The War Power

8/3/2019 The War Power

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THEWARPOWERMICHAELSTOKESPAULSEN*

MynearlyridiculousgoalforthisEssayistopresentacomprehensivetheoryoftheConstitutionsallocationofwarpowersand,then,toapplyittoeverysignificantissueofthewaronterror,intwentyfivepages.My thesis is straightforward:The allocationofwarpowers

under theConstitution isa classic illustrationof theFramersconceptionofseparationofpowers.TheFramersregardedthewarpoweras too important tovest it inasinglesetofhandsand

so,

by

conscious

design,

chopped

it

updivided

itand

allocated portions of that power to variousbranches, givingsomepowersexclusivelytoeachbranchandalsoprovidingforsomeareasofoverlap,andthussharedauthority,amongthem.Iwillmakethreebroadpointsaboutthewarpowerasitex

istswithin theConstitutions structural separationofpowers.First,theConstitutionvests,inthemain,inCongress,andnotinthePresident,thedecisiontoinitiatewartheauthoritytotakethenationintoastateofwar.1Second,theConstitutionvestsinthePresident,andnot inCongress, thepower toconductwar.2

*Distinguished

University

Chair

&

Professor

of

Law,

The

University

of

St.

Tho

mas.ThisEssayisarevisionofapresentationgivenattheTwentyEighthAnnualFederalistSocietyNationalStudentSymposium,heldatYaleLawSchool.1.For a short textual and structural defense of this proposition, see Michael

StokesPaulsen,YoungstownGoestoWar,19CONST.COMMENT.215,23839(2002).Foroutstanding, fulllengthpresentationsofthetextualandhistoricalbasisforthisposition,seeSaikrishnaPrakash,UnleashingtheDogsofWar:WhattheConstitutionMeans by DeclareWar, 93CORNELLL.REV. 45 (2007) andMichaelD.Ramsey,TextualismandWarPowers,69U.CHI.L.REV.1543(2002).Forfineexpositionsoftheopposingview,favoringunilateralexecutivewarmakingpower,seeRobertJ.Delahunty&JohnYoo,MakingWar,93CORNELLL.REV.123 (2007),RobertJ.Delahunty&JohnYoo,ThePresidentsConstitutionalAuthoritytoConductMilitaryOperationsAgainstTerroristOrganizationsandtheNationsThatHarbororSupportThem,25HARV.J.L.&PUB.POLY487(2002),andJohnC.Yoo,TheContinuationofPoliticsbyOtherMeans:TheOriginalUnderstandingofWarPowers,84CAL.L.REV.167(1996).

2.For

abrief

exposition

of

this

proposition

and

an

important

historical

illustra

tion,seeMichaelStokesPaulsen,TheEmancipationProclamationandtheCommanderinChiefPower, 40GA.L.REV. 807 (2006) (arguing that theCommanderinChief


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114 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33

Eachofthesepowersis,inthemain,autonomousofthepowers of the otherbranch and thus to a substantial degree immunefromcontrolbytheotherspowers.

Third,the

Constitution

vests

no

substantive

war

powers

in

thejudiciary.Butquestionsof theConstitutionsallocationofwarpowersnonethelesscanbejudicialquestions.Thissusceptibility tojudicial decisionmaking does notmean that everything that thecourtswilldecideonsuchmatters is right.Nordoesitmeaneventhateverythingthatthecourtssayshouldbefollowedbytheotherbranchesofgovernment.Anotheraspectof the separation ofpowers is that the Framers regarded thepowertointerpretlawthepowerofconstitutionalinterpretationas another power too important to vest exclusively inanyonebranchofgovernment.3Ittoolikethewarpowerisadivided,sharedpower.Thepoliticalbranchesthusrightfully

mayuse

the

constitutional

powers

at

their

disposal

to

resist

ju

dicialencroachmentsontheConstitutionsassignmentsofwarpowers to them.Nonetheless, thejudiciaryspower todecidecases, includingcasesconcerning theConstitutionsallocationofwarpowers,andtoseektopressitsinterpretationsuponthe

ClausevestsinthePresidentalldecisionswithrespecttotheactionsofU.S.forcesin timeofauthorizedwarincludingallmattersofmilitary strategyand tactics;generalandspecificmilitaryobjectives;rulesofengagement;meansandmethodstobe employed;whenandunderwhat circumstanceshostilitiesare tobe terminated;andallmattersofdetention,interrogation,andmilitarypunishmentofcaptured enemy combatantsand noting that this broad conception of the Commander

in

Chief

Clause

is

an

essential

ingredient

in

the

lawfulness

of

President

AbrahamLincolnsEmancipationProclamation).SeealsoMichaelStokesPaulsen,TheConstitutionalPowerToInterpretInternationalLaw,118YALEL.J.1762,181216,183554 (2009) (developing thesepropositions and applying them tomany contemporary issues). For the most plausible textual and historical argument thatCongressrightfullymayshackletheexecutivesCommanderinChiefClausepowersthroughitsperipheraltextualpowersconcerningregulationofthemilitary,seeSaikrishnaB.Prakash,TheSeparationandOverlapofWarandMilitaryPowers,87TEX.L.REV. 299 (2008).Although I findProfessor Prakashs evidence and argumentinterestingandinstructive,Iultimatelyfinditunpersuasive.SeePaulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supra,at1852n.209.3.This proposition hasbeen a theme of my other scholarship. E.g., Michael

StokesPaulsen,The IrrepressibleMythofMarbury,101MICH.L.REV.2706 (2003);MichaelStokesPaulsen,TheMostDangerousBranch:ExecutivePowertoSayWhattheLawIs,83GEO.L.J.217(1994);seealsoMichaelStokesPaulsen,LincolnandJudicial

Authority,83

NOTREDAMEL.REV.

1227

(2008).

On

the

several

branches

independ

entpowerswithrespecttotheinterpretationandapplicationofinternationallaw,seePaulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2.


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No.1] TheWarPower 115

otherbrancheswith the limitedpowersat itsdisposal, isalsopartoftheseparationofpowersdynamic.

I. THECONSTITUTIONALPOWERTOINITIATEWAR(JUSADBELLUM)Considerfirsttheconstitutionalpower tostartwartotake

thenation fromaconditionofpeace intoastateofwar.ThatpowerisCongresss,notthePresidents.IntheAmericanconstitutional order, the power to initiate war is a legislativepowerandnotanexecutivepower.

A. PreconstitutionalBackgroundUnderstandingsoftheWarPower

Thingswerenotalwaysthatway.Indeed,thewarpowertra

ditionallywas

understood

to

be

an

aspect

of

the

executive

powerwithrespect to foreignaffairs.TheFramersof theU.S.Constitutionwrote against abackground understanding thatthe war power was part of the foreign relations executivepowerof thekingadescriptionattested toby thebest legalauthorities known in the eighteenth century, includingMontesquieu, Blackstone, and Locke. The Framers wrote againstthatbackdrop,butconsciouslydepartedfromthatfamiliardesignby taking someof thepowers traditionallyvested in theEnglishkingandassigningtheminsteadtothelegislature.Themost importantof those reallocations in theareaofwarandforeignaffairsisArticleI,Section8sassignmenttoCongressof

thepower

[t]o

declare

War.

4

B. TheConstitutionsAllocationoftheWarInitiatingPower:Text,Structure,andHistory

Congress,andnotthePresident,thuspossessestheconstitutionalpowertodeclarewarornottodeclarewar.Thismeansthat Congress, and not the President, has the constitutionalpowertoinitiatewar.TheCommanderinChiefClausepowerof thePresident is (as Idiscussbelow) a formidable,plenary

4.U.S.CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 11.On the traditionalbackgroundEnglishunder

standing,see

Ramsey,

supra

note

1,

at

156163

(citing

sources).

See

also

Saikrishna

B.Prakash&MichaelD.Ramsey,TheExecutivePoweroverForeignAffairs,111YALEL.J.231,26572(2001).


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116 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33constitutionalpowerofmilitarycommand.But itdoesnot include a power to declare war on another nation, entity, orgroup.ThePresidentmaynotat leastnotconstitutionally

launchawar

all

on

his

own.

That

power

belongs

to

Congress.

Thisproposition shouldnotbe controversial. I submit thatthisissimplytheproperunderstandingofthetexttheoriginalpublicmeaningofthewordsoftheConstitution.It is thatunderstandingthatshouldcontrolconstitutionalpracticenotpolicy,precedent,pragmatismoranythingelse.5Andtheoriginalmeaningoftheworddeclareasusedinthiscontextthatis,asappliedtothepowertodeclareWarwastoinitiatebywordoractionalegalconditionofwar.6Somemaybeunconvincedbybareargumentsfromoriginal

linguistic meaning of the Constitutions words, but there ismore to the argument than that. This understanding of the

meaningof

the

Declare

War

Clause

is

supported

as

well

by

the

structureandinternallogicoftheConstitution.Specifically,theunderstanding of the power to declare war as a substantivelawmakingpower(andnotamerediplomaticordomesticnoticegivingprovision)7isstronglysupportedbythelocationofthepowerinArticleI,Section8asoneofthespecificenumerated lawmakingpowersofCongress.TheConstitutiontakesatraditional executivepower, relocates it away from thePresident,andplopsitdownintoalistofsubstantivepowerscommittedtoCongress.Theimplicationfromlocationisnotalwaysreliable,butitishardtoavoidhere:TheFramerstookthedecisiontogotowarawayfromtheexecutiveandvesteditinthe

Congress.This

inference

from

structure

and

relationship

is

fur

5.ThemeaningoftheConstitutionistheoriginalpublicmeaningthatthetextswordsandphraseswouldhavehad, incontext, toanobjective, informed readerandspeakeroftheEnglishlanguagewithintherelevantpoliticalcommunity,atthetime theConstitutionwaswritten and adopted. Those exercising governmentalauthorityunder theConstitutionaredutybound toapply theConstitution inaccordancewithsuchanunderstanding.Forastraightforwardinternal,textualjustificationforthisinterpretivemethodologyanditsbindingcharacter,seeVasanKesavan&Michael StokesPaulsen,The Interpretive Force of theConstitutions SecretDraftingHistory,91GEO.L.J.1113(2003).6.SeePrakash,supranote1;Ramsey,supranote1.ProfessorPrakashand,sepa

rately,ProfessorRamsey,marshaltheevidenceconvincinglythatthisistheoriginallinguisticmeaning,inhistoricalcontext,ofthephrasetodeclareWar,asused

in

the

Article

I,

Section

8

of

the

Constitution.

7.ThatistheincorrectpositionofProfessorsDelahuntyandYoo.SeeDelahunty&Yoo,MakingWar,supranote1;Yoo,supranote1.


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No.1] TheWarPower 117therreinforcedbytheevidentnecessitythattheFramersfelttoassign a specific CommanderinChief Clause power to thePresidentinordertomakeclearwhataspectsofthewarpower

werenot

thereby

assigned

to

Congress

(i.e.,

the

power

of

armed

forcescommandthepowertoconductwarwhichIdiscussinthe next section). In addition, Article I, Section 10 prohibitsstates fromengaging inwaron theirown (unless theyare invadedor in immediateperil)unlessCongressconsents.8DontcallthePresident;callCongressthebranchassignedthepredominantpowertocontrolthedecisionofthenation(orevenapartofit)toengageinwar.Finally,thisconclusionisverifiedbynearlyallofthelegisla

tivehistoryandearlypractice.TheConstitutionalConventionrecords, the ratificationdebates,and thestatementsandpracticesofearlypresidentsallsupportthisconclusion.9

TheConstitutional

Convention

debates

provide

an

interest

ingperspective.10An earlier version ofwhatbecame theDeclare War Clause provided that Congress would have thepower to make war.11 James Madison and Elbridge Gerrymoved tosubstitutedeclare formakeonAugust17.Thisproducedafamousshortdebate,takingjustafewpagesinFarrandsRecords andMadisonsNotes,discussing the proposedalterationof thedocuments language fromtomakewar toto declarewar.12Naturally, aswith any type of legislativebody,therecorddisplaysacertainamountofconfusionamongthedelegates as to exactlywhat the import of the change inwording would be. But two overlapping explanations are

prominent.The

first

is

that

changing

make

to

declare

would

leave in the President, as executive, the traditional executivepower to repel attackson thenationa defensivepresidentialwarpower.13

8.U.S.CONST.art.I,10.9.MuchofthisevidenceiswellsetforthinRamsey,supranote1,at160309.

10.On the propriety of resort to the secret drafting history, see Kesavan &Paulsen,TheInterpretiveForceoftheConstitutionsSecretDraftingHistory,supranote5.11.2THERECORDSOFTHEFEDERALCONVENTIONOF1787,at31819 (MaxFar

randed.,YaleUniv.Press1966).

12.Seeid.at31820.13.This is the recorded explanation for themaking of themotion in the first

place,and

part

of

Madisons

description

of

its

intended

consequence.

Id. at 318(Mr.Madison andMr.Gerrymoved to insert declare, striking out makewar;

leavingtotheExecutivethepowertorepelsuddenattacks.).


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The second explanation is that declare was a superiorword choice to makebecause the lattermightbe taken toimply,wrongly, thatCongress, the legislativebranch,would

havethe

power

to

conduct

war,

which

was

properly

an

execu

tivefunction.14Thislittlesnippetofconstitutionaldraftinghistory isobviouslyof interest for itsbearingon themeaningofthe CommanderinChief Clause powers of the President,which Idiscusspresently in Section II. I like to imagine thisdiscussion occurring under the approving,but studiously silent,gazebutperhapsarchedeyebrowsof thePresidentofthe Convention, General George Washington, who had hadsomefamiliaritywiththeproblemsofwarsbeingrunbylegislativecommittees.Atallevents, theFramersdeliberatelysubstituteddeclare formake, explained their reasons fordoingso,andadoptedthetextinthatform.

Thereis

anatural,

intuitive

synthesis

that

comes

out

of

the

text,structure,andconstitutionaldraftinghistory:Congresshasthepower to take thenation toastateofwarwhere therehadbeennonebefore,butthePresidentretainsthetraditionalexecutivepower todefend thenation against attacks.Therewill alwaysbe linedrawing issuesas towhereonepower leavesoffandtheotherbegins,butthisisthenutsandboltsoftheConstitutionsdivisionofthewarpower,intermsofthepowertostartawar.15It is significant that the text, structure, and historical evi

denceoforiginalintentionallcohere,pointinginasingledirection:ThePresidentdoesnothaveconstitutionalpowertoiniti

atewar

on

his

own.

Rather,

by

conscious

structural

design,

the

FramersmeanttovestthatpowerintheCongress.

C. IsHistoricalPracticeaGlossontheMeaningoftheConstitution?

Onemighttrulyobserve,however,thatalotofournationsactual practicedoesnot conformparticularlywell to this abstract constitutional division of powers. Presidents seem to

14.Id.at319n.* (On theremarkbyMr.King that makewarmightbeunderstoodtoconductitwhichwasanExecutivefunction,Mr.Elseworthgaveuphisobjection,andthevoteof[Connecticut]waschangedtoay.).

15.There

are

also

important

line

drawing

questions

as

to

what

constitutes

war

within themeaningof theclauseandwhethertheremightexistaresidualexecutivepowerovernonwarmilitaryactions.Ileavetheseforanotherday.


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startsmallandlargewars,withoutCongresssauthorization,afairbitofthetime.Hasournationsactualconstitutionalpractice in the fieldofwar conformed to theConstitutionsprovi

sions?If

not,

should

we

conclude

that

historical

practice

consti

tutes a gloss of sorts on the meaning of the Constitution,alteringhowweshouldunderstandtheConstitutiontoday?Ordoes itmean,quite the reverse, that theConstitutionhasbeenmateriallyviolatedon importantoccasions,and thatwe shouldseektorecovertheConstitutionstruemeaninginsteadofbending it tojustify the violations of the past and (furthering thewrong)thenusethebentversiontojustifyfurtherdepartures?Thesefundamentalquestionsbedevilmanyareasofconstitu

tional law,but they arepresented inan especially sharp andcriticalwaywith respect towarpowers. Indeed,muchofourconstitutional practice today departs from the Constitutions

originalvision

with

respect

to

the

allocation

of

war

powers.

Specifically, the last fifty years have seen the rapiddevelopmentofunilateralpresidentialwarmaking.SomeofourconstitutionalpracticewithrespecttowarpowersfitsthemodelIhavesketched,butsomeofthepracticesimplydoesnot.Tocitejusttwoquickexamples:Icannotfindaway legally

tojustifythe1999KosovoWarunderthetextualtheoryIhaveadvanced.Thatdoesnotmean thatAmericas involvement inthismilitary actionwasbad from a policy standpoint; itjustmeans that this significantmilitaryactiondidnot conform tothe text, structural logic, and original understanding of theConstitutionsallocationofwarpowers.Thesamegoesforthe

KoreanWar.

Congress

did

not

authorize

it;

President

Truman

initiateditonhisown.ItseemsimpossibletodenythattheKoreanWarwasawar in theconstitutionalsenseof the term.Butitplainlydoesnotfitintothemodelofconstitutionallyrequiredcongressionalauthorization.TheKoreanWarmayhavebeenagoodwar,but itwasanunconstitutionaloneifbyunconstitutionalonemeansatvariancewith theConstitutionsoriginalpublicmeaning.16

16.GaryLawson,TheRiseandRiseoftheAdministrativeState,107HARV.L.REV.1231,1231(1994).Ihope todevelopthesehistoricalobservationsand othersin

futurework.

For

now,

it

is

sufficient

to

note

that

Kosovo

and

Korea

are

prominent

examplesofsustained,open,armedconflictagainstanenemyforceorpower,ofanintensityandduration thatmustbeconceded toconstitutewar,butwhere the


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Thisisaclassicproblem.Whathappenswhenconstitutionalpracticedoesnotconformtosoundfirstprinciplesofconstitutional interpretation?Thereare twowaysofresolving thisdi

lemma.Under

one

school

of

thought,

ours

is

aliving

Constitu

tion, the meaning ofwhich changes with the times.Underanother, the Constitution sets forth immutable principles offundamental law thatmustneverbealteredbymeregovernmentofficials.TheLivingConstitutionpositionisusuallyassociatedwithliberalconstitutionaltheorists,andtheOriginalMeaningpositionwithconservatives.Butintheareaofwarpowers,thepositionsofthecontendingpartiesseemalmostexactly reversed.Conservatives frequentlydefendbroadpresidentialwarinitiatingpower,against thegreaterweightofevidenceoforiginalmeaninganddesign.Moreshockinglyyet,theydoso largely forpolicy reasonsanddefend suchantioriginalist

constitutional

revisionism

on

the

basis

of

consistent

modern

practiceaposition that fewconservativeconstitutionalscholarswoulddefendinotherareas(likecriminalprocedure,abortion,or expansive conceptionsof federalgovernmentpower).Butsotoodoliberalschangetheirconstitutionalstripeswhenitcomestowar:Infew,ifany,areasdothosewhootherwisesoferventlydefendtheideaofanevolving,changingConstitutionclingsotenaciouslytotheFramersandtheoriginalmeaningofthewordsoftheConstitution!

Iam theonlyprincipledconstitutional interpreter. Idonotchangemystripes.17Wherepracticeunder theConstitution (orprecedent,includinglongstanding,ostensiblysettledjudicial

precedent)

departs

from

the

actual

original

meaning

of

the

Constitutionsprovisions, one must go with the Constitutionand notwith the practice.Always.18The principled constitu

warwasnotauthorizedbyCongresssdeclarationofwarorequivalentstatutoryauthorization.17.This isnotquite true.Thereareotherprincipledconstitutional interpreters

outthere.Iamsurethereare.

18.Bythisreasoning,itfollows(asIhavearguedelsewhere)thatstaredecisis,inthesenseofdeliberateadherencetoawrongdecisionmadeinthepast,isunconstitutional.SeeMichaelStokesPaulsen,AbrogatingStareDecisisbyStatute:MayCongressRemovethePrecedentialEffectofRoeandCasey?,109YALEL.J.1535(2000);Michael Stokes Paulsen, Can a ConstitutionalAmendment Overrule a Supreme CourtDecision?, 24CONST.COMMENT.285, 289 (2007);Michael StokesPaulsen,Captain

JamesT.

Kirk

and

the

Enterprise

of

Constitutional

Interpretation:

Some

Modest

Proposals

from the TwentyThird Century, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 671, 67881 (1995); MichaelStokesPaulsen,DoestheConstitutionPrescribeRulesforItsOwnInterpretation?,103


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tional interpretermustbite thebullet, swallow hard, andbewilling to say thatmuch of our nations actual practicewithrespecttothepowertodeclarewarinfacthasbeenunconstitu

tional.So

much

the

worse

for

our

nations

practice.

Notallofit,ofcourse:asInotedbefore,therearemanyareasofambiguityanduncertainty inapplication,includingthedomainof thewordwarandalso therealmof thePresidentspower to defend the nation against sudden (or imminent)attacks.Butwhenpushcomestoshove,Iamwillingtosaythatsome exercises ofmilitary force in our nations history havebeen wars and that,where theywerenot authorized, theywereunconstitutional.

D. Application:TheLawfulnessoftheWar(s)onTerrorFortunately,noneofthishasanysaliencewithrespecttothe

waron

terror.

At

least,

none

of

this

should

have

any

salience.

TheAuthorization forUseofMilitaryForceofSeptember18,2001(AUMF)isthebroadest,mostsweeping,embracing,legaldeclaration ofwar in our nations history.19 The President isexpressly

authorizedtouseallnecessaryandappropriateforceagainstthose nations, organizations, or persons he determinesplanned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacksthatoccurredonSeptember11,2001,orharboredsuchorganizationsorpersons,inordertopreventanyfutureactsof international terrorismagainst theUnitedStatesbysuchnations,organizations,orpersons.20

Thisis

an

absolutely

sweeping

authorization

for

military

force.21Congressdeclaredwaragainstnotonlyenemynations(as described), but against organizations or persons. The solecondition is that the President determineshe alone is assigned thepower tomake the relevantdeterminationthata

NW.L.REV. 857, 913 (2009);Michael StokesPaulsen, The Intrinsically CorruptingInfluence of Precedent, 22CONST.COMMENT. 289 (2005); Paulsen, The Irrepressible MythofMarbury,supranote3,at273134.19.Authorization for Use of Military Force Against September 11 Terrorists

(AUMF), Pub. L. No. 10740, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 1541(2006)).SomeofthediscussionthatfollowsisbasedonmyearlierworkinPaulsen,supranote1,at25057.

20.

AUMF

2,

115

Stat.

at

224.

21.Someofthediscussionthatfollowsisbasedonmyearlierwork.SeePaulsen,supranote1,at25057.


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122 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33nation, organization, or person has participated in any of anumberofways,directorindirect,insupportoftheattacksofSeptember11,2001,includingharbor[ing]personsororgani

zationswho

may

have

aided

persons

or

organizations

who

planned, authorized, or committed those infamous attacks.Combining the links in the chain of legal authorization, thePresidenthasplenarypowertowagewaragainstanyoneconnectedinanyactiveorevenpassivelysupportivewaywiththeorganizationsorpersons responsible for theSeptember11attacks.He chooses the targets;hedetermines the enemies, includingnotjustnationsbutindividualpersonsandgroups;hechoosesthetiming;hechoosesthemeans;hechoosestheends.Moreover,theAUMFswhereasclausesembraceessentially

thepropresidentialviewofconstitutionalpowerto initiatewar,including preemptive war, against terrorism: Whereas, the

PresidenthasauthorityundertheConstitutiontotakeactiontodeter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the

UnitedStates....22Congress, inenacting theAUMF,sweepinglyand in separationofpowers terms somewhat surprisinglydeclared its acceptance of unilateralpresidential militaryactiontodeterandpreventactsofterrorismagainsttheUnitedStates,andoftheclaimofunilateralpresidentialconstitutionalauthoritytodoso.All of this is extraordinary. TheAUMFmarks a stunning,

landmarkparadigm shift in the constitutionalpracticeofwarpowers, lightyearsdistant in toneandattitude from theWarPowersResolutionof1973,23whichwasnotsomuchrepealed

assimply

overwhelmed

by

the

September

18,

2001

AUMF.

The

AUMFwaspassedbyavoteof4201intheHouse24and980intheSenate.25Ithasnotimelimitnoexpirationdate.There ismore yet.The separate congressional enactment au

thorizinguseofmilitaryforcespecificallywithrespecttoIraqis

22.AUMF2,115Stat.at224(emphasisadded).23.WarPowersResolution,Pub.L.No.93148,87Stat.555(1973)(codifiedat50

U.S.C.15411548(2006)).OntheWarPowersResolution,seePaulsen,supranote1,at24250.

24.

H.R.J.

Res.

64,

107th

Cong.

(2001)

(enacted);

seealso

Paulsen,supra

note

1,

at

252n.106.

25.S.J.Res.23,107thCong.(2001)(enacted).


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also,legally,afullyfunctionaldeclarationofwarforthatspecificenemyortheater.26Thus,whateverthescopeof legitimatedebateoverwhether

thePresident

may,

in

certain

circumstances,

employ

military

force on his own unilateral constitutional authority, notwithstandingCongresssenumeratedpowertodeclareWar,thatdebateismootwithrespecttothesewars.CongresshasaddeditspowerstothoseofthePresident.InYoungstownishterms,27the wars of September 11, 2001, including the Iraqwar, areCategory Iwars:Theyare fullyconstitutionallyauthorized,onanyviewoftheConstitutionsallocationofwarpowers.Morethanthat,Congresslegislatedsweepinglyinsupportof

presidential powerwith the enactment of theMilitaryCommissionsActof2006.28ThatactgivesthePresidenttheauthority to interpret international law for the United States, and

delegatesbroad

war

powers

with

respect

to

the

capture,

deten

tion, interrogation, andmilitary punishment of unlawful enemycombatants.Ifeveritwerethecase,itiscertainlytrueherethatpresiden

tial power towagewarauthorization to use force and themannerofitsconductisatitsmaximum.Congresshasaddedessentially all of its powers to those that the President possessesbyvirtueofhis independentconstitutionalpowersunderArticle II. Insucha situation,militaryactioncommandedbythePresidentis,asJusticeJacksonaptlyputitinhisconcurringopinioninYoungstown,supportedbythestrongestofpresumptions and the widest latitude ofjudicial interpretation,

andthe

burden

of

persuasion

would

rest

heavily

upon

any

whomightattackit.29

26.SeeAuthorizationforUseofMilitaryForceAgainstIraqResolutionof2002,Pub.L.No.107243,116Stat.1498(codifiedat50U.S.C.1541(2006)).27.YoungstownSheet&Tubev.Sawyer,343U.S.579(1952).

28.MilitaryCommissionsActof2006,Pub.L.No.109366,120Stat.2600(codi

fied

as

amended

in

scattered

sections

of

10

U.S.C.);

see

also

Paulsen,

The

Constitu

tionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at184751.

29.Youngstown,343U.S.at637(Jackson,J.,concurring).


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II. THECONSTITUTIONALPOWERTOCONDUCTWAR(JUSINBELLO)

Whohas

the

constitutional

power

to

conduct

war,

where

war

hasbeenlegallyauthorizedbyCongressorwheremilitaryactionfallswithintheresidualexecutivepowertodefendagainstsuddenorimminentattacks?TheConstitutionsanswerisclearandcategorical:ThePresidenthas thepower toconductwar,andCongressdoesnot.

A. TheExecutivePowerandtheCommanderinChiefClauseOnceagain, it is fairly easy todiscern theFramers separa

tionofpowers design in dividing, allocating, and checkingpower.Atthelevelofgranddesign,theFramerssplitthewarpowerbetweenthepowertoinitiatealegalconditionofwar

nowvested

in

the

legislative

branchand

the

power

to

con

ductwar,retainedintheexecutive.Atthelevelofspecifictext,thisdivisionisreflectedintheinitialgrant,ingross,oftheexecutivePower to a single chiefmagistrate, thePresident, inArticleII.30Thatgrantisthenqualifiedbythereassignment,inwholeorinpart,ofcertaintraditionalexecutivepowerstothelegislative branch by specific enumeration.31 Notably, thesepowers include the power to declarewar32 and to raise andsupport armies33traditional executive powers of the BlackstoniankinginEngland34andthequalifiedlegislativeroleintreatymaking.35Suchspecifictextualreassignmentsofpowerdeviationsfromthetraditionalmodelinturnrequiredclarifi

cationsof

what

was

not

meant

to

be

reassigned.

Most

signifi

cantly, thepower todirect and command thenationsuse ofmilitary force, another clearly executive power under traditionalunderstandings(asindeedallwarpowerpreviouslyhadbeenunderstoodasexecutive),wasintendedtoberetainedbythe Presidentnot reassigned to Congress. Thus, the crucialCommanderinChiefClause.TheCommanderinChiefClauseofArticleIIistheConstitutionsdefinitiveclarificationthatthe

30.U.S.CONST.art.II,1,cl.1.31.U.S.CONST.art.I,8.

32.U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cl.11.

33.

U.S.

CONST.

art.

I,

8,

cl.

12.

34.See,e.g.,1WILLIAMBLACKSTONE,COMMENTARIES*24951.

35.U.S.CONST.art.II,2,cl.2.


13/25

No.1] TheWarPower 125traditionalexecutivepowertoconduct,manage,anddirectinshort,toexecutewarisretainedintheexecutivepower,tobeexercisedsolelybyaPresidentoftheUnitedStates.Congress

decideswhether

or

not

to

start

awar.

The

President

decides

howtocarryitout.In her plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice

OConnorquippedthatastateofwarisnotablankcheckforthePresident.36Well,then,whatkindofcheckisit?Likemostjudicialaphorisms,thisoneismorewittythanastute.Adeclarationofwar(toextendJusticeOConnorsmetaphor)writesacheckinthefullamountoftheexclusiveCommanderinChiefClausepowerofthePresidenttoconductwaragainsttheenemiesdesignatedbythedeclaration.TheAUMFwritesanenormouscheck.It is,asnotedabove,

in legal effectadeclarationofwar triggering the fullextentof

theCommander

in

Chief

power

to

wage

war

against

those

againstwhomitwasdeclaredandtoprotectthenationfromattacksby those enemies. There is no question that the AUMFgives thePresident theabsolutemaximumofhisconstitutionalauthoritytowagewarandauthorizeshimtodosoagainstpersonsandorganizationsconnected to theSeptember11attacksinawayhedeterminessufficientlyproximatetojustifyactiontopreventfuturesuchactsofinternationalterrorismagainsttheUnited States. The Authorization for Use ofMilitary Force inIraqdoesthesame,specificallywithrespecttotheIraqtheater.37Congressspowertoauthorizewarisnotapowertomanage

theconductofwar.Thatisaportionoftheexecutivepowerthe

Framersdid

not

reassign

to

the

legislative

branch,

but

apart

retained and reaffirmed as solely vested in the Presidentthrough the CommanderinChief Clause. To switch metaphors, Congressspower todeclarewar is an onoff switch,notathermostatthatCongresscanadjusttowhateverlevelitprefers.38Once the switch is flicked to theonposition, andforsolongasitremainsinthatposition,thePresidenthasthepowertoconductwar.AndCongressdoesnot.36.542U.S.507,536(2004).

37.AuthorizationforUseofMilitaryForceAgainstIraqResolutionof2002,Pub.L.No.107243,116Stat.1498(codifiedat50U.S.C.1541(2006)).

38.Paulsen,

TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at1840.ContraPrakash,supranote2,at347(statingthatCongressswarpowersare

moreanalogoustoadimmerswitchthananonoffswitch).


14/25


What is the scope of the Presidents CommanderinChiefClausepower,fullytriggeredherebyCongressssweepingauthorizationsfortheuseofmilitaryforce?Isubmitthatpower,

inatime

of

authorized

war,

extends

to

all

matters

of

military

strategy and conductwith regard to thewaging of thatwar,includingrulesofengagement,interceptionofenemycommunications,choiceofweaponryandtactics,rulesofinterrogationand investigation, and the impositionofmilitarypunishmentforviolationofthelawsofwar.39TheCommanderinChiefpower, correctlyunderstood, is a

formidable powerand quite properly so. It is a dangerouspower, as allpower isdangerous.But that is inherent in thenatureofthepowertoconductwarandinthedecisiontovestthepowerofultimatemilitarycommandinasingleindividual.ThePresident,andnotCongress,decideswhenandwhere to

attack,whom

to

attack,

how

hard

to

attack,

and

what

the

stra

tegicand tacticalobjectivesare.ThePresident,andnotCongress,directs the capture,detention, interrogation, andmilitary punishment for lawofwar violations of enemycombatants.Hedecideswhattodowithregardtointerceptionofenemycommunications.Heexercisesthepowertointerpretand apply international law for purposes of executing thepowertowagewar.40Thispositioniscontroversial.Ithasdramaticimplications.It

meansthatthePresidenthasthepowerifImaybebluntandmaybe abit overdramatictodecidewhether ornot to kill,capture, hold, interrogate, torture, or play loudmusic in the

faceof

enemy

armed

forces.

41

In

saying

this,

Iam,

of

course,

onlymakingastatementaboutconstitutionalpower.Iamnotsayingwhetheranyorallofthesethingsaregoodorbadfromapolicystandpoint.Constitutionalpoweristhepowertodoornottodoanyorallofthesethings.Onecanflipthehypotheticalexactlyaroundandsee thatPresidentObamasrecentand

39.Ihavedevelopedandsupported thepropositions in thisparagraphand theseveral that follow at greater length elsewhere. See Paulsen, The ConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at183942;Paulsen,TheEmancipationProclamationandtheCommanderinChiefPower,supranote2,at814,82731.

40.SeePaulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at 183941; Paulsen, The Emancipation Proclamation and the Commander in Chief

Power,

supra

note

2,

at

82731.

41.SeePaulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at1840.


15/25


proposedactionsarejustifiedby thissamebroadunderstandingoftheCommanderinChiefClausepower.Thereasonitisconstitutionally permissible for the President unilaterally to

closeGuantanamo,

to

release

prisoners,

to

refrain

from

serious,

aggressive interrogation,tonotseekthecaptureofcertainterrorists,torevealinterrogationtechniquesandclassifiedinternallegal memoranda, to decline to intercept enemy communicationsor to refrain from serious intelligencegathering, topullback frommilitaryengagements, toplay softer,gentlermusicforwarprisoners,or to indulgewarcriminalspreferences forordinaryciviliancriminaltrialsratherthanmilitarytribunalsisthat, constitutionally, thesedeterminationsabouthow to conductwarare for thePresidentof theUnitedStates.Theymaybeusedinonedirectionoranother.

B.

Congresss

Legislative

Powers

Thealternativeisthatthesepowersandthesechoicesinonedirection or anotherare subject toCongresss control.42Congresscouldprohibitorrequiretorture,harshinterrogation,orloudmusic.CongresscouldprohibittheclosingofGuantanamo,thedisclosureof interrogationmethods, the interceptionofenemycommunications,oranyothermilitaryaction.This is anutterly implausible reading of theConstitutions

allocation ofwar powers, considered holistically.Tobe sure,CongresshascertainpowersundertheLawofNationsClause,the RulesConcerningCapturesClause, and theGovernmentandRegulationoftheArmedForcesClause.43Thoselittlepow

ersare

significant

ones

and

can

be

used

to

leverage

checks

against thePresident.Butnoneof them, fairly construed, extends to the Presidents core power to direct the conduct ofwar,nordoallofthemcombineddoso.Wereitotherwise,

theCommanderinChiefClausewouldbe a titleonly,notan independent,substantivepresidentialpower.Thepowertoprescribe theactionsand conductof thenations armedforcesagainsttheenemywouldbeCongresss,asaresultoftheaccumulatedweightofseveralperipheralpowers,noneofwhichaddressesthepowerofmilitarycommanddirectly.This ishardtosquarewiththe textoftheConstitutionand

42.SeegenerallyPrakash,supranote2.

43.U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cls.10,11,14.


16/25


withwhatweknowofthehistoryoftheFramersdecisionsinallocatingwarpowersbetweenCongressandthePresident.44

C. ThePowertoTerminateWarMy finalpointconcerning theconstitutionalseparationand

allocationof thewarpowerbetweenCongressand thePresidentconcerns thepower to terminatewar.Thispower is likewise (inpractical effect)a sharedpowerofCongressand thePresident,butinasomewhatdifferentsensethantheallocationofwarmakingpowersdiscussedabove.With respect to thosepowers, each branch has an exclusive province that cannotproperlybeinvadedbytheother.45ThePresidentcannotproperly invadeCongresss legislative power to declarewar, andCongress cannot properly invade the Presidents executivepowertoconductwar.Thewarmakingpowerissharedinthe

sensethat

it

is

divided

and

portions

of

it

are

made

the

exclusive

provinceofbranches that are constitutionally independent ofoneanother(evenaseachpossessesstrongchecksontheotherby virtue of its possession of certain exclusivewar powers).Thepowertoterminatewarthepower,asitwere,todeclarepeace46isasharedpowerinthesensethatitresultsfromtheoverlappingintersectionofCongressspowertoinitiate(ornotinitiate)warandthePresidentspowertoexecute(ornotexecute)war,sothateitherbranchhasthepracticalpower(withinlimitsandsubjecttootherchecks)tostopwar.Startwith the President. I submit that it follows from the

above discussion of the Presidents CommanderinChief

44.Paulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at184041.Congressalsopossessespowerunder theNecessaryandProperClause,U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cl.18,tolegislateinsupportofthePresidentsexerciseofhiswarexecutingpowerunder theCommanderinChiefClause,bypassing laws itjudgesnecessaryandproper forcarrying intoexecution thePresidentspower.Thepower isa sweepingone thatenlarges theoverallscopeofnationalgovernment power, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government ofAdequate Powers, 31HARV.J.L.&PUB.POLY991,1001(2008),butitisnotproperlyapowerthatmaybeusedtosubtractfromthePresidentsconstitutionalpowersundertheCommanderinChiefClause.AlthoughCongressofcoursemayusetheauspicesoftheNecessaryandProperClause topressitsviewsof thelimitsofpresidentialwarpower,theClause isnotapower todisempoweranotherbranch,butapower tograntotherbranchespowersancillarytotheirconstitutionalpowers.

45.

See

Lichter

v.

United

States,

334

U.S.

742,

77879

(1948).

46.IhopetodevelopthisthemeinasubsequentessayprovisionallyentitledThePowertoDeclarePeace(unpublishedpartialmanuscriptonfilewithauthor).


17/25


Clause war power with respect to decisions concerning theconductofwarthatthedecisiontoendawar(ortorefrainfrompursuingitaggressively)isanaspectoftheexecutivePower

andthe

Commander

in

Chief

Clause

power

of

the

President.

The President may terminate war by reaching a treaty thatwouldlegallyterminateit,andthePresidentmayfunctionallyterminate awarbydeclining to continue to pursue it, orbyreaching an armistice or a truce (a nontreaty executiveagreement) thatwould functionallyend, thoughperhapsnotlegallyterminate,aconstitutionallyauthorizedwar.47Finally, andmost radically, it follows from the Presidents

unilateralCommanderinChiefandexecutivepowerover theconductofwar that thePresidenthas thepower to decline toexecuteadeclarationofwar.IftheCommanderinChiefClausepoweristakenseriously,itisthePresidentsdecisionwhento

endwhento

quita

war.

To

put

the

matter

colloquially

(and

in a retro, sixtiesish sortofway),what ifCongress threw awarandnobodycameormorespecifically,whatifthePresidentdidnotshowuptofight?TheconstitutionalansweristhatthePresidenthastheconstitutionalpowernottofightawar,ortoendit,bythenonexerciseofhisexclusivewarpowerundertheCommanderinChiefClause.Congress has some powers in this regard, too. Congress

couldrepealadeclarationofwarandstripwhatever legalauthorizationcomeswithsuchdeclaration (in thoseoverwhelmingmajority of situations inwhich such authorization is required)leavingawarnolongerlegallyauthorized.Congress

didessentially

this

with

respect

to

the

Vietnam

War

by

repeal

47.On the legal force of executive agreements, seePaulsen, The ConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at178799.Mypreliminaryviewisthatawarthatisendedasapracticalmatterbyapresidentialexecutiveagreementwiththehostileforceorpoweranarmisticeortruceconstitutionallymayberesumedby thePresident (orasuccessorPresident),withoutrenewed legislativeauthorization,when, in thePresidentsjudgment, theexecutiveagreement isnolongerintheUnitedStatessinterest.ApeacetreatythatcomplieswiththeConstitutions treatymakingrequirementshas thestatusofsupremeU.S. law,underArticleVIoftheConstitution.ItisdifficulttoimaginecircumstancesinwhichsuchatreatywouldnotbeunderstoodaslegallyterminatingCongresssstatutorydeclarationorequivalentauthorizationofwar(nomatteronesviewastowhetherthe

lastin

time

rule

with

respect

to

the

relative

legal

force

of

statutes

and

treaties

is

correct, see id.at1773n.28).Again, Iexpect todevelopandrefine thispoint inasubsequentessay.Paulsen,ThePowertoDeclarePeace,supranote46.


18/25


ing the TonkinGulf Resolution.48 In addition,Congress possessestheappropriationspowerandcanemploysuchapowerto defund an authorized war.49 The exercise of that power

couldeffectively

(though,

again,

probably

not

legally)

terminate

awar.CongressdidthiswithrespecttotheVietnamWar,too,conditioning itspostTonkinrepealmilitaryappropriations insuchawayas toessentiallyshutdown thewar in Indochina,leadingtoAmericaspracticaltacticaldefeatandevacuation.50SomefolksmistakenlytakethistomeanthatCongresssreal

warpower is theappropriationspowerand that thedeclareWarclauseiseithertoothless,meresurplusage,ormustmeansomethingother thanawarauthorizationpower.51Notatall.Thepower todeclarewarornotremains the relevant substantivepowerofCongress.Thepoweroverappropriations ismerelyCongresss trumpcard,shootoutpoweradifferent

substantivepower,

but

apowerful

one

that

Congress

may

em

ploy to effectuate itsother constitutionalpowers, including itssubstantiveconstitutionalpower to initiatewar.Butnote thatdefunding does not deauthorize; a resumption of fundingwould return to thePresident thepracticalability tocontinuetowagewarwithoutneedforreauthorization.ThereremainsalegitimatedebateovertheproprietyofCongressusingitsap

48.TheTonkinGulfResolution,Pub.L.No.88408,78Stat.384 (1964),was, inmyopinion the legalequivalentofacongressionalauthorizationofwar,albeitafairlyimprecise,vague,andgeneraldelegationtothePresident.In1971,CongressrepealedtheTonkinGulfResolution,inaonesentenceamendmenttoanunrelatedbill.SeeActofJan.12,1971,12,Pub.L.No.91672,84Stat.2053,2055(1971).In

thecase

of

the

Vietnam

War,

the

repeal

of

the

Tonkin

Gulf

Resolution

may

not

have had the effect of repealing all congressionally granted authority.SeeJOHNHARTELY,WARANDRESPONSIBILITY:CONSTITUTIONALLESSONSOFVIETNAMANDITSAFTERMATH3234(1993).49.SeeJ.GregorySidak,ToDeclareWar,41DUKEL.J.27,99108(1991)(discuss

ingseveralversionsofthispropostition).

50.In1973,Congresspassed,andPresidentNixon signed, theJointResolutionMakingcontinuingappropriations forfiscalyear1974,108,Pub.L.No.9352,87Stat.130,134(1973)(Notwithstandinganyotherprovisionoflaw,onorafterAugust15,1973,nofundshereinorheretoforeappropriatedmaybeobligatedorexpendedtofinancedirectlyorindirectlycombatactivitiesbyUnitedStatesmilitary forces inoroveror fromoff theshoresofNorthVietnam,SouthVietnam,LaosorCambodia.).

51.SeeDelahunty&Yoo,MakingWar,supranote1,at12729;Delahunty&Yoo,ThePresidentsConstitutionalAuthoritytoConductMilitaryOperationsAgainstTerror

istOrganizations

and

the

Nations

that

Harbor

or

Support

Them,

supra

note

1,

at

49193;

Yoo,TheContinuationofPoliticsbyOtherMeans:TheOriginalUnderstandingofWarPowers,supranote1,at174,17682.


19/25

No.1] TheWarPower 131propriationspowersoasto leverage it intoimpairmentofthePresidentsCommanderinChiefClausepowersbutwithouthaving repealed a declaration or authorization of war. This

maybe

unfair,

but

it

too

would

seem

to

be

apart

of

the

separa

tionofpowers game. Thebranchesmay attempt to leveragethepowers theyhave inorder topress their respectivepositionswith respect to theConstitutions (sometimesdebatable)allocations of the war power. And the branches may, andshould,resistsuchleveragingbytheotherswiththepowersattheir disposal. Put concretely, Congress may push but thePresidentshouldpushback.52With respect to thepower to terminatewar, it is interesting

thatneitherpartymayforcetheothertoengageinwar(atleastnotconstitutionally).Thismeansthat,iftheconstitutionalplanishonored,eachbranchpossessesaunilateralpowertostopwar.53

Inthat

font

of

legal

insight,

the

movie

Ghostbusters,allhellbreaks lose if the Gatekeeper and the Keymaster act in

52.JamesMadisonofcoursesawallthisclearly,asamatterofgeneralprinciple.SeeTHEFEDERALISTNO. 49, at 314 (JamesMadison) (ClintonRossiter ed., 1961)(Theseveraldepartmentsbeingperfectlycoordinateby the termsof theircommoncommission,neitherofthem,itisevident,canpretendtoanexclusiveorsuperior rightof settling theboundariesbetween their respectivepowers[.]);THEFEDERALISTNO.51 (JamesMadison), supra,at32022 (Towhatexpedient, then,shallwefinallyresort,formaintaininginpracticethenecessarypartitionofpoweramongtheseveraldepartmentsaslaiddownintheconstitution?Theonlyanswerthatcanbegivenisthatasalltheseexteriorprovisionsarefoundtobeinadequatethedefectmustbesupplied,bysocontrivingtheinteriorstructureofthegovernment as that its several constituentpartsmay,by theirmutual relations,be themeansofkeepingeachotherintheirproperplaces....Inordertolayaduefoundation

for

that

separate

and

distinct

exercise

of

the

different

powers

of

govern

ment,whichtoacertainextentisadmittedonallhandstobeessentialtothepreservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have awill of itsown[.]...[T]hegreatsecurityagainstagradualconcentrationoftheseveralpowers in the samedepartment consists ingiving to thosewhoadminister eachdepartment the necessary constitutionalmeans and personalmotives to resist encroachmentsof theothers.Theprovision fordefensemust in this,as inallothercases,bemadecommensuratetothedangerofattack.Ambitionmustbemadetocounteractambition.Theinterestofthemanmustbeconnectedwiththeconstitutionalrightsoftheplace.).53.Ofcourse,withrespecttoCongresssexerciseofanyofitslegislativepowers,

thePresidentretains thequalifiedvetosetforthinArticleI,Section7.Congresssexerciseof its legislativepowers is thus internallychecked.Nonetheless, thevetopowerisnotaveryeffectivepowerwithwhichtocompelCongresstodoanything.(Ashield isnotmuchofasword.Butitmightbeusedsomewhatasone.)Tothe

extentcongressional

inaction

is

sufficient

to

accomplish

certain

endsinaction

yieldsnonfundingthevetoisaveryweakcheckonCongressspowersilentlytodeclarepeace.


20/25

132 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33concert,butonlyiftheyactinconcert.Neithercontrolstheactionsoftheother.54So toothewarpowerunder theConstitutionisunleashedonlyifCongressauthorizesandthePresident

executeswar.

One

loads

the

gun

and

the

other

pulls

the

trigger.

Neithercontrolstheother.Andjustaswarcannotconstitutionally occurwithout the concurrence ofboth,war constitutionallymayterminateeitherwhenCongressstops loadingorthePresidentstopsfiring.

III. THERELEVANCEANDIRRELEVANCEOFTHEJUDICIARYWhataboutthethirdbranch?WhenIfirststartedteachinga

specializedcourseintheconstitutionallawofwarpowersinOctoberof2001,immediatelyaftertheeventsof9/11andupuntil2004, Iwouldhavesaid (anddidsay)that, inmattersof

war

and

peace,

the

judiciary

has

been

a

rare,

hesitant,

timid

player.Thecourtshistoricallyhavebeeninclinedtoduckconstitutional issuesofwarpowers,finding lackofstanding,dismissing cases on political question, ripeness, or othernonjusticiability grounds, or deferring substantively (evensometimes cravenly) to the executivebranchs constitutionalinterpretations.(IthinkofcaseslikeDames&Mooreasanillustrationofthelastphenomenon,andevenmoreextraordinarily,KorematsuandHirabayashi.)55Such abstention,deference, andducking arewrong.Under

our system of separation of powers, thejudicialbranch is (asHamilton explained in Federalist No. 78) incomparably the54.GHOSTBUSTERS(Columbia1984).55.Thecasesofcravendeferencetotheexecutivebranch,referredtointhetext,

areDames&Moorev.Regan,453U.S.654(1981);Korematsuv.UnitedStates,323U.S.214(1944);Hirabayashiv.UnitedStates,320U.S.81(1943).Forrecentrepresentative judicial decisions holding warpowers questions nonjusticiable, seeCampbellv.Clinton,203F.3d19,2024 (D.C.Cir.2000) (finding lackofcongressionalstandingtochallengeunilateralpresidentialwarmaking);Kucinichv.Bush,236F. Supp. 2d 1, 311 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding lackof congressional standing tochallengepresidentialconductofwar);Dellumsv.Bush,752F.Supp.1141,114446,114952 (D.D.C.1990) (findingchallenge to threatenedunilateralpresidentialwarmakingunripe(butnototherwiseanonjusticiablepoliticalquestion));Angev.Bush,752F.Supp.509,510(D.D.C.1990)(findingchallengetopresidentialtroopdeployment a nonjusticiable political question). I have previously criticized thecourtsuseofthesocalledpoliticalquestiondoctrinetoavoiddecisionsinmat

tersof

war

powers.

See

Paulsen,

TheConstitutionalPower to Interpret InternationalLaw,supranote2,at181622;MichaelStokesPaulsen,TheConstitutionofNecessity,

79NOTREDAMEL.REV.1257,129396(2004).


21/25


weakestof the three,unablesuccessfully toattackeitherof theothers.Itpossessesneitherforcenorwill,butmerelyjudgment.56Butitmustrenderjudgment.TheConstitutiondoesnotcon

template,and

its

text

does

not

support,

afree

floating

restric

tiononjudicialpowertodecideissuesotherwiseproperlypresented to them simply because they involve constitutionalquestionsofwarandpeace.Neitherthepoliticalsensitivityofan issue nor the importance of an issue disables thejudicialpowerentirely(assomeapplicationsofthepoliticalquestiondoctrinealmost seem tohold)orgeneratesajudicialobligationtodecideacasewronglyindeferencetowhatotheractorshavedonewrongly.Since 2004, the pendulum has swung dramatically, even

radically, in the opposite direction with cases like Hamdi v.Rumsfeld,57Rasulv.Bush,58Hamdanv.Rumsfeld,59andBoumedi

enev.

Bush.60

Each

of

these

decisions

was,

in

my

view,

wrongly

decidedverybadly so, andwith potentially harmful consequencestothenationssecurity.61Butnotewell:Itisnotthefactofjudicialdecision in thisarea,but the substance of theactualjudicial decisions in this area, that constitutes the problem.Courtshave thepower toaddressconstitutional issuesof thisnature. They simply have no rightful power to decide themwrongly.Thatisamisexerciseamisuseoftheconstitutionalpowerofthecourtstorenderindependentjudgment.What,then,doyoudowhenthejudiciarysuddenlybeginsto

intrudeon theConstitutionsallocationofpowers, interferingwiththeproperArticleIIpresidentialpowertowagewar,de

tainprisoners,

and

impose

military

punishments

on

unlawful

enemycombatants?Oneoptionissimplelegislativecorrection.

56.SeeTHEFEDERALISTNO.78(AlexanderHamilton),supranote52,at469.

57.542U.S.507(2004).

58.542U.S.466(2004).59.548U.S.557(2006).

60.128S.Ct.2229(2008).

61.Afulldefenseofthispropositionwouldconstituteanarticleinitself.Ihavemademanyofthosesubstantivepoints inotherwritings,anddiscussedandembracedobjectionsmadebyothers.SeePaulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at183442.Mycentralpointhere,however, is theonetowhichIproceedinthenextparagraph:Assumingtheexistenceofawronglydecided,harmfultonationalsecurityjudicialdecisioncertainlynotanunthink

ableproposition,

given

the

Courts

recent

decisions

in

these

caseswhat

does

the

ideaofseparationofpowershavetosayabouttheexecutivesobligationtofollowsuchdecisions?


22/25


ThissolutionisavailablewhentheCourtrestsitsdecisiononaseparationofpowersgroundthatthePresidentsactionlegallyrequires congressional authorization and such authorization

hasnot

been

given.

Regardless

of

whether

such

ajudicial

deci

sion issoundorunsound, itoftencanberemediedby theexpedient of going toCongress for the authorization theCourtthoughtnecessary.This iswhathappened in theaftermathoftheCourts2006decisioninHamdananegregiousandpotentiallydangerousdecision,butonethatprovedcapableoflegislativecorrectionbecauseitultimatelyrestedonthegroundthatthePresidentsmilitary commissionprocedureswereunconstitutionalonlybecausenotlegislativelyauthorized.PresidentGeorge W. Bush chose to put the issue to Congressandraised the stakesby transferring several highvalue terroristunlawful combatants toGuantanamo.62Congress responded

with

the

Military

Commissions

Act

of

2006

(MCA).63

The

MCA

was, in effect, a sweeping legislative repudiation of Hamdanand abroad reaffirmation of President Bushs position,buttressing presidential power.64 Congress (to use Youngstownspeak)added its legislativepowerstothosethatthePresidentpossessesinthisareabyvirtueofhisexclusiveArticleIIpowers. Presidential actions consistentwith theMCA fallwithinthe safest harbor of Youngstowns Category I of mostindisputablyauthorized presidential actions. The MCA thusgavePresidentBush,andnowPresidentObama,alltheauthorityhecouldpossiblyneedwithrespecttomilitarycommissionsandwarprisonerdetentions.Whenoneadds theMCA to the

already

existing

authorizations

for

use

of

military

force,

it

is

impossiblenot toconclude that thewagingof thewaron terror,withrespecttomattersofcapture,detention,interrogation,andmilitarypunishment,standsonanythingbutthefirmestofconstitutional footings.ThePresident is at theveryheight ofhis constitutionalpowers.One could think of this as YoungstownCategory Ion steroidsa sortofa superduperYoungstownCategoryIsituation.

62.PresidentMoves 14 Held in Secret to Guantanamo,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006,http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/07/us/07detain.html.

63.Pub.L.No.109366,120Stat.2600(codifiedasamendedinscatteredsections

of

10

U.S.C.).

64.Fordiscussionand elaborationof thispoint, seePaulsen,The ConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at183538.


23/25


Justabout theonlyaspectofHamdan that theMCAdidnotrepudiatewas theproposition thatsuch legislativeauthorizationwas constitutionallynecessary in the first place. Is there

notacertain

implicit

weakening

of

presidential

power

by

the

veryactofacquiescingtothesupposedneedtogetCongresssapproval?Not necessarily,but one can certainly understandthe concern that asking Congress for authority implies, orcouldbetakentoimply,alackofindependentauthority.Thereisalso theconcern thatCongressmightrefuse toactormightlegislate in supportof thePresidentsposition in anot fullysupportiveway. This concern no doubt influenced the Bushadministrations decisions not to seek specific legislative authority or support in the first instance. With respect to theMCA, the story had a mostly happy legislative ending. Butwhatifithadnot?

Sometimes,the

Court

will

erroneously

hold

legislative

au

thorizationnecessaryforpresidentialactionandCongresswillnotgrantthatauthorizationtothefullextentthePresidentfeelsnecessary.Andsometimes theCourtkeeps invalidatingpresidentialaction,notwithstandingcongressionalauthorization,orfinds aspectsof theauthorizationunconstitutional.This is anaptdescriptionofwhathappenedinBoumediene.65Whatthen?Isubmit that theschemeofseparationofpowersthe logic

of theFramersdesignand theclear implicationof thewordstheyusedtoexplainanddefendthatdesignmustpermitthePresident,asCommanderinChief,torefusetobeboundbyerroneousdecisionsoftheSupremeCourtthatposeaseriousharmtothe

nation.66

Iexpect

that

President

Bush

would

have

so

refused,

hadhethoughtitnecessary.Thisposition,ofcourse,iscontroversialintodayslegalculture.Butitshouldnotbe.Theideaofexecutive reviewofunlawful SupremeCourtdecisions follows from the same premises thatjustifyjudicial review of

65.128S.Ct.2229,226272(2008)(invalidatingaprovisionoftheMCAascontrarytotheWritSuspensionClauseofArticleI,Section9).66.Ihaveadvancedversionsofthispropositioninotherarticles.SeePaulsen,The

Irrepressible MythofMarbury,supranote3;Paulsen,LincolnandJudicialAuthority,supra note 3;Michael Stokes Paulsen, TheMerryman Power and the Dilemma ofAutonomousExecutiveBranchInterpretation,15CARDOZOL.REV.81(1993);Paulsen,TheMostDangerousBranch:ExecutivePower toSayWhat theLaw Is, supranote 3;

MichaelStokes

Paulsen,

Nixon

Now:

The

Courts

and

the

Presidency

After

Twenty

five

Years, 83MINN.L.REV.1337,134568 (1999); see alsoPaulsen,TheConstitution ofNecessity,supranote55,at126063.


24/25


congressionaldecisions:Noonebranchisboundbytheconstitutionalinterpretationsofanyoftheothers.67Indeed,IsubmitthatitwouldbeaviolationofthePresidentsoathifhewere,in

acase

endangering

the

nations

security,

deliberately

and

con

sciouslytoadheretowhatheconcludesisanerroneousjudicialdetermination that poses a grave threat to national security.PresidentLincolnclearlyunderstoodthisdutyandsawinthePresidentialOathClause aduty todefend the nation and toresisterroneousjudicialdecisionsthreateningtheConstitutionandtheconstitutionalorder.68ThePresidentswearsanoathtopreserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, a personal,nondelegable, nondefeasible moral and legal obligation thatlogically includes thepreservation,protection,anddefenseofthenationwhoseConstitution it isanduponwhoseexistenceeverythingelseintheConstitutiondepends.

Toput

it

as

plainly

as

Ican:

It

would

be

aviolation

of

the

PresidentsoathtoaccedetoajudicialviolationoftheConstitutionthatendangersthenationssecurity.If,inconsequenceofHamdi,Hamdan,Boumediene,oranyothererroneousjudicialdecision, the President of the United States would be required to take action endangering the nations security, heshouldannounce thathewill, to thatextent, refuse tohonorthatjudicialdecision.

CONCLUSION

Thewarpower,likeanyotherpowertooimportanttovestin

a

single

set

of

hands,

is

a

divided,

separated,

shared

power.

In

crudeoverview:Ingeneral,thepowerto initiatewar isCongresss and not thePresidents. Similarly, thepower to executewar,butnottoinitiateit,isthePresidents.Eachbranchpossesses exclusivepowers that the othermaynot properlyinfringeorusurp.Buteachbranchmayleverageitswarpowers, and itsother constitutionalpowers, to check theothersexerciseof theirsor to attemptprecisely suchan improperusurpation. That is how the separation of powers game

67.Paulsen,TheIrrepressibleMythofMarbury,supranote3,at272438.SeegenerallyPaulsen, TheMost Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to SayWhat the Law Is,

supra

note

3.

68.Paulsen,LincolnandJudicialAuthority,supranote3,at12771301;Paulsen,TheConstitutionofNecessity,supranote55,at126467.


25/25


works, as a general proposition, and the interaction ofwarpowersisnoexception.Thecourts,asthethirdbranchinthisgame,havetheimpor

tantand

proper

roleand

dutyof

deciding

genuine

Article

IIIcasesinvolvingwarpowers,inaccordancewiththeConstitutionstrueallocationofwarpowers.Theyhavenosubstantive war powers, but an important, coequal interpretiveprovince.Theyshouldnotshirktheexerciseoftheirtrueconstitutionalpowers,butneithershouldtheyabusethatpower.Where theydo,a furtheraspectof the separationofpowersgame isthattheotherbranchesmay,andshould,resistthoseencroachmentsontheirexclusiveprovincesencroachments inviolationoftheConstitutionbytheexerciseoftheircoequalinterpretivepowers.

The War Power

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