Theory of Escalation and Intl Conflict Jo Cr

8/3/2019 Theory of Escalation and Intl Conflict Jo Cr

1/25

A Theory of Escalation and International ConflictAuthor(s): Lisa J. CarlsonReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 511-534Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174579 .

Accessed: 17/11/2011 12:34

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of

Conflict Resolution.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sagehttp://www.jstor.org/stable/174579?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/174579?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage


2/25

A Theoryof Escalationand InternationalConflictLISA J. CARLSONUniversityof Idaho

Escalationprocessesarefound nmanytypesof international onflict.However,agreatdealof the theoreticalandempirical iterature n escalation s contextspecific andconcentratesonexplaining the outcomes of an escalationprocess. This approachhas generatednumerousinsights;however, ourunderstanding f escalationprocesses, in general,remainspartialandincomplete.In this article,the authordevelops a two-sidedincompleteinformationmodel toidentify hekindsof escalation trategies tatesare ikelytoadopt nconflict.Themodelproducesseveralhypotheses,one of which is testedempirically n the contextof militarized nterstatedisputes. The hypothesis states that as the disparitybetween the players' cost tolerancesincreases,the lower cost tolerantactor s morelikely to escalate to the maximumof his or herabilityon the first move in the conflict. The resultsof thetest confirm hetheory'sexpectationsof aninverserelationshipbetweencosttoleranceandanactor'sescalationbehavior.The articleconcludesby noting mplications orfutureresearchon escalationprocesses.

The recent debatewithin the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationNATO)overwhatstrategy opursue oward hewar-tornormerYugoslaviaprovidesapoignantexampleof thepassionate eactions vokedbythe meresuggestionof "escalation."The NATO debate exposes a serious problem for bothpolicymakersand nternationalelations cholarsdedicated ounderstandingescalationprocesses.Decision makersoften confronta dilemma n tryingtominimize the costs thatmustbe paidto achieve theirgoal in conflict. Anyattempt o analyzethe likelihood that a statewill prevailin a conflict mustbe guided by a theoretical rameworkhatspecifies therelationshipsamongkey variablesaffectingescalationdecisions.The problem of escalation has been widely discussed (Kahn 1965;Schelling 1960, 1966; Holsti 1972; Smoke 1977; Brecher1994), but untilrecentlytherehave been few attempts o developa generaltheoryaimedat

AUTHOR'SNOTE: thankCliffMorgan,RayDacey,andRicStollfortheirextremelyhelpfulcommentsandsuggestions.Responsibilityoranyerrors estswiththe author.JOURNALOFCONFLICTRESOLUTION,Vol. 39 No. 3, September1995 511-534? 1995 Sage Publications, nc.

511


3/25

512 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

generatingtestablehypothesesof escalationprocesses. In the absence ofempiricaltesting, it is difficult to assess the comparativeexplanatoryandpredictivecapabilitiesof competingescalationmodels.Of those studiesthathave focused on escalationprocessesin general,manyare weddedconcep-tuallytoaparticularypeof international ontextsuch as armsraces(Richard-son 1960; IntriligatorandBrito 1984) or deterrence ituations(BramsandKilgour1987, 1988;Zagare1987, 1992).These studies have contributedoourknowledgeof particular rocesses,butourunderstandingemainspartialandincomplete.Thepurposeof this article s to presenta theoryof escalationprocesses.The model is based on the theoryof gamesand is used to derivehypothesesidentifying the conditions under which states escalate and the level ofescalationstatesachieveduringconflict. The model is sufficientlygeneraltosupporthypothesesin a varietyof contextsin which escalation can occur.These contextsinclude armsraces,crisisbargaining,deterrence, ndwar.Inthisarticle,one of the model'shypotheses s testedempiricallyn thecontextof militarized nterstatedisputes(Gochmanand Maoz 1984).More specifically,thehypothesisstates that as the disparitybetweentheplayers'cost tolerances ncreases,there s an increase n theprobability hatthe lower cost tolerant(LCT)actorachieves his or hermaximumlevel ofescalationat theoutsetof theconflict.Theresultsof theempirical estsupportthetheory'sexpectationsandsuggestthatfurther esearch s warranted.The article s organizedas follows.The firstsectionexamines heprevioustheoreticaland empiricalefforts to understandescalationprocesses. Thesecond section develops the model used to identifythe levels of escalationstatesarelikely to achievein conflict.The subsequent ection discusses theresearchdesign used to test the hypothesisderived fromthe model. This isfollowedby ananalysisof the test results.The final sectioncontainsconclud-ing remarks.

LITERATUREREVIEWEscalationprocesseslie at the heartof manycontextsof stateinteraction.Escalationhas beenstudied n connectionwitharmsraces(Richardson1960;

Intriligatorand Brito 1984), deterrence Bramsand Kilgour 1987; Zagare1992), and escalationin war (Smoke 1977; Wittman1979; Pillar 1983).Internationalrises havebeen anespecially mportantocalpointforresearchon escalationprocesses (Schelling 1960, 1966; Holsti 1972; Lebow 1981;Leng 1980, 1993; Siverson and Miller 1993; Brecher 1994). In a crisissituation,notonlymust statesdecidewhether oescalate,but actorsalsomust


4/25

Carlson THEORYOFESCALATION 513

consider the degree of coercive pressure to direct against an opponent(Lockhart1979).Although herehasbeen a greatdeal of attentionpaidto thefactorsthataffecta state'sdecisionto escalateto thehighestlevels, therearefewer systematic,theoretical,andempiricalstudiesidentifyingthe level ofescalation statesachieveshortof war.

Manyof theearliestattempts o address hequestionof escalationplacedthe bargainingprocess at centerstage (Schelling 1960, 1966; Kahn 1965;Young 1968; Snyder 1972; Smoke 1977). Accordingto Schelling (1960,1966), one of the potentialeffects of escalationis to convince anopponentto backdown by exploitinghis orher fear thatfutureescalationwill lead todisaster.Because both actors are engaged in demonstratingheir superiorability to tolerate these risks, escalation is conceptualizedas a game ofcompetitiverisk taking (Schelling 1960; Kahn 1965; Powell 1987, 1988;Maoz 1985, 1990; Geller 1990). AlthoughKahn(1965) and others haverecognizedthattherateat which states escalate(imposecosts) can have animportant ffecton thebargaining rocess,few havespecified, theoretically,the conditions under which actors select different levels of escalation toachievetheir ends during he bargainingprocess.Some case studieson escalationhave dealtmoredirectlywithidentifyingthe kinds of escalationstrategiesstatesadopt n conflict (Ikle 1971; Smoke1977; Snyderand Diesing 1977; Pillar 1983; Haig 1984). In general,thediscussionrevolves aroundwhether a series of small escalationsteps (lowescalation)or a few decisive escalationmoves(highescalation) s more ikelyto produce an opponent'sconcession. States that use a series of smallescalationactionsminimizetheirrelativecosts;however, hisoptionrunstherisk of counterescalationby failing to isolate the opponent'stoleranceforescalation(Haig 1984;Patchen1988). On the otherhand,some arguethathigh escalationoffers a betteropportunity o surpassthe opponent'scostthreshold,butthe priceof thatconcessionmay exceed what was necessaryto secure the outcome(Bonoma 1975).There is by no means any consistent theoreticalagreementon thesepropositions,however.SynderandDiesing (1977) have argued hat,undercertainconditions,high escalation s morelikely to producecounterescala-tion thanit is to producea concession. In addition, t has been argued hatlow, gradualescalationis morelikely if stateshave greaterresources thandoes anopponent Brecher1994)andthat ow escalationworksforstates hathave fewer resources and for whom the issue in disputeis less important(Lockhart1979).Whereaspartof the inconsistency n findingsis due to thefact thatresearch n thisarea s guidedby differentassumptionsand differenttheoretical rameworks, ne of the more seriousproblems s that ew of thesedebates areimbeddedwithina theoretical rameworkhatrigorouslyspeci-


5/25

514 JOURNALOF CONFLICT ESOLUTION

fies how the key variables nteractand whatconditions lead statesto selectamongthe various evels of escalation.

Theredoesexist fairlywidespreadagreementhatactors'relativemilitarycapabilitiesandthe valuetheyattach o the issue at stake are two of thekeyvariables affecting the decision to escalate (Leng and Gochman 1982;GochmanandMaoz 1984; Siverson andMiller 1993).Militarycapabilitiesareclearly mportant ecause heyfunctionas theprimarymeansof imposingcosts on anopponentduringa crisis.Despitepersistent heoreticaldisagree-ments (Brecher 1994), there is a consistent body of empiricalevidenceindicatingthatstatesof relativelyequal poweraremorelikely to go to warwith one another hanare stateswithdisparatecapabilities(Bremer1992).Thereis also empiricalevidence suggestingthatactorswho place a greatervalue on theissue indisputearemorewillingto escalatetothehighestlevelsto achieve a demand(Gochmanand Leng 1983; Maoz 1983; Wilkenfeld1991;Brecher1994).These studies have been concernedprimarilywith explainingthe condi-tions under which states escalate to the extreme (i.e., war). How thesevariables interact at levels short of war to affect a state's choice overescalationstrategies emainsunclear.Recentattemptso understand argain-ing and/orescalationprocesseswith formalmodelshavebegunto shedlighton why weakerorunresolvedactorsdo notalwayscapitulatemmediately othe strongerside's demands(Powell 1987; Morrow 1989; Lalman 1990;Zagare1992).Undercertainconditions,a strongeractorcanmisperceivehisor herbargainingpositionandgive in, or anunresolvedactorcan achieve hisor herdemandby bluffinga willingnessto beartherisks of escalation.Even though this literaturedoes not explicitly identify the theoreticalinteractionbetweencapabilities/values nda state'sdecisionto use a low orhigh escalation strategyshort of war, it is clear that a player's optimalescalationstrategy s conditionedby his orherperceptionsof theopponent'scapabilitiesand value over the issue at stake.Moreover,by manipulatingherate of escalation,a statecanattempt o send anopponenta signalregardingthewillingnessto bearescalationcosts.Presently,however, hereexistsalargegap n ourtheoretical ndempiricaltreatmentsof escalation.Formalmodels of escalationprocesses have pro-duceda greatdeal of insighton how uncertainty ver anopponent'swilling-ness to bearcosts andthe evaluationof a demandaffectsescalationdecisions.Although there exists a generalconsensus on some of the key variablesaffecting states' escalation behaviorin both the theoreticaland empiricalliterature,here s also a noticable ack of agreementon how these variablesinteractto produce low- or high-escalation strategies short of war. The


6/25


remainderof this article seeks to fill the gap betweenthe theoreticalandempiricalresearchon this facetof escalation.

A THEORY OF ESCALATIONEscalation is conceptualized as a tool states use during bargaining(Schelling1960, 1966;Kahn1965;Young1968;Snyder1972).Thebargain-ing processis initiatedby one orbothactors o reconciletheirpositionsoversome issue in dispute.Actorsbegin the bargainingprocess by articulatingtheirproposalsfor a negotiatedsolution,which can be eitheracceptedorrejectedby theopposing player. f one side acceptsthe termsforagreement,thenactorsreceivethe benefitthey associatewith the proposedoutcome. Ifanofferis rejected, hen thebargaining rocesscontinuesand neitherplayerreceives any benefits until one of the sides concedes to a demand.lThe

problemfacingboth actors s to providethe opponentwith an incentive tomake concessions. Actors can create that incentiveby makingit costly forthe opponent to persist in rejecting demands (Cross 1969; Pillar 1983;Morgan1990, 1994).Escalation s one waythatactorscan makebargainingcostly.Escalation mposescosts on both actors.Forinstance, heescalatingstatesuffers the costs associated with expending resources and risking lives,whereas the receivingstate suffersthe costs of rebuilding ndustrial entersandthe like. The benefit of a negotiatedoutcomedecreases for bothactorswhenone of them decides to escalate.As the costs associatedwithdisagree-ment(or thevalueof a settlement) ncrease,playersaremorelikely to givein to theiropponent'sdemand.An actor concedes if the costs of enduringfurtherescalationwill outweighthe benefitsof giving in to the opponent.Thus, as Schelling (1966) points out, escalation is the coercive side ofbargainingn whichthefearof even greater ost impositionmotivatesstatesto concede.The maximumescalationcosts that a player will endure to achieve ademand s referredo as aplayer'scost tolerance. assume thatthepricethatan actor is willing to pay to play dependson how an actorevaluates the1.Theconceptualizationf bargaining fferedhere differs rommanyeconomic models ofthebargainingprocess.Forexample,Rubenstein1982) conceivesbargaining s aproblemoverhow to divide a pie between two players.Players bargainuntil an offer is acceptedby oneside. In my conceptualizationof the bargainingprocess, the players arenot concerned with

distributing he gains from a pie. First,players may or may not agreeon the size of the pie.Second,the players'bargainingbehavior s aimed at convincing he opponent o concedeto anentire demand.


7/25


importanceof theissue atstake.A playerwho considers he issue at staketobe of greater alience thansomeother ssue thatmightariseshouldbe willingtopaygreater osts to secure heopponent's oncession.Conversely,aplayerwill toleratefewer costs to achieve a demandwhen the issue at stake isdeemedrelatively ess important.Thus aplayerwill continue o bargainonlyif he or she believes that the opponent'scost tolerance s lower than his orher own.Toillustrate his idea,considera situationn which bothplayersknow theopponent'scost tolerance(playersalways know their own cost tolerance).Thepredictions that heLCTplayerconcedes mmediately.The LCTplayerknows he or she will lose eventuallyto the higher cost tolerant (HCT)opponent.Thus theformerconcedesimmediately o avoidpayingescalationcosts. It follows thatescalation s possibleonly whenplayersareuncertainaboutkeyaspectsof theirstrategic nvironmentWagner1982;Powell 1987,1989;Lalman1990).Forexample, f PresidentLyndonJohnsonwouldhaveknown the outcome of the VietnamWar,he would not have escalatedAmerican nvolvementbeginning n 1964.An actorescalatesbargaining nderconditionsof incomplete nformationto projectthe image thathe or she has a highercost tolerance handoes theopponent. The problem a player confronts is to determinewhether theobserved escalationbehaviorprovidesan accuratereflectionof the oppo-nent's truecost tolerance.A player'sabilityto drawthe appropriateonclu-sion is complicatedby the fact thatplayersof varyingcost tolerances aremotivated o escalateatdifferent evels dependingon theirbeliefs abouttheadversary.All players aremotivatedto minimize the costs necessaryto achieve ademand.Thesecosts canvarydependingon theparticularmix of cost tolerantactorsengagedin adispute.HCT actorsmayhavean incentiveto escalateatlower levels earlyon in the conflict.If the opponentbacksdown, the HCTactor obtains a greaternet benefit than what would have resulted fromescalatingat higher levels. On the otherhand, if the opponentrefuses toconcede, HCTplayersarewilling to pay additionalescalationcosts duringthe next round Ikle1971;Patchen1988).LCTplayerscanalsoplaythat ypeof escalationgame, especially if they perceivethattheircompetitor s alsoLCT.However, f theopponent s perceived o be HCT, hen a long series ofgraduated scalationmoves mightnot convince theopponentto give in. Inparticular, scalatingat higherlevels from the outset of the conflict mightlead an opponentto believe that the escalating player has a higher costtolerancethan is actuallythe case. Thus there is some chance thatan LCTactor can achieve a demandby manipulating he costs of escalation.The


8/25


questionfor the LCTplayeris, Which level of escalationmaximizes his orherexpectedutility?To analyze this question,a two-sidedincompleteinformationmodel isdeveloped.Thereare two actors,states i andj. Eachplayerhasthe choice ofescalating ow orhigh.2The alternatives iffer ntermsof the costs generated

byan actor orcarryingout thataction(e.g.,ahigher evel of escalationequalshighercost imposition).I assume thatplayersare able to discern the costdifferentialassociated with each escalationoption.Thusplayerscan deter-mine the choice madeby theopponent.I assume that nature elects playerito move first andlast in the game. Playerj has a single choice of escalatinglow orhigh.3Thekey featureof themodelis that andj canbe one of two types:LCTor HCT.4 assumethatLCTactorswill withstandonehigh-escalationaction,takenby eitheractor, o achieveademand. fhighescalation ails to convincetheopponent o backdown,thenLCTplayerswould rathergivein thansufferadditionalcosts over an issue deemed less importanthansome other ssuethat might be contested. On the otherhand, HCT actorswill enduretwo

high-escalationactionsto achieve a demand.Thewillingnessof eachtypetosufferdifferentcosts is modeledby distinctpreferenceorderingsover theoutcomes.I return o thispointin thefollowing section.Bothplayersknow theirowntypebut areuncertain f theopponent's ruetype. Playeri (j) knows only the distributionof types in the populationofpossiblej (i) playersandthe preferenceorderingassociatedwith eachj (i)type. These distributionsserve as the players'prior probabilitiesthat theopponent s aparticularype.Player 's escalationdecisionon the firstmoveserves as an inputor additional nformation hat uses to revise his or herpriorestimatesof i's type. I assume that uses Bayesian updating o revisehis or herpriorbeliefs regarding 's cost tolerance.Player uses his or herupdatedbeliefs about 's typeto determinewhetherhe or she shouldescalatelow orhigh. Player hasthefinalmove, andeachi typeselects the alternativethatproducestheoutcomewith thegreaterexpected utility.

2. A morerealisticassumptions thatthe level of escalation s continuous.Allowing theplayersto choose between two escalationoptionsprovides an extremelyuseful first cut foridentifying he conditionsunderwhichtheplayersescalateto one of two clearlydefined evels.3. The model couldinclude anothermove forplayerj. Infact,thegame could be extendedindefinitely.However,the gain in descriptiveaccuracy s boughtat the priceof reducingtheanalyticrigorof the model.Thecalculationo determineheequilibrium utcomeafter ncludingan additionalmove would be identicalto the previouscalculationwithout the extraplay. Themodel producesa rich set of hypotheses whose expectationsdo not change substantiallybyincludingadditionalmoves.4. Again,amorerealisticassumptionwouldinvolve a continuum f player ypes.The LCTandHCTtype dichotomy s ausefulapproachn the initialanalysis.Future esearchextendsthemodelby relaxingthis assumption.


9/25


THE MODELThe two-sidedincomplete nformationgameis representedn extensiveform in Figures la and lb. I begin by presentinga set of assumptionsandthendiscusshowthe model s usedtoidentify he escalation trategiesplayersadopt n equilibrium.Priorto the game, natureassigns a cost tolerancetype to each player.RecallthatanLCT actorwill withstand ne high-escalationmove to achievea demand,whereasan HCT actorwill toleratetwo high-escalationmoves.ThusLCT andHCTtypesaredistinguishedon the basis of theirpreferenceorderingsover theoutcomes.An LCT iprefersgi > hi> di>f > bi> ci> ei>

ai.An HCT prefersgi> ci> ei> hi> ai>f > bi> ci.5Nature nformsplayersof their ype,andeachplayer's yperemainsprivate nformation.Eachplayerknows the probability hathis or her opponent s an LCT or HCTtype. InFiguresla andlb, LCTi andj typesarerepresentedby p ands, respectively.HCT i andj typesare denoted1-p and 1- s, respectively.Becausethereareonly two playertypes,p + (1 -p) = 1.0 and s + (1 - s) = 1.0. The limitingcase occurswhenp (s) assumes a value of 0 or 1. In either orbothof thesecircumstances, (i) knowsthe opponent'scost tolerance.For the remainderof the discussion,I assumethat0

hj> dj>gj> bj> ej> cj> aj.An HCTj prefersfj> bj> hj> dj> gj> ej> cj> aj.


10/25

* (ai, aj)high /

h highJ.--T*-- t, -]^ / loi. d,j)

hieh -o_ lwhi (ei,ej)(eiee/hiehj\ *ihJ, ifwfi)-i

hii1

^^ y ^ i '

low i'h/ * -* ow E (ghi j) ,Iw*l~o---/ ''lw.?

,j..

' * x(ki,hkj)

\ i / . J' f; \'

',,

\\ \(highk)(niki k- high__ ~i \. /* (ki'j)" Y ^ 's- ^

-(rijrj)

-('lo i Zo (s;,high *( i(, j)high

(~~) i /,o wlow\ lb -- -n (h

I high - . - -

*- * (hi ij)i

Cost Tolerantj Cost Toleost Tolerant Cost Tol


11/25


i concedes toj's demand).This assumptionholdsonly for i's finalmove. Ifi escalateshighon the lastmove, thenI assumethatjconcedes to i's demand.Finally,if the playersescalatehigh (or low) at each decision node, then Iassume that natureends the gameby imposinga solution that lies midwaybetweentheplayers'demands.Player i begins the game knowing thatj is LCT with probabilitys andHCTwithprobability1- s. Becauseneither scalationoptiongives i a certainpayoff,i mustconsidera set of gambles n whichone of n outcomescanoccur.I assumethat i's preferencesamongthese gamblesarerepresentedby vonNeumann-Morgenstern tility functions and that i chooses the level ofescalation that maximizeshis or herexpectedutility.I also assume thati isriskneutral.6I arguedpreviouslythat neitherplayer type has a dominantstrategytoescalate low or high.Because both typesplay low or high escalation withsome positiveprobability,'s bestresponsetoj's strategy s to play a mixedstrategy.Themixedstrategy ells i to playhighescalationwithprobabilityxand low escalationwithprobability1 - x.Player i uses j's payoffs to calculatethe mixed strategythat makesjindifferent between his or her two strategychoices. Player i knows thepreferenceorderingassociatedwitheachj type,but i remainsuncertain fj'struetype. Thus i calculatestwo mixed strategies:one used against LCTjs(escalatehigh with probabilityx' and escalatelow with probability1 - x')and anothermixed strategyused againstHCTjs (escalatehigh with x" andescalate low with 1 - x").However, i cannot play either mixed strategywith a 1.0 probabilitybecause j's true type remains private information.Player i randomizesbetweenthe two mixedstrategiesusingtheprobabilities hatj is an LCT orHCTtype.Thisoverallmixedstrategy ells i to escalatehighwithprobabilityx andescalate ow withprobability1-x. Thisstrategymaximizes 'sexpectedutilityby makingbothan LCT andanHCTj indifferentbetweenescalatinglow orhigh.The strategiesthatplayersadoptin equilibriumare identifiedusing theperfectBayesiansolutionconcept.Thisequilibriums astrategy ombinationand a set of beliefs that satisfiestwo conditions.First,at each decision nodein the game,the strategies or the remainder f the gameare Nash given thebeliefsandstrategiesof the otherplayers.Second,theplayers'beliefs at eachinformation et arerationalgiventhe evidenceappearinghat arin thegame(Rasmusen1989, 110).Playeri's equilibrium trategyspecifies that i play amixedstrategy hatmakesbothj typesindifferentbetweenescalating ow or

6. Theassumptionsmade aboutplayer also pertaino playerj.


12/25

Carlson THEORYFESCALATION521

high. An LCT i determineshis or her mixed strategyaccordingto thefollowing:ps*[(x)*(b) (1- x)*()] +p(l -s)*[(x)*(l)+ (1-x)*(y)] =ps*[(x)*(e) (1- x)*(g)]+p(l - s)*[(x)*(n) (1- x)*(t)].

Isolatingx, the probability hat an LCT i escalateshigh, produces equation1.1:7p[(s*(g - t -f+ y) + (t - y)]

p* (s*(b f- +y - e + g + n- t)+ (l - y - n + t)]In equation1.1, the dependentvariable,x, is theprobability hat an LCTi escalateshigh.Theindependent ariablesare ocatedon theright-handideof theequation.Thevariablesreflectj'spayoffsfor differentoutcomesin the

game andbothplayers'priorestimates of the opponent's ype. By manipu-lating the values of the independentvariables,equation 1.1 produces aplethoraof hypotheses dentifyingdifferentconditionsunderwhich an LCTi escalates ow orhigh.Additionalhypothesescanalso be generatedusinganequationreflectingtheequilibriummixedstrategy or an HCT . A sampleofthe hypotheses derived from equation 1.1 are listed here. Several of thehypothesesappearntuitive;however, heseinterrelationshipsecome rathercomplexonce they areoperationalized.

Hypothesis:AnLCT is moreikely o escalate ighwhen , theprobabilityhatj isLCT,decreases.Hypothesis:An LCT is moreikely o escalate ighas thedifference etweenthevalueof winning nd osing oj increases.Hypothesis:An LCT is more ikely o escalate ighas theexpected tilityofescalatingowforeitherLCTorHCTjactors ecreases.The first hypothesisis tested empiricallyand then is discussed shortly.First,I expose thelogic behindthesecondhypothesisand then elaborateonj's roleinthegame.The secondhypothesis s derivedby increasingj'spayoffsfor eitherbj,dj,orfjwhileholding heremaining ariables onstantnequation1.1.The samehypothesiscan be obtained'bydecreasingj's payoffsfor cj, ej,or gj while holding all other variables constant.The second hypothesisidentifiesthe conditionsunderwhichan LCTi perceivesj to be HCT.Playeri'sperceptionmaybe a functionof the issue atstakesuchasj's effortto builda state (e.g., Serbia).Because j will toleratea great deal of cost before

7. See AppendixA for themathematical erivationof thisequation.


13/25


conceding to i's demand, i can maximize his or her expected utility byconcealinghis orherLCTtypeandescalatinghighat theonset of thedispute.Playerj, who moves second in the game,has the opportunityo observei's escalationand torevise his or herpriorbeliefsconcerning 's type.Playerj has two pieces of information.First, knows thepriorprobability hati isan LCTor HCTtype. Second, is awarethat neither type has a dominantstrategyto escalate low or high. Assume thatj observes high escalation.PlayerjusesBayes'srule to calculate heposteriorprobabilityhattheplayerescalatinghighis also LCT:

P(ple)*(p)P(ple)*(p) + P[(1 - p)le]*(l -p)

wherep = the priorprobability hati is LCT,(1 -p) = thepriorprobabilitythati is HCT,P(ple) = theprobability hatanLCTi escalateshigh, andP[(1-p)le] = theprobabilityhatanHCTi escalateshigh.Playerjuses his orherrevisedestimatesof i's typeto assess whether he outcomesassociatedwithlow orhighescalationprovidej withgreaterexpected utility.P(ple)*() *(bj)+ - P(pe)*(p) 1 (kj)=

P(ple)*p + P[(1 - p)le]*( - p) P(ple)*p + P[(1 - p)le]*(1 - p)P(pe)*(p) *(dj) + - P(ple)*(p) *(j)P(ple)*p + P[(1 - p)le]*(1 - p) P(ple)*p + P[(1 - p)le]*(1 - p)

wherep = priorprobabilityhat i is LCT,(1 - p) = priorprobability hat i isHCT,P(plx) = probability hatan LCT i escalateshigh (call this w), P[(1 -p)ly] = probability hat an HCT escalateshigh (callthisz), bj= the value tojof i's concession minus two high-escalationcosts (i is LCT),kj= the valuetoj of the nature'smposedcompromiseminusthreehigh-escalationcosts (iis HCT),dj= thevaluetoj of concedingto i minus onehigh-escalationcost,andmj= the valuetoj of concedingto i minustwo high-escalationcosts.Isolatingw,8

(m-k)w= m-k)(1.2)p*(b - k- d + m)'Thetermw reflectsj's updatedprobabilityhattheplayerescalatinghigh

is LCT; 1 - w is the updatedprobability hatthe playerescalatinghigh isHCT.Equation1.2 also producesa rich set of hypothesesthatidentifythe8. See AppendixB for themathematical erivationof thisequation.


14/25


conditionsunderwhichj typesescalate low or high. Oneof the hypothesesstates thatas thevalue of w increases(i is morelikely to be LCT),anHCTjis morelikely to escalate ow. ThetheorystatesthatHCTjs are in a strongerposition to secure the opponent'sconcession more cheaply than are LCTactors. f low escalation ailsto convincei toconcede,thenHCTjsarewillingto escalateto higher evels.This completes a descriptionof the game. The first hypothesisderivedfromequation1.1is discussedand hen s testedempiricallynthesubsequentsection.Thishypothesisstatesthat an LCTi is morelikely to escalatehighwhens, theprobabilityhatj is LCT,decreases.Thehypothesis eadsto theexpectation hatLCTtypesaremorelikely toescalatehigh as thedisparitybetweentheplayers'cost tolerances ncreases.The intuitionbehindthis hypothesis s illustratedby theJapaneseattackonPearl Harbor n 1941. The Japanesehigh commandcalculated that theirmilitaryhad,at best, 4 to 5 monthsto solidify gains in SouthAsia andthePacific beforeresourceswould be exhausted.Toaccomplishthis goal, theU.S. Navy had to be rendered ncapableof interferingwith the Japanesemission. The one thing of which the Japanesewere fairlycertainwas thatAmerica'sgreaterresourceswouldpreventtheJapanese romprevailing nawarof attrition.TheJapanesewerewillingto gamblethatasaresultof theirescalatinghighfromtheoutset,the United Stateswould come to termsratherthan continuetheescalationgame.Statedmoregenerally,LCTactorsare less likely to obtainanopponent'sconcession by playing a game of low escalation. Thus LCT actors mustbehaveas if theywere HCT.Onewaytoaccomplish his is by demonstratinga willingnessto sufferhigherescalationcosts earlyon in the game.If highescalationailsto convincejtoconcede, henLCTactorsare ikelyto give in.

OPERATIONALHYPOTHESISThe dependentvariableof the hypothesisis theprobability hatthe firstescalationactiontakenby the LCT actorwill also be the highest level ofescalationthat actorwill achievein thedispute.Operationalizinghedepen-dent variablerequirescomparing he level of escalationassociatedwith twoactions.A criterion s established o determinewhethera subsequentactionwas takenatthe same,a lower,or a higher evel of escalationrelative to thefirstaction nthedispute.Therehavebeen a number f attemptso categorizedifferent scalationactions BlechmanandKaplan1978;GochmanandMaoz1984).These effortsguidethe discussionhere.I assumethat differentescalation actionscan be distinguished romone


15/25


another n termsof the costs borneby an actorfor carryingout an action.Certaingroupsof escalation tactics are consideredmore or less costly thanothersbasedon thecurrent osts thataplayermustpayto execute theaction.Clearly,the lowest point on the escalation continuum s representedby noaction or zero cost imposition.An actor who fails to escalate is effectivelychoosing to withdrawfrom the escalationgame. The second least costlyoptionis a threat o use force.An actorexperiencesrelatively ew immediatecosts in proclaimingthat he or she will engage in some futurecoercivebehavior.Manyof the costs sufferedby thethreatening ctorwill be paidata later dateeither because the threatwas actuallycarriedout or becausetheactor ncursreputation osts forfailingto follow throughon apreviousthreatof escalation.A show of forceis animplicitthreat o use force. Yet a show ordisplayof force is considereda higherescalation evel than s a threatgiventhat hereare mmediatecosts associatedwithmobilizingtroopsandthelike.A use of force is considered the next highest level of escalation. Theseescalationtactics subsumethe acts of demonstratingorce (andtheiratten-dantcosts) andgenerateadditional osts bydirectlyengagingtheopponent'sresources n hostile actions.Finally, he maximum evel of escalation s war.The independentvariable of the hypothesis is the relative value of theplayers'cost tolerances.Recallthatcost tolerances definedas the maximumcosts an actor s willingto sufferto secure some valuein conflict.Achievinga perfectcorrespondencebetween theconceptualandoperationalmeaningsof cost tolerancewouldrequiredetermininghow anactorevaluatedanissuein a disputefor all disputes ncluded n theanalysis.The limitationsassoci-ated with this exercise are ratherserious;however, by stressing a state'sabilityto imposeescalationcosts, it is possibleto achieve a fairlyreasonablesurrogate or cost tolerance.Militarycapabilitiesare amongthe most important ools states have toimposecostsontheiradversaryOrganski ndKugler1980;SmallandSinger1982).All otherthingsbeing equal,an increase n aplayer'srelativemilitarycapabilitiesshould also be associatedwith an increasein thatplayer'scosttolerance.As Rosen (1972) notes,theper-unitcost of usingforcedecreasesas a player's military capabilities increase. In addition, the ability of arelativelystrongeractor to replenish expendedresources more efficientlyalsosuggeststhatcostperunit of forceis decliningdue to economies of scale(Cannizzo1980). It is also reasonable o suspectthat states that arewillingto consumethe costs associatedwith developingstrongermilitarycapabili-ties are ikely to be heavilyinvolvedin the issues of theinternationalystemandmay feel thatthey have a stakein preserving he statusquo (Organski1968).Theargument uggeststhatthere s an associationbetweencost tolerance


16/25


andmilitarycapabilities.Clearly, hese variablesdo notoverlapcompletely;however,militarycapabilitiesserve as a reasonableapproximation f costtolerance.The operationalhypothesisleads to the expectationthat as thedisparityn the actors'militarycapabilitiesncreases, heprobability hattheweaker actor escalates to a higherlevel subsequent o the first escalationactiondecreases.In the following section,the researchdesign is presented,followed by an analysisof the results of theempirical est.

RESEARCH DESIGNThe hypothesisis testedin the contextof militarized nterstatedisputes(MIDs) (GochmanandMaoz 1984).MIDs are defined as aset of interactionsetween ramong tatesnvolvinghreatso usemilitaryforce,displays fmilitaryorceoractual sesofmilitaryorce.Tobe ncluded,theseactsmustbeexplicit, vert,non-accidentalndgovernmentanctioned.(p.587)

The natureof MID crises meansthat thereis an increasein the probabilitythat one or both of the playerswill resortto the use of force to resolve theconflict.Consequently,MIDsprovidea rich contextfor analyzingthetheo-reticalexpectationsof the model.An appropriateest of the theory requiresthat the dependentvariablecapturedifferent levels of escalation. The militarizedinterstate incidentdisputedataset (Gochmanand Maoz 1984) identifies the kinds of actionsand the numberof incidents(actions)takenby each actor n adispute.Stateactionsarerepresentedn theincidentdataset by a variablecalled amilitaryconfrontationaction(MCA).There are 14 differentMCAs that aregroupedinto four escalationcategories:threatsof force, displays of force, uses offorce,andwar.According o theargument resented arlier, hehighest evelof escalation s war, ollowedby a useof force,adisplayof force,and a threatto use force.9The dependentvariable s the escalationbehaviorof the LCT actor.Theexpectation s that the LCTactorwill achieve his or herhighestescalationlevel of the entiredisputeon his or her first move. Thus the LCT actor'sfirstaction(andits appropriatescalation evel) must be compared o the escala-tion level of anysubsequentaction n thedispute.A dichotomousdependentvariablewas created o identifycases in which anLCT actorescalatedat thesameor to ahigher evel. Thedependentvariablewas scored1 if thefirst and

9. The "no actionor no escalation"category s not representedn the data set. Therefore,the lowest level of escalationaction s a threat o use force.


17/25


highestactionsin thedisputerepresentedhe samelevel of escalationor0 iftheLCT actorescalatedto a higher evel.Theindependent ariable,cost tolerance,was operationalizedn terms ofmilitarycapabilities.Thecapabilitiesdatawere obtained romtheCorrelatesof War(COW) data set (Small and Singer 1982). Militarycapabilitiesaremeasuredusing six different ndicators:militaryexpenditures,militaryper-sonnel, iron/steel production,energy consumption,total population,andurbanpopulation.These indicators are combined in the COW data set tocreate an indexreflectinga state'spercentageof the totalcapabilities n theworld foreachyear.Fromthisindex,I createda variablereflectingtheratioof military capabilities of the actors per dispute. The stronger state is

representedn the numerator ndthe weaker state in the denominator.Theratio can vary from 1 (the actors'capabilitiesare equal) to any positivenumber.Because the hypothesisrefers to dyadic disputes, any cases in whichnations oined an ongoingdyadicdisputewere excluded from the analysis.Inaddition,allminor-minor isputeshadto be excludedforlack of data.Withthese exclusions, the test was performedon 119 cases. The cases includedtheyearsfrom 1816 to 1976. Beforeproceedingwith the dataanalysis,it is

important o stress that the hypothesis is tested at the monadic level ofanalysis.Thehypothesisrefersexclusivelyto the escalationbehaviorof theLCT(militarilyweaker)actor.Theresultsof theempirical estarepresentedin thefollowing section.

DATAANALYSISThe hypothesiswas testedusing logit. There are 39 cases in which theweakerside escalated to a higherlevel and 80 cases in which the first and

highestlevels of escalationwerethe same.The estimatedequation ncludesa control variable that identifies the first level of escalation taken by theweakersideinthedispute.Thecontrolvariables not anexplanatory ariablebecausethetheorydoes notpredict he initiallevel of escalation.Thetheorydoes state that,given the first action (whateverthat actionmight be), theweaker nation is less likely to escalate to higher levels in the dispute.Excludingthis variablecouldpotentiallybiasthefindingsin favorof reject-ing the null hypothesis. The reason is that states are constrainedfromescalatingto higherlevels dependingon the initial level of escalation.Forinstance,a statethatuses force from the outsetcan achieve a higher evel ofescalationonly by going to war,whereasa state thatstarts hedisputewith a


18/25

Carlson/THEORYOF ESCALATION 527

threatto use force can escalateto threehigherlevels. The test results arepresented n Table1.

Thetest resultsareconsistentwith the expectationof an inverserelation-shipbetweencosttoleranceandLCTactors'escalationbehavior.Thisfindingis particularly ncouraging n lieu of the fact that there is a likely selectionbias in the test cases.Theselectionbias is aresultof theimperfectcorrespon-dence betweencost toleranceand ts surrogatemeasure,militarycapabilities.The bias is againstthose cases in which less capableactorswere excludedfrom thedata set becausetheydid notplacesufficientvalue on theirdemandto reachthe crisis stage.Therefore, he less capableactorsthat are includedin the analysis are likely to have higher cost tolerances relative to theirexcluded, ess capablecounterparts. his selectionbiasprovides or atoughertest of the theoryby makingit more difficult to rejectthe null hypothesis.With this in mind, the test results indicateclearly that an increase in thedisparitybetween the players'cost tolerances s associated with a decreasein theprobability hat LCT actorsescalateto higherlevels. I also expectedthat the relationshipbetween the variableswould be modest given theassociationbetweenmilitarycapabilitiesandcost tolerance.Thisrelationshipis also confirmedby the test results.Thenaivemodel,whichsimply predicts heoutcomebased on themodalcategory,predicts67%of the casescorrectly.By comparison, helogitmodelreduces hefrequencyof incorrectpredictionsby 12%.Thereductionnerrormay appearmodest,but note that the distribution f cases on the dependentvariableallows the naivemodel to performquitewell in the absence of anyinformationon the actors'relativecost tolerances.Theexplanatoryvariablemust be able to discriminatestronglybetween the cases to generate anysubstantialmprovementn thefrequencyof accuratepredictions.The mili-tary capabilitiesvariable s distinguishingbetween the cases; however,forthe reasonsalreadymentioned, he effect of this variable s not particularlystrong.This conclusionis corroborated otinghow differentvalues for therelativecapabilitiesvariableaffecttheprobability f observingweakeractorsescalatingto higher evels.Relativeto conditionsof roughmilitaryequality,actorswho are100timesweaker hantheopponentare 13% ess likelyto escalatetohigher evels. Thelargechange n movingfromapproximate arity o gross powerdifferentialsproducesa fairlysmall changein the probability hatweaker actors fail toachieve higherescalation evels. The interpretationf the logit coefficientsconfirmsthe expectationthatthe capabilitiesvariablehas difficultyin dis-criminating tronglybetween the cases.Contingency ables areusefuldiagnostic ools foridentifying hepercent-


19/25


TABLE1Logit Estimates or WeakerState's EscalationBehavior(N = 119)

Variable Coefficient AProbabilityIntercept 4.5139(1.03)Ratio -.006 .01

(.004)Firstescalatingaction -1.63*(.333)

NOTE: Numbersin parenthesesare standarderrorsof the estimates.Percentagespredictedcorrectly:null= 67%,logit= 78%.*p


20/25


TABLE2Level of EscalationAchievedbytheWeakerStatein aMilitarized nterstateDispute

Power RatioaRatio> 2.44 Ratio> 12.03

Ratio< 2.44 and< 12.03 and < 59.31. Ratio> 59.31(N = 29) (N = 30) (N = 30) (N = 30)

Escalation evelNo escalation 21 19 15 25

(72) (63) (50) (83)One level higher 4 8 10 3(14) (27) (33) (10)Twolevels higher 4 3 5 2

(14) (10) (17) (7)NOTE:Percentagesare in parentheses.a.Power ratio= disparitynmilitary apabilities f strongertateoverweaker tate(e.g., apowerratio of 2 meansthatstronger tateis twice as strongas theopponent).

not a strongrelationship,betweenmilitary capabilitiesand cost tolerance.The contingency table analysis reveals that the association between thevariablesmay not be consistent acrossall levels of powerdisparities.10hetheorydoes not identifythe factors thatmay be contributingo the unevenresults across the set of disputecases. Further nvestigation s required odetermine henatureof thisrelationship.Despite this empirical curiosity, the test results confirm the theory'sexpectations.It is clearthatas the disparity n the players'cost tolerancesincreases,LCT actorsare less likely to escalateto higherlevels relative totheirfirst actionsin the dispute.An LCTactor s aware thathis or hercosttolerancewill be surpassedbefore that of an HCT adversaryby playing agame of low escalation. To have any chance of winning the opponent'sconcession, LCT actors must behave as if they are willing to bear greaterescalationcosts. Oneway for LCT actors o accomplish his is to escalate tothe maximumof theirabilityat the onset of thedispute.

10.Thepercentagesof cases fallingwithinallcells inthe thirdcolumn(a 12:1 to 60:1powerratio)are all inverseof the model'stheoretical xpectations.This suggeststhattheremaybe asystematicpatterno the cases in thiscategory.An analysisof thecases in this column revealedthat 25% of the cases were drawn rom WorldWarII. This raisesthepossibilitythatthe casesare not independentdue to a complexset of alliancepatterns.A logit analysiswas performedexcludingtheWorldWarII cases.Theresultswereconsistentwith thefirstempirical est.


21/25


CONCLUSIONEscalationoccupiesa centralplacein manystudies of conflict resolutionprocesses. To date, however, there have been few attemptsto develop ageneraltheoryof escalation aimedat derivinga set of testablehypothesesthatholdacrossdifferentcontexts.Onewayof improvingourunderstandingof conflict processes and outcomes is to focus our attentionon escalation

processes in general and to subject hypotheses to empiricaltests acrossdifferentcontexts. Oneof themajorconcernsdominatinghe crisis behaviorresearch has been to identify the conditionsunder which states escalate.Another mportantquestion,and one thathas receivedless systematictheo-reticalor empirical reatment,s the level of escalationthat states arelikelyto achieveoncethe decisionto escalatehas been made.This articleaddressesthatgapby presentinga generaltheoryof escalationthatproducesa rich setof hypotheses identifying the levels of escalation states will achieve inconflict.Onehypothesis eadstotheexpectation hatas thedisparityn theplayers'cost tolerances ncreases,theprobability hat LCT actorsescalate to higherlevels relative o the firstdisputeactionsdecreases.An LCTactor s less likelyto secureanHCTplayer'sconcessionusingaseries of low-escalationactions.By escalatingto the maximum romthe onset of the conflict, an LCTactorcan demonstrate willingnessto sufferthe costs of escalation.Thusan LCTactor s motivated o behaveas if he or she hashighercost tolerance han sactuallythecase. The test resultsconfirmthetheory'sexpectations,andthisis especiallyencouraginggiventheimperfectcorrespondence etweenmili-tary capabilitiesandcost tolerance.This findingis consistentwith the conclusions of many formal modelsseekingto explainwhy weakeractorsdo notcapitulatemmediately o theirstrongeropponent(Morrow1989;Lalman1990;Zagare1992). The theoryexplainswhythelevel of escalationobserveddependson theplayers'beliefsabout heirenvironment ndtheiropponent'swillingnessto sufferescalationcosts. Frequently,discussionspertaining o states'escalationstrategiesas-sume thatsome optimalconditionor level of escalationexists independentof the strategiccontext(Ikle 1971;Lockhart1979;Haig 1984).Moreover,the findings indicateclearly that the theory merits furtherinvestigation.One of the model's hypotheseswas testedin this article,butmany otherhypothesescould be tested to providea more comprehensivepictureof escalationprocesses.However,a morecompleteunderstanding fescalationprocessescan be achievedonly when ourthinking s guided by asystematic,rigoroustheory.Escalationcan be too dangerousandcostly forsociety when guidedsoley by policymakers'ntuition.


22/25


APPENDIXAA Lower Cost Toleranti's Mixed Strategy1. ps[(x)*(b) + (1 - x)*(]+p(s)[(x)*()(1 - )*(y)] =

ps[(x)*(e) + (1 - x)*(g)] + p(l -s)[(x)*(n) + (1 -x)*(t)]2. ps(bx +f+fx) + (p-ps)(lx + y- yx)= ps(ex + g- gx) + (p- ps)(nx + t- tx)3. psbx + -psf pslx + py - pyx- pslx - psy + psyxpsex + psg -psgx + pnx + pt - ptx- psnx - pst + pstx4. (psbx-psfx - psx + psyx)+ (plx- pyx) + (psf- psy) + py =(psex- psgx - psnx+ pstx)+ (pnx-ptx) + (psg - pst) + pt5. (psbx-psfx -pslx +psyxpsex+ psgx+ psnx-pstx) + (plx-pyx- pnx+pt) =(psg - pst - psf+ psy) + (pt- py)6. psx (b-f- l+y - e+g+n- t)px(l-y- n + ) =ps(g - t-f+y) +p(t - y)7. px[(s*(b-f- - e + g + n- t) + (- y - n + t)] p[(s*(g - t-fy)+(t- )]

p[(s*(g t-f +y)+ (t- y)]p[(s*(b -f- l+y - e + g + n - t)+(l - y - n + t)]NOTE: ubscriptsnplayerj's ayoffs-b,f, I,y, e, g,n,and -are dropped.


23/25


APPENDIX BPlayerj's Revised Estimates of i's Type

P(ple)*(p) 1*(bj) + 1 - P(ple)*(p) 1*(kj)=P(ple)*p + P[(l -p)le]*(l - p) LP(ple)*p + P[(1 -p)le]*(l -p)

[wp 1(p)(b)+ 1-wp +) *(k)=

f wp 1 *(d)+l - wp 1*(m)=wp + z(l -p)J [wp + z(l -p)wpb+ m - wpm1

wp + z(1 -p) J(wpb+ k- wpk)*[(wp+ z(l -p)]1. dividingbothsides by wp+ z(1 -p),

wpb+ k- wpk2. collectingtermsandsubtracting,(wpb- wpk- wpd+ wpm)3. takingout commonterms,

wp (b- k - d + m)4. dividingbyp*(b - k- d + m),

= (wpd + m - wpm)*[(wp + z(1 - p)]= wpd + m- wpm= (m - k)= (m - k)

(m k)*(bp*(b k- d+ m)NOTE:P(ple) = probability hathigh-escalatingplayer s low cost tolerant callthis w). P[(1 -p)le] = probability hathigh-escalatingplayeris high cost tolerant call this z). Subscriptsaredroppedafterequation.

REFERENCESBlechman, Barry,and StephenS. Kaplan.1978. Force withoutwar: U.S.armedforces as a

political instrument.Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitution.Bonoma,Thomas V. 1975.Conflict:Escalation and deescalation.BeverlyHills, CA: Sage.Brams,StevenJ., andD. MarcKilgour.1987. Threatescalationand crisis stability:A game-theoreticanalysis.AmericanPoliticalScienceReview 81:833-50.-- 1988.Windingdown f pre-emption r escalationoccurs.Journalof ConflictResolution31:547-72.

wpb + k - wpklIwp+z(1 -p) J


24/25


Brecher,Michael. 1994. Crisesin worldpolitics:Theoryandreality.Oxford,UK:Pergamon.Bremer,StuartA. 1992. Dangerous dyads: Interstatewar, 1816-1965. Journal of ConflictResolution36:309-41.Cannizzo,Cynthia.1980. The costs of combat:Death,duration nd defeat. In Thecorrelatesofwar. Vol.2, Testing omeRealpolitikmodels,editedbyJ. DavidSinger,233-57.New York:Free Press.Cross,John.1969. The economicsof bargaining.New York:BasicBooks.Geller,Daniel S. 1990. Nuclearweapons,deterrence,and crisis escalation.Journalof ConflictResolution34:291-310.Gochman,CharlesS., andRussell J. Leng. 1983. Realpolitikand the roadto war:An analysisof attributes nd behavior. nternationalStudiesQuarterly27:97-120.Gochman,CharlesS., andZeevMaoz. 1984. Militarized nterstatedisputes:Patterns,processesandprocedures,1816-1976.Journalof ConflictResolution28:585-616.Haig,Alexander.1984. Caveat.London:Weidenfeld& Nicolson.Holsti,Ole R. 1972. Crisisescalationwar. Montreal:McGill-QueensUniversityPress.Ikle,Fred C. 1971.Everywar must end. New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Intriligator,Michael D., andDagobertL. Brito. 1984. Canarmsraceslead to the outbreakofwar?Journalof ConflictResolution28:63-84.Kahn,Herman.1965. Onescalation:Metaphorsandscenarios.New York:Praeger.Lalman,David. 1990. The anticipationof interstateconflict. 1990. International nteractions15:243-54.Lebow, RichardN. 1981. Betweenpeace and war. Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.Leng,RussellJ. 1980. Influence trategies nd nterstateonflict.InThecorrelatesofwar.Vol. 2,

Testing omeRealpolitikmodels,editedbyJ. DavidSinger,124-57.New York:Free Press.. 1993. Reciprocating nfluence strategiesin interstatecrisis bargaining.Journal ofConflictResolution37:3-41.

Leng, Russell J., and CharlesS. Gochman. 1982. Dangerous disputes:A study of conflictbehaviorandwar.AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience26:664-87.Lockhart,Charles.1979. Bargaining n international onflicts.New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Maoz, Zeev. 1983. Resolve, capabilities,and the outcomesof interstatedisputes.Journal of

ConflictResolution27:195-229.. 1985. Decision-theoreticandgame-theoreticmodels of international onflict.In Dy-namicmodels of internationalconflict,editedby Urs Luterbacher nd Michael D. Ward,76-111. Boulder,CO:LynneRienner.- 1990. Paradoxesof war:Theart of nationalself-entrapment.Boston:Unwin Hyman.

Morgan,T. Clifton. 1990. Power,resolve andbargainingn international rises. InternationalInteractions15:279-302..1994. Untyinghe knotofwar:Atheoryof bargainingn international rises.AnnArbor:

Universityof MichiganPress.Morrow,James D. 1989.Capabilities,uncertainty,ndresolve:A limitedinformationmodel ofcrisisbargaining.AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience 33:941-72.Organski,A.F.K. 1968. World olitics.New York:AlfredA. Knopf.Organski, A.F.K., andJacek Kugler.1980. The war ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press.Patchen,Martin.1988.Resolvingdisputesbetweennations: Coercionor conciliation?Durham,NC: DukeUniversityPress.


25/25


Pillar,Paul R. 1983. Negotiatingpeace: War erminationas a bargainingprocess. Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress.Powell, Robert. 1987. Crisis bargaining,escalation,and MAD. American Political ScienceReview 81:717-35.

- . 1988. Nuclearbrinkmanshipwith two-sided ncomplete nformation.AmericanPoliti-cal ScienceReview 82:155-78.. 1989. Nuclear deterrenceand the strategyof limitedretaliation.AmericanPoliticalScience Review 83:503-19.

Rasmusen,Eric.1989.Gamesandinformation:An introductionogametheory.New York:BasilBlackwell.Richardson,Lewis F. 1960.Armsandinsecurity:Amathematicaltudyofthecauses andoriginsof war. Pittsburgh,PA: Boxwood.Rosen, Steven. 1972. War,power andthe willingness to suffer.In Peace, war and numbers,

editedby BruceRussett,167-83.BeverlyHills,CA: Sage.Rubenstein,Ariel. 1982. Perfectequilibriumn a bargainingmodel.Econometrica50:97-109.Schelling,ThomasC. 1960.Thestrategyofconflict. Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.-- . 1966. Arms andinfluence.New Haven,CT:YaleUniversityPress.Siverson,RandolphM.,andRoss A.Miller.1993.Theescalationof disputes owar. nternationalInteractions19:77-97.Small, Melvin,andJ. DavidSinger.1982. Resortto arms.BeverlyHills, CA:Sage.Smoke,Richard.1977. War:Controllingscalation.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Snyder,Glenn H. 1972. Crisis bargaining. n Internationalcrises: Insights rom behavioralresearch,editedby CharlesF.Hermann, 17-56. New York:FreePress.Snyder,GlennH.,andPaulDiesing. 1977.Conflictamongnations:Bargaining,decisionmakingandsystemstructuren international rises.Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress.Wagner,R.Harrison. 982. Deterrence ndbargaining.ournalof ConflictResolution 6:329-58.Wilkenfeld,Jonathan.1991. Trigger-responseransitionsn foreign policy crises, 1929-1985.Journalof ConflictResolution35:143-69.Wittman,Donald. 1979. How war ends: A rationalmodel approach.Journal of ConflictResolution23:743-63.Young,OranR. 1968. Thepolitics offorce: Bargainingduring nternational rises.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.Zagare,FrankC. 1987. Thedynamicsof deterrence.Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress.. 1992. NATO,rationalescalation,and flexible response.Journal of Peace Research

29:435-54.

Theory of Escalation and Intl Conflict Jo Cr

Documents

Transcript of Theory of Escalation and Intl Conflict Jo Cr