Timmons Roberts, Brown University 2O October KLIMOS Brussels · 2016-11-08 · H ow m u c h i s b e...
Transcript of Timmons Roberts, Brown University 2O October KLIMOS Brussels · 2016-11-08 · H ow m u c h i s b e...
Climate Adaptation and Development: Problems Of Definition And Tracking
Timmons Roberts, Brown University
2O October KLIMOS Brussels
Core questions
1. What is being done to help developing countries cope with climate change impacts?
2. How do we understand the promises which have been made?
3. How can we know if promises are being kept?
4. What might be the value of local tracking of adaptation action?
Our Roadmap
1. Introduction: counting adaptation is political
2. First thoughts on the 2020 US$100billion Roadmap
3. A brief history of climate aid promises in the negotiations
4. A study of the Rio Marker for adaptation
5. How definitions matter: DFID portfolio study
6. Building local capacity for tracking and evaluating adaptation
7. The challenge of counting private sector adaptation
8. Conclusion
1. INTRODUCTION: COUNTING ADAPTATION IS POLITICAL
W h a t m i g h t b e n e e d e d ? T h e c o s t o f a d a p t a t i o n i n d e v e l o p i n g
c o u n t r i e s
F i n a n c e : H o w m u c h i s n e e d e d ?
OECD-CPI Report, October 2015 H o w m u c h i s b e i n g d e l i v e r e d ? C l a i m s :
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CLIMATE AID PROMISES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
Since Stockholm in 1972, an “EARTH INCREMENT” HAS BEEN promised.
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1992 UNFCCC Promise:
• Industrialized nations agreed under the Convention to support climate-change activities in developing countries by providing financial support above and beyond any financial assistance they already provide to these countries.
The Rio Bargain: Promises vs. Performance • At Rio, 700-page “Agenda 21” document was designed to break the impasse between
developed and developing countries. It called for a significant increase in “new and additional” ODA for global and local environmental problems
Finance arises again and again --Kyoto was negotiated largely by developed
countries and was accepted by developing
ones “because they thought there was money
in it” [the Clean Development Mechanism]
(Atiq Rahmin, BCAS)
--The Bali Action Plan in 2007 promised
“improved access to adequate, predictable and
sustainable financial resources…”
--The Copenhagen negotiations threatened to
fail without guaranteed finance
The Copenhagen Promise (2009)
$30 billion 2010-2012 “Fast Start Finance” “Scaling up” to $100b/y “jointly mobilized” by 2020
3. FIRST THOUGHTS ON THE 2020 $100B/Y ROADMAP
October 2016 Roadmap
“The Roadmap aims to build confidence and provide increased predictability and transparency about the actions developed countries are and will be taking to achieve the US$100 billion goal.”
$100 b Roadmap
Released Monday
Two sides to the Roadmap
PROS • More cautious this time • Only uses stated promises • Good acknowedgement of
MDBs’ major goals • Consultations with developing
countries • Excellent priorities going
forward: – Public resources – Finance for adaptation – Mobilizing private finance – Enhance access and capacity
building
CONS • Does not acknowledge deep
methodological problems, including national inconsistencies
• Consultations unclear • Adaptation not balanced and
no viable roadmap to balance • No info on grant equivalence
of loans • “new and additional” issue
avoided, burden-sharing formula, prioritization
Paris on finance:
“Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.”
“$100b maintained thru 2025”
Considering “Modalities”? The Paris Decision text calls for the development under the UNFCCC of “modalities” to account for financial resources provided to developing countries
Still lacking a
definition: what
counts as climate
finance?
4. A STUDY OF THE RIO MARKER FOR ADAPTATION
The Reality: the fragmentation of climate funds
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org
Understanding the Rio Marker system
In 2015, students in my Brown University Climate and Development Lab conducted an analysis of 5,201 OECD projects which donor governments listed as having adaptation to climate change as a principal or significant objective using the Rio Marker system
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OECD Climate Adaptation Marker
• 0 – Climate adaptation not an objective of the project
• 1 – Significant objective: Adaptation to climate change was an important, but not principal objective. Minimum criteria: a.) It is intended to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems to the impacts of climate change by increasing adaptive capacity and resilience and reducing climate related risk; or b.) It aims to develop the necessary capacity to forecast the impacts of climate change, to assess climate risks and vulnerability or to develop climate risk management responses
• 2 – Principal objective: Climate change adaptation is an explicit objective of the activity and fundamental in its design; a principal objective meets the minimum criteria of a significant objective, while answering negatively to the question “Would the activity have been undertaken without this objective?”
what OECD MEMBERS claimed:
• Summing projects with positive Rio Markers, the OECD member countries together claimed that in 2012, US$10.1 billion was "adaptation related," with US$2.68 billion "explicitly targeting adaptation as a principal objective."
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what we found: After reexamining each project title and description, we found
that only US$2.34 billion appears to
be genuinely adaptation related, and only US$1.2 billion targeted adaptation as a principal objective.
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5. HOW DEFINITIONS MATTER: 2008 DFID PORTFOLIO STUDY
A case study: DFID
• Gordon Brown pledge of climate adaptation
funding agency need to decide “what counts as
adaptation”
• In 2009, DFID contracted AidData to categorized all
2,226 projects in DFID’s 2008-9 portfolio
• Goal was to understand which projects would be
captured by different categorization schemes
• Expert review at June 2009 Bonn UNFCCC
negotiations
The categorizations
1. OECD “Rio Markers” (Mitigation) 2. OECD Draft Adaptation Markers 3. Mitigation and Adaptation Planning and Action 4. High-Carbon vs. Low-Carbon Adaptation 5. Adaptation "Models" (WRI 1) 6. The "Targetedness Continuum” (WRI 2) 7. Adaptation Strategies Employed (WRI 3) 8. Vernon’s (DFID) Triangle Categorization 9. LDC/Lesotho 2008 position on adaptation 10. EU Framework for Action on Adaptation 11. Nairobi Work Programme 12. Bellagio Framework 13. Qualifies for Waxman-Markey Bill Adaptation Funding 14. World Bank Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) Qualifying
Requirements
DFID Triangle (Vernon 2008) 0 – Not targeted: Outside the DFID
Adaptation Circle.
1 – “Good development practice”: Educated, healthy people working in a diversified economy are less vulnerable overall and better able to deal with climatic shocks and change
2 – Climate ‘proofing’ climate-sensitive development measures and efforts to reduce vulnerability
3 – Expanding climate-relevant development measures and efforts to build resilience and reduce vulnerability, e.g. disaster risk reduction (incremental shifts).
4 – Undertaking climate-specific measures to target climate risks (new approach).
• 99 – Insufficient data to categorize
WRI “targetedness continuum” Weathering
the Storm McGray 2009
• 0 – No noted adaptation features of project
• 1 – Addressing the Drivers of Vulnerability: At the development end of the spectrum, activities reduce poverty and address other fundamental shortages of capability that make people vulnerable to harm.
• 2 – Building Response Capacity: Adaptation activities focus on building robust systems for problem solving.
• 3 – Managing Climate Risk:
• 4 – Confronting Climate Change: Actions focus almost exclusively on addressing impacts associated with climate change.
• 99 – Not sufficient data to categorize
12 categorizations of 2,226 DFID projects
A consensus measure?
The MDB 3-Step Method
“This methodology is comprised of the following key steps: “
• Setting out the climate vulnerability context of the project
• Making an explicit statement of intent to address climate vulnerability as part of the project
• Articulating a clear and direct link between the climate vulnerability context and the specific project activities
6. BUILDING CAPACITY FOR TRACKING AND EVALUATING ADAPTATION
C B I T p r o p o s a l - F o u r S t e p s
1. Build web portal and mobile app
2. Populate database with all adaptation projects for 6 nations
3. Conduct workshops and remote trainings on use
4. Compare effectiveness and tracking in four evaluation groups & report
7. THE CHALLENGE OF COUNTING PRIVATE SECTOR ADAPTATION
--IDB stuff, difficulties in tracking--governance study--what can be expected of firms for disclosure?
The range of private sector adaptation
8. CONCLUSION
Remaining: The need for public,
grant-based adaptation
funding
H o w t o b u i l d a r e a l S y s t e m
1. Create clear and universal system of accounting modalities
2. Discontinue Rio Marker—adopt MDB 3-step approach
3. Assign a common baseline
4. Develop an online tracking tool
5. Engage locals in tracking
6. Include “support needed” in the global stocktake
Core questions
1. What is being done to help developing countries cope with climate change impacts?
2. How do we understand the promises which have been made?
3. How can we know if promises are being kept?
4. What might be the value of local tracking of adaptation action?
Our Roadmap
1. Introduction: counting adaptation is political 2. First thoughts on the 2020 US$100billion Roadmap 3. A brief history of climate aid promises in the
negotiations 4. Green aid/brown aid-- lessons from AidData 5. A study of the Rio Marker for adaptation 6. How definitions matter: DFID portfolio study 7. Building local capacity for tracking and evaluating
adaptation 8. The challenge of counting private sector adaptation 9. Conclusion