The Welfare State: Still on Solid GroundAuthor(s): Charles R. AthertonSource: The Social Service Review, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Jun., 1989), pp. 167-179Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30012014Accessed: 14/01/2010 01:36

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The Welfare State: Still

on Solid Ground

Charles R. Atherton University of Alabama

The welfare states of North America and Western Europe have seen slower growth and even cutbacks during the 1970s and 1980s. Critics on the Right blame the faulty ideology behind "social engineering." The Left points to the fundamental incom- patibility of the welfare ideology with capitalism. I argue that the slowdown in growth is a decision made by the middle of the political spectrum. Conservative and moderate political victories of the period have not given conservatives a mandate for the dismantlement of the welfare state. At the same time, the voters have rejected the Left's extreme view of "substantive equality."

A few years ago, the welfare state seemed to enjoy robust health.

Following World War II, there was a period of continuous growth in social services in Canada and Western Europe. Even in the United States, often described as a reluctant welfare state, services expanded and programs multiplied, particularly during the War on Poverty in the 1960s. During the late 1970s and 1980s, however, growth has been slowed, and some programs have been cut back, eliminated, or had their eligibility rules tightened. These effects are most evident in the United Kingdom and the United States, but they are noticeable in Canada and in Western Europe. The reductions have been attributed to the neoconservative policies of the Right.' While some on the extreme

Right generally object to the welfare state as a matter of principle, I do not think that their opposition is the major force in slowing its

expansion. The purpose of this article is to suggest an entirely different

interpretation of the election of political conservatives and moderates

Social Service Review (June 1989). © 1989 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0037-7961/89/6302-0004$01.00

168 Social Service Review

in North America and Western Europe in the late 1970s and 1980s:

expansion of the welfare state has encountered resistance because the middle of the political spectrum does not support it.

What Is the Welfare State?

The term "welfare state" does not mean the same thing to all who use it. There are at least three ways in which this term is used, and each has different implications for public policy.

Some years ago, Sidney Fine traced the development of what he called the "general welfare state" in the United States.2 He described this as a state "that seeks to promote the general welfare not by rendering itself inconspicuous but by taking such positive action as is deemed

necessary to improve the conditions under which its citizens live and work."3 He made a distinction between the "general welfare state" and the "welfare state," which he said "has come to be identified in this country with Mr. Truman's Fair Deal and especially with a thor-

oughgoing program of social security and a firm government com- mitment to maintain full employment."4 Fine's concept of the general welfare state encompasses everything that political scientists subsume under the term "positive government"-as opposed to "negative gov- ernment," which was championed by Herbert Spencer in the late nineteenth century. It was Spencer's view that government should be limited to the maintenance of civil order and national defense. Anything beyond this was outside government's natural role.

The Acceptance of the General Welfare State

Although Spencer was highly regarded by many people during the latter part of the nineteenth century, few accepted the most extreme elements of his position. Even those who agreed with him in principle did not follow him in practice. Fine notes that in reality there was a

"general lack of correspondence between the theory of laissez-faire and the practice of governments."5 Positive government prevailed because there were interests to be served, and government was the obvious instrument to serve them.

In the twentieth century, there are no negative governments (in the

nineteenth-century sense of noninterference) on either side of the Iron Curtain or in the Third World, for that matter. All modern

nations, including those that the economists call the "less developed countries," seek to promote the general welfare, although they differ on what the general welfare may be. In the following discussion, I assume that the general welfare state, or positive government, is, in principle, not a contentious issue for anyone except the most extreme

Spencerian. It is the "welfare state" not the "general welfare state" that has received the criticism.

The Welfare State 169

Two Views of the Welfare State

Fine's narrower view of the welfare state-that it is identified with

programs aimed at specific problems rather than the society as a whole-is the one taken by most writers in the United States. For

example, in a recent book, Bruce Janssen sees the welfare state as a

body of programs and laws developed over time in response to identified social problems, with the most significant developments coming since the Great Depression.6 In this context, a welfare state is a capitalist state that devotes a portion of its gross national product, through taxation, to the solution of certain social problems without changing the basic nature of the economy. I will refer to this as the "programmatic welfare state," when appropriate, because the effort is focused through specific programs aimed at either a problem (e.g., poverty, unem-

ployment) or set of problems faced by an identifiable group (e.g., the

aged, neglected or abused children). While there is some redistribution of resources, the solution of problems appears to be the major aim.

The other definition of welfare state is associated with Richard Titmuss and his followers and has a more European flavor. According to this view, a welfare state is "a modern democratic Western state in which the power of the state is deliberately used to modify the free play of economic and political forces in order to effect a redistribution of income."7 In such a state, there is a government-guaranteed level of income, medical care, education, housing, and personal social service that is considered a benefit of citizenship. I will refer to this view as the "redistributive welfare state" when the distinction is needed, because while it may offer benefit programs in specific areas (e.g., medical care, housing) or to specific groups of people (e.g., the aged, the

unemployed) its central aim is a redistribution of wealth and income. The difference in emphasis is important to policymakers and planners, even though the two welfare states may look much the same from the consumer's point of view.

Titmuss thought in terms of a government-guaranteed minimum of

goods and services as the goal of redistribution. His successors, as will be detailed later, have extended the notion of redistribution beyond that of minimum standards. Under the concept of distributive justice they have argued for what is usually called "substantive equality." This involves a "just" redistribution of incomes, wealth, political power, and social privilege.

Intended Beneficiaries of the Welfare State

If one is to evaluate the status of the welfare state, it is fair to ask, For whom was it designed? The easy answer, following Harold Wilensky and Charles Lebeaux, is that the welfare state is institutional, therefore it is designed for everybody. This is more rhetoric than substance.

170 Social Service Review

The beneficiaries of the welfare state (in either programmatic or re- distributive form) are primarily the lower middle class and the working class. There is no evidence to suggest that the designers of the welfare state had the upper class or upper middle class in mind as principal beneficiaries. Although the upper classes benefit, this is a by-product of the central aim. Asa Briggs argues that the single most important factor in providing the impetus for the welfare state was the high rate of unemployment in North America and Western Europe during the Great Depression of the 1930s.8 This tilt toward "work-connectedness" is confirmed by the simple observation that most programs in Western

Europe, the United States, and Canada are designed to maintain the workers' incomes when they retire, sustain their survivors when they die, or compensate workers for industrial accidents or occupational diseases. Universally, the bulk of welfare state programs are organized as work-related social insurances. Labor unions and labor-oriented

political parties have been prime movers in the development of pro- grams, primarily to benefit the lower middle class and the working class.

How about the Poor?

Poverty (except poverty related to retirement, unemployment, or work- connected disability) has not been a major focus of the welfare state.

By and large, the chronically poor do not receive much more attention in the welfare states of Europe than they do in the United States. Sweden, for example, has what is called a "social welfare grant" that

goes to people who cannot work. The underlying assumption of the welfare state is that people are gainfully employed-or ought to be under ordinary circumstances. Most welfare states do not have high levels of chronic poverty. The United States is different in this regard, but the reasons may be more social or political than economic. That is, persistent poverty in this country is complicated by racism, language problems, ethnic diversity, sexism, and the lack of integration of the chronic poor into the working class. The only comparable situation in Europe is the regional conflict in England between the south and the north, which is based as much on social factors as it is on economics.

From the Right The Right has consistently challenged the welfare state. Its ideological objections, however, mask the pragmatic acceptance of most social insurance programs. The conservative arguments against the welfare state are well known and do not require lengthy explication since there is no novelty in them. A brief summary of a few important points will suffice.

The Welfare State 171

First, the Right has charged that the welfare state is paternalistic and antilibertarian. Donald Richberg argued that "a comprehensive welfare state must be a police state."9 It was his contention that any state that provides comprehensively for the welfare of its citizens must be strong enough to take resources from one and give them to the other. This supposes that the state is the best entity to judge from whom to take and to whom to give. This argument is effective only when applied to totalitarian states. It does not apply when democratic states act with the consent of the governed.

Second, the Right has argued that the welfare state simply does not work. In his controversial book Losing Ground, Charles Murray argued that most of the programs aimed at the poor have not only failed but have actually worsened the problems they were designed to solve.'o Murray's target was not the core programs of the welfare state, however, but programs in law enforcement, education, and poverty assistance since 1950. Even if he is granted his points over the programs he opposes, he must be challenged for glossing over the success of the social insurance programs.

Third, the Right has argued that the welfare state costs too much given its results. Nathan Glazer examined the state of social welfare during the early years of the Reagan administration." He argued that the Great Society programs, the social insurance programs, and public assistance had, prior to the Reagan administration, consumed an in- creasing share of the gross national product over time with disappointing results: "The programs grew, in number and scale; the problems re- mained."12 This argument is popular with conservatives, but even so, Glazer admits that the social insurances are so widely accepted and so well defended politically that they are untouchable. Further, they are effective and reasonably efficient. Glazer also fails to note that the social insurances are self-financing. In the end, Glazer argues that the Reagan administration's real disapproval is centered on the Great Society programs and not on those programs that were established prior to the 1960s.

Fourth, the Right argues that the welfare state is based on a misplaced faith in "social engineering," which consists of "targeting money to deal with a complex social problem in specified ways, with an underlying assumption that Washington would know better how to deal with it than local officials."13 The major trouble with social engineering, Glazer says, is that it is ideologically wrong in a mixed economy because it leans too far toward centralized planning. While this, too, is a popular argument among conservatives, it fails to recognize the strong role of local government in welfare states, particularly in Western Europe.

Fifth, the welfare state has lost sight of important values. While Murray casts his argument in a pragmatic framework, he also finds moral implications. The programmatic welfare state has failed, he

172 Social Service Review

argues, because it has not supported central, American values. It has not strengthened the family or supported the value of work. This moral failure is echoed by Lawrence Mead, who argues that welfare

programs (primarily Aid to Families with Dependent Children) have

provided benefits without requiring any commitments to the obligations of citizenship (e.g., self-support when possible, political participation) from the recipients.'4 This argument fails to take into account the work-connectedness of the bulk of social welfare programs and the

positive effect of the social insurances on retirees, survivors, injured workers, the unemployed, and their families. While the public assistance

program has been less effective in reaching its goals, Mead, as did

Murray, failed to look at the larger picture. The programs used by most North Americans and West Europeans support workers and their families fairly well.

It should be clear from the above discussion that much of the Right's opposition is not to the welfare state as such, but to programs designed to deal with the social problems attendant to chronic poverty. What must disconcert the supporters of the welfare enterprise is that a number of forceful, negative views have come from the Left and deal with issues more directly related to the social insurance programs. The

arguments from the Left are more complex and will be given a more detailed treatment.

From the Left

Nearly 15 years ago, Vic George and Paul Wilding wrote an extremely thoughtful analysis of the presuppositions that underlie several com-

peting views of social policy.'5 They devoted a chapter to an examination of the failure-"failure" is their word-of the welfare state in the United Kingdom since the war. While they claimed that some small victories had been won, their criticisms included the failure to provide an even quality of medical care throughout Britain, a persistent mal- distribution of qualified, full-time teachers in the schools, an increased number of homeless people, and the lack of progress in reducing poverty. They were especially vocal in expressing their disappointment in the failure to reduce the inequalities in incomes and wealth. While

George and Wilding conceded that taxation had resulted in some redistribution, they characterized it as "from the very rich to the rich."

They referred to the intrafamily transfer of capital from one generation to another to avoid heavy "death duties" (i.e., inheritance taxes).

George and Wilding reviewed a number of reasons that have been

traditionally offered for this failure of the welfare state. The list will sound familiar to Americans: shortage of resources; policies that, while sound in conception, were technically weak; administrative weaknesses either at the national or local level; and the lack of trained staff. George

The Welfare State 173

and Wilding rejected all these reasons. The real problem, as they saw it, was the capitalist value system with its stress on self-help, freedom, individualism, competition, and achievement. In their view, the United

Kingdom did not have a genuine welfare state at all, but "welfare cap- italism"-something not too radically different from the programmatic welfare state in the United States.

Because of deeply entrenched "capitalist values," for example, the

government had failed to put professional personnel, including social workers, where they were most needed. Instead, professionals and skilled workers were allowed to choose their work sites. Worse yet, the

government allowed professionals and skilled workers who had been trained at public expense to emigrate or to work in the private sector. Further, the government had not addressed the serious inequality that occurs because of the differential rewards that resulted from a market

system. By providing only minimum standards of living, the welfare state had merely been "grafted on to an economic system intrinsically hostile to the welfare ethic."'6 The solution, they said, was to get rid of the capitalist system and the values associated with it, particularly individualism and the inequalities resulting from the existing economic

system. George and Wilding argued for the acceptance of a new set of values

that center on equality-not of opportunity-but of result. They ex-

pressed the view of social justice in the traditional socialist motto: from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs. The realization of this ethic would create the socially just society "where

equality is the accepted principle for the distribution of resources and where inequalities have to be justified."17 The chief barrier to the achievement of this aim "has been that the general public has not shown much enthusiasm for substantive income equality."" A second barrier, but one that George and Wilding believed that reasonable

people could cross, was the question of what needs were and who should define them.

And how shall the true welfare state be achieved? George and Wilding did not advocate a revolutionary solution. They said that "reform may, of necessity, have to be through a stumbling incrementalism" but that their task was to focus on the ends and not the means.

In a more recent article Esping-Andersen acknowledges that the victories of conservative governments in Britain, the United States, and Scandanavia in the early 1980s seemed to some to show a "mass renunciation of the modern welfare state. It seems an outdated and naive vision whose time has come and gone."'9 One of the problems is that liberals "have neither mounted a convincing political defense of the welfare state, nor sorted out its economic logic."20 She argues that conservatives have a clearer view of the situation than do liberals.

They correctly perceive that the welfare state erodes "traditional au-

174 Social Service Review

thority and self-reliance" because the benefits of the true welfare state "cease to be defined by wage and salary earnings." Further, the burden of benefits does weaken the operation of a market system. "And it is unfortunate-and probably politically self-defeating as well-that most defenders of the welfare state continue to insist that it really does not erode private incentives, savings, authority, or efficiency. For the welfare state does indeed relax the individual's dependence on market forces. If it did not emancipate citizens from dependency on their private resources, it would hardly be worth defending."2'

Esping-Andersen, too, stresses the notions of universalism and

equality. In her view, "The state is a welfare state when it guarantees a decent standard of living to all, as a citizen's right."22 This involves three basic principles. First, people should be entitled to a decent standard of living independent of market considerations. Second, the welfare state should operate on the principle of distributive justice, which corrects the inequalities caused by the market. Third, in the true welfare state, there is a collective responsibility for each individual.

Esping-Andersen shares George and Wilding's view that what was

supposed to be the redistributive welfare state is merely the capitalist programmatic welfare state. The major problem is that the welfare state's supporters have not been willing to be candid about the real

implications of distributive justice and substantive equality and thus

provide a clear policy alternative. Essentially, what is needed, then, is for the Left to provide a new vision of the ideal redistributive welfare state. Although Esping-Andersen does not provide a detailed course of action, she implies that this can be done through social action based on a more frank statement of aims.

Ramesh Mishra examines the rise and fall of the welfare state with more thoroughness than most.23 In a chapter entitled "The Lost Le-

gitimacy," Mishra discusses the development of the postwar welfare state. It is the programmatic welfare state that is the focus of his concern, although he, too, begins with the assumption that the welfare state is supposed to be redistributive.

Mishra identifies several factors that gave the welfare state its le-

gitimacy. First, Keynesian economics provided an economic rationale for state intervention designed to "ensure a high level of economic

activity and full employment." Second, Lord Beveridge's postwar report on the state of social services in Britain gave legitimacy to the incor-

poration of social insurance into the institutional framework of the state. Third, functionalist social theory added legitimacy by defining the welfare enterprise as a stabilizing force in the social system. Fourth, theories about the emerging industrial society (which was seen as

"postcapitalist") incorporated social welfare as a social utility. Fifth, there was a widespread belief that social science had enough reliable knowledge to support social management of the economy. Sixth, the

The Welfare State 175

welfare state was legitimated and supported, particularly in Western

Europe, by the socialists who believed that the programmatic welfare state was a step toward egalitarian objectives.

By the end of the 1970s, says Mishra, "most of these supports had been seriously weakened."24 The reason was the worldwide "stagflation" of the 1970s in which governments were faced with the choice of either raising taxes or cutting back on social welfare. The failure of

governments to handle this crisis effectively called into question the

general ability of government to manage its affairs. Also questioned were the economic and social theories that gave legitimacy to the

government's management of the economy. Further, the socialists were disillusioned because the welfare state had not, in reality, redis- tributed income and wealth. Accordingly, they have withdrawn their

support for the programmatic welfare state and taken a more hard- line stand.

Like Esping-Andersen, Mishra admits that the center of the Left has not made a systematic or substantive challenge to conservatism. Mishra does not recommend the openly socialist goals of George and

Wilding or of Esping-Andersen. His remedy is for other Western countries to emulate either Austria or Sweden, which have similar, but not identical, versions of what he calls the "corporatist welfare state." In general, a corporatist welfare state requires the voluntary cooperation of capital, labor, and government to integrate social and economic objectives and programs. But Mishra is no revolutionary either, and he has no effective advice on how to sell the adoption of

corporate welfare to other Western capitalist societies. He acknowledges that Austria and Sweden have the advantages of being culturally ho-

mogenous and have long traditions of labor-capitalist cooperation. His wistful hint on strategy is: "There is of course the 'science' of

muddling through."25 In summary, the Left's criticisms of the welfare state focus on one

theme: the current welfare states in Europe and North America are not really welfare states but merely social insurance or "welfare capitalist" states. They have grafted welfare onto a fundamentally incompatible economic and ideological system. They have not solved the inherent contradiction between capitalism an'. the true welfare ideology. The Left's critique, as does the Right's, glosses over the real successes of the social insurance programs in improving the life chances of the

great mass of people in North America and Western Europe.

The Contrast between Left and Right The ideologists of both the Left and the Right believe that the welfare state has failed on pragmatic grounds. While some individuals are better off, generally the welfare state has not solved all the problems

176 Social Service Review

that it has addressed. Murray on the Right and George and Wilding on the Left suggest that, in a number of areas, things unintentionally have gotten worse. It is generally agreed on the Left that there has not been any significant redistribution of income and wealth between rich and poor, either in North America or in Western Europe. The

Right thinks that too much has been attempted without any corre-

sponding benefit to society. However, the Left and Right are not

talking about the same thing. The Left is critical of the programmatic welfare state because it is not redistributive. The Right is critical of a limited range of programs that are not successful in solving social

problems associated with chronic poverty. Both ignore the substantial areas of achievement clearly demonstrated by the success of the social insurance programs among their intended beneficiaries.

The other differences of opinion rest on ideological grounds. The

Right, as expected, dwells on philosophical objections to the welfare state because that system represents an intrusion of government into economic and social life. The Left focuses on the failure of the welfare state to bring about distributive justice and social solidarity.

The solutions are predictably different. The Right has pragmatically accepted social insurance as a legitimate function of the general welfare state but beyond that has urged us to eschew social engineering (a term they use pejoratively) and depend on the private sector and local

government to deal with social problems (e.g., poverty, educational

inadequacy, and crime). The Left wants us to embrace democratic socialism, which will, through social engineering (a term that is used

nonpejoratively) finally redistribute income, wealth, and social privileges as the existing welfare state has failed to do. The Left is silent on the

problem of chronic poverty, but then the welfare state as that group knows it does not address this problem very directly.

Each side promotes a set of social values that are the antithesis of the other. The Right espouses the positive Victorian values that Him- melfarb expressed as "self-control, self-help, self-reliance, and self-

discipline."26 The Left promotes the values of distributive justice, sub- stantive equality, and collective responsibility. Both sides claim to have the interests of the public in mind, but there seems to be little concern with what the public believes. The Left and the Right seem preoccupied with justifying their views to their own identifiable interest groups rather than convincing the other side. They are each "preaching to the converted."

Discussion

Esping-Andersen provides a valuable insight through her perception that the political victories of conservative governments can be interpreted to mean that "the voters have not only rejected flawed and expensive

The Welfare State 177

programs, they have renounced the very idea of the welfare state."27

Certainly, there has been public approval for the curtailment of ex-

pensive programs that are not perceived to be effective. It also appears that there has been a rejection of the notion of substantive equality by the voters: "The general public has not shown much enthusiasm for substantive income equality."28

At the same time, there has not been a wholesale dismantling of

programs throughout the West. The political victories of governments on the right did not constitute mandates to eliminate the welfare state. The social insurance programs (in either European or North American form) are still intact and appear to be politically untouchable at their core. There have been cuts in some other programs, but while they have disturbed those within the welfare enterprise, there has been little public outcry of the kind that erupted when President Reagan proposed cuts in the growth of Social Security benefits.

It is entirely too easy to assume that the lack of enthusiasm for substantive equality and the failure to take to the streets to oppose program cuts is because the lower middle class and the working class have been seduced into the acceptance of "capitalist values" as some writers on the left have suggested. Seduction implies a certain amount of deceit. I suggest that most of the middle and working classes knowingly accept an economic system that offers differential rewards based on creative or productive work of some kind. This value is not limited to the West. We have seen the growth of incentives and the encouragement of small scale entrepreneurship even in the centrally managed economies of China and the Soviet Union. While this does not indicate that socialist countries will suddenly abandon all central planning and adopt western market systems on a large scale, it does suggest that the notion of differential social rewards is not a value that is limited to capitalism.

The mass of people in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada accept most of the programs that they have and are willing to pay for them as long as those programs are perceived as a good value for the money and as effective and fair. The Europeans and the Canadians accept a larger role for government than do their counterparts in the United States, but this has historically been true. I suggest that the victories of conservatives and moderates in this decade in Canada, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States (although Social Democrats have now been returned to office in France and Sweden) can be interpreted as messages from the voters about the limits of the welfare state or, using a broader focus, messages about the general conduct of government.

The welfare state was not the only issue in elections in the West during the late 1970s and 1980s. Neither Mr. Reagan nor Mrs. Thatcher's Conservatives (nor the other conservatives and moderates) were elected solely with the votes of those who were committed to a conservative

178 Social Service Review

ideology. They were elected by the swing vote-the politically uncom- mitted middle-which is largely composed of citizens of the working and lower middle classes. Reagan's and Thatcher's opponents were seen as too extreme on a number of issues, including national defense and the general conduct of government. It is not so much that the public voted for Reagan or for Thatcher's Conservative party as much as they voted against what they perceived as Mondale's and Benn's programs, which included, but were not limited to, welfare issues.

The lesson seems clear. The programmatic welfare state is not ter-

minally ill. Cost-conscious programs that produce perceivably favorable results are still acceptable. The social insurance programs are safe. Public assistance (and its European counterparts) will not be discon-

tinued-although the emphasis on work will remain strong not because the ideologues of the Right insist on it, but because it is important to

ordinary middle-class and working people. The political middle is not interested in either going back to laissez-faire or toward the govern- mentally managed substantive equality of the pure socialist state.

George and Wilding are partially correct. The traditions of individ- ualism and personal liberty are strong, but not because they are en- trenched in the upper classes. It is because they are highly regarded by the masses. The masses also favor a balanced, mixed economy and will react when they perceive the balance to be shifting too far in either direction. There are other issues that are important in the electoral decisions of the working class (e.g., nationalism, honesty in government). It is difficult to sort the influence of these other issues, but they may confound the simplistic notion that social welfare was a basic factor in the elections of the late 1970s and the 1980s. The lesson that both

supporters and opponents of the welfare state must learn is that the middle and working classes do vote for their class interests, but they do it on a pragmatic basis rather than on strict ideological lines.

Notes

1. Demetrius latridis, "Neoconservatism Revisited," Social Work 28 (March-April 1983): 101-7.

2. Sidney Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General Welfare State (Ann Arbor: University of

Michigan Press, 1964). 3. Ibid., p. 375. 4. Ibid., pp. vii-viii. 5. Ibid., p. 352. 6. Bruce S. Jansson, The Reluctant Welfare State (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1988). 7. Charles Schottland, "Introduction," in The Welfare State, ed. Schottland (New York:

Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 9-15, quote on p. 10. 8. Asa Briggs, "The Welfare State in Historical Perspective," in Schottland, ed., pp.

25-45. 9. Donald I. Richberg, "Liberalism, Paternalism, Security and the Welfare State," in

Schottland, ed., pp. 184-94. 10. Charles Murray, Losing Ground (New York: Basic, 1984).

The Welfare State 179

11. Nathan Glazer, "The Social Policy of the Reagan Administration: A Review," Public Interest (Spring 1984), pp. 76-98.

12. Ibid., p. 98. 13. Ibid., p. 89. 14. Lawrence Mead, Beyond Entitlement (New York: Free Press, 1985). 15. Vic George and Paul Wilding, Ideology and Social Welfare (London: Routledge &

Kegan Paul, 1976). A second edition was published in 1986 which is less critical of the welfare state, but the authors' fundamental conclusion remains the same.

16. Ibid., p. 129. 17. Ibid., p. 137. 18. Ibid., p. 130. 19. G6sta Esping-Andersen, "After the Welfare State," Public Welfare 41 (Winter

1983): 28-34, quote on 28. 20. Ibid., p. 28. 21. Ibid., p. 30. 22. Ibid., p. 28. 23. Ramesh Mishra, The Welfare State in Crisis (New York: St. Martin's, 1984). 24. Ibid., p. 18. 25. Ibid., p. 178. 26. Gertrude Himmelfarb, "In Defense of the Victorians," Wilson Quarterly (Summer

1988), p. 99. 27. Esping-Andersen, p. 28. 28. George and Wilding (n. 15 above), p. 130.