Thomas Aquinas_ Political Philosophy

8/11/2019 Thomas Aquinas_ Political Philosophy

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Thomas Aquinas: Political PhilosophyThe political philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), along with the broaderphilosophical teaching of which it is part, stands at the crossroads between the Christiangospel and th eAristotelian political doctrine that was, in Aquinas time, newly discovered inthe Western world. In fact, Aquinas whole developed system is often understood to besimply a modification of Aristotelian philosophy in light of the Christian gospel and withspecial emphasis upon those questions most relevant to Christianity, such as the nature ofthe divine, the human soul, and morality. This generalization would explain why Aquinasseems to eschew, even neglect, the subject of politics. Unlike his medieval Jewish andIslamic counterparts, Aquinas does not have to reconcile Aristotelianism with a concretepolitical and legal code specified in the sacred writings of his religion. As far as he isconcerned, God no longer requires people to live according to the judicial precepts of theOld Law ( Summa Theologiae [hereafter ST], I-II, 104.3), and so the question of formulatinga comprehensive Christian political teaching that is faithful to biblical principles loses iturgency if not its very possibility. Unlike Judaism and Islam, Christianity does not involvespecific requirements for conducting civil society. In fact, most Christians before Aquinas

time (such as St. Augustine) had interpreted Jesus assertion that we should render untoCaesar the things that are Caesar s ( Matthew 22:21) to mean that Christianity can flourishin any political regime so long as its authorities permit believers to render unto God thethings that are God s. Although Je sus claimed to be a king, he was quick to add that hiskingdom was not of this world ( John 18:36), and whereas St. Paul had exhorted Christiansto obey the civil authorities and even to suffer injustice willingly, he never considered itnecessary to discuss the nature of political justice itself.

These observations perhaps explain why Aquinas, whose writings nearly all come in theform of extremely well organized and systematic treatises, never completed a thematicdiscussion of politics. His letter On Kingship (written as a favor to the king of Cyprus)comes closest to fitting the description of a political treatise, and yet this brief andunfinished work hardly presents a comprehensive treatment of political philosophy. Evenhis commentary on Aristotle s Politics is less than half complete, and it is debatable whetherthis work is even intended to express Aquinas own political philosophy at all. This does notmean, however, that Aquinas was uninterested in political philosophy or that he simplyrelied on Aristotle to provide the missing political teaching that Christianity leaves out. Nordoes it mean that Aquinas does not have a political teaching. Although it is not expressed inovertly political works, Aquinas thoughts on political philosophy may be found withintreatises that contain discussions of issues with far reaching political implications. In hiscelebrated Summa Theologiae , for instance, Aquinas engages in long discussions of law, the virtue of justice, the common good, economics, and the basis of morality. Even though notpresented in the context of a comprehensive political teaching, these texts provide a crucialinsight into Aquinas understan ding of politics and the place of political philosophy withinhis thought.

Table of Contents

1. Natural Law 2. The Political Nature of Man 3. Human Legislation 4. The Requirements of Justice 5. The Limitations of Politics 6. References and Further Reading a. Primary Sources

i. Aquinas Political Writings in English

ii. Two Useful Collections of Aquinas Political Writings in English b. Secondary Sources . Books
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i. Articles and Chapters

1. Natural Law

Aquinas celebrated doctrine of natural law no doubt plays a central role in his moral andpolitical teaching. According to Aquinas, everything in the terrestrial world is created byGod and endowed with a certain nature that defines what each sort of being is in itsessence. A thing s nature is detectable not only in its external appearance, bu t also andmore importantly through the natural inclinations which guide it to behave in conformity with the particular nature it has. As Aquinas argues, God s authorship and active role inprescribing and sustaining the various natures included in creation may rightfully be calleda law . After defining law as an ordinance of reason for the common good, made bysomeone who has care of the community, and promulgated. (ST, I -II, 90.4), Aquinasexplains that the entire universe is governed by the supreme lawgiver par excellence :Granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providencethe whole community of theuniverse is governed by Divine Reason. (ST, I -II, 91.1). Even though the world governed byGod s providence is temporal and limited, Aquinas calls the law that governs it the eternallaw. Its eternal nature comes not from that to which it applies, but rather from whom thelaw is derived, namely, God. As Aquinas explains, the very idea of the government ofthings in God the Ruler of the universe, has th e nature of a law. And since Divine Reason sconception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Prov. viii, 23thiskind of law must be called eternal. (Ibid.).

In the vast majority of cases, God governs his subjects through the eternal law without anypossibility that that law might be disobeyed. This, of course, is because most beings in theuniverse (or at least in the natural world) do not possess the rational ability to actconsciously in a way that is contrary to the eternal law implanted in them. Completelyunique among natural things, however, are humans who, although completely subject todivine providence and the eternal law, possess the power of free choice and therefore have a

radically different relation to that law. As Aq uinas explains, among all others, the rationalcreature is subject to Divine Providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes ofa share of providence, by being provident both for itself, and for others. Wherefore, it has ashare of the Eter nal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end.(ST, I- II, 91.2). Because the rational creature s relation to the eternal law is so differentfrom that of any other created thing, Aquinas prefers to call the law that governs it by adifferent name. Instead of saying that humans are under the eternal law, therefore, he saysthey are under the natural law, and yet the natural law is nothing else than the rationalcreature s participation of the eternal law (Ibid.). Another, equa lly accurate, way of stating Aquinas position is that the natural law is the eternal law as it applies to human beings.

As the rule and measure of human behavior, the natural law provides the only possible

basis for morality and politics. Simply stated, the natural law guides human beings throughtheir fundamental inclinations toward the natural perfection that God, the author of thenatural law, intends for them. As we have seen, however, the human subjugation to theeternal law (called the natural law) is always concomitant with a certain awareness thehuman subject has of the law binding him. This awareness is crucial in Aquinas view. Sinceone of the essential components of law is to be promulgated, the natural law would lose itslegal character if human beings did not have the principles of that law instilled in theirminds (ST, I-II, 90.4 ad 1). For this reason Aquinas considers the natural law to be a habit,not in itself, but because the principles (or precepts) of the natural law are naturally held inour minds by means of an intellectual habit, which Aquinascalls synderesis . Synderisis denotes a natural knowledge held by all people instructingthem as to the fundamental moral requirements of their human nature. As Aquinasexplains, just as speculative knowledge requires there to be certain principles from whichone can draw further conclusions, so also practical and moral knowledge presupposes anunderstanding of fundamental practical precepts from which more concrete moral
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directives may be derived. Whereas Aquinas calls the habit by which human beingsunderstand the first moral principles (which are also the first principles of the naturallaw) synderesis (ST, Ia, 79.12), he calls the act by which one applies that understanding toconcrete situations conscience (ST, Ia, 79.13). Therefore, by means of synderesis a man would know that the act of adultery is morally wrong and contrary to the natural law. By anact of conscience he would reason that intercourse with this particular woman that is nothis wife is an act of adultery and should therefore be avoided. Thus understood, the naturallaw includes principles that are universally accessible regardless of time, place, or culture.In Aquinas words, it is the same in all humans (ST, I -II, 94.4), unchangeable (ST, I-II,94.5), and cannot be abolished from the hearts of men (ST, I-II, 94.6). It is in light of thisteaching that Aquinas interprets St. Paul s argument that the Gentiles who have not thelaw do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they donot have the law. They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts. (Romans2:14-16).

How are the precepts of the natural law derived? According to Aquinas, the very firstprecept is that good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided. (ST, I -II, 94.2). Ashe explains, this principle serves the practical reason just as the principle of non-

contradiction serves the speculative reason. Just as the speculative intellect naturallyapprehends th e fact that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,the practical intellect apprehends that good is to be pursued and evil is to be avoided. Bydefinition, neither the first principle of speculative nor practical reason can bedemonstrated. Rather, they are principles without which human reasoning cannotcoherently draw any conclusions whatsoever. Otherwise stated, they are first principlesinasmuch as they are not derived from any prior practical or speculative knowledge. Still,they are just as surely known as any other knowledge obtained through demonstrativereasoning. In fact, they are naturally known and self-evident for the very same reason thatthey are not subject to demonstration. This is important from Aquinas perspective becauseall practical knowledge (including the moral and political sciences) must rest upon certainprinciples before any valid conclusions are drawn. To return to the above example, a man who recognizes the evil of adultery will only know that this act of adultery must be avoidedif he first understands the more fundamental precept that evil ought to be avoided ingeneral. No one can prove this general principle to him. He simply understands it by thehabit of synderesis .

Aquinas would be the first to recognize, of course, that the simple requirements of doinggood and avoiding evil fail to provide human beings with much content for pursuing themoral life. How, one must ask, do we know what things actually are good and evil? Inresponse to this Aquinas argues that human beings must consult their natural inclinations.Beyond the mere knowledge that good is to be pursued and evil avoided our naturalinclinations are the most fundamental guide to understanding where the natural law isdirecting us. In other words, our natural inclinations reveal to us what the mostfundamental human goods are. As Aquinas explains, man first has natural inclinations in

accordance with the nature he has in common with all substancessuch as preservinghuman life and warding off its obstacles. Secondly, there are inclinations we have incommon with other animals, such as sexual intercourse, the education of offspring andso forth. And finally there are inclinations specific to man s rational nature, such as theinclination t o know the truth about God, to shun ignorance, and to live in society.(Ibid.). It may seem strange that Aquinas would list the pursuit of sexual intercourse asone of the natural inclinations supporting and defining the natural law. To be sure, Aquinasrecognizes that all the aforementioned inclinations are subject to the corruption of oursinful nature. It is not morally good, therefore, simply to act on an inclination. One mustfirst recognize the natural purpose of a given inclination and only act upon it insofar as thatpurpose is respected. This is why Aquinas is quick to add that all inclinations belong to thenatural law only insofar as they are ruled by reason. (ST, I -II, 94.2, ad 2). As someone isinclined to sexual intercourse, for instance, he must also recognize that this natural goodmust be pursued only within a certain context (that is, within marriage, open to thepossibility of procreation, etc.). If this natural order of reason is ignored, any natural good


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exchange ( Commentary on the Politics Book 1, Lesson 1 [31]). This is one reason why the village is eclipsed by political society, which proves much more useful to human beings because of its greater size and much more elaborate governmental structure. There is,however, a far more important reason why political society comes into existence. Inaddition to yielding greater protection and economic benefits, it also enhances the moraland intellectual lives of human beings. By identifying with a political community, human beings begin to see the world in broader terms than the mere satisfaction of their bodilydesires and physical needs. Whereas the residents of the village better serve their individualinterests, the goal of the political community becomes the good of the whole, or thecommon good, which Aquinas claims (following Aristotle) is better and more divi ne thanthe good of the individual. ( Commentary on the Politics , Book 1, Lesson 1 [11]). Thepolitical community is thus understood as the first community (larger than the family) for which the individual makes great sacrifices, since it is not merely a larger cooperative venture for mutual economic benefit. It is, rather, the social setting in which man trulyfinds his highest natural fulfillment. In this sense, the political community, even though notdirected to the individual good, better serves the individual by promoting a life of virtue in which human existence can be greatly ennobled. It is in this context that Aquinas argues(again following Aristotle) that although political society originally comes into being for the

sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well. ( Commentary on the Politics , Book 1,Lesson 1 [31]).

Aquinas takes Aristotle s argument that political society transcends the village andcompletes human social existence to prove that the city is natural. Similar, but not identical,to this claim is Aquinas further assertion that man is by nature a civic and social animal.(ST, I- II, 72.4). To support this, Aquinas refers us to Aristotle s observation that human beings are the only animals possessing the ability to exercise speech. Not to be confused with mere voice ( vox ), speech ( loquutio ) involves the communication of thoughts andconcepts between persons (ST, I-II, 72.4). Whereas voice is found in many different animalsthat communicate their immediate desires and aversions to one another (seen in the dog s bark and the lion s roar) speech includes a conscious conception of what one is saying(Commentary on the Politics , Book 1, Lecture 1 [36]). By means of speech, therefore,human beings may collectively deliberate on core civic matters regarding what is usefuland what is harmful, as well as the just and the unjust. ( Commentary on the Politics ,Book 1, Lecture 1 [37]). Whereas other animals exhibit a certain social tendency (as beesinstinctively work to preserve their hive), only humans are social in the sense that theycooperate through speech to pursue a common understanding of justice, virtue, and thegood. Since speech is the outward expression of his inner rationality, man is political bynature for the same reason he is naturally rational.

The fact that man is a naturally political animal has far-reaching implications. In additionto being a father, a mother, a farmer, or a teacher, a human being is more importantlyidentified as a citizen. Achieving genuine human excellence, therefore, most always meansachieving excellence as a citizen of some political society (Aquinas does mention the

possibility that someone s supernatural calling may necessitate that they live outside ofpolitical society. As examples of such people, he mentions John the Baptist and Blessed Anthony the hermit. See his Commentary on the Politics , Book 1, Lecture 1 [35].). To besure, the requirements of good citizenship vary from regime to regime, but more generallyconceived the good citizen is the one that places the common good above his own privategood and acts accordingly. In doing so, such a person exhibits the virtue of legal justice whereby all of his actions are referred in one way or another to the common good of hisparticular society (ST, II- II, 58.5). Following the progression of Aristotle s discussion ofcitizenship, however, Aquinas recognizes a certain difficulty in assigning an unqualifiedlyhigh value to citizenship. What sense does it make to speak of a good citizen in a badregime? One does not need to consider the worst sorts of regimes to see the difficultyinherent in achieving good citizenship. In any regime that is less than perfect there alwaysremains the possibility that promoting the interests of the regime and promoting thecommon good may not be the same. To be sure, good men are often called to stand upheroically against tyrants (ST, II-II, 42.2, ad 3), but the full potential of the good citizen will


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never be realized unless he lives in best of all possible regimes. In other words, only in the best regime do the good citizen and the good human being coincide ( Commentary on the Politics , Book 3, Lecture 3 [366]). In fact, even the best regime will fall short of producing amultitude of good citizens, since no society exists where everyone is virtuous ( Commentaryon the Politics , Book 3, Lecture 3 [367]).

But what is the best regime? Following Aristotle, Aquinas argues that all regimes can bedivided into six basic types, which are determined according to two criteria: how the regimeis ruled and whether or not it is ruled justly (that is, for the common good). As he explains,political rule may be exercised by the multitude, by a select few, or by one person. If theregime is ruled justly, it is called a monarchy or kingship when ruled by one singleindividual, an aristocracy when ruled by a few, and a polity or republic when ruled by themultitude. If, on the other hand, a regime is ruled unjustly (that is, for the sake of theruler(s) and not for the common weal), it is called a tyranny when ruled by one, anoligarchy when ruled by a few, and a democracy when ruled by the multitude ( On Kingship ,Book 1, Chapter 1; Commentary on the Politics , Book 3, Lecture 6 [393-394]). SimplyStated, the best regime is monarchy. Aqui nas argument for this is drawn from a mixture ofphilosophical and theological observations. Inasmuch as the goal of any ruler should be the

unity of peace, the regime is better governed by one person rather than by many. For thisend is much more efficaciously secured by a single wise authority who is not burdened byhaving to deliberate with others who may be less wise and who may stand in the way ofeffective governance. As Aquinas observes in his letter On Kingship , any governing bodycomprised of many must always strive to act as one in order to move the regime closer tothe intended goal. In this sense, therefore, the less perfect regimes tend to imitatemonarchy in which unanimity of rule is realized at once and without obstruction ( On Kingship , Book 1, Chapter 2). This conclusion is confirmed by the example of nature, whichalways does what is best. For the many powers of the human soul are governed by a singlepower, i.e., reason. A hive of bees is ruled by a single bee, i.e., the queen. And mostconvincingly of all, the universe is governed by the single authority of God, Maker andRuler of all things. As art is called to imitate nature, human society is therefore best that isgoverned by a single authority of a eminently wise and just monarch who resembles God asmuch as humanly possible.

Aquinas is well aware, of course, that such a monarch is not always available in politicalsocieties, and even where he is available it is not always guaranteed that the conditions will be right to grant him the political authority he ought to wield. Even worse, there is alwaysthe danger that the monarch will be corrupted and become a tyrant. In this case the best ofall regimes has the greatest tendency to become the worst. This is why, whereas monarchyis the best regime simply speaking, it is not always the best regime in a particular time andplace, which is to say it is certainly not always the best possible regime. Therefore, Aquinasoutlines in the Summa Theologiae a more modest proposal whereby political rule issomewhat decentralized. The regime that he recommends takes the positive dimensions ofall three good regimes. Whereas it has a monarch at its head, it is also governed by

others possessing a certain degree of authority who may advise the mo narch whilecurbing any tyrannical tendencies he may have. Finally, Aquinas suggests that the entiremultitude of citizens should be responsible for selecting the monarch and should all becandidates for political authority themselves. Whereas the best regime simply speaking ismonarchy, the best possible regime seems to be the mixed government that incorporatesthe positive dimensions of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (In the SummaTheologiae , Aquinas appears to use the name of democracy in place of Aristotle sconception of polity.). To support this conclusion, Aquinas is able to cite the Hebrew formof government established by God in the Old Testament. Whereas Moses (and hissuccessors) ruled the Jews as a monarch, there also existed a council of seventy-two elders which provided an element of aristocracy. Inasmuch as the rulers were selected fromamong the people, this sacred regime of the Bible also incorporated a certain dimension ofdemocracy (ST, I-II, 105.1).


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3. Human LegislationThe fact that regimes may vary according to time and place is a perfect example of the factthat not every moral or political directive is specified by nature. In fact, Aquinas is eager topoint out that the natural law, while providing the fundamental basis for human action and

politics, fails to provide specific requirements for all the details of human social existence.For example, whereas the natural law does provide certain general standards of economic justice (which we shall consider later on), it does not give a preferred form of currency.There is no natural law that requires how often public roads should be repaired, or whethermilitary service will be mandatory or voluntary. Whereas Aquinas argues that the naturallaw requires criminals to be punished for injustices such as murder, theft, and assault, thereis no natural specification as to precisely what kinds of punishments ought to be imposedfor these crimes. Even though, as Aquinas recognizes, these details do not pertain directlyto whether a regime is good or bad, human social life would be impossible to maintain without attention to such detail. Such is the role, according to Aquinas, of human law (ST,I-II, 91.3).

This is not to suggest, of course, that human laws only concern those matters which may just as easily be decided one way or another. Within a particular socio-political context, itmay indeed be a terrible mistake to make military service compulsory or in another contextto punish treason with leniency, even though the natural law does not specify whichsituations call for which measures. Additionally, human law is necessary to enforce themoral and political requirements of the natural law that may go unheeded. Even though theprecepts of the natural law are available to human reason when it considers matters rightly,not all human beings use their practical reason to its fullest capacity and some actmaliciously even when they happen to know better. And because the natural law does notsimply enforce itself, the basic requirements of justice must be bolstered by an organizedand civilized human authority (ST, I-II, 95.1). Accordingly, human laws serve two purposes.First, they provide the missing details that the natural law leaves out due to its generality.Secondly, they compel those under the law to observe those standards of justice andmorality even about which the natural law does specify. This second function of human lawleads Aquinas to a crucial distinction. After asking whether human laws are derived fromthe natural law, he argues that, although all human laws are derived from the natural law ina certain sense, some are more directly derived than others. The distinction he invokes isthat between human laws which constitute conclusions from principles of natural law andthose which constitute determinations from the natural law. Human laws are consideredconclusions from the natural law when they pertain to those matters about which thenatural law offers a clear precept. To use Aquinas own example, that one must not kill m ay be derived as a conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to no man. (ST, I -II,95.2). Thus, human laws must include prohibitions against murder, assault, and the likeeven though such actions are already prohibited by the natural law. At the same time,however, the natural law does not specify exactly how a murderer must be punished,

whether (for example) by means of banishment, the death penalty, or imprisonment. Suchdetails depend upon a number of factors that prudent legislators and judges must take intoconsideration apart from their understanding of the general principles of natural justice. According to Aquinas, those dictates of natural reason which human beings shouldrecognize as directly pertaining to the natural law, and which are therefore commonprinciples of human law in many different regimes, are embodied in something called thelaw of nations [ ius gentium ]. Strictly speaking, the law of nations is a human law derivedas a set of conclusions from the natural law. On the other hand, the law of nations is not thelaw of any particular regime and for this reason is sometimes equated with the natural lawitself. For Aquinas treatment of the law of nations (see ST, I -II, 95.4 and ST, II-II, 57.3).Such details are the bases of human laws that Aquinas calls determinations from thenatural law. It is important to note that both conclusions and determinations are based onthe natural law in some way, for the question of how a murderer or a thief ought to bepunished would be meaningless without the more general requirement (found in thenatural law itself) that injustice must be met with a punishment that in some way fits the


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crime. To consider the matter by way of analogy, we may take note of Aquinas ownexample in the Summa Theologiae . As he explains, legislators rely upon theirunderstanding of the natural law in the same way that craftsmen must use the generalform of a house before they build a particular house to which many architectural detailsmay be added (ST, I-II, 95.2). To press the analogy further, just as all houses must be builtaccording to certain general principles (e.g., all houses must have a roof, a foundation, windows, at least one door, etc.), so also all political regimes must enforce certain humanlaws as conclusions from the natural law (e.g., prohibitions against murder, theft, adultery,and assault). In the same way, just as a house under construction may exhibit a wide arrayof details not belonging to the general form of a house (e.g., some houses have a brickfoundation and some are on a concrete slab, some are heated with oil and some withnatural gas, etc.), so also political regimes may vary according to similarly non-essentialdetails that Aquinas would call determinations of the natural law (e.g., determining specificpunishments for specific crimes).

In Aquinas view, human laws are essential for the maintenance of any organized andcivilized society. At the same time, however, Aquinas understands human laws to besomewhat limited in scope. Several passages in the Summa Theologiae testify to this,

including Aquinas comparison between human law and divine law. As he explains, the veryreason why divine law is necessary pertains directly to those areas where human law (andeven natural law) fall short. The most obvious example of this is the simple fact that humanlaws may be in error. Regardless of whether they are intended to be conclusions ordeterminations of the natural law, human laws are made by fallible human beings and mayoften tend to hinder the common good rather than promote it. Secondly, Aquinas arguesthat, given certain circumstances, some human laws may simply fail to apply. This does notnecessarily mean that such laws are unjust or even erroneously enacted. Aquinas suggests,rather, that there sometimes arise situations in which securing the common good requiresactions that violate the letter of the law. For example, a law that requires the city gates toremain closed during certain times may need to be broken to allow citizens to enter as theyare pursued by enemy forces (ST, I-II, 96.6; II-II, 120.1). Thirdly, Aquinas explains thathuman law is unable to direct the interior acts of a man s soul. As a result, human law has adifficult time directing people toward the path of virtue, since genuine human goodnessdepends not only on external actions but upon interior movements of the soul, which arehidden. This is not to say that the coercive power of human law may not play some role inleading people to virtue, or even that virtue should not be an express goal of human law(that virtue is an express goal of human law, see ST, I-II, 92.1, 95.1.). It only means that thepower of human law is limited by the fallible intellects of the human beings who enforce itand who only see a person s external actions. Finally, human law is unable to punish orforbid all evil deeds. (ST, I -II, 91.4). By this Aquinas means that human laws mustconcentrate upon hindering those sorts of behaviors that are most damaging to thecommonwealth. Aquinas elaborates upon this by saying that the political community woulddo away with many good things if it attempted to forbid all vices and punish every act thatis judged to be immoral. Thus understood, human legislators must remember that most of

their subjects need to be governed in relation to their limited capacity for virtue. As a result,human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the moregrievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those thatare to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not bemaintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft, and suchlike. (ST, I -II, 96.2).

4. The Requirements of Justice As we have seen, Aquinas argument for the necessity of human law includes theobservation that some human beings require an additional coercive incentive to respect andpromote the common good. By means of the law, those who show hostility to their fellowcitizens are restrained from their evildo ing through force and fear, and may eveneventually come to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and become virtuous.


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(ST, I-II, 95.1). During this discussion, Aquinas mentions two specific dimensions of thecommon good that are of particular concern to human legislation. The first of these ispeace. By this term ( pax ), Aquinas means something considerably more mundane thanany sort of inner peace or spiritual tranquility that one finds as a result of moral orintellectual perfection. Instead, he seems to have in mind the requirements for maintaininga social order in which citizens are free from the aggression of wrongdoers and otherpreventable threats to safety or livelihood. In addition to preserving social order at its most basic level, however, Aquinas also makes clear in the above passage that human law shouldstrive to instill virtue, and specifically that kind of virtue which has to do with thecommon good of society. In other words, human law is interested in instilling virtuesinsofar as those virtues perfect human beings in their dealings with fellow citizens and the broader community as a whole. Later in the Summa Theologiae , Aquinas calls this kind of virtue legal justice. (ST, II -II.58.5-6; Commentary on Ari st otles Nicomac hean Ethics ,Book 5, Lecture 2).

According to Aquinas, legal justice is the political virtue par excellence . Contrary to what itsname appears to signify, this virtue does not imply simple obedience to the law. It means,rather, an inner disposition of the human will by which those possessing it refer all their

actions to the common good (Aquinas follows Aristotle in calling it legal justice becausethe law, too, has the common good as its proper object. See his Commentary on Ari st otles Nicomachean Ethics , Book 5, Lecture 2 [902]). Thus understood, Aquinas (again following Aristotle) considers it to be a general virtue. By this he means that legal justice embracesany act of virtue whatsoever, so long as the agent refers his action to legal justice s pr operobject. To use Aquinas example, fortitude is normally considered to be a virtue distinctfrom justice, since fortitude deals with the perfection of the irascible appetite and a person sability to overcome fear, whereas justice deals with the perfect ion of the will and a person sdealings with others. However, a particular act of fortitude may be referred to the commongood as its object and thus become an act of justice as well. For example, a soldier whorushes into battle displays fortitude by overcoming his fear of death, but he also displays justice if he is motivated by a love for the common good of the society he protects.Considered specifically, his action is courageous. Considered generally, it is an act of justice. As Aquinas explains, the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation tohimself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good,to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, insofar as it directsman to the common good. (ST, II -II, 58.5).

In addition to considering justice generally, however, Aquinas also considers it as aparticular virtue of its own. This seems to explain why he mentions in a later discussion ofhuman legislation that the law should promote justice in addition to peace and virtue (ST,I-II, 96.3). Regardless of the fact that justice is a virtue that legislators would like to instill within their citizens, the law also seeks to preserve justice as a certain kind of fairness. This becomes clearer when one considers Aquinas discussion of right ( ius ), which hecharacterizes as the object of justice considered as a particular virtue, and which must be

safeguarded by the law regardless of whether legislators have succeeded in implantingthe virtue of justice in the souls of their citizens. Strictly speaking, ius is understood by Aquinas as synonymous with iustum , or that which is ju st in a particular situation (ST, II-II,57.1). Aside from making their citizens just by cultivating in them the perpetual andconstant will to render to each one his right [ ius ], (ST, II -II, 58.1) legislators and judgesensure that the ius of particular situations between individuals is established or restored,that each person receives what is due to him such that a certain equality is maintainedamong citizens. When a judge orders a person to pay $100 to another for a servicerendered, for example, that judge reestablishes the equality of their relationship before theservice was performed. In such a case, the $100 owed to the provider of the service ishis ius , which must be returned if justice in this case is to be accomplished. Again, this isnot a sense of justice according to which the one paying his debt necessarily exhibitsthe virtue of justice, but in the sense that his actions (proceeding from any motivation whatsoever) reestablish that certain equality which can only be restored if the one who owesrenders no more and no less of his debt to the one who is owed. To exhibit the virtue of


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justice, therefore, is much more than to perform an action that reestablishes the equality of justice or renders to someone his ius , and yet without the notion of ius , Aquinas concept of justice as a virtue would be unintelligible. This is why the concept of ius lies especially at thecore of that part of justice which Aquinas characterizes as particular. In contrast to thegeneral virtue of legal justice, which directs the acts of the other specific virtues to thecommon good, particular justice always includes some person or group who owes some sortof identifiable debt to another.

In explaining the details of particular justice, Aquinas further distinguishes betweencommutative justice and distributive justice. The example above involving one personowing $100 to another for a service rendered would be an example of commutative justice, because it involves one private individual s debt to another private individual. It mayhappen, however, that something is owed to a person by the community as a whole. In thiscase the community distributes things according to what each individual deserves. Anexample of this sort of debt would be found in the realm of punitive justice. Since thepunishment of criminals is not a matter pertaining to private citizens, but society as a whole(ST, I-II, 92.2 ad 3), a political community owes a certain amount of punishment that must be inflicted upon a criminal if the equality of justice is to be restored. The degree of

punishment, furthermore, constitutes the ius of the particular situation. Therefore, just asin matters of exchange, where it would be unjust to fall short of or exceed the ius between buyers and sellers, it would likewise be unjust for a society to punish more or less than thecriminal deserves. In addition to punishment, a political society may distribute such thingsas wealth, honor, material necessities, or work. As Aquinas explains, however, distributive justice seldom requires that society render an equal amount (good or bad) to its members.Following Aristotles teaching in the Nicomachean Ethics , Aquinas argues that the ius ofdistributive justice must be calculated according to a geometrical proportion. By this hesimply means that more should be given to those who deserve more and less to those whodeserve less. To return to the example of punishment, it would be gravely unfair to punish amurderer with the same penalty as a shoplifter. The equality that justice requires must beconsidered proportionally in the sense that greater punishments for greater crimes (andlesser punishments for lesser crimes) do in fact constitute equal treatment ( Summa ContraGentiles , III.142 [2]). Such is not the case in matters of commutative justice such as buyingand selling , which Aquinas says must follow an arithmetic proportion. By this Aquinassimply means that the good or service provided must be proportional to the value of thecurrency or commodity for which it is exchanged (ST, II-II, 61.2; Commentary on Ari st otles Nicomachean Ethics , Book 5, Lecture 5).

To observe how this teaching is applied to particular situations in the political community,it is helpful to consider Aquinas famous discussion of usury. Usury inherently constitutes a violation of commutative justice, according to Aquinas, because it creates an unfairinequality among those private individuals in society. Aquinas logic is extremelystraightforward. If I lend someone $1000 there exists a $1000 disparity in his favor. Thefact that he owes me this sum of money means that there now exists a ius that obliges him

to pay me back the money he borrowed. If, however, I charge him a 10 percent fee for theuse of the money lent, I require him to pay back $100 more than he originally borrowed. According to Aquinas, by doing this I would be charging him $100 more than what I amentitled to receive. Since he only borrowed $1000, he should only have to pay me back$1000.

Aquinas condemnation of usury has little to do with the idea that money should only belent from the motive of generosity (even if this happens to be a consequence). It is, rather, based on his notion of the nature of money itself. Contrary to most modern economictheories, Aquinas understands money to be nothing more than a medium for exchangingcommodities and thus subject to the requirements of commutative justice. Any use ofmoney beyond this purpose distorts its original function. If money can ever be considered a

commodity in its own right, it should be compared to those commodities whose useconsists in their consumption. (ST, II -II, 78.1). Its exchange value is more akin tosomething like food or wine than to a house or a tool. When someone lends his house to be
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used, it makes perfect sense to charge rent and also to repossess the house when theallotted time for renting has expired. On the other hand, it would be quite unreasonable fora grocer to charge a fee for his food and then additionally to demand the food back after it isused. As Aquinas explains, the exchange value of money should be considered more likefood than a house: Now money, according to the Philosopher, was invented chiefly for thepurpose of exchange: and consequently the proper and principal use of money isconsumption or alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very natureunlawful to take payment for the use of money lent. (It is necessary to add that Aquinasdoes allow lenders to require an additional fee under two conditions. The first would be ifmoney is lent to someone entering a business venture in which the lender shares some ofthe risk [ periculum ]. If, for example, I lend someone $1000 to invest in renting a vineyard,I am entitled to a share in his profits so long as I also agree to lose some or all of my moneyif the investment yields a net loss [ST, II-II, 78.2, ad 5]. Secondly, I may charge anadditional fee for money lent if lending causes me to suffer some loss that I would haveotherwise avoided. For example, if my loan of $1000 to a friend in need prevents me frompaying my rent and thus incurring a $100 late fee, I may justly demand $1100 in return tocover my losses [ST, II-II, 78.2, ad 1]). Again, Aquinas condemns usury because it exceedsthe ius that justice requires to exist between individuals. The same injustice would exist if

one were to take advantage of a buyer s desperation by selling a product for more than its value or to take advantage of a seller s desperation by buying something for less than its value (ST, II-II, 77.1). In either case someone falls short of or exceeds the ius of a givensituation, which is inherently contrary the equality that justice requires.

5. The Limitations of Politics As we have seen, much of Aquinas political teaching is adapted from the Aristotelianpolitical science which he studied in great detail and which he largely embraced. Perhapsthe most central Aristotelian political doctrine in Aquinas view is the inherent goodnessand naturalness of political society. It is also necessary to understand, however, that in

addition to being good and natural political society is also limited in several importantrespects, not all of which would have been pointed out by Aristotle but are unique to Aquinas teaching. As we have already seen, Aquinas believes that the human lawsgoverning political societies must be somewhat limited in scope. For example, the fact thatsomething like the practice of usury is unjust does not necessarily mean that politicalsociety can or should forbid it: Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account ofthe condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of many advantages,if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments appointed for them. (ST, II -II, 78.1 ad3). In this argument, Aquinas is making the simple point that human law is incapable ofregulating every dimension of social life. Perhaps he would elaborate that attempting topolice the practice of usury may in some cases hinder a society s ability to prevent moreserious crimes like murder, assault, and robbery (ST, I-II, 96.2). This is due to the limitednature of human law and political society itself and is one of the reasons why God has wisely chosen to apply his own divine law to human affairs. In addition to its infallibilityand the fact that it applies to the interior movements of man s soul, divine law is able topunish all vices while demanding the moral perfection from humans that God expects (ST,I-II, 91.4). Human law, on the other hand, must often settle for preventing only those thingsthat imperil the immediate safety of those protected by it. This is not to say that human lawdoes not also look to promote virtue, but the virtues it succeeds in instilling seldom fulfillthe full moral capabilities of human citizens.

Secondly, Aquinas definition of natural law as the human participation in the eternal lawalso indicates something emphatically trans-political about human nature that cannot befound in the Aristotelian doctrine to which Aquinas largely adapted his own. Whereas Aristotle had argued for the existence of a natural standard of morality, he never suggestedan overarching human community with a supreme lawgiver, and yet this is precisely what Aquinas teaching explicitly affirms (ST, I -II, 91.1-2). Not only is the natural law a


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universally binding law for all humans in all places (something that Aristotle neverrecognized), it also points to the existence of a God that consciously and providentlygoverns human affairs as a whole (also something absent from the Aristotelian teaching). Without such divine origins, the natural law would lose its legal character, since under Aquinas own definition there can be no law that does not derive from someone who hascare of the community. (ST, I -II, 90.3-4) Hence the very existence of natural law implies amore universal community under God that transcends political society. This is alsoapparent by looking at the epistemological basis of Aquinas natural law theory. As we haveseen, human beings know the precepts of the natural law by a natural habit Aquinascalls synderesis . Whereas these precepts may be reinforced by the political community,they are first promulgated by nature itself and instilled in man s mind by the hand of God.They owe nothing, therefore, to political society for their content. This is considerablydifferent from the Aristotelian doctrine that includes no teaching regarding the self-evidentfirst principles of natural morality upon which Aquinas natural law theory stands or fallsand that seems to suggest (contrary to Aquinas view) that no univers ally binding law evenexists that is not somewhat subject to change from regime to regime ( Nicomachean Ethics ,1134b33). This difference points out in a particularly striking way the un-Aristoteliancharacter of Aquinas insistence that all regimes, whethe r they realize it or not, are under

God s supreme authority and owe the binding force of their laws to the more fundamentalnatural law of which God is the sole author.

Finally, political society as Aquinas understands it is limited in an even further sense. Wemay observe this by returning to Aquinas claim that political society is natural. In onesense, of course, this affirmation of Aristotle s teaching constitutes a very high exaltation ofthe political. Only by living in political society is man capable of achieving his full naturalpotential. Thus understood politics is no mere instrumental good (as in the teachings ofmodern political thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke), but is part of the very fabric of thehuman person, and thus the individual s par ticipation in political society is a great intrinsicgood for the individual as well as for society. On the other hand, the characterization ofpolitics as natural also means for Aquinas that it falls short of man s ultimate supernaturalend. For this reason Aquinas never ceases to remind us that, although politics is natural toman and constitutes an important aspect of the natural law, man is not ordained to the body politic according to all that he is and has. (ST, I -II, 21.4 ad 3). By this Aquinas meansthat beyond the fulfillment of the natural law, the active participation in political society,and even the exercise of the moral virtues, human beings find their complete perfection andhappiness only in beatitude the supernatural end to which they are called. Of course, beatitude is only fully completed in the afterlife (ST, I-II, 5.3), but even in his terrestrialexistence man is called upon to exercise a supernatural perfection made possible throughhis active cooperation with God s grace. Precisely because it is a natural institution, politicalsociety is not equipped to guide human beings toward the attainment of this highersupernatural vocation. In this respect it must yield to the Church, which (unlike politicalsociety) is divinely established and primarily concerned with the distribution of divine graceand the salvation of souls ( On Kingship , Book I, Chapters 14-15). Again, to say that political

society is merely natural is not to suggest that it should only concern man s basic naturalneeds such as food, shelter, and safety. The common good that political authorities pursueincludes the maintenance of a just society where individual citizens may flourish physicallyas well as morally. Politics thus promotes the natural virtues (most of all justice), which arethemselves the human soul s preparation for the reception of divine grace and the infusionof the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and, above all, charity. The best one can hopefrom political society is that citizens will be well disposed to receive the grace available tothem through the Church, which transcends politics both in its universality as well as in thefinality of its purpose.

6. References and Further Reading


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a. Primary Sources

i Aquinas Political Writings in English Summa Contra Gentiles , vol. III. 1975. Trans. Vernon Bourke. Notre Dame: University of

Notre Dame Press. Summa Theologiae . 1981. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Westminster:Christian Classics.

Commentary on Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics . 1993. Trans. C. I. Litzinger, O. P. NotreDame, IN: Dumb Ox Books.

Commentary on Aristotles Politics . 1963. Trans. Ernest L. Fortin and Peter D. O Neill.In Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook , eds. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi.Toronto, ON: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Commentary on Aristotles Politics . 2007. Trans. Richard Regan. Indianapolis, IN: HackettPublishing.

On the Governance of Rulers . 1943. Trans. Gerald B. Phelan. London: Sheed and WardPublishers.

ii Two Useful Collections of Aqui nas Political Writings in English On Law, Morality, and Politics . 2002. Trans. Richard Regan. Indianapolis: Hackett

Publishing. Aquinas: Political Writings . 2002. Trans. R.W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

b. Secondary Sources

i Books Oscar, Brown. 1981. Natural rectitude and divine law in Aquinas: an approach to an

integral interpretation of the Thomistic Doctrine of Law . Toronto: Pontifical Institute ofMediaeval Studies.

Di Blasi, Fulvio. 2006. God and the Natural Law: A Rereading of Thomas Aquinas . SouthBend, IN: St. Augustine s Press.

Finnis, John. 1998. Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory. Oxford University Press. Gilby, Thomas. 1958. The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas . Chicago: University of

Chicago Press. Hall, Pamela M. 1994. Narrative and the Natural Law: An Interpretation of Thomistic

Ethics . Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Kempsall, M.S. 1999. The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought. Oxford

University Press. Keys, Mary M. 2006. Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common

Good. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Malloy, Michael P. 1985. Civil Authority in Medieval Philosophy: Lombard, Aquinas, and

Bonaventure . Lanham: University Press of America. Maritain, Jacques. 1951. Man and the State . Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Maritain, Jacques. 1947. The Person and the Common Good . New York: Scribner s. Maritain, Jacques. 2001. Natural Law Reflections of Theory and Practice. St. Augustine s

Press. McInerny, Ralph. 1997. Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas

Aquinas, Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press. McInerny, Ralph. 1992. Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice . Washington DC:

Catholic University of America Press. Nemeth, Charles. 2001. Aquinas in the Courtroom: Lawyers, Judges, and JudicialConduct. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.


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Porter, Jean. 2004. Nature As Reason: A Thomistic Theory Of The Natural Law. Wm. B.Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Simon, Yves. 1993. Philosophy of Democratic Government . University of Notre DamePress.

Simon, Yves. 1992. The Tradition of Natural Law: A Philosophers Reflections. FordhamUniversity Press, 1992.

Simon, Yves. 1980. A General Theory of Authority . University of Notre Dame Press.

ii Articles and Chapters Bleakley, Holly Hamilton. 1999. The Art of Ruling in Aquinas De Regimine

Principum, History of Political Thought 20: 575-602. Blythe, James. 1986. The Mixed Constitution and the Distinction between Regal and

Political Power in the Work of Thomas Aquina s, Journal of the History of Ideas 47: 547-565.

Brown, Montague. 2004. Religion, Politics and the Natural Law: Thomas Aquinas on OurObligations to Others, Skepsis 15: 316-330.

Brown, Oscar. 1979. Aquinas Doctrine of Slavery in Relation to Thomistic T eaching onNatural Law, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 53: 173-181. Crofts, Richard. 1973. The Common Good in the Political Theory of Thomas Aquinas, Thomist 37: 155-173.

Degnan, Daniel. 1982. Two Models of Positive Law in Aquinas: A Study of the Relationshipof Positive and Natural Law, Thomist 46: 1-32.

Dewan, Lawrence, O.P. 2002. Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes, Thomist 66(2): 275-309.

Dewan, Lawrence, O.P. 2000. St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Politi cal Good ,Thomist 64 (3): 337-374.

Dewan, Lawrence, O.P. 1996. Natural Law and the First Act of Freedom: MaritainRevisited Maritain Studies 12: 3-32.

Eschmann, I.T. 1958. St. Thomas Aquinas on the Two Powers, Mediaeval Studies 20: 177-

205. Eschmann, I.T. 1946, Studies on the Notion of Society in St. Thomas Aquinas, PartI Mediaeval Studies 8: 1-42.

Eschmann, I.T. 1943. A Thomistic Glossary on the Principle of the Preeminence of aCommon Good, Mediaeval Studies 5: 123-166.

Finnis, John. 2001. Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment, American Journal of Jurisprudence, 46: 3-36.

Finnis, John. 1998. Public Good: The Specifically Political Common Good in Aquinasin Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work ofGermain Grisez , ed., Robert George, (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press) 174-209.

Finnis, John. 1987. Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Some Comments andClarifications, New Scholasticism 61: 307-20.

Finnis, John. 1981. The Basic Princip les of Natural Law: A Reply to RalphMcInerny, American Journal of Jurisprudence 26: 21-31.

Foley, Michael. 2004. Thomas Aquinas Novel Modesty, History of Political Thought 25:402-423.

Fortin, Ernest. 1987. Thomas Aquinas In The History of Political Philosophy , eds. LeoStrauss and Joseph Cropsey. University of Chicago Press, 248-275.

Froelich, Gregory. 1993. Ultimate End and Common Good, Thomist 57 (4): 609-619. Froelich, Gregory. 1989. The Equivocal Status of the Common Good, New

Scholasticism 63: 38-57. Gelinas, E.T. 1971. Right and Law in Aquinas, Proceedings of the American Catholic

Philosophical Association 45: 130-138. Grisez, Germain. 1965. The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on

the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2, Natural Law Forum 10: 168-201. Henle, R.J. 1990. Sanction and the Law According to St. Thomas Aquinas, Vera Lex 5-6.


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Kreyche, Robert. 1974. Virtue and Law in Aquinas: Some ModernImplications, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 5: 111-140.

Koritansky, Peter. 2005. Two Theories of Retributive Punishment: Immanuel Kant andThomas Aquinas, History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (4) 319-338.

Kries, Douglas. 1990. Thomas Aquinas and the Politics of Moses, Review of Politics 52: 1-21.

Lee, Patrick . 1997. Is Thomas Natural Law Theory Naturalist? American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71: 567-587.

Lee, Patrick. 1982. Aquinas and Scotus on Liberty and Natural Law, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56: 70-78.

Lustig, Andrew. 1991. Natural Law, Property, and Justice: The General Justification ofProperty in Aquinas and Locke, Journal of Religious Ethics 19: 119-149.

Lutz- Bachman, Matthias. 2000. The Discovery of a Normative Theory of Justice inMedieval Philo sophy: On the Reception and Further Development of Aristotle s Theory ofJustice by St. Thomas Aquinas, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 9: 1-14.

McInerny, Ralph. 1980. The Principles of Natural Law, American Journal of Jurisprudence 25: 1-15.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1996. Natural Law as Subversive: the Case of Aquinas, Journal of

Medieval and Early Modern Studies 26: 61-83. Osborne, Thomas. 2000. Dominium regale et politicum: Sir John Fortescue s Response tothe Problem of Tyranny As Presented by Thomas Aquinas and Ptolemy of Lucca, Medieval Studies 62: 161-187.

Pakaluk, Michael. 2001. Is the Common Good of Political Society Limited andInstrumental? Review of Metaphysics 55: 57-94.

Pope, Stephen. 1991. Aquinas on Almsgiving, Justice and Charity: An Interpretation andReassessment, Heythrop Journal 32: 167-191.

Porter, Jean. 1989. De Ordine Caritatis: Charity, Friendship and Justice in Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae, Thomist 53: 197-213.

Regan, Richard. 1986. The Human Person and Organized Society: Aquinas. In The Moral Dimensions of Politics : New York: Oxford University Press: 37-46.

Regan, Richard. 1981. Aquinas on Political Obedience and Disobedience, in Thought 56:77-88. Rosario, Tomas. 2004. St. Thomas on Rebellion, Philosophia 33: 72-85.

Ross, James. 1974. Justice is Reasonableness: Aquinas on Human Law andMorality, Monist 58: 86-103.

Rowntree, Stephen. 2004. Aquinas Economic Ethics Profoundly Anticapitalistic? Vera Lex 5 (1-2): 91-111.

Schall, James. 1998. On the Most Mysterious of the Virtues: The Political andPhilosophical Meaning of Obedience in St. Thomas, Rousseau, and YvesSimon, Gregorianum 79 (4): 743-758.

Schall, James. 1957. The Totality of Society: From Justice to Friendship Thomist 20: 1-26. Schols, Sally. 1996. Civil Disobedience in the Social Theory of Thomas

Aquinas, Thomist 60: 449-462.

Scully, Edgar. 1981. The Place of the State in Society according to Aquinas, Thomist 45:407-429. Seebohm, Thomas. 1986, Isidore of Seville versus Aristotle in the Questions on Human

Law and Right in the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 11: 83-105.

Sigmund, Paul. 1993. Law and Politics in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas , ed.Kretzmann, Norman (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Stump, Eleonore. 1998. Aquinas on Justice Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 71: 61-78.

Weithman, Paul. 1998. Complimentarity and Equality in the Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Theological Studies 59 (No. 2): 277-296.

Weithman, Paul. 1992. Augustine and Aquinas on Original Sin and the Function ofPolitical Authority, Journal of the History of Philosophy 30: 353-376.

Weithman, Paul. 1990. St. Thomas on the Motives of Unjust Acts, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 63: 204-220.


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