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Transcript of Thesis r.keijzer ma european policy
I
National Foreign Policy And The Common Security And Defence Policy:
The ‘Big Three’ And Large-Scale Military Operations Under The CSDP
Case studies: Libya and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
MA Thesis in European Studies
Graduate School for Humanities
University of Amsterdam
Author: Remmert Keijzer
Main Supervisor: dr. C.W.C. Reijnen
Second Supervisor: dr. mr A.C. van Wageningen
April, 2013
I
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. C.W.C.
Reijnen, for his guidance and support throughout this entire process. His encouragement and
generous assistance have contributed to the great pleasure I experienced writing this thesis.
It is to my mother and father that I dedicate this thesis and my diploma to. Throughout my entire
life my parents have unconditionally supported and loved me, regardless of the choices I
believed were best for me. Without their support and love I would not have been able to
accomplish what I have accomplished.
Mom, Dad, thank you for everything.
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List of Abbreviations
Council Council of the European Union
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
EEAS European External Action Service
EEC European Economic Community
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HHG Helsinki Headline Goals
HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy
IR International Relations
LT The Lisbon Treaty
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
QMV Qualified Majority Voting
TA Treaty of Amsterdam
TEU Treaty of the European Union
TM Treaty of Maastricht
TNC Transitional National Council of Libya
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNOCHA United Nation Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC United Nations Security Resolution
US United States of America
WEU Western European Union
WWII World War Two
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements I
List of Abbreviations II
Table of Contents III
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Design 3
1.2 Methods of Analysis 4
1.3 Case selection 4
2 Historical Overview of the CSDP 6
2.1 Development of the CSDP 6
2.1.1 Western European Union 6
2.1.2 Petersberg Tasks 7
2.1.3 The Maastricht Treaty 8
2.1.4 The Treaty of Amsterdam 8
2.1.5 The European Security Strategy 9
2.1.6 The Lisbon Treaty 10
2.2 Conclusion 11
3 National Foreign Policy and the CSDP 13
3.1 France and the CSDP 13
3.1.1 Post-WWII 14
3.1.2 Post-Cold War 15
3.1.3 Post-9/11 17
3.1.4 France’s CSDP 18
3.1.5 IR Theory and the CSDP 19
3.2 Germany and the CSDP 20
3.2.1 Post-WWII 20
3.2.2 Post-Cold War 21
3.2.3 Post-9/11 22
3.2.4 Germany’s CSDP 23
3.2.5 IR Theory and the CSDP 24
3.3 The United Kingdom and the CSDP 25
IV
3.3.1 Post-WWII 26
3.3.2 Post-Cold War 26
3.3.3 Post-9/11 27
3.3.4 The United Kingdom’s CSDP 28
3.3.5 IR Theory and the CSDP 29
3.4 Conclusion 30
4 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the CSDP 33
4.1 Operation Concordia 33
4.2 France and Operation Concordia 35
4.3 Germany and Operation Concordia 36
4.4 The United Kingdom and Operation Concordia 37
4.5 Conclusion 38
5 The Libyan crisis and the CSDP 41
5.1 The Libyan crisis 41
5.2 France and the Libyan crisis 42
5.3 Germany and the Libyan crisis 45
5.4 The United Kingdom and the Libyan crisis 47
5.5 Conclusion 48
6 Conclusion 53
References 60
1
1 Introduction
In 2011 the world witnessed profound changes taking place in large parts of North-Africa and
the Middle-East. Autocratic leaders were brought down by their people who had enough of the
restrictive measures they had been a victim of for so many years. The civil unrest that had
spontaneously broke out in Tunisia soon spilled over to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria.
Citizens demanded their leaders to step down in order for democracy to be introduced. These
civil uprisings have been met with violent responses from authorities and have, in some cases,
led to civil wars.
For many Western countries the events of the Arab Spring came unexpected. Although
many of them supported the people’s cry for democratic changes, no serious efforts were made
to actively involve themselves in these domestic conflicts. However, having witnessed the
atrocities committed by Colonel Gadhafi in Libya, an international coalition of the willing
intervened militarily which eventually led to the downfall of the dictator.
On 20 March 2011 this coalition of the willing conducted aerial bombardments after the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1973. This Resolution permitted the
coalition to enforce a no-fly zone over the North-African country. After a week, mission control
was handed over from the coalition, which was mainly led by the United States of America in
military and intelligence contributions, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The civil war in Libya has proven to be a perfect test-case for the European Union (EU)
to see if it is able to fully maximise its military capabilities. Several preconditions that were most
favourable for the EU were made in the run-up to the military operation: Security Council
Resolution 1973 authorised the use of force; regional support in the form of a request made by
the Arab League; and the US made it clear that it would not take the lead as it has done so many
times before.
However, the possibility of an EU military intervention in Libya was quickly rejected
since no agreement could be reached between the 27 EU Member States. Considering that this
crisis has occurred near its periphery, and recollecting the EU’s total absence during the
Yugoslav wars, it is surprising that the EU did not respond to the Libyan people’s cry for help.
The European Union’s handling of the civil war in Libya has been labelled as passive, slow and
incoherent (Brattberg 2011, p. 1). This is most surprising considering the tough talks expressed
prior to the military intervention by France, the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent, Germany.
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The conflicting national foreign policies posed the biggest constraint on the EU’s effectiveness
to intervene in Libya. This thesis will therefore try to answer the following research question:
Will the different perceptions that the ‘Big Three’ have of the CSDP hinder the EU’s capability
to conduct future large-scale military operations?
By selecting two case studies, Libya and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM), this study will try to answer this question by comparing two military operations.
Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), on the one
hand, was considered to be a successful military operation. On the other hand, the Libyan crisis
can be depicted as a large-scale military operation in which the EU, as a whole, did not
participate in. With the selection of the two case studies this thesis will show how the ‘Big
Three’, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, portray the EU’s Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) during a moment of civil unrest near its borders and which preconditions
need to be in place in order for the ‘Big Three’ to approve EU military involvement.
Furthermore, this thesis will reconstruct the type of argumentation that played a role in their
considerations to help develop the CSDP throughout a time-period of sixty years. It will do so by
not just analysing the official political point of view but also by reviewing whether these official
statements were indeed matched by costly (in)action. These analyses can be linked to an
analytical framework that will focus on three aspects that are essential for European military
integration: the technical aspects of the CSDP; its decision-making structure; and EU-NATO
relations. These three aspects are areas in which a parallel position of Member States is essential
for further integration in security and defence and, above all, reflect essential features of national
strategic culture and hence help to identify how convergent, or divergent, the French, German
and British preferred versions of the CSDP are.
Chapter 2 of this thesis will provide an overview of the development of the CSDP
throughout the years. Chapter 3 will assess the CSDP’s development from a French, German and
British perspective in three different time-periods, whereby a clear distinction between these
Member States’ foreign policy shall be made visible. Special attention shall be given to the
events that helped shape and develop their perception of the CSDP in this chapter. In chapter 4 a
closer look shall be awarded to the type of reasoning these countries upheld prior and during
Operation Concordia that was deployed in the FYROM. It is essential to analyse the conditions
that led to the EU’s approval of this small-scale military operation as a comparison can be drawn
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with the Libya crisis, the case study that will be treated in chapter 5. By comparing the two case
studies in the final chapter, a conclusion can be drawn about the EU’s possibility to conduct
large-scale military operations. This thesis will argue that the EU is capable of conducting large-
scale military operations, but that certain preconditions need to be in place in order for the ‘Big
Three’ to give their approval.
1.1 Research Design
The primary objective of the Treaty of Lisbon (LT), which entered into force on 1 December
2009, was to allow the EU to become a more effective global actor. Compared to its predecessors
the LT contains several amendments which apply to the EU’s foreign and security policy, the
most important one being the expansion of the Petersberg Tasks which allows the EU to cover a
wide range of possible military options, including joint disarmament operations, post-conflict
stabilisation and the fight against terrorism. However, despite these amendments, the Libya crisis
has made it clear that these changes, which should have made it easier for the EU to act more
active and coherent, did not lead the EU to intervene militarily. The dependent variables in this
thesis, therefore, are the failure of an active and coherent European approach to the Libya crisis
on the one hand and the success of its first military operation, Operation Concordia in FYROM,
on the other hand.
By taking an in-depth look into the perceptions the members of the ‘Big Three’ have
towards the CSDP, several independent variables come in play which have resulted in Member
States’ cooperative or non-cooperative behaviour throughout the years. Some of these
independent variables are: attachment to multilateralism and pacifism; pursuing national interests
through the CSDP; geo-political events; Euroatlantic relations; US pressures; counterbalancing
Member States’ dominance; and strong focus on ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’. These
independent variables support the statement that the future development of a European defence
capability is driven more by external than by of ideological susceptibilities the ‘Big Three’ hold
(Giegerich & Wallace 2004, p. 178).
It should be noted that this thesis will deal primarily with the military and defence aspects
of the CSDP and its operations. The main argument for this is that the connection between
foreign policy and CSDP will be most apparent in its military operations. The ability to
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effectively use force to achieve political ends is of utmost importance for the EU’s plans to
maintain security through CSDP.
1.2 Methods of analysis
To answer the research question two different methods shall be applied. The method of process
tracing attempts to identify the intervening causal process between independent variables and the
outcome on the dependent variable, in this case Operation Concordia and the Libya crisis
(Bennett & Elman 2006, pp. 459-460). It is an indispensable tool which carefully maps the
process and explores the extent to which it coincides with prior expectations about the creation
of, for instance, national foreign policies (Ibid., p. 462). By using primary (official documents,
public statements etc.) and secondary sources (literature, press accounts etc.) it is believed that
the method of process tracing can be applied to its fullest.
This study also tries to provide a conceptual theoretical framework for each individual
member of the ‘Big Three’ by reconstructing the type of argumentation they upheld during the
development of the CSDP in a time-period of sixty years. Through this conceptual framework,
and by analysing the dominant approaches that other authors have constructed, a specific
International Relations theory to each individual member of the ‘Big Three’ can be applied
which helps to not only answer this thesis’ research question but also to see whether or not
theoretically based explanations of CSDP from a national perspective are possible. It is therefore
necessary to explain the variation among the three with regard to their preparedness to
communitarise security and defence affairs. This thesis will not provide the same IR frameworks
for the other policy fields in which the EU is involved such as economic and social integration.
1.3 Case selection
In order to analyse the dependent and independent variables that played a role during Operation
Concordia and the Libya crisis, a closer look shall be awarded to the responses of France,
Germany and the United Kingdom. This thesis shall focus solely on the member of the ‘Big
Three’ since they are seen as the countries that help shape and formulate the EU’s Common
CSDP (King 2005, p. 46). Because of their economic, historical and political size, these
countries have the biggest influence on other EU countries, notably the smaller to medium sized
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ones. With their combined military strength these countries are the only ones who can lead and
participate in a military operation.
The independent variables that led to the EU’s decision to support and deploy a military
operation in FYROM came about in a time when its Member States were aware of the US pivot
to the Asia-Pacific region, thereby devoting their attention away from Europe. Above all, the
EU’s absence during the Yugoslav Wars has raised awareness of the necessity of creating an
autonomous security and defence policy. The use of the word autonomy in this thesis is defined
in relation to NATO and the US.
During the Libyan crisis these Member States showed diverging views with regards to
the correct usage of the CSDP which eventually led to the EU’s absence during the crisis.
Notably France and the United Kingdom were the biggest advocates for military intervention,
although the latter preferred NATO as the most credible actor to intervene. Germany only
wished to support a humanitarian operation and strongly opposed military intervention.
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2 Historical Overview of the CSDP
Of the many external factors that have influenced the development of a common European
security policy, the most important one was the end of the Cold War from which a new European
security environment was born. With the end of the Cold War the bipolar world disappeared, the
Soviet threat vanished and the fall of the Berlin Wall led to the unification of East- and West
Germany (Sens 2007, p. 9). In recent years it has become clear in recent years that the dominant
American presence in Europe is slowly starting to diminish. The US favours a stronger economic
and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, meaning that Washington expects the EU to
take responsibility over its own security (Howorth 2012). The Libyan crisis, however, has shown
that the EU is not yet capable of conducting large-scale military operations near its periphery.
Therefore, the main challenge for the EU in the upcoming years is to find common ground on
defence and security issues, the so-called ‘high politics’ or ‘ultimate bastion of sovereignty’
(Bretherton & Vogler 2006, p. 163; Smith 2011, p. 64).
This section will provide background on the development and creation of the CSDP up to
the Libya crisis and will provide special attention to the cornerstones that helped shape the CSDP
throughout the years.
2.1 Development of the CSDP
The development of a European security and defence policy in the post-World War II
environment was facilitated by the continued presence of a Soviet threat and the dream of
European integration (Sens 2007, p. 7). The European continent had been overwhelmed by
thousands of wars throughout its history and it was only since the end of WWII that Europe
started to consider cooperating in the field of security and defence. It is therefore important to
take a closer look to the development of the CSDP in order to understand the contemporary
issues in a more comprehensible manner.
2.1.1 Western European Union
After WWII several European countries were convinced about the necessity of creating a stable
European security environment. Therefore, in 1948 the Western European Union (WEU) was
founded in order to establish a firm basis for European economic recovery; to promote the unity
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and encourage social and economic integration of Europe; and it was a response to possible
Soviet involvement in the countries of Central Europe (Ibid.). Most importantly, the WEU was
intended to guarantee the safety of the Member States who had signed the treaty encompassing a
‘mutual assistance’ clause and demonstrated to the US that Europe was capable to participate in
a post-World War II security environment (WEU 2010).
However, in the years following the creation of the WEU it became clear to many that
NATO, which was founded in 1949, was the most credible actor in safeguarding European
security. Therefore, no serious commitments were made to the WEU by its Member States since
it would remain fully dependent on NATO for its practical capability. Considering the fact that
its military command structure was integrated into that of NATO and its military assets were
negligible, the WEU proved to have a more symbolic meaning (Rafnsson 2011, p. 14). The
European Economic Community’s (EEC) Member States clearly preferred the transatlantic
defence structure over a European one (Gross 2009, p. 4)
The WEU was considered to be the first step in the creation of the CSDP. There were,
however, many more steps to be taken as the Cold War period reflected the “desirability of
cooperating in the construction of a peaceful and prosperous Western Europe” (Bretherton &
Vogler 2006, pp. 163-164). Therefore, the focus of the EEC during the Cold War period was
placed on economic and social integration (Ibid., p. 164).
2.1.2 Petersberg tasks
With the breaking-up of the Soviet Union a new security environment in Europe was created in
which the EU could no longer solely depend on American security guarantees. The possibility of
a Western-Eastern war had vanished which meant the EEC had to adapt to this new environment
in which it had to approach the newly independent eastern European states and in which it had to
respond to the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia (Sens 2007, p. 9). In light of these changes
the EEC chose to set a list of military and security priorities. In practice, this meant that the
Member States agreed to deploy their troops and resources under the authority of the
reinvigorated WEU.
The Petersberg tasks, which were adopted at the Ministerial Council of the WEU in 1992,
cover a wide range of possible military missions which were formulated as followed:
humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks for combat forces in crisis
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management, including peace-making. These tasks were eventually incorporated into the Treaty
of the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty of Lisbon (LT) which now includes ‘joint
disarmament operations’, ‘military advice and assistance tasks’, ‘post-conflict stabilisation’ and
‘the fight against terrorism’ (Article 43, paragraph 1 LT).
2.1.3 The Maastricht Treaty
The reinvigorated WEU, however, was quickly submerged by larger attempts to infuse the now
called EU with a stronger and more independent external policy component which became
known as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), one of the three pillars of the EU
under the Maastricht Treaty. The CFSP was intended to create synergies between its Member
States by creating common strategies through joint actions and common positions (Sens 2007, p.
12).
However, there were some serious limitations to the CFSP, more specifically the
consensual decision-making procedures which meant that every Member State reserved the right
to veto a military operation under the CFSP. The Yugoslav Wars, in which the EU was absent,
exposed the lack of a cohesive foreign policy (Ibid., pp. 12-13). During these wars NATO was
the only security actor capable of providing security in the Balkans. The failure of the EU of
providing military support to NATO underlined the shortcomings of the CFSP which led to some
unprecedented changes (Bretherton & Vogler 2006, p. 5; Gross 2007, p. 4). The Balkan Wars
can even be seen as the raison d’être of the CSDP in its early years.
2.1.4 The Treaty of Amsterdam
With the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam (TA) the post of High Representative (HR) for the
CFSP was created. The HR would advise the Presidency of the Council on all CFSP matters and
could represent the Council of Ministers abroad. The TA also provided for the gradual
development of a common defence policy although it did not commit its Member States to a
common defence (Sens 2007, p. 13).
The deep split over the creation of a common EU defence policy was shown by France
and the United Kingdom who, bilaterally, signed an agreement which called on the EU to “have
the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to
use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Franco-British
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Joint Declaration 1998). In light of the Yugoslav Wars, the decline of American security
presence on European soil, British fear that NATO’s role would be diminished and French desire
to create an autonomous security identity eventually led to this joining of forces. The 1998 Saint
Malo agreement, however, did start discussions on the then called European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) and sought out, for the first time in its history, to create an autonomous
European military capability (D.R. Smith 2011, p. 13).
During this same period, the EU launched the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG),
encompassing the deployment of an army corps consisting of 50,000-60,000 troops, 100 ships
and 400 aircraft deployable at 60 days’ notice and sustainable for one year. Its aim was that, by
2004, the EU would be capable of conducting two military operations, under the Petersberg
tasks, simultaneously. In 2004, however, due to a lack of political commitment, the EU approved
the Helsinki Goal 2010, extending the timeline with six years. This lack of political commitment
was made evident by the signing of a joint EU-NATO declaration in 2002, named the Berlin Plus
agreement. This agreement guaranteed the EU the use of NATO’s structures and assets but it
also highlighted the lack of political will to the ESDP project as it seriously strained the
development of a real autonomous defence capability. The US and other Atlanticist countries
were concerned that the development of an ESDP threatened the existence of NATO (Sens 2007,
p. 13). Therefore, it was in their interest that the ESDP would be subsumed under the Alliance.
Some Member States’ desires for an autonomous ESDP were driven by the wish to free
themselves from their reliance on the US (Ibid.).
2.1.5 European Security Strategy
The events of 9/11 had a significant impact on the European security environment (Sens 2007, p.
15). The US post-9/11 discourse of unilateralism, as witnessed by its invasions of Iraq and
Afghanistan, provided the EU the opportunity to adopt new roles and responsibilities which were
acknowledged in the European Security Strategy (ESS) (Bretherton & Vogler 2006, p. 27).
European divisions over the US unilateralism prompted discussions over setting up a common
European threat assessment based on diplomatic and strategic interests (Sens 2007, p. 17). The
ESS created cohesion and a strategic roadmap for the Union which was looking for ways to give
weight and authority to its common foreign policy (Gross 2007, p. 46; Ojanen 2006, p. 86). It
was at this time that the EU, for the first time in its history, conducted both small-scale military
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operations and civilian operations in Africa and the Balkans, ranging from a police-training
operation in Kosovo to a peace-keeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The Iraq war and the ESS pushed the EU towards a softer, civilian/military side of ESDP
(Simón 2012, p. 104) which was, according to the French and the Germans, necessary for the EU
to promote an alternative to the “dominant Washington Consensus within the existing global
institutions” (Habermas 2009, p. 57). As was the case in the Cold War period, the US’
dominance on the international scene allowed the Europeans to distance themselves from US
military unilateralism while benefiting from it for their own economic development and social
integration (Simón 2012, p. 109). Furthermore, during this period the EU expanded with several
new Member States as a result of which the Union gained more economic and political power.
But this enlargement also hampered the development of a military ESDP since most of these new
Member States viewed the Alliance as the only actor capable of guaranteeing them from a
possible post-Soviet hostile Russia (M.A. Smith 2006, p. 11).
2.1.6 The Lisbon Treaty
The final chapter in the history of a European common defence capability in the run-up to the
Libya crisis is the impact the Treaty of Lisbon (LT) had which renamed the ESDP into the
CSDP. This treaty introduced some prominent changes which have affected the CSDP greatly.
Some of these changes were: expanding the Petersberg tasks (as mentioned in paragraph 2.1.2);
the introduction of the mutual assistance and solidarity clause; the creation of a Permanent
Structured Cooperation (group of Member States who commit themselves to cooperation in the
area of capability development); and it created the position of High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) who oversees the European External Action
Service (EEAS).
The wording of the mutual assistance- and solidarity clause, however, are labelled as
rather vague since it does not refer to military means and most importantly, it says that it “shall
not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”
(e.g. giving NATO a higher status) (Art. 42-7 TEU; Simón 2012, p. 105). It is not, however, the
wording of these clauses that pose the biggest constraints to an effective CSDP but the
incoherence of many Member States’ security policies and a lack of material contributions
required for military intervention (Menon 2011, p. 76). The problem of the CSDP under the LT
11
is Member States’ willingness to spend the amount of money required for defence and to spend it
wisely (Ibid, p. 86). Some go even further by arguing that the changes the LT brought about
made the situation even worse as it did not take into account the evolution of the geopolitical
environment, as the crisis in Libya so clearly have shown (Simón 2012, p. 112). The fact that
Member States retained the ‘unanimity rule’ in the LT for military missions revealed the still
present ‘sovereignty reflex’ which hamper effective and speedy decision-making (Alecu de Flers
2008, p. 12) and it thus represented a weak compromise between different national preferences
and priorities (Menon 2011, p. 78).
2.2 Conclusion
During the Cold War Europeans did not felt the need to construct an autonomous military and
defence capability since NATO provided them with security guarantees in a bipolar world. The
focus of the EU was put on economic and social integration as a consequence of which it was the
only multilateral framework with no security policy of its own (Rieker 2006, p. 512).
The post-Cold War period and the events of 9/11, however, dramatically changed the
way in which Europeans constructed their identity in an ever more US unilateral led world. The
Balkan Wars and the sudden appearance of independent central and eastern European states and
their desire to join the EU led to some significant changes allowing the EU begin formulating in
what is now known as the CSDP.
The subsequent treaty changes have awarded the EU with the possibilities to conduct
large-scale military operations but it is because of political will and material shortcomings that
the EU was, and perhaps still is, incapable of conducting these operations. It has shown,
however, that it is capable of conducting CSDP missions ranging from civilian missions and
(small-scale) military missions to police training missions since it has been engaged in 25
different operations. The fact that Member States could find agreement on approving these
missions made it clear that the EU adapted to the global demand for various forms of
international security (M.E. Smith 2011, p. 2). Although some of these missions have proven to
be successful, a large part of them have not achieved their political objectives and, above all,
have not created the lasting political impact the EU set out to accomplish (Bickerton et al. 2011,
p. 5; French Defence White Paper 2008, p. 76l; M.E. Smith 2011, pp. 60-61). Furthermore, the
softening of the CSDP may have had negative effects on Europe’s military credibility as the EU,
12
especially in the 2000s, put more emphasis on multilateralism and comprehensiveness than on
providing ‘hard’ security (Simón 2012, p. 104).
13
3 National Foreign Policy and the CSDP
This chapter highlights the manner in which EU foreign policy was or was not used as a way of
managing a transition away from identifiable national strategies to a common European strategy.
A closer look shall be given to the foreign policies of the ‘Big Three’ during the CSDP’s
development, cutting it in three periods, all prior to the Libyan crisis. These periods are: the post-
World War II period, the post-Cold War period and the post-9/11 period. These different periods
cut across a time-frame of 60 years. Moreover, this chapter will reconstruct the type of
argumentation that played a role in their considerations to help develop the CSDP and attempts
to frame these types of argumentation into an IR theory from which a clear distinction between
the three can be observed. It will do so by not just analysing the official political point of view
but also by looking at the specific national interests in play through which it becomes possible to
review whether these official statements were indeed matched by costly (in)action. In addition,
the analyses will also look at the specific national interests at play which can be linked to the
independent variables.
As mentioned before, the ‘Big Three’ occupy a leading role in the construction of a
CSDP. As this section will show, the positions of these countries vis-à-vis the development of
the CSDP and its usage has changed over time. Since they are considered as the main drivers
behind the CSDP, it is important to analyse this pattern of behaviour from which it becomes
possible to deduct their rationales behind the construction of the CSDP.
3.1 France and the CSDP
France’s relationship with Europe, more in particular with the CSDP, has shifted in recent
decades. In order to understand these changes, France’s foreign policy is best explained in terms
of its domestic politics and the ideological structure of international politics. Therefore, this
paragraph seeks to assess the nature of these changes in French strategy and identifies its driving
factors in three different periods.
14
3.1.1 Post-World War II
During the Cold War the EU underwent a period of strong economic growth, political stability
and European integration. This, however, left France excluded from what they perceived was an
American directorate (Simón 2013, pp. 9-10). The humiliating defeat in World War II and the
dominating US influence in Europe over the next decades was a severe blow to the French
grandeur and its self-perceived global status (Ibid). The French would never allow another
country to dominate its security interests and therefore, Charles de Gaulle, president of France
from 1959 to 1969, committed himself to restoring French pride, meaning national strategic
autonomy and European autonomy under French leadership (Ibid.).
France’s foreign policy during this period became known as Gaullism, consisting of the
following two components: military independence from both the US and the Soviet-Union; and
creating and maintaining a strong relationship with its former colonies (Bickerton 2011, p. 47).
In short, France had only one foreign policy goal in the Cold War period: to restore its position
in world politics (Rieker 2006, p. 515). This French notion of grandeur has even been traced
back to the outbreak of the French Revolution, a time in which they believed that spreading
French norms and values through Europe was considered a moral obligation (Belkin 2009, pp. 3-
4).
For the French, autonomy of a European defence capability was considered a top priority
as it was believed that by strengthening Europe its national interests and its position in the world
would be best served. This means that the EU was meant to be used as a tool for a ‘French-led
block against US and Soviet dominance by a German-French entente” (Bickerton 2011, p. 50).
However, German reluctance to join this block was hampered by the fact that it preferred a close
relationship with the US over a French-led block with strong anti-American sentiments (Ibid.)
Despite strong French anti-US sentiments, France relied heavily upon US security
guarantees which deterred the Soviet Union and assured that Germany would remain weak and
dependent to the West, ensuring French leadership in Europe (Simón 2013, pp. 10-11). It realised
that the only way for the EU to become a credible security actor was through either
supranationalism or working closely together with Germany. Both solutions were not an option
to France since this would have meant it would have to give up its leading role in Europe (Ibid,
p. 11). Therefore, it did not choose to actively push for an autonomous European security
strategy.
15
French foreign policy was a product of the turbulent political times in the 1950s and
1960s in which a deep social conflict broke out by the collapse of the French empire. This,
combined with the impact of the colonial wars and the diminishing French role on the global
scene all led up to the Gaullist vision of grandeur (Bickerton 2011, p. 50). This vision, however,
was not ideologically driven but was a ‘realist’ view of what France believed were to be part of
International Relations as France sought out to create a European defence capability, fully aware
that the US provided them with security guarantees against a possible hostile Soviet Union
(Menon 1995, p. 20). By using the EU as a tool the French hoped that they could retain back
their role on the international scene.
3.1.2 Post-Cold War
The end of the Cold War changed the geopolitical realities that were in existence ever since the
end of World War II and it raised the issue of the role of the EU in providing European security
and France’s preservation of her status. Especially the prospect of a reunified Germany and the
resulting concerns over a French marginalisation in Europe led to a different French foreign
policy attitude. But perhaps most importantly, the American troop withdrawals from Europe and
the possibility of threats that would no longer hit the US but Europe, for instance the Yugoslav
Wars, played a key role in the change of French policy (Menon 1995, p. 22).
With the fall of the Soviet Union a unilateral world order was created in which the US
became the dominating actor. In this new world order France saw the necessity to push for the
creation of an autonomous European security strategy, bearing in mind the Soviet exclusion,
Germany’s strengthening, NATO’s rule and the absence of any clear security threats (Menon
1995, p. 20; Simón 2013, p. 13). A European security strategy would fulfil all of France’s
wishes: placing a strong and unified Germany within a multilateral setting and opposing US
dominance (Ibid., p. 12). France and Britain joined forces by signing the Saint Malo agreement
which was an expression of French desire to form an autonomous security capability. France and
Britain, however, differed greatly on the ESDP’s level of autonomy and its implications for
Euroatlantic relations (Bickerton et al. 2011, p. 3). Whilst many in France saw the agreement as
the birth of a ‘Europe politique’, in Britain it was viewed as an instrument to improve European
military capabilities and to revitalise NATO (Ibid.).
16
Throughout the 1990s, France opposed all NATO expansion outside the field of
territorial defence and resisted any EU-NATO cooperation which it saw as hampering EU
autonomy in the field of foreign policy (Meimeth & Göler 2011, p. 195; Simón 2013, p. 2). This
French behaviour was a continuation of a Gaullist notion born out of distrust of American
motives (Meimeth & Göler 2011, p. 195). The possibility of eastern enlargement in the 1990s
was first expressed by NATO and France was convinced that this would benefit the US and
Germany greatly as both countries supporteds NATO’s enlargement. French involvement in the
EU and NATO enlargement process during the 1990s was therefore motivated by their desire to
exert some influence over NATO’s enlargement (Simón 2013, p. 13). This non-cooperative
behaviour of France resulted in American unwillingness to support an autonomous ESDP,
thereby aided by the United Kingdom, which has led to the reform not of the ESDP but that of
NATO.
However, during the 1990s France realised that the EU was incapable of conducting
large-scale military operations as became visible during the Yugoslav Wars. French fears over a
passive EU with its German ‘soft power model’ posed a serious threat to the EU’s strategic
autonomy. It therefore reached out to NATO to counterbalance this pacifist trend as was
expressed by French support for the NATO operation in Kosovo (Ibid., p. 14).
In the post-Cold War period France has struggled to create its own foreign policy
identity. On the one hand it opposed NATO expansion which would hamper the creation of an
autonomous ESDP, but on the other hand supported the Alliance to oppose German pacifism.
This attitude was best expressed by French president Chirac who stated that “[...] the
construction of a European defence is a major ambition of our country. We want the Europeans
to get the capacity to take common decisions and to undertake military operations within the
framework of comprehensive crisis management. [...] This does not mean that it will replace the
Atlantic alliance, which remains a legitimate framework for collective defence.” (Chirac, as cited
in Rieker 2006, p. 14).
An attachment with Gaullism still remained but with neither the domestic nor the
international support for it (Menon 1995, p. 24). EU foreign policy was no longer considered to
be a tool for French interests but was seen as a substitute for an unclear French foreign policy.
17
3.1.3 Post-9/11
The events that took place on 9/11 and the resulting US unilateralism rule would, according to
the French, damage European autonomy in foreign, security and defence policy. The French
believed that a greater emphasis on an independent ESDP was needed and was extremely
hesitant on any EU-NATO cooperation (Simón 2013, p. 5). French foreign policy in this period
was born out of a need to balance US unilateralism and it therefore identified multilateralism as
its core objective (Ibid.). Earlier concerns over German ‘pacifism’ and its influence on Europe
were put in the backburner in the early 1990s. France had additional concerns over US’ support
for Israel in an anti-Western Middle Eastern region. By opposing this dominant US behaviour
the French political elite enjoyed great support from France’s large Muslim population
(Čmakalová 2010, p. 119).
As a result of US unilateralism the EU started to develop a ‘comprehensive approach’
which represented a clear shift towards the softer, civilian/military side of ESDP (Simón 2012,
pp. 103-104). This approach does not only consist of the use of force but allows the EU to use its
diplomatic and economic tools.
Although French focus was put on the ‘comprehensive approach’, they feared that too
much focus on the civilian aspect would come at the expense of a military ESDP (Simón 2013,
p. 17). Under president Sarkozy France reached out to the US to mitigate the consequences of
US focus on the Asia-Pacific region and German reservations to the use of force. By reaching
out to the US, amongst others by re-joining NATO’s military command structure, France hoped
that the advance of ‘civilian power’ Europe and the ‘crippling’ of the EU’s strategic potential
could be stopped (Ibid., p. 19). Some, however, believe that France’s Atlanticist turn was used in
order to enhance European defence cooperation. By re-joining NATO’s military structure France
believed that it could convince the EU’s eastern Member States to develop an autonomous ESDP
(Bickerton 2011, p. 54). Moreover, by re-joining the NATO command structure France would be
able to align itself with countries of its policy choice and through NATO it could constrain US
dominance (Čmakalová 2010, pp. 119-120).
As was the same during the post-World War II and the post-Cold War period, France is
too dependent on American security to truly support an autonomous CSDP although calls have
been made to ”reinforce the European defence capability and play an active role in the dynamic
renewal of NATO” (French Defence White Paper 2008, p. 96). The EU’s apparent inability to
18
use its military tools to address instability in its neighbourhood poses a problem for France and
the Atlantic connection guarantees stability and French influence in Europe’s region (Simón
2013, p. 22). However, France is still convinced that through the EU it is able to uphold its status
as an international actor (Čmakalová 2010, p. 118).
3.1.4 France’s CSDP
In the French Defence White Paper 2008 and its 2013 update, the French government has spelled
out its ambitions for the CSDP as it strives for a more "united, stronger and more assertive
Europe" (French Defence White Paper 2013, p. 69). With regards to the CSDP’s technical
aspects it wants the EU being able to conduct military operations at the highest intensity, with an
intervention capacity of 60,000 troops or up to three medium military as well as several small
civilian operations simultaneously for a minimum period of one year (French Defence White
Paper 2008, p. 82). The Permanent Structured Cooperation, as mentioned in paragraph 2.1.6,
should not have a minimum threshold of participating countries (Ibid.). In its 2013 update,
France is in favour of “developing and consolidating European partnerships […] aimed at
reinforcing the CSDP” (French Defence White Paper 2013, p. 69). The bilateral defence
agreement it has signed with the UK supports this statement (Ibid., p. 70). France wishes to go
even further by expressing the desire to introduce rules for the procurement of common defence
equipment and by introducing financial solidarity within the CSDP (Ibid., pp. 84-87).
Furthermore, France believes that an autonomous permanent European capability for steering
and planning should be placed under unified strategic leadership in Brussels from which the
EU’s military and civilian missions should be guided (Ibid., p. 84). Additionally, calls have been
made to create a jointly built weapons system; air mobility capabilities; aero-naval capabilities; a
European statute for reservists for civilian and military personnel; and to boost capabilities for
analysis and anticipation (Ibid., pp. 82-85).
The second aspect of the analytical framework focuses on the Euroatlantic relations.
France expresses the wish to “close the recurring debate over a putative a priori division of
labour” between the EU and NATO as these divisions have damaged EU-NATO relations
(French Defence White Paper 2008, p. 95). France hopes to forge a renewed strategic partnership
between Europe and the US as NATO needs an EU capable of shouldering a growing share of
the burden in the stabilisation of external crises, as the Libyan crisis has made clear and, on its
19
turn, the EU needs an Alliance capable of performing its defence missions and which strengthens
the links between Europe and North America (Ibid., p. 96). The drop in defence budgets in
Europe following the financial crisis poses serious operational constraints on NATO. These
problems should be addressed by the pooling and sharing of resources (French Defence White
Paper 2013, p. 73).
With regard to the decision-making aspect of the CSDP, France argues that a collective
approach to decision-making and action should be promoted (French Defence White Paper 2008,
p. 115). It is remarkable, however, that in the 2013 update it stresses its independence in
decision-making as it clearly identifies the option to use military instruments unilaterally (French
Defence White Paper 2013, p. 55). It therefore prefers CSDP to be of an intergovernmental
nature (Ibid., p. 71).
3.1.5 IR theory and the CSDP
French investment in the CSDP-project can be framed into a ‘structural realist’ IR theory. From
the analysis, two clear features can be deducted which are in line with the ‘structural realist’
theory such as: using the CSDP as a balance of American power; and using the CSDP to balance
German power in the EU (Rynning 2011, p. 27). It is argued that the development of the CSDP
represented an act of ‘balance of power’ on behalf of France and was caused by the dominant US
security discourse during and after the Cold War (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 271; Weiss 2012, p.
660). This position was exemplified by French President Chirac who stated that: “any
community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one and provokes reactions.
That’s why I favour a multipolar world in which Europe obviously has its place” (Ford 2003).
The Balkan Wars have made it clear to France that the EU should autonomously manage security
problems on Europe’s periphery since it does not believe that the US to will always be present
and because the French, unlike the British, simply do not agree in the way the US addresses
these problems as was made visible in the early 2000s (Posen 2006, pp. 150-151).
At the same time, however, France never really departed from bandwagoning with
NATO, thereby locking-in the US in European security affairs. This is indicative of the logic
underpinning French involvement in the CSDP: as long as the EU is willing to contribute France
is willing to work through the EU (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 280).
20
French fears over a dominant (unified) Germany and the threat it could pose for European
security led France to believe that containing German power within an institutionalised setting
would ensure long-term peace in Europe (Rynning 2011, p. 27; Weiss 2012, p. 660). In the
2000s, fears over possible German aggression faded but was soon replaced with the dramatic
effects the ‘comprehensive approach’ could entail for the EU’s credibility as a security provider.
The claim that French involvement in the CSDP can be framed into a ‘constructivist’
theory, in which the sharing and diffusing of common ideas, norms and beliefs among Member
States lead to some sort of common identity, insufficiently covers the aspects the ‘structural
realist’ approach offers (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 66; Wagnsson 2010, p. 1090). It has been
argued that France advocated and promoted a European military policy which resulted in a
paradigm change taking place within the EU (Dyson 2010, p. 160). French involvement in
multilateral frameworks, in which their Gaullist ideas, norms and beliefs are shared, was simply
born out of ‘structural realist’ notion in which France wanted to restrain US dominance and
create a division of labour between the two (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 82).
3.2 Germany and the CSDP
This paragraph will provide a brief overview of Germany’s stance towards the development of
the CSDP ever since its defeat in WWII. Germany quickly adapted to the new security
environment in which institutionalism and multilateralism were considered key components of
its foreign policy. It will become clear that not much has changed over the past 60 years in which
German public guilt over its violent history played a pivotal role in its attitude towards the
CSDP.
3.2.1 Post-World War II
During the Cold War West Germany relied heavily upon US security guarantees against a
possible hostile Eastern-Germany which was under Soviet control and it was during this time
that West-Germany maintained a solid and strong relationship with the US. However, during the
Cold War West-Germany had to find a balance between US demands to contribute to NATO and
West-German public hostility against military participation (Speck 2011, p. 4). This public
hostility became known as ‘principled pacifism’ resulting in a West-German defensive role
within NATO (Ibid., p. 3). West-Germany preferred a commitment to social market democracy
21
and multilateralism over the development of an autonomous European and/or German military
strategy (Chen 2012, p. 21).
Maintaining a close relationship with the Western powers became the leading policy in
the Cold War as Germany believed that a strong relationship and commitment to multilateralism
would serve German interests best: dismantling of discriminatory measures and support for re-
unification (Ibid., p. 140). This policy of multilateralism led to a European integration whereby
Germany developed a co-operative image. This co-operative image of Germany helped develop
the German ‘civilian character’ that became leading in the decades to come (Ibid., p. 142). There
was a consensus in West-German politics not to develop and restructure their armed forces, like
France had done, arguing that a collective defence, under NATO, was preferred over the
protection of its national interests (Meimeth & Göler 2007, p. 197). Like so many other EU
Member States, West-Germany did not support an autonomous European defence capability
since NATO already fulfilled this role during the Cold War.
3.2.2 Post-Cold War
One of the biggest challenges for Germany in the post-Cold War period was dealing with rising
international expectations about its re-unification and its reluctance to take on the leading role in
Europe (Bickerton 2011, p. 39). Its new status as the most powerful and biggest country in
Europe did not mean that Germany looked for a new security identity. It still accepted NATO as
the only actor capable of providing hard security (Chen 2012, p. 157). In the 1990s continuity in
the field of German foreign policy became a key component: its relationship with the US
remained important for Germany and it made sure that the US, under the umbrella of NATO,
stayed involved in European security affairs (Ibid., p. 157); and Germany stayed involved in
multilateral frameworks which was seen as a key element of German post-World War II
economic and political success (Speck 2011, p. 4). It therefore did not actively push for an
autonomous European defence strategy.
However, German support towards an autonomous ESDP became visible during the
Kosovo War which created a sense of public vulnerability and made it clear that Europe could no
longer depend solely on US military power (Bickerton 2011, p. 45; Dyson 2010, p. 168). In the
latter half of 1999, when Germany had the EU Presidency, it helped bridge the gulf between the
British and French interpretations of the CSDP (Howorth 2004a, p. 224). German support for the
22
ESDP was motivated by its wish to stay actively involved in security issues within an
institutionalised and multilateral framework without itself having to militarise as it was believed
that through these multilateral institutions its interests could be best served (Haftendorn &
Kolkmann 2004, p. 476). Moreover, Germany feared to be left out in the agreement as the UK
and France forged a close relationship during the negotiations (Ibid., p. 470; Howorth 2004a, p.
220).
Its image of a co-operative ally failed to offer them with the tools to act effectively in
times of international upheaval. Its participation in the Kosovo operation did not change the
German security identity since continuity was still its main goal, but it did change the means in
achieving this goal, leaving the ‘civilian power’ identity of Germany intact (Chen 2012, p. 159).
In the 1990s the ESDP helped Germany adapt to its status as Europe’s powerful country
but without having to change its strategic culture which was based on non-intervention and non-
military tools.
3.2.3 Post-9/11
Anti-US sentiments in Germany started to rise when the US decided to invade Iraq without a UN
mandate. Germany, together with France, publicly opposed the war thereby showing a great
divide between the ‘Big Three’ as Britain supported the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein.
With its decision to oppose the Iraq War, Germany had not just given up its traditional middle
ground in transatlantic and European affairs but it had also given up its role as ‘balancer’ within
the EU as a direct consequence of US unilateralism (Duke 2009, p. 406). It cannot be excluded,
however, that part of the German motivation to oppose the Iraq War were electoral
considerations as Chancellor Schröder was elected for a second term during the run-up to the war
(Speck 2011, p. 3). It should be noted that the Iraq War, according to Germany and France, was
not really about the war itself but about the "authorisation of coercion in global security
governance by the most powerful country and the threat it posed to international co-operation"
(Lindley-French 2004, p. 11).
By opposing US unilateralism and supporting a ‘comprehensive approach’, Germany
joined forces with France thereby constructing a new German security identity: that of a ‘civilian
power’ Germany which concentrated more on the other tools that were available in managing
(rising) conflicts (Chen 2012, p. 156). This ‘civilian power’, however, did damage European
23
citizens’ desires to address humanitarian crises through military intervention (Youngs 2002, p.
106).
Although Germany was capable of taking the lead role in Europe to develop an
autonomous ESDP, Germany still preferred NATO over the ESDP to provide Europe with
security guarantees. Instead, it wanted the EU to concentrate on the civilian power aspect of the
CSDP as became clear during the 2000s when the EU conducted 25 out-of-area operations.
Strengthening European defence autonomy was considered an addition to NATO, not an
alternative, as opposed to what France believed.
German security strategy was, and is, based on two different aspects: on the one hand the
German political elite has to adhere to its international obligations as one of the leading countries
in the EU, but on the other hand it has to take into account the pacifistic nature of the German
public (Göler 2011, p. 1). This reluctance to contribute militarily to any out-of-area operation is a
clear consequence of the Westpolitik policy that originated during the Cold War. The success of
this period, expressed through German economic growth and re-unification, did not lead the
country to change its role on the international military scene; continuity and multilateral
cooperation, albeit it with a new discovered self-awareness was its main ambition.
3.2.4 Germany’s CSDP
The German Defence White Paper of 2006 does not give much clarity about the manner in which
Germany portrays the CSDP with regards to its technical aspects. It reconfirms the developments
made throughout the years as references have been made to the HHG and the EU Battle Group
concept, an EU force consisting of 1,500 troops designed for rapid and resolute action at any
given moment. The German Federal coalition agreement of 2009 states that the EU should be
equipped with its own planning and leadership capabilities (Coalition Agreement 2009, p. 168).
As like France, Germany also believes that the pooling and sharing of resources would benefit
the EU greatly but it does not elaborate on this as it fails to provide clear-cut recommendations.
It does, however, show support for the creation of a European army under full (EU)
parliamentary control, but with a strong focus on civilian crisis management capabilities (Ibid.;
German Defence White Paper 2006, p. 38).
Euroatlantic relations are considered to be of great value as NATO remains the EU’s
strongest element of common security (Coalition Agreement 2009, p. 169). Therefore, Germany
24
is determined to remove all obstacles which hinder EU-NATO cooperation and tries to exploit
common potential between the two and will particularly campaign for a more efficient
coordination of EU-NATO activities since this will benefit the efficiency of both organisations
and conserves resources (Ibid.; German Defence White Paper 2006, p. 40). It is unclear,
however, how it will achieve this since it fails to provide concrete suggestions.
With regards to the CSDP decision-making structure, Germany is a strong advocate of a
European Security and Defence Union as part of a fully developed Political Union as they
believe that “only a strong, united Europe […] can help to shoulder responsibility in overcoming
the challenges to collective security” (German Defence Policy Guidelines 2003, p. 11; German
Defence White Paper 2006, p. 33).
3.2.5 IR theory and the CSDP
The development of the CSDP from a German perspective can, according to some, be attributed
to different IR theory approaches. For instance, Germany’s co-operative image, its strong belief
in multilateralism and its focus on ‘civilian power’, can be framed into a ‘neofunctionalist’ IR
theory (Risse 2005, p. 304). This theory argues that integration in one sector will create strong
incentives for integration in other sectors (Chen 2012, p. 8). It has even been said that the
German federal state structure explains this ‘neofunctionalist’ CSDP integration as federal states
are more prepared to share sovereignty (Ibid.). However, when reviewing the development of the
CSDP from the three national perspectives, it is hard to agree with the ‘neofunctionalist’ theory
since the evolution of the CSDP was the result of negotiations and geo-political events, such as
the Balkan Wars and the Iraq War. Some have even stated that it is impossible to create a spill-
over effect in a supranational setting, especially in the field of ‘high politics’ (Bickerton et al.
2011, pp. 8-9). Furthermore, it does not correlate with German resistance over forming an
autonomous European defence capability during the Cold War while embracing it after
unification.
Others say that German perception of the CSDP can be framed in the theory of ‘social
constructivism’ since Germany invested in international security institutions such as NATO and
the CSDP, and it enabled states to gain security by negotiating a shared sense of international
order with its allies (Berenskoetter & Giegerich 2010, p. 410). With regards to the CSDP, it
strongly conformed to Germany’s identity as a ‘civilian power’ (Ibid., p. 411). Framing Germany
25
into a ‘(neoclassical) realist’ and a ‘institutionalist’ theory is unconvincing since their
involvement in the CSDP was neither a balancing act against the US nor to constrain them as the
former theory would argue (Rynning 2011, pp. 26-27). Only in the early 2000s did Germany
oppose US unilateralist behaviour but it kept on preferring US involvement in security matters.
There is, however, one feature of this theory that can be applied to German involvement in the
CSDP: the shaping and using of the ideologies of ‘Atlanticisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ by the
German political elite for their own domestic political agenda, as was the case in the early 2000s
(Dyson 2010, p. 192). The theory of ‘institutionalism’, however, is unconvincing since this
would have meant that Germany considered NATO to be insufficient and therefore invested in a
new security institution (Berenskoetter & Giegerich 2010, pp. 410-412).
This study argues that German investment in the CSDP can be framed into the ‘social
constructivist’ IR theory. The analysis presented above shows that the German co-operative
attitude in multilateral frameworks was shaped by the interaction of history, tradition and culture
which allowed Germany to preserve its identity (Ibid., p. 452; Schmidt & Zyla 2011, p. 486).
The logic of ‘social constructivism’ is to negotiate one’s favoured norms in order not to
undermine a strong international community that can act effectively and Germany did just that
(Wagnsson 2010, p. 1096). Through ‘social constructivism’ a collective identity within a
multilateral world-order was created which eventually led to security and institutional loyalty
expressed through ‘civilian power’ Europe.
3.3 The United Kingdom and the CSDP
In recent years the United Kingdom has opposed many of the reforms drafted to put a halt to the
crisis the EU has been in for the last years. Not only did the UK oppose these financial reforms
but it also opposed the creation of an autonomous CSDP for a long period of time. This
paragraph will show that British behaviour towards the EU was partly constructed in order to
protect the ‘special relationship’ it enjoys with the US and their fear of being marginalised in
Europe.
26
3.3.1 Post-World War II
With the end of WWII the British Empire and its influence in the world slowly started to
diminish and the United Kingdom had to adapt to a changing security environment in which the
United States took a leading role. However, the UK continued to define its foreign policy from a
global perspective and because of the fact that the UK only joined the EU in 1973 they could not
contribute to the development of a European defence capability (Chen 2012, p. 109). It was
during this time that the UK favoured a strong UK-US relationship with the US while neglecting
UK-EU relationships (Ibid.). As a consequence of this preferred relationship the UK played a
pivotal role in NATO’s dominance in Europe’s security environment since no other viable
security actor was present (Dietl 2003, p. 157). Also, by using American strength the UK hoped
to reinforce its threatened global status which also provided them with an alternative to a
European commitment (Wallace 1991, p. 71).
This independent position from and in Europe during the Cold War became a key aspect
of British foreign policy as it considered committing itself to an autonomous European defence
capability. The UK believed that the transatlantic link provided them with security and, above
all, would prevent the US from returning to ‘isolationism’ which could result in a French-led EU
(Bartlett 1992, p. 16). It perceived any attempts made by France to promote a European defence
capability as competing with NATO which, for the UK, was the only actor capable of deterring a
nuclear Soviet-threat (Dietl 2003, pp. 156-157).
3.3.2 Post-Cold War
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the changing global security environment did not change the way
in which the UK viewed the ESDP in the early 1990s. It went on to prefer the ‘special
relationship’ it had with the US over an autonomous European security strategy as it blocked any
supranational initiatives that could weaken or undermine NATO, resulting in the qualified
majority voting decision-making procedure in the Maastricht Treaty and its veto over a French-
German proposal to merge the WEU with the EU (Gowland & Turner 200, p. 216). Additionally,
further institutionalisation of the CFSP might result in more sovereignty being transferred to
Brussels, a feature the British opposed (Chen 2012, p. 127).
It was not until 1998 when the UK made a monumental shift towards the development of
the ESDP. The Yugoslav Wars had made it clear that they could no longer solely depend on US
27
military strength. By joining forces with France at Saint Malo the UK hoped that by
strengthening the European defence pillar, most notably the crisis management aspect, the
survival of NATO could be guaranteed as Blair argued that “strengthening European defence
capability will [...] strengthen NATO” (Blair 1998; Howorth 2004a, p. 221). Another plus side to
this agreement was to ensure British involvement in European affairs so it could counterbalance
French-German dominance (Gross 2009, p. 5). The UK and France, however, differed greatly in
the correct usage of the ESDP as the former considered the ESDP to be complementary to
NATO and not autonomous. According to Blair: “[...] On defence, we are engaged in a debate
that will ensure Europe’s defence policy proceeds absolutely consistently with NATO” (Blair
2000). By supporting the ESDP the UK hoped to permanently lock the US into the European
security structures and to revitalise NATO (Dietl 2003, p. 153; Howorth 2004a, p. 222). This
pro-European policy undertaken by Blair could not be interpreted as a change in policy for he did
not alter British stance towards the intergovernmental framework, it was rather a tactical shift in
policies (Dover 2007, p. 24).
British foreign policy was not just based on the ‘special relationship’ it enjoyed with the
US but was also based on the biased ideological assumptions of the great British Empire which
collapsed in the second half of the 20th
century (Wallace 1991, p. 70). Nostalgia for the past had
become an obstacle for the British political elite since it encountered difficulties in adapting to a
changed geopolitical environment.
3.3.3 Post-9/11
The US’ decision to invade Iraq posed a severe blow to British rapprochement expressed in the
Saint Malo agreement. The UK supported the ‘War on Terror’, thereby distancing itself from
Germany and France who opposed the US’ unilateral approach. Since 9/11 the UK moved away
from Europe which it considered to be a new and untried ally, and focused on the Atlantic
relationship (Howorth 2004a, p. 228). The divergence between the ‘Big Three’ seriously
constrained the further development of the ESDP as it became clear that the UK, once more,
preferred the Atlantic relationship over the European one (Chen 2012, p. 132). However, the UK
soon realised that by taking a non-cooperative stance it would be marginalised in Europe as it
had experienced during the Cold War (Chen 2012, p. 137). By staying involved the UK, on the
one hand, hoped to add value to the crisis-management aspect of ESDP while on the other hand
28
oppose any big changes in the decision-making procedures of the ESDP. It has even been said
that the UK is hampering ESDP’s development to prevent other countries from further deepening
military cooperation (Biscop 2012, pp. 1303-1304).
For the UK, the development of an autonomous European defence capability is
unacceptable for it will most likely undermine NATO’s role (Ibid., p. 136). The UK chooses
instead to work within NATO or through bilateral agreements as this offers more decisive action
in tackling problems without gaining consensus from states which have historically objected to
military intervention (Hurst 2011). The 2010 bilateral defence agreement with France is a clear
example of this working-method. Through this agreement, the UK is convinced that it can do
business with a country that has participated in many military operations in the past and reaching
consensus with only one EU Member State is easier than with all 27 (Ibid.)
3.3.4 The United Kingdom’s CSDP
The UK has supported the instalment of several technical aspects of the CSDP, such as the Batlle
Groups, the Berlin Plus agreement and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (UK National
Security Strategy 2009, p. 71). It believes, however, that the CSDP should solely focus on
specialised areas such as conflict prevention, mediation, stabilisation, recovery and peace-
building by using a permanent comprehensive political and strategic planning capability with
civilian and military strategic planners working together (Ibid., pp. 71-109). In its 2003 Defence
White Paper the UK expresses its support for coordinating common acquisition policies (UK
Defence White Paper 2003, p. 6). In its 2012 National Security Technology White Paper it
reconfirms this statement by saying that harmonising requirements, the pooling of resources, the
sharing of facilities and overhead costs will benefit the EU, but in particular the UK, greatly (UK
National Security Through Technology 2012, p. 30). However, the bilateral defence agreements
it has signed with France and the US have proven to be of great value to the UK and it therefore
no longer prefers doing so under the CSDP as the UK made it clear that they “generally favour
bilateral collaboration on technology, equipment and support issues, as we believe this offers the
best balance of advantages and disadvantages” (Ibid.). The UK is only supportive of CSDP
military operations when it is clear that NATO is not planning to intervene (UK Strategic
Defence and Security Review 2010, p. 62). Only then it is willing to lead and acts as a
framework nation for the CSDP (UK Defence White Paper 2003, p. 8).
29
British support for the CSDP is mainly regarded as an instrument for improving military
capabilities in order to strengthen Euroatlantic relations. Accordingly, the British government
stressed that the “UK is a strong supporter of developing EU capabilities in order to complement
NATO” (Ibid., p. 6). Furthermore, it argues that both operations should share their expertise and
develop complementary, rather than duplicate, skills and capabilities (UK Strategic Defence and
Security Review 2010, p. 62).
Similar to France, the UK stresses the importance of multilateral governance structures to
address (potential) conflicts but it explicitly mentions the “ability to act alone where we cannot
expect others to help” (UK National Security Strategy 2009, p. 62). Although it is in favour of an
intergovernmental approach to the use of military force, as the intervention in Libya and the
peace-keeping operation in FYROM have made clear, when its national interests are in play it
will remain the right to use armed force (UK Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010, p.
17).
3.3.5 IR theory and the CSDP
In response to French President Chirac’s wish to see a multipolar world in which the EU took a
firm place, Blair replied saying “the multipolar world would very quickly develop into rival
centers of power.” Instead, Blair preferred a “one polar power but which encompasses a strategic
partnership between Europe and America and other countries too” (Blair, as cited in Posen 2006,
pp. 167-168). In the post-Cold War period the UK was convinced that the US would no longer
automatically guarantee European security as it had done before (Howorth 2000, p. 34). By
actively involving themselves in the CSDP it would secure American engagement in European
security affairs and it would be on the fore-front of the future development of a European
defence capability.
The degree of satisfaction that Britain enjoyed with the power asymmetry during the
Cold War was gradually shifting as a consequence of French yearning for a European defence
capability independent from NATO (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 282). The UK sought out to
balance this by strengthening NATO through the CSDP since it was aware of the fact that NATO
would not automatically involve itself in European security affairs (Art et al. 2005, p. 190). This
approach has been labelled as ‘reformed bandwagoning’: to prove yourself useful to the US it is
30
better to involve yourself in the CSDP (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 282). It did so, amongst
others, by preserving the intergovernmental structure of the CSDP (Dover 2007, p. 3).
British involvement in the CSDP-project can therefore be framed in the ‘neoclassical
realism’ IR theory. A key aspect of this theory is demonstrating an active problem-solving
approach through which the status-quo can be restored as was exemplified with its support for
the Iraq War and to a lesser degree the CSDP missions (Wagnsson 2010, p. 1091). It has even
been argued that the CSDP was used by the UK as an instrument of government policy (Dover
2007, p. 80). The ‘neoclassical realism’ theory excludes the ‘social constructivist’ approach
which Germany personifies since restoring and preserving the status-quo for the British was
considered to be of greater importance than the sharing of common ideas, beliefs and norms as
the analysis above has made clear.
3.4 Conclusion
Throughout its history, Europe has been engulfed by thousands of wars and it was only since
1945 that Europe started concentrating on economic and social integration thereby creating a
prosperous Europe for all its 27 Member States. These successful results stand in stark contrast
with its foreign and security policy. As mentioned earlier, the ‘Big Three’ are considered to be
the main contributors to the CSDP as they possess the military, political and financial means to
influence EU foreign and security policy. By analysing their viewpoints towards the CSDP
throughout its history, it becomes clear that they all have different national foreign policies
which, unsurprisingly, result in the CSDP’s ineffectiveness.
Although the EU has been involved in many civilian/military operations outside its
border, it has not proven to be capable of conducting large-scale military operations in the 1990s
and the 2000s when the CSDP truly started being developed. For too long it has remained too
dependent on American military support as was evidenced during the Yugoslav Wars. Many
attempts have been made in order to promote the EU from being a ‘civilian’ or ‘soft’ power to a
‘hard’ power but because of specific national interests this shift has not become visible.
From the first, CSDP was characterised by marked disagreements amongst its creators as
to its ultimate nature and purpose. What becomes clear from these analyses is that the British and
German governments, in opposition to the French, understand CSDP as one institutional option
among many, and saw it as playing a supporting role to NATO. In creating a Common Security
31
and Defence Policy-identity it is necessary for the ‘Big Three’ to come to an agreement as to the
correct usage of the CSDP.
The divergent normative approaches towards this, still relatively young, EU instrument
play a damaging role in its development and usage. The analysis demonstrates that each member
of the ‘Big Three’ has tried to advance its version of normatively appropriate behaviour in the
field of International Relations. The conflicting IR theories and the ‘Big Three’s’ preferred
version of the CSDP signal a high degree of practical sophistication of the CSDP and are
difficult to combine. For the French, the CSDP was seen as balancing American power in a
unipolar world. For the British, restoring the status-quo legitimised their involvement in the
CSDP. Lastly, for the Germans, developing a sense of shared values, norms and beliefs through
the EU’s ‘civilian power’ was their motive for participation. France and the UK clearly identify
the option to use military force unilaterally, thereby denouncing Germany’s wishes to see a
CSDP Union under full parliamentary. But despite these differences the ‘Big Three’ supported
every CSDP mission that has been deployed since 2003. However, considering that these were
all relatively small in size it is difficult to make a comparison between hard military operations in
which the EU is yet to be involved in. The next chapters will provide this study with a
comparative analysis of two military operations.
From the analyses made above, clear differences can be observed between the ‘Big
Three’, the most important ones are the focus that Germany and the UK put on its crisis
management approach in comparison to the ‘hard’ security approach that France prefers and the
fact that France and Germany consider the completion and usage of CSDP as an end instead of a
means to serve national interests. In short, they disagree on the key functional role of the CSDP:
the UK believes it should act as a support arm for NATO, the Germans believe that it should
solely act as a peacekeeping/humanitarian force and the French view it as being an independent
force (M. Smith 2004, p. 258). The main point of agreement, however, is that they all have
shown to place more value to NATO in providing security than to the CSDP as the analyses so
clearly have shown. Although the US has always hoped that the EU would become a more
relevant actor in international politics it never really desired an autonomous defence capability
that would potentially represent a serious competitor to NATO (Peterson 1998, p. 11). It has
even been argued that the failure to develop a common strategy for the CSDP is linked to the
continuing dependence on the US (Kempin & Mawdsley 2013, pp. 55-56).
32
In the next chapter a closer look shall be given to Operation Concordia which has had a
positive effect on the EU’s capability of becoming a security actor. By analysing the type of
arguments the ‘Big Three’ upheld prior and during this operation, it can be shown that a certain
degree of continuity among their viewpoints towards the correct usage of the CSDP can be
observed.
33
4 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the CSDP
In 2003 the EU conducted a small military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) to coordinate international efforts in support of the correct implementation
of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. For many, Operation Concordia was labelled a success
since, for the first time in EU defence history, a military operation was conducted. It is the aim of
this chapter to analyse the type of reasoning the ‘Big Three’ upheld in giving their support to the
operation. Furthermore, it will try to answer the question why the EU was capable of approving
this relatively small-scale military operation? The answer to this question is important because it
can be compared to the EU’s absence in Libya. What are the preconditions that need to be in
place in order for the ‘Big Three’ to conduct a military operation? First, however, a brief
overview of the operation will be given as it represented a decisive shift in the balance of power
between the US and the EU and it laid the groundwork for the EU’s growing profile as a military
security actor.
4.1 Operation Concordia
As a direct outflow of the Kosovo War, civil unrest started to grow in FYROM due to ethnic
tensions between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority in which the latter group
aimed to gain more autonomy. In the late 1990s the Albanian minority was concerned about their
lack of representation in state institutions and feared that discrimination was rooted in the
Macedonian state (Mace 2004, p. 475). The Macedonian majority, however, feared that due to
these grievances, Albanian separatism could split the country in two and therefore viewed their
demands with suspicion (Ibid.).
In January 2001 the ethnic tensions came to the surface when members of the National
Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Albanian minority, attacked Macedonian police and
army units, which, eventually, led to a civil war that lasted until Augustus 2001 leaving many
dead. The international community was aware of the serious ramifications the Macedonian
conflict could have for the Balkan region. The EU and NATO, therefore, actively sought out to
mitigate the possible destabilising consequences the civil war could have which resulted in the
Ohrid Framework Agreement (Papavizas 2012, p. 56). This agreement called for the immediate
“cessation of hostilities”, the “development of a decentralized government” and securing “non-
discrimination and equitable representation” of the Albanian minority in FYROM’s state
34
institutions (Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001). The EU was appointed to facilitate, monitor
and assist in the implementation of this agreement. However, since the agreement appointed
NATO as the organisation tasked with overseeing the disarmament process, the EU could do
nothing more but focus on the civilian crisis management aspects of the agreement. It was not
until the completion of the Berlin Plus agreement, which allowed the EU to use NATO structures
and assets, that the EU was capable of providing military assistance under the Petersberg tasks.
Due to prolonged Greek-Turkish negotiations regarding the EU’s use of NATO assets and
structures Operation Concordia could not be launched at an earlier stage (McNamara 2007, p. 2).
The Berlin Plus agreement was considered essential in handing over supervision of the
Ohrid agreement in a time when France and the UK stood opposite from one another concerning
the correct usage of the CSDP and its future development. It was agreed that NATO’s assets and
capabilities had to be used as it helped maintain the transatlantic consensus on the development
of a European defence capability (Mace 2004, pp. 481-482).
On 31 March 2003, under Council Decision 7537/03, Operation Concordia was launched
and lasted until 15 December 2003 to make room for EUPOL Proxima, a police mission charged
with overseeing the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Concordia’s
predecessor, NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony, proved to be of great value to the EU’s troops
stationed in FYROM as it provided legitimacy to the EU’s presence with the Macedonian public
(Ibid., p. 481).
The effectiveness of Operation Concordia can be depicted as successful as it a) was the
first autonomous mission under the then ESDP, b) put EU troops (approximately 400) on foreign
soil and c) maintained peace in the operation’s duration (D.R. Smith 2011, p. 45). Above all, this
operation has proven to be a symbolic victory for the EU since its Member States were able, for
the first time in EU history, to agree on deploying a military mission, thereby making use of the
much contested Berlin Plus agreement. Furthermore, it demonstrated that it was able to conduct
small-scale military crisis management operations both with and without recourse to NATO
assets and showed that the EU had a longer-term view on crisis management and conflict
prevention. Concordia was therefore seen as the EU’s first step in developing a comprehensive
crisis management approach (Pentland 2011, p. 558).
35
4.2 France and Operation Concordia
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, during the late 1990s and early 2000s France hoped to, on the
one hand, counterbalance German pacifism and its economic and political power, but on the
other hand develop a strong European defence capability that was able to oppose US
unilateralism by using a more ‘comprehensive approach’. The changes in the European security
landscape had dramatic consequences for the EU and its lack of coherence and ability to
intervene in the Yugoslav Wars led France to take the lead in developing a European security
narrative (Giegerich 2007, p. 48). The then Minister of Defence, Alliot-Marie, stated that “[...]
The development of the ESDP is the only real chance for the US to see Europeans accepting at
last their full share of responsibilities and increasing their capabilities” (Alliot-Marie, as cited in
Gärtner 2002, p. 66). French consent to the deployment of a military operation in FYROM was
therefore born out of an awareness of waning US devotion to European security.
The necessity to construct a suitable mechanism under which a coherent and common
foreign policy could be carried out eventually led to the signing of the Berlin Plus agreement
which was severely delayed due to Turkish and Greek bickering. French views towards the
Berlin Plus agreement were two-fold: on the one hand it believed that it blocked the development
of a truly autonomous European defence policy since the agreement de facto meant that US
involvement was a given (Cornish 2004, p. 74). On the other hand, through Berlin Plus,
European security policy could begin to acquire substance thereby giving it potential autonomy
from the US (Ibid.). Because of the small size of Operation Allied Harmony France argued that
the finalisation of the Berlin Plus agreement should not hinder the deployment of Operation
Concordia, Germany and the UK believed otherwise (Menon 2004, p. 636).
For the French, supporting Operation Concordia was closely tied to the EU’s wider
strategy of the Stabilisation and Association Process which offered FYROM membership
perspectives into the Euroatlantic structures (Aybet 2004, p. 7; Gross 2007, p. 109). For both the
EU and NATO, their support for the Balkan region was to prevent instability spilling over that
could have had serious ramifications for the region (Ibid.).
The divide over the Iraq War, which had split Europe in two camps, also played a
significant role in French approval of the operation as they deemed it necessary to show their
international counterparts, more in particular the US, that the EU could reach coherence and
36
agreement externally over its security and defence policy in a time when France, together with
Germany, stood opposite from the UK (Haftendorn 2007, p. 171).
4.3 Germany and Operation Concordia
In the 2002 Bundeswehr outlook paper it is stated that Germany’s military commitment in
international peacekeeping missions remains on the Balkans (German Defence Policy Guidelines
2003, p. 7). The Yugoslav Wars have made Germany realise that it is necessary for them to
contribute to the multilateral frameworks it is a member of, and, above all, that the EU should be
able to act quickly and effectively across the entire spectrum of its crisis management tools
(Bickerton 2011, p. 45; Meiers 2005, p. 154). According to the 2003 Defence Policy Guidelines,
the new security environment should lead to the “[...] progressing development and
strengthening of the Euroatlantic security structures” (German Defence Policy Guidelines 2003,
p. 7). Furthermore, as was the case in the 1990s, Germany still regarded US contribution to
European security as ‘indispensable’ and believed that CSDP should supplement NATO to form
a European pillar within the Alliance (Ibid., p. 8).
Germany’s opposition to the Iraq War has, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, led them to
not just give up its traditional middle ground in transatlantic and European affairs but it had also
given up its role as ‘balancer’ within the EU. It was during this time that Germany started to
develop and support the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ towards crisis management, as was
expressed through its support for, among others, Operation Concordia. Furthermore, the EU-
NATO tensions, a direct result of the changed American security discourse after 9/11, have
strengthened German belief in multilateralism as cooperation in multilateral institutions
remained the main pillar of German foreign policy (Haftendorn & Kolkmann 2004, p. 467). For
the Germans, Operation Concordia was the perfect example of their perception of this new form
of multilateralism as several preconditions were in place: a NATO mandate served as legal basis
for the operation; the request to deploy troops came from FYROM itself; NATO’s assets and
instruments through Berlin Plus were utilised; and the Council unanimously approved the
deployment of EU troops.
Similar to France, by supporting a small military mission, with minimum risks involved
for German troops, it was able to visualise European unity and was therefore highly symbolic in
nature (Gross 2009, p. 133). Above all, prior and during Concordia Berlin wanted to retain the
37
Alliance as a transatlantic framework for action and as an instrument for crisis management
(Haftendorn & Kolkmann 2004, p. 476). It therefore deemed it essential that the Berlin Plus
negotiations were to be completed prior to deployment of Operation Concordia since this could
jeopardise Euroatlantic relations (Menon 2004, p. 636).
4.4 The United Kingdom and Operation Concordia
The UK’s special relationship with the US and NATO has always been an important aspect of
British foreign policy. In the previous chapter it was made clear that, especially after the events
of 9/11, UK support for the US became more distinctive in Europe as was expressed by British
involvement in the Iraq War and the ‘War on Terror’. With regards to the development of a
European ‘hard power’ security component the British Defence White Paper 2003 stated that
“The UK is a strong supporter of developing an EU military capability to complement NATO,
rather than competing with it” (UK Defence White Paper 2003, p. 6). Fully in line with its
European foreign policy, which was adopted during the Cold War era, the UK still recognised
the pre-eminence of NATO in providing collective defence over the ESDP. It was in the early
2000s when Britain stopped building a close relationship with its European counterparts and that
fears about the future of the ESDP started to grow (Menon 2004, p. 640).
As mentioned before, the UK, together with Germany, blocked an earlier deployment of
Concordia since the negotiations of the Berlin Plus agreement were not completed. For the UK,
completion of the agreement was deemed necessary since they feared an earlier deployment
would seriously hamper Euroatlantic relations and there still was the possibility of violent
escalation in FYROM (Ibid., p. 636). If another outbreak of violence would occur, the UK
strongly believed that the EU was not able to address this since the EU was considered to be
under-equipped and ill-trained (Howorth 2004b, p. 179). Also, as mentioned in this chapter’s
introduction, NATO enjoyed a higher level of public legitimacy in FYROM and the EU had yet
to prove itself. Concluding Berlin Plus was therefore born out of “utilitarian considerations rather
than out of a principled transatlantic preference” (Gross 2009, p. 67). Considering that the
outcomes of Berlin Plus were closely tied to British preferences of the ESDP, since it remained
bound to NATO, the UK therefore chose to support Concordia, thereby bearing in mind
Europe’s need to be capable of responding to imminent crises (Menon 2004, p. 643).
38
Furthermore, by staying actively involved in the operation, the UK believed it could shape the
ESDP to its own specifications (Watt & Norton-Taylor 2002).
The UK was aware of the fact that if it would not make concessions the EU would not be
capable of buttressing possible crises in its periphery, such as the Yugoslav Wars. The British
were convinced that their support for Concordia would enable the EU to pursue a more effective
and capable foreign and security policy (Gross 2009, p. 67). Most importantly, however, a non-
cooperative posture would marginalise their involvement in European politics, something which
they have experienced throughout the Cold War (Chen 2012, p. 137). British support for
Concordia was a pragmatic acceptance of a strategic reality and for the other European countries
British involvement in the operation was considered reassuring (Howorth 2004b, pp. 187-188).
4.5 Conclusion
Operation Concordia was the first EU military operation since the construction of the ESDP in
the 1990s and was considered to be a success as it showed that the EU was, despite the
pessimistic nature of some countries, capable of conducting a military operation in a time when
Europe was divided due to the Iraq War (Gross 2009, pp. 91-92). The fact that the first European
military operation took place in the Balkan region should hardly come as a surprise. A sense of
moral guilt and bad conscience over the EU’s lack to intervene during the Yugoslav Wars played
an important role in approving the operation (Pohl 2012, p. 12). The small size of the operation
and the absence of any serious threats in FYROM to the EU’s troops was another key aspect that
led to the ‘Big Three’s’ decision to approve Operation Concordia, an operation in which France
served as framework nation as they provided the bulk of the troops (Gross 2009, pp. 99-133;
Menon 2004, p. 641).
In the previous chapter a closer look was given to the development of the CSDP from a
French, German and British perspective. When comparing these viewpoints with the viewpoints
expressed prior and during Operation Concordia, it can be observed that all three Member States
have shown a pattern of continuation in their views towards the correct usage of the CSDP. Fully
in line with its policy of counterbalancing US unilateralism in the early 2000s, the method of
process tracing shows that France has adopted norms and policies shaped by the geo-political
events of the Balkan Wars, the Iraq War and US retreat from Europe. These events, the so-called
independent variables, resulted in France’s support for Concordia, the dependent variable. A
39
truly autonomous ESDP in the early 2000s was never a real option since France soon realised
that, as the previous chapter has shown, it needed the Atlantic connection to guarantee stability
and American involvement in European security affairs. Most importantly, Germany and the UK
did not share French views on the development of CSDP.
Similar to France, Germany adopted norms and policies that were a direct result of the
Yugoslav Wars and US unilateralist behaviour in the early 2000s. These events have
strengthened German belief in multilateralism which, on its turn, was a direct result of
Germany’s Westpolitik born in the Cold War period. Additionally, the Yugoslav Wars have
enabled the Germans to reconsider their pacifistic nature and has allowed them to discuss the
acceptability of deploying troops abroad which was also in congruence with its goal to a) assume
more responsibility on the international scene, b) to become a more credible and influential
player and c) to prevent France and the UK from dominating the ESDP (Giegerich & Wallace
2004, p. 166; Gross 2009, pp. 123-128). The Iraq War convinced Germany about the necessity of
creating a European military capability, albeit with a strong focus on civilian crisis management
(Menon 2004, p. 645). Although Germany did not approve of US unilateralist behaviour, it did
welcome the involvement of NATO in Concordia as this guaranteed continued US participation
in the Balkans, a region in which the US is considered to be an important political player (Gross
2009, pp. 130-131).
In the case of Operation Concordia the method of process tracing makes it clear that
several independent variables were in play that led the UK to support the operation. Not only did
the Yugoslav Wars contributed greatly to British consent but also the lack of actual risks present
for British troops, the small size of the operation and the fear of being marginalised in European
affairs. Furthermore, the political symbolism of the operation, in a time when the ‘Big Three’
were divided about the Iraq War, paid testimony to British political determination to contribute
to the ESDP. British involvement in concluding the Ohrid Framework Agreement and its support
for Concordia, therefore, ran counter to arguments made in the past that the UK would avoid
committing itself to European military cooperation (Gross 2009, p. 67). British motives for
involvement in FYROM were best expressed by Blair who stated that: “[…] once the EU-NATO
links are in place, I am keen to see an ESDP operation in Macedonia, to show that Europe can
play its part in bringing security and stability to this part of the continent” (Blair, as cited in
Gross 2009, p. 70).
40
By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the ‘Big Three’s’ views regarding the ESDP
had sufficiently converged to not just allow the deployment of the EU’s first military operation
but to also create a common strategy towards the economic development of the Balkan region
(Ibid., p. 104). Apart from the ‘Big Three’s’ individual arguments, several preconditions can be
observed that are depicted essential in order for any EU military operation to be approved: a)
when the consent of (local) influential actors is secured; b) when a conflict can be identified as
an opportunity rather than a challenge since France, Germany and the UK both believed that
strengthening the CSDP militarily was necessary in order to address any possible future crises
occurring near Europe’s periphery; and c) when resources are aligned in terms of command and
control arrangements as the completion and usage of the Berlin Plus agreement was testimony of
(Engberg 2013, pp. 155-156). The development of the ESDP was both the price to be paid for
continued US engagement and hence the viability of future NATO relevance, as well as the
insurance policy for limited military action in case the US proved to be reluctant (Giegerich
2007, p. 45).
In the next chapter attention shall be given to the Libyan crisis. This study shows that
although there are several differences noticeable between the two case studies which affect
Member States’ decision to approve or disapprove the missions, various similarities can be
observed. The results obtained from the cases are time-specific and the conditions prevalent are
not likely to be reproduced in their entirety. Several prerequisites for military intervention were
not in play in Libya but were present in the ‘Big Three’s’ decision to approve a military mission
in FYROM. It is therefore important to underline these differences and similarities in order to
bring forward the preconditions that need to be in place for the ‘Big Three’s’ approval of a
CSDP military operation.
41
5 The Libyan crisis and the CSDP The aim of this chapter is to firstly give a brief overview of the events that took place during the
Libyan crisis in which a coalition of the willing took the lead in aerial bombardments aimed at
ousting Libya’s leader, Colonel Muammar Gadhafi, who had brutally struck down civilian
uprisings in the North African state. A closer look shall be given to the type of reasoning the
‘Big Three’ upheld during this crisis. This chapter will try to show that different domestic and
foreign policy considerations have played a decisive role in the failure of the EU’s handling of
the Libyan crisis.
5.1 The Libyan crisis
The Libyan crisis started on February 17 2011 with massive protests in Benghazi. The uprising
was soon followed by United Nations (UN) Resolution 1970 which froze assets, banned travel of
Libyan high-placed officials and put into place an arms embargo. Despite these measures the
humanitarian situation worsened which raised the question about a possible military intervention.
On March 17 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 which implemented a no-fly
zone over Libya thereby “taking all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack
in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on
any part of Libyan territory” (UN Security Council, 17 March 2011). A few days later French
airstrikes destroyed a Gadhafi regime column about to storm the eastern city of Benghazi and
attacks on Libyan air defences followed quickly. On March 24 the military command that was in
the hands of the coalition of the willing, spearheaded by the United Kingdom, France and the
United States, was handed over to NATO since the US made it clear that they would not take the
leading role in the operation (Simón 2012, pp. 112-13).
The EU decided to go further than Resolution 1970 by sanctioning dozens of persons and
financial entities affiliated with the Gadhafi regime and it was one of the first to recognize the
Transitional National Council (TNC) as the ‘political interlocutor’ of Libya (Council Decision
2011/137/CFSP). At the extraordinary European Council session, France and the UK tried to
convince the other Member States to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya but since no agreement
could be reached the CSDP could not be used other than providing humanitarian assistance to the
Libyan people. On April 1 the Council adopted a decision on EUFOR Libya, a military operation
to support humanitarian assistance operations in Libya. However, this mission would only be
42
deployed if the UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs would request so; to date this
request has not been made.
The EU’s handling of the Libyan crisis has been depicted as “too slow, too weak, too
divided and essentially incoherent” (Koening 2011, pp. 12-13). The efforts made by the UK and
France to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya by using the CSDP’s tools did not succeed and once
again NATO did the heavy lifting by taking over the command of the operation. Although
several EU Member States contributed to the NATO-led operation, the CSDP was never
considered a viable option to intervene militarily (Menon 2011, p. 75). The belated decision to
approve EUFOR Libya can be judged as an act of symbolism or face saving rather than effective
intervention (Ibid., p. 22; Menon 2011, p. 75). Although all EU Member States agreed that
Gadhafi had to step down they differed in the way how to best achieve this. The adoption of
Resolution 1973 is a perfect example of this since Germany abstained from voting, evoking
memories of the divide during the Iraq War. The following paragraphs will analyse the role and
motivations of the ‘Big Three’ in their choice to either support or disapprove of any CSDP
involvement in Libya.
5.2 France and the Libyan crisis
According to the 2008 French Defence White Paper, the northern African region is perceived as
a “main strategic axis of special importance for historic reasons, the presence of North African
communities, language, learning, energy and economic co-operation” (French Defence White
Paper 2008, p. 45). Furthermore, it calls for the “EU to play a greater role in defence and
security” (Ibid., p. 104) and it sees itself as the driving force behind major European initiatives in
all areas of security and defence. Above all, it believes that Franco-German co-operation is the
best tool to achieve this (Ibid., pp. 75-82). What becomes clear from the White Paper is that
France is still highly supportive of an independent European security identity able to intervene
militarily in its neighbourhood. The question now rises: why was the EU unable to live up to
these French expectations? And what role did France play during the crisis?
To answer the second question one has to take into account the specific (national)
interests and motives that were in play before, during and after the Libyan crisis. The French
response to the Arab Spring has not been easy to follow. In Tunisia, where the Ben Ali-regime
was backed by French ‘policing expertise’ during the civil uprisings, France failed to act in
43
coherence with other Western states. With Egypt, France took the form of a wait-and-see
approach (Henry 2011, pp. 411-412). Having learned from these lessons, Sarkozy decided to
compensate these inadequacies during the Libyan crisis by taking on the lead role and he did so
by being the first one to unilaterally recognise the TNC as Libya’s only legitimate government, a
move unappreciated by many Member States, and the first one to use military force against
Gadhafi’s troops (Ibid., p. 412; Erlanger 2011; International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011,
p. 3). He stated that “[…] the continuing brutal and bloody repression against the Libyan civilian
population is revolting [...] the international community cannot remain a spectator to these
massive violations of human rights” (Watt & Wintour 2011).
By actively taking on a leading role he hoped to save France’s bad image in the Arab
world, prove that France still matters on the global stage, save his re-election in 2012 and defend
global human rights (Chrisafis 2011). Furthermore, the possibility of state failure would likely
increase the influx of illegal immigrants into Europe (Goldhammer 2011). But perhaps most
importantly, at a time when Washington is stepping back from its Cold War commitment to
European security, Europe has to assume responsibility for its neighbourhood. During the Libya
crisis, US Secretary of Defence Gates lamented the European allies for “shortages of spending
and political will” and a possible “irrelevance for the Alliance” (Shanker & Erlanger 2011). As
was made clear in an earlier section in this thesis, France was highly dependent on American
security guarantees. Therefore, by taking the lead role, France, together with the UK, wanted to
show the US that Europe was in fact capable of conducting military operations.
Prior to the crisis, France’s economic relationship with Libya was rather modest although
Sarkozy announced the endorsement of contracts worth €10 billion (Zoubir 2009, pp. 412-413).
This improved relationship developed in the early 2000s when French economic rapprochement
to Libya was based on the fear that American hegemony in the Middle-Eastern and North
African markets represented a genuine threat to French interests in Libya (Ibid., p. 412). The
endorsements and rapprochement, however, did not stop Sarkozy from taking the lead role. After
the crisis it was reported that the TNC had signed an agreement with France in which the former
gave Paris the right to exploit 35% of Libya’s oil resources in return for French support, claims
which both parties immediately denied (Rousseau 2011).
On a European level, by taking the lead in the Libyan crisis, France hoped to reassert to
the EU, notably Germany, that it was still leading the continent on foreign and military affairs
44
(Stratfor 2011). Still cautious about Germany’s increasing economic and political power, by
joining forces with the UK France hoped to counterbalance this German EU dominance. By
unilaterally recognising the TNC, which goes against the EU’s principle of not recognising
governments but states and which prevented the EU from developing a common strategy towards
the TNC, Sarkozy aimed to make France’s role in the conflict a leading one despite objections
from several Member States (Europa-Kolleg Hamburg 2011, p. 51; Koening 2011, p. 21). The
bilateral defence agreement that France and the UK had signed in 2010 was for the former the
perfect tool to engage itself in a joint operational and political leadership during the Libya crisis
(International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 3). In their joint letter they called on their
“European partners, our Allies, and our Arab and African friends to [...] provide support for all
possible contingencies [...] This could include a no-fly zone or other options.” (Sarkozy &
Cameron 2011). This, combined with France’s return to NATO’s military structure, would
strengthen the CSDP and not weaken it (Simón 2013, p. 22).
Since it became clear that several EU Member States did not support a military
intervention under the CSDP, an EU military operation was not an option. Aware of this, France
and the UK drafted a UN Resolution which called for the implementation of a no-fly zone which
was adopted by the UNSC on March 17. The handing over of operation-command to NATO was
a move not welcomed by France as they preferred an Anglo-French command since, according
to French foreign minister Juppé: “[...] the Arab League does not wish the operation to be
entirely placed under NATO responsibility” (Erlanger 2011). Furthermore, by working closely
together with the UK under the bilateral defence agreements and other countries in a ‘coalition of
the willing’, France hoped to diminish the role of NATO in favour of a European defence
capability (Watt et al., 2011). However, the entire operation was quickly handed over to the
Alliance which, surprisingly, Sarkozy portrayed as a Franco-American success. Sarkozy stated
that “[...] the two presidents have come to an agreement on the way to use the command
structures of NATO to support the coalition” (Ibid.). France, however, did manage to keep the
political oversight of the operation with the members of the coalition. The military command, on
the other hand, was transferred to the Alliance.
Once more, France has proven to be too dependent on American assets since the latter
one was the only actor capable of compensating European military deficiencies even though the
US took a back-stance in the conflict by withdrawing forces from direct combat already on April
45
4 (Barry 2011, p. 5; De Young & Jaffe 2011). But for France, bilateral and trilateral co-operation
offer great flexibility as the EU has proven to be incapable of providing hard security guarantees
in its neighbourhood. Not surprisingly, it is easier to convince only a small amount of countries
than 26 countries.
For France, the Libyan crisis was used to develop a strong and autonomous European
defence capability without having to recourse to NATO. According to Sarkozy: “[...] The war in
Libya is a lesson for EU foreign policy [...]. Europeans have shown for the first time that they are
capable of intervention in a decisive way, with their allies, in an open conflict on their doorstep.”
He went on saying that “[...] the world is changing. President Obama has presented a new vision
of American military engagement which involves the Europeans assuming their responsibilities”
(Rettman 2011). He may be right on the latter part of his speech but certainly not on the former
since only a limited amount of Member States contributed to Operation Unified Protector and a
military operation under CSDP was never an option. It was a French diplomat who said: “CFSP
died in Libya- we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it” (Menon 2011, p.
76).
5.3 Germany and the Libya crisis
As mentioned before, Germany was the only country of the ‘Big Three’ to abstain from voting
on UNSC 1973. Although Foreign Minister Westerwelle stated that “He (Gadhafi) has to go”, he
excluded the use of “outside intervention or foreign troops” (Westerwelle 2011). Furthermore, he
said that “every military operation claims civilian victims” (Ibid.). He was supported by
Chancellor Merkel who said: “I see no need for military intervention” (Mock & Morris 2011).
German reluctance to support this Resolution was, to some, borne out of its strategic
culture of reservation and rejection of military deployments (Göler 2011, p. 9). It has even been
argued that Germany has lacked a strategic culture ever since its re-unification (Speck 2011, p.
4). What becomes clear is that the reluctance of policy-makers to develop a military strategy
correlates with German public opinion that has shown to oppose military intervention ever since
the end of World War II. A survey had shown that 61% of the population supported Germany’s
abstention. Electoral considerations could have played a role in Germany’s decision to abstain.
However, this abstention did not do Merkel much success in the regional elections in which her
party suffered a defeat (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 2; Louati 2011).
46
When looking to geo-political interests, Germany does not appear to have any specific
interests in North Africa. Germany’s African policy is aimed to develop its economy and
military capabilities (German Africa Policy 2009). In its Defence White Paper of 2006 it does list
possible military deployment scenarios but no clear priorities have been named (Göler 2011, p.
4). The same applies for its geographical prioritisation which is labelled as “global” (German
Defence White Paper 2006, p. 33). Furthermore, it says that “[...] now and in the future, the
fundamental issues of European security can be only addressed together with the USA.” (Ibid., p.
21). Since Germany was the country calling for the imposition of economic sanctions, it is highly
unlikely that economic relations with Libya were reasons to oppose military intervention,
although Germany was Libya’s second-largest trading partner prior to the crisis (Miskimmon
2012, p. 402; Zoubir 2009, p. 406). To this date it is too early to determine what possible
commercial advantages for Germany or German companies there are in post-war Libya although
early reports find that German businesses are unwelcome in Libya (Buse & Würger 2012).
During the crisis Germany deviated from its cooperative behaviour in multilateral
institutions by abstaining on Resolution 1973 as electoral considerations and the pressures from
the Eurozone have overwhelmed German foreign policy (Miskimmon 2012, pp. 404-405). By
abstaining it “privileged short-term calculations over traditional multilateral commitments”
(Ibid., p. 405). Furthermore, non-compliance with the Libyan common position did not elicit
any sanctions for Germany concerning its international relations (Wagner 2003, p. 585).
It was made clear by Germany that a military operation under the CSDP was not an
option. Its refusal to do so has made it clear that its focus still lies on civilian crisis management,
made visible by its support for EUFOR Libya, and it was a clear sign to France and the UK that
Germany will continue to assess each military operation on its own terms: It shall not mimic
French and British policy (Ibid., p. 393). Its abstention has damaged Germany’s cooperative
image since it becomes more difficult to conduct large-scale military operations with a Member
State who is reluctant on the use of force. Moreover, the much applauded French-German axis,
which has proven to be successful in tackling the Euro-crisis, has been severely damaged by
Germany’s abstention (Weiland & Nells 2011). It has even been said that “Germany turned the
idea of a unified European foreign policy into a farce” (Erlanger & Dempsey 2011).
German handling of the crisis was a clear sign to all their European partners that it would
not participate in a military operation. German concerns were not to be found in the ends but in
47
the means of how to deal with the situation. Its increasing economic role did not lead Germany to
exert its will on EU foreign security policy and, although Germany is supportive of an effective
CSDP, the best way to address security and defence situations appeared to be through civilian
methods, a concept strengthened by the EU’s successful civilian missions and Berlin’s
preference of NATO providing hard security over the CSDP.
5.4 The United Kingdom and the Libyan crisis
During the outburst of the conflict in Libya, Prime Minister Cameron, at first, held out the
prospect of imposing sanctions instead of a military intervention. In an interview Cameron stated
that “[...] sanctions are always an option for the future if what we are seeing in Libya continues.
Of course, if Libya continues down this path, there will be a very strong argument [for
sanctions]” (Watt & Wintour 2011). When asked about the prospect of military action he stated:
“I do not think we are at that stage yet” (Ibid.). At the emergency EU summit Cameron and
Sarkozy tried to persuade their European partners to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya. Since it
became clear that Germany, amongst others, opposed a no-fly zone, Cameron quickly stated that:
“[...] the EU is not a military alliance and I don’t want it to be a military alliance. Our alliance is
NATO” (Watt et al., 2011). During the summit Cameron had made it clear that continued
planning with NATO allies should be supported to enforce a no-fly zone (Waterfield 2011).
Eventually the UK managed to endorse a no-fly zone over Libya through Resolution 1973 and
on March 24 command of the operation was handed over to NATO. For the UK, the EU would
only be utilised to impose political and economic sanctions on Libya (Chen 2012, p. 208).
Aware of the US’ pivot to the Pacific and their reluctance to take on a leading role in the
operation, the UK sought out to, as a major European military power, take the lead in the crisis
as it was the first country to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone (BBC News 2011;
International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 3). Unlike the French, who favoured a
Franco-British command structure, the UK remained an ‘Atlanticist’ in nature. This attitude
presents no surprise since the UK has unconditionally stayed on the side of the US throughout
the years. The UK’s special relationship with the US and NATO is at the centre of Britain’s
foreign policy as becomes clear when examining the British Defence White Paper. With regards
to the role of the CSDP it says that “The UK is a strong supporter of developing EU military
capability to complement NATO, rather than competing with it” (UK Defence White Paper
48
2003, p. 6). Furthermore, it says that “The UK recognises the pre-eminence of NATO as the
Alliance upon which Europe and North America depend for collective defence and global crisis
management” (Ibid.) In a House of Commons debate, prior to the military intervention, Cameron
went even further by saying that “[...] the EU is not a military alliance and there is always
hesitation about discussing military options” (Cameron 2011). This statement means that after
more than twenty years the UK still did not see the EU able to play a military role. Consequently,
similar to what the UK experienced during the Kosovo crisis, it still depended on NATO to carry
out military operations. The bilateral defence agreement signed with France was for the UK a
genuine choice that opted for bilateral cooperation instead of European cooperation with a
partner that could be relied upon, as the Libyan crisis eventually has made clear (Biscop 2012, p.
1306). Additionally, by excluding Germany in this agreement, France and the UK wanted to
profile Franco-British defence dominance in a European context (Miskimmon 2012, p. 401).
Several motives were in play for British involvement in the Libyan military operation.
Firstly, a weak state on Europe’s border would pose an imminent security threat to Europe and
other countries surrounding Libya as the UK feared a spill-over effect. Secondly, they viewed
this crisis as an opportunity to complete political reform in the Arab world. Foreign Secretary
Hague has even stated that “the gain for the British security and prosperity will be enormous”
(Hague 2011). Finally, by taking the lead in the conflict, the UK, together with France, wanted to
demonstrate their political will and military capability to NATO and the US by solving this crisis
(Chen 2012, p. 210). Just as France, the UK did not seem to have any clear specific economic
interests in Libya as it was the first country to publicly call for the implementation of a no-fly
zone. Prior to the crisis, rumours were in circulation about possible secret oil deals the British
government had struck with Libya in exchange for the release of the Lockerbie bomber
(Macalister 2009). However, as was the case for Germany and France, it is too early to analyse
what the economic advantages for the UK were by co-leading the military operation, although,
soon after the conflict ended Britain sent trade officials to Libya to ensure lucrative oil contracts
(Kirkup & Waterfield 2011).
5.5 Conclusion
The Arab Spring was the first test for the CFSP under the changes introduced by the LT but it
has failed to create a common understanding on the correct use of the CSDP by the ‘Big Three’.
49
Although it is said that the Arab Spring came unexpected for many Western countries the EU
was fully aware of the atrocities committed by Gadhafi, even prior to the Arab Spring. It has
been argued that Libya’s international rehabilitation in the 2000s, after being accused of
supporting terrorism, manufacturing nuclear weapons and cruel domestic authoritarianism, was
facilitated by trade, security and energy contributions that have served Europe well (Zoubir
2009, p. 414). Libya has proven to be Europe’s ‘perfect storm’, thereby revealing all of Europe’s
weaknesses. The EU was unable to conduct an autonomous military operation under the CSDP
as some Member States publicly opposed military intervention. Divisions among the ‘Big Three’
on how to act in Libya have caused that no serious military proposal was put on the table.
When applying the method of process tracing to the UK’s decision to support a military
intervention in Libya, several independent variables can be observed. Firstly, the UK was aware
of the fact that the US was bent on stepping back from its Cold War commitment to European
security and it hoped to gain support from several EU Member States in order to conduct a
military intervention. It therefore saw the Libyan crisis as an opportunity to take the lead in an
international conflict on Europe’s doorstep. Secondly, Cameron hoped to counterbalance
German economic and political dominance by taking the lead in Europe’s foreign and security
affairs. Thirdly, the gross violation of human rights and the possible spill-over effects to other
countries in the region left Cameron no other choice than to intervene militarily. Finally, the
British ‘Atlanticist’ nature, which has been in existence ever since WWII automatically, seems to
give preference to NATO over the CSDP. The Libyan crisis has made it clear that the UK still
sees NATO as the only actor capable of leading the operation as, according to the UK, the CSDP
should complement rather than compete with NATO. British perception of the CSDP has shown
a pattern of continuation throughout the years and Libya has not done much to change this.
Sarkozy has portrayed the Libyan intervention as a European success because of the fact
that several Member States joined the ‘coalition of the willing’. French involvement in Libya can
be attributed to several independent variables. Firstly, by taking on the lead role France hoped to
counterbalance the German economically and politically dominated EU by showing that France,
similar to the UK, is fully in charge with regards to Europe’s foreign and security affairs.
Secondly, France hoped to diminish NATO’s role as the only actor capable of providing security
and to push for an autonomous EU military operation. Thirdly, French handling of the Arab
Spring had received much criticism domestically and by intervening Sarkozy hoped to repair
50
France’s bad image in the Arab world, prove that France still matters on the global stage, save
his re-election in 2012 and defend global human rights. The crisis has reinforced the claim for
both France and the UK that further military cooperation between the two is essential to address
imminent security threats near its periphery (Barry 2011, p. 10). Therefore, although France still
favours a European military capability and it actively pushed for a common EU approach
towards Libya, the crisis has reconfirmed the fact that the EU cannot come to an agreement on
the use of force in times of international upheaval. During the run-up to the crisis French
viewpoints towards the CSDP have been consistent with the same pattern of behaviour it has
expressed throughout the years but it failed reaching its goal. In the end Europe was too
dependent on American assets to truly function autonomously.
The German role during the crisis has been a remarkable one but can be best explained by
analysing the independent variables that were in play. Firstly, its pacifistic nature played a key
role in its decision as it preferred the EU’s civilian crisis management tools as the best way to
address the crisis. Its cooperative image in multilateral fora has always characterised German
international behaviour but the Libya crisis has slightly damaged this reputation. Secondly, its
economic and political weight has created a new political conscience in which it shall no longer
mirror French and British policy. Its growing self-confidence in foreign policy means that it will
only commit itself to international operations if they are in its direct national interest
(Miskimmon 2012, p. 393). Thirdly, since WWII Germany has been very reluctant on the use of
force. During the post-Cold War period but especially during the post- 9/11 period, Germany has
put more focus on the ‘soft power’ narrative of the EU. Its non-cooperative image during the
Libya crisis and its refusal to contribute militarily can therefore be seen as a continuation of its
policy towards the CSDP: an autonomous EU military capability which should solely focus on
civilian crisis management.
The Libya crisis showed that the EU was unable to conduct a large-scale military
operation without the support of all members of the ‘Big Three’ which can be attributed to their
conflicting approach to European security and defence integration. Instead of creating a common
European approach, several Member States have chosen to join forces, thereby creating a divide
within the EU as some Member States were unable or unwilling to contribute to the operation.
An important aspect that has contributed to this unwillingness were the austerity measures
resulting from the current financial and budgetary crunch (Simón 2012, p. 111). Not surprisingly,
51
it will become more difficult for a fully operational CSDP when Member States are reluctant to
contribute financially to it. Libya has shown that the cracks in relations between the ‘Big Three’
become more visible in a moment of crisis when rapid deployment of armed forces is needed
(Miskimmon 2012, p. 398). Furthermore, those who are motivated to contribute to the success of
the CSDP are neutralised by those who oppose its strengthening (Perruche 2011, p. 1). The crisis
did show, however, that several EU Member States are capable of conducting a military
operation by joining forces, albeit said that without US support enforcing the no-fly zone would
have posed serious problems.
When comparing the Libya crisis with Operation Concordia several similarities can be
observed: a) both crises occurred on Europe’s doorstep with a high-risk of instability spilling
over to the region; b) the waning American commitment to European security was a given in
both crises; c) NATO played a supportive role in both operations; and d) both crises offered the
EU the possibility to profile itself as a ‘hard security’ actor. Despite these similarities no CSDP
operation was ever considered a feasible option. The German reluctance on the use of force and
the British preference of NATO providing ‘hard security’ played a decisive role in their handling
of the crisis.
It is not only important to highlight the similarities between the crises but also the
differences that led to the distinctive decisions in both operations. The circumstances that were
present during the crisis in FYROM and which led to the approval of Operation Concordia were
not present in Libya: a) there was no divide between the Member States of the EU on a major
geo-political event, unlike the divide resulting from the Iraq War in the early 2000s; b) the ‘Big
Three’ were under enormous pressure during the Libya crisis as the atrocities committed by
Gadhafi worsened by the day while it took the EU eighteen months to finally approve Operation
Concordia; c) the absence of any real risks of civilian casualties stands in stark contrast with the
Libya crisis, an argument that justified Germany’s abstention; d) Concordia was a relatively
small military mission; and e) the EU, unlike in FYROM, was unable to take the leading role in
the Libya crisis as it did not possess the military resources required for hard intervention.
52
6 Conclusion The development of a Common Security and Defence Policy has been characterised by different
interpretations and visions about the correct usage of this instrument. The Treaty of Lisbon has
tried to give impetus and weight to this field by trying to create a coherent and active EU foreign
policy. The civil war that broke out in Libya was the CSDP’s first test under the changes
introduced by Lisbon. However, the EU could not find agreement on the best way to address this
crisis in its neighbourhood.
This thesis has attempted to shed some light on the EU’s failure to act in Libya by
reconstructing the type of argumentation the members of the ‘Big Three’ upheld during this
crisis. It has done so by using the method of process tracing in two different case studies:
Operation Concordia in FYROM, a relatively small-sized military operation, and the Libya
crisis, a large-scale military operation. Through this method, and by analysing the dominant
theoretical approaches other authors have constructed, a specific International Relations (IR)
theory to each individual member of the ‘Big Three’ was applied. The analysis has shown that
each member of the ‘Big Three’ has tried to advance its version of normatively appropriate
behaviour in the field of International Relations, some more active than others. The conflicting
IR theories that were presented in this thesis signal a high degree of practical sophistication of
the CSDP and provide more insight to the difficulties the CSDP faces.
By having analysed their viewpoints towards the CSDP throughout a time-period of sixty
years, it has become clear that all three members of the ‘Big Three’ have shown consistency with
regards to their views on the correct usage of the CSDP throughout this entire period. But most
importantly, it has shown that these viewpoints differ too greatly to fully exercise the
possibilities that the CSDP has offered them as crucial differences in foreign policy among the
‘Big Three’ have created barriers to what can and cannot be accomplished.
France can be depicted as the biggest advocate for the creation and development of an
autonomous European defence capability. This support was a direct consequence of its swift
defeat in WWII and its following dependency on the US. Restoring its lost grandeur through the
notion of Gaullism has remained intact throughout the years. Their desire to act autonomously on
the international scene from the US and NATO, through the CSDP, is considered to be the main
driving force in their support for the CSDP and was the biggest motive for supporting Concordia
and a military intervention in Libya. By strengthening Europe it was believed that its national
53
interests and its position in the world would be best served. Another important independent
variable that led to continuous support for the CSDP was to counterbalance German political and
economical power in Europe. By focussing too much on the ‘comprehensive approach’ and
neglecting the ‘hard power’ component of the CSDP, the French feared the EU would be unable
to address possible crises with military means. However, France realised that American
involvement in European security matters was vital to address not just the crises in FYROM and
Libya but also the Soviet threat during the Cold War, the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s and the
stabilisation of the Balkan region in the 2000s. The independent variables that helped identify the
intervening causal process with its outcome on the dependent variables were:
a) restoring the lost French sense of grandeur;
b) US dominance in European and global security affairs;
c) the awareness of French dependence on American security guarantees;
d) the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region;
e) the Yugoslav Wars;
f) rising German economic and political power in Europe;
g) US unilateralist behaviour and the divide over the Iraq War;
h) counterbalancing the EU’s focus on the CSDP’s ‘soft power’ component.
French investment in the CSDP-project can be framed into a ‘structural realist’ IR theory. From
the analysis, it became clear that France wanted to restrain US dominance and create a division
of labour between the two. Additionally, it used the CSDP to balance German power in the EU.
French involvement in multilateral frameworks, in which their Gaullist ideas, norms and beliefs
were shared, was born out of ‘structural realist’ notion. French support for Operation Concordia
and a military CSDP intervention in Libya was in full harmony with its perception of the CSDP.
Ever since Gaullism became part of the French way of life on the international scene, France has
devoted itself to create an autonomous European security and defence identity with the tools to
act militarily and independently from the US and NATO.
German views towards the security and defence policy of the EU have shown a pattern of
continuation ever since the end of WWII. Maintaining a close relationship with the Western
powers became the leading policy in the Cold War as Germany believed that a strong
relationship and commitment to multilateralism would serve German interests best. This policy,
which became known as Westpolitik, proved to be of great success as its economic development
54
and its re-unification were testimony of. The success of its Westpolitik-policy has strengthened
German belief in multilateralism as cooperation in multilateral institutions remained the main
pillar of German foreign policy throughout the 1990s and 2000s, albeit it with a new discovered
self-awareness. Germany, however, did need to find a balance between, on the one hand, its
growing awareness to contribute to NATO and the CSDP and, on the other hand, German public
hostility towards the use of force. The successful ‘civ/mil’ CSDP operations, combined with US
unilateralist behaviour in the 2000s and the German pacifistic nature, led to a new German
security identity, one in which it was believed that by using the EU’s ‘soft power’ and its
‘comprehensive approach’, crises in its neighbourhood could be best addressed. Part of
maintaining a close relationship with Western powers led to German preference of NATO over
CSDP in providing Europe with security. Just like France it was aware of the necessity of
American involvement in European security affairs. The independent variables that helped shape
German perception of the CSDP and which can be linked to its support for Concordia and its
disapproval of a military intervention in Libya were:
a) its awareness of German and European dependence on American security guarantees;
b) its successful Westpolitik which has led to great economic success and German re-
unification; c) the Yugoslav Wars that highlighted the lack of a European defence and
security capability;
d) the successful CSDP missions in the 2000s that strengthened German belief in the ‘soft
power’ component of the CSDP;
e) US unilateralist behaviour in the early 2000s and the following divide over the Iraq
War;
f) its culture of reservation and rejection of military deployments.
The German perception of the CSDP can be framed in the theory of ‘social constructivism’ since
Germany invested in international security institutions such as NATO and the CSDP, and it
enabled them to gain security by negotiating a shared sense of international order with its allies.
Furthermore, it strongly conformed to Germany’s identity as a ‘civilian power’. Through ‘social
constructivism’ a collective identity within a multilateral world-order was created which
eventually led to security and institutional loyalty expressed through ‘civilian power’ Europe. In
retrospect, its refusal to participate militarily in the Libya crisis should not have come as a
surprise, its abstention in the UNSC, however, did but was a consequence of its new discovered
55
self-awareness in which it shall no longer mirror French and British policy. By abstaining it
privileged short-term calculations over traditional multilateral commitments.
Of the three, the UK can be labelled as the staunchest opponent of the CSDP. During the
Cold War period the UK developed a strong relationship with the US which it shared a similar
foreign policy with. Britain believed that by involving the US in European security affairs it
would stop the US from returning to its ‘isolationist’ status. During this period UK-EU tensions
were exemplified by French veto’s over British admission to the then EEC, as a consequence of
which the UK became marginalised in European affairs. After the Cold War the UK kept
preferring NATO over the creation of a European security and defence capability but it soon
realised that Europe needed to be able to address humanitarian crises in its neighbourhood.
British rapprochement to the EU in the late 1990s and early 2000s was born out of its awareness
of the American pivot away from Europe and to guarantee the survival of NATO since many
believed that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Alliance had lost its raison d’être.
After 9/11 Europe became divided once more as Britain opted for closer cooperation with the US
in the ‘War on Terror’. However, the fear of being marginalised once again in Europe and the
highly symbolic nature of Concordia, led the UK to support the CSDP but with close ties to
NATO. By intervening militarily in Libya, not through the CSDP but via NATO, the UK hoped
to regain its former glory as a global player by showing the US that it was capable of handling
crises as the former made it crystal clear that it would take a back-seat in managing the conflict.
In the run-up to the aerial bombardments on Libya Britain actively sought out to find allies in
Europe. This move should not be interpreted as a complete turnaround in support for a military
CSDP but was aimed at convincing their European counterparts to act swiftly and decisively in
the light of the waning American commitment to European security affairs. Throughout a time-
period of sixty years the UK has remained sceptic towards the development of an autonomous
CSDP. The ‘special relationship’ it enjoyed with the US was the main reason it opposed the
CSDP’s development as it believed the US, through NATO, was the only actor capable of
providing security. The CSDP, according to the UK, should serve as a support-arm for NATO
rather than competing with it and the independent variables that helped shape this perception
were:
a) the ‘special relationship’ it enjoyed with the US coupled with its dependency on the
US in the Cold War period;
56
b) fear of marginalisation in European affairs;
c) securing American involvement in European security affairs;
d) the Yugoslav Wars;
e) counterbalancing French-German dominance in the EU;
f) the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region.
British involvement in the CSDP-project can be framed in the ‘neoclassical realism’ IR theory.
The UK demonstrated an active problem-solving approach through which they hoped the status-
quo, as it was during the Cold War, could be restored. The degree of satisfaction that Britain
enjoyed with the power asymmetry during the Cold War was gradually shifting as a consequence
of French yearning for a European defence capability independent from NATO. The UK sought
out to balance this by strengthening NATO through the CSDP since it was aware of the fact that
NATO would not automatically involve itself in European security affairs.
Comparative research has tried to answer the question under what circumstances the EU
is likely to undertake military operations. The preconditions that were depicted as essential are:
a) when the consent of (local) influential actors is secured;
b) when a conflict can be identified as an opportunity rather than a challenge:
c) when a individual Member State or the EU has intervened in the past;
d) when resources are aligned in terms of command and control arrangements;
e) when the involvement of each member of the ‘Big Three’ is guaranteed (Engberg
2013, pp. 155-157).
When comparing Operation Concordia with the Libya crisis it can be observed that not all of
these preconditions were present as Libya did not meet preconditions c, d and e. This shows that
the results that can be deducted from both case studies are time-specific and the conditions are
not always likely to be reproduced in their entirety. For both of the case studies it is therefore
important to put them in context. During the time of Operation Concordia, the EU was deeply
divided due to US unilateralist behaviour and the Iraq War. The ‘Big Three’s’ approval to deploy
EU troops in FYROM was therefore considered to be highly symbolic and showed that the EU
was capable of conducting a military operation, although fairly modest in scale. The fact that no
actual risks were present in FYROM for European troops and NATO was deeply engaged in the
region played an important role that led to the approval of the operation. A sense of moral guilt
and bad conscience over the EU’s lack to intervene during the Yugoslav Wars also played a role
57
in approving the operation. Following Concordia, the EU conducted over 25 operations not just
in Europe but also in Africa and Asia. The successes of these operations reinforced the British
and German claim that the EU should solely focus on (civilian) crisis management operations.
The fact that no serious military operation under the CSDP in Libya was even considered by a
large part of the EU damaged the EU’s credibility as a ‘hard security’ actor. In Libya, when
compared to FYROM, the humanitarian situation on the ground worsened by the day and in
order to successfully enforce the implementation of the no-fly zone, a large amount of military
force was required. The difference with FYROM was that the members of the ‘Big Three’, in the
case of Libya, were under great pressure. The process that led to the approval of Concordia took
eighteen months as the Berlin Plus agreement had to be finalised prior to the operation. It seems
that not only the above-mentioned preconditions need to be present in order for the EU to
involve itself in a military operation, but also the direct presence of the US and NATO in the
operation. As the analyses have shown, the German culture of reservation towards the use of
force and its new discovered self-awareness, combined with British preference of NATO over
CSDP, led to the EU’s inability to cope with the crisis.
The EU’s lack of effectiveness in Libya has posed serious questions regarding the future
of the CSDP. To some it confirms that the EU’s ambitions as a military power have experienced
a setback and its future as a hard security provider hangs on the line for its emphasis on soft
crisis management is entrenching Europe in a general reluctance on the use of force (Brattberg
2011, p. 3; Simón 2012, pp. 13-14). CSDP has declared itself irrelevant and has even handed
back the responsibility to address crises in Europe’s neighbourhood to NATO (Howorth 2013).
The future of the CSDP should thus lie in lower-intensity crisis management and not on ‘hard
power’ (Koenig 2012, p. 4). The austerity measures taken by European governments further
diminish the prospects for an autonomous CSDP, which, according to some, can even be dubbed
as ‘CSDP fatigue’ and another twenty years of the same processes will most likely not produce
different results (Howorth 2012, p. 4; Howorth 2013; Koenig 2012, p. 1). It has even been
argued that the EU has proven itself not to be a credible player in international security and the
CSDP should therefore cease to exist (Seidler 2011). For others, Libya does not necessarily mean
a change of long-standing commitments as the EU is gradually developing itself as a hard
security actor (Schmidt 2012, p. 187). The crisis has shown that several EU Member States are
willing to join forces and it can continue to do so in the future, thereby creating ad hoc coalitions
58
(Brattberg 2011, p. 3). The Libya crisis could be viewed as path redefining as it can be
interpreted as new twists on past discourse (Schmidt 2012, p. 172). It is therefore unclear in
which manner the CSDP will develop in the future for it raises questions for the future of
European defence and security integration which cannot be answered so easily, especially since
the Libyan crisis is time-specific and the conditions that were present during that time are
unlikely to be reproduced in their entirety. The analyses made of FYROM and Libya are
illustrative of this. Moreover, the process of strengthening the EU’s foreign policy derived from
changes in the geopolitical environment.
The EU itself is aware of the “growing demand for the EU to become a more capable
and strategic global actor” and it “emphasizes that further progress in CSDP is necessary” and it
therefore expressed its determination to take the CSDP forward as new CSDP missions in the
Horn of Africa, Sudan and the Sahel region were announced and deployed after the Libyan crisis
(Council of Foreign Affairs 2011, pp. 1-5). The EU, however, must realise that they are facing a
“do or die” moment (Jankowski 2012) for the future of the CSDP as the alternative to the CSDP
will increasingly reveal itself to be an empty box, for as the US turns away from Europe and
NATO, even that alliance will become meaningless without an enhanced collective European
effort. Libya has shown that the US is no longer as committed to Europe as it was during the
Cold War. The ‘Big Three’ will have to confront their divergent attitudes in Europe in order to
fill in the hole the US will leave behind. Only a jointly led CSDP will be more comprehensive
and have greater critical mass as the French will certainly go ahead anyway, as the military
intervention in Mali has shown. In their Defence White Papers, France and the UK explicitly
mention the possibility of unilateral military intervention when certain national interests are in
play. This stands in stark contrast with Germany’s wishes to resolve conflicts through
multilateral frameworks and to create a Political Union in which all CSDP operations are under
full (EU) parliamentary control. Despite these differences only Paris, London and Berlin are able
to initiate the major collective turnaround which can enable the EU to act coherently and
effectively. One option that has been mentioned is the pooling and sharing of scarce resources
which enables Member States to work closely together so differences could be overcome. The
individual members of the ‘Big Three’ must find a way to bridge their different and in many
ways conflicting EU foreign policy cultures. The future of a successful CSDP with a ‘hard
59
power’ component, which is able to address crises in its neighbourhood, depends on the
acceptance and appreciation of these conflicting views.
For the moment, it can be concluded that the ‘Big Three’ are capable of conducting
military operations under the CSDP as Concordia and several other military missions have
shown, but that strict preconditions need to be in place in exchange for their support for large-
scale military operations. The high-risk military crisis management under the CSDP will not be a
feasible option until some fundamental issues between the members of the ‘Big Three’ are
resolved as their perception of this instrument differs too greatly. The deeply rooted “security-
cultural heritage” remains an obstacle to mutual understanding (Howorth 2000, p. 35). As long
as France, Germany and the UK hold strong individual normative approaches, the EU risks
becoming hampered from acting rapidly and united. However, the EU’s failure to act coherent in
Libya does not automatically mean that it is not able to intervene militarily as the EU still shows,
that it is capable of conducting small civilian crisis management operations.
60
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