TICOM Vol. 9 - German Traffic Analysis

8/4/2019 TICOM Vol. 9 - German Traffic Analysis

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DOCID: 3633965, ScenEI'Nul . ' , Ily Authority of ih eu n a ; ; ~ Commandinq General~ l , Dme

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ARMY ,SECURITY AGENCY1,[ash1ngton, D. C.

C0o \o:c ' J '...... ' " 7?'r ..... 't - (I), ' ( , , ~ """'" poEUHOPEA,.1'{ AXIS SIGIiAL INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR, I I i ' Q ") ~

AS REVEALED BY;' TICOM '! INVESTIGATIONS t:;, ' " ~ " '"'.....;:r ;. tIAND BY OTHER PR-ISONER OF .viAR INTERROGATIONS .,


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

(;hapter I Secur1ty of Russ1a.n Communications( ~ h a . p t e l ' I I German Exploi ta tion of Russian Communi

oationsC:hapter I I I Summa.ry of German Successes in Traffic

A n ~ y s i ~ ot Russian Oommunications~ ~ a b A


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INTRODUCTION. \.' The contents ot this volume deal with German ex-,plo1 tation ot Russian communications through Traffic ..An.llysis. There is not as much source mater ia l avai lab leon Russia as there 1s on United states and England.Thei' main interest of the 1 n t ~ r : t ' o g a t i o n otficers n01'Dl&11:iwalil centered .on gaining intelligence concerning Amer1

C8Jl and Bl'it ish communications,. and consequently in -telt"est concerning Ge1"m8n activity on the communicationso f o th er countrie s had to be of secondary 1 m p ~ r t a n c e .In addition, because of the condi tions under vil1ch manyof the interrogations vere conducted--a number ot thembeing made in active combat zones--there were oftentimesgreat diff iculties encountered in carrying out eventhe necessary routine line of questioning. Even hadthere been ideal conditions under which to work it ispl'iobable that not muoh more intelligence could have.been obtained on Russian 'communications because the 'German personnel Who vere engaged in that 'Work were inthe Russian zone of operations. Only a fev or thesefel l into English or American hands--the Russians capturing the others. However, th e material which is.available does give a fairly adequate, though not complete, picture ot Russian communicat1ons as seen bythe German Traffio Analyst

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VOLUME 9Chapter 1

SECURITY OF,RUSSIAN COMMUNICATIONS

G e n e ~ a l s e c u ~ i t y . . . 1 ' ) . ~ (Paragraph. . 1 , 2,ecu:rity on Partisan Nets

J ~ and Air Forces Hets

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. 1. General SecurItY.--Although the Russians monitoredthe ir own milItary communications for th e more outstandingbreaches or cryptographic and transmission security, company,and secondary commands were very careless with their rad1otelephone transmissions. Code covell names were rarely heard, byGermsn l istening operators. However ~ private conversatIons were intercepted as th e Russians had a tendencyto use radio-telephone facili t ies as an ol'd1nar7 telephone.Also th e Russian rad1ooperators committed violations insecurity which greatly facil1tated the work ot the GermanSignal Intelligence. l . , "The Russian radio and radio-telephone operators habItually engaged in Iioperator chat". One 1nstance of such conversations, and th e subsequent value to German Signal Intel l i -gence, occurred in January 194, when the Germans learned thata British-American d e ~ e g a t i o n was Visiting the Rusaian Oentral.front. In other instances the arrival ot high-ranking off1cerswas disclosed in private radio-telephone conversations as wellas dates tor planned ' o t t e n ~ 1 v e s : 2 ,AlthOUgh theIr rad1o-telephone t raff ic was on a verylow level ,ot security I the' .:morse and non-morse rad10 t raff icot the Russian m1litary torces reached a high degree otsecurity during th e la ter p e ~ i o d s 01' the war. This appearsl I - 7 ~ P 42 . ,I-75 P 4

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to have, been due to t he inc reased amount of radio tra1n1Dggiven th e operators; the increased amount of t raf f ic which~ h e y h E ~ to seUd; and the sUbsequent efficiency which came.from practice.;) '. , .

2" security on Partisan Nets. --on the Russian PartisBDradio nets good operators vere employed and the Germans wereunable to learn much about t he opera tion and ac:tivity otthese l[lets. In th e w in te r ot 1 9 ~ } the Germans tormed adetachment to trace the act ivi ty of the Partisan net's. Theseattempts however vere unsuccessful owing to the tac t ~ b a tmessages transmitted were very brief and, there was only ashort duration of radio act ivi ty when the nets were in opera-tion.4, .~ i Army and Air Forces Nets. -The set-up ot the RuS81anradio nets. was a ret lectIon or the o r g a n 1 z a t ~ o n o t' the . .Sovle1i Armed Forces. As radio faci l i t ies vere used withoutreatr lct ions 6 on account ot inadequate line communications.trarrjlc intercept and analys1s 6 as a primary source ot in te l l i gence to th e Germa.ns l reached a high degree of ef fi ci ency.

An inl3ight into the makeup ot the radio nets was facil i tatedby 1 m J p e r f ~ c t ,changes 1n the radio discipline.5The a ir units ot the RussIan &1'IIl1es vere torced, due toinade'quate l ine communlclj.tlonsl to exercise command trom A1rArmy downwards by rad10. b .In nets from divisIon downwards in the Army cQmposIt1onr a d I c l - t e ~ e p h o n e channels vere used to r t he passing in ot communIc:ations in add ition t o the use otmorse rad10 tratt.1c.Dl.lrulLg the l a t t e r days ot the war this use ot ,rad10-telephoneincrEI&Sed. At thebeg1nning ot the val' radio-telephone transmission in regard' to opening o tne t s l message warning s 1 g n a l s ~and 1 ~ h e use of the alphabet in spelling out names and codegroups vas carried out str iot ly in accordance y1th existingregu:Lations . Such was not the case la ter : the traff1c then'1-75" .P4 :'. .! -75,p51- 7'0, p61-1'0 6 P 3

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DOCIO: 3633965sometimes assuming $. very tree torm. Radio-telephony vasused for passing messages, t i re 'orders for arti l lery,reports ,tor th e Ai%' 'Warning Service, and'also tor generalconversation between ofticers and c o m m a n d e r ~ . The traff icconsisted m o s t ~ y ot tvo-and-three-figure message-text,plain-text, and mixed figure-plain-text. Radio stationsused cover names which were easily analyzed by th e Germans.Cal.l signs ot these stations were mostly tormed trom tl1ecOll'er names ot the stations. (Thus the cal l sign "MAP"wasl tormed trom the cover name of 11MAPKA It ) 7In analyzing Russian traff ic the Germans used a ll thedat;a available: , pad num,bGrs, originators' serial numbers,call sign system composItion, c o o ~ d 1 n a t i o n and ,knowledge ot

m a ~ 1 coordinates, any results obtained trom dcrypted mater-ials , and any direction-finding 1 n t o r m a t i o n . ~ "

71.17' .. p 108I _19b, P 5


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,VOLUME , ~ Chapter 2

GERMAIf EXPLOITATIOIf OF RUSSIAN COMMUNICA'l'IONS

Methods and Results ot German Traftic Analysis . . . . . . .Russlun Radl0 Procedure. Special Traffic Characteristics.

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~ a ~ T a P h ff-:(5 & 6 ~ t

Gernaan Monitoring and Analysis ot Russian Naval Trat t ic l ,

Air 'to Ground Traffic. .'. .10" (

Russian Air service Command Traffic. .11

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Advlutced W a r ~ g Reports and Route Tracking.

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. . . .. . . .Analysis ot Characteristic Messages.

Russian Air Rald Warning Service

German Use ot Captured Russian Materials

I n t ; ~ r c e p t ot Russian Radar Ruaslan Radio Counter Measures

Point to Point Wets.. Call Signs and Frequencies

'4. Russian Radio Procedure.--During the f1rst days ofthe Russian-German war the speed or the transmitting operatorsva:J very low, bu t as time vent on they developed their speeduntil at the end ot the war the average speed attained vas16 to 18 words per minute. On some ot the more importantpoint-. to-point radio nets, th e average speed vas 25 wordsper minute.99]7-187 I P 48


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. a. Procedure S i ~ a l S .......The International "Q" and "z"signal gl'oups vere u s e as procedure signals by the Russians.Th43 Germans assumed that' some of the Russian operators' hadbeen trained by the British because some well ...known Bri t ishab'breviations suoh, &S "ok", Hpsel!, "tor" , "tm ll , ntks", etc . ,otten were f'ound 1n t ra f f ic . Thezae was also & cer tain amount01' amateul' radio p:Etocedure used. In addition as a separator ,.between ca l l signs the Russians used both "de" and "a". The ' \ r . ' ~ : "l e t te r "I ' l l was used as a break between numbered groups inc1.pher text While a comma was used in clear-text messages.'NOI break sign vas used in the radio nets of h1gher headqUlarters, the onJ..1 1n41cation. of a bre8.k sign being a pauseat ter a word 01" code group had been completed. This was ,onered10 characteristic which a ~ d e d the German traff ic analystin identifying the traff ic or higher Russian headQ.uarters. 0

b . Radio Disc ip l ine . --'When Russ1e.n nets underwent callsjLgn changes 01 ' frequency changeS, the German in tercept operators had l i t t l e di f f icu l ty in identifying the nets since al , ~ c k of security in , t u on or ra dio s et s and check1ng o ff:requencies (known as "tuning") 1 n I ~ i a b l y permitted reoog-n.1 tioD ot the changes in the nets.,. 'security violations vere often committed when work shi f t svere changed. An excellent example or the type or informationthus made ava il ab le to the Germans is to be found in the fol lowing intercepted message . . ."This 1s Mishka:,hoY did you sleep? II"'We could not decode the third group in your message, number 25 of las t evening. II"You MUS t transDlitit again. H

=, ' 1 ~ h u s Mis):lka and h is re qu est not only gave the Ge1'JD8.D.8 th etdentity or the net but enabled them possibly to obtain apreViously intercepted message in a new key i f th e secondoperatorlsomplied with the request to re-transm1t theIl1essage. ."Some Russian: operators furnished the Germans with aI ~ o o d in sig ht in to Russian morale by Ilgriping" over the r a d ~ o .,iSome or the operators were so obliging as to inform other, ,operators of the neWlfrequency which they would beg in using, a t a specified t ime. , r. 'IOD-187, p 48llIF-187, p 4912IF - 181, p 491}IF-187 J P 49


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:Russ1an lapses in radio disc1pline otten led to, o b ta1n1ng by the Germans ot valuable intelligence. At onetime the scarcity of t raffic from a part of the Leningrad frontled th e Geman Signal Intelligence to think that the Russianswere planning a new offensive. The German Signal Intelligencealrsa,dl knew the identity of Air Combat units wh1ch were basedin that ar&a. Therefore, when .messages from the F1nn1sharea were intercepted conta in ing the names ot escadril leleads1rs and 1 n s ~ r u . c t i o n s for future operations" it was established by the G e ~ S 1 g n a l Intel11gence that those unitsf o ~ ) r l y located on the Leningrad front had moved to theKarel.ian front 1n Finland. This intell igence, which wassubsElquently proven correct, was obtained by the Germansalthclugh a oomplete change of cal l signs and frequeno1eshad l>een made by the Buss1ans .14 .

5. Special Traffic Charac te r is t ios .a. Call 81gns.--The tol10wlni fiitormat1on concerningwork which the Germans did on/the.Russian Call Sign Bookswas .1l r1 tten by uttz. (Non-oommissioned otf1cer) WilhelmHEIMJUlIf. The Russian Call .sign system,accord1ng to HEIMAmI,1s a c o n t ~ u a t i o n trom a preViously known system which theGel'Dllms had analyzed. The production ot the cal l s1gn bookswas 1by the same method as had been used w1th the older system,but the manner or selection of the cal l s1gns/by eno1phermentot the rad io stat ion basic numbers was d i t t e "n t and new.This la t ter method was almost identical to the system usedby.the Germans at ter l10vember 1944 when a l l the cal l sign8y8 tams used by the Germans were changed. ImIM.AJm thoughtperhaps the Russian method may have 1ntluenced the adopt1on

~ o r the same method by the Germans. one difference betweenthe tvo methods was that wh11e the Germans enoiphered a cal lsign. which was detel'Dl1ned by the enciphered basic rad108 t a t 1 o ~ number, the Russians merely used the enciphered basicnumbl8r to r de term' 01 ng directly the page I row, and column .in t,he cal l sign book where the new cal l sign would be totllld."Colllsequently", said HEIMAtm" "the German system 1s unbl'eak'ablE' without , say , captured data; the Russian is quite break ....ablE/ given suff1cient cal l signs and day-to-day continuity. "1514IIp_187, p 49.1 5 D ~ - 1 9 f , p 6.

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DOCID: 3633965When the Germans t i r s t began studying ' the Russian system ot call signs their purpose vas to establish the call s1gnboo}j:s or systems (-\Jtlterlagen) from which call s1gns were taken;the method ot selection ot the calls1gns trom the book; andthe var ious groups of call sign users. The objective ot theGer.tiDans in 'making the. study was to determ1ne, on the basis otthe call signs used, the character and composition of any

g i v t ~ n radio net; to identify in that net thevariou8 tOl'Ulations;and to maintain continuity throughout call sign changes.1o -The tollowing methods and results of this study are givenby :HEIMANN: .. l "Call Sign Systems. ,"There were found to be two tables (ditferen, otcall signs:"TPR 4;: a l i s t ot 1,200 words, the f i rs t threele t ters ot which vere used 1n keying t ra t f ic .. "Call Sign Books: each with 1,100 - 1,200 cal lsigns, which were compiled of le t ters and figures 1nsuch a manner that (excepting compi1erst errors) ident ical cal l signs could not occur."TPR 4, had. 16 pages" 74 call signs per page ..

diviQed into three groups, each ot 25 cal l signs.Each group had 5 lines, each with 5 call signs.(The above is based on captured documentsJtlA Call Sign Book contains 100 call. signs, in10 l ines with 10 columns, on each of i t s 11 or 12pages. ( c o ~ 1 r . m e d also by captured documents.), "Prom the numbering of captured documents the.approximate scope of this material can be estimatedat about 17 to'18 books. UP t i l l nov, about 12 orl}'books have 'been in use. Books were not compiledas complete books, but approximately 200 pages were

f irst compiled and then spl i t up into books. Each.page contains 96-call sign$ beginning with}2 ditfer- .ent characters, . ' call signs per character, and 4 cal lsigns beg1nnina-w1th 2 other characters, 2 call signsper charactel


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RUSSIAN' ENGLISH MORSE ~ U 6 S I A N ENGLISH MORSEA A n p .c ...Ei B P R -.0 El V -- (w) c s o r , G -- ' T '.1'.'.a D y 00 0r 3 E F~ F " ....11 ZH - (V) X KH eli)..

e 3 z ....- Lt '.1'8 ~ -.' Ce)~ ,1 4 OH ----.,.. ill (oJ,~ I (J ) SHH Ie -o- ut SHeH --.- (Q)11 bob B A ~ 6 (X)' ,- SOfT.. - : ....M bl SIG11r


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. "Do call signs began with E, Z, H, U, SHOH Q).anOt . The 34 characters, therefore , used asbeg1nners 1 . . e ~ , 1n;1tlal characters were:"A, B, V W)l G( D, ZH V, I, J, X, L, M, .,0, P, 5, T, Fl KH ( H)l, TS 0 ) , CH, SR, Y, X, IU,lA, 1" 2, " ~ 5, , 7, 8, 9., 'The unused beginners are obViously those likely tobe contused with Russian International Oal l Signs , operat-ing: signals, etc. '"Since the 34 beginners vould have yielded 3 x 34 :102 call signs, 2 beg1Dn&rs in rotation were selected tor o ~ m 2 cal l s1gns each.

r ,..J/ "The' affi l iat ion ot the books could thus be 1'ecog-nized by knowing which 2 in i t ia l characters OD each pagewere those limited to torm 2 cal l signs each.uTo keep check on the allocation ot cal l signs toindividual pages the compiler used a l i s t in which the 34, ini t ial characters each had ,two sheets" ont:t extend1ng tromA to 1'5 0 and the other trom ,OB to 9. 1ts ""The compiler" having dei!ved the call sign, Bay AM,ent,ered , i t in any position on the page which vas then apportioned to one at the 17 or 18 books. The designation ot i tsloc,ation, in terms at page and coordinates on that page,e.'a:., page 07, coordinates 23,19 vere then entered in thespace to r AAA. Some' pages would then appeal' diagonally~ a d ~ a c e n t ' 2 W h 1 1 e others would be vertically or horizonta lly. ad J8.cent. 0 " ,"The printed text ot 11 or .12 pages was so arrangedthat two pages were printed on one side of a sheet at paper.Thus two pages were permanently associated."Atter some't1me these sheets, each or two pages, couldbe 'unbound and reshutfled so that a completely new arrangement 'ot books resulted. Reshuffl1ngs of this type tookplace a t the beginning at O O , t ~ b e r ,1944 and in the middleof :8ebruar-y 1945.' ." "Manner of Selection.", "PormatIons vorkingwith TPR 43 , especially trom thedlvtsion forvard, were allotted a page by the ch1etsignals18slge Figure' 1, p 16,19F:lgure 2, p 1:6- 1-..20 .P:Lgu:re 1, p 16

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oftJ.cer;. selection was made according to the individual 'stanc:y but often th e page vas usedl1ne by l ine. Suchstel'eotyped usage led to th e recognit ion of cal l signs. lt21b. Russian Secret Police Nets.--The High Command netsof the RU8sian 5ecret Police' ( N ~ ) " often ,including t h e 'netEl of regiments forward to b.a.ttalion, entered the cal l .S l ~ l selected from TPR 43 (ei ther consecutively or a t random)in JLO x 10 squares (100 cal l signs). By means of dailychanging digi t coordinates for the squares i tw&spossibleto lssue a maximum of 100 cal l signs to a radio stat ionpro"ldedvi th a 2-dlgi t basic number.' This system vas validfor three months. _For example, consider a radio station with th e basicn:um1)er ,31. :rhe cal l sign for the f i r s t day is SHOP. Thecal l sign for the 8 e ~ ~ n d day 1s NASH, and the c a l ~ s lgn to r

'. the 96th day is STA.For enciphering the 10's digits of the radio stationbas:lc numberthel'e were 6 vert ical coordinate columns andfor enciphering the lOs digits th$re vere 6 horizontalcoo:rdinate rows, thus yielding 6 x 6 = ,6 possible encipherments.per month. ' The columns and roWs chtDged monthly; thecontents of the square changed quarterly.23 .. .. , c. Air Force Ground Nets. --The nets of the Air ForceGround areas (RAB) entered the call s ign selec ted consecutively from TPR 4-} -i n simllar _squares and .then used thesesquares, l ine by l ine, for 31 days. For the RAB which usedthis procedure ~ ~ same cal l sign and meaning recurred everycalenda.r month.For radio stations with call sign books ' -d ig i t radiostation numb&rs vere is sued . Thus up to 1,,000 stations -couldmake a daily change or cal l signs by means or one cal l signbook. The' basic radio stat ion number was changed dally by .enc1pher1i1g' i t by means of a simple substitution tablewhich would then give the page in the cal l sign book; thevert ical coordinat.o l and the horizontal coordinate. Theint,ersection of ~ h e s ~ 6 c o o r d 1 n a t e s would. t ~ e n indicate t h dally c ~ l l sign. "~ 1 J : - 1 9 f , -p 222j?1gure 3 .23JC-19f, P 3 .24:r_19f, p 3251rlgure 42 6 J ~ 1 g u r e 3

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x PRONOUN' ABLE. . l'YPE. CIfLL GENERAL.t.Y T Pit -+3

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DAYOFMONTH

PAGE OF TPR 4, CALL SIGN BOOKDAY OF MONTH

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2 17 96 :3 1 9 .8 561 8 ,1 7 9 1 7, 48 10 7 , 5 1 99 5 6 BAC PAL DOM SOM 3 1 POM TUR SHUF LEN ,4 7 ,.j M03 STA YOS BOL5 6 9 WO:J.; NKT, 2

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Figure 31. Find day ot month in 6 x '6 square in upper le t t handcorner.2. Locate f i r s t digi t (lO's) of basic 'station number invertical c o l ~ in which day of month 1s located.

,3. Locate second digi t ( I tsl , in h o r 1 z o n t ~ 1 row in which day0'

of month 1s located . 4. Intersection of these coordinates g ives call sign.

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SUBSTITUTION TABLE FOR BASIC STATION NUMBER

I) igl ts ot basic radio t= ~ U o n numbe, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9lOa's digi t substitution 5 7 2 6 'si 8 1 3 9 4lOts digj..t substitution 6 4 5 2 1 3 rJ 8 9 1l ' s digit substitution 2 8 4 6 $I 7 5 , 1 9Figure 41. Locate digits of bas ic radio station number a t top.2. Substitution tor digit Vil1 be found in column under-

neath each digi t aooording to 100's, 10's, or 1'8position.EXAMPLE:., ; -'.,' ..3. Radiostatlon basic number: 587S U b s t ~ t u t i o n t o r ' ~ r i r s t digi t (5) in lOQ"th'

...... . .. ~ '. -position is "8'\.Substitution for seoond digit (8 ) in 10's

position is ."911 Substitution tor third digi t (7 ) 1n l is

position i8"3 11 Enciphered number is therefore 893 and g1ves-:

8 =page or book9 =vertioal coordinate3 =horizontal ooordinate.

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\.The rows ot 10 dig1ts used 1nthe substitution table (seeFigure 4) were taken from a large table of 100 rovs which werederived by cycl ical subst i tut ion trom 11 basic rows. !he threerowa ot digi ts to be selected dailY were found from a tablewhich vas valid to r three months. This table consisted ot a.. column indicating the day ot the month. Opposite each da1 atthe month were three columns. In each column vas the number orthe row ~ h 1 c h was. to be selected trom'the la rg e ta ble ot 100 .rows. The, table was 9 columns wide: the first, columns des ignat ingthe f i r s t month; the second 3 columns the second

mon.th; and the l as t 3 columns the th ird month. Tbe arrangemen.t vas such that in anyone column no row ot the 100 rov .table vas r epea ted d u r ~ t ~ three months effect ive period.27" d . Groups of Call Sign Users. --The Genera lS ta t t radionet,s used their own ca l l sign book up t i l l , about February 1945.Aft.er this date th e ca l l sign book vas not ident if ied by theGermans in other t ra f ' f1c .The High Command n e t a : l . e . , the:


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ver-y ..;e11 and were able to make predictions which were rel iable.At thEt beginning of July 1944 the Russian radio nets maintained,rad10 silence for seven weeks preceding th e Russian offensivewhich took place in the late summer . When radio AI!lence vas1ittelo a ll th e Russian call sign systems had been changed. Fromthat time on i t was very difficult tor the Germans' to have muchsuccess with the call sign systems. However by th e end at May f )at 1945 HEUDORF s t a ~ ~ d that good progress had been made in=--Isolv1ng the system. I.) , . '

. t . F ive other German prisoners, Sgts. E r i c ~ KARRENBERG,Dietx1ich S U S C H O W K ~ SCHMITZ, HEMPEL" and Corp. GRUBLER.. describedthe technique used by the Qe!.'1'll8DS 1n identifying rad10 stationsin the People's Commissariat to r River Shipping (NKRF). ~ h e y ,stated t h e ~ had no particular diff iculty in locating the. stations

f1About 50'; ot the messages are not sent directtrom ~ h station ot th e sender to the recipient butare passed on, in some cases by way of three or fourstations. For example.9 suppose tha t 5a1'atov (RBtJU)has some urgent messages to r Moscoy (RaFO). But thenext t raffic time between Saratov and Moscow is notunti l two hours la ter . However,' 5aratov h a traf"fica t that moment with Ku1beshev (RBFR) and knovs thatbecause of i t s t raf f ic s c h e d u l e ~ i b e s h e v wil l beworking with Moscow immed:1.ately after i t has fin1shedw:1.th Saratov. So Saratov f}ends i:ts messages to RB1


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with th e "ca ll sign s and places which come up w1ththem. For example:RBUU GORBAOEW SARATOV OE,OERINOEOERIN GORBAOEW."If one has at least two names which cOme up together one can say certa.inly that t ~ cal l signand locatlonhave been identified. One name aloneis not sufficient for identification, as in a, large net there might easily be people,w!th thesame name working a t different places. I .g. German personnel working on identifIcation of Russian

call signs, stations, and nets kept elaborate card indexes whichcOlO-tained a l l known and unknown call s igns p1ckedup on th e .en"tire Eastern front. These cards showed whether" and in whatc ~ n n e c t I o n , the call sign had previously appeared. A covername index was also kept Which contained a l l the cover namesthat had been collected, and indicated the source and date otoccurrence. With the ass is tance of these card indexes almostc o m p l e t e ~ c o v e r name tables for th e Russian fronts v e ~ e r e covered ......2h. The cal l signs of a l l Russian ground stations were1'J1&deup or three characters, either or letters, or le t ters andflgures. An exception vas the fixed 4 -l et te r c al l sign usedon several transport nets. For the greater par t, the call signsWE,re taken from a call sign book used by the Russian Army a t te rA])rl1. 1944.To form the oall signs a ll the le t ters and the dig1ts trom1 to 9 were used." However as the case with the book TPR 43the le t ters E, Z R, U, SHCHQ)) were not used a8 the f i rs telement of the cal l sign. Eaoh page of th e book contained1,,000 cal l signs. These oall signs were changed at irregular1:ntervals, sometimes daily and at othert1m.es at longer periods.When units and headquarters moved, &sutf'lx was added to thecal l signs of th e various eQhe1ons. Tllus, "BEM"--rear echelon;. 1 1 B E M - l ' ~ - - a d v a n c e d echelon.:;:>Call signs used by the Russian Army, Air F o r c e s ~ and th e311- 168, P 7;)21F-187, p 2: ~ 3 " I F - 1 8 7 , p,50

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Russian Secret Police (NKVD)34 down to divis ion nets had th egener's.l form ot "XXB", where X could represent any le t ter ot, the Ii'oman alphabet 01 ' any digi t trom 1-9 (o not being used)"while: B could onl, represent a letter.. Letters ot the Russian~ l p h e l b e t such as 'IAn ( . - . - ) , flIU"( - - ) , I1CH"(---.), and ! 'SHe ._--} vere omitted tor th e purposeot camouflage since t.,:Y,.. ,:thoSEl l e t t e ~ s only appeared in Russian morse t raf t ic and thU8call signs employing those morse characters would be recog- .. . ,nizeCi immediately as being Russian . S1mill ar ly .O was not used's i n c E ~ the Russian operator always used th e a b b r e v l a t ~ d tOl'JD .(.-) l1hich would have contused i t with the le t ter 'l'.':>;' ., 'The cal l signs were taken from a call sign book cODslst1ngof 26 pages, each page containing 35 x }5 or 1,225 ,items (the

2 6 1 E ~ t t e r s of the roman alphabet plus the digits 1-9) . Thelast element or the unenciphered station call sign indicatedth e page of the book (the 26 :{>ages corresponding to the 26 'le t ters of the roman alphabet)'; "the f i rs t elementot th e cal l ..s ign indicated th e horlzontalrov of the desIgnated page; andth e second element i nd icated the vertIcal column. Call sIgnsb e g 1 1 ~ 1 n g With 'iSHCH (Q,)" or"Z" were not used, as these mightbe confused'with the procedure signals o f the InternatIonalQ or Z code. One call aign block was kept tor long periods .of t.1me, apparently tor a year in most cases. I t was assumedby the Germans that un!ts of the Army, Air Force and th eSecret Police (NKVD) a l l took their call signs trom oneblock, to r by this means the simultaneous appearance of thesame cal l sign at different places vas most easily avoided.Units Which appeared in regimental nets down used .call signsof the general form !lBBB" in which "a" represented any le t ter ., of t,he'Russian alphabet. These cal l signs were ' f o ~ e d from .the cover name allotted to the units. If , for instance, a34The R u s ~ i a n 8 e ~ r e t police (NKVD) worked in conjUnotion w1thth e Russian Armed Forces. The functions of the N.KVD frontiertroClps 'W(I:;" as follows:a. Arrest of Army deserters. .b. Prevention of inf11tration by enemy groups intorearareas.c. Location and arrest of enemy agent's dropped in rearareas.\ d. Evacuation of civilians from batt le zones.e. ,Superv!s1onof railroad t raffic; guarding of railroadlines, traff1c routt;;9" bridges and industrial plants;

close search 01' forests and Villages for deser te rsand enemy agents.351_17" p 21

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unit was allotted theoover name "SVJEZDAfl ' to r a certain time,1 t w'ould, use th e cal l signs SVE, 8ZA, 8ED.. etc. " in i ts rad10traf'f1c. No changes might be made ' in the sequence at thele t ters . Oal l s igns were chosen so that no contusion wasPOsEl1ble. These cal l s 1 g n , ~ wel'"e changed at inteFvals of oneday to a week" and occasionally were changed a t the aame t1mea new cFyptogFaphic system was placed 1net tect . However" therew e r l ~ exceptions to the above use of' call signs. From time totime i t was observed by th e German opeFators and traf'fioa n a l y s t ~ that some Fadio stations appeared whose gall signsva.ried trom each other only ba: the addit ion of a ~ ~ ; p i + . I tthese stations belonged to alv1810n or hIghe r ee elon,tbenthey were a l l in the' same unit" bu.t i t the cal l s1gns a p p e & 1 ' ~ d .in a small unit th e stations belonged. to ,individual urcl ' iAi ' :taIllks, etc36 in communication w1tha ground statIon, leadtank, etc. . . .The call signs ot a tew ot the higher Secret Po11Qe(NKVD)unj. ts , and ot the nets of the "Artillel'Y Reserve of the SupremeCOllomandtlwere, in some cases, made up ot four eleinents . Thesew e J ~ not taken from call s1gn blocks nol' f'or.med from covernames. In a ll internal state traff ic of t he People's Commis-sariat ~ t e r . n a t i o n a l call signs were used.37 . .

i . Cover Names.--Oover names (simple in nature) wereused frequently by the Russian military torces to covel' orcamouflage the '-dent1ty' ot units, looations, propel' names,airfields, etc. , and' could be tound in various positions inmessages. EXe.IlWaeS of cover names which were common vere'ROSA and kUBm.:? . .The German Signal Intelligence Regiment}S}, vhioh was onth e Russian Northern front, reported i t was easy to solve thes j ~ l e code cover name system used by a l l thea1r units intllat sector. Each a ir division had a code name which changedth1'ee times 8. month. Regiments used the basic divisional coden J ~ e plus a figure suffiX, the lowest regimental number havingthe lowest suffix. Aircl'att had a basic code name accordingto type to which would be added thel'eg1mental s u f . f 1 \ . ~ , andeither a number or the pilot 's name to indioate theindi"v1dual)16I - 173, p 21:)71- 173, p 21~ ; 8 I F - 1 8 1 , p 50

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a 1 1 ' c J ~ a f t . Ground ,control stations with the' armies 1n ,thet ield.also had a bas; code name with figure,suff1xes to rsubs:Ldlary stations. .j . Proper Names.--Theuse a t proper names o t t e ~ ledto the identity ot particular Russian traff ic. statementsof the capture of German pr1soners, communiques, and. pressrepor ts o ft en served to confirm identifications wh1chthe\, Germans 'had previously made. Air base depots and a1rf1eldbattal10nsused the names ot unit commanders tnthe ' clearas 8 i s1gnature to messages or put48henames in th e actualmessage content in plainlanguage. . 'k. P r e a m b l e s . - ~ M e s s a g e s ot the Ant1aircraft Defense(Pr


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The successes on th e Southern front and the informationgained from sources other than cryptanalysis may be 8UDm1ed upB,S 1'ollovs:

8. KnOWledge of tl:1e Russian a ir si tuat lon. b . Knowledge of the organization and order of batt le of'Russ ian Air Armies. .c. Knowledge. of. th e s tr ength o f Russian units inclUdingtype.s and armament of aircraf t .d. KnOWledge of the location and occupation of a l ~ f 1 e l d 8 .e. KnOWledge of th e movements arid concentrations ofRussian a ir and ground units .t . Knowledge ot operational intentions.g. Knowledge ot the. &mount and type ot a i r transport .h. Knowledge ot th e supply si tuat ion.i . KnOWledge ot probable targets . 44Interroga t10n of members of th e German ArmY Kona No. 1(Kommandeur del' Kachrichten Aufk1aerUng 1) brotight to l ightsome important f 'acts concerning German successes in analyzingintercepted Russian t raff ic . 45 Kana 1 vas engaged in the.interception. analysis and evaluation of th e Russ1an biD:,.,A.ir, and Secret Po11ce.(NKVD) t raff ic on tlle southern half' oft.he Russian 1"ront from June 1941 un t i l May 1945. The Germans.were able to. obtain, as a result of . th1s v o r k , ~ c c u .' ~ p 1 c ture of the Russian order of batt le. They were ab e o t t e J } t l m e a ~to predict th e time and l ocat ion o f impending ussian oten- 'sives in sufficient time to be able to take advantage of suchInf 'ormation. rThese resul ts vere aohieved more by the close.interrogation or a l l available sources of information( t raff io analysis, evaluation, priscner of' war interrogation,captured doouments, eto.) than by reading of' enciphered orencoded t r a f ~ However, there was considerable ot the .B:ussia.n low an medium grade t raff ic read. In th e oerman/.rommand organiza t ion th ere e xis te d considerable rivalrybetween th e oryptana1y t ic and t raff ic analysis personnelon the relat ive merits of their respective units. Thisf 'act appea rs to have created defini te disturbances as towhich of th e two units was the most valuable source of in -t el li gence t o the German High Command . I t seems, f'romtheoverall p i o ~ u r e presented by the interrogation ot Germanpersonnel of the two'unita, that to the German'Signal I n t e l l -genoe the r e s p " e _ c - t . 1 Y . e - - Y . a l u e - o L . . t r , ~ n - 1 o MA.1ya1a and ot_c. '. . -a.n-a1:1if!s vas about three to one. This Is due to tv o factors

44IF-186, p 4945I-l9b, p 121

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a. The general unreadability :r Russian high gl'$de / 'traff ic because of the extensive use of ane-time ' 'pad systems. "b. The large amount of information that could be e ~ tracted from the generally low standard ~ Russianradio and cipher securitYJ especially in respect tthe use ot call signs and radio frequencies andindicators.4-b , 'Russian security, trom a cryptanalytic angle, was basedialmost entirely on the use of one-time pad systems for highlevel traff ic and the use ot a large number or code bookS,and enciphering tables for medium and low level traff ic. 47" The main source of information to the t raffic analystcame from the Russian use of call signs and indicator groups,and from s,tereot'Yped direction-finding reports. On t,he bas1sot this information the German traff ic analystaestablished adetalledand accurate order 01' battle of the Russian forcesoperating on the e n t ~ r e E asterntront. In addition the,-also gained 1 n o r m a t i ~ n concerning Russian operational move-ments and intentions. , , ,The Russians had a habit of u s the surnames ot o t ~ l 1'8and Pilots J, for code and cover names. This vas especiallyin the AJ.r Rorce. This type of information was c o n s ~ d e r e d eryvaluable by th e Germans. .Q,uite often 'the information provided by the German SignalIntelligence units to the various Gel'D18Jl c o m b a t ~ U n 1 t s went un-heeded. For example, in the fal l of 1941, when iRe, GeX'IDaDS .were attempting to e t ~ e c t ,a junction w1th th e Finns a t T1chvtn, certain radio characteristics appeared in interceptedRussian traff ic Which had been noticed two weeks previouslyin , t raffic emanating from Siberia. This fact was evaluated bythe German Signal Intelligence &s a n ~ d i c a t i o n that RUB siantroops had been transferred in this short interval tromSiberia to the sector north of Tichvin. The German Commandmaintained that such a thing was imposs1ble,and thereforedid not talee any evasive action. Consequently, the Russiansattacked in great to rce and won a 'decided Victory. The461-19.6, p 147I -19b" P 1481- 19b" P 19

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junct i10nwlth the Finns never took place. The railroad between : L e ~ r a d and Moscow was l iberated by the Russians andthe Germans were f o r c ~ d to take up posi t ions on the Volchovfront leaving the 11 hedgehog I' redoubt a t Demyansk to i t s f'ate. 49A clar i f ica t ion ot the working organization ot the RussianAir Force is adv is ab le b efor e con sid er ing th e weak points inthe i r tItansmission s e c u r i t y ~ The Air Forces vere an in tegralpar t or the Russian Army. The ir operat ions were c o n t ~ e d pr i marily to the tac t ica l a i r support of ground operations. DuritJE.operat ions actual command was by the ground force commanders,with the a ir commanders act ing in an advisory capacity and having sole responsibi l i ty to r the successful execution ot missions.The structure of , th e Sov iet Air organization emphasizes it asan instrument of the Army. or some 12,000 Russian ai rcraf tident i f ied by the German Luftwaffe Signal Intel l igence duringthe war (not counting l o n g ~ r a n g e bombers which vere ina separate organizat ion) almost 10,000" or more than 8 ~ vere f ightersand t ighter bombers. The remainder were bombers and operatedmainly against t ron t - l ine targets . At the end ot the val'there were 11 Russian Air Al'Dl1es operat ing on the Eastern t ront .These vere, from south to north, the 1 7th, 5th , 8th, 2nd, 6th .16th" 4th, 1st" 3rd" 15th" and 7th Air Army. One Air Armywas assigned to each Army Group to which it vas operationallys u b o r d 1 n a t e ~ and was then subdivided into Corps, Divisions"R e g 1 m e ' ~ t s J and Escadri l les . Each A ir Army had two to e ightCorps, according to the importance ot i t s work. At f i r s tthese corps were mixed t ighter , fighter-bomber, and bomberuni t s . During the war, however, there vas a tendency tochange these mixed uni ts 1.nto unifol'Dl corps, and by the endof thElwar there was only one mixed corps l e t t on th e Eastf ront : the VI Corps. Each, corps vas made up of tvo to threed1v is j. on s; e ach d1vis10n or two o r three regiments; and eachregimElnt of three escadr i l les . Reconnaissance and ar t i l l e ryobser'\ration a 1 : r c r a f t ~ as ve l l as ti:t&nsport uni t s , were some"';times organized into escadri l les" but usually they were reg i ments and vere direc t ly subordinate to the Air Ar'af3. EachAir A l also had one reconnaissance and one a r t i l l e ~ ob- Iservatiion regiment. In areas "here preparations tO,r a conc e n t r ~ ~ t e d at tack were being carr ied out the Air Armies wereof ten rein forced by one or more of these regiments. Bynoting such re1ntorcements the Germans could recognize, att1meS ll the 1I1tentions and probable plens of the Russians. 5049 IF - JL86, p 1650, IF-187" P 9

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COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF GERMAN AND ALI:IED FORCES j" IGERMAN AMERICAN BRITISH , RUSSIAN ist,atrel Flight Flight . Escadr1lle Ii9-12 planes 8-12 planes 8-12 planes 8-10 planes IGruppe Squadron Squadron l'Ceg1JDent.(3 Staffeln) 20-}0 planes 20-:,}0 planes about ,0 planes27-'0 planes

,

i e ~ s c h v a d e r Group Wing~ Gruppen) 70-90 planes 70-90 planes

~ ( ) - 9 0 planes D1v1sion (2 or 3Regiments, u 8 u a l l ~~ J L 1 e f - J a f ' l i Wing 3) 60-150 planes(2 Geschwader) 2l0-}60~ b o u t 160 planes -!planes Group (num-ber of planes~ l i e g e r - depend on ' ,Division mission)I\bout 320 Command (2 orlanes Corps (2 or :3ore wings) , ,700-1#500 'Divisions) 120-i'11egerKorps planes 450 planes(2 or 3Dlv1sions) , -A,bout 600-900 ' . Iplanes

,

I.,uf'tflotte Air Force ColDZllB.nd or A 1 Arm.1TacticalAir Force ,-F1gure 5 :J.I.

t51IF-1811 p 9a24

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Lt. Werner RASCH, of the 353rd German Air Force SignalIntelligence Regiment in th e East, gives the fol loving accountot the development and achievementsoot the Russian Long RangeB o m b c ~ r Forces (ADD--Av1tsiya D a l n e ~ e Dyestjviya)."Soon after th e outbreak of the Russian-German .war, practically a l l o t th e Russian Long Range BomberPorce was destroyed, either by German attacks onRussian airf ields, or in combat with Geman fighters.What was l e t t of i t was withdrawn from action. Marshall GOLOVANOV, chief of ADD, reorganized his forcesw ith the intention of using them in night o p e r a ~ i o n s

only, owing to th e threat presented by the strongGerman f'lak def'ense. The f 'irst successtul operationsfollowing the reorganization took place in the batt leof Stalingrad september 1942 - February 194,.From then on, ADD operations played an important partin a ll Russian ottens1ves The t ra in ing for nightoperations was of' long duration; a t the end of' thewar each bomber reg1ment had crevs .which vere s t i l la training status. ."The achievements of' th e ADD units were not -very impress!ve Crews were not trained to r carrying out' night attacks in close formation. In thela t ter days of the war 60 aircraft of a divisionneed apprOXimately one hour to assemble and takeoff, and even this was accomplished only- under themost favorable naVigational and meteorologicalconditions. In planning an attack, each divisionwas allotted 20 minutes over the target; in thattime i t was intended that a ll aircraft or one divisionshould have completed their mission and moved out tomake room for the next division. Unless targets onthe front i tsel f were being raided, the front linewas usually crossed before dark. This permitted the -take,:"oft to be made during daylight, and the f i rs t aircraft to take oft were held in an assembly area in ordel'that a close-flying formation be formed. Formationsequipped with radio-telephone communications-vere again brought into c lose o rder by t he l eadingaircraft of the regiments before g o into thebomb run. Each regiment had several P a t ~ 1 n d e r air- .craft , which w e r ~ flown by the most experienced crevs .since t he success ot the mission depended upon the1refforts. In addition to t h e 1 ~ t lares , they usuallycarried a 1,,000 pound bomb."5

25 -

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" 7. P oin t-to -P oin t Nets. --These p o 1 n t - t o - p o i n t n o t ~ ,at theL O I ~ Range Boiber Forces (ADD) alone vere a 'suff ic ient basison Which the Germans could build up an accurate picture otthe ADD organization. When the 18th Russian A 1 Army,vasreorgaIlized the Germans immediately recognized such stepsfrom t ra f f ic on these nets . ' The most profi table -traffict h t ~ s e neta" from an i n t e l l i g e ~ c e standpoint, came from unitswh:lch were widely separated in the f ield as this necessitatedth e use of radio faci l i t ies for communication. In instanceswhere the units Yere c lo se t ogethe r very l i t t l e s1gnalintelligence could be gained sin ce th er e was sl ight need to rr ~ ~ i o transmissions.From the in tercept and analysis 'or t ra f f ic on thesepo:tnt-to-point nets .. movements ot the Russian Air Army uni ts ,10lcationsand occupations of air f ie lds" numbers 01' operationalanld u , n o p e r ~ t l o n a l aircraf t" and locations 01' supply dumpscould be determined. Traffic intercepted-on these' netsalso gave-the G e ~ s considerable inrormat10n regarding1ntended operations and offensives. One outstanding successalong this 1 1 n ~ occurred when a Russian order to bomber un1"tsvas intercepted by the Germans. The message ordered anattack on Shavli" Lithuania .. Where an ent i re German PanzerArmy w&stmmobilized due to a lack of suff icient fuel . 'The GerD1811 Signal Intell igence Service reported the'!n.formationto the Luf t t lo t te which'prov1ded f ighters to meetthe Russ1a.n Long R$llge BOlnbers while German JU 52' s droppedge,Boline supp11es to ,the encircled Panzer Amy and enabledit to escape. 5}

'8 . , Call 5 1 ~ S and FreCluenc1es. --Three-character ca l lslgns were used. the 1'8410 nets oetween the Air A1!mY andi t s Corps. They, were changed once during the day and once~ & . . . J l 1 g h t .. a t which time the frequencies also were changed.I Call signs were based on an arbitrary eombination,ot l e t te rs& I digi ts and ~ e r e selected from a cal l s i g n ~ s t t h a t ,changed monthlL} The ~ ~ ~ = w . e r - e ; ~ \ U l ~ b l . e . - t . o ; ; . . A e . , t ~ r m 1 n ewhe ther ' ~ 1 i . f f Y _ g ~ . t 1 n U : e : : : : S : Y . B < t e m = w a a - e m p J . . ~ e Q . . . . . . C Q - l ' the_choosing'

o j the ~ . c a l l ~ . 8 j , g a s - . - ' P f t e r d ' t " d - n " O t : j : c & , t = b & W E l.a r . . . . - ~ ~ ~ t - d u r 1 n gt : h E r ~ c c i u r s e o ta month a ca l l a1gn..uaad-b.N_a_ given rad10 stat ionm j l : g h t - - ~ 7 e ~ e . c C . i I i f i i o u . t - t . h e - s . u c . c _ e . s A i ~ n )..gL..


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of cal l signs, but onf1xed t r e q u e n c 1 e s ~ Th1s tacta1ded theintercept tasks of the German S1gnal Intelligence. Frequenciesused 'were in the 2,SOO-5,OOOkilocyc.le band: i . e . , the n o r ~ a lRussian military frequency band. The. call sign systems and thetime of change differed from corps to corps as there was noover-all unificat10n 1n their communication systems,'. andtJ1isfact vas a great aid to the German Signal Intel11gence in .ident1fying th e various units. Each. radio l ink had' tv o dif feren.ttz-equenclesfor use during the day and tvodl t terentfrequ.encies for use a t night. The night frequencies lay inthe 3,400-4,509 kilocycle band; the day frequencies betweenthe 5 , O O O ~ 8 , o o o kilocycle band. As the seasons or the yearadvanced. the day f r e q y ~ n C l e S gracluallymoved up t o a maxImumof 10,000 kUocycles. ' . . . ' .

9. Analysis ' of ChB;racterist ic Messages.-- ,a. Address and Signature Groups. - - Five-figUre messagesof the Russian Long Range Bomber u n 1 t s ~ o u l d not be deer1ptedb t the German Signal Intelligence Jervice but they vere ableto extract a great deal ot important information from th eanalysis9t data found i n the message numbers and deliverygroUl)S. n these messages the s i ture ou vas next. tothe l as t one ess e . .' s s gna ure. g r b u ~ J w a s constant and served to identify the headquarters otthe originator', each headquarters having a ~ . d 1 g i t d e B l g r i a "t i ~ m .. '. Two zeros inserted 1n t ront o f the 3-d1git s1gnaturedesignation completed the S--tigure group. Since no or.herRusslan 5-t1gure t raffic contained similar eroups, this signa>ture vas the most essential cha.racteristic tor the identif ication ot the traf 'f ic of the Long Range Bombers. The t ra t f"lc ",as fu rthe r iden t if ied by two address groups containedin th e preamble of the messages. These address groups werelike,,1:se ' - d ig i t groups, repea 'ted periodically, oneot themdes igna ting the unit and the other the section . In front . .of the add-ress group appeared the symbol ."ADR" ( a d d r e s s ) ~ In f'J:,ont of the signature group appeared the symbol "SIG" .55b. Pre-arranged Message Forms. -- A very valuable sourceot intelligence vas found.in the,pre-arransed m e a s a ~ e to;:SWhich all , the ..Lorig Range Bomber unIts Ve e e uGer to s_ . _to theircomman ges contained data on regimentalr e p ~ ~ t s ot l oca tions, s tr ength, and aircraft serviceabil i ty.One i ~ y p e . ot these pre-arranged message,rorms was "Form 1":a d811)' report sent by d iv is ion to corps, contAining ~ e g 1 m e n t a l 54IF 187 p J7'S5IF 187 p ~ )

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strengths in personnel and a i rcra t t . The text of the messages consisted of unenciphered numbers preceeded by a 2d i g ~ t nul l , r es ul ti ng i n a tour or f ive digi t croup. ,Thefollowing i s an example ot such a messa.ge.

n122}8 1.350 14.36 0... .. o. 2.3.32 2430 2502 2629 2728 .'2801 2903 3002 3101." .Atter removing the f i r s t two nulls of each group the messagecan b,e i n t e ~ p r e t e d as follows: (12)2}8 indicates the designat ion ,of the regiment Whose strength i s being reported: 1 .e . , .the 2 : ~ 8 t h . Regiment. The second group (13)50 conta.1ns data onp e r 6 ~ ~ e l strengtb--the deta i ls ofwh1ch were never defini telydeterln:tned by the Germans. The l a s t nine groups (2332 thl'ough'3101) re ter to ai rcraf t strength and must be read in unitsof tml'ee groups. Atteragain removing the tvo nulls of eachgZ"ouP., the . f i r s t gives to ta l number o:f.planes; theseoondgroup' the number of se rv iceable p lanes ; and the third grOUfthe mnnber of unserviceab le planes. In th is c as e (23)32, 2 4 ) 3 ~( 2 5 ) 0 ~ ~ i nd ic at es t he re is . 32 planes to ta l ; 30 serViceable, and02 ,plnnes unserviceable. The second unit of three groups.( i . e . J' groups 2629" 2728, & 2801) indioate the to ta l numberof a1J:-cratt on an ai r f ie ld , '. and the number of' serViceableand wlsel'viceable planes. In th is case" there are a t o t a l o t29 p l ~ m e s , ot which 28 are serviceable and 1 unserviceable.The lns t three groups ( l . e . , 2903, }002, and 3101) re ter to:reg1metntal aircJ'a.rt which had landed a t other ai r f ie lds 0In th is case, a to ta l of 3 planes, o:f which 2 are serViceableand 1 unserviceable. 'J.nother pre':'a.rranged message form, known as "Porm 4,"was sent every f i f th day by division to corps, and by corpsto Air' Army. Here again the ' t ex t 01' the message conais tedot nUDlbers in the clear s l ight ly camouflaged by a two-digitnull 1.n t ront of each group. An example is .as f o l l o w ~ : '

tl'22250 .3246 421442685 5229 6203 7240 1219 tt

B aga.in removing the two nul ls of' each g roup the messagesgives the following information:

(22)250 (32)46 (42)14 (42)685 \"52)29 (62)03 (72)40 (12)19.Message being reported by the 250th Regiment; located a t 46,. a grid. system o f coo rd inat es .not tcod1tt1cult to solve ( th issystem. changed montnlY)i l4 ai rcraf t type; 685 serviceableai rcraf t ; 29 ai rcraf t unserviceable; 03 and 40 give detaUs

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_ot personnel strength which the Germans never could tu l lyunderstand. The l as t group "lY" indicates the number ot

c r E ~ ' W S ready fo r operations. .The tvo types of pre-arranged message forms given aboveveX'e the' two main sou rces o f information to r the Ge1"'1D8Jl 'S1gnal Intell igence in gai n1ng in to rma tl on o f th e organlzati1on, order ot bat t le , locati()n, and ai rcraf t strength ofthe R u s ~ i a n Long Range Bomber Forces.56 ., c. Operations Reports . - Reports 'o f resul ts ot opera- .,,,,,'"t ions were also sent by' C'01'pS to Ail' Artmyby pre-arranged: " ',,' ..message forms. These messages contained deta i ls as to thenumber of a irc: ra f' t ta.king par t in an at tack, the target , timean.d al t i tude oveI' tre target , weight of bombs dX'opped accord-ing to type, resul ts observed by fllng personnel, deta i lsof' German defenses , d e t a i l s of Russian losses , and observa-t1.ons ot weather condit1ons. Quite of'ten messages tromc()rps tp division containing operat ional orders were alsoi n ~ e r c e p t e d . T h e s e messages contained deta i ls as to thetarget , ' the time of' at tack, and th e al t i tude ot at tack, andorten afforded ample time to r German counter-measures to be .e j ~ r e c t e d . The division also reported to corps thenwnber ora t l ' c ra f t to part icipate in the a.ttack, as well aa the time of't/ue-ott. This information provided the Ge rmana with avaluable ,and re l iable basis f"or r o u t e - t r a c k i n g . ' ~ ' .d. . :Airt1eld Serviceabi li ty ' Reports. - - Corps were requiredt,o make daily reports (:m th e serviceabil i ty of" ai r f ie ldsbeing used by thei! ' regiments 'and divis ions. Airfield , . ' . , . . . ,".locat ions were given by using a 6 - d i g i t g I ' i d r e r ~ r e n o e system.The serviceabi11ty was indicated by constant 4-f1guregroupsdesignating "serviceable," "par t ial ly servicea.ble, 11 and ,"unservicea.ble." These reports a ff ord ed th e German Air ForceSignal Intel l igencea.good picture ot Russian ai r f ie ld ,service-. a.bliity and ot any changes in location which might have taken,place. 'e . Orders for Use or NaVigat ional Aids;- -The headquar te s() ! the Air Army t r a n s ~ t t e d messages to subordlnate cOllllD&l1ds()rdering the use of navlgat1.onal aids for a par t icular d.y,. 'd:Lndic.at1ng th e type. of a,id to be used.', 'When these messageswere intercepted it couin be taken as a defini te indication ofis. forthcoming o p e r ~ t l o n , . , I f no messages were intercepte it.could 'be interpreted t h ~ g no at tack vas to be anticipated uringthat (lay or that night. .56IF-187,'P 3857IP ...187, P 4()~ ) 8 I P - 1 8 7 , p 40

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. 'f . Weather Messages.--Weather messages were of greata s s 1 ~ l t a n c e to the German S1gnal I n t e l l i g e . Q ~ e Service in Ident tying the geographical origin of other t ~ a ~ ~ l c intercepted 0the same ' radio nets. These weather messages often mentionedin the. clear the names and lo ca tions o f Russian meteorologics t ~ t 1 o n s . Thus probable location of the radio station couldbe I1ULde. ., ~ h R u s s i ~ vea-ther messages could be recognized easilybY,the German Signal Intelligence Service because of message,p r ~ ~ [ 1 b l e characteristics, by random use of the le t te r "X"w ~ , t h : ~ the text, and by th e absence ot message number anddell ' ,ery groups. In the early part of the war the RussianstranlJmit ted weather messages in the clear quite trequently.~ t e l r in the war a l l the messages were enciphered. ,A large number otRussian weather messages v e ~ e 1nterc e p ~ 4 3 d by the Germans. The conten,ts of these messages, when,decr;Pted , served tvo purposes. One purpose vas to brief th eGerman a ir crews on th e weather conditions in Russia; theothe:r purpose was to obtain advance warning of impendingRuss,1an operations. I f a nwinds alot t II message V&s in tercepted by th e Germans in the middle of the day, i t could betaken as an indication of an 'impending a ir operation by theRussian corps transmitting the message . 5 9 . , ,10. Air to Ground Traffic.--The assignment of cal l sgnsand frequencIes used In alr- to-ground radio t raf t ic of the 'Long Range Bomber forces was, performed individually by thecorps signal off icers and did notfQllow any uniformprocedu ethroughout the entire All' Army. ' I t vas there torea rather,simple task, because of this lack of uniformity, to r theGerman Signal Intelligence Service to ident lfythe variousindividual corps ~ their cal l signs and frequencies. Eachl'eg1,ment, as well as each aircraf t , vas al lot ted two differ tfreQ.uencies, ; one to r transmitting and one to r receiving.The aircraf t of each regiment vere diVided into two groups,each group transmitting on i t s own frequency. The frequencies or the ground stat ions, in general, lay between 2 , ~ 5 0 0and 3,000 kilocycles, while the t r e q ~ e n c i e s ot th e aircraf tverEt between 3,,000 and 3,700 kilocycles. The a i rc ra t to f tpe''iY ( J ~ u a r d s Corps of the 18th A ir Al'IIly, whose units were equipped with American B-25 planes" and, therefore had AJDer1.can '\r a d j ~ o sets,. used frequencies between 1,800 ~ 2,500 kl1o- ., cycles. Call signs on these air-to-ground nets remained 1nuse tor several months; th e various call signa being re- qpea1;ed a t irregular intervals of 5, 6 ,01 ' 7 d.'-ys. The, 5 9 D , ~ - 1 8 7 , p 41.,

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/'

regimental ground stations used 2-01 ' 3-le t ter call signs,while aircraft used 1-01 ' 2-1etter cal l s igns w ith numerical suf fi xe s. These suff ixes referred to the l lo t rather'. t to the a i r ' J an were a ocated by either theCOlllIDian g regiment o r commanding division. 'When th e suffixeswere allocated by th e commanding regiment the 'numbers of th esuffixes ran from 1 to 32; when alloca.ted by the commandingdivision they ran from 1 to 100. The German Signal Inte l l i genc,e Service could identify regiments arter a short periodo'f t.ime because they also used special CQ cal l signs. b,O&. Tuning and Take-orf Trarfic.--When the Russian bom-'bersl vere,assembling to r th e take-ofr on a mission the 811'craf ' tusual ly engaged in tuning t raf f ic while s t i l l on thegrol.llllo" and a t th e completion of tuning the t raf f ic wasusuBllly t e r ~ 1 n a t e d with a "QSA 4" or "QSA 5" procedureslgrlsl- indicating what the signal strength of the radio setin the aircraft vas. The tuning traffic furthermore was'transmitted by one of th e rrequencies al lot ted to r thispu:t'pose and vas easi ly intercepted by the Germans. Thus,th e beginning of an operation could be recognized immediately,because the end of th e , tuning t raf f ic indicated that th et a k E ~ - o f r vas to begin. In those divisions which had a ir ...'crat"t equipped with radio-telephone sets the noise of th eenglnes being warmed up could be heard by the German operatorl3, and this also $erved as an additional source of earlywarlling. In the radio-telephone t raf f ic , in stead of using 6the complete ca.ll sign, only the numerical suffix vas used. 1b.. Direction-finding Trarflc.--The naVigational t rainin g of the L o n 6 ~ a n g e B o i l i b e r Force crews vas so poor that

" C J ) J ~ " and "QDRbear ings oonstantly had to be ,given by thegrouno stations while th e plane s were enroute to the target .Thi:s fact a.ided the German Signal Intelligence Service inthe.1r route-tracking of th e Russian Air Force because the IRussians, in stead of flying feint courses as did the Americans and Brit ish, usually flew 8. direct .course to the target . Therefore, these direct ion-f ind ing f ixes sent by theground stat ions could be taken as t h ~ a c t u a l course of thebombers and permitted the Germans to make a reasonablyaccura.te target prediction. The direction-finding t raf f icbetween aircraf t and ground sta.tions did no t possess ,anyspecial characteris t ics as the bearings were given in theclear with l i t t le attempt a t camouflage. The ground stationsof the IV ~ ~ 8 r d s Corps of the 18th Air Army used two nulls601F-l87, p 4161IF-187, P 4262QDM requests magnetic oourse to steer with no wind.Q,DR requests P18gnetlc bearing i n r ela tio n to station.

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"

1;,,",;':_"',~ ; ' \ " ,=-

,before a three-digit group indicating course bearings; e.g. ,00252 1.ndica.ting a course of 252 degrees The I Guard, Corps \Jlsed the abbreviaUon "TRS" before giving bearingson the outward f l ight, and "OPM" before giving b e ~ 1 n g s on'the return fl ight . other corps transmitted the , letter "w" 'three tlmezs before g l V 1 n ~ the course bearing' on the outwardf l ight and the le t ter "A three times before giv ing the be aring on the return f l ight. These charagteristics served toidentijry th e type of t raffic and unit. ,c. Tactical Traft lc. - -Over a long period of time Germanmonitoring of bomber tactical t raffic during approach f l ightsresulted in the identification of the greater part of thistype ot t raffic. The procedure signals used tor this t rafficdlt.fer,ed with individual corps. In most cases the traff1cconslstedot 2 or }-dlgit groups, sometimes enciphered andsometimesunenciphered. The I I I and rv, Guards Corps' werevery free in their use of tactical traff ic, their aircraf t

I often reporting such data as take-otts, t l ight over theInltie.l point (IPM), f l ight over the front. execution ofmission, and observations over the targets. In such traff icthe t lme was alv&)'s given and thlsaided the'German'SignalIntell.igence in itsroute-tl '&cking. The ground stationsalso ,.tten. transmitted data conce1"l11ng, the target or timeof a t 1 ~ a c k in 'cases vhere plans had to be changed at ter theplanell had taken ,ofr. This data vas very valuable to theGermans in detelam!ng the most favorable4time to put their, night fighters in the all' tor detense. b11. Russian Air Service ComiDand Trat.fic.--The largestunit lo t the Air Service Command vas the DIstrict Air BaseDepot (Rayon A V i a z i o n n h g ~ aaiirovaniya--RAB) and# in ,the caseof t h e ~ N ~ v a l Air Force, the Naval Air Base D e p o ~ (Morakaya

Aviabasa--MAB). As a rule each Russian Air Army had ,threeto five ot these RAB's. In order to use to the f u l l e ~ textent the 1 r i t e l l i g e n c e ~ h 1 c h couid be gained trom an analysisof th e daily reports, sent by the' airfield bat ta li on s t o theirDistr 'ict Air ease Depots i t was necessary tor the Germansto dIlall' up as complete a Russian AiX' '8efvice Command orderof b a t t l ~ as possible. The reports contained details onnumber ot serviceable'and unserviceable aircraft in thetact:1Lcal units. From such an order o t battle the'German51gnnl Intelligence Service of" the Air Force vas able"- ; .

6}!F,-181, p 4364IF-l87# p 44

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to cox'elate Russian a1rf1elds and tac t ical units" and topred1c,t movements 01' tac t ical units on the basis 01' a l r -I f1elds, under construction. The ' locations at the ai rf Ie lds '


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a. Supply Traffic. --Valuable intelligence vas obt ainedby the German Signal Intelligence from the intercept10n otradlo t raffic which gave detai ls on'supplies at fuel .. ammUn1tioll and other mate rials. D etails ot railway movemellts otSUP1)lies Vere transmitted by the Distr ic t Air Base Depots tothejlr subordinate airf ield battal ions. ,These messages contain.ed information on the destination, number or JOailw&1carlS being. used, amount and tlPe or supplies, and the scheduled time of arrival . When the trains arrived a t ' their destinlition a message announcing t he ir a rr iv al was sent to the'a1r:[,1elo battal ions. As a result ot theeXploltat ion otthis type of t raffic the Germans were able to b o m ~ successfully the stations soon af ter tr ai nl oads o r ruel and ammunition bad arrived. In the;:So'l:tthern sector a service Commandp o ~ n t - t o - P 9 1 n t radio net reported arrivals or ~ e p l a c e m e n ta I r ~ r a t t to r th e 17 th, 5th, and 8th Air Armies. These re-placement planes were terr ied from the f ac to ri es t o the &1%'- .f ie lds . Tactical'. uni ts down to regiment ,level receiptedto r these planes and supplies, ana tram interception ottheses tr .ength repor ts ~ h Germans vere able to estimatetheproduct1on and distr ibutIon rate of Russian planes.Cur'rent fuel and ammunition' supplies a t airf ie lds werereported on pre-arranged-message forms transmitted by theal1"':"rield battal ions. ' These messages, a,ince tuel and ammunition supplies were always increased prior to an offensive,a fforded the Germans agQund basis for predicting impend-ing Russian ottens1ves.( , ,

b . Miscellaneous Air Service Command Tratfic. --TheRussian Air Serv1ce CQmmand reported by rad10 on t he ach ieve melLts in, salvaging German aircraf t Which had been shot down,o r l1hlch had been forced to land. These reports affordedt h E ~ Germans With a source of informat1on 'concerning their ,minsing crev.s, and 1n many, cases 1 twas poss1ble to r theGel:smanS to inform t8m11ies that thecrev memb,ers vere alive 'and w ~ r e Russian pl'lso:ners of val'. , Reports ot interrogation I ,of captured German mIlItary p e r s o n n e ~ v e r e also Qften t ransmitted and intercepted \by the Germans. In some cases &s arel3ult ot the 1nf'ormat1on conta1nedin' the se repoJ'ts, th eGe:rman Command, carried out cpnrt m a r : t , ] ~ l - P J ' . o . c e e d 4 - n g - 8 1i1ab:sentia where the intercepted 1 n f Q ~ ~ . 1 C ? ~ l - 9 . . ~ ; r ~ ~ g _ Q . . t U ' t 1 ell.rut P 1 1 1 1 r - t h l I r t ' h " e - G e : r m ~ _pr:[soners of val' had revealedi I i _2-l;Dat _ g J L o t ~ a , s e c ~ e _ t " , -nature. An Air service Command or .the 8th Russian,Air Army on th e sou thern t ront reported routesto ' be flown by a1rcraf t in ~ a ~ g e - s c a l e g r o u n d attacks; givingthe time a t which the attack would take place. ' Fox-such'67IF- 187" p'24

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atta10ks the Russian Air Army usually ordered the placing'ot' smoke markers in the frontal area on the dar before theattack would take place. These smoke ~ k e r s vere used byth e Russian planes as an orientat ion point , and not onlyindicated the proposed direc tion to be f lown, but alsocorresponded to the direction the ground torce would advance.After a study of these smoke signals the German Air ForceSlgtialIntelligence learned that the signals vere l i tt h i J ~ t y minutes to an hour be tore the actual t1me ot attack.Thus, ~ h e ~ i t vas learned that smoke signals had been setout the German Signal Intelligence could usually informthe Air and Ground forces some twggty-tourhours in advanceof plans tor a Russian ottensiva . ' ,

, ,12'. Russian Air Raid '-larning Service. --The Russian A1rRel'el Warn1l'ig ServIce vas moiiltored regularly by the Germans. ,Fro:m this source the following, 1 n t o ~ t i o n was a v a i l a b l ~ :a. Reports at German aircraft over Russian territoryana, their posltiona. ' _ 'b. Reports ot Russian and American aircraft over RU8-SifllJ1 terr i tOl'y 'In the case ot f l ights made entirely over Russian t ~ r r 1 t o r yt h E ~ time ot departure and airfield destination was included., In tbacase of f l ights which crossed the tr on t into GermanteXtr1tory the time of arrival at the tront would be given" 'When observation ot German aircratt was reported by theRussians l t vas possible tor the Ger.manSlgnal IntelligenceService to warn the, planes that the Russians, mew theirposltiona and to re,commend a change ot course or otherevasive act1on.Reportson American aircraft otten revealedintormatlon about t he '! shutt le fl or 'ItrSpglllal'''fl.Ights of the 8th and 15th u. S. Air Forces. -.

1 '. German Monitoring and Analysis ot Russian NavalTrattlc,,--!he RUssian H a ~ h i a Its own All' Foree vhlchperr-ormed the follOWing duties:a. Protection ot Russian Naval units and their basesb. Support ot liaval operations.c. ' Combat ot enemy naval forces.68 .. ~ - 1 8 7 , p 2569

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e.

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14. Advanced W Be orts and R o u t e - t l ' a c ~ . - - .Adv.:mced warn g repor s an rou e- rae w ~ oeD: possiblefrOD! the resul ts of t raffic analysis. The German Air ,Force .51811al Intelligence Agency had more success than the G e A r D I ~ r Signal Intelligence had against the Russians. oneS O U J ~ c e of intormat ion from Which the German Air Force SignalI n t E ~ 1 1 1 g e n c e were able to make use in g1v1ng timely warn1:DSsto 1:;he German Air FOl'ce came trom the t raff ic of RussianSpec,iali8t Air Force Lia1son ott1cers who acted 1n an in termediary capacity between Army and Air Force to r ArmY cooperat ion, c lose support , and tac t ical reconnaissance. .Theseotf:lcers were knoVll 8S "Flivos" (F11egervel'bindungsottiz1er).The F11vos cons1stentlytransm1tted messages which containedthe start ing time and course of the Russ1an Air units to whiohthey vere a S $ 1 g n ~ d . From the in tercept ionot these messagesand the exploitat1on ot the informat1on derived t h e r e t r o m ~the German Air Force was able to destroy a large numbel'otRussian planes. Assumptions ot impending ground torce operat1o:ns could also be made noting an increase in l ooal a tt ackso r th ru sts in the are&sin which the Fl1vos were located.The Germans also ~ $ success in l o c a t ~ points of armoredc o n c e n t r a t 1 o n s s 1 n ~ e orders asking to r special a ir supportwould be t l ' a n s m 1 t t ~ d b the Fllvos. These requests r o ,support originated ~ Army and Motorized Oorps headquazttera.and .came .up on a point-to-point net between the All ' Armiesand,the1r subordinate corps and independent divisions. As.thel cryptographic systems in which these messages vere sentWelte being read by th e GermanS1gnal Intelligence the GermanH 1 e ~ Oommand was kept 1ntormed c u ~ r e n t l y ot those targets forwhlch a1r support was requested. By the time operat1.onal in -s t x ~ c t i o n s had been sent by the Russians to an Air Division byan Air Corps the German tl'OOps. had ample time to take effectivecountemeasures. Thus these F livos messages a ff orded the GermatlS an excellent means at making tact ical evaluat10ns of imttlediate value, espe01ally 'When t he l 'eport s contained Russiano b l J e ~ v . t l o n s ot G e ~ s t r o n g and weak points at defense. Thereasons g iven by the German Signal Intelligence &s to theus.,tulness of this t raffic vel'e: (a) because ot the closecoc)peratlon between the Russian Ail'. and Ground Forces,a ]leavy groUnd attack could be expected Whenever s t ronga1rsupport vas requested; (b ) the Fllvos ~ e p o r t e d thei r locationsin these r e p o r t ~ , thereby revealing the position of RussianA ~ n y and Corps headqual'tel's atwh1ch the Flivos were located;-. ' .- ~ ' . . . . ' ; ......Y.;. ..

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II

\\\\r\

and (c) trom ground situation reports transmitted by theFlivos, seve,ral t imes a day, an acourate picture of th efrontal s e ~ t o r of each Russian Army ,unit could be con-structed. ' ! .The German Air Force Signal Intelligence Agency furthermore claimed that trom information obtained .from t he F livost raffic the German High Command had ful l knowledge of th econcentration ot troops a t 5talingrad. This informatIoncame 1ihen five ent1re Air Divis ions moved into th at area.The Germans had learned that vhenever traff ic revealed, Flivos ot five Air Divisions were present in any area i tc o u l ~ be! expected' that the Armies of those divisions would .rappea.r there in a short t1me. ' The Germans furthermore .claim ~ h e y had information trom the same source as to theplana, ot the Russians tor the last driva upon Berlin, butwere unable to do a n y t h ~ about the matter because ot the

, s e l ; 1 c ~ : u s 7 c o n a i t i o n 1n which their Armed Forces t o ~ d them-se lVE,s . : J , , , .. a . ,Route-tracking Data Available from Mess8.gea.--When the German Signal Intelligence ServiCe 1nterceptedoperation orders i t . was an easy task to track the course flown by .Long Range BOltlber Force formations. The only.pz-oblems rama1n.ing were to identify the units participating in the tormatton, as several corps were quite otten used1n one raid,and"'to make necessary corrections i f any new time vas re-,por tedat ter th e take-ott of th e predioted time ot arrival.over' the targets. The 18th Air Army t raffic ot this typeserved to piece together the intel11gence already derivedtrom air.to-ground traff ic, which a t that stage was usuallymeatl1ngless. .The Russian. Air Defense organizations alsofrequently transMitted notification of impendingm1ss1oDswhic}hgave data regarding the course to be flown: over R u 8 ~ 1 a nterJr1tory These. messages which were d ir ec ted to theRus:sian Ailti-air-craft U I i l t ~ contained the number and t ' Y P ' ~ot ~ l a n e 8 as well as the location ot the point of attack.'. b Weather Reconnaissance. - - In instances where theGermans did not intercept operational orders there s t i l lexisted a possibility tor predicting R u s s l ~ bomber raids' l 2 1 : ~ 1 7 ~ 1-16'; IF-186i IF-187733:_17

74:('-187, p 44

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trom ~ ~ o r m a t 1 o n derived from thetntercept ion of weather

, r e c o n n e ~ i 8 8 a n c e reports. These reports were usually carriedout in the target area prior to an attack. From an analys1sof' thelile messages the Germans could usually predict whetheror not a raid was soon to take p l a c e ~ as a ra1d generallyoccurred only i f the ceiling over the target area was a t 'least ~ ~ , O O O meters and there was no more than 6 to 10% otcloud ()over. Route tracking ot the weather reconnai,ssanceplanes was aided because or the tact that they. transmittedm e s a a g . ~ s every 5 to 10 minutes, sometimes even reportingthe1r ] ~ o s i t 1 o n , and thus making direction-finding by theGermanls unnecessary. 75 .. c. Flash Reports. - -Tact ical intelligence result ingf r o ~ the interception ot Russian Long Range Bomber Forces(ADD) ' traftio was immediately enciphered and, forwarded bywire t10 vlsual?observational posts, to the Air Foroe, toth e so-called "light diVision" for special missions 1n theGerman A1'mY (Jagddlv1sion), to tlie Arit1-air-cratt u n 1 t 8 ~and : ~ th e Cen tr al Reporting Center to r Defense of theReicl:l (Meldekopr). As a resul t of ear ly wam1ng throughthese flash reports German d.etensive preparations againstan anticipated Russian night raid often took place duringthe mC 1rn1ng p1'8ceed1ng the raid. As soon as ,the take-otf ota bomber formation was established. a w1rel ine from theSignal. Intelligence service evaluation oompany to t ighterand AIlLt1-air-cratt unit headquarters vas kept open, and a l ls u b s e ~ L u e n t information currently reported to the stat ions.Another d1reot wire l ine was maintained to the n e a r e 8 ~ GermanSignal Intelligenoe Service radar intercept stat ion. Thisstat1cJn vas kept informed ot the course and al t i tude ofthe R\lSs1an .bofribel' formation so that when rad10 silence V&876begun the radar station could take over the route-tracking. .

15. Intercept of Russian R a d & r ~ - - R B 4 a r intercept on the II.Russ1,U1 Eastern hont by the German Signal I n t e l l ~ g e n o e .S e r v 1 ~ 3 e ,brOUght only insignif1cent resul ts sin ce th e Russiansmade : l1ttle use of radar equipment. Very fev detai ls otRussi.an radar equipment are available. on several ocoasions,howevlEJr I in t raf t ic intercepted on point-to-point ' nets somemention of three t1,es ot eq,uipments w a ; J ' ~ found These .mentioned "RUS-l", 'RUS-2'" (Radio Ulav11vatel samole1;;ov)and ",MRU" (Mellei Radio Ulavlivatel) . Several Russian .l>rieoners75 IP-187, p 4576IF-'187, p 47

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1 6 I : ~ " ' l 8 7 J p 2977];F_187, P 70

of ~ i stated to German interrogators that intruder reg1menti:s ~ the Long Range Bomber Forces (ADD) used radar a g a 1 n ~ tGerman night- f ighters . However, the Germans never found anytrac1e of any airborne radar equipment in the Russian planeswhic:h crashed or v h ~ c h vere shot down. I t vas concludedbJ the German Signal Intell igence Service that the Russianprisoners only made the s ta tements because or suggestionsmade by the interrogators rather .than from any knowled,geof such equipment because the, lmt;lW the Ge1'Dl8J1B and theAllies vere using radar to a great extent a n 0 7 ~ e r e onlywishing their own torces vere doing the same. In thes u m m ~ r of 194, the Germans did establish, trom interceptedradlo-telephone traffic" that the Russians were experimenting with ground radar to be used in the i r defense zones .Thre'e or tour German radar in tercept t eams were placed a longthe. Eastern t ront and equipped w1th d1rectlontinders. I n - ,, telllgence obtained tram these teams indicated that theRussllans vere making very l i t t l e progre,'Is in the f ie ld otr a d l l ~ r , and that t h ~ i r equipment was 1nf'er1or to that ot theGernwis,,1 Bl'it1sh, and Americans. In the t a l l ot 1 9 ~ ~ theGeI'1118Jl Signal Intell igence further determined that on the 'Cen1iral Russian t ront , apart trom several small radar '" _ setlJ apparently being used t o r an t i- a ir - c ra f t control, \ therewas only one large instal la t ion which was near Warsaw.F u r 1 ~ h e r interception of Russian radio-telephone t raff icl a t ~ ~ r again indicated there were se ve ra l o th er rad ar 1nata l la t ions within the a ir defense zone" but the locationscould never be established by German d1rect1on-findel's.77

, '16.' Russian Radio Counter-measures .--Very l i t t l e in tor- 'mat:lon in r efe rence t o Russian use or radio counter-measuresis 'to be found in TICOM materials. The Russ1ans had a term( c ~ : a ) which denoted a l l types of var1ed camouflaged CODlmunications procedures, derived a t t e r 1 9 ~ 2 by the 51gnals0.f1'1c9rs tor use a t t he . fr on t. The Russians apparently did

~ o assume that their ClB-procedures would give l O O ~ s e c u r 1 t ~ .The procedures x-emained val1d tor indef in .1te periods, b ~ 1 n g /changed ei ther on the judgment of th e S ign als O ffice r who IiS8uedthem, or when there was a suspicion o c o ~ r o m 1 8 e . /, " ~

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In g e l U ~ l ' a l , the CYB-pl'ocedU1'8S of the Russian Air Forcesr e m 4 ; j . n 4 ~ d in use longer t those of the Army, , ince the 'Air Fo:t'ce procedures were employed behind the l ines ' and wereless e;xposed to physical compromise.76- - , '

1'1 German Use of Captured Russian Material. - - The .German 'Signal IntellIgence servIce salvaged a l&1'ge amountof material from Russian planes which were shot or forced'to crash. However" the Germans did not gain much outstand-1ng information from this material because thet were already inpossess ion of most ot the important tacts and informationconcerning, !'tu8s1an equipment. They were able to 8.&:in conB 1 d e r B ~ l e 1ntormatlon from, th e Standard Q p e r a ~ 1 n g Instructions salvaged trom planes. This included d a t ~ on Russiancodes, cal l signs, 1',;10 requencie8, maps, and grid-square\ enciphering::,ay8 tems.

781-116, P 3791F187 J P 71

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VOLUME i:

,

..... Chapter 3SlJMMARY OF GERMAN SUCCESSES IN TRAFFIC ANAIiISIS OF

RUSSIAN COMMUNICATIONS

1. The l{uss1ans depended on the use ot one-time Padcr,ptographic systems for s ec urIty o f the i r high level t ra f fand on code books and enciphering tables to r the i r medium-and low level t ra f f ic . The One-time Pads were not read bythe OerDlians; but the medium and low level systems were read .to a g re at ext en t.2. The main source ot information the German Traffio Inal l1ys1tsl had cdamie ftrom eXPlloltatlon or inthediRuStS1anuse of .ca s gns, ra 0 requenc es, message C&'or groups,

and dlrEtction-tinding reports . :;. Another source of information came from the in te l l l - 1gence gained from reading pre-arranged message forms. T h ~ .RusslanEl used these forms extensively for ~ p o r t s . The . .'Germans had l I t t le dift icul ty in reading such t raf t ic .4. There V8S very close cooperation between .the Germanintercel.rt operators and t l 'a tf ic analysts in th e f ie ld . I n t E f - ; ~ ..igration of available information, such as t ra t f ic analysisresults;, evaluation of. data, c ryp tanalysi s, p r isoner ot war

interrogations, captured documents, and other types atintell igence was carrIed outv l th e x c e l l e n ~ e f r i c l e n c ' Y .5.,,' The Russian cal l sign systems were not asaeCUl'e asthe Russians believed. GIven suffIcient cal l s1gn t raff1cand day-to-day continu1ty the German Signal Intel11genceService was able to r econst ruct the systems.6. Some ot the outstanding successes of German TrafficAnalys1.s were:

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& . A kIlowledge ot the Russ1an Air Force order ot

batt le a x of batt le s1tuat ion. .b. A knowlec1ge .ot the organ1zat10n and order otbatt le ot some Russian ArmY units.c. A knowledge' ot B t r e n g t h ~ types, and armament otaircraf t ., 'd. A ~ o w l e d g e of the 10cat10nand occupat10tt of a1r-f1elds.e. 'A knowledge or the movements andconcentratlons ofAir and .llround'Force un1ts

l ' A knowledge of operat ional intent10ns. .g. A knowledge ot the amount and tyPe or a1r t ransport .h. A knOWledge ot the Russian supply situation ..i.A knowledge of probable targets

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.VOLUME 9

'.1lAB A,

.- ~ (AVitsiya Dalneye Dyest'v!ya.) .. --Russian. Long RangeBomber. / ,ADR. Russian symbol for "adress" appearing in front ofthe addre:ss group in military me'ssages ..Air.--Vozduch (Russian), abbreviatedVZD ..Air Army.. RUfiSia.n equivalent to American Air Force, andBritish Gommand.Air Liaison O j ~ f " i c e r . --German translation: Fllegerverbin-d ~ g s o r f i z l e r , (FLIVO).. 'Antiaircraft Defense.--Protlvovosduschnaya oborone. (PVO).AVitslya Dalneye Dyestvlye. (ADD).--Russian Long RangeBomber F,;,rces.Corps (Air Force). 120-450 Russian planes (2 or 3 Divisions),partly equivalent to an American Wing ..OYB. A Russian term denoting a l l types of varied camou-flaged communications procedure.District Air Base.--Rayon AViazionnage Baslrovanlya (RAB).Largest Wllt at the Russian Air Service Command. ,Division (Ail" Force) 60-150 Russian planes, unit classedbetween an American Group and Wing.Escadrille. A .flight of Russian p l ~ e s , usually containing8"'10 p1Ellles.F1ieftl,-Jatti.. About 160 German planes (2 Geschwader), equl. valent to American Wing.Flieger-Div1nlon. About 320 German planes, classed betweenan A m e r ~ L c a . n Wing and Command. .

Flieger Korps. About 600-900'German planes (2 or 3 Divisions),partially equivalent to an American Command.F11vo ( F l ~ e : r v e r b 1 n d u n g s o f f l z l e r ) .--German fo r Air L ia ls onOfficer. .Fliegerverbi:ndungsoff1zier(Fllvo).--German for Air Lia isonOtficer. -Geschwader.70-90 German planes (3 Gruppen), eqUivalent to, American ,Group, and Brltlsh 'Wing.Golovanov,Marsball. Russian commander of the Long Range

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Gruppe. 27-30 German planes (3 StaffelD), equlvalent 1 to US. and Br1 t1sh squadron.Heimann, Corporal William. A member of Kona 1, of th e Signal. In tEllligenoe Agency of th e Army High Command (OKH/Gen.. , d. N4). .He,Dipel, Sgt . W e r n e r ~ A member of' Gruppe VI, of the SlanalInte tl11gence Agency of the Army High Command (OKH/Gen.. d. NA). He was a Baudot intercept technician.Herold, Oaptain Wad1m. Orficer in charge of Ln . Regiment111/353 of the S ignal Intelligence Agency of th e Air, . Force High Command (OKL/LN) in the East.Beudorf, Corp. A mamba!' ot Naa 8 (radio intel l igence. . battalion) of the 3rd Panzer Army1-17. ltExtracts of SRAEF Interrogation of the fo llo vingGerman communica.t1ons personnel:. lfC.aJ. Gen. Boner,Col. Gruba, L t . Col. Mettlg, Maj. Rottler. II A TICOMpublication. . .1-19. fb ) "30 reports written by Kona I personnel.r'(f) "Report on t raff ic analysis of Russian wirelesstrat 'f ' lc. fI A TICOM p U b l i c a . t i o n . , .. .1-70. tlPaper on th e German 51gint Service by Lt. Col., Friedr ich ." A TICOM publ icat ion . . . ,1-75.' "Interrogation reports on German field S1gintpersonnel carried out a t Buffer. L t. August Schroeder,L t. S ~ a . r k e J C 0 1 ~ . Heudorf', Capt Holetzko It " ..1-116. "JRaport on th e interrogation. of J...t . Alex Det tmann .and Oberwachtmelster Sergius S : \ ~ K t ' > j . : . ' ' : : ' . ; - ' , of OItH {Gen.

TICOM Vol. 9 - German Traffic Analysis

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