THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN DIGNAGA AND DHARMAKIRTI

by S. R. Bhatt

[1]

When Buddha Sakyamuni attained enlightenment beneath the bodhi tree more than

two and a half thousand years ago , his achievement was not only the result of

having reached the peak of meditative stabilization, of having brought great

compassion to fruition, but also of clear analytic thought. ----- Thus, the study of

logic and the nature of knowledge have been crucial to Buddhist tradition from the

outset.

The Dalai Lama

(Foreword to Buddhist Epistemology by Bhatt & Mehrotra)

[2]

The varied and variegated Indian philosophical thought can be broadly classified

into “Atmavada” (Substance ontology) and “Anatmavada” (No-substance

ontology). The Buddhist thought advocated Anatmavada whereas the rest of the

schools followed Atmavada. In order to expound and explicate anatmavada view

the Buddhist thinkers developed their own system of epistemology, logic and

language to suit their ontology and value theory. The ideas of anatta (No-

substance), sunyata (essence-less-ness) ksana santana (existence series), the theory

of pratityasamutpada (interdependent origination), and the goal of nirvana etc.

required new modes of knowing and thinking. The Buddha acquired knowledge

for his own enlightenment and also communicated knowledge for the

enlightenment of others. The essential significance of enlightening knowledge in a

liberating philosophy of Buddhism need not be highlighted. However it should be

pointed out that the Buddhist theory of knowledge is only a corollary of the

Buddhist theory of reality and the Buddhist theory of reality is consciously

purported to be directed towards realization of Nirvana for all living beings. So,

the Buddhist epistemological thinkers discussed atmasamvit (knowledge for ones

own sake) and also parasamvit (knowledge for other’s sake). Dignaga in the

beginning of Nyayapravesa writes,

Sadhanam dusanam caiva sabhasam parasamvide

Pratyaksamanumanam ca sabhasam tvatmasamvide.

i.e.,

“Giving arguments in support of one’s position and pointing out defects in the

rival’s position, along with their respective fallacies are essential for

communicating knowledge to others, whereas for acquiring knowledge for one’s

sake perception and inference and their respective fallacies are essential.”

[3]

Right from the times of the Buddha there is insistence on proper knowledge based

on right mental make up (samyak drsti). Though references are found in Pali

literature to epistemological concepts and theories, particularly about

consciousness and noetic process (cittavithi) for want of information it can only be

said that systematic theorizing is available only in the Buddhist Sanskrit literature

when the schools of Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara and Madhyamika came

into existence.

[4]

It will be interesting and relevant to discuss the noetic process described in the Pali

literature which can be regarded as precursor to later Buddhist epistemology.

Consciousness is the focal point of noetic process. Consciousness can be defined as

‘everything taken together that has the characteristic of cognizing is to be known as

aggregate of consciousness.’ The Abhidharma tradition puts exclusive emphasis on

immediate experience rather than discursive reasoning. It insists that genuine

experience is attainable only in a kusala (pure and undefiled) citta. That is why

noetic process conducive to samadhi (meditation) leading to nirvana is put forth in

a moral setting. According to Abhidharma all empirical cognitions are conditioned

by kama (volition) which can be described as sense-relatedness or intentionality.

Intentionality has two facets--one pertaining to the object and the other to the

mental state. In every cognitive process there is an object which is intended to be

cognized and there is an intention in which an object is intended to be cognized.

This may also be characterized as subjectivity.

[5]

Consciousness in itself is self-enveloped and dormant. It is known as

'vithimukta'. When it gets activated it is known as vithicitta. The process of

consciousness is technically known as Citta-vithi. The cognitive process

begins when the cognitive senses receive the reflex of objects – external or

internal. The external objects are received through five outer senses known

as panca-dvara and the internal objects are cognized through mind known

as mano-dvara. For functioning of each type of course of cognition there is a

distinct process and a specific object.

The cognitive process which apprehends external objects is further

classified under ten stages. They are as under:-

1. Bhvanga -- -It is a passive state of mind, going on smoothly on its own

course, quite undisturbed, existing immediately prior to the

appearance of any type of object. It is also called atita bhavanga. It is

pre-reflective consciousness. Bhavanga also stands for the

consciousness which one has while in deep sleep which is more or less

passive than active. Arising and perishing every moment it flows on

like a stream not remaining the same for two consecutive moments.

Bhavanga is so called because it is an essential condition for continued

existence. It may be called life-continuum. One always experiences

bhavanga consciousness as long as it is uninterrupted by outside

stimuli.

2. Bhavanga-calana - - It is vibrated state of mind. When an object enters in

the range of a cognitive sense, it creates a simple vibration in the

smooth flow of mind just like falling of a pebble on the calm surface of

water of a tank. It is beginning of the disturbance in the passive state of

consciousness.

3. Bhavanga-viccheda -- Immediately after bhavanga-calana the smooth

flow of mind is arrested. It ceases to be a passive state and gets

disturbed and vibrated.

4. Pancadvaravajjana - Avajjana means alertness or awareness. The

cognitive senses become alert to receive the impressions of an object. It

is sense consciousness or sensory consciousness. It is turning of

consciousness towards an object.

5. Indriya/Cakkhu vijnana - If the object is a visible one the object

causes a sensation in the eyes. The same is the case with other

cognitive senses. It is sense operation upon the object.

6. Sampaticchana citta -- Immediately after the eye consciousness the

mind attends to the object as something existing outside. It is simply

marking of an object and not determining its details. 'There is

something' is cognized but 'what it is' is not known. So it is receiving

consciousness, a consciousness which receives sensations. It is the

moment of reception of the object so seen.

7. Santirana citta - It is attending to the object and trying to determine

its nature on the basis of past experience. It is a determining cognition

on the basis of past recollection. But here there is not full

determination. So it is also known as investigating consciousness.

8. Votthapana citta - It denotes the sense of determination. The

comparison of the details with past experience enables the mind to

determine it as such and such. Here discrimination is exercised and

freewill may play its part. It is determining consciousness.

9. Javana citta - It is actively involved consciousness. It is an attitude of

mind towards utilization or rejection of the object. In case the object

thus determined is an agreeable one the mind utilizes it and if it is

otherwise the mind rejects it. So it is psychologically important stage.

Since an action is judged here as immoral or moral etc. Javana literally

means running. It is so called because it runs consecutively for seven

consciousness-moments. The mental states occurring in all these

thought moments are similar but the potential force differs.

10. Tadalambana citta - - It literally means functioning on that object. It

lasts for two consciousness moments. The entire cognitive process

which takes place in an infinitesimal part of time ends with this.

[6]

In this way seventeen consciousness-moments are involved in the

cognition of an object. These seventeen moments complete full course of

cognition of an external object. It is to be noted that both matter and

consciousness are momentary but endurance of matter is seventeen times

more than that of consciousness. In other words, one matter-movement

equals seventeen consciousness-movements. When an object comes in the

range of sense organ the course of cognition begins. By the time

consciousness undergoes changes for seventeen times through different

stages, the object remains in the same stage. At the end of seventeen

consciousness-moments the full course of cognition is complete and the

duration of the object is also over. The object ceases to exist giving rise to

its effect. When the object is fully cognized it is called 'very distinct object'.

It may be that the object does not meet with all the ten stages. It may be

that object comes into existence but does not attract cognitive process at the

outset. So there can be abrupt beginning or abrupt end. In such a situation

the cognition process is not complete and the object is not fully or properly

cognized. Thus the object can be clear (vibhuta) or obscure (avibhuta).

[7]

These ten stages of cognitive process arise in quick succession being

regulated by the principle of pratitya samutapada. The preceding and

succeeding stages are marked by similarity as they are caused by the same

object.

Thus, the total process of cognizing consists of ten stages from Bhavanga to

Tadalambana. First three stages are preliminaries. They stand for the mental

preparedness for receiving the impressions. The remaining seven are

concerning the awareness of the object and are known as cittotpada (arising

consciousness of an object). Bhavanga is comparable to deep sleep. It is a

lazy state of mind. After seventeenth moment there is bhavanga pata

(cessation of cognitive process or vithi-bhanga).

MANODVARA VITHI:

The internal objects like thoughts, feelings, sentiments etc. are cognized in a

slightly different way as it involves the role of mind only.

THE CONCEPT OF CITTA:

The concept of citta plays a very significant role in Buddhist epistemology.

Cinoti iti cittam, on the basis of this etymology, citta can be understood as

that which builds up its own continuity. This means that citta is a complex

of several factors or events which occur in succession. These successive

events can be named as caitta. There is no separate entity called citta apart

from the caittas. In fact, citta is a convenient and conventional term to

denote a variety of psychic events in an organized unity. For all practical

purposes caittas which are mental states alone are real and citta is just a

fiction (prajnapti sat).

[8]

Manas:-

Another epistemic term employed by the Abhidhammic tradition is manas.

Manas is both a cognitive sense and the receiver of the sense impressions.

As a cognitive sense it functions at par with the other five senses. Whereas

these five senses namely eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin apprehend

external objects, mind apprehends internal states. The other function of

mind is to receive the sense stimuli and here it comprehends both the

objects of its own field and also the objects of the fields of outer senses. In

its overall functioning mind precedes and succeeds sense perception. It

precedes in the form of attending to the sense stimuli and its succeeding is

in the form of discrimination and selection of the sense stimuli. It is in this

sense that we say, 'Eyes don't see but mind sees it'. That is why the

Buddhists use the word 'door' for the senses.

[9]

In the Abhidhammic tradition perception is described as of two types. One

is sensuous and the other is non-sensuous. The sensuous perception is due

to five cognitive senses, which have their respective fields of functioning

and corresponding objects. Every cognitive sense has its own distinct

jurisdiction and class of objects to be cognized. There is no over-stepping

and intermingling in their jurisdiction. Nor can they usurp the functioning

of mind which is another factor involved in the process of cognition.

The non-sensuous perception is Yogic Perception. It is available only in

heightened state of consciousness.

[10]

To sum up, the cognitive process is interplay of mind with the five senses.

Each sense has its own mode of functioning e.g. 'Eye' has the nature of

seeing, its capacity is activated by consciousness along with the totality of

causes and conditions including the object, the eye consciousness and

accessories like light etc. The object appears, the eyes see and the eye

consciousness knows. The process gets completed in what is known as

manovijnana dhatu which consists in grasping of the object of consciousness.

Before the start of the cognitive process citta is in a latent or natural state of

existence. It is known as vithimukta citta or pakkatimano. It is also known as

nibbuta citta. Bhavanga is such a state of citta. The cognitive process starts

with bhavanga and ends in bhavanga (nibbuta citta). In its functioning as

stated earlier citta is conditioned by emotional afflictions and ideational

defilements but when it is freed from all this then it becomes bodhi citta

which is prakrti prabhasvara citta (naturally luminous citta).

[11]

II

Distinct from the Theravada analysis of consciousness we find a full fledged

epistemology in later Buddhism. Dignaga and his illustrious successor Dharmakirti

have been the impelling force responsible for the development of the medieval

Indian philosophy in general and epistemology and logic in particular. They have

been the epistemological thinkers of the first order and their contributions to the

philosophical thought have been unique and distinct. Both have been brilliant stars

in the firmament of Indian philosophical horizon. It is therefore highly significant

to study, analyze and evaluate the seminal contributions of Dignaga whose

thoughts find culmination in Dharmakirti. The main objective of this write-up is to

expound and understand their philosophical ideas in the field of epistemology in

the background of metaphysics and value-theory. It should be our endeavor to

study both the constructive and critical aspects of Dignaga-Dharmakirti

philosophical tradition with special reference to theory of knowledge so as to bring

to the fore and evaluate its seminal contributions with a view to put them before

the modern world scholarship for appreciation.

[12]

In the Dignaga-Dharmakirti tradition precursors like Maitreya, Asanga and

Vasubandhu made pioneering attempts to construct epistemology on the Buddhist

pattern. Maitreya discussed in detail the nature of reality and modes of knowing.

He is the forerunner of the art of debate (vadavidhi) in Buddhist circles. Asanga

followed Maitreya by and large but differed in respect of theory of proof.

(sadhana). Vasubandhu carried forward and systematized this enterprise. However,

it was Dignaga who put Buddhist epistemology on a solid footing and gave it a

distinctive character. He imparted a new direction to Indian epistemology by

giving a new mode of understanding the nature of knowledge and ways of

knowing, in propounding a formal system of logic and a differential theory of

language. He did it by interspersing the treatment of ontological issues within

them, a style that was later on followed by Gangesa in the Nyaya School. It was

innovative of Dignaga to point out that epistemology has to be structured keeping

in view the requirements of ontology (Meyadhinamanasiddhih). For this he

composed distinct and independent treatises. The most significant work of Dignaga

is Pramana-samuccaya with auto-commentary. It consists of six chapters dealing

with pratyaksa (perception), svarthanumana (inference which is only cognitive for

ones own sake), parathanumana (syllogistic inference which is verbalized for the

sake of others), hetu-drstanta (reason-example), apoha (negation of the opposite)

and jati (analogue). Another work ascribed to him is Nyaya-pravesa which deals

with anumana and its fallacies. Another small but very valuable work is Hetu-

cakra-damaru which outlines a formal system of logic. Forth work is Alambana-

pariksa. Fifth work is Trikala-pariksa. Another work ascribed to him is Nyaya-

mukha. Tibetan versions of all these works are available but lost original Sanskrit

versions of some of them have been restored.

[13]

Dharmakirti is a prominent Buddhist thinker belonging to the syncretic phase of

the Sautrantika-Yogacara tradition. He not only mastered the systems of Asanga,

Vasubandhu and Dignaga but also excelled in them. He has several works to his

credit but Pramana vartika can be regarded as his magnum opus in which he

expounds his thought in a systematic and detailed form. It is advancement on the

views of Dignaga propounded in Pramana samuccaya and it surpasses them. It

consists of four chapters. The first deals with analysis of the pramanas in general,

the second with pratyaksa as pramana, the third with svarthanumana (inference)

and the fourth with pararthanumana (syllogism). The next work of Dharmakirti is

Pramana viniscaya. It is an abridgment of Pramana vartika. The third work is

Nyaya bindu which is a further abridgment. There are five other small tracts

devoted to specific topics. Hetu bindu is a short classification of logical reasons

based on the Hetu cakra damaru of Dignaga. Sambandha pariksa is an

examination of the problem of relations. (See for details my paper in Journal of

Indian Council of Philosophical research, Volume XIII, Number 3, May-August,

1996). Vada Nyaya and Codana prakarana are treatises on the act of carrying on

disputation. Santanantara siddhi deals with the reality of other minds. It attempts

to refute solipsism.

[14]

In the Pramana vartika Dharmakirti undertakes a systematic exposition of the

Buddhist conception of ‘sarvajnata’ along with other arguments for proving the

authoritativeness of the Buddha vacana. He gives an elaborate account of the

nature, criteria and means of knowledge. He logically argues for the tenability of

the theory momentary-ness and flux. He explains the meaning and significance of

the fundamental Buddhist concept of ‘pratityasamuptada’. He delineates upon the

nature and means of moksa (nirvana) along with an exposition of the ‘Four Noble

Truths’. He provides a logical foundation to the theory of ‘Vijnaptimatrta’, a

central thesis of the Vijnanavada School. He discusses the theories of karma,

samsara and rebirth in the Buddhist context. He makes significant contribution in

the exposition of the theory of ‘apoha’ in its ontological, epistemological and

linguistic dimensions.

[15]

III

The Indian philosophical thought has developed only through mutual discussions,

debates and encounters among different schools, systems and thinkers. “Vade vade

jayate tattva bodhah” has been the guiding spirit in philosophizing. Right from the

times of the Vedic thought it has been enjoined that the truth can be approached,

understood and expressed in diverse ways and therefore the game of

philosophizing can be played by mutual supplementations and complementarities.

The development of philosophical thought in each school has not been in isolation

or exclusion but in intimate interactions so much so that one can not understand

much less appreciate the schools of Indian thought without at the same time being

well-versed and steeped in the prevailing systems. There can be mutual corrections

and borrowings. There can be agreements to disagree. But there cannot be mutual

ignoring or overlooking. Dharmakirti is no exception to this rule of the game.

There have been sharp and brilliant philosophical responses by and to Dharmakirti.

He undertook close encounters with the then prevalent ideas, theories and

viewpoints and ably defended Buddhist position from the attacks and counter

attacks of the rival systems and thinkers. He even developed and perfected the

mode of debate (Vada- vidhi). His encounters with Samkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-

Vaisesika, Purva and Uttara Mimamsas, Lokayata thinkers and Grammarian

philosophers like Bhartrhari, Jaina thinkers and many others are notable and worth

merit. His critical examination of the theories of Sphota of the Grammarians,

Samavaya and other relations of the Naiyayikas, of the Nyaya proofs for the

existence of the Creator God etc. is really penetrating and innovative. This

tradition was carried forward ably by Santaraksita in Tattva-samgraha and by his

commentator Kamalasila in his Panjika.

[16]

IV

Every school of philosophy (Darsana) in India has attempted a theory of

knowledge (pramana sastra) on which its metaphysical structure is built. The

ultimate goal of all philosophizing, and for that matter of all human enterprises, is

to realize freedom from pain and suffering, and experience peace and bliss. For the

realization of the summum bonum of life knowledge of reality (tattva jnana) is an

essential and necessary prerequisite. It is believed that a theory of knowledge is

propaedeutic to a theory of reality because for knowing the reality one has to know

knowledge itself. This belief is grounded in the fact that to philosophize (in Indian

context) is to reflect on the nature of reality given in experience. Every experience

is caused by and pertains to an object that is a part of reality. It has a built-in self-

transcendence, a trans-phenomenal character, an intentionality, pointing to an

object (arthavisayakatva). This reference to the object may be cognitive or non-

cognitive (emotive, volitional etc.). A cognitive reference consists in revelation of

the object (jnanamarthaprakasakam) or in making the cognizer aware of it

(arthadhigama) in terms of its existence, nature, relations and functions. Though

every cognitive reference reveals an object, there is always a possibility of going

astray in this reference and there is no guarantee that it will faithfully and

adequately reveal its object. It may reveal its object as it is or other than what it is.

This possibility of error in cognitive reference (visamvada) necessitates an inquiry

into its veracity. That cognition is knowledge (prama /pramana) which is true or

which is non-discordant with its object. There has to be indubitability with regard

to the truth of the cognition in terms of its non-discordance. The truth-claim of

knowledge has to be well evidenced. The entire epistemological pursuit begins

with and centers round this task. Dignaga and Dharmakirti also have provided a

firm epistemological basis to their theory of reality by constructing a theory of

knowledge in keeping with the ‘process ontology’.

[17]

“All successful human action is necessarily preceded by knowledge”. With this

prefatory remark Dharmakirti defines the scope and aim of epistemology in the

Nyaya bindu. Human action may be either purposive or instinctive. Human

purpose is again something either desirable or undesirable. A purposive action

based on knowledge consists in attaining the desirable and avoiding the

undesirable. Knowledge is efficacious in causing successful action in the sense that

it results in the attainment of the desirable aim and avoidance of the undesirable

one. A cause may be productive (karaka) or informative (jnapaka). Knowledge is a

cause of successful action in the latter sense only. It enables us to reach the real,

which alone has practical efficiency. However, it must be made clear that practical

efficiency (arthakriyakaritva) is only the test of the truth of knowledge and not its

laksana (criterion or definition). In the Pramana vartika he defines knowledge as a

cognition that is not in discordance with its object (Pramanamavisamvadijnanam).

He further maintains that a cognition that is perfectly in accord with its object will

also be characterized by novelty (ajnatarthaprakaso va). It is revelatory of an

object not yet known because the object is momentary in nature and only that

knowledge will accord with object that arises at that very moment when the object

is also in existence. It is the first moment of cognition, the moment of the first

awareness. Unlike the thinkers of Nyaya School he maintains that continuous

cognition (dharavahika jnana) is not true. Dharmottara in his commentary on the

Nyaya bindu explains it as follows: “In common life when we say that truth is

being spoken what we mean is that it makes us reach an object. Similarly, that

cognition is true which makes us reach an object it points to. In fact, knowledge

does not create an object and does not offer it to us, but just makes us reach at it.

By making us reach to it nothing else is meant than attending to it.”

[18]

Dharmottara further specifies that knowledge is of two types. It is intuitive when it

springs from inside. It is discursive when it is acquired by directing our attention

toward an object with the help of the senses and the cognizing consciousness. Only

discursive knowledge is analyzed in epistemology.

[19]

V

Indian thinkers generally adopt a causal approach to knowledge. Knowledge is

taken to be an outcome of a particular causal complex in which the most efficient

instrumental causal condition (karana) is technically known as pramana. In the

Buddhist tradition, the word pramana refers to both the process of knowing and

the knowledge acquired on that basis. The Buddhist thinkers do not entertain the

distinction between the process of knowing (pramana) and its outcome

(pramanaphala=prama). Whether or not pramana and pramanaphala are to be

sharply distinguished has been a hotly debated issue between Nyaya and Buddhist

thinkers. Nyaya thinkers insist that pramana as a process leading to prama should

be distinguished from the latter, which is its result (phala). For them prama is the

pramanaphala, and pramana is the karana of prama. Buddhist thinkers, however,

maintain no distinction between the two. The act of cognizing completely

coincides with the cognition of the object. The Naiyayikas are

paratahpramanyavadins. For them pramana is the evidencing condition for the

truth of knowledge and prama is the evidenced knowledge. For Buddhist

knowledge is self-evidencing (svasamvit). This follows from the theories of

dvairupya and sakarajnana propounded by Dignaga. Every knowledge is produced

with two-fold appearance, viz., svabhasa (of itself) and

visayabhasa/arthabhasa/arthakara (of the object). In being svabhasa a cognition

cognizes itself. In being visayabhasa it establishes its truth because of its being in

the form of the object (arthasarupya), i.e., non-discordant with its object. To be in

the form of the object is the sufficient condition of its being true. Thus a cognition

is never devoid of a form of its own.

[20]

The doctrines of svaprakasa and svatahpramanya go together. Not only is every

cognition a cognition cognizing itself, but it also evidences itself. Thus the

difference between the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas is in their understanding of

the nature and role of pramana. For the Buddhists pramana means that by which

an object is known (pramiyate artho aneneti) whereas the Naiyayikas understand

pramana as that which is the most efficient causal condition giving rise to and

evidencing the truth of knowledge (pramayah karanam iti pramanam). Dignaga,

however, concedes that from functional point of view if a distinction is needed it

can be drawn.

[21]

In the Dignaga-Dharmakirti tradition two different views are available about the

nature of pramanaphala. According to one, pramanaphala consists in the

cognition of the object (visayadhigama). According to the other it is self-cognition

(svasamvitti). Both these views are complementary and not conflicting and are

available in the works of Dignaga, Dharmakirti and Dharmottara. Santaraksita

gathers them together and brings out their distinction. He maintains that according

to the Sautrantika tradition which believes in bahyartahvada, sarupya is pramana

while visayadhigati is pramanaphala. According to Vijananavada, sarupya is of

course the pramana but svasamvedana is the pramanaphala. In the ultimate

analysis these views are not different because visayadhigati and svasamvedana are

not two different phenomena as they are two facets of the same knowledge-

situation in Buddhist epistemology.

[22]

The idea that the truth of cognition is to be determined in terms of its reference to

its object leads Buddhist thinkers to propound the theory of

meyadhinamanasiddhih as different from the Nyaya and Samkhya view of

manadhinameyasiddhih. These are not to be taken as contradictory views but

complementary only. Between reality and knowledge there is an intimate organic

relation of mutuality. Reality is dependent on knowledge for being known

(prakasa). This is noetic dependence. Knowledge is dependent upon reality for its

origin (utpatti) and evidencing of its truth (jnapti). This is ontic dependence. The

Buddhists emphasize ontic dependence whereas the Naiyayikas highlight noetic

dependence. However, to make the distinction clear it must be admitted that the

Buddhist thinkers argue that epistemology is to be structured to support ontology

but the Naiyayikas insist that epistemology should lead to structuring of ontology.

The Buddhist view led to acceptance of the position of pramanavyastha

(separation of the spheres and functioning of pramanas) whereas the Nyaya view

resulted in establishing the position of pramanasamplava (commingling of the

different pramanas in their operation). According to the Buddhists there are two

kinds of objects of knowledge, viz., the unique particular (svalaksana) and the

generalized concept (vikalpa/samanyalaksana). The Naiyayikas refuse to draw

such a distinction. This has resulted in a sharp distinction of philosophical

positions of the two schools.

[23]

It has been one of the most significant tasks of philosophy to put forth a criterion

of truth and a mode of its ascertainment. An enquiry into the problem of truth is

necessitated because all cognitions are not alike in their truth values. Had they

been so there would have been no need to evidence them. The very possibility of

error in cognition demands its subjection to critical examination with a view to

establish its veracity. If the veracity of cognition is to be established the question

arises as to what sort of criterion is to be resorted to. The problem of pramana has

been raised and discussed precisely because of this. According to Dignaga and

Dharmakirti the truth of knowledge is intrinsic to it and consists in its coordination

with the object. This is technically known as meyarupata or arthasarupya.

(Arthasarupyamasyapramanam, Nyaya-bindu, I.19; Tasmat prameyadhigateh

sadhanam meyarupata, Pramanavartika, II.306.) Knowledge is caused by its

object and therefore it must possess the form of that object. In other words, since

knowledge is determined by its object this determination is expressed as

knowledge having the form of the object. Thus when we have a distinct cognition

of something blue this cognition is determined by something blue and not

something yellow, and this determination is made by the form of something blue in

the cognition itself. In order that cognition has to be true it has to represent its

object in its proper form. This is possible only when the cognition is arising in the

form of the object. The truth of cognition therefore consists in sameness of form

with its object. The same thing has been stated by Dignaga as, “Whatever form of

the thing appears in the cognition, as, e.g., something white or non-white, it is an

object in that form which is cognized.” (Pramanasamuccayavrtti, I.9)

[24]

When Dignaga and Dharmakirti talk of sarupya as pramana it should not be

misunderstood as advocacy of similarity of cognition with object because

cognition can never be similar to its object. Cognition and object belong to two

different categories One is epistemic and the other is ontic. Therefore it will be

meaningless to talk of their similarity. All that it means is that every cognition

necessarily refers to its object and every true cognition has to refer to its object as

it is. To refer to the object as it is has been figuratively expressed as the cognition

having the form of the object. This point is made clear by Prajnakara while

commenting on Pramana vartika II.309, with the example of a new born child who

showing similarity to his father is said to have taken the form of the father,

although he has no such function as taking his father’s form. It is just a

metaphorical way of saying things.

[25]

According to the Dignaga-Dharmakirti tradition there are only two types of objects

of knowledge, viz., grahya (the given, perceived) and adhyavaseya (mentally

construed, conceived) and accordingly there are only two types of true cognitions

viz., pratyaksa (perception) and anumana (inference). (Dvividho hi pramanasya

visayo grahyasca yadakaramutpadyate prapaniyasca yamadhyavasyati. Anyo hi

grahyam anyascaadyavaseyah, Dharmottara’s commentary on the chapter on

pratyaksa). Corresponding to these two types of cognitions there are two types of

akara or pratibhasa (form or reflex of the object). The perceptual cognition

consists in a pratibhasa which is niyata (definite or fixedly determined) because it

is caused by the object independent of perceiving consciousness and therefore

objectively real. In the case of conceptual cognition the control of the object is

remote and hence the pratibhasa here is aniyata (indefinite and vague). Both

Dharmakirti and Dharmottara have made this point very clear. As Dharmaottara

puts it, “The perceived object giving rise to awareness generates a regulated mental

reflex (i.e., a reflex limited to that object). It is just like a patch of colour which

giving rise to a visual awareness generates definite mental reflex limited to that

patch. The conceptual awareness on the other hand is not directly generated by the

object. Thus in the absence this causal factor regulating the mental reflex there is

no fixed or definite mental reflex.”

[26]

Dignaga insists that every niyata pratibhasa has to be in coordination with its

object because it is produced by that object only. An object can not produce any

such pratibhasa

which does not accord with it. Logically therefore he rules out any possibility of

deviation from its object in a niyata pratibhasa. That is why he defines pratyaksa

simply as ‘kalpanapodham’ and does not feel the need to add the adjective

‘abhrantam’. Dharmakirti, however, does not agree with him and maintains that an

object may sometimes fail to give rise to its genuine pratibhasa. This point will be

elaborated under discussion on pratyaksa.

[27]

VI

Vasubandhu, Dignaga and Dharmakirti on perception (Pratyaksa)

There are two types of object to be known and accordingly there are only two ways

of knowing which are pratyaksa and anumana. Corresponding to unique particular

(svalaksana) we have pratyaksa (perceptual knowledge) and corresponding to

samanyalaksana/ vikalpa there is anumana (inferential knowledge). Pratyaksa is

pure sensation, a direct sense apprehension of the unique particular. Anumana is is

a mental construction in the form of generalized images. What is known in

pratyaksa is not knowable in anumana and vice versa. Pratyaksa is foundational

pramana in so far as anumana depends upon it. Anumana presupposes pratyaksa

(pratyksaprsthabhavi). However both are equally important (tulyabala).

[28]

In the Vadavidhi Vasubandhu defines perception as “Tato’rthadvijanam

pratyaksam, i.e., ‘perception is a cognition produced by the specific object.’ It is

exclusively caused by the object as distinct from inference which is a mental

construction. It is free from all conceptualization. Though he does not explicitly

say so, this is his intension. The word ‘tato’ points out exclusive role of the object.

[29]

Instead of defining perception in terms of ‘object-generated’ cognition Dignaga,

being an abstruse logician, defines it as “kalpanapodha, i.e., ‘free from mental

construction’ perhaps because the idea of perception being ‘opposite of inference’

can be better expressed with the help of the technique of double negation. For the

Buddhists all knowledge is either perceptual or conceptual (inferential), there being

no third variety. Thus perception is not inference and inference is not perception.

This is known as pramanavyavastha. . From this it follows that perception can be

defined as ‘opposite of inference’. In fact there is no basic difference between

Vasubandhu’s and Dignaga’s definitions. The same thing has been positively

stated by one and negatively by the other.

[30]

A perceptual cognition is solely determined by its object and not in any way

constructed by its object. The expression ‘kalpana’ is defined by him as

‘namajatyadiyojana’ which means association of concepts and words. So to say

that it is ‘kalpanapodha’ means that it is free from all mental constructions

(kalpana, vikalpa) in terms of dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma (action,

relation), jati (class character) and nama (verbalization). It is just what is given to

us in immediate experience. It is the immediately given sensum in complete

isolation from all conceptual and verbal determinations. Thus the theory of

pratyaksa as nirvikalpaka was spearheaded by him. Perceptual cognition arises

when an object gives rise to its reflex (pratibhasa) in the cognizing consciousness

through the senses. It is called prati+aksa and not prati+visaya because even

though the object is emphasized here the senses are the specific cause whereas

object is only a common cause.

[31]

The usual definitions of perception in terms of ‘sense-object contact’ given by

Nyaya-Mimamsa and Jaina schools and in terms of ‘modification of internal

cognitive sense’ (antahkaranavrtti) given by Samkhya and Advaita Vedanta are

not acceptable to Dignaga , as perception is pure sensation (pratibhasa) caused by

the object in the cognizing consciousness. A cognitive sense has its own object and

its own function. Its object is unique particular (svalaksana) which alone being real

and efficient can produce sensation. Its function is to make the object present to the

cognizing consciousness. Thus perception consists in an awareness of presence of

the object, its mere presence and nothing more. To construct a determinate

awareness of the object whose presence has thus been sensed is another function

which follows in the wake of the first. This is known as mental construction

(pratibhasa pratiti) which is the function of mind. Accordingly, a distinction is

drawn between “Nilam vijaniti” (cognizing blue) and “Nilamiti vijaniti” (cognizing

that it is blue) following the Abhidharma.

[32]

According to Dignaga erroneous cognition is not perception as it arises due to

conceptual construction. All errors are consequences of faulty mental

constructions. At the level of pure sense data there is no question of error because

the sense data are wholly given by the object and there can be no error. That is

why he does not include the term ‘abhrantam’ in his definition of pratyaksa.

[33]

Dharmakirti following Dignaga defines perception as ‘kalpanapodha’ (free from

mental construction) but adds the adjective ‘abhrantam’ (non-erroneous). The

object of perception is svalaksana, which is unique particular having nothing in

common with any other object similar or dissimilar. This object is not a mental

construct (samanya laksana, vikalpa) in the form of substance, quality, relation,

class character and linguistic expression. He defines kalpana as

‘abhilapasamsargayogyapratibhasapratiti’. It is mental construction. Every

mental construction is determinate cognition and not just pure sensation.

Determination is function of cognizing consciousness and as such it can not be

regarded as a part of perceptual cognition. He draws a clear distinction between

pratibhasa (indeterminate) and pratibhasapratiti (determinate). Pratibhasapratiti

is kalpana which is paroksa. Pratibhasa is perception and not the later which

follows the former. Pratibhasa is incapable of verbalization ( anabhilapya)

whereas pratibhasapratiti (determinate cognition) alone is capable of verbalization

(abhilapasamsargayogya). It has potential verbalization. His argument is that no

verbalization can take place in the absence of conceptualization and there is no

conceptualization in perception. In other words, perception, which is pure

sensation, is only to be experienced. Though it is necessary that there can not be

verbalization without conceptualization, the reverse is not the case.

[34]

Differing from Dignaga Dharmakirti says that perceptual cognition should be

defined as free from error, because cognitive sense can also be a causal factor for

error. Accordingly he analyses four types of error, caused by defective cognitive

sense, spatial placement of object, spatial placement of cognizer, and mental state

of cognizer. He mentions instances of error caused by colour blindness, rapid

motion, travelling in a boat, mental sickness, and so on. Dharmottara points out

that these four different illustrations represent four different types of error. The

cause of colour blindness is located in the sense organ (indriyagata), the cause of

motion resulting in the cognition of fiery circle is located in the object

(visayagata), the cause of illusion of moving trees is located in the external

circumstances that condition the perceiver (bahyasrayasthita), and the cause of

hallucinatory illusions is located in the internal circumstances (adhyatmagata)

[35]

Perceptual cognitions are classified by Dignaga and Dharmakirti into four types:

sense perception (indriya pratyaksa), mental perception (manasa pratyaksa), self-

perception (svasamvedana pratyaksa) and mystical perception (yogi pratyaksa).

Sense perception is caused by external object. Mental perception consists in mental

awareness of an object which is derivative from the object of immediately

preceding sense perception. Self-perception is internal awareness of all mental

phenomena like knowledge, desire etc. The concept of self-perception is one of the

most significant contributions of Dignaga. According to him each cognition

cognizes itself while cognizing an object. The scope of self-perception has been

enlarged by Dignaga to include the awareness of conceptual constructions also.

The intuitions apprehended by yogis are perceptual direct awareness.

[36]

In Dharmakirti we find detailed analysis of these four types of perception with

greater clarity and depth. So far as indriya pratyaksa is concerned it is most

fundamental and pervasive type of perception. Such knowledge consists in

presentation of an object to consciousness through the medium of the senses. The

cognitive sense are only medium (dvara), not agent. Their function consists only in

creating a sort of link between cognizing consciousness and objective reality

outside. Manasa pratyaksa immediately follows indriya pratyaksa. It is in fact the

element of attention when indriya pratyaksa arises. That is why Dharmakirti in the

Nyaya-bindu defines it as, “mental sensation which follows sense perception,

which is its immediately preceding homogeneous cause”. (For details refer my

book on Buddhist Epistemology). Svasamvedana pratyaksa is cognition cognizing

itself along with cognizing its object. Cognition of all mental states also comes

under it.( For details refer to my book) . Dharmakirti defines yogi jnana as

intuition of yogi that is produced from sub-culminational state of deep meditation

on transcendental reality. It is experience realized in the state of samadhi.

Dharmakirti states that yogi pratyaksa is generated by deep contemplation, and it is

vivid and free from conceptual construction.

[37]

VII

Dignaga and Dharmakirti on inference (anumana)

The other mode of knowing accepted in the Buddhist epistemology is inference

(anumana) which subsumes other pramanas like sabda. It is both a mode of

knowing and a way form of reasoning. Thus it has epistemic and logical aspects

inseparably coalesced into one. The earliest formulation of Buddhsit theory of

inference is available in the Yogacarabhumisastra of Maitreya and

Prakaranaaryavacasastra of Asanga, though in the Kathavatthu several terms of

reasoning and logic are available. A systematic study of the theory of inference is

introduced by Vasubandhu in the Buddhist tradition. Dignaga gave it a new

direction and impetus. His analysis of inference was so strikingly original that

Nyaya circles also had to take cognizance of it. A distinctive contribution of

Dignaga has been to draw a distinction between inference as a pure thought

process and its linguistic expression (prakasana/akhyana). The former is purely

propositional and the latter is sentential. The other innovation of Dignaga is

advocacy of a variety of inference which may be called analytical entailment

(svabhavanumana), in which one concept is so connected with another concept

that the former can be inferred from another. The most important and innovative

contribution is presentation of a formal schema of different relations of hetu

(reason, probans, middle term) with sadhya (probandum, major term) known as

hetucakra, and pointing out the conditions of validity of inference on that ground.

This is an attempt to construct a formal system of logic. Dignaga’s system of

inference is further explicated and elaborated by Dharmakirti. His special

contribution is systematic formulation of the negative entailment relation with its

eleven varieties. Lastly, in Dignaga we find a new understanding of the concept of

anumeya. According to the Nyaya logicians sadhya is anumeya, but for Dignaga it

is paksa characterized by sadhya which is anumeya. The later Naiyayikas

emphasize the co-locus-hood (ekadhikaranya) of hetu and sadhya in paksa,

whereas Dignaga talks of hetu and sadhya as co-properties (dharma) of paksa.

Dignaga’s formulation of theory of anumana was further explicated by

Dharmakirti in his Pramana vartika and Nyaya bindu and other works. His main

contribution lies in elaboration of the doctrine of trairupya linga.

[38]

The process of inference is a thought process consisting of antecedent knowledge

(premises) and consequent knowledge (conclusion). The two must have entailment

relationship (gamaka-gamaya bhava) which is technically known as avinabhava or

vyapti (necessary concomitance). Avinabhava constitutes the logical ground for the

process of anumana. The antecedent leads to, or gives rise to, the consequent and

is therefore a gamaka (that which entails). The consequent results from the

antecedent and is therefore the gamya (that which is entailed). This entailment

relation is due to an existential tie (svabhava pratibandha) which is a necessary

relation between a logical mark (linga) and the object of which it is a mark

(lignin). In the Buddhist view the logical mark and the object of which it is a mark

are concepts only, and not things or events or metaphysical reals, as in other

systems.

[39]

Anumana has been defined by Vasubandhu in the Vadavidhi as, “Nantariyakartha

darsanam tadvido anumanam.” That is, anumana is knowledge arrived at on the

basis of inseparable relation of hetu with sadhya by a person who knows that

relation. This definition is acceptable to Dignaga and Dharmakirti but keeping the

concept of trairupyalinga as the focal point they give another definition which is

expressed by Dharmakirti in the Nyaya bindu as, “Trairuyallingad yadanumeye

jnanam tad svarthanumanam.” This definition takes into account the distinction

between svarthanumana and parathanumana, the latter being linguistic expression

of the former. Dharmottara gives etymological definition as, “Lingagrahana

sambandhasmaranasya pascanmanamanumanam. Here anumana is defined as that

cognition which is implied by the perception of the linga that characterizes the

paksa and the remembering of the necessary concomitance between the hetu and

sadhya.

[40]

The process of inference involves three basic terms and their interrelations. The

three terms are minor (paksa), middle (hetu or linga) and major (sadhya or lignin).

There are three types of relations among them. The first two are constitutive of

premises, one being relation of middle term to minor term known as

paksadharmata, and the other is relation between middle term and major term

known as vyapti (necessary concomitance). The third relation is anumiti

(conclusion), a relation between minor term and major term.

[41]

Paksa stands for the subject under consideration in the inferential reasoning.

Every inferential reasoning pertains to some individual or class of individuals

about which we want to infer or establish something. It is technically known as

paksa. Etymologically paksa (pacyate iti paksah) means that to which hetu and

sadhya belong as its properties. In this sense it is referred to as dharmin, the

underlying substratum to which hetu and sadhya are ascribed as dharmas. This

idea was later developed in Navya Nyaya as ‘ekadhikaranya’ or

‘samanadhikaranya’. Paksa is subject under consideration in inferential

reasoning. Therefore it is called anumeya and defined as jijyasita viseso dharmi.

Though at the level of objective reality Buddhists do not entertain the distinction

between dharma and dharmin at the conceptual level, which underlies all our

worldly behaviour, such a distinction is very much necessary because no

conceptualization can take place without bringing in distinctions in terms of

dravya, guna, karma, jati and nama. Since paksa may stand for an individual or a

class of individuals a distinction is drawn between two types of concept

corresponding to a paksa, namely, having universal denotation (sakaladesavrttitva)

and having individual or particular denotation. (ekadesavrttitva). From another

point of view distinction can again be drawn between ‘time bound’ (as in

karyanumana) and ‘time free’ (as in svabhanvanumana) paksa. In Pracina Nyaya

paksa is regarded as ‘samdigdha sadhyavan’ but in Buddhist it is ‘jijnasita

sadhyayavan’ and in Navya Nyaya there is transition to ‘sisadhayisa’. This

development in thought is very interesting.

[42]

The hetu or linga (middle term) is a pivotal element in the process of inference. It

is a necessary mark of the sadhya (major term) and therefore becomes the ground

or reason for its inference (hinotiiti gamayati paroksartham). In order to serve this

function it has to satisfy three formal requirements. Only after meeting these

requirements it becomes valid middle term (sadhetu) and renders the inferential

reasoning valid. The three conditions are:

i) its necessary presence in subject’s totality (anumeye sattvam)

ii) its necessary presence in similar instances only, although not in

their totality (sapaksevasattvam)

iii) its necessary absence from dissimilar instances in their totality.

(asapakse casattvameva niscitam)

Qualified by these three conditions the middle term is known as trairupya linga

(three-featured middle term). The middle term is a property of the minor term.

Dignaga defines it as that apprehended property of the minor term which is

pervaded by the major term.

[43]

According to the Buddhists there are three types of hetu, namely svabhava

(essential identity), karya (effect) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition). On the basis

of these three types of middle term there are three types of inferences, named as

svabhavanumana, karyanumana and anupalabdhi anumana.

[44]

Svabhava hetu is defined as the one whose mere existence is sufficient for the

establishment of sadhya. For example, in the inference, “It is a flower because it is

a rose”, the hetu, namely, rose is sufficient for proving the sadhya, namely, flower.

The two have sameness of reference (tadatmya). Both are existentially identical,

and have the relation of analytical entailment. The second type of hetu is karya

hetu which is in the form of an effect necessarily presupposing its cause. The

causal relation is a relation of succession different from the relation of identity

which is that of simultaneity or co-existence. The third type of hetu is anupalabdhi

which is negative in nature. It is defined as ‘non-cognition of such an object that

otherwise fulfills the conditions of cognizability. The non-cognition of a thing is

sufficient to infer non-existence of that thing on the ground that if it were present it

would have been necessarily perceived when all other conditions of perceptibility

are fulfilled. Dharmakirti has discussed eleven varieties and Moksakaragupta has

added five more to this. Sadhya (major term) is that property of the minor term

which is to be proved or inferred. The object of inferential reasoning (anumeya),

therefore, is not the major term alone but the major term as being the property of

the minor term.

[45]

There are two more terms that occur in the process of inference. They are

sapaksa (homologue) and asapaksa or vipaksa (heterologue). Homologue is

similar to minor term in so far as it necessarily possesses the major term as

its property. For example, if fire is the property to be inferred in relation to a

hill then all those instances like kitchen etc. where fire is known to be a

property constitute homologue. A homologue is similar to the minor term

only in the respect that both of them comprehend a similar property.

Dissimilar to homologue and the minor term is the heterologue. In other

words, it is that which is never a possessor of a property possessed by the

minor term and the homologue. It is of three types, (a) different from

sapaksa (anya), (b) contrary to sapaksa (viruddha) and (c) absence of

sapaksa (abhava).

[46]

Paksadharmata constitutes one of the necessary grounds for the process of

anumana. It consists in judjmentalization of the perceptual cognition of hetu

located in paksa. It stimulates the process of anumana.

[47]

The other ground of the inferential process is vyapti which is the relation

between hetu and sadhya which can be understood in terms of necessary

dependence (avinabhavaniyama). The Buddhist conception of vyapti stands

for an invariable necessary connection. Vyapti is a necessary bond because

of the fact that it is rooted in what is technically known as svabhava

pratibandha or existential dependence. Existential dependence means

dependent existence. It may be in the form of a causal relation or an

analytical entailment. For example, the dependence of effect on its cause

enables us to infer the cause the moment the effect is known to us.

Similarly, an analytically deduced fact by its very essence depends upon the

fact from which it is deduced. Thus there is svabhava pratibandha between

cause and effect and between the deduced object and that from which there

is deduction. The example of the former type is the relation between smoke

and fire and of the latter type is the relation between rose and flower. We

can deduce one fact from another only if there is existential dependence. It

can be asked why is it that we can deduce one fact from another only if there

is existential dependence. The answer given by the Buddhist logicians is that

this is so because effect which is not dependent upon another object cannot

be invariably and necessarily concomitant with the later. In other words, if

effect is not tied up by its existence to another object, it can not be

necessarily concomitant with the latter. There will be no invariability

(avyabhicara). Thus the possibility of deducing one fact from the other

depends upon an invariable and necessary connection which precludes the

existence of the one without the existence of the other. Therefore, if two

facts are existentially connected we can assert that one of them can not exist

independently of the other and therefore from the presence of the one

follows the presence of the other.

[48]

The most significant and fundamental contribution of Dignaga is to give a

formal schema of nine valid and invalid types of anumana/anumanabhasa

based on three logically possible relations of hetu with sapaksa and

asapaksa. His work titled, “Hetucakradamaru” is a primer of ‘Buddhist

Formal Logic.’ (For details see my book ‘Buddhist Epistemology)

.

[49]

VIII

Dignaga and Dharmakirti on differential theory of language (apoha)

In the Buddhist system language is a part of epistemological discourse in the

context of verbalized cognition. Language is not a separate source of knowledge,

nor does it describe reality. The real is only perceptual and perceptual is

inexpressible. Only conceptual knowledge is expressible in language. Language is

a result of mental construction and hence it refers to mental concepts only.

[50]

The method of apoha has been a technique of philosophizing cultivated and

developed in the Dignaga-Dharmakirti tradition of Buddhist thought. It has been

used in dealing with ontological, epistemological, logical and linguistic issues with

great ingenuity and precision to understand and appreciate the basic doctrines of

Buddhist view and way of life. It helps in proper understanding of the nature of

reality, thought and language from Buddhist perspective. It is an approach based

on the theory of differentiation and mutual exclusion. It views anyonyabhava

(mutual exclusion) between every element of reality (in the form of dharma known

as svalaksana), between every conceptualization of reality (in the form of

samanyalaksana known as vikalpa) and between meaning of every linguistic

expression (in the form of abhilapa known as nama or sabda). Every element of

reality, thought and language is discrete from (svato vyavartaka) but inter-relatable

with the rest of its kind and fine-tuned inter-netting is possible between and among

them. All are pratityasamutpanna and thus they are interdependent. Generally

Apoha has been known as a theory of meaning and its ontological, epistemological

and logical dimensions have not been emphasized. It is interesting to note that

according to the Buddhist view every svalaksana and every vikalpa is a counter

correlate of its opposite (anyapoha). Therefore no apprehension of any one,

whether it is perceptual or conceptual or linguistic, is possible without delimiting it

by excluding the rest. Every determination is negation in this sense. The reality in

itself is indeterminate and any attempt to determine it has to proceed through

anyapoha only. It is to be undertaken by the principle of double negation. Every

dharma is distinct and discrete and it can be understood as the counter correlate of

its opposite. To use the terminology of Class Calculus, it is like a class that is the

counter correlate of its complement class. The same holds good with regard to a

vikalpa and a sabda.

[51]

The meaning of a word stands for the relation of word and concept. In a verse

attributed to Dignaga it is stated that words originate in concepts and concepts

originate in words. The two are interdependent and interspersed. The nature and

function of the two are similar. A concept is a mental construct. It is an exclusion

or differentiation of one mental construct from all other mental constructs. By its

very essence it is an exclusion of the other. It is the negation of all supposed

possibilities other than itself. Likewise, a word coveys its meaning by negating its

contrasting meaning. It is the affirmation of its own meaning necessarily by the

negation of its opposite meaning. A word expresses its meaning per differentium.

Without negation it expresses nothing. A word conveys a positive meaning

qualified by exclusion of its opposites. For example, all that the word ‘cow’

expresses is the exclusion of ‘non-cow’ and thereby communicates its meaning.

The meanings of words ‘cow’ and ‘non-cow’ consist in the negation of each other.

It is to be made clear that only the contradictory meanings are to be negated. Thus,

we can have joint assertion of ‘white’ and ‘cow’ but cannot assert ‘cow’ and ‘non-

cow’ together.

[52]

We have to attempt to understand afresh the Buddhist theory of Apoha, in the

context of language, as a continuity of thought from Dignaga to Ratnakirti. It does

not seem to be correct to hold that there have been three stages in the development

of this theory centering round Dignaga-Dharmakirti as Negativists, Santaraksita-

Kamalasila as Positivists, and Jnanasrimitra-Ratnakirti as Synthetics. Such a view

runs counter to the very assertions of each later thinker coming after Dignaga who

claims to follow Dignaga and Dharmakirti in his responses to Nyaya –Mimamsa

critiques of the Buddhist position by reformulating the ideas of his predecessors.

Neither Santaraksita and Kamalasila nor Jnanasrimitra and Ratnakirti state that

they are differing or deviating from their masters. They only claim to expound the

views of their masters to clarify the doubts, queries and misunderstandings of the

critics.

[53]

For a proper understanding of the Buddhist philosophy, and its doctrine and

practices, one should always remember the advice, or rather the injunction, given

by Nagarjuna that there are two distinct standpoints to approach them, viz., the

empirical (samvrti) and the trans-empirical (paramartha). He avers, “Dve satye

samasritya buddhanam dharmadesana”. He makes it clear that both are necessary

and useful in a successive order. He says, “Vyavaharamanasritya paramartho na

desyate. Paramarthamanagatya nirvanam nadhigamyate.” This is a very

categorical and unambiguous statement. Most of the misunderstandings of the

theory of Apoha have arisen because of overlooking of this advice.

[54]

The Buddhists of the Dinnaga and Dharmakrti tradition, like the Upanisadic

thinkers, draw a clear distinction between the ‘tattva’(ens) and the

‘padartha’(object of knowledge and linguistic representation). The tattva is pure

existence apprehensible (grahya) through perceptual cognition that is bare

sensation (pratibhasa) of the tattva as its object. The tattva and its sense

apprehension are beyond the ken of the intellect and language. The intellect can

only attend to the sensation, and can conceptualize and verbalize it as a padartha in

the form of dravya, guna, karma, jati and nama. This is known as kalpana that

plays its role through vikalpa and sabda. It should be made clear that the intellect

can play its legitimate role only if there are sensations to be attended to. Its task is

to transform pratibhasa into pratibhasa pratiti. The object then is conceptualized

(adhyavasita). The point to be noted is that the real (vastutattva) is never the object

of thought and language. It can only be perceived and can never be conceived. Of

course every genuine conceptualization has to be preceded by sensation. So

conceptualization is pratyksaprsthabhavi, i.e., arises in the wake of perception

only. The real is presented in perception and it is represented in conception. Only

when the real is first presented in perception and represented in conception it can

stimulate practical activity (vyavahara or pravrtti).

[55]

As stated earlier according to Buddhist tradition there are two types of object of

knowledge. One is the grahya that is perceived and the other is adyavaseya that is

conceived. The grahya is svalaksana, the unique particular, and the adyavaseya is

samanyalaksana which is generalized representation. Concepts and words pertain

to samanyalaksana only, and they have nothing to do with the real, svalaksana,

directly. So in the context of language the Buddhist draws a distinction between

referent and referend. Word directly refers to referend only. The object ,say a cow,

is directly grasped or sensed in perceptual cognition whereas the object in

conceptual awareness is determined as ‘cow-ness’ or ‘cow form.’ In the knowledge

arising from utterance of the word ‘cow’ what we determine is an ‘object’ out there

on which we superimpose cow-ness this cow-ness is to be interpreted as exclusion

of non-cows. Here the determination is in the form, “It is not a non-cow”, it

excludes our non-cow supposition. On hearing the word ‘cow ’we not only

apprehend cow-ness but also determine an external object as being excluded from

non-cows. So upon hearing the word ‘cow’ we have a mental image of cow in

general which takes the form of something excluded from non-cows. But the object

of our practical activity is induced by that verbal knowledge is a particular and real

object which is characterized by being excluded from non-cows.

[56]

The theory of Apoha, in the context of language is an arrangement only (vyavastha

matra) to understand meaning of a word and language. According to it a word does

not directly refer to a real (vastutattva) that is ineffable. It is only an

adhyasa(superimposition) on it. Or, it can be its abhasa in the intellect. Though

Dignaga gave a systematic formulation to the theory of Apoha and made use of it

in philosophizing about reality, thought and language, it is Vyadi who is his

precursor in propounding this theory of language and advocating padavada as

different from Vajapyayana who propounded vakyavada. Bhartrhari reconciled the

two in the Vakyapadiya. Dignaga also attempted a similar reconciliation. So he

should not be regarded as padavadin or vakyavadin alone. Likewise he would

accept both Abhihitanvayavada and anvitabhidhanavada in different contexts. It

will not be proper to regard him as an exclucivist. The theory of apoha is very

much comparable to the theory of sphota of Bhartrhari.

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Suggested readings;-

1. Dignaga-- Pramana samuccaya

2. Dharmakirti—(a) Nyaya bindu with Tika of Dharmotttara

(b) (Pramana vartika)

3. Santaraksita---Tattva samgraha with Panjika of Kamalashila

4. S.R.Bhatt---- Chapter on ‘Logic and Language in Buddhism’

published in ‘Companion Encyclopedia of Asian

Philosophy’,

Routledge, London & New York, 1997

5. S.R.Bhatt Buddhist Epistemology,

& Greenwood publishing House, Connecticut, USA, 2000

Anu Mehrotra

6. S.R.Bhatt Noetic process (Citta vithi)—A Theravada Buddhist View

Dharma and Abhidharma, Vol. II, Somaiya Publications,

Mumbai.

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Sideshwar Rameshwar Bhatt

Former Professor and Chair. Department of Philosophy,

University of Delhi, India.

e-mail < srb_indiaphil (at) yahoo.co.in>

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

About Prof. S.R.Bhatt

Professor S.R.Bhatt is an eminent philosopher and Sanskritist. He was General

President of Indian Philosophical Congress and Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad

(All India Philosophy Association). He retired as Professor and Head, Department

of Philosophy, University of Delhi. He is internationally known as an authority on

Ancient Indian Culture, Buddhism, Jainism and Vedanta. His research areas

include Indian Philosophy, Logic, Epistemology, Ethics, Value-theory, Philosophy

of Education, Philosophy of Religion, Social and Political Thought etc. He has

lectured in many universities and research institutes of India, China, Sri Lanka,

Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Turkey, Germany, United States and Trinidad.

He is a member of many national and international associations. He is a Regional

Coordinator of Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, USA, which has

brought more than 170 volumes on world cultures and civilizations.

Prof. Bhatt has organized more than 50 national and international conferences,

seminars and workshops. He has authored and edited 18 books and has more than

100 published research papers to his credit. His important publications are The

Philosophy of Pancharatra; Studies in Ramanuja Vedanta; Knowledge, Values and

Education; Buddhist Epistemology; The Concepts of Atman and Paramatman in

Indian Thought; Major Religions of the World; Buddhist Thought and Culture in

India and Korea(Ed.) ; Buddhist Thought and Culture in India and Japan (Ed.);

Glimpses of Buddhist Thought and Culture(Ed.);Nyayamanjari of Jayanta Bhatta

(Hindi translation from Sanskrit)

Source: http://www.kjf.ca/109-TABHA.htm