nigeria for nearly

thirty-years, only battles to democratize the political process while

democratization of foreign affairs is dependent on the political process. In

the several military regimes, typically the Head of state and his military

council, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) under Babangida or the

provisional ruling council under General Abacha, constitute the chief

executive. It is an executive which continues by the authority of its power,

the policy formulation and policy execution functions. It has no legal

obligation to consult with any civilian governmental institutions or agencies

before taking foreign policy action. Consequently, there are no independent

legal constraints on the foreign policy operation of the military executive. If

the AFRC or PRC as the case may be rejects the president’s ambassadorial

selections, like the senate rejected the four of Shagari’s ambassadorial

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nominees from the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP).

This is not likely to become a subject matter to public debate thereby

contrary to democratic principle and procedures. The setting up and

recommendations of the Adedeji commission appointed by the Murtala

regime in 1975 were crucial in shaping the direction of foreign policy under

MurtalalObasanjo regime. The commission was charged with the task of

reviewing and studying Nigerian foreign policy and making appropriate

recommendations for changes. Other ministries and agencies whose

activities affect foreign policy were consulted in this process. Also, the

representatives of interest groups and other individuals made representations to the

commission and by implication democratizing foreign policy making. The result

was the incorporation of a wide range of inputs in formulating a new emphasis in

foreign policy. Meanwhile, president Babangida appointed in 1986 a panel to

examine the issue of Nigeria’s relationship to the Organization of Islamic

Conference (OIC). This suggests that the commission device will continue to be

used as a means of ascertaining the views of intense, interested publics but it was

surprising that when final decision was taken on that which saw Nigeria as a

member of 0.LC, both the commission, the foreign minister - Akinyerni and

other agencies were not consulted. Babangida by this action, people felt will

continue democratization in foreign policy but all of a sudden violated his

democratic moves.

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In one of the writings of Segun Johnson, he remarked that, “the Nigerian

experience in formulating and implementing foreign policy has mainly been

shrouded in secrecy for reasons only known to political actors and chief executives

and justified on grounds of diplomacy and security, hence the inability to allow for

a democratic process in arriving at any particular policy”.

All over the world, democratic states do advertise the input of the masses into their

decision making process in order to achieve credibility and respectability both at

home and abroad. It is only on this basis as conceived by experts in foreign

policy making and implementation that a state foreign policy objectives can

achieve considerable success. However, undemocratic states mainly among

the third world countries which Nigeria is a typical example do not seem to

care much about their reputation on the input of their citizens in the

formulation of foreign policy. Most of these states constitute cosmetic

conferences where individuals and pressure groups air their feelings in

which case government rarely consider the outcome of their deliberation for

their policy choices.

In Nigeria, the August 1961 conference and that of April 1986 were

cases in point but in all, it served as a device for legitimizing the regimes in

power. The Nigerian experience with alternating shorter civilians regimes

and longer military regimes perfectly supports this position. Indeed, while

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the military regimes of over twenty-seven years may not owe any apology

for not exhibiting any form of democratization in either domestic or foreign

policy decision making process, the need to identify’ with the governed for

possible acceptance and perhaps legitimacy has arisen over the year to show

that some element of democracy are still acceptable to them. Johnson has

also once asserted that,

Nigeria has never tried to democratize its foreign policy formulation process, irrespective of trickling measures in conferences and committee set up to advice various governments.

In 1983, the director general of Nigerian Institute of International

Affairs (NIIA) Ibrahim Gambari, openly criticized the Nigerian foreign

policy as dangerously bureaucratized, during the first four years of the

presidential system. He further state that one of the problems in making the

country’s foreign policies was the multiple and often conflicting ministries,

agencies and offices of government involved in foreign policies activities,

one need not be told that Gambari with all his experiences in foreign affairs,

objects to the issues of democratization of foreign policy. On the contrary,

Ofoegbu (1962) views the institutions concerned with the formulation of

Nigerian’s foreign policy as follows:

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i. Executive office of the president.

ii. Ministry of defense and internal affairs

iii. Ministry of external affairs

iv. Universities

v. Research institutions

vi. The press

vii, Defense institutions and

viii. Interest groups, example, Labour and students.

He further observed that there are certain structures on the ground for

foreign policy and diplomacy in international politics, for example, the

United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth

nations and personal diplomacy by the president and minister for external

affairs. He, however, comes to a conclusion that very few inputs of the

formal institutions are accepted. By this, he gives credence to our earlier

position of a near-zero democratization of the process of Nigeria foreign

policy making and conduct of external relations.

The era of civilian regimes, though have never lasted much longer, many

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people expected would have brought good measure of democratization to the

foreign policy formation by allowing the people representatives in

parliament to have effective input. Unfortunately, this expectations failed

while Ofoegbu suggests that the National Assembly should conduct public

hearing on foreign policy. Many of such calls were made during the second

civilian regime with little or no response.

It was noted during this political era that some members of the federal

government controlled party, NPN, called for periodic review of the

country’s foreign policy. The truth remains that Nigeria lacks the culture of

debating foreign policy as a national and vital issue for political participants

to reflect upon, thereby eliminating the fundamentals of democracy.

In a way, conferences on foreign policy direction allow for participation by

Nigerians, but actually, it is a very narrow participation. A limited number of

selected or nominated people are usually gathered and papers are discussed

and perhaps together. Government again further flaws the conference by

picking only those that will not go contrary to what it wants and not what

will benefit the whole country. Moreover, those so selected may not have

acquired necessary knowledge and experience for foreign policy analysis.

As early as August, 1961, just shortly after independence, a conference on

foreign affairs was held under the chairmanship of K.O. Mbadiwe and after

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about twenty-five years in April 1986, another similar conference was held

under the chairmanship of Haroun Adamu. In each of these conferences, no

attempt was made by the government to articulate their deliberation and

debates on foreign affairs with the exception of the abrogation of Anglo-

Nigerian defense pact and giving of aids to African countries, no other

resolutions of 1961 conference was implemented and none of the major

decisions of that of 1986 was carried out by the Babangida regime. The view

of Nduba Echezona explains better the kuru conference of 1986. He

describes the situation as follows,

If a ruling class gives you a rostrum to criticize

them and you come down from the rostrum to be

congratulated and to be wined and dined by them

for a very constructive criticism, then there is no

seriousness to the whole affairs.

He condemned the 1986 conference on the ground that government failed to

implement its outcome infact, he concluded that the exercise was a jamboree

of the ruling class and their peripheral associates.

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The absence of democratic principles and participation in the Nigerian

foreign policy decision making process can not be ruled out as a factor for

the seeming failure of a Nigerian foreign policy. Consequently, an

ideological disharmony among and within the foreign policy institutions in

Nigeria coupled with government secrecy and trichery in international

matters is the major and lasting blow to democratization in the foreign

affairs. The importance of democratization can not be over emphasized.

Even the military and other arbitrary regime recognize its value. Babangida

in 1986 stated that;

any government, be it civilian or military must

take the people with it if it hopes to succeed but

warn that his regime will not summit to

unreasonable demands.

In the view of Thomas Jefferson, although the will of the majority is

in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable. Thus,

democratizing the conduct of foreign policy must go with reasonability,

equitable justice and full knowledge of the issues in question. The idea of

quantitative wisdom does not mean that the ignorance of the masses should

be transferred to the formulation of foreign policy whereas it rests on the

government to educate the masses on foreign affairs. It was in recognition of

the level of awareness on the part of the masses that Wetzel wrote;

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Most people do not know much about foreign

policy matters and do not care (unless they feel it

affects them directly). Furthermore, inconsistency of views,

contradictory ideas and lack of coherence

and direction abound. Actually, instead of

influencing the policy maker, the general public

usually looks to him for guidance. In most cases,

the public is more of a follower than an influencer.

One does not deny this fact while it will be wrong and inapplicable for

us to rely on this view and take decision of public concern. It was on this

grounds that George Kenan wrote:

It seems many, if not most authors tend to agree

that foreign policy cannot be left to everybody to

be involved in its formulation. Yet if policy

making is left to government alone, the depth of

such democracy would be very shallow.

Democratization of foreign policy making involves not only the

widening of the base for participation in the shaping of options but also the

devising of ways of making decision makers responsive to the views and

interest of the people and the search for ensuring effective control of the

decision makers by the people representatives elected into the National

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Assembly. It is necessary for Nigeria to begin the process of democratization

of its foreign policy formulation so that many, if not all, segments of the

state can adequately participate.

4.3 The Political Process and Foreign Policy Institution

In recent times, discussion on foreign policy making and

implementation might be incomplete without a mention of the existing

foreign policy institutions and agencies. It is interesting to note that foreign

policy is politics and as such radiates from the domestic content of a states

political system. By implication, a state’s foreign policy is a reflection of its

political history, ideology and orientation including its understanding and

interpretation of the prevailing international politics and her role in the entire

system. It was on this ground that Echezona noted:

People had doubts on the all Nigerian Conference

of 1986, since Nigeria has no foreign policy

tradition in the sense that we do not have foreign

policy frameworks from which policy radiates.

Since it has been discovered that it is ideologically wrong and

intellectually misleading to abstract a state’s foreign policy from its

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domestic politics, it is the target of this part of our research to link the

Nigerian political process and her established foreign policy institutions. In

fact, the Nigerian colonial experience and its aftermath has not only

accentuated the government and political actors from the wishes of the

masses but has also created a different relationship between the government

and its institutions, so also her foreign policy institutions. There has been

since independence an administrative governmental pattern built into our

political culture which has undermined the proper utilization of our

established foreign policy institutions.

Nweke (1985) remarked that;

it has been a common knowledge that Nigeria’s

present and past political process has operated in

strict conformity with the interests of the local economic political

and military ruling classes in

collaboration with their foreign colleagues.

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He emphasized that just and equitable political process must express the will

and interest not only of the military and bureaucratic elites but essentially

also of the working class, the peasantry and intelligencia as well as ethnic

and nationality groups. There is no doubt that the political process is

conditioned by the economic and the socio-cultural systems. In fact, we must

accept the fundamental truth that the political process forms part of the

superstructure, which is ultimately determined by the economic base of the

society. Thus, the economic base itself has been seriously penetrated by the

Western economics of which the activities of the numerous trans-national

and multi-national corporations has not for now permitted us to have direct

contacts with our domestic economic base to enhance economic take-off

There is hardly any doubt that a proper structuring as well as understanding

of the political and administrative processes gives an observer a more

informed and illuminating perspective of the institutional dimension of

policy operation and reforms necessary to improve the nation capacity for a

more efficient policy co-ordination, particularly of domestic and foreign

policies. In an analysis of the relationships between the Nigerian political

processes and her established foreign policy institutions, Akindele (1990)

observed that;

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in Nigeria, a political process that recognizes and

appreciates the values and benefits that could be

derived from these institutions has become a very

central administration challenge since independence.

He added that these challenges must, therefore, be addressed with

care, realism and a sense of urgency. Institution building and political

utilization are critical dimensions and indicators of political development.

As a manifestation of development, institutionalization must form part of the

structural reforms and innovations necessary to facilitate policy orientation

and efficient management of public affairs.

To delve into the delineation of the political interplay between the

Nigerian political process and foreign policy institutions, it is necessary in

the first place to make the Nigeria foreign policy institutions known. A

renowned scholar in the study of Nigerian foreign policy, Ofoegbu has

previously enumerated these institutions, to include:

a. executive office of the president;

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b. ministry of external affairs;

c. ministry of defense and internal affairs;

d. universities;

e. research institutions;

f. the press;

g. the defense institutions;

h. interest groups (labour and students)

The argument among scholars has been that, these foreign policy

institutions has no consensus in the making of Nigerian foreign policy.

While foreign policy decision making has been monopolized by the top

institutions of the office of the presidency and that of ministry of External

Affairs, the Nigerian political processes seem to have a total disregard for

the integration of these institutions into the main stream of foreign policy

decision making. Also, along this line, political actors merely observe these

institutions as just administrative organization and their ingenuity in foreign

policy formulation and implementation are yet to be tested and utilized by

the past and present regimes.

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As our discussions and analysis progresses in this research, we may

accept or reject the above assertions. Most writers on Nigerian foreign

policy seem to have come to terms, that the basic issue regarding foreign

policy and political institutions, that is, state organ of socio-economic

development public and local administrations, foreign policy and

international relations, mass media, the political party, as well as the

executive, legislature and judiciary, trade unions and youth organizations are

not so much than formal existence as institutions, but the point at which the

citizen whether working class or expert, civilian or military, can most

usefully be fitted into the general framework of policy formulation and

implementation. They believed that in Nigeria the principal institutions of

policy formulation and implementation reflected at a given time the

perception and attitude of the incumbent (chief executive or Minster for

Foreign Affairs). The point is that such a political process offers

opportunities only to the elites to play a role in the decision-making process.

The majority of the working class and the peasantry remain outside. Once

this idea is accepted, the claim that all Nigerian conference of 1961 and

1986 on foreign policy is a progressive idea is faulty.

From the point of history, in the political arrangement of 1960-1966, the

cabinet was under the dominant leadership of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa,

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the prime minister and only a few of his ministers were the key decision

makers in domestic affairs. As for foreign policy, it has been pointed out that

the nerve centre for most crucial decisions was the prime minister and one or

two of his colleagues. Parliamentary committee on external affairs was never

allowed to be created. Even though such committees were constituted, for

other policy fields, they were decisively and conspicuously sidetracked in

the performance of their duties and consequently acquired only a rubber

stamp value and reputation. In any system, where the critical decisions are

outside the formal structures for collective action and policy articulations the

functions which policy institution are supposed to perform and the role they

are expected to play are inconsequential assaulted and subverted. What is

necessary is that such institutions constituted be given the opportunity to

perform its functions and not to thwart the objectives for which they were set

up through political maneuvering. In the view of Akindele (1990: 243-250):

they should not be obscured from its duties and

consequently allowed to become glorified rubber-

stamp institutions.

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By 1985, when the Babangida administration came to power, there

was the perfection of the military high handedness in most areas of public

policy affairs including foreign policy matters. In his military political

tactics, fashioned by crude and arbitrary political devices, the various

foreign policy institutions merely existed without any informed potentials

being tapped from them. The boycott of the 1986 Edinburgh games and the

methods used by Babangida in Nigerian membership of Organization of

Islamic Conference (OIC) were outstanding cases which he demonstrated

non militilization of the advice of established foreign policy institutions. The

good number of experts technocrats and foreign policy intellectuals in the

research institutes like Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and the

Universities were never given the opportunities to direct and advice the

government on issues of foreign policy. Within the same political era, the

foreign minister, Bolaji Akinyemi, who is a professor in International

Relations or in other words, an expert in foreign policy matters had a great

deal of difficulty with the top echelon of the foreign ministry for a number

of reasons. In the first place, being characterized by the prevailing political

process, his initial contact with the top officials of the ministry according to

inside sources was extremely infuriated. The minister made his entry into the

ministry in the mamier of an adversary entering a hostile territory. The ground for

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his initial adversary encounter had been well prepared because of the total

inexplicable rivalry between the ministry of external Affairs and the Nigerian

Institution of International Affairs which reached its climax at the time of

Akinyemi as the Director — general of NIIA.

This circumstance apart, Akinyemi’s personality and decision style

conflicted with the established norms and procedures in the ministry of External

Affairs. There were reports and incessant complaints that the foreign minister

failed to consult his departmental needs to seek their opinion and advice prior to

taking actions on serious matters of policy. Such officials were usually requested

to take remedial measures after serious damage might have been done to the

particular policy issue.

The Nigerian nation emerged into the international system from a colonial

rule. This colonial characterization of the Nigerian foreign service according to

Bassey Ate;

tend to be accentuated by the interior, rigidity and

lack of creative imagination usually associated with developing countries

bureaucracies.

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He submitted that the result has been that despite various attempts at the

reforms since the end of the civil war in 1970, our foreign service has remained

relatively slow in adopting ideologically and organizationally trends and values in

the international system. In a political atmosphere, whereby the potentials of these

foreign policy institutions were not harnessed and utilized, the wealth of

knowledge and foreign affairs experiences which they harbour were allowed to rot

and decay while ignorance, illiteracy and ideological bankruptcy were allowed to

thrive in our domestic and foreign policy directions and pursuits.

In many less developed countries, experience has shown that the capacity-

building for policy orientation, is not enough to focus attention on institutions —

centred approach alone. It is also important, and perhaps more so, to seek to

routinize and institutionalize the political and administrative processes of ensuring

such policy linkages and co-ordination, bearing in mind the need for all public

polices to be consistent with the national interest over which a consensus is

presumed to exist. In the international system, external events impinge on

domestic policies and vice-versa, the complexity of public policies stares the

political actors, as decision — makers, squarely in the face. One appreciates this

complexity when cognizance is taken of the fact that a foreign policy actor is

inevitably and situationally involved in a two level game. At a national level, he

seeks to respond and to answer domestic group pressurizing the government to

adopt policies which favour-their group interest. At the international level, he

attempts to maximize his ability to satisfy the domestic national pressure on

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him. Clearly, as Rolert A. Putham rightly observed; neither of the two games

can be ignored by central decision makers, so long as their countries remain

independent, yet sovereign. As the games become more and more

independent and complex, the skill required by the players become

specialized. In foreign policy formulation and implementation, these skills

are located in the various foreign policy institutions and agencies. The

performance of these institutions are conditioned by prevailing political

culture of the state as well as the dispositions of political actors by whose

duty it rests the management of the entire political process. The foreign

policy system of any country requires resourceful and adaptive response to

such changes and development, which have been taking place in foreign

policy environment. In policy making, established institutions and structures

through which policy decisions are processed, do matter a great deal. It then

follows that explanation and understanding of public policy behaviour,

including foreign policy behaviour, must begin with and focus on decision

making structure and process. Any policy behaviour is a product of as well

as an expression of the political and cultural background which exist pari-

pasu with a personalized decision making pattern. Decision making is said to

be democratic, not when all the citizens actually make decision, for this is

impossible, but when participation and proper use of informed institutions

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are encouraged and adopted by the political system. This dimension in

political and administrative processes ensures articulation, aggregation and

selecting from rational options. Hence, for the making of any decision is

wide, broadly based when decision is seen to be responsible to the views,

interest and aspiration of the citizens and when there is control by the

national Assembly over the executive arm of government which makes

policy decisions. A critical study of Nigerian political process and her

foreign policy institutions carried out by Akindele (1990) states;

the Nigerian political system since independence

does not encourage the effective use of foreign

policy making institutions. It has always been an

affairs of the chief Executive and the Minister of

External Affairs once their views and interest on

foreign affairs are at compromise.

The Tafawa Balewa’s regime of the independent era established such

foreign policy posture while other subsequent regimes both civilian and

military have not taken any radical steps to utilized the nation’s foreign

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policy institutions. Consequently, foreign policy institutions in Nigeria

merely serve cosmetic purposes since the political system which has

remained fragile and unstable, frustrate the utilization of these institutions.

The ministry of external Affairs has an established policy planning which

regrettably, is anything but research based and research oriented. Besides, it

is not staffed by core officers who, by training and experience are in-house

scholars in their own right and are, therefore, research oriented. Strategic

foreign policy planning is a policy oriented but intellectually based exercise that

requires thoughtful imagination and a firm grasp of the main issues in different

areas of international affairs. Sound policy-making is informed by scientific

research which produces reliable data for use by the policy decision. makers.

There is no doubt that policy oriented research and systematic information

gathering have not yet been given the attention they deserve in the decision

making culture of the ministry of External Affairs. That not - withstanding, the

material and human resources of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, the

leading foreign policy think tank in the country and those of the universities have

not always been used or at best have been seriously under-utilized in fashioning

out Nigerian foreign policy goals and objectives.

By and large, there are enough evidences and facts as provided by over protracted

studies so far for us to accept that Nigerian political process from the past to

present has despicably declined from making proper utilization of her foreign

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policy institutions. At least for now, despite our political processes as well as

political actor’s feelings and ideas, all governments need is well-organized policy

planning institutions and the strengthening of their management information and

intelligence system, both of which are necessary for an informed and up-to-date

policy advice and analysis.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Conclusion

The critical findings of this work, though diversified but basically

national - rest and conduct of Nigeria’s external relations, has been fashioned by

the character of our domestic political economy. Which by implication is fragile in

conjunction with the structure imposed by underdevelopment as a result of the

linkages with international dependency.

Historically, the first Nigerian foreign policy came up at a period of

international turmoil. The crisis of cold war, big powers’ interest in Africa,

decolonization quagmire and the crisis of Vietnam, Middle East and Congo

brouhaha. All contributed to devastating effects in the making of Nigerian foreign

policy. This crisis created international tension, instability and confusion in the

world. At this scenario, Nigeria had just emerged in the international system as an

independent nation and as such our domestic structure was rudimentary and

feeble. The country’s political and economic forces were wholly dependent on

Western capitalist economy, and as such our self-determination and pursuit of

external policy could not thrive outside the economic confine. The economic

strangle hold by the western countries through the various devices, especially, the

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multinational corporation, whose interest is on economic repatriation adversely

affected Nigeria’s autonomy, as well as our foreign policy posture and orientation.

In the present neo-colonial era, the Nigerian state has never committed herself

with a foreign policy that implicated the fundamental needs and problems of her

citizens. In most new countries, the Commonwealth exerted considerable

pressures on them and their leaders that they had little or no autonomy for

pursuing an objectives foreign policy. In the First Republic all debates to establish

a parliamentary committee on foreign policy failed. While it is the believe of

analysts and scholars that our external policy respond more to class or group

interest.

General Babangida’s administration showcased that it has almost noting

new to add to his predecessors’ foreign policy goals and objectives. He and his

foreign policy officials further abused the fundamentals of foreign policy making

and implementation. His interest was basically to acquire recognition for his

regime and not to solve the problem of the Nigerian citizens. Billions of naira was

wasted by this administration during the invasion of Bostwana, Gambia and much

more on the liberation struggle in South Africa. While Babangida was spending

this tremendous amount of money on problem affecting neighbouring African

countries, most Nigerian citizens lived in abject penury.

Some initiates of the regime such as the Structural Adjustment

Programme (SAP) policy and ECOMOG finances in Liberia all gulped

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Billions of naira at the expense of the welfare needs of the Nigerian people.

Africa being the centre piece of Nigerian foreign policy was not only

imbibed by genera] Babangida’s administration but vigorously pursued. This

work has shown that president Babangida’s African centered foreign policy

was mainly fat personal glorification and protection of his colleagues in

political crisis, such as the Charles Taylor and Liberian ECOMG imbroglio a

has proven! Babangida and other regimes in Nigeria have paid deaf ears to

the voices of scholars that Nigerian African centered foreign policy can only

be successful and credible when we re-evaluate our foreign policy and

evolve a self-reliant socio-economic and political system and more

importantly the welfare neck of our citizens.

This research work has also shown that Babangida’s administration was

tenaciously arbitrary and ardent high handedness in decision making process

in foreign policy and other public policies. The regime out-rightly failed to

pay heed either to democratic or diplomatic means of decision making in

foreign policy. The boycott of the Edinburgh common wealth games in 1986

and the strategy adopted by the regime in the final decision of Nigeria full

membership of the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) provide

enough evidence that Babangida side tracked the views and wishes of the

masses as well as concerned institutions in foreign policy decision making

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The regime abysmally monopolised the exclusive of decision making in foreign

policy and made it an exclusive duty of the Head of state or the Chief Executive as

the case may be the realization of Nigerian national interest has been greatly

obstructed by the various influences, both internal and external and to this moment

national actors rather than beings decisive on the national interest question

collaborated in the bid to hinder the national interest to their personal or class

interest which they compulsorily have to protect. Moreover, the low level of

Nigerian economic strength and military capability is not in a position to control

these influences and penetrations into her domestic affairs. Consequently in the

international politics, nations that have preponderance in economic strength and

military power exploit these capabilities and penetrate weak countries without

serious interceptions. The international intercourse between the weak and the

strong nations is such that the weak nations suffer economic exploitation and

political humiliation and the underdevelopment of the weak by the strong.

With regards to democratization of decision making in foreign policy, this

research x-rays clearly that Nigeria is not democratizing her decision making

process in foreign policy making implementation. Both the 1961 and 1986 foreign

policy conference had never been taken serious by the various regimes of this

country. The decision reached at Kuru in 1986 conference was not implemented

in our for’ nolicy programmes. Suffice to state that since independence, the

foreign policy decision in Nigeria is either that of the political actors as the

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president Babangida’s era has shown or those he prefer to involved, not

minding official personalities and institutions whose duty should make input

in such decisions.

Though the military government, being unconstitutional, devoid of

democratic principles and philosophy, may not be expected to democratize

foreign policy decision, the civilian administrations has no remarkable

improvement in the democratization of external policy decisions.

Therefore, it may be bold to state, that the prevailing Nigerian political

process has seriously underutilized the country’s foreign policy institutions.

In fashioning out external policy, the country’s universities, research

institutes such as NIIA and other external policy agencies merely serves

cosmetic purpose and exist just as administrative centres contributing little

or nothing in the nation’s foreign policy making.

Despite the long lasted low profile foreign policy which Nigeria has

operated since independence, there are no alternatives than to sought for

urgent solutions that are capable of pulling the nation out of the cyclic

historical, social, economic, political and hence a position of servitude which

the Nigerian nation find herself for more than five decades in the

international system.

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5.2 Recommendations

It will be logically wrong and structurally faulty, if we disassociate

Nigerian foreign policy posture from our socio-economic and political

weakness in the international politics.

1. There is need for the re-orientation of the Nigerian citizens from life style

of endless self-aggrandizement and primitive accumulation of socio-

psychological consciousness of national development. Not withstanding,

Nigeria has to pursue economic revival through self- reliant economy. This

could be simply achieved by utilization of the manpower. Involving mostly

into technological advancement, industrialization to harness her abundant

natural resources and increase her wealth and financial base. Nigeria’s

economic diplomacy is relevant to the country’s quest for economic

development and should continue to aim at satisfying the material needs of

majority of the Nigerian citizens. Hence it is universally accepted that rich

nations are in better position to influence her interest in the international

environment than poor countries.

2. Nigeria needs political resurgency, our political behaviour and processes

are internally antagonistic and confrontational and externally without

reputation. A political system that has no respect for human rights, no free

and fair election and no security for lives and properties and by implication

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not democratic, is not in a position to influence much in the international

system. It is quite glaring that unacceptable political system can not achieve

cohesiveness from the people while its policies and programmes will not be

genuinely supported by the citizens. Moreso, a recognition of arbitrary

political system in the international community may be quite controversial, a

political actor not popularly chosen by the masses may eventually not carry

the people along and our national interest will be unpopular constructed,

while the strategies for policy implementation must have been ill conceived

and will at the end fail to achieve or actualize its objectives.

In the foreign policy making and implementation, it is high time the country

recognized that this field of human endeavour is not just all comer affairs

where any person can perform and substantially succeed. It is a technical

field where experts need to have control, when fruitful results are necessary

and are expected by the country. In furtherance, Nigerian government should

call for a national conference committee to be composed mainly of foreign

policy experts, staff of foreign affairs institutes, whose duty centres on

foreign affairs research and development and scholars of political science

and international relations. These calibers of people possess the intellectual,

technical and diplomatic skill for foreign policy formulation and

implementation.

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4. Reconciliation and peace keeping roles in Africa should be kept on, as this

holds a lot of favour for the country’s power position both in Africa and the

World at large but priority must be given to the needs of the Nigerian

people.

5. The task for foreign policy formation in this democratic dispensation

should be the sustenance of momentum of Nigerian investment and

technology and to open up market for Nigerian products abroad, especially

manufactured exports. The government should also encourage the

establishment of multinational corporation owned by Nigerians to reap the

benefits of opportunities offered by the newly industrialized nations of the

world, such as banking and financing. Along this line, an enabling

environment should be provided by government for meaningful and

sustainable productive enterprise. The necessary and efficient infrastructure,

security and political stability that can attract good foreign investors to the

country should be put in place.

6. The present civilian regime type should be safeguarded from possible

military intervention, while at same time the government should do its best

to maintain a content civilian population, within a democratic structure.

Hence, a peaceful atmosphere will surely be attractive for development.

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7. It is not only necessary but also expedient that national policies and

programmes, as well as foreign policy has to be geared towards the

fundamental needs and problems of Nigerian citizens. This entails that the

basic needs and problems of the masses that embraces, hunger, diseases,

employment, shelter and other social amenities must have to be provided by

the government to engender policy support from the masses.

8. Finally, if these suggestion and conditions mentioned above are

implemented and fulfilled the country stands to be truly a great nation both

politically and economically.

127

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