The World Bank · Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00004483...

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: ICR00004483

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IDA-54450 / IDA-44060)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 94.8 MILLION

(US$ 148.33 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA

FOR A

LK DAM SAFETY AND WATER RESOURCES PLANNING (DSWRPP) ( P093132 )

December 14, 2018

Water Global Practice

South Asia Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective May 15, 2018)

Currency Unit = Sri Lankan Rupee (Rs)

Rs 172.65 = US$1

US$ 1.43 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

Regional Vice President: Hartwig Schafer

Country Director: Idah Z. Pswarayi-Riddihough

Senior Global Practice Director: Jennifer J. Sara

Practice Manager: Takuya Kamata

Task Team Leader(s): Shyam KC

ICR Main Contributor: John Factora

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AF Additional Finance

CAS Country Assistance Strategy

CEB Ceylon Electricity Board

CPF Country Partnership Framework

CPS Country Partnership Strategy

DSRP Dam Safety Review Panel

DSWRPP Dam Safety and Water Resources Planning

EA Environmental Analyses

EMP Environmental Management Plans

ERR Economic Rate of Return

FM Financial Management

GIS Geographic Information System

HMIS Hydrometeorological Information Systems

IAs Implementing Agencies

ICOLD International Committee of Large Dams

ICR Implementation Completion Report

ID Irrigation Department

IDA International Development Association

ISCs International Support Consultancies

ISR Implementation Status and Results Report

LSA Livelihood Support Assistance

MASL Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MMDE Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment

MRRP Mahaweli Restructuring and Rehabilitation Project

NCDS National Center for Dam Safety

NPV Net Present Value

NWSDB National Water Supply and Drainage Board

NWUP National Water Use Plan

O&M Operation and Monitoring

OP Operational Policy

PDO Project Development Objective

PMU Project Management Unit

SDR Special Drawing Rights

TRC Technical Review Committee

WARM-P Water Resources Management Project

WBG World Bank Group

WRB Water Resource Board

Table of Contents

DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................................1

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ...................................................................6

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL ......................................................................................................6

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION .............................................................8

II. OUTCOME ..................................................................................................................................9

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ...........................................................................................................9

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ................................................................................... 10

C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................ 17

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ................................................................. 17

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS ..................................................................................... 17

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ............................................. 18

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................ 18

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION .......................................................................... 19

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .......................... 20

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ......................................................... 20

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE.................................................. 21

C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................ 23

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .................................................................................... 24

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................... 24

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................................ 26

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ...................................... 38

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................................ 41

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................... 42

ANNEX 5. BORROWER COMMENTS .................................................................................................. 49

ANNEX 6. THEORY OF CHANGE ......................................................................................................... 53

ANNEX 7. TYPICAL OPERATIONAL DEFICIENCIES OF DAMS AND REMEDIAL MEASURES ...................... 54

ANNEX 8. DETAILS OF DAM SAFETY REHABILITATION ........................................................................ 55

ANNEX 9. STATUS OF CURRENT FEASIBILITY STUDIES OF PROPOSED INVESTMENT PROJECTS ............. 64

ANNEX 10. TRAINING DAYS COMPLETED .......................................................................................... 66

ANNEX 11. DELAYS IN CONTRACT COMPLETION ................................................................................ 67

The World Bank LK Dam Safety and Water Resources Planning (DSWRPP) ( P093132 )

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DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID Project Name

P093132 LK Dam Safety and Water Resources Planning (DSWRPP)

Country Financing Instrument

Sri Lanka Investment Project Financing

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)

Related Projects

Relationship Project Approval Product Line

Additional Financing P148595-LK: AF Dam Safety WRP - Addl Fin.

05-May-2014 IBRD/IDA

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

Ministry of Finance and Planning MASL/Ministry of Mahaweli Development and

Environment (MoMDE)

Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO

(i) Establish long-term sustainable arrangements for operation and maintenance of large dams; and (ii) improve water resources planning.


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FINANCING

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)

World Bank Financing IDA-44060

65,327,700 65,327,700 63,440,780

IDA-54450

83,000,000 83,000,000 73,002,344

Total 148,327,700 148,327,700 136,443,124

Non-World Bank Financing

Borrower 6,330,000 6,330,000 6,330,000

Total 6,330,000 6,330,000 6,330,000

Total Project Cost 154,657,700 154,657,700 142,773,123

KEY DATES

Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing

27-Mar-2008 26-Jun-2008 09-Sep-2011 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions

09-Sep-2012 28.41 Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

05-May-2014 55.05 Additional Financing Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

19-Dec-2014 66.03 Reallocation between Disbursement Categories

KEY RATINGS

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Satisfactory Satisfactory Substantial


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RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual

Disbursements (US$M)

01 13-Oct-2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory .95

02 05-May-2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory .95

03 26-Nov-2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.11

04 22-May-2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 9.20

05 05-Dec-2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 9.20

06 13-Jun-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 23.01

07 17-Dec-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 23.01

08 07-Jun-2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 23.01


10 31-May-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 42.31


12 06-Mar-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 49.97

13 28-Sep-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 61.58


15 14-Aug-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 77.42


17 07-Sep-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 97.86

18 20-Jan-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 113.92

19 20-Jun-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 113.92



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SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Public Administration 27

Central Government (Central Agencies) 27

Social Protection 1

Social Protection 1

Water, Sanitation and Waste Management 72

Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste Management

72

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Finance 10

Finance for Development 10

Disaster Risk Finance 10

Urban and Rural Development 50

Rural Development 20

Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 20

Disaster Risk Management 30

Disaster Response and Recovery 10

Disaster Risk Reduction 10

Disaster Preparedness 10

Environment and Natural Resource Management 40

Water Resource Management 40

Water Institutions, Policies and Reform 40


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ADM STAFF

Role At Approval At ICR

Regional Vice President: Praful C. Patel Hartwig Schafer

Country Director: Naoko Ishii Idah Z. Pswarayi-Riddihough

Senior Global Practice Director: Constance A. Bernard Jennifer J. Sara

Practice Manager: Adolfo Brizzi Takuya Kamata

Task Team Leader(s): Anthony Nihal Fernando Warnakulasuriya Alagappage

Shyam KC

ICR Contributing Author: John Factora


Page 6 of 67

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

A1. Country and Sector Context

1. The project reflects the importance of water resources development to Sri Lanka’s economic growth and poverty

reduction. Development of dams, barrages, reservoirs, trans-basin canals and irrigation systems have been priorities

of all governments since independence, and investments in water resources were featured in the 2006-2016 national

development framework. These hydraulic assets serve the critical irrigation, hydropower, domestic and industrial

water supply needs, provide flood control in the river basins, and sustain human settlements in rural areas and the dry

zone, which cover nearly two-thirds of the country and are home to about 80 percent of the population. In the decades

preceding the project, there was growing concern over the public safety of large dams, part of an extensive network

of dams comprised of 80 large-sized, 270 medium-sized, and over 14,000 small dams located within 103 river basins.

The majority of large dams were past the 50-year effective life span of new construction and rehabilitation, and the

few repairs over the preceding four decades were done on a piecemeal basis as governments focused scarce resources

on downstream irrigation development. With no regular, comprehensive rehabilitation and modernization efforts,

large dams faced various structural deficiencies and shortcomings in operations and maintenance (O&M) facilities;

many of the large dams assessed in the late 1990s were determined to be high-hazard with some deemed unsafe.1

2. Concern centered on the risk of dam breach and the possibility of added pressure on downstream dams, which

may also succumb, threatening large populations. The Kantale dam failure in January 1986 led to loss of life,

displacement, and substantial damage to agriculture, commercial and public infrastructure and private assets. The

cost to the government of rebuilding the breached section of the dam was about three times the cost of the

government’s relief, rehabilitation, and housing expenditures for those displaced. Government and private reports

and consultations that followed recommended, inter alia, prompt action to ensure proper maintenance of dams and

reservoirs and long-term arrangements for dam safety. Moreover, the establishment of early warning systems through

reliable hydrological and meteorological data was critical to protecting the public from floods and dam failure. The

tsunami disaster in December 2004 intensified calls for improved disaster preparedness and management.

A2. Rationale for Bank Support

3. The project was fully in line with the government’s strategic sector priorities, as laid out in the national

development strategy for 2006-16 (called Mahinda Chinthanaya). The strategy included a framework to examine the

development potential of select river basins through a master plan and strategy for integrated water resources

management. The strategy also built on post-tsunami efforts to enhance disaster risk mitigation, including the creation

of new institutions, legislation, assessments, and action plans to address various risks.

1 See Project Appraisal Document (Report No. 39708-LK). High-hazard is a term used by a majority of dam safety programs. While the

definition varies slightly by program, it generally means if failure of a high-hazard dam occurs, there is potential for loss of life and

property damage. Unsafe dams are those that have deficiencies which leave them more susceptible to failure.


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4. The Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) Progress Report for Sri Lanka of 2005 recognized that lending would

focus on infrastructure development. The Dam Safety and Water Resources Planning Project (DSWRPP) was to

strengthen public sector management by building capacity, establishing long-term sustainable arrangements for dam

O&M, contributing to protect the public against the risk of dam failure, and effectively managing the country’s water

resources. The project was to address the critical technical needs of the water sector, many of which were of a “public

goods” nature with high strategic priority. The project aligned with the Bank’s water resources strategy that recognized:

(i) the role water resources management plays in sustainable growth and poverty reduction; and (ii) the need to assist

countries in developing and maintaining appropriate stocks of well-performing hydraulic infrastructure. Moreover, the

Bank had supported similar operations within the region and had the global experience to undertake the project. In

fact, the project was preceded by the Sri Lanka Mahaweli Restructuring and Rehabilitation Project (MRRP, P034212,

1998-2004), which undertook preliminary studies on dams and recommended a dam safety project. The MRRP also

recommended modernizing the hydrometeorological network and enhancing the capacity for related data for planning

and management of dam operations, public safety, hydraulic assets, and drought and flood hazards.

A3. Contribution to Higher Level Objectives

5. The project was to help protect the public from potential water and dam induced hazards and enhance the long-

term capacity for sustainable planning and management of water resources and related hydraulic infrastructure. These

are all critical to agriculture, industry, energy, transport, and to the health, safety, and productivity of communities,

which, in turn, contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction.

A4. Theory of Change

6. Please see Annex 6.

A5. Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

7. The key performance indicators for measuring progress in achieving the project development objectives included:

(i) reduced number of dams with unacceptable risk index; (ii) number of dams with risk-based O&M plans

operationalized; (iii) improved water database utilized by implementing agencies for flood forecasting and dam

operations; and (iv) national water use plan (NWUP) and at least one river basin development plan adopted by Cabinet.

A6. Components

8. The project had four components and comprised two IDA credits, the original for SDR 41.1 million ($65.33 million

at approval) and an additional financing (AF) for SDR 53.7 million ($83 million at approval). Total IDA financing was

SDR 94.8 million ($148.33 million at approvals) while the government committed $6.33 million in counterpart funding.

Total disbursed was $136.4 million in IDA funds (or 92 percent disbursement), plus the $6.33 million from government.

9. The main responsible agency was the Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment (MMDE) and the

Implementing Agencies (IAs) were Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL), Irrigation Department (ID), Ceylon

Electricity Board (CEB), National Water Supply and Drainage Board (NWSDB), and Water Resource Board (WRB). The

Project Management Unit (PMU), established under MMDE, coordinated overall activities.


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Component 1: Dam Safety and Operational Efficiency (projected $125 million, actual $115.9 million)

10. The component was to address various structural deficiencies and shortcomings in O&M facilities, thus enhancing

public safety of selected high-risk large dams and improving their operational efficiency. It was also to promote

sustainable institutional arrangements for dam safety management and O&M. The component comprised: (i) essential

remedial works for 63 high- and medium-risk large dams; (ii) provision of basic safety and operational facilities for 80

large dams (including the 63 dams); and (iii) collection of basic engineering and operational information essential for

sustainable operation and management of the 80 large dams; (iv) risk assessment on the remaining portfolio of large

dams and training in dam safety and O&M; (v) development of O&M manuals; (vi) preparation of codes of practice and

operating procedures and manuals; (vii) establishment of an inter-organizational arrangement for regular dam safety

inspection and dam safety regulation; (viii) establishment of two water quality laboratories within the MASL.

Component 2: Hydro-Meteorological Information System (projected $11.4 million, actual $14.4 million)

11. The component would enhance staff capacity and physical and analytical infrastructure for monitoring

hydrometric data, detecting and forecasting water hazards and assessing water resources for multi-sectoral planning,

development and management. This component comprised the: (i) establishment of 167 new and upgraded

hydrometric stations to strengthen the hydrometric network; (ii) establishment of data banks and improved analytical

capability; (iii) establishment of procedures and provision of tools and training for real-time analysis of flood situations

in some major reservoirs; and (iv) establishment of a core groundwater monitoring system.

Component 3: Multi-sector Water Resources Planning (projected $10.5 million, actual $7.5 million)

12. The expected outcome of this component included the: (i) development of a NWUP to achieve the country’s long-

term development goals and objectives based on an analysis of updated estimates of present and future water demand

and supply in the 103 river basins in the country; (ii) updating of the Mahaweli Water Resources Development Plan for

the Mahaweli Ganga and adjoining connected river basins, based on an optimization study of water supply and demand

in all sectors; and (iii) preparation of a multi-sector, integrated and comprehensive Mundeni Aru Basin Development

Plan, and feasibility studies of priority investments; (iv) improvement of two training centers.

Component 4: Project Management and Monitoring (projected $7.8 million, actual $4.9 million)

13. The component was to help ensure smooth implementation of project activities as well as monitoring project

processes and outputs.

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION

B1. Project Restructurings, Additional Financing, and Other Changes

14. There were several key changes during implementation. The first was an approval in September 2012 of a two-

year extension of the project closing date from June 30, 2013 to June 30, 2015. The extension was needed to make up

for delays in recruiting three teams of international consultants (one for each main component) and to begin

implementation. The second change was the May 2014 approval of an AF for $83 million in IDA credits which financed:


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(i) cost overruns totaling $25 million to complete the rehabilitation of 14 dams from the original project;2 and (ii) scale-

up of successful project activities, including 31 additional dams and 20 hydrometeorological information systems

(HMIS) stations.3 The AF also extended the project closing date to May 15, 2018 and changed results indicator values.

Another project restructuring in December 2014 allowed for a reallocation of credit proceeds between disbursement

categories and components to formalize the increase in the number of upgraded or new hydro-meteorological stations

from 50 to 122. Following the December 2014 restructuring, the government requested the installation of an additional

80 hydrometeorological stations. The project ultimately installed an additional 45, bringing the total to 167 stations.4

B2. Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

15. There was no change to the PDO or to the Theory of Change throughout project implementation. However, the

AF introduced one new intermediate indicator to capture the preparation of feasibility studies for future investments.

In addition, the target values of some of the indicators were revised to reflect increased end of project values.

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Rating: High

16. The Sri Lanka Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) Progress Report of 2005 (Report No. 34054-LK) recognized that

IDA financing would focus largely on infrastructure. The indicative lending program of the CAS included the DSWRPP

for FY07. The project was to establish long-term sustainable arrangements for dam O&M to reduce the risk of dam

failures, strengthen capacity of key agencies to manage water resources and major water assets, which the government

saw as essential in promoting economic growth and poverty reduction in its national development strategy for 2006-

16. There was strong rationale for the project; it would address critical technical needs of the water sector, many of

which were of a “public goods” nature with strategic priority.

17. The AF was prepared in keeping with the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for FY13-16 (Report No. 66286-LK),

which was focused on (i) facilitating sustained private and public investment and (ii) improving living standards and

social inclusion. The CPS recognized that, with the end of almost three decades of internal conflict, the country had

started shifting from a focus on reconstruction to laying the foundation for growth and middle-income status. The CPS

proposed refocusing the Bank’s engagement on creating the enabling environment for increased foreign and domestic

2 There were several reasons for the cost overrun: (i) during project preparation, not all dams were inspected in detail and the actual

costs were higher than what was estimated; (ii) the scope of work at most dams was larger than estimated and required works had

increased over time, which is common for rehabilitation projects; and (iii) the construction costs had increased more than the 11

percent allocation for price contingencies.

3 The additional financing project paper noted that about 30 additional dams would be rehabilitated. In early 2016, the exact number

of additional dams to be rehabilitated turned out to be 31, when the ID dropped one and added two dams due to risk levels. The final

number of additional dams was noted in the Aide Memoire for the May 26-June 3, 2016 mission

4 See Aide Memoire for the October 1-6, 2015 mission. The government requested an additional 80 hydrometeorological stations but

available financing could cover no more than 50.


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investment and enhancing the efficiency of the state, while increasing resilience to natural disasters and climate

change. The rehabilitation and modernization of infrastructure, including dams and other hydraulic assets, and

improved water resources management, responded directly to the CPS goals. Furthermore, the AF was prepared as

part of the broader effort to consolidate peace and equitable growth through investments in conflict affected parts of

the country. Hence, some of the 31 dams selected under the AF were in the northern and eastern parts of the country.

18. The project remains relevant under the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY17-20 which emphasizes

infrastructure strengthening under Objectives 1.3 (scaling up infrastructure), 2.3 (improving living standards in lagging

areas), and 3.2 (strengthening climate resilience and disaster risk management). The project’s objectives also remain

relevant to the government’s priorities, which seek to balance growth with environmental conservation and climate

resiliency, and to manage the country’s natural resources for sustained growth and livelihoods. These are crystalized

in recent strategies and action plans, such as the Public Investment Plan 2016-2020, the National Plan of Action for the

Social Development of the Plantation Community 2016-2020, and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) to

address climate change. The Bank is preparing the new Water Resources Management Project (WARM-P) that builds

on the DSWRPP by rehabilitating hydraulic assets and improving water resources management, including the

restoration of watersheds, to contribute to climate resilience, sustainable growth, and poverty reduction.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Rating: Substantial

19. The PDO consisted of two parts: (1) Establish long-term sustainable arrangements for operation and maintenance

of large dams; and (2) improve water resources planning. The outcome indicators used to monitor and assess

achievement of the PDO included: (a) reduced number of large dams with unacceptable risk index; (b) need-based

O&M plans operationalized in select dams; (c) improved water database utilized by implementing agencies for flood

forecasting, dam operations and water allocations; and (d) national water use master plan and at least one river basin

development plan adopted by the cabinet. Overall the PDO was substantially achieved.

B1. Assessment of PDO 1: Establish long-term sustainable arrangements for O&M of large dams

Rating: Substantial

(i) Dam Safety and Operational Efficiency

20. The first part of the PDO was to be achieved, in part, through remedial works of 63 high-risk large dams, the

provision of basic facilities to all 80 large dams, and the collection of essential basic engineering information for all 80

dams.5 The scope of remedial works varied by dam, but typical safety issues common in earthen dams include: (i)

seepage boils and leakages in the downstream of dams; (ii) deformity and some localized erosion of upstream and

downstream slopes; (iii) slope sloughing / slips, erosion of abutments, settlement and cracks along dam crests; (iv)

cracks in concrete spillway and outlet gate sections, etc. In the case of gravity dams, common issues were: (i)

malfunctioning of dam monitoring instruments and (ii) need for repair and replacement of spillway and outlet gates

5 The assessment and selection of the original 32 dams are described in Annexes 1 and 4 of the project appraisal document (PAD),

Report No. 39708-LK, February 26, 2008.


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and gate hoisting mechanism. Moreover, almost all the large dams lacked basic safety facilities, such as: (i) monitoring

and deformation measuring instruments including micro-seismographs and pore water pressure gauges; (ii) functioning

communication and observation systems (wireless or telephone at site, upstream and downstream flush lighting

system with standby generators); (iii) all weather access roads; and (iv) equipment for minor O&M and emergency

situations. Many reservoirs had undergone excessive sedimentation and reservoir rim deformation and did not have

updated engineering and operational information (such as reservoir elevation-capacity curves). The project undertook

remedial works to address these deficiencies in the 63 large dams, as described in Annex 8.

21. Remedial works reduced risks in all 63 dams. For each dam, risk assessments were carried out before works began

and after completion. The methodologies employed included both quantitative and semi-quantitative assessments for

the original 32 dams and a semi-quantitative assessment for the 31 dams under the AF.6 Based on the semi-quantitative

assessments, risks were reduced by 65 percent on average for all 63 dams. There was a higher risk reduction

percentage for the 32 dams under the original project (81 percent) compared to the 31 dams under the AF (48 percent),

reflecting the higher risk profile among the former set of dams. It should be noted that for Outcome indicator 1, “Large

dams with unacceptable risk index”, the word “unacceptable” was never clearly defined and no threshold score was

proposed. Neither the quantitative or semi-quantitative assessments had risk indices that easily corresponded to risk

“categories” (acceptable / unacceptable, extreme risk, high-risk, moderate risk, etc.).

22. There were other project activities that contributed to long-term sustainable arrangements for dam O&M. The

establishment of modern HMIS allows for automated, accurate, and real-time collection of rainfall, water volume and

flow data that is transmitted through a network to data centers at the MASL and ID for flood forecasting, dam

operations, and water allocations. This represents a tremendous improvement over the manual readings, which were

prone to errors and delays in data collection, transmission, and analysis. Data is also better integrated with greater

application and usage by the IAs. Authorities are now able to more accurately forecast floods and droughts and make

decisions accordingly, for example, on available water for irrigation purposes in a specific scheme or whether to call

for an evacuation of downstream residents due to an impending flood. This change is captured in the third PDO

outcome indicator: “Improved water database utilized by IAs for flood forecasting, dam operations and water

allocations”. The expectation was for hydrometeorological stations to be installed at every dam site and that enough

data would be collected over time (roughly two years) to enable IAs to use the databases to help manage dam

operations. While HMIS were installed in all 63 dams, the target value was kept to the 32 dams under the original

project. All 32 dams now have sufficient data collected over several years to allow for effective utilization by their IAs.

23. A Flood Control Center was also established that connects six major dams on the Mahaweli river basin through a

common control center where real time data on upper catchment conditions, reservoir inflows, gate operations, etc.,

is collected and analyzed, and decisions are taken to optimize reservoir operations. In times of heavy rain, the control

center could, for example, release flood waters in advance and in a controlled manner to avoid sudden downstream

6 The quantitative assessment is based on a methodology developed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation. The semi-

quantitative assessments were undertaken by Jason Gibb and Associates. A quantitative risk analysis yields a numerical estimate of

the risk of adverse consequence, considering the probability of load, probability of dam failure, and magnitude of adverse consequence

given dam failure. Annex 7 includes risk ratings for all dams.


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inundations. The Center is fully staffed and operational and is the first integrated dam management system in Sri

Lanka. Further discussion of HMIS is provided in the next section.

24. Emergency action plans were prepared for 13 dams for which dam engineers were trained to update on a regular

basis. A central electronic database now stores core engineering data related to dam design and operation (as-built

blueprints, records of flood history, geotechnical information, surveys and physical measurements, estimates and

investment information, and other data), which is a significant improvement over the dispersed storage of hard and

soft files by individual dam owners. Lastly, training and capacity building were a key aspect of establishing long-term

sustainable arrangements. All told, there were 487 training hours devoted to dam safety, operations, maintenance;

more than half took place overseas. Also see Section E for a discussion on institutional strengthening.

25. The project experienced a few shortcomings in establishing sustainable arrangements for O&M of large dams.

The first dealt with the O&M plans that were to be prepared for each of the 63 rehabilitated dams. This was the second

outcome indicator of the project. For the initial phase of the project, an international consultancy prepared the O&M

plans for the 32 dams (in addition to conducting the risk assessment studies, verifying detailed designs, preparing cost

estimates and specifications for tenders, inspecting works during and after completion). These responsibilities were

devolved to the individual IAs7 for the 31 dams rehabilitated under the AF, due to a Cabinet-imposed limit on

international consultancy contracts. While the IAs proved themselves capable of undertaking these responsibilities,

the post-renovation O&M plans were not treated with appropriate urgency and were delayed. As of this writing, all 31

plans have been reviewed by the independent Dam Safety Review Panel (DSRP) and are being used by the relevant IAs.

(ii) Institutional Arrangements

26. There were also delays in establishing a national-level dam safety institution (or Dam Safety Inspectorate, as

referred to at appraisal), an intermediate results indicator of the project. Now referred to as the National Center for

Dam Safety (NCDS), the institution was first attempted under the MRRP without success and was subsequently included

in the design of the DSWRPP to, inter alia, help establish codes of practice and essential guidelines and procedures for

dam O&M and dam safety, including inter-organizational arrangements for regular dam inspections, asset

management, and assistance for the establishment of dam safety regulation. Formal approval is expected by end-2018

and its set-up has been slow and incremental. It comprises a high-level National Dam Safety Steering Committee and

a Dam Safety Secretariat. Suitable offices have been identified near the city of Kandy. And while staffing requirements

have purportedly been approved by the Management Services Department, transfer of staff to the Secretariat and

recruitment are pending. In the meantime, the PMU has arranged a work program of dam inspection by a team of

senior engineers from the IAs to revisit the rehabilitated dams for inspection. This is a temporary measure that is no

substitute for the envisioned NCDS. Despite delays, progress over the past eight months indicates the NCDS will be

fully operational soon. The WARM-P provides a platform to continue advising and supporting its operationalization.

7 Of the 63 dams rehabilitated, 31 were owned by the Irrigation Department, 21 by the Mahaweli Authority, 5 by the Ceylon Electricity

Board, 3 by the Northern Provincial Council, 2 by the Kandy Municipal Council, and 1 by the National Water Supply


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While bureaucratic inertia and intransigence provide an explanation for the limited progress, the underlying issue

seems to be the recurring challenge of establishing a comprehensive framework for managing water resources.

27. One of the envisioned tasks of the NCDS was to help with budget planning and allocation for O&M and dam safety.

Although not an explicit output of the project, sufficient budget for O&M is key to sustainability of the project’s

investments, including the remedial works for dam safety. The Bank was unable to obtain evidence of budgetary

allocation for need-based O&M expenditure. And while it could be argued that the relatively recent completion of

remedial works precludes the need for immediate budget allocation, discussions with officials from the ID indicate that,

at least by one estimation, only 25 percent of the requested budget for O&M is approved in any given year. Visits to

dam sites and talks with field operators also indicate insufficient resources for even relatively routine maintenance,

such as repairing bund roads, clearing / preventing overgrowth of vegetation along the banks of reservoirs, etc. This

issue is expected to be addressed as the NCDS takes shape and with support from the WARM-P.

28. Despite these shortcomings, the project substantially achieved the first objective of establishing long-term

sustainable arrangements for O&M of large dams. The rehabilitation and modernization of 63 large dams improved

the stability of the dams per international dam safety standards and extended the effective design life period by

another 50 years, effectively reducing the dams’ risk index and concerns over public safety. All 63 dams have O&M

plans that have been operationalized and all 80 of the country’s large dams have proper O&M equipment. Despite

delays in establishing the NCDS, considerable capacity building, institutional strengthening, and operational-level

institution building (new flood control centers, HMIS databanks, training centers, etc.) were successfully carried out to

establish long-term sustainable arrangements for dam O&M. Other issues beyond the scope of the project, such as

adequate budgetary allocation for need-based O&M and establishment of an overarching national water sector

framework for integrated management of water resources, will continue to be addressed through on-going dialogue

with the government, particularly under the WARM-P. All told, an estimated 500,000 people who live near the dams

and whose lives would be directly affected by a dam breach have benefited by the achievement of the first objective.

Beyond this group of people, the government considers “direct beneficiaries” to be the 1.3 million people whose

livelihoods directly depend on the dams, reservoirs, and in many cases, the associated irrigation schemes. These

include farmers, fishermen, aqua-culturalists, etc. Indeed, field visits and beneficiary feedback indicate positive effects

of dam modernization on livelihoods, such as improved irrigation and agricultural intensification.

B2. Assessment of PDO 2: Improve water resources planning

Rating: High

29. The second part of the PDO was to be achieved through, inter alia, improved physical and analytical infrastructure

for monitoring hydrometeorological data, detecting and forecasting water hazards, and assessing water resources,

including groundwater. In addition, water resources planning would be enhanced through the completion of a national

water use plan and two water resources development plans for future priority investments in select river basins.

(i) Hydrometeorological Information System Improvement

30. The project succeeded in establishing and upgrading hydrometeorological stations. In proper planning and usage

of water-related infrastructure, especially in the operations of reservoirs, hydrological data analysis and applications


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play a vital role. These data are extremely useful in forecasting floods, operating dams, allocating bulk water, and

managing irrigated agriculture. All told, the project financed the installation of 167 hydrometric stations (a scale up

from the target of 142 revised at the time of the AF), including the upgrading of 35 existing stations, replenishing the

basic equipment and tools used for stream monitoring and installing more robust and modern automated data-

collection tools. The latter included: data loggers to control automated sensors and locally store data; various water-

level, precipitation, and other sensors to provide data to the loggers; solar-powered and other power supply

subsystems; technologies to telemeter data from stations to a databank; capacity to download data directly from the

data logger; and other tools and equipment, including lightning protection. As mentioned in the previous section, the

upgraded system represents a significant improvement over the manual readings, which were prone to errors and

delays in data collection, transmission, and analysis. One Aide Memoire reported differences by approximately 200mm

in hourly rainfall in the Kelani River Basin as reported by manual observation versus modern HMIS.8

31. There was tangible evidence of improved local capacity. Officers for relevant IAs were trained on data collection,

database management, flood forecasting, catchment water yield computations, and rainfall-runoff models. In total,

there were 260 training hours conducted on topics related to HMIS, including 30 hours conducted overseas. By the AF

phase of the project, the IAs took a lead role on several key activities. These included site surveys, development of a

plan for each station, preparation of the design package, and some of the civil works and instrument installation. Two

data centers were established at the Hydrology Divisions in the ID and Water Management Secretariat in MASL and all

necessary equipment was installed. As discussed in the previous section, these two data centers are now receiving and

utilizing data from the 32 dams rehabilitated under the original project.

32. Hydrometeorological stations were also installed for the 31 dams under the AF and since some time is required

to collect data, the use of the data banks to monitor and manage these dams are limited. The management of the

HMIS themselves was dependent on the capacity of IA staff to collect and analyze data and to monitor and manage the

hydrometric databases. In this regard, the project succeeded in providing modern data collection and analysis

infrastructure, and the framework for improving analytical capacity, including advanced applications of hydrologic and

meteorological data, and integration of historical and real-time data with remote sensing data and existing spatial

dataset of topography, land use, soils, and population, to develop rainfall-runoff models to compute reservoir inflow

and outflow, all necessary for decision making for flood hazard management and dam operation. As of the project

closing date, HMIS data was accessible to IA staff only but the HMIS website will soon allow access to the general public.

33. As was seen in some dams, there are concerns over the sustainability of the HMIS due to inadequate funding for

O&M. Although the Bank could not verify budget allocation for such purposes, a discussion with field officers at HMIS

sites indicated insufficient resources to undertake anything beyond menial repairs. Moreover, some HMIS belonging

to the ID have not been correctly handed over to regional ID offices and, as a result, are not being properly maintained.

The HMIS should be transferred, with care-takers appointed, and guidance provided for upkeep of stations.

(ii) Groundwater Monitoring

8 Aide Memoire, June 3, 2016.


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34. Another important means of improving water resources management was groundwater monitoring. This entails

monitoring, assessing, and safeguarding groundwater resources, which had been over-exploited in some parts of the

country. Many aquifers in Sri Lanka are shallow and highly vulnerable to pollution. Over extraction for irrigated

agriculture in many coastal areas induces saltwater intrusion and puts many aquifers at risk. Other natural and human-

induced contaminants include fluoride, iron, nitrates, industrial contaminants; fecal coli from bacteria; and a range of

agricultural chemicals. Exacerbating these issues is the lack of systematic and coordinated monitoring of groundwater

level and quality as well as little public awareness regarding groundwater resources.

35. The project identified and monitored eight pilot areas in different provinces with groundwater issues. These issues

included bacteriological and extensive fertilizer usage, extensive agriculture, over-extraction of groundwater, kidney

diseases,9 industrial pollution, salinity, water quality assessments. For each pilot, the project established a

groundwater monitoring network and information system to inventory groundwater use and catalogue issues and

complaints; monitored groundwater quality and quantity, and disseminated results to researchers, policymakers, and

universities; developed hydrological maps; established a groundwater database, coupled with geographic information

system (GIS) and other applications; built the analytical capacity of the WRB staff for groundwater monitoring and

analysis; and undertook a public awareness campaign on groundwater. On capacity building, 81 training hours were

conducted on a range of topics on groundwater monitoring and analysis. The project also provided funds to upgrade

and equip the existing water quality laboratory in Anuradhapura operated by the WRB, by which they could analyze

chemical, bacterial, and metallic content in water samples. Public outreach included "Jala Sayana" (Water Clinics)

programs set up by request, which provide knowledge of local water levels, water quality, and purification methods.

36. Design methodology was established for a groundwater monitoring program to carry out a systematic long-term

monitoring network in the country. Field activities included in-situ testing, detailed laboratory analysis, groundwater

level monitoring, drilling of wells, installation of automated data loggers, well levelling, and pumping tests made the

program successful. Subsequently, hydrological maps were developed, awareness program for community and officials

in the area were conducted, and preparation of base maps and geographic surveys in pilot areas were carried out for

effective implementation of the sub-component. One-hundred wells were drilled in the pilot areas and water samples

tested to assess the standard water quality, heavy metals, bacteriological analysis, and pesticide analysis. The

establishment and functionality of regional-level groundwater monitoring committees was undertaken by the WRB

and government has committed to continued work by WRB such that longer term and sustainable monitoring work

could be done to better understand trends and draw clearer conclusions on ground water quality.

(iii) Multi-sector Water Resources Planning

37. Current demographic and economic trends indicate greatly increased demand for agriculture, safe and reliable

water supply for domestic, commercial and industrial use, and increased and more reliable electricity. These trends,

9 Public interest in groundwater has grown in recent years given the alarming rise in “chronic kidney disease of unknown etiology”

(CKDu) of which some districts report a 15-22 percent prevalence rate. While no definitive cause for CKDu has been identified,

geographical mapping indicates a relationship between CKDu and agricultural irrigation water sources. More information is available at

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5102238/


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along with heightened sensitivity to environmental conservation, have resulted in increased competition for water

among different uses and sectors, and disputes over where water resources are available for development. The project

helped to address these issues by (1) developing a NWUP; (2) updating the Mahaweli Water Resources Development

Plan for the Mahaweli Basin; and (3) preparing a multi-sector development plan for the Mundeni Aru Basin.

38. The NWUP entailed broad stakeholder consultations conducted at both the district and national levels. It was

based on an assessment of the availability of water in 103 river basins; studied 30-year potential water demands and

development policies in the country; took into account social and environmental assessments to develop baseline

scenarios; studied potential impacts; identified alternative strategies for planning and implementation; and proposed

potential water resource investments to consider for the short, medium, and long-term horizons. The updated

Mahaweli Water Resource Development Plan (originally completed in 1968) consists of three development options

that would use water from the Mahaweli Basin for the development of North-Central and Central Provinces. The

Mundeni Aru basin plan includes regulating water resources for domestic water, additional supply for irrigation, and

environmental flow requirements. Staff were trained in water resources planning and management and supported the

preparation of all three plans which were then reviewed by the Technical Review Committee (TRC), representing the

main IAs.10 Final plans were presented in a national workshop and approved by the Cabinet for implementation.

39. Based on the three plans, 26 water investment projects with an approximate cost of $240 million were proposed.

Eight feasibility studies have been completed and are in various stages of review by the TRC. Subsequently, the Bank

together with IAs prepared the Report "Strategic Options for Water Conservation, Management, and Development in

Sri Lanka" which details the government policy, priorities, development plans, institutional arrangements, challenges,

and strategies in irrigation and water resources development in the country. The report provides a framework for

discussing future water sector priorities between the government and development partners.

40. The project fully achieved the second PDO of improved water resources planning. Hydrometeorological data

collection and analysis have significantly improved, owing to the establishment and upgrading of 167 hydrometric

stations, establishment of data centers that are in full operation in the two main water resources ministries, and the

provision of tools and training for real-time analysis of flood situations in the influent streams of key reservoirs.

Groundwater monitoring and analysis have also improved through the eight pilot programs, paving the way for scale-

up and possible development of regulations to safeguard groundwater resources. Lastly, the development of the

National Water Use Plan, the updated Mahaweli Water Resources development plan, and Mundeni Aru Basin

Development Plan have provided government with a strategic framework to assess options for future development of

water resources. As previously discussed, issues beyond the scope of the project, including establishment of an

overarching national policy, legal and institutional framework for water resources management, will continue to be

addressed through policy dialogue, particularly through the WARM-P and Bank advisory services and analytics (ASA).

B3. Justification for Overall Efficacy

10 The intermediate indicator measuring the number of core staff trained for multi-sectoral water resources planning targeted 15 staff

across the key water agencies but it was later determined that only 10 were required to help develop the three plans.


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41. Overall efficacy is rated “Substantial”, based on substantial achievement of the first PDO (Establish long-term

sustainable arrangements for the O&M of large dams) and full achievement of the second PDO (Improve water

resources planning), as reflected in progress on outcome and intermediate indicators.

C. EFFICIENCY

Rating: Substantial

42. Following the methodologies adopted for the project appraisal in 2008, the ICR-stage ex-post economic analysis

was conducted to re-assess the economic viability of the project investment. Given the fact that economic analyses

were conducted at both the original project appraisal (Phase 1) and appraisal for the additional finance (Phase 2) in

2014, the ICR-stage economic analysis was conducted with four different scopes: (i) 32 dams for Phase 1; (ii) five

portfolio dams for Phase 2; (iii) 30 dams for Phase 2; and (iv) the entire 63 dams of Phase 1 and 2. The primary benefits

of the project are: (i) reduced risk of dam failure and (ii) reduced risk of floods caused by deficient dam operation. More

detailed information including assumptions used for the analysis can be found in Annex 4.

43. The results of the ICR-stage economic analysis for the entire project (Phase 1+2) indicate a positive net present

value (NPV) of US$ 23.9 million and an Economic Rate of Return (ERR) of 26.6 percent. The ERR for Phase 1 dams and

Phase 2 dams were 30.6 percent and 16.8 percent, respectively. Phase 1 shows higher ERR than that at appraisal-stage

(18.8 percent). This is presumably attributable to the project cost that did not exceed the estimated expenditure

despite the high inflation rate during the project period (5.1 percent per year on average). However, it is hard to identify

the source of difference since the cash flow chart used in the project appraisal is no longer available.

44. It should be noted that some of the benefits materialized by the project (e.g., reduced risk of deaths from floods,

increase of agricultural productivity and contribution to the reconstruction of post-conflict area) were not included in

the current analysis due mainly to the difficulty in valuation, which made the analysis more conservative. The efficiency

of the Project is rated as “Substantial”, given the reasonably high economic viability. Some implementation delay and

cost overruns were observed in Phase 1, but after the project extension in 2012 and the AF to scale up project activities

in 2014, there were no further delays or cost overruns. The higher ERR in comparison to the ex-ante assessment

suggests the rating as “High” instead of “Substantial”. However, the limited availability of data from the ex-ante

analysis made the results of ex-ante and ex-post analyses less comparable, therefore there is too limited unambiguous

evidence to justify a rating of “High”.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

45. Based on the above assessment, with Relevance rated “High”, Efficacy rated “Substantial”, and Efficiency rated

“Substantial”, the overall outcome rating of the project is “Satisfactory”.

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS

E1. Institutional Strengthening

46. As discussed in the above sections, the project had a strong institutional strengthening element with the aim of

building the capacity of the IAs in several specialized skills. Those included modem state-of-the-art dam engineering

principles; risk assessment and dam portfolio management; engineering design and construction quality control; social


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and environmental management of dams and water resources management; dam safety codes of practices; dam

operation and risk-based maintenance; safety monitoring and inspection; dam emergency preparedness planning;

hydrological and meteorological data management; flood forecasting; and multi-sectoral water resources planning. To

build capacity, a number of trainings were conducted both in-country and overseas (Annex 10). Moreover,

implementation responsibility of all three main components were anchored within relevant government departments,

which built strong ownership and created a favorable environment for sustaining project activities and investments.

The tasks performed by international consultants during the original project were delegated to and satisfactorily carried

out by the IAs during the AF phase. The improved implementation performance during the second half of the project

implementation period testifies to the success of improved capacity and knowledge transfer.

47. Knowledge transfer through experience sharing, exposure visits, and on-the-job training proved extremely useful

for field staff at the dam site who may not have been able to participate in national or regional training events. For

example, the idea of building simple O&M structures to store tools and as a resting place for field workers spread from

one scheme to another. Another example was the idea to cover the newly installed gate-lifting motors and supporting

accessories with a simple roof structure to guard against exposure to the elements. During field visits, it was noted

that such minor matters significantly contribute to the effectiveness and sustainability of the investments.

E2. Peace Consolidation

48. There were a few other key changes in the country context and operating environment that impacted the project

scope and implementation. The first revolved around the formal end of the 26-year civil war in May 2009 between the

Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The conflict had particularly affected the northern

and eastern parts of the country, which had largely been inaccessible to the government and its development partners.

Hence under the original project, none of the 32 dams selected for rehabilitation were located in these areas. The

peace accords called for a new era of peace, reconciliation and development, and the latter included reconstruction of

both social and economic infrastructure. The DSWRPP was conceived as a good vehicle for spurring economic growth

through dam rehabilitation that inter alia, had associated benefits for irrigation schemes and therefore to farmer

livelihoods. Thus, for the AF, 10 of the 31 dams were selected from conflict-affected parts of the country.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

49. The project benefited from good project preparation which was guided by the objective of reducing disaster risk

and improving water resources management. The objectives were clear, realistic, and achievable, and buttressed by a

straight forward project design with clearly structured components and clear operational logic. The project was well

designed and entailed a comprehensive technical review that followed internationally acceptable methodologies.

However, detailed inspection of all dams could not be fully undertaken during preparation, resulting in an

underestimation of projects costs by 27.8 percent, which necessitated AF to cover cost overruns. The identification of

risks and mitigation measures were well-founded and adequate. Procurement risks were addressed through the

recruitment of a strong procurement unit within the PMU (the procurement specialist eventually became the PMU

director) and the preparation of a comprehensive procurement manual and training in line with Bank guidelines. The


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risk of communities not agreeing to civil works that could affect their livelihoods was mitigated by a well-designed and

executed outreach campaign to ensure informed decision making as well as transparency in transactions.

50. There were some shortcomings in project design and preparation that affected implementation. First, the

monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework had some measurability issues (see Section IV). Secondly, there were

limitations to what could be achieved under a conventional investment project design, e.g., the operationalization of a

national dam safety entity, which could have been better supported by other approaches, including output / results-

based financing, development policy financing, and technical assistance. Lastly, the long delays in hiring the three

international support consultancies (ISCs), which were critical to implementation, could have been mitigated by

ensuring the recruitment process was further along prior to project approval.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

B1. Factors Subject to Government / PMU Control

(i) Implementation Delays

51. As noted above, there were significant delays during the first three years of the project in hiring the ISCs

responsible for providing technical inputs to plan, design, and initiate the three components. The delays meant very

little implementation could be done and were caused by a number of factors: (a) the complex nature of procurement

and evaluation process; (b) the large number of proposals and the length of time needed to review; and (c) approval

processes from various agencies, including the World Bank. According to Aide Memoires, the ISCs for Components 1

and 3 were on board by February 2010, while the ISC for Component 2 was recruited in August 2012, representing

delays of 20 and 50 months, respectively, from the effectiveness date.

52. Contract management was challenging throughout implementation but particularly during the original project

period. The ISCs took more time than expected to develop detailed designs of more complex dams. Delays continued

during the construction phase. As shown in Annex 11, under the original project, 19 contracts were to be completed

within 12 months, but they were instead completed in 28 months. Similarly, seven contracts were to be completed

within 18 months but were instead completed in 33 months. While there were fewer and shorter delays during the AF

period, any delay defers achievement of results; risks escalation of the price of materials, transport and labor; risks

cash flow issues; and delays succeeding activities. Furthermore, contractors often cited adverse weather conditions as

the justifications for contract extensions to avoid penalties. Another problem observed was the use of the mobilization

advances (MA) for other purposes (settle previous loans, buy new vehicles, etc.). The project officers have the authority

to advise the contractors on use of MA or to pay the MA in instalments. Many of these delays could have been averted

by enhanced monitoring and contract management.

(ii) Implementation Roles and Responsibilities

53. A Cabinet decision in September 2007 affected the implementation of the AF in several ways. First, the AF was

mandated to be completed within four years (whereas it was originally planned for five). Secondly, IAs were to limit

international consultancies and to give preference to local consultants or implementing agencies. Third, the project

was to be implemented in greater coordination with line ministries. The Ministry of Irrigation and Water Management


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subsequently advised that financial management (FM) and procurement administration would come under the purview

of the ID, thus requiring these functions to be devolved to the ID to the extent possible with oversight provided by the

PMU. Both ID and MASL followed the above decisions and acted accordingly, effectively taking over key responsibilities

undertaken by the ISCs during the original project. By and large, these Cabinet and ministerial decisions did not

adversely affect implementation of the AF. The capacity of the IAs had improved due to institutional strengthening

activities and the close collaboration between IA and ISC staff. In addition, the independent six-member Dam Safety

Review Panel continued to provide regular technical support (though not as often during the last two years).

54. The above decisions enhanced the role of IAs which had the effect of promoting ownership, sustainability, and

institutional strengthening. However, they also effectively diminished the role of the PMU. While still responsible for

overall project management (see Annex 1 for achievements against intermediate indicators related to project

management), the PMU took on more of a coordinating role. It continued to take the lead in designing and executing

training, M&E, and environmental and social safeguards. But its capacity to be a central, independent, and authorized

entity to ensure inter-ministerial collaboration and agreement on more substantive matters, were constrained.

B2. Factors Subject to World Bank Control

55. The Bank provided adequate supervision of the project. During the 10-year implementation period, there were

three task team leaders (TTLs) and the transition between them seems to have been smooth. The Aide Memoires

indicate that teams proactively identified opportunities to scale up project activities for development impact, engaged

in appropriate follow-up and resolution of bottlenecks, and appropriately adapted to changing conditions. The M&E

design and utilization had some minor weaknesses. Moreover, the delays and lack of progress during the first few

years of implementation were well documented but inadequately reflected in the project ISR ratings.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

Rating: Substantial

A1. M&E Design

56. The M&E framework contained features that one would expect from a Bank-financed project in terms of clear

roles and responsibilities, sources of data, and frequency of data collection and reporting. The reports would cover the

key inputs, outputs, and processes of project management, as well as the expected outcomes necessary to show

achievement of the PDO. While the outcome indicators encompassed all aspects of the PDO, they were some

weaknesses. Most notably, the first indicator, “Large dams with unacceptable risk index”, would have benefited from

a clear definition of “unacceptable risk index.” As discussed earlier, the risk index used a point system with the more

points assigned, the higher the risk. The index, however, did not indicate a certain threshold for “unacceptable” nor

does the project attempt to provide one. Remedial works were assumed to lower risks below unacceptable levels.

A2. M&E Implementation


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57. Generally speaking, M&E data was collected, analyzed, and reported in a methodologically sound manner.

However, there seems to have been some confusion on the part of the PMU on the third outcome indicator, “Improved

water database utilized by IAs for flood forecasting, dam operations, and water allocations.” The achievement

constituted: establishment of new or upgraded hydrometric stations at dam sites; establishment of a databank at the

IA and MASL; improved analytical capacity by IA and MASL staff; and establishment of procedures and provision of

tools and training for real-time analysis. The PMU nonetheless reported on the number of dams with installed HMIS.

A3. M&E Utilization

58. The PMU prepared monthly, quarterly, and annual reports as planned. However, the reports mostly focused on

contract details, inputs, activities, and outputs with very limited reflection and evaluation. The Bank Aide Memoires

on the other hand, did utilize the M&E framework to inform implementation and decision making. The project would

have benefited from a mid-term review, which was planned but never undertaken. The AF project paper also indicated

that an interim ICR would be undertaken after the closing of the original credit, but this too was not done. However,

by the close of the original credit, project implementation had been progressing well and a stocktaking of progress,

lessons learned, and course corrections for the remainder of the project period were not seen as priorities.

A4. Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

59. Based on assessment of design, implementation, and utilization, the overall rating of quality of M&E is

“Substantial”. Despite the shortcomings described above, the M&E framework was more than sufficient to assess the

achievement of the project’s objectives. It should also be noted that the PMU continues to use the M&E framework

as part of the preparation of the proposed WARM-P which would continue the dam modernization program and efforts

to improve water resources management.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

B1. Environmental Safeguards

60. The project was a Category B as it did not entail construction of new dams, alteration of primary design profiles

of selected dams, or capacity augmentation of reservoirs. Environmental impacts were not significant or irreversible

and overall, the project would result in positive environmental benefits, due to reduced risk from rehabilitated dam.

Nonetheless, dam rehabilitation works resulted in removal of large quantities of topsoil, boulders and in the generation

of concrete debris and other construction wastes. As such, two environmental safeguard policies were triggered: OP

4.01 on Environmental Assessment and OP 4.37 on Safety of Dams. The measures required to address the provisions

of the policies included environmental analyses (EA), environmental management plans (EMP), the hiring of experts to

design, supervise civil works and adhere to certain dam safety measures in the design, tendering, construction, O&M

of the dam and associated works. The government appointed a DSRP to review and advise the IAs on matters related

to dam safety and other critical aspects of the dam, its appurtenant structures, catchment areas, the area surrounding

the reservoir and downstream areas. All other requirements were met. The project remained fully in compliance with

safeguards policies; even with the departure of the PMU’s environmental officer during the last year, there were no

lapses in safeguards implementation and monitoring. Bank ISRs consistently rated safeguards as “Satisfactory”.


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B2. Social Safeguards

61. The project triggered OP 4.11 on Cultural Property and OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement. In both cases, the

project remained in compliance with requirements and the project was consistently rated “Satisfactory”. The former

required Department of Archaeology assistance in the implementation of an archeological impact assessment and an

implementation action plan when dam structures deemed archeologically significant were found. The policy calls for

that structure to be preserved, as was the case of an ancient sluice structure identified at the Urusitawewa site.

62. The policy on involuntary resettlement was triggered but the project did not entail any land acquisition or physical

displacement of people. However, in the case of seven dams, water flows to the reservoir and to connected irrigation

schemes were interrupted in order to conduct detailed technical investigations and rehabilitation works. These

interruptions had adverse impacts on the livelihoods of farmers and others downstream dependent on dam reservoirs.

A Livelihood Support Assistance (LSA) Plan was developed to deal with the hardships faced by affected people. The

plan consisted of several types of activities for about 15,500 affected households. These included a wage assistance

plan which provided wage employment for affected farmers, fishermen, and landless laborers; an alternative crop plan

to assist farmers in growing drought resilient crops; a program to replenish inland fish stocks; a gender action plan; and

a domestic water supply provisioning program. A grievance redress mechanism was established and monthly reports

issued. An oversight committee was established to resolve the complaints with direct participation by stakeholders.

B3. Procurement

63. Procurement was identified as a substantial risk to the project with likely delays in procurement processing.

Indeed, the project experienced significant delays as described in Section III. However, over time, capacity and

proficiency in Bank procurement guidelines improved, as did overall contract management. A strong procurement unit

was established in the PMU which produced a project specific, comprehensive procurement administration manual in

line with Bank guidelines. The risk rating was eventually lowered to “Moderate” and then “Low”. The Bank team

provided close monitoring and there were periodically updated procurement plans and procurement activity

monitoring plans. In addition, considerable training (317 hours) was provided to PMU and IA staff on procurement and

contract management and, indeed, over time, performance on both improved (see Annex 10). The senior procurement

staff in the PMU eventually became the PMU Director for the project.

64. Generally speaking, there were no issues in regard to procurement compliance and the quality, reliability, and

transparency of procurement administration has been satisfactory. The procurement process complied with Bank

procurement rules and procedures. The IAs and PMU demonstrated sufficient capacity in carrying out procurement

activities in a satisfactory manner, including procurement preparation, planning, bidding process, and contract

management. Bank ISRs consistently rated procurement as “Satisfactory”.

B4. Financial Management

65. Financial management (FM) was identified as a moderate risk to the project and was consistently rated

“Satisfactory” in Bank ISRs, reflecting adequate arrangements and capacity for planning and budgeting, funds flow,

disbursement arrangements, internal controls, physical verification of assets, accounting, reporting, and auditing.

There were no concerns regarding staffing or incidents of non-compliance. The fund transfer mechanism was


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effectively implemented through the Special Dollar Account and there were no cash flow issues. Financial reporting

was carried out in a timely manner and while the PMU was asked on several occasions to ensure consistency between

project records and Client Connection, the quality of reporting was acceptable. Audit reports were timely and were of

good quality. FM arrangements also proved adequate in the execution of the LSAs, as described above.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Rating: Satisfactory

C1. Quality at Entry

66. The project reflected the strategic priorities of both the Bank and the government and the development objective

was highly relevant. Costs were underestimated by 27.8 percent but largely because of the difficulties in arriving at a

precise cost without detailed technical inspection of all dams. The project was nonetheless well designed and entailed

a comprehensive technical review that followed well-established, internationally acceptable methodologies. As noted

above, the LSA helped to mitigate the adverse impacts of the dam rehabilitation works on farmers and others

downstream dependent on dam reservoirs and was based on a well-designed and executed outreach campaign to

ensure informed decision making as well as transparency in transactions. Procurement risks were addressed through

a strong procurement unit within the PMU and the preparation of a comprehensive procurement manual in line with

Bank guidelines. The implementation delays at the outset of the project were largely due to internal government

procedures associated with the recruitment of three teams of international consultants. Implementation

arrangements were appropriate and adequately addressed the risks of poor collaboration among different ministries

and dam custodians. All other risks were similarly well founded and properly addressed. As discussed above, there

were a few shortcomings in terms of the M&E framework and limitations to using a conventional investment project

design to support and incentivize the type of institutional reform (establishment of the NCDS) and behaviors

(preparation and updating of O&M manuals) that the project envisioned.

C2. Quality of Supervision

67. The task team undertook 20 formal implementation support missions, not including technical and other visits.

Aide Memoires raised key implementation issues, generally proposed remedies, and were of good quality. Certain

issues, such as establishing the NCDS and delays in preparing O&M manuals, were highlighted multiple times. There

were some minor shortcomings in M&E that were not addressed during supervision. These issues, however, should

not take away from the task team’s focus on development impact, strong implementation, and problem solving,

particularly in the second half of the project implementation period. As noted previously, implementation began

against the backdrop of an on-going conflict and fledgling implementation capacity relative to what was required for a

comprehensive dam safety program with large civil works contracts. Accelerated implementation during the second

half of the AF period allowed the project to finish strong. About 65 percent of total disbursements took place over the

last three years, reflecting, in part, success in addressing bottlenecks and building local implementation capacity.

C3. Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

68. Based on the quality of Bank performance at entry and at supervision, the overall rating for Bank performance is

rated “Satisfactory”.


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D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

69. The risk to the project’s development outcomes is relatively moderate and is based on assessment of three aspects

of sustainability: (i) technical sustainability; (ii) institutional sustainability; and (iii) financial sustainability. In terms of

technical sustainability, and as discussed throughout the report, the project helped strengthen capacity and skills

among IAs to maintain asset inventories, dam O&M, water resources planning and management, and the use and

management of hydrometeorological stations and systems. With the remedial works, the expected life of the dams

were extended by another 50 years. New monitoring instruments installed as part of the remedial measures and

modernized HMIS allow for timely and effective detection of problems and risks in dam operation. However, technical

sustainability requires skills transfers to be passed on through formal and informal learning. The NCDS, once

operational, could help strengthen the culture of O&M and public safety to the next generation of engineers.

70. In terms of institutional sustainability, the project imparted a strong institutional strengthening element with the

aim of building the capacity of the IAs in several specialized skills. Those include modem state-of-art dam engineering

principles; risk assessment and dam portfolio management; engineering design and construction quality control; social

and environmental management of dams and basin water resources management; dam safety codes of practices; dam

operation and risk-based maintenance; safety monitoring and inspection; dam emergency preparedness planning;

hydrological & meteorological data management; flood forecasting; groundwater monitoring and analysis; and multi-

sectoral water resources planning, among others. The implementation arrangement that anchored the

implementation responsibility of all three components with the concerned government departments have built a

strong sense of ownership of the project and its outcomes, creating a favorable environment for sustainability. The IAs

themselves should serve as the institutional, skill and information base for post-project water resources management,

to be supported eventually by the NCDS. As discussed earlier, the Bank looks to consolidate and build upon the

project’s institutional achievements, including the WARM-P and ASA that have helped underpin the team’s policy

dialogue with government and development partners.

71. From the financial sustainability perspective, there is a higher awareness of the importance of O&M in ensuring

not only operational efficiency but public safety. Dialogue between the government and the Bank and other

development partners continue to look at options to optimize social, economic and environmental benefits of large

dams as a means for income generation from providing ancillary public services (like mini-hydro systems, recreational

parks, fisheries, eco-tourism, etc.) to supplement O&M funding.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

72. The project has delivered many positive results in terms of ensuring sustainable arrangements for O&M of large

dams and improved water resources planning. The following are some good lessons for future Bank assistance.

73. Instrument choice and project design. While the government demonstrated strong ownership and commitment

throughout, the project fell short in establishing the NCDS, despite repeated assurances. The lack of progress on this

important output reflects, in part, the challenges of supporting policy and institutional reforms through a conventional

investment project design. As the Bank intends to continue to support Sri Lanka’s water sector, there are various


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instruments and approaches to support future reform efforts, starting with high level policy dialogue underpinned by

ASA and complemented by technical assistance, as well as more results-based approaches to program financing.

74. Comprehensive water sector framework. Beyond instrument choice, broader reforms are needed to put in place

a national policy, legal, and institutional framework for the integrated management of water resources. The slow

progress with regard to the NCDS is symptomatic of the broader challenge of instituting a national, inter-ministerial

framework, which can only be achieved through strong government ownership and a bottom-up approach to policy

and institutional reforms. The major water sector agencies need to be willing to address water resources development

and management needs, taking into account competing demands for water and associated social, economic, and

environmental dimensions. To this end, the project’s water resources development plans and the cross-agency

collaboration undertaken to identifying priority investments were a small but important step toward a more integrated

water resources framework which the WARM-P looks to address more fully in the coming years.

75. Implementation arrangements. Many of the core responsibilities of implementation were transferred to the IAs

during the AF period and the role of the PMU gradually became confined to coordination and monitoring. Though

empowering line ministries is critical to promoting ownership, institutional development, and sustainability, a strong

entity at the central level is important for addressing broader cross-ministerial and technical issues. The weakened

role of the PMU in the last few years in particular contributed to the lack of progress on the national dam safety entity.

76. Building and sustaining capacity. The ability of the IAs to take the lead in implementing the project during the AF

phase reflects the strong capacity developed during the initial phase of the project. While the ISCs took the lead on

key aspects of implementation, there was very close collaboration with IA staff, resulting in knowledge transfer. Formal

training was also emphasized throughout the project. This allowed sufficient capacity to be built to take over

responsibilities of the ISCs once the AF was requested. This level of capacity will need to be sustained as senior

engineers and dam operation staff retire or move on. Once fully operational, the NCDS is expected to help continue

capacity strengthening and instill a culture of dam safety and O&M among younger engineers and dam operators.

77. Climate change adaptation. As discussed, the project’s objectives continue to be highly relevant to both the Bank

and government, particularly in light of climate change and predicted climate variability. Sri Lanka is considered highly

vulnerable to climate change, which is projected to, inter alia, result in more frequent and severe flooding. While dam

safety is critical to government’s efforts at adaptation, so too are efforts to improve watershed management to reduce

vulnerability and enhance adaptive capacity. Building on the project’s achievement, the WARM-P will continue the

dam safety program, complemented by activities to restore and rehabilitate watersheds to promote sustainable land

and water management practices, thereby reducing degradation, erosion, and improving flood control.

78. Project management. Given the 10-year duration of the project, there are a number of useful lessons learned

from the Bank’s and government’s management of the project. The ICR highlights a few salient issues, including the

need to ensure good contract management and the monitoring of contractor practices to reduce delays; the focus

on capacity building through formal and informal knowledge and skills transfer; the importance of maintaining a

strong implementing unit to not only competently execute core tasks but also to lead on broader strategic issues; and

the need to ensure results indicators are well defined and measurable. .


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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: PDO1: Establish long-term sustainable arrangements for O&M of large Dams

Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised

Target

Actual Achieved at Completion

(Reduced) Number of Large Dams with Unacceptable Risk Index

Number 63.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): Additional financing project paper in 2014 proposed an increase in total dams to be rehabilitated to about 62. This was changed to 63 shortly afterward. The indicator was also modified and the word "reduced" was deleted. 100% target achieved.


Target


Dams with need-based operation and maintenance (O&M) plans operationalized.

Number 0.00 32.00 63.00 63.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 28-Sep-2018


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Comments (achievements against targets): 55% target achieved at project closing date. 100% target achieved by end-September 2018.


Target


Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 0.00 1030000.00 1348000.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018

Female beneficiaries Percentage 0.00 0.00 535000.00 754000.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): 131% of the target achieved. Objective/Outcome: PDO 2: Improve Water Resources Planning


Target


Improved water database utilized by IAs for flood forecasting, dam operations, and water allocations.

Number 0.00 32.00 32.00 32.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): 100% target achieved.


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Target


National Water Use Master Plan and at Least One River Basin Development Plan adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers

Text No National Water Use Plan and river basin plan exist.

Mundeni Aru Basin plan completed

National Water Use Master Plan and at 2 River Basin Development Plans adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers.

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): 100% achieved for two basin development plans and National Water Use plan adopted by cabinet.

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Component 1: Dam Safety and Operational Efficiency Improvements


Target


Large dams rehabilitated with necessary remedial measures.

Number 0.00 32.00 63.00 63.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018



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Target


Dams provided with basic safety facilities

Number 0.00 80.00 80.00 80.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018



Target


Dam Safety Inspectorate with essential guidelines and procedures established and operational

Text Dam Safety Inspectorate does not exist.

Dam Safety Inspectorate Fully operational

Mixed Progres

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The National Center for Dam Safety (NCDS) was formally established but is not yet fully operational.

Component: Component 2: Hydro-metrological information system


Target


Hydrometric stations and agro-meteorological stations established/upgraded and

Amount(USD) 0.00 50.00 142.00 167.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018


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functional

Comments (achievements against targets): 118% of the target achieved.


Target


Hydrology and meteorology databases developed and accessible by different users

Text Databases do not exist.

Database fully operational and accessible by different users

Databases developed, accessible, and in use by IAs.

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018



Target


Basic groundwater monitoring system with sufficient number of observation points established

Number 0.00 0.00 8.00 8.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): 100% target achieved. Eight pilot groundwater monitoring systems established.


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Target


Staff trained for O&M of HMIS

Number 0.00 50.00 142.00 167.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): 118% of the target achieved.

Component: Component 3: Multi-Sector Resources Planning


Target


A national water use master plan developed

Text Plan does not exist. Plan finalized and adopted.

Plan fully developed.

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018



Target


Mahaweli basin development plan updated

Text Plan exists but outdated.

Updated Plan completed and adapted.

Plan fully updated.


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01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018



Target


Water resources development plan for Mundeni Aru river basin developed

Text Plan does not exist. Basin Plan finalized. Plan fully developed.

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018



Target


Core team, in number of staff, trained for multi-sectoral water resources planning.

Number 0.00 12.00 15.00 10.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): 67% target achieved. Government realized that only 10 core staff were needed for multi-sectoral water resources planning.


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Target


Feasibility studies prepared for key interventions identified in the various Plans

Number 0.00 0.00 6.00 8.00

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018


Component: Component 4: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation


Target


Timely completion/update of annual work programs, progress reports, FMRs, procurement plans

Text No N/A Yes

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018



Target


Cumulative physical and disbursement performance targets do not fall below 80%

Text No N/A Yes

01-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2013 15-May-2018 15-May-2018


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of trhe cumulative targets after Year 1

Comments (achievements against targets): 100% target achieved after Year 3.


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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome 1: Establish long-term sustainable arrangements for O&M of large Dams

Outcome Indicators

1. Number of large dams with unacceptable risk index

2. Dams with need-based O&M plans operationalized

3. Direct project beneficiaries

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Large dams rehabilitated with necessary remedial measures

2. Dams provided with basic safety facilities

3. Dam Safety Inspectorate with essential guidelines and procedures established

and operational

Key Outputs by Component

(linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)

Component 1. Dam Safety and Operational Efficiency

1. Large dams rehabilitated / modernized

2. O&M plans for rehabilitated / modernized dams operationalized

3. All large dams provided with basic safety facilities

4. Emergency action plans prepared for 13 critical dams

5. Central electronic database stores key data on dam

6. Dam Safety Inspectorate (National Center for Dam Safety) established

7. Flood control center established for Mahaweli River Basin

8. Staff trained on dam safety and O&M

9. Training center rehabilitated

Objective/Outcome 2: Improve water resources planning

Outcome Indicators 1. Improved water database utilized by IAs for flood forecasting, dam operations,

and water allocations


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2. National water use master plan and at least one river basin development plan

adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Hydrometric stations and agro-meteorological stations established/upgraded

and functional

2. Hydrology and meteorology databases developed and accessible by different

users

3. Basic groundwater monitoring system with sufficient number of observation

points established

4. Staff trained for O&M of HMIS

5. National water use master plan developed

6. Mahaweli Basin development plan updated

7. Water resources development plan for Mundeni Aru river basin developed

8. Core team, in number of staff, trained for multi-sectoral water resources

planning

9. Feasibility studies prepared for key interventions identified in the various Plans

Key Outputs by Component

(linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)

Component 2. Hydro-Meteorological Information System

1. Hydrometric stations and agro-meteorological stations established/upgraded

2. Data centers housing hydrology and meteorology databases established

3. Groundwater monitoring pilot conducted

4. Staff trained on HMIS O&M and data analyses, groundwater monitoring

Component 3. Multi-sector Water Resources Planning

1. National water use master plan developed

2. Mahaweli Basin development plan updated

3. Mundeni Aru River Basin development plan developed

4. Staff trained on multi-sectoral water resources planning


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5. Feasibility studies prepared for key interventions identified in the various plans


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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name Role

Preparation

Nihal Fernando Task Team Leader,

Xiaokai Li Co-Task Team Leader, Water Resources

Ohn Myint Dam Engineering and Costing (Consultant)

Seeniathamby Manaoharan Implementation Arrangements and Coordination

Suryanarayan Satish Social Development Specialist

Walter A Garvey Water Resources River Basin Planning (Consultant)

Nagaraja Harshadeep Rao Hydrological Models and DSS Tools

Sumith Pilapitiya Environmental Safeguards

Supervision/ICR

Shyam KC Task Team Leader(s)

Asif Ali, G. W. Anjali U. Perera Vitharanage, Sunethra

Chandrika Samarakoon

Procurement Specialist(s)

Bernadeen Enoka Wijegunawardene Financial Management Specialist

Zakia B. Chummun Team Member

Joop Stoutjesdijk Team Member

Cecilia Belita Team Member

Anju Gaur Team Member

John Factora Team Member

Samanmalee Kumari Sirimanne Team Member

Seenithamby Manoharan Team Member

Rolande Simone Pryce Team Member

Susrutha Pradeep Goonesekera Social Safeguards Specialist

Prabha Kumari Perera Team Member


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Jun Matsumoto Team Member

Suranga Sooriya Kumara Kahandawa Team Member

Mokshana Nerandika Wijeyeratne Environmental Safeguards Specialist

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost

No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)

Preparation

FY05 10.660 48,160.56

FY06 13.851 43,563.41

FY07 46.445 324,996.93

FY08 15.985 80,877.88

Total 86.94 497,598.78

Supervision/ICR

FY08 4.750 20,884.72

FY09 21.490 80,724.27

FY10 13.025 60,204.14

FY11 19.655 78,320.34

FY12 19.363 113,071.13

FY13 13.975 73,765.33

FY14 19.039 152,223.65

FY15 15.632 66,793.81

FY16 21.275 121,687.83

FY17 23.927 187,270.47

FY18 23.817 189,867.85


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FY19 5.582 39,037.63

Total 201.53 1,183,851.17


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ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components Amount at Approval

(US$M)

Actual at Project

Closing (US$M)

Percentage of

Approval (%)

1. Dam Safety and

Operational Efficiency

Improvement

125.0 115.9 92.7

2. Hydrometerological

Information Systems

Improvement

11.4 14.4 126.4

3. Multi-Sectoral Water

Resources Planning 10.5 7.5 71.7

4. Project Management,

Monitoring and Evaluation 7.8 4.9 63.3

Total 154.7 142.8 92.3


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ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Background

1. Although Sri Lanka’s economy is shifting towards industry and services, agriculture still plays a key role (7.5

percent of GDP and 27.1 percent of employed population) especially in rural economy. However, aging reservoirs

are threatening the life of local residents and infrastructures, as has been witnessed in the accident in 1986

where the Kantale tank in Trincomalee District breached, killing over 100 people, destroying 1,600 houses and

800 ha of paddy and affecting over 8,000 families.

2. This project was implemented to reduce the probabilities of dam failure and ‘artificial flood’ caused by lack

of hydro-met information in the upstream and dam mismanagement through: i) remedial works of dam facilities;

and ii) establishment and upgrading of hydro-meteorological stations. The primary beneficiary of the project is

both urban and rural population of over 0.5 million in the downstream area of target dams, who could be placed

at physical risk in the case of dam failure.

Methodology

3. To keep consistency with the past appraisals of the project, the project benefit was defined as the difference

of expected value of flood and dam failure damage with project and without project scenario. The expected

damage value for each scenario was calculated as product of dam failure (or flood) probability and damage

caused by dam failure (or flood).

4. Economic analysis for this project has been conducted twice to date, i.e. original appraisal in 2008 and

appraisal for additional finance (AF) in 2014. As is summarized in Table A4.1, each appraisal covers different

dams and different methodologies. In order to analyze the project viability from different angles but in a

consistent manner, the ICR-stage economic analysis was conducted with four different scopes, i.e. i) 32 dams for

Phase 1, ii) 5 portfolio dams for Phase 2, iii) 31 dams for Phase 2, and iv) entire 63 dams of Phase 1 and 2. For

benefits, both dam failure and flood was considered as source of reduced damage.

Table A4.1: Scope of past economic analyses

Original

appraisal (2008)

Additional Finance appraisal (2014)

Dams

covered

Phase 1 Entire 32 dams Entire 32 dams

Phase 2 N/A 5 sample dams


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Benefits covered Reduced

damage by dam

failure and flood

Fixed benefit11 Reduced

damage of dam

failure

5. The key assumptions used in the ICR-phase economic analysis are as follows:

i ) The period covered by the analysis is in accordance with the estimated project life of 25 years,

which spans over 2008 to 2032.

ii ) The exchange rate of Sri Lanka Rupee (Rs) to US Dollar (USD) in 2008 to 2018 is based on the

rate by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

iii ) The cost of annual O&M is assumed to be 0.3 percent of the total capital investment for

respective dams.

iv ) The economic discount rate is 12 percent.

v ) All the capital investment amount during the project (nominal or current prices) are converted

to the real (or constant) prices as of 2008 using the inflation rate by the Central Bank of Sri

Lanka. (The average inflation rate in 2008 to 2018 is 5.1 percent per year.)

vi ) Standard Conversion Factor (SCF) is not applied to convert domestic financial prices to

economic prices for couple of reasons12.

vii ) The unit prices used for project benefit (avoided flood damage) estimation is based on Jacobs

Gibb study (2004)13. All the unit prices are converted to the prices in 2008 using the inflation

rate by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Current beneficiary population is estimated using the rate

of national population growth by the Department of the Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka. (cf.

Table A4.2 and A4.3)

viii ) Probability of failure of each dam increases by 4 percent per year irrespective of dam

rehabilitation works. (e.g. If the failure probability of a dam is 0.1 percent in a certain year, it

increases to 0.104 percent in the next year.)

11 Rs 1.25 million per year was allotted as the fixed benefit from the project after the completion.

12 i) the cost breakdown of domestic/import materials and labor for respective 63 dams was not available; ii) according to the

Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the SCF in 2014 is 0.97, which translates to quite small impact by the use of SCF; and iii) past

appraisals of the project did not use SCF either.

13 Jacobs Gibb (2004) Activity 18: Protfolio Safety / Conservation Review, Risk & Economic Assessment, Dam Safety & Reservoir

Conservation Program, Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka.


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Table A4.2: Unit prices for damage estimation

No. Items (unit) Original value in

Jacob Gibbs (2004)

Adjusted value

in 2008 prices

1 Damage to houses14 (Rs. per unit) 200,000 309,931

2 Damage to public buildings 50% of housing damage

3 Damage to major roads (Rs. per km) 1,750,000 2,711,895

4 Damage to local roads (Rs. per km) 1,000,000 1,549,654

5 Damage to railways (Rs. per km) 10,000,000 15,496,541

6 Damage to agriculture (Rs. per ha) 100,000 154,965

7 Loss of economic production (Rs. per

capita)

325,000 503,638

8 Loss of hydropower generation

(Rs. per kWh)

10 15

9 Intangible cost 20% of tangible cost15

10 Dam replacement cost (Rs.) 50,000,000,000*(h/100) ^3

h: dam height (m)

77,482,706,400*(h/100) ^3

h: dam height (m)

6. Table A4.3 presents the key figures describing overall extent of target dams and beneficiaries.

Table A4.3: Key figures related to target dams and beneficiaries

Items Value

Population at risk 547,208

Houses (20% of population) 103,580

Paddy area (ha) 248,672

Hydropower capacity (MW) 924

Major road length (km) 117

Local road length (km) 524

Railway length (km) 51

Costs

7. The actual and estimated cost build-up of the project is shown in Table A4.4. The project had encountered

some delay at the initial stage but gained acceleration in the second half of the entire project period. For cost

calculations, government contributions to the project have been included in addition to the loan from the World

14 It is assumed one house is resided by 5 persons. Therefore, the number of houses is one-fifth of population.

15 Tangible cost is defined as the sum of item 1 to 8 in Table A4.2.


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Bank. The O&M cost of 0.29 million per year (0.3 percent of total capital expenditure for dam remedial works)

was also allocated for each year after the close of project period.

Table A4.4: Estimated and actual disbursement schedule

Unit: million Rs.

Year Planned Actual

2008 2.4 0.0

2009 10.1 0.4

2010 20.3 8.3

2011 20.5 5.5

2012 10.3 8.3

2013 1.8 19.3

2014 10.0 13.2

2015 15.0 17.3

2016 28.0 16.2

2017 25.0 24.9

2018 5.0 25.1

Total 148.3 138.5

Benefits

8. The primary benefits gained through the project includes: i) reduced risk of dam failure, and ii) reduced risk

of floods caused by inappropriate dam operation due to lack of hydro-meteorological information in the

upstream catchment area. These benefits are calculated as the product of reduced probability of disaster

occurrence (dam failure or flood) and expected damage and loss caused by respective disasters. Through the

review of past documents, it was noted that the additional finance appraisal in 2014 counted only reduced risk

of dam failure as project benefit, while the original appraisal counted both dam failure and flood. It was also

found that the additional finance appraisal overvalued the probability of dam failure cited from Jacobs Gibb

study (2004) by 10 times. If correct values of failure probability are applied, both ERR and NPV will turn to

negative values (-4.49 percent and -713 million USD, respectively). Given these discrepancy in the benefit

calculation methodology in the past appraisal, this report follows the benefit counting of original appraisal which

considers both dam failure and flood as source of benefit.

9. Ideally, estimated flood damage is to be calculated through numerical flood simulation models for each

flood cases with different return-period. These models require extensive input data such as historical

rainfall/river flow monitoring record, grid-wise topography, longitudinal/cross-sectional river profile and so on.

Due to the constraints of time and financial resources, under current analysis, expected values of flood damage

was estimated by simple linear regression model developed through the flood simulation results conducted at

the original appraisal in 2008. Population at risk, which showed highest correlation with flood damage value,


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was selected as explanatory variable to estimate the damage amount caused by floods with different return-

period.

10. Following past appraisals, the unit cost for respective damage and loss factors were cited from Jacobs Gibb

(2004), which are summarized in Table A4.2. For Phase 1 dams, the benefit of three dams, i.e. Victoria,

Randenigala and Kotmale, that accounts for 28 percent of total cost for the phase are calculated respectively

and those of other 29 dams are calculated in aggregated manner. For Phase 2 dams, benefit of all 31 dams are

calculated in aggregated manner, since the probability of failure are not available for some of the target dams.

It should also be noted that some of the benefit factors are not included in the current analysis due to the

difficulty of quantification. These include: i) reduction of human life mortality and injuries caused by dam failure

or floods; and ii) improvement of agricultural productivity downstream of the dam, which was reported by

farmers but direct assessment was not feasible due to data constraints.

Results of the economic analysis

11. The results of economic analysis are summarized in Table A4.5. In all cases, the updated ERR showed higher

value than past appraisals. This increase is attributed mainly to the decrease in the capital investment value in

real (constant) prices as of 2008. While the nominal (current) total capital investment amount was almost

equivalent to those envisaged in the appraisal, it is reduced by more than 20 percent when converted to real

prices of 2008 by applying the inflation rates of respective years, which are as high as 5 percent on average16. In

other words, we can say that the project was implemented quite efficiently despite the high inflation rate during

the project period. On the other hand, the NPVs did not show as much increase as ERRs. Since the cash flow data

for the economic analysis of past appraisals are no longer available, it is hard to identify the cause behind this

inconsistency, but these results imply less nominal benefit values in the CRR than past appraisals.

12. Phase 1: While same tendency (higher ERR) as the overall results are observed with Phase 1, it should be

also noted that the benefit from the three portfolio dams, i.e. Victoria, Randenigala and Kotmale, accounted for

more than 50 percent of the total benefit generated through the phase. The annual project benefit was between

Rs. 1.24 to 1.31 billion.

13. Phase 2: The results of ICR- and additional finance -stage economic analyses are not comparable, since the

methodology adopted for benefit counting differs significantly. However, what is to be noted is, when compared

with the results of Phase 1, the entire 31 dams of Phase 2 show lower ERR (16.8 percent), while the ERR of 5

portfolio dams is as high as 30.6 percent. This implies that the dams selected for Phase 2 are less efficient in

terms of economic return. However, the ERR is still higher than 12 percent, which means the investment itself

16 In principle, project economic analysis is conducted in real (constant) prices, which are nominal (current) prices adjusted with

the inflation rate. This is based on the assumption that inflation affects the prices of both inputs and outputs equally. By using

real prices, the analysis can avoid the impact of unpredictable inflation (or deflation) in the future. (cf. ADB (2017) Guidelines

for the Economic Analysis of Projects)


Page 47 of 67

can yet be economically viable. The fact that is not reflected in the analysis is that many of the dams of Phase 2

are located in the northeastern part of the country which was devastated by the civil war, therefore, the project

has also achieved indirect positive impacts on the reconstruction of post-conflict area.

14. Entire project: The ERR and NPV of entire 63 dams were 26.6 percent and Rs. 2.6 billion respectively. The

viability of entire project is thus confirmed as envisaged at the original and additional finance appraisal.

Table A4.5 Summary result of economic analysis

ERR NPV

(Rs. million)

Phase 1

(32 dams)

Original appraisal 18.8% 2,371

AF appraisal 15.0% 670

ICR 28.9% 2,368

Phase 2

(Portfolio of

5 dams)

AF appraisal17 17.9%

(-4.5%)

320

(-712)

ICR 30.6% 249

Phase 2

(31 dams)

AF appraisal N/A N/A

ICR 16.8% 224

Phase 1 + 2

(63 dams)

ICR 26.6% 2,592

Sensitivity analysis

15. Sensitivity analysis of economic viability of the project was conducted for Phase 1, Phase 2 and the entire

project (Phase 1 + 2) respectively. Although the ERR of Phase 2 in the scenario of benefit decrease showed the

values slightly below 12 percent threshold, the ERR of entire project still shows robust economic viability with

any scenarios. Increase in the O&M cost, which is very likely in growing economies like Sri Lanka, has negligible

impact on the economic viability, while the decrease of benefit has relatively large impact.

17 Values in parenthesis are those when correct probability of dam failure is applied for economic analysis. As described at, AF

appraisal overvalued the probability of dam failure by ten times, while excluding the benefit of flood damage mitigation.


Page 48 of 67

Table A4.6 Summary results of the sensitivity analysis

ERR NPV (Rs. Million)

Ph.1 Ph.2 Ph.1+2 Ph.1 Ph.2 Ph.1+2

Base case 28.9% 16.8% 26.6% 2,368 224 2,592

O&M cost at 150% of the

base case

28.9% 16.7% 26.5% 2,355 216 2,571

Benefit at 80% of the base

case

22.2% 11.7% 20.0% 1,431 -13 1,418

O&M cost at 150% &

benefit at 80% of the base

case

22.2% 11.5% 19.9% 1,418 -21 1,397

Conclusions and recommendations

16. Recalculation of ERR and NPV at ICR stage confirmed the economic viability of Phase 1, Phase 2 and the

entire project, thus justifying the investment over the last decade. It is to be noted that some of the benefits

materialized from the project, such as reduction of death casualties from floods, increase of agricultural

productivity and contribution to the reconstruction of post-conflict area were not included in the current analysis

due mainly to the difficulty in quantification.

17. There are essentially two lessons learned in terms of economic analysis obtained through ICR preparations.

Firstly, the data used for appraisal-stage economic analysis should be handed over until the project closure or

even after that. Ideally, ICR-stage economic analysis should adopt consistent methodology as the appraisal-

stage, but this was not the case with the current analysis since the calculation spreadsheet was lost over the

decade-long project implementation period and little clues for recalculation was left on the appraisal document.

Therefore, this ICR had to conduct economic analysis almost from scratch, resulting in incomparability of key

parameters, i.e. ERR and NPV, between different project stages.

18. Secondly, key parameters for economic analysis should be included in the results framework of the project.

In the case of current project, some of the statistical parameters such as affected population and irrigation

command area, are subject to change over project period, and this may have significant impact to the project

benefit. However, such time-dependent change was not captured in the current analysis due to the lack of latest

data. The quality of economic analysis can be improved if at least key parameters are included in the M&E

framework.


Page 49 of 67

ANNEX 5. BORROWER COMMENTS

The External Resources Department (ERD) of the Government of Sri Lanka circulated the ICR report among the

different stakeholders and the comments below were received by the Ministry of Mahaweli Development and

Environment (MMDE). The Bank concurs with these comments which are reflected in the ICR. A second letter

from MMDE was received on November 30, 2018 reiterating the Ministry’s concurrence with the ICR findings.


Page 50 of 67


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Page 53 of 67

ANNEX 6. THEORY OF CHANGE

Activities Project Outputs

Project Development

Objectives / Outcomes

Longer Term

Outcomes

Co

mp

on

ent

1

• Remedial works for high-risk

dams

• Provision of basic safety

facilities for large dams

• Training for strengthening

dam-owning organizations

• Studies and supply of

specialized equipment

• Livelihood Assistance Plan

for affected communities

1. 63 large dams rehabilitated with

necessary remedial measures

2. 80 large dams provided with

basic safety facilities

3. Dam Safety Inspectorate with

essential guidelines and

procedures established and

operational

PDO 1. Establish long-term

sustainable arrangements for

O&M of large dams

1. Reduced number of large

dams with unacceptable risk

index

2. Need-based O&M plans

operationalized in select

dams

PDO 2. Improve water

resources management

3. Improved water database

utilized by implementing

agencies for flood

forecasting, dam operations

and water allocations

4. National water use master

plan and at least one river

basin development plan

adopted by the cabinet

Effective management

and development of

water resources and

hydraulic assets help

prevent or mitigate

natural disasters and

contribute to

productive sectors and

communities,

economic growth, and

poverty reduction.

Co

mp

on

ent

2

• Establishment and upgrading

of hydrometric stations

• Establishment of a databases

at ID & MASL

• Flood protection procedures,

tools and training for

analysis of flood inflows to

major reservoirs

• Establishment of a

groundwater monitoring

system

1. Hydrometric stations and agro-

meteorological stations

established / upgraded and

functional

2. Hydrology and meteorology

databases developed &

accessible by different users

3. Staff trained for O&M of HMIS

4. Basic groundwater monitoring

system with sufficient number

of observation points

established

Co

mp

on

ent

3

• Preparation of a National

Water Use Plan

• Updating the Mahaweli

Water Resources

Development Plan

• Preparation of a Water

Resources Development Plan

for Mundeni Aru River Basin

• Train core staff on integrated

water resources planning

• Prepare feasibility studies of

priority developments

1. A national water use master

plan developed

2. Mahaweli Basin Development

Plan updated

3. Water resources development

plan for Mundeni Aru river basin

developed

4. A core team trained for

integrated multi-sectoral water

resources planning

5. Feasibility studies prepared for

key interventions identified in

the various plans (AF)


Page 54 of 67

ANNEX 7. TYPICAL OPERATIONAL DEFICIENCIES OF DAMS AND REMEDIAL MEASURES

No. Problems existed Remedial measures attended

1 Bund-related activities

1.1 Inadequate free-board, steep

upstream and downstream slopes,

weak sections of the bund

Raised the bund, renovated slopes as per designed specifications,

and strengthened the weak sections by providing berms - filling and

compacting of selected earth and planted strip turf to new earth

fill.

1.2 Slope sloughing, slips, settlements,

cracks along the dam crest,

settlement of abutments, and erosion

Constructed loading berms, removed and re-filled some sections

with necessary compaction;

Removed dead trees, anthills and filled with suitable material and

compacted.

1.3 Seepage boils and leakages in the

downstream of the dam

Provided toe-filters, drains, loading berms, fixed Piezometers to

assess the pore-water pressure & weirs to measure seepage flow;

Cleared the toe road for easy inspections

1.4 Collapsed rip-rap and eroded

upstream slopes due to wave actions

Removed the disturbed rip-rap, earth-filled and compacted the

upstream slope, placed Geotextile along the U/S slope and

replaced/ repaired the riprap up to a maximum 600 mm depth.

1.5

In concrete dams, malfunctioning of

equipment, weak conditions in pre-

tension cables and accessories

Replaced most of the equipment; checked the pre-tension cables

and replaced the weak cables.

2 Remedial measures in sluices/ outlets and spills

2.1 Damaged/mal-functioning of gates,

hoisting mechanisms, electro-

mechanical work in sluices & spills

Repaired and improved the concrete structures, sluice barrels,

replaced or repaired the damaged gates, and painted them.

Attended to all electro mechanical works.

2.2 Damaged spills, the inadequacy of

discharge in an emergency situation,

damaged stilling basin and other

Fabricated and installed new radial gates for selected spills, fixed

hoisting arrangements, improved stilling basins, and other civil and

electro-mechanical work.

3 Access

3.1 The public roads on the bunds were

highly damaged

Repaired and improved all bund roads (metalling and tarring);

Improved the access roads.

3.2 Damaged bathing places and other

related activities

Renovated or constructed new bathing places, constructed small

bridges and culverts.

3.3 Encroachments into reservations in

some schemes

Surveyed and fixed permanent concrete posts along the bund

channels or water holding area in some selected schemes.


Page 55 of 67

ANNEX 8. DETAILS OF DAM SAFETY REHABILITATION

Phase 1 Dams

No Name of the

dam / Agency

Tank Charac-teristics

Remedial measures in Bund Remedial measures

in Sluices Remedial measures

in Spills Other relevant activities

Total cost Rs M

Risk Index

Reduction

1 Nachchaduwa (ID) T- HE

L- 1646 m H- 11m C-55.7 mcm

Installation of Safety and Monitoring Facilities (SMF), improvements to dam including replacement of Rip Rap, construction of toe filter and toe drain

Improvements to RB high level sluice and RB low level sluice

Repairs the spill way wall, spill way gates, reinstall gantry crane, electrification for operations

Construction of access roads, Construction of bathing places, Improvements to foot bridge,

138.5 85%

2 Kaudulla (ID) T-HE

L- 9236 m H- 15m C-64 mcm

Installation SMF, improvements of tank bund and replacing Rip Rap, construction of toe drain

Improvements to LB and RB sluices

Improvements to spill way

Construction of bathing places

328.8 72%

3 Minneriya (ID) T-HE

L- 2332 m H- 21m C-136 mcm

Installation of SMF, improvements to the dam, Construction of toe drain

Improvements of sluices

Improvements of main spill way

Improvements of access road, construction of bathing steps,

168.3 73%

4 Ridiyagama (ID) T-HE

L- 5000 m H- 8.5 m C-27 mcm

Installation of SMF, improvements to dam, replacement of Rip Rap, construction of toe filter & toe drain

Repairs to LB sluice including electro-mechanical works

Improvements to spill ways 1 and 2

Construction of bathing steps and other

239.6 89%

5 Nalanda (ID) T-CG

L- 123 m H- 31m C-15 mcm

Installation of SMF, Improvements of concrete dam including d/sside work

Improvements to outlets control valves

Reinstallation of spill way,

309.7 91%

6 Nuwarawewa (ID) T- HE

L- 6500 m H- 11m C-44 mcm

Installation of SMF, improvements of dam, construction of toe drain, improvement of Rip rap,

Improvement to Right and Left bank sluices

Improvements to RB spill way including foot bridge over it.

Construction of access road, bathing place and inspection steps

428.95 77%

7 Kantale (ID) T- HE

L- 2300 m H- 18 m C-135 mcm

Installation of SMF, Improvements to the dam, Construction of toe drain and Rip rap improvement,

Electro mechanical work, repairs in sluices and electrification

Improvements to spill way, Electro mechanical work, radial gates to spill

Improvt. of access road, construction of bathing and inspection steps Connecting tank bund with Vendarasn

118.8 72%


Page 56 of 67

8 Giritale (ID) T- HE

L- 550 m H- 23m C-24 mcm

Improvements to dam, construction of toe drain, Replacing and extension of Rip rap, work related to the saddle dam,

Repairs t LB and RB sluices and electro mech.l work in RB sluice

Construction of access road, bathing and inspection steps

131.19 81%

9 Vandarasan (ID)T- HE

L- 1143 m H- 16 m C-245mcm

Installation of monitoring and safety facilities, construction of toe drain and toe filter, Improvements of dam, Rip rap replacement.

Improvements to LB and RB sluices, electro-mechanical work in sluices

Improvement to spill way

Construction of bathing and inspection steps,

153.22 89%

10 Tabbowa (ID) T- HE

L- 1910 m H- 9 m C- 19mcm

Installation of SMF, Improvements to tank bund, Rip rap & Construction of toe drain,

Construction of LB sluice and outlet structure, improvement to center sluice, & RB sluice

Improvements to spill way gates

Construction of access roads, bathing & inspection steps, Improvements to foot bridge,

220.55 88%

11

Usgala Siyambal angamuwa (ID) T- HE

L- 1433 m H- 4 m C-27mcm

Installation of SMF, Bund raising, slope stabilization& seepage control, toe dam, replacement of Rip rap,

Improve LB & RB sluices & electro improvement work

Refurbishment of spill ways No.2 and 3

preliminaries, bathing steps etc. access roads

157.26 84%

12 Tissawewa (ID) T-HE

L- 3480 m H- 11 m C-4.3 mcm

Installation of SMF, improvements to bund, construction of toe drain, Replacement of Rip Rap,

Repairs to center and RB sluice, seepage control of LB sluice, mechanical work in LB and RB sluices

Repairs to concrete in LB spill way

Construction of access road, construction of bathing and inspection steps

150.68 75%

13 Huruluwewa (ID) T-HE

L- 2377 m H- 25 m C-67 mcm

Installation of SMF, Improvements to dam, construction of toe drain and toe filter, improvement to Rip rap

Repairs to LB, RB and Center sluices, electro mechanical work in sluices

Repairs of spillway, Improvements to natural spill way, electro mechanical work

Construction of access roads, Construction of bathing, inspection steps,

150.2 86%

14 Inginimitiya (ID) T-HE

L- 4115 m H- 24 m C-72 mcm

Installation of inspection and monitoring facilities, improvement to tank bund including to U/s slope, Construction of toe drain,

Repairs to sluices and electro mechanical work.

Repairs to cubicle room at spill way, electro mechanical work, Repairs to radial gates

Additional funds for tank bund road.

146.7 75%


Page 57 of 67

15 Parakrama Samudra (ID) T-HE

L- 12300 m H- 15 m C-134 mcm

Installation of SMF, Improvement to tank bund, construction of loading berm and toe drain, improvement to Rip Rap,

Repairs to sluice tower, repair and electro mechanical work in sluices

Repairs of spill way, electro mechanical work, radial gates to main spill way, and electrification

Construction of access road, construction of bathing and inspection steps and bathing steps,

181 73%

16 Rajangana (ID) T- HE

L- 4043 m H- 18.3 m C-100.6 mcm

Installation of safety and monitoring facilities, Improvements to tank bund, rip rap establishment, Construction of toe drain,

Repairs to LB and RB sluices, Electrification and automation of radial gates (

Spill way repair, Replacement of 15 Nos radial gates (27.02 m), stage Ii, Radial gates

Construction of access roads, bathing steps,

270.8 69%

Average cost per scheme = Rs 206 million Total 3,294 80%

No Name of

the dam / Agency

Tank Charac -terictics

Remedial measures in Bund Remedial measures in

Sluices Remedial measures

in Spills Other

Total cost Rs M

Risk Index

Reduction

17 Chandrikawea (MASL) T- HE

L- 2500 m H- 19 m C-27 mcm

Installation of SAF, improvements of the dam, construction of toe drain and berms, Rip rap

Repairs to sluices, mesh fencing of sluice gates,

Improvements to spill way, construction of gabion wall

Construction of access roads, construction of bathing steps,

281.3 91%

18 Rantambe (MASL) T-CG

L- 420 m H- 41.5 m C-11.5 mcm

Installation of SAF, improvements to the dam, construction of toe drain and berms, Rip rap replacement

Bottom outlets and control gate repair,

Repairs to spill way gates, cranes, mechanical works

Providing lightening 133.31 90%

19 Polgolla (MASL) T- CG

L- 143 m H- 15 m C-4.1 mcm

Establishment of Reservoir control center (new building establishment and old building repaird)

296.47 77%

20 Kandalama (MASL T- HE)

L- 975 m H- 20 m C-33 mcm

Installation of SMF, D/s and U/S face remedial work, Renovation of existing toe drain, construction of loading berms, inverted filter

Rip rap around U/s of LB sluice, repairing of sluice barrel and tower

construction of D/s gabion wall for spill way(LHS)

construction of inception steps on D/S face,

39.25 79%


Page 58 of 67

21 Victoria (MASL) T- CA

L- 520 m H- 122 m C-722 mcm

Installation of SMF, SCADA system Construction of dam distribution sub-station,

Repairs to low level outlet,

Improvements to spill way, repairs to gantry crane

installation of transformer, supply of O&M manuals, safety equipment and training

1,405.60 87%

22 Maduru Oya (MASL) T- RF

L- 1008 m H- 43 m C-722 mcm

Installation of SMF, Improvements to toe dam including restoration of slopes

Repair to sluice gate towers, power supply and distribution , installation of flow measuring inst.

Lightening spill

Construction of access road, lightening RB, dam crest, preparation of O&M manuals and training

152.98 82%

23 Randenigala (MASL) T- RF

L- 495 m H- 94 m C-460 mcm

Installation of SMF Repairs to granty cranes

Repairs to spill way gates, top logs

Preparation of O&M manual and training,

123.6 74%

24 Kotmale (MASL) T-RF

L- 600 m H- 87 m C-175mcm

Installation of SMF, modification of control room, power supply to dam, Preparing O&M manuals and provision of training

Repairs and installation of electric facilities to outlet

Spill way repair, gantry crane repair, spill way gate control

143.04 74%

25 Kalawewa (MASL) T- HE

L- 6500 m H- 14.8 m C-123.3 mcm

Installation of SMF, Improvements to the dam,

Repairs to sluices, made of cement and masonry stones, repairs to sluices

Spill way repair, gantry crane repair, power supply to the crane, spill way gate control

Construction of bathing steps

160.9 69%

26 Bowatenna (MASL) T- CG

L- 327 m H- 30 m C-56 mcm

Installation of SMF, Improvements dam, data acquisition and monitoring system,

Improvements to bottom outlet, main outlet shelter, Irrigation tunnel shelter, import. to RB and LB outlets, elec work,

Improvements to spill, Rb and LB spill way repair, spill way radial gates, Repair to RB and LB outlets (Low level), ,

maintenance and safety equipment, electrification of control boards, lightening protection system, building electrical services

67.12 83%

27 Dambulu Ova (MASL) T- HE

L- 1680 m H- 12 m C-11.7 mcm

Dam crest remedial work, D/s inspection path, and surface drainage, U/s face remedial work, rearrange the rip, rap, Renovation of measuring well,

Repairing of RBsluice barrel,tower, Repairs to LB sluice,

Repairing spill way, mechanical work in spill way

Construction of inspection steps, Renovation of building Renovation of access roads,

105.61 67%


Page 59 of 67

28 Laxapana (CEB) T -CG

L- 137 m H- 29.6 m C-597 mcm

Installation of SMF, Improvements to dam,

Improvements of outlet including electro mech. work

Improvements to spill way including electro mech work

Supply of electrical equipment

116.6 88%

29 Canyon (CEB) T- CG

L- 181 m H- 28 m C-925 mcm

Installation of safety and monitoring facilities, Improvements to the Dam,

Improvements to bottom outlet. Electrical work

Improvts to spill way, Electrical work in sluice including electro mech..work

Spill way lightening 172.7 88%

30 Norton (CEB) T- CG

L- 103 m H- 29 m C-395 mcm

Installation SMF, improvements to dam

Improvements to bottom outlet

Improvement to spill way including electro mech. work,

Mechanical work in inlet and main distribution board, control gate s,

192.3 88%

31 Castlereigh (CEB) T- CG

L- 2033 m H- 47 m C-55 mcm

Installation of SMF, Improvements to the dam, improvements to electrical control chamber,

Electro mechanical work in bottom outlet,

Electrical work in the sluice,

Electrical work in control chamber, bridge and galleries

104.98 89%

32 Kalatuwawa(NWSDB)

L- 1143 m H- 16 m C-245 mcm

Installation of SMF, Improvements to abutments and dam

Outlet work Improvements to spill way

electrical work 42.01 71%

Total Average per scheme = Rs. 221 million

Total 3,538 81%

Phase 2 Dams (Additional Financing)

No Name of

the dam /

Agency

Tank Charac

-terictics Remedial measures in Bund

Remedial measures in


in Spills Other

Total cost

Rs M Risk Index

Reduction

1 Nawakiri

T- HE

L- 3310 m

H- 11 m

C-60 mcm

Provided monitoring facilities, Constructed a bridge

across RB spillway 86

22%

2 Padaviya

T- HE

L- 4400 m

H- 18 m

C-105 mcm

Improvement of tank bund; Rip rap

replaced; consisting of toe drain and

toe filter

Improved with new GI

pipes; Installed 3

emergency gates

Site office; Installed steel

gates in main canal;

bathing place 131

35%


Page 60 of 67

3 Angamuwa Installation of SMF, Improvement of

tank bund; Rip rap replaced;

consisting of toe drain and toe filter;

Repair walls, const. of

gabion walls

Repair of spill way.

Construction of

curtain wall;

Construction of watcher

hut; Boat yard 167

82%

4 Mahawilac

hchiya T-HE

L- 3100 m

H- 12 m

C-40 mcm


replaced; loading berms; toe drain

and toe filter; Installation of SMF

Improved RB & LB

sluices; provided new

emergency gates Repaired the spill

Access road impt;

uprooting trees in canal

bunds 210

64%

5

Mahakana

darawa T-

HE

L- 3219 m

H- 17 m

C-44.7 mcm


replaced; toe drain and toe filter;

fixed monitoring facilities; gravelling

the road

Impt. RB & LB sluices;

improved access road

to the sluice Repaired radial gates

Bathing steps, inspect.

steps, security hut, guard

stones 102

33%

6 Kottukachc

hiya

Improve tank bund; Replacing

collapsed Rip rap, filling of tank bund,

consisting of toe drain and toe filter,

removing trees on the tank bund

Construction of Hume

pipe culvert &

construction of a new

sluice

Reduce rock surface

level of D/S and U/S

of the spill and

construed spill gate

Repairs to tank bund

road, Construction of

bathing steps 74.5

68%

7 Kachchima

du

Improvement in tank bund including

earth work and Rip rap

establishment, removal of trees in

tank bund, construction of toe filter

and toe drain

Removal of damaged

sluice and new spill

way gate

constructed

Construction of a service

road, a new dam office

and bathing steps 97

40%

8 Thoppur Rehabilitation of 2.6 m of tank bund

and construction of a net barrier for

weeds

Const. of a new sluice

at Supply channel &

sluice

Improvt to spill No:1

at Thoppur tank

bund & sluice

Const. of a road at spill,

improvt. to Potta

drainage 48.3

53%

9 Wan Ela

Providing toe drain and toe filer Rip

rap in a section of tank, construction

of piezometers, and level

monuments

Construction of service

roads, and bathing steps 69.17

22%

10 Bandagiriya Improvements in Badagiriya tank

bund Improvements to

sluice Construction of R/B,

L/B gated spills Construction of toe road 78.29 62 %

11 Janaranjan

a

Improvements to tank bund, breach

filling of a section of tank bund, Improvts of main

sluices Improvements to

spill No:1, Const. of roads, R walls

in channels. 108.5

36%


Page 61 of 67

12 Sorabora

T-HE

L- m

H- m

C-20.7 mcm

Improvements to tank bund, and Rip

Rap protection,

Improvements to

spill way, 19.46 64%

13 Unnachchai

T-HE

L- 1776 m

H- 15 m

C-51 mcm

Rehabilitation of mechanical system

and electrification of radial gates (03) Electrification of sluice

gates Improvements to LB

spill 73.81 46%

14 Badulu Oya Improvement to tank bund, Improvement of sluice

tower

Improvement to access

road, box culverts 59.85 44%

15 Muthukand

iya T-HE

L- 1113 m

H- 22 m

C-30.3 mcm

Filling pot holes in tank bund and

improvements to Rip Rap.

Electricity supply for

the sluice, improvet to

the sluice.

Reconstruction of

spill basin

Lighting road and

boundary blocks,

retaining wall 20.04 33%

Total Cost per scheme - Rs 90 million

Total 1,345 47%

No Name of

the dam /

Agency

Tank Charac




in Spills Other

Total cost

Rs M RI

reduction

16

Ulhitiya-

rathkinda

T-

HE;Includin

g Minipe

trans basin

canal

L- 4670 m

H- 28 m

C-146 mcm

Installation of SMF, construction of

toe drain, Rip Rap, construction of

mid-drains from and cascade drains

Installation of SMF and ther civil

works, mechanical and electrical

works

Improvements of

sluices including

electro mechl work

Removed trees

blocked spill,

Civil and Electro

mechanical work

Rehabilitation of bund

road access roads const

of bathing steps,

261 +

482.54 =

743.54

54%

17 Henanigala

(MASL)

Installation of SMF, improvements of

D/S slopes of dam, toe filter and toe

drain, improvements of Rip Rap

Improvements to

sluice gates Clearing of spill way

Rehabilitation of access

roads, toe road, foot

step D/S slope, 125.5 36%

18 Bambaraw

ana (MASL)

Installation of SMF, improvements of

dam slopes, improvements to toe

drain and toe filter, Rip rap

Rehabilitation of

outlet sluice gates,

servicing sluice gates

Rehabilitation of crest

road, toe road, cons. of

bathing steps 59.27 35%


Page 62 of 67

19

Muwagam

mana

(MASL)

Installation of SMF, improving bund

& D/S slopes, construction of toe

drain, installation of electric items

Installation of a sluice

gates (cast iron (in BC Repair of surface of

spill

Rehabilitation of bund

top road, construction of

bathing steps, 64.09 33%

No

Name of

the dam /

Agency

Tank Charac



Sluices

Remedial measures

in Spills Other

Total cost

Rs M Risk Index

20

Pimburatht

hewa

(MASL) T-

HE

L- 1951 m

H- 18 m

C-49 mcm Improve bund, slope protection 261 64%

21 Pusselawin

na (MASL)

Installation of SMF, improvement of

U/s and D/s slopes of the bund, Rip

rap

Construction of

Bridge cum spill way

structure

Repairs of road, new

bathing places, toe road 42.4 33%

22

Udawalawa

(MASL) T-

HE

L- 4023 m

H- 39 m

C-269 mcm

Installation of SMF, electro

mechanical work and improvements

to bypass gates

Repairs to bypass

gates Electro mechanical

work in spill

Drain clearing and road

establishment, import.

of toe road 91.47 45%

23 Panakkiniy

a (MASL) Improving tank bund and rip rap

Renovating the spill,

wing wall at Spills of

LB and RB

construction of a gabion

wall bathing places 15.14 29%

24

Ambagaha

gama

(MASL)

Improvement to earth bund including

to Rip Rap, Construction of RB

and LB sluices Construction of spill

way

Construction of bridge

retaining wall and

bathing steps 34.72 44%

25 Urusitawe

wa (MASL)

Installation of SMF, Rehabilitation

and improvement of tank bund Repairs to sluice

structures, Improvement of spill

way 48.66 29%

26

Muthyanka

ddu (NCP)

T-HE

L- 1829 m

H- 20 m

C-50.5 mcm

Bund raising rip rap & bund top road

& flank bunds (119.47m) Fixed radial gates

New radial gates &

structures Construction of Unit

office, bathing steps, 599.5 56%

27

Periyapand

ivirachchan

(do) )

Improvement of tank bund including

Rip Rap establishment and i Improvements to LB

and RB sluices Improvements to

spills Construction of bathing

steps 72.44 29%


Page 63 of 67

28

Thodaman

aru barrage

(NCP)

Electo-Mechl work, constructed cut

off wall, cushion, raising gate sill

level, flood protection bunds etc. 382 94%

29 Dunumadal

awa (KMC)

Improvements to concrete dam, de-

silting of tank, Improvements to

sluice gates

Improvements to spill

tail canal, and road 43.94 78%

30 Roseneath

(KMC)

Improvements to the tank bund,

structures and removing silt

Improvement to road

way 24.62 64%

31 Maussakela

(CEB) T-CG

L- 4188 m

H- 41 m

C-144 mcm

Installation of SMF, improvements to

dam and valve house, construction of

Gibbon walls at d/s

Electrification of gate

operations

Improvements to

spill way gates &

steel wire ropes

Improvements of dam

monitoring office 69.24 75%

Total Average Rs 161 million Total 2740 50%


Page 64 of 67

ANNEX 9. Status of Current Feasibility Studies of Proposed Investment Projects

No. Project Present Status

1 Feasibility Study for upper Elahera canal

& North Central Province canal

Feasibility studies in upper Elahera canal was completed, and the

constructions are on-going; In NCP canal, the feasibility studies

completed by Lahmaya Internat. Co. and the constructions are on-

going under Mahweli Water Security Investment Program

2

Feasibility study on Environmental

Assessment of Trans basin diversion of

Mahaweli Ganga flows to North Central

Province.

Environment Assessment (EA) for the Phase 1 (Moragahakanda to

Hurulu wewa, Mannakkattiya, Eru wewa & up to Mahakanadarawa)

has been completed. EA for NCP will be done after completing the

Feasibility Study

3 Feasibility study on the River for Jaffna Construction works are on-going under the supervision of ID

4 Diversion of Gin and Nilwala Ganga

project to south eastern dry zone

Through this project, which covers 25 Divisional secretary areas in

Galle, Matara and Hambantota Districts, it is proposed to divert part

of the water (117 MCM per year) to the adjacent south-eastern dry-

zone areas to cultivate 4,000 ha in both Yala and Maha seasons. In

addition, it is expected to provided 160 MCM per year to the propose

Hambantota Industrial Zone and to generate 73 Gig watt Hours of

electricity per year. The feasibility study has been completed with the

total cost estimated at Rs. 76,000 million.

5

Feasibility study to investigate the

option of increasing the capacity of

Maduru oya reservoir

Feasibility Study is on-going and is part of a contract that includes

engineering procurement & construction contract.

6

Feasibility study for Mundeni aru basin

water resource development project

Environmental and Social Assessment

FS completed by a French company (Agence Francaise de

Development AFD). The scope of the projects to ‘ improve livelihoods

of local population in Batticaloa and Ampara districts with improved

water management in a sustainable way”. The specific objective is to

join the Rugam Tank and the Kithulwewa tank with a dam constructed

across the Mundeniaru to increase cultivated area and to reduce the

impact of inundation of the downstream area of the basin.

Proposed to provide irrigation facilities to 3,380 ha. 14 mcm of water

from 03 reservoirs for domestic and industrial usage, and 1.2 GWh

and 2.1 GWh hydro-electricity generations.

According to FS, the NPV is Rs. 8,782 million, IRR is 15.8%, and the

cost-benefit ratio is 1.7; project feasibility is satisfactory. The total

cost of the project will be Rs. 24,500 million.


Page 65 of 67

8

Feasibility study on broad-scale

improvement of irrigation efficiency in

Sri Lanka

Proposals have been prepared to improve irrigation, land, and crop

productivity in 40 large schemes (command area is more than 600 ha)

and 40 medium schemes (command area is between 80 ha to 600 ha).

This is an integrated programme with four line agencies – Irrigation

Department, Department of Agriculture, Irrigation Management

Division, and Agrarian Development Department.

The estimated project cost is Rs.18, 500 million.


Page 66 of 67

ANNEX 10. TRAINING DAYS COMPLETED

Component In-

country Overseas Total

Dam safety 219 268 487

HMIS & Ground-water monitoring 229 111 340

Procurement 317 317

GIS and comp. applications 91 91

Other 149 149

Total 1,005 379 1,384


Page 67 of 67

ANNEX 11. DELAYS IN CONTRACT COMPLETION

Agreed contract timeframe (months)

Original Project Additional Financing

12 18 24 12 18 24

No. of contracts per agreed timeframe 19 7 5 24 7 1

Avg. actual timeframe completed 28 33 34 18 21 41

Increase in the period as a percentage 133% 83% 42% 50% 17% 71%

The World Bank · Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00004483...

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Transcript of The World Bank · Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00004483...