THE UYGHUR COMMUNITY · gives a comprehensive and updated view of the relations between the Uyghur...

THE UYGHUR COMMUNITY

Diaspora, Identity and Geopolitics

EDITED BYGÜLJANAT KURMANGALIYEVA ERCILASUN

AND KONURALP ERCILASUN

POLITICSAND HISTORY IN CENTRAL ASIA

Politics and History in Central Asia

Series editorTimur Dadabaev

University of TsukubaTsukuba, Japan

In the past few decades, Central Asia has drawn the attention of academic and business communities as well as policy professionals because of its geostrategic importance (being located between Russia and China and in close proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and India), its international stability, and its rich energy resources. The region also faces challenges, such as post-conflict peacebuilding, impacts of the Afghan conflict, a number of recent inter-ethnic conflicts, and post-Socialist devel-opment paradigms. Approaching the problems and issues related to this region requires a multi-disciplinary perspective that takes into account political science, international relations, political economy, anthropology, geography, and security studies. The Politics and History in Central Asia series serves as a platform for emerging scholarship on this understudied region.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14540

http://www.springer.com/series/14540

Güljanat Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun Konuralp Ercilasun

Editors

The Uyghur Community

Diaspora, Identity and Geopolitics

Politics and History in Central AsiaISBN 978-1-137-53144-5 ISBN 978-1-137-52297-9 (eBook)https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52297-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017955048

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-tional affiliations.

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EditorsGüljanat Kurmangaliyeva ErcilasunGazi UniversityAnkara, Turkey

Konuralp ErcilasunGazi UniversityAnkara, Turkey

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52297-9

v

In recent years, studies on the Uyghurs of China have become more popu-lar globally. Consequently, the Western world is becoming more familiar with China’s remote western region. This popularization is related to vari-ous factors. One of these factors is the rise of China as a global economic power, which results in increased popular interest from the rest of the world. Another factor is the potential for tensions in the region after the Urumqi clashes of 2009. In fact, the Urumqi incident seemed to be an important turning point in the region’s recent history. The Chinese state tightened its rules after this incident, which in turn created a counter- effect in the region. China has been facing more and more incidents in the region since the “strike-hard” operations that were conducted after the Urumqi incident. The third factor may be defined as the new, stricter regulations of the government, such as restrictions on fasting and the pro-hibition of entrance to mosques for some groups of the native population. These restrictions attracted attention toward the region.

A boom in interest has also occurred in English-language scholarly publications. Although there was already an increasing number of studies on the region and its people since 1990, this trend accelerated tremen-dously after the Urumqi incident.1 In fact, an early edited book by S. Frederick Starr is a crucial academic work that underlined the impor-tance of the topic and popularized it in the Western world. The 2009 incidents further popularized the field. It seems that this interest is going to continue and more publications (both scholarly and fiction) are likely to appear in the future.

Foreword

vi FOREWORD

This book aims to analyze the Uyghur issue with its traditional, histori-cal, geopolitical, and religious roots. The book starts with an introductory chapter that summarizes the region’s geographical features and historical discourse. By concentrating on identity and diaspora studies, the book gives a comprehensive and updated view of the relations between the Uyghur community and Chinese state. Furthermore, the book presents research dealing with Chinese-Uyghur relations and their impacts on geopolitics.

The second chapter which is written by Güljanat Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun focuses on the early stages of Eastern Turkestanese-Chinese rela-tions according to the travelogue of a nineteenth- century scholar-official and analyses the formation and development of identity in the region. Nabijan Tursun contributed a chapter that describes the internal and external factors of Uyghur identity development, especially during the first half of the twentieth century. Colin Mackerras elaborates on the religious angle of the identity of the Uyghurs from the twentieth century through the contemporary period.

The next chapters present diaspora studies. Isık Kusçu Bonnenfant deals with the theoretical foundation of diaspora politics. Suchandana Chatterjee focuses on the formation of the Uyghur community in Kazakhstan; her chapter constitutes an example of local history of the Uyghur issue. Another chapter on this topic was written by Yitzhak Shichor, who makes a profound analysis of the possibility of dialogue between the Uyghur diaspora and the Chinese state.

The final chapters of the book focus on geopolitics. Erkin Emet pres-ents a narrative report of the Urumqi incidents and the official and unof-ficial reactions. Erkin Ekrem’s chapter focuses on the relations between China and Turkey, which have experienced ups and downs during the last few years.

Since the topic is very sensitive, it has reflected on the terms. Therefore, authors’ terminology was maintained, and unity of the terms was not obliged. Thus, different variations of the terms are all indicated in the Index. By focusing on identity, diaspora, and geopolitics, we believe that this volume will contribute greatly to Uyghur and Chinese studies.

vii FOREWORD

Notes

1. There have been a number of publications on Uyghurs and Xinjiang in the beginning of the century through 2009. The most prominent ones include the following: Michael Dillon, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Far Northwest, London, New York: Routledge, 2004; S. Frederick Starr (ed.), Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004; Arienne M. Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse, Washington D.C.: East-West Center Washington, 2005; James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A history of Xinjiang, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007; Colin Mackerras and Michael Clarke (eds.), China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: History, Transition and Crossborder Interaction into the 21st Century, London: Routledge, 2009. The boom can be traced after 2009 by the publications such as Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010; Michael Clarke, Xinjiang and China’s Rise in Central Asia—A History, London: Routledge, 2011; Nick Holdstock, The Tree That Bleeds: A Uighur Town on the Edge, Edinburgh: Luath Press Ltd., 2011; Rian Thum, The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014; Michael Dillon, Xinjiang and the Expansion of Chinese Communist Power: Kashgar in the Early Twentieth Century, London: Routledge, 2014; Yu-Wen Chen, The Uyghur Lobby: Global Networks, Coalitions and Strategies of World Uyghur Congress, New York: Routledge, 2014; Shaoying Zhang and Derek McGhee, Social Policies and Ethnic Conflict in China: Lessons from Xinjiang, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; Nick Holdstock, China’s Forgotten People: Xinjiang, Terror and the Chinese State, London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015; Joanne Smith Finley and Xiaowei Zhang (eds.), Language, Education and Uyghur Identity in Urban Xinjiang, New York: Routledge, 2015; Rongxing Guo, China’s Spatial (Dis)integration: Political Economy of the Interethnic Unrest in Xinjiang, Boston: Elsevier, 2015; Ondrej Klime, Struggle By the Pen: The Uyghur Discourse of Nation and National Interest c. 1900-1949, Leiden: Brill, 2015. It seems that this interest will continue to increase in the future.

ix

Introduction: The Land, the People, and the Politics in a Historical Context 1Konuralp Ercilasun

A View from the Nineteenth Century: Eastern Turkistanese-Chinese Cultural Relations in Chokan Valikhanov’s Works 17Güljanat Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun

Factors and Challenges of Uyghur Nationalism in the Early Twentieth Century 27Nabijan Tursun

Religion and the Uyghurs: A Contemporary Overview 59Colin Mackerras

Constructing the Uyghur Diaspora: Identity Politics and the Transnational Uyghur Community 85Isık Kusçu Bonnenfant

Bordered Conscience: Uyghurs of Central Asia 105Suchandana Chatterjee

CoNteNts

x CONTENTS

Dialogue of the Deaf: The Role of Uyghur Diaspora Organizations Versus Beijing 121Yitzhak Shichor

Urumqi Clashes: The Reactions and the Aftermath 137Erkin Emet

The Uyghur Factor in Turkish-Chinese Relations After the Urumqi Events 153Erkin Ekrem

Index 179

xi

Suchandana Chatterjee is Senior Academic Fellow of Indian Council of Historical Research, New Delhi, India. Her research topic is “Revisiting the role of Indians in Central Asia: A Reappraisal of Eurasia’s Regional Dynamics.” She is also Honorary Associate, China Centre, University of Calcutta. Her research inter-ests include connected spaces, shared histories, and shifting identities of Eurasia. During 1993–2015, as Research Associate and Fellow of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata, India, she worked on projects sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, Government of India related to Central Asia, Eurasia, and Buddhism in Asia. Her latest publication is Images of Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: A Cosmopolitan Space with Borderland Anxieties (Delhi: KWP, 2017). She was awarded a doctorate degree in 2002 by the Department of Arts (History), University of Calcutta for her thesis Emirate of Bukhara, 1868–1924: Encounters with Transition. She is based in Kolkata.

Erkin Ekrem is Associate Professor in the Department of History, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey. He was born in the Chinese city of Lanzhou and stud-ied there until the end of high school. Between 1981 and 1986, he got his BA from Xinjiang Chinese Medical Faculty (today’s Xinjiang Medical University) and worked as an orthopedist in Xinjiang City Hospital between 1986 and 1991. He received his MA and PhD from the History Department of Hacettepe University. He has written many articles on the ancient history of Turks and published many analyses on China and Chinese-Turkish relationships.

Erkin Emet is Associate Professor at the Department of Modern Turkic Studies at Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey. He holds a BA in Uyghur Language and Literature from Beijing University, China. He earned his PhD from Ankara University with a dissertation titled East Turkistan Uyghur Dialects (Kashgar, Lopnor, Kumul and Hoten Dialects). He has published many articles and books on

Notes oN CoNtributors

xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Uyghur culture, language, and literature. He has also many publications on the current situation of Uyghurs and the policies of the People’s Republic of China.

Konuralp Ercilasun is a Professor in the History Department at Gazi University, in Ankara, Turkey. He holds a BA in History from Ankara University and an MA from the National Cheng-chi University, Taipei. He earned his PhD from Ankara University. Ercilasun has worked and lectured in Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and the Republic of Korea. He published several articles on the steppe regions, Xiongnu, Chinese historical documents, and the modern era of Mongols. Ercilasun co-authored the Turkish annotated edition of the Xiongnu chapter in Han Shu. He also wrote a book on Kashgar from the ancient times through the nineteenth century.

Güljanat Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun is an Associate Professor at the Department of Modern Turkic Studies at Gazi University, Ankara. She holds a BA in History and an MS in Political Science from the Middle East Technical University, Turkey. She earned her PhD in History from the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University, Kyrgyzstan. Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun’s publications are mainly on various aspects of the political and social history of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyzs, especially the Soviet period, intelligentsia, collectivization, religion, women, and family institutions. Her current research focuses on the Kazakh and Kyrgyz societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as oral history and memory studies.

Is ık Kus çu Bonnenfant is an Associate Professor at the International Relations Department of Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. She received her PhD in December 2008 from the Department of Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana University. She was a visiting scholar at the Davis Center, Harvard University for the 2016–2017 academic year. She received the British Academy Newton International Fellowship for 2016–2018. Her research interests cover the former Soviet region (FSU), migration, diaspora politics, ethnic migration, and peace and conflict studies. She has published in journals such as International Migration, Central Asian Survey, and Nationalities Papers.

Colin Mackerras is Professor Emeritus at Griffith University, Australia, and a Fellow of the Academy of Humanities of Australia. A Sinologist, he has visited and worked in China numerous times, and researched many aspects of China’s past and present. He has published widely, including on the Uyghurs and China’s other ethnic minorities. His many authored books include China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). In addition, he has carried out primary research on Uyghur history in The Uighur Empire According to the T’ang Dynastic Histories, A Study in Sino-Uighur Relations 744–840 (Australian National University Press, 1972).

xiii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Yitzhak Shichor PhD (the London School of Economics), is Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Asian Studies at the University of Haifa, and Michael William Lipson Chair Professor Emeritus at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was Dean of Students at the Hebrew University and Head of Tel-Hai Academic College. His main research interests include China’s arms transactions and defense conversion, Middle East policy, international energy relations, labor export, Sino-Uyghur relations, and Xinjiang. Recently, he published “Crackdown: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in China,” in Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures (Beatrice Heuser et al., Eds. London: Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 95–112).

Nabijan Tursun is a senior editor at the Uyghur Service of Radio Free Asia, Washington DC. He is an expert on Sino-Russian relations and Uyghurs with a PhD from the Oriental Studies Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. He received his BA from Central University for Nationalities, Beijing. Dr. Tursun is one of the co-authors of Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. He is the author of The Uyghur Reader, The Issues of Uyghur Ethnogenesis in the Chinese Historiography (Russian), and The Issues of Uyghur Political History in the Chinese Historiography (Russian). He presented papers in many international conferences relating to Central Eurasia. He has also taught for many years and provided pre-sentations at institutions in the United States, post-Soviet Russia, China, and Turkey.

xv

Fig. 1 Clothes of the Uyghurs of Eastern Turkistan 20Fig. 2 Uyghurs of Eastern Turkistan 21Fig. 3 Hairstyles and hats of Uyghur women of Eastern Turkistan 22

List oF Figures

1© The Author(s) 2018G. Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun, K. Ercilasun (eds.), The Uyghur Community, Politics and History in Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52297-9_1

Introduction: The Land, the People, and the Politics in a Historical Context

Konuralp Ercilasun

The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region—or Eastern Turkistan, as the Uyghurs call it1—is one of the ancient points of civilization. Remnants of this ancient civilization show themselves in archaeological finds and popular mummies from four thousand years ago. The region was home to a great variety of people who mostly belonged to or were influenced by the steppe culture. Lattimore characterized the region as the pivot of Asia2 because it was the main region affecting all of its surroundings during a long course of history. Thus, the geographic location and landscape characteristics of the region are summarized in this introductory chapter. The People’s Republic of China has claimed that China had contact with Xinjiang since ancient times by hinting that the word “contact” means “governing.” Conversely, the Uyghur diaspora and other scholars have argued that Eastern Turkistan was a distant and distinct region from China throughout history. Taking this debate into consideration, the history of the region with a special emphasis on governing powers are also summarized in this chapter.

Eastern Turkistan is one of the most distant lands from the sea. This situation led to the claim that the geographical center of Asia is located near Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. Whether it is the real geographical center

K. Ercilasun (*) History Department, Gazi University, Ankara, Turkey

2

or not, the region certainly played an important role in history, which sup-ports Lattimore’s definition. The reason that Eastern Turkistan played an important role was its geopolitical (or maybe more accurately, geo-eco-nomical) location as a key point on the Silk Road. It was located between the steppe zone and several agricultural regions. Agricultural people in dif-ferent regions had unique styles of production. Steppe people had a surplus of flocks and leather, which they could offer to the agricultural zones. More importantly, steppe people had the ability to mobilize easily, which made them perfect carriers of goods. Eastern Turkistan, as an intersection point, benefitted very much from this location, but sometimes it suffered too.

An examination of the geographic condition of the region shows arduous ranges, wide steppelands, springs of rivers, and oases scattered among vast deserts. The Altai Mountains, Karakorum Mountains, and Kunlun Mountains form the geographic borders of the region to the north and south. Another mountain range, the Tian Shan (Tengri Taghliri), lies between these two ranges, but closer to the northern part. Beginning from the eastern parts of Xinjiang, the Tian Shan reaches high elevations in the south of Urumqi and continues in a western direction until entering Kyrgyzstan.

The land that lies to the north of Tian Shan is called Zungharia and is mostly dominated by steppeland. This region, which is suitable for animal husbandry, hosts plenty of important rivers and lakes. The Irtish and Ili rivers originate from the mountains of Zungharia. Lakes Sairam, Ebinuur, Manas, Urungu and Barköl—all nourished by regional rivers—are scat-tered around Zungharia.

The eastern part of Xinjiang contains the Turpan basin, one of the low-est points on the earth. This location has been known for its fruit-growing ability since ancient times, especially for grapes and melons. It is also famous for its earliest annual maturation of fruits. Turpan and Kumul (Hami) in the east are areas where the Chinese first imported some fruits, such as melons and watermelons.

The greater part of Xinjiang—the Tarim Basin—lies to the south of the Tian Shan Mountains. The Tarim Basin has had different names throughout history, including Kashgaria, Altishahr, and Yitishahr. The Chinese court also named this area Nanjiang (Southern Frontier) in modern times, an expression that points to its location in reference to the Tian Shan Mountains.

The Tarim Basin is the land of the Tarim River and Taklamakan Desert. The Karakorum Mountains and Kunlun Mountains mark the southern end of this region, separating it from the Tibetan Plateau. The Tarim River flows through the desert. In the past, it reached Lake Lobnor from time

K. ERCILASUN

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to time. However, nowadays, most of its water evaporates because of the hot temperatures. Lake Lobnor, which was once fed by the Tarim River, is largely dried up now because the river ends deep in the desert. The Tarim River has plenty of tributaries that are important both geographically and socially. Both its tributaries and the Tarim River itself were oases around which ancient people could develop agriculture and gather. Most of these tributaries bear the same name as the ancient cities that appeared just beside them. Thus, when you look at a map, you will notice that Aksu, Kashgar, Yarkent, Hotan, Keriya, and Cherchen are both toponyms and hydronyms.

Oasis farming developed in the early settlements of the Tarim Basin in ancient times. When these settlements became more populated, some individuals abandoned agriculture and began their involvement in inter-city trade by forming caravans. These caravans were the core of the Silk Road trade that would develop later. Caravans also transformed local set-tlements into the well-known trade cities of ancient and medieval times.

Zungharia was the location of mostly nomadic pastoralists, whereas the Tarim Basin was mainly the homeland of oasis agriculturalists and traders. However, nomadic pastoralists in the north dominated the south most of the time. When there was strong organization in the steppe, it controlled the Tarim Basin either directly or indirectly. However, when there was turmoil in the steppe zone, nomadic tribes fled from the steppe and filled the oasis cities of Tarim Basin. Thus, the region was strongly influenced by the nomadic culture.

From archaeological finds, it is known that humans were living in the region during the Paleolithic era.3 Settlements existed before 2000 BC—a fact that has been ratified by the discovery of ancient sites during the twen-tieth century. Mummies found at these sites have been a point of interest in the West during the last two decades. The most famous mummies are the Kroran (Loulan) Beauty and the Cherchen Man, who were dated to 2000 BC and 1000 BC, respectively.4 The popularization of and research into these mummies led to another debate between the Uyghur diaspora and China. Along with the research regarding these mummies, Uyghurs claimed that the mummies provided inarguable evidence that their ances-tors were the first inhabitants of Eastern Turkistan. This claim and the research findings of Western scholars disturbed the Chinese authorities. A minor crisis ensued when the mummies were sent to the United States for an exhibition in 2011.5

INTRODUCTION: THE LAND, THE PEOPLE, AND THE POLITICS...

4

Written texts were not found in the steppe zone in general or in Eastern Turkistan specifically until later times. Moreover, the record-loving cen-ters of central China, Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and Iran are too far away to provide any information about the region. More reliable and continuous accounts of the region coincide with the rise of the Xiongnu in the steppe in the third century BCE. Accounts dedicated to the Xiongnu and the region can be found in early Chinese dynastic records. Modun, the famous Chanyu of Xiongnu, wrote a letter to the Chinese emperor in 176 BCE and stated that he had subjugated Loulan, Wusun, Hujie, and twenty-six states.6 This was the first account of the region in terms of subjugation in Chinese texts.

The first written account of a Chinese encounter with Eastern Turkistan came half a century later from the letter of Modun. The Chinese emperor of the Han dynasty, seeking an alliance against Xiongnu, sent an envoy to the region in 138 BCE. Zhang Qian, the Chinese envoy, returned to China only in 126 BCE after a hazardous journey. He had twice been captured by Xiongnu. Moreover, the Yuezhi, who had been pushed by the Xiongnu, turned down the offer of an alliance with Han China. However, Zhang Qian brought valuable information on the region, which had been called the Western Regions by China. In his report, Zhang Qian gave information about the countries in the region, including their location, history, and military power.7 This report was a new discovery for the Han Chinese court. From this report, the Chinese court understood that the states in the Western Regions were fundamental for the economic power of Xiongnu. Considering the information brought by Zhang Qian, China developed a new policy that depended on separating the region from the Xiongnu to undermine its economic base. Thus, the ancient version of a Great Game began between Han China and Xiongnu.8

Han China attacked and defeated Fergana in 101 BCE. After this mili-tary campaign, most states in Eastern Turkistan sent their envoys to the Chinese army and offered tributes. However, this was a dual subjugation for the city-states of Eastern Turkistan because they also continued to give tributes to Xiongnu. In addition, they were still giving more importance to Xiongnu envoys than the Han Chinese delegations.9 A Xiongnu garri-son in the region was charge of collecting taxes from the city-states and controlling them at the beginning of the first century BC.10

The Xiongnu control of the region collapsed in the second half of the century. After the split, one portion of Xiongnu came under the control of Han China and the other portion migrated to the environs of Issyk Köl.

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Han China defeated the western part and dominated the Western Regions. During its rule in Eastern Turkistan, Han China founded a new bureau named the Military Governorate of Western Regions. The Governorate was modeled on the previous Xiongnu local garrison. It was in charge of collecting tributaries and acted as a mediator between the city-states when there was a dispute.11

The same pattern was repeated a century later. Xiongnu overthrew the Han hegemony at the beginning of the first century and then controlled Eastern Turkistan once more. There was a local rival for Xiongnu from one of the cities of Western Regions. The Yarkent king declared himself as “Chanyu” in 41 AD and competed with the Xiongnu for the supremacy of the Western Regions.12

However, the Xiongnu power split a second time and southern Xiongnu came under the rule of Han China in the middle of the century. The con-trol of Eastern Turkistan frequently changed between Northern Xiongnu and Han China in the second half of the century. Finally, Han China established its power in the Western Regions during the second century.13 However, the Han Chinese control of the region was not continuous. In fact, the southern part of the region seems to have been under the rule of the Kushan Empire.14 Moreover, there were plenty of challenges from the region itself against this rule. For example, Han China sent a troop of more than 30,000 soldiers against Kashgar, a city-state that had been expanded and dominated some other cities, in 170 AD. However, the Chinese army could not take hold of a small city under the rule of the Kashgar king, even in a siege of forty days.15

The fall of the Han dynasty in 220 AD ended Chinese rule over the Western Regions. The city-states of the region either established their inde-pendent rules or came under the rule of other empires, such as the Kushans and Hepthalites, during this period. The cities in the Western Regions then began to give tributes to the Wei dynasty,16 a sinified rule from the steppe, between 435 and 440.17

A dramatic change in the steppes during the middle of the sixth century affected the region deeply. Bumin, a leader of Ancient Turks, marched against and defeated his superior Rouran Kaghanate in 552. This was the beginning of a new rule in the steppe, which resulted in the domination of Eastern Turkistan again by a steppe power. The cities were either sending tributes or giving taxes to the Ancient Turks.18 This situation continued for almost a century, until China became powerful under the Tang dynasty and expanded its rule to Western Regions by 648.19 This time there was another


6

rival: Tibet, the southern neighbor of the region, became powerful and occasionally enforced its dominance, especially in the southern part of the Western Regions.20 A third rival emerged at the end of the seventh century in the Issyk Köl area. This rival was named the Turgesh Kaghanate, which was established in 690. The Turgesh Kaghanate also sometimes disturbed the rule of Tang China in the Western Regions. Meanwhile, the kaghanate of Ancient Turks was re-established and subjugated the Turgesh. Thus, the Western Regions came under the rule of the Ancient Turks once again. In the first half of the eighth century, the Turgesh kaghanate enjoyed more independent activities in the region.21

The Islamic Arabs, a new power from the west, had appeared by the decline of the Turgesh Kaghanate towards the middle of the eighth cen-tury. At the same time, the ruler of the steppes had also changed and the Uyghur Kaghanate dominated the land that is now known as Mongolia. However, the rivalry was between the Arabs and China at that time; these two rivals waged war in the Talas region in 751. This war had great implications for Tang China, which was the defeated party. Many warlords emerged and strived for power, endangering the sovereignty of the Tang dynasty. Interestingly, the Arabs, the winning party, also removed their forces from the region because of the power struggle in their center.22 This power vacuum resulted in the expansion of Uyghur Kaghanate’s domina-tion of the region in the 750s.23

Uyghur’s dominance was sometimes disturbed not only by Tibet, but also by the Karluks. The Karluks were internal rivals of the Kaghanate clan and migrated into the region after being defeated in the power struggle for the steppe supremacy. Nevertheless, the Uyghur supremacy continued until the fall of the Kaghanate in 840.24

The year 840 was an important turning point for the region. In this year, many clans poured into the region because of a decline in the steppe’s power.25 The region became very populated during this time, which may have caused the emergence of the native powers of the region. One of them was the Karakhanids, who were established in the ninth century and ruled the southern parts of the region at the beginning of their sovereignty. The other power was the Turpan Uyghur Kingdom, which was the northeast-ern neighbor of the Karakhanids.

The period between the fall of the Uyghur Kaghanate and the rise of Chinggis Khan was the era of booming cities in the region. The cities of the Tarim and Turpan basins flourished culturally and became important cen-ters. Cities of the Tarim basin became representatives of Islamic culture after

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the tenth century, whereas Turpan-Beshbalyk became the representative of Buddhist culture. The two sovereignties, which both depended upon steppe heritage, struggled with each other mostly due to religious reasons. Although they did not manage to destroy each other, the Karakhanids expanded their power westward and captured Transoxiana.26 Meanwhile, the kingdom of Turpan Uyghur nominally accepted the supremacy of Tang China.27 In the succeeding centuries, the Turpan kingdom could not match the military or territorial power of the Karakhanids. However, both coun-tries were affected by global developments, such as the rise of the Saljuks,28 the migration of the Kitans,29 and the flight of the Kuchluk.30 All three pow-ers enjoyed supremacy over one or another of these native states.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Turpan Uyghur leader Barchuk Art Tigin acted wisely by voluntarily submitting to Chinggis Khan.31 Meanwhile, the Eastern Karakhanids who possessed Kashgar diminished—not only due to the clashes between Kara Khitay and Kuchluk, but also because of internal revolts.32 The rise of Chinggis Khan gave the Uyghurs new opportunities in this new global empire. Because of his voluntary submission and active participation in the military cam-paigns, Barchuk Art Tigin was accepted as the fifth son of Chinggis Khan and was given important posts.33 The Uyghur leaders enjoyed relative autonomy in their land and some of them served in several posts, ranging from China to Anatolia.

Beginning in the second half of the thirteenth century, Eastern Turkistan became a place of shelter for the rivals of the Great Khanate of Chinggisids, as well as for the rivals of the Kubilay and Chagatay Khanates. One of these rivalries was that between Kaidu and Kubilay. Kaidu pro-claimed himself as the Great Khan and controlled the Ili and Tarim regions in 1267. Another rivalry occurred for the post of the Chagatay Khanate between Tarmashirin and Jangshi during 1333–1334. As a result, Jangshi controlled the Ili Valley and some of the local tribes gained power.34 The Dughlats, who were one of the local tribes, controlled the region after Jangshi’s death.35

The second half of the fourteenth century witnessed the appearance of Temür in Mawarannahr (Transoxiana). After consolidating his power in the Chagatay Khanate in 1370, Temür expanded his territory in every direction. He dominated the Tarim region in 1390.36 However, Dughlat leaders were still active in other parts of Eastern Turkistan. Thus, they took back the Tarim region after Temür’s death.37 Some research refers to this Dughlat power as the Eastern Chagatay Khanate.38


8

Meanwhile, the Oirats, another Mongol tribe, were gaining power in the north.39 They would enter the picture in the fifteenth century and would expand their land under the leadership of Esen Taishi during the middle of the century. Esen Taishi was strong enough to capture the Chinese emperor and besiege Beijing in 1449 in the east.40 After just a few years, Uz Temür, one of his successors, would crush Abulkhair Khan, a powerful Shibanid leader of Turkistan during 1455–1457 in the west.41

One of the princes from the Chagatay lineage entered the Tarim Basin due to the fall of Timurid Empire at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Chagataid prince Sultan Said Khan occupied the Tarim Basin and established his khanate, which is known as Yarkent Khanate, in 1514. Dughlats were still enjoying some power at the beginning of this new khan-ate. However, the successors of Sultan Said Khan broke down their power.42 During the sixteenth century, Yarkent Khanate consolidated its rule in the region. The armies of the khanate raided Gansu in the east and Tibet in the South.43 However, the power politics of the khanate were complicated. The Khojas, who were assumed to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, had considerable social respect and support. Moreover, this Khoja power was divided into at least two sects.44 To make things more complicated, there was a rivalry between members of the khanate family. Thus, during the seventeenth century, there were four parties struggling for power and mak-ing cross-alliances against each other.

On the other hand, the Oirats, who were the masters of north of Tian Shan, were succeeded by the Zunghars during the seventeenth century. Both the former Oirats and their successors the Zunghars had been candi-dates for the Mongol leadership since the fifteenth century. However, they had failed to achieve their goal for Mongol supremacy. Consequently, they turned their attention towards western and southern territories to become the sole rulers of the steppe. Taking advantage of the civil strife in the Yarkent Khanate, the Zunghars entered the Tarim basin and helped one of the parties to come to power. As a result, the Khojas secured their position as vassals of the Zunghars in 1678.45

Although there were uprisings, the vassal status of the Tarim basin con-tinued until the second half of the eighteenth century. A new authority had been rising in the east since the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Manchus occupied Beijing and established a new dynasty (the Qing dynasty) in China in 1644. They also subjugated Southern and Eastern Mongols during the seventeenth century. As a result, the Zunghars and Manchus engaged in a furious struggle during the eighteenth century.

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The Manchus were the victorious side of this strife: they took complete control of the Zunghar basin in 1757 and the Tarim Basin in 1759.46 Another important outcome of this struggle was the elimination of the Zunghar population as a result of bloody warfare.

The Manchus studied the structure of the region carefully before they established their administration, an organization of three different admin-istrative systems in Eastern Turkistan. In the Zunghar basin, they expanded their banner system of Mongolia. In the northern cities of Urumqi, Turpan, and Hami, they established the province system, which was useful for gov-erning the sedentary population. In the Tarim basin, the Manchus inte-grated the previous administrative structure with their imperial Qing rule by excluding the Khojas from the region.47 As a result, the Khojas found shelters in the western states such as Bukhara, Khokand, and Afghanistan.

Although there were a plenty of Qing garrisons in the region, the new Qing rule was very careful to separate this outside military power from the local population, especially in the Tarim basin. The military regime was not so recognizable for a common city dweller of the Tarim basin.48 Thus, only one large uprising was seen during the first fifty years of Qing control.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Khokand Khanate, which was a neighbor of the Tarim basin, had been gaining influence in the region. Many Khojas had fled to the land of this khanate after the Qing occupation. The Khans of Khokand supported these Khojas to establish their power in the Tarim basin. Consequently, a chain of uprisings began in the region. The first uprising was in 1815 and another one erupted in 1824. Unable to suppress the continuous rebellions, the Manchus were obliged to give some privileges to Khokand in the Tarim basin in 1833.49 However, this concession did not put an end to the problems of the Manchu rule. The region continued to disobey the Manchu court and finally broke away totally in the 1860s. At that time, Yakup Bek, originally a commander of the Khokand Khanate, had founded his own khanate in Eastern Turkistan and established diplomatic relations with Russia and Britain. By enjoying independency, his rule continued until his death in May 1877.50 Then the Qing court, which was already sinicisized, main-tained the help of Russia and defeated the remnants of the Khanate in one year.51 The new Qing rule was totally different than the previous one. The two-century-long rule in China resulted in a gradual sinicization of the Manchus; this process was completed in the second half of the nineteenth century. The court now had more of the characteristics of a Chinese reign than before. Thus, the Qing court gave up the old style of indirect


10

governing of the region and consolidated its power by establishing a prov-ince, which would be governed in the same way as the Chinese provinces of the empire. When comparing the two periods of the Qing court in Eastern Turkistan, the first era can be called “Manchu rule” and the sec-ond era “Chinese rule,” although they were the same dynasty. The other change was in the official name of the region. The Eastern Turkistan or Western Regions of ancient and medieval times became Xinjiang in 1884.52

China fell into turmoil in the first half of the twentieth century. Xinjiang was under the strict rule of Chinese warlords during this period.53 A Kashgar-based uprising began in 1933 which resulted in the declaration of Eastern Turkistan Republic.54 Although this movement affected a vast ter-ritory, it did not last long. The Soviet Union on the one side and the Chinese warlords and Dungan warlords on the other posed a great threat to the Republic. Under the pressure of these threats, the government was dissolved at the beginning of 1934.55 The declaration of a “republic” can be regarded as a new phase in the development of the society and can be understood by the developments in a greater area. The forms of the Central Asian states were khanates or emirates until the beginning of the twentieth century. However, Central Asian people declared many short- lived repub-lics after the fall of the Russian Tsarist Empire. This was one of the out-comes of a modernization movement, Jadidism, which had been in progress among Russian Muslims since the nineteenth century. This move-ment also had some repercussions in Xinjiang, such as the establishment of Jadid schools in Kashgar. Another development that should be mentioned was the overthrow the monarchy in China in 1912, although the effect of Jadidism was more fundamental. Thus, the twentieth century movements in Eastern Turkistan came out as republican trends.56 There was a Japanese attempt at positioning a Sultan of Eastern Turkistan from Ottoman descent. However, this attempt was not successful, not only because of the Japanese withdrawal but also because of local resistance.57

After the fall of the Republic of Eastern Turkistan, the region came under Soviet influence. The governor of Xinjiang kept a foot in both Russia and China for almost a decade. His tricky politics resulted in many revolts and in the declaration of a second “Eastern Turkistan Republic” in the northern part of Xinjiang in 1944. This republic lasted five years, although it had many internal conflicts. While the Republic was still alive, a joint government formed in Urumqi in 1946, consisting of Uyghur, Kazak, Chinese, and Dungan members. Some members of the joint government were the repre-sentatives of the Eastern Turkistan Republic. However, Soviet Russia has

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been still influencing the region and the Eastern Turkistan Republican Government. Soviet Russia compromised with China because of the estab-lishment of the Communist Chinese government in 1949. The leaders of the Eastern Turkistan Republic boarded a plane for Beijing under the influence of Soviet Russia, after which it was announced that the plane had crashed and the passengers were dead. In fact, they were imprisoned in Beijing. Thus, the Chinese army leader in Xinjiang declared subordination to the Peoples’ Republic of China. However, local resistance continued until 1951.58

The new Chinese government established the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in 1955, although its position was not so secure in the region. There were plenty of uprisings against the new Chinese admin-istration, including three large uprisings during the 1950s and three more during the 1960s.59 Tensions continued in the second half of the 1980s. The most well-known clashes were the 1990 Barın and the 1997 Ili (Gulja) clashes. Finally, the tensions peaked after the 2009 Urumqi clashes.

The controlling powers of Eastern Turkistan from ancient times can be summarized as follows. With regard to the Chinese government, some pure Chinese dynasties of Han and Tang governed the region. There were also many sinified steppe rulers of China, such as Liao, and Qing, who also governed the region. The sinicization of the last empire was absolute. Therefore, when the Qing Empire governed the region in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was a sole Chinese rule. The Republic of China nominally ruled the region because the main power was in the hands of the Chinese governors of the region, who can also be counted as war-lords. The last governing power was the People’s Republic of China.

When other governing powers are considered, different types of rules are apparent. One type of domination can be regarded as local domina-tion, in which the capital of the state is in the region. The self-governing city-states of the earliest times fall into this category. In some cases, a city- state became more powerful than the others and governed the neighbor-ing cities, such as the Yarkent Kingdom of the first century and the Kashgar Kingdom of the second century. Other powers that fall into this category include the Karakhanids, the Turpan Uyghur Kingdom, the Yarkent Khanate, the Zunghars, the Yakup Bek Khanate, and the Republics of Eastern Turkistan. In fact, most of the rulers on this second list originated from the steppe because the region had been integrated into steppe poli-tics for many centuries. The steppe powers also governed the region as the periphery of their realm. These powers include the rule of the Xiongnu, Xianbei, Rouran, Ancient Turks, Orkhon Uyghur, Kara Khitay, Chinggisid,


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Chagataid, and Timurid Khanates. The capital was either in the Orkhon valley in Mongolia or at Mawarannahr. Kushans and Hephtalites, who were both of steppe origin but had their core center in Afghanistan and India, also principally ruled the southern part of the region.

Notes

1. The naming of the region is an important debate between Uygur, Chinese, and sometimes Western scholars. China stresses the official name of the region, whereas Uygur scholars indicate that Eastern Turkistan is the origi-nal name. They further point out that Xinjiang is an artificial name and this term has a short history. Sometimes, Western scholars also get involved in this dispute. The ancient Chinese name for the region is Western Regions. In this introductory chapter, I generally (although not strictly) use the terms Eastern Turkistan and Western Regions when describing the histori-cal discourse and the term Xinjiang when describing recent events.

2. Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950.

3. A. P. Derevyanko and Lü-Zun E, “Upper Palaeolithic cultures”, History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Vol. 1, edited by A. H. Dani & V. M. Masson, Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1992, p. 107.

4. Elizabeth Wayland Barber, The Mummies of Ürümchi, New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999, plates 1 and 9. For a good and detailed discussion of popularization of the mummies and of some misunderstand-ings please refer to James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 15–17.

5. Another Stop on a Long, Improbable Journey (NYT—Feb 20, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/arts/design/21silk.html?_r=0); After Mummy Mix-Up, Philly Unwraps Museum Exhibit (Foxnews—Feb 21, 2011 http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/02/21/mummy-mix-philly-unwraps-museum-exhibit.html).

6. Shiji p. 2896; Han Shu p. 3757.7. Shiji pp. 3157–3180.8. Konuralp Ercilasun, “Silk Road as a Sub-Global Region: A Sphere Emerging

from the Interaction of Cultural and Economic Fields”, in International Seminar on Reviving the Silk Route: New Initiatives and Engagements for the 21st Century, The Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), International Center, Goa, India, 9–10 February 2007. https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiKnYr35q3JAhXBCywKHWc9Cf8QFggfMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.centralasia-southcaucasus.com%2Fdocs%2FSilk%2520Route%2FPa

K. ERCILASUN

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/arts/design/21silk.html?_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/arts/design/21silk.html?_r=0

http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/02/21/mummy-mix-philly-unwraps-museum-exhibit.html

http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/02/21/mummy-mix-philly-unwraps-museum-exhibit.html

https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiKnYr35q3JAhXBCywKHWc9Cf8QFggfMAE&url=http://www.centralasia-southcaucasus.com/docs/Silk%20Route/Paper_Konulrap_Ercilasun.doc&usg=AFQjCNHrabBklqNHPZMdxyjpyOLk7pQ6_w




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per_Konulrap_Ercilasun.doc&usg=AFQjCNHrabBklqNHPZMdxyjpyOLk7pQ6_w

9. Yü Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations, Berkeley and LA: University of California Press, 1967, pp. 139–140.

10. Han Shu p. 3872.11. Yü Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure

of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations, p. 142.12. William Montgomery McGovern. The Early Empires of Central Asia, Chapel

Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1939, pp. 226–230. Bahaeddin Ögel, Büyük Hun Imparatorlugu Tarihi II (History of the Great Xiongnu Empire II), Ankara: Ministry of Culture Publications, 1981, pp. 245–247, 260–262.

13. Konuralp Ercilasun, Tarihin Derinliklerinden 19. Yüzyıla Kâs gar (Kashgar till the 19th Century), Ankara: TTK Publications, p. 19.

14. L. Ligeti, Bilinmeyen Iç Asya (Unknown Inner Asia), tr. Sadrettin Karatay, Ankara: TDK Publications, 1986, p. 240.

15. Hou Han Shu pp. 2926–2927.16. Unlike the Han dynasty, the Wei dynasty was not founded by ethnic

Chinese. The rulers were from the origin of Tabgach, which migrated from the steppes. They ruled the steppe area and China up to the shores of Yangtse River for almost two centuries. Because most of their population were Chinese, they were gradually sinified, especially during the second half of the fifth century. I brahim Kafesoğlu, Türk Milli Kültürü (Turkic National Culture), I stanbul: Ötüken Publications, 1997, pp. 90–93.

17. Bei Shi pp. 3205–3206.18. Wei Shu p. 2268, Sui Shu p. 1852.19. Howard J. Wechsler, “T’ai-tsung (reign 626–49) the consolidator”, The

Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, ed. Denis Twittchet, Taipei: Caves Books Limited, 1989, p. 227.

20. Denis Twittchet, Howard J. Wechsler, “Kao-tsung (reign 649–83) and the empress Wu: the inheritor and the usurper”, The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, pp. 285–286.

21. Hüseyin Salman, Türgis ler (The Turgesh), Ankara: Ministry of Culture Publications, 1998, pp. 17–24, 42–46.

22. Konuralp Ercilasun, Tarihin Derinliklerinden 19. Yüzyıla Kâs gar (Kashgar till the 19th Century), p. 24.

23. Hüseyin Salman, Türgis ler (The Turgesh), pp. 81–82.24. S. G. Klyashtornıy—T. I. Sultanov, Kazakistan Türkün Üç Bin Yılı

(Kazakhstan: A History of Three Thousand Years), tr. D. Ahsen Batur, Istanbul: Selenge Publications, 2003, pp. 117–118.




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25. For Uyghur migrations Özkan I zgi, Çin Elçisi Wang Yen-te’nin Uygur Seyahatnamesi (The Travel of Wang Yen-te: A Chinese Envoy to Uyghurs), Ankara: TTK Publications, 1989, pp. 25–26.

26. Peter B. Golden, “The Karakhanids and Early Islam”, The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, edited by Denis Sinor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 360. Reşat Genç, Karahanlı Devlet Teskilatı (The State Structure of Karakhanids), Ankara: Ministry of Culture Publications, 1981, pp. 44–45. Reşat Genç, “Karahanlılar” (The Karakhanids), Türkler (Turks), vol. 4, Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, pp. 449–450.

27. I brahim Kafesoğlu, Türk Milli Kültürü (Turkic National Culture), pp. 90–93.

28. Peter B. Golden, “The Karakhanids and Early Islam”, p. 367.29. Herbert Franke, “The Forest Peoples of Manchuria: Kitans and Jurchens”,

The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, edited by Denis Sinor, p. 410.30. V. V. Barthold, Mogol I stilasına Kadar Türkistan (Türkistan Down to the

Mongol Invasion), Ankara: TTK Publications, 1990, p. 390.31. Özkan I zgi, Çin Elçisi Wang Yen-te’nin Uygur Seyahatnamesi (The Travel

of Wang Yen-te: A Chinese Envoy to Uyghurs), p. 30.32. V. V. Barthold, Moğol I stilasına Kadar Türkistan (Türkistan Down to the

Mongol Invasion), p. 390.33. Özkan I zgi, Çin Elçisi Wang Yen-te’nin Uygur Seyahatnamesi (The Travel

of Wang Yen-te: A Chinese Envoy to Uyghurs), p. 30.34. Rene Grousset, Bozkır Imparatorlugu (Empire of the Steppes), tr. M. Reşat

Uzmen, I stanbul: Ötüken Publications, 1980, pp. 319–327. Mustafa Kafalı, Çag atay Hanlığı 1227–1345 (Chagatai Khanate 1227–1345), Ankara: Berikan Publications, 2005, p. 115.

35. Jean-Paul Roux, Orta Asya: Tarih ve Uygarlık (Central Asia: History and Civilization), tr. Lale Arslan, I stanbul: Kabalcı Publications, 2001, pp. 332–333.

36. Rene Grousset, Bozkır I mparatorluğu (Empire of the Steppes), pp. 396–400. Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugünkü Türkili Türkistan ve Yakın Tarihi (Contemporary Turkistan and Its Modern History), I stanbul: Enderun Publications, 1981, pp. 102–105.

37. Rene Grousset, Bozkır Imparatorluğu (Empire of the Steppes), p. 452. W. Barthold, “Duglat”, Islam Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia of Islam—Turkish Version), Vol. 3, Ankara: Ministry of Education Publications, 1963, p. 652.

38. See for ex. Rene Grousset, Bozkır Imparatorlugu (Empire of the Steppes), p. 396 and Jean-Paul Roux, Orta Asya: Tarih ve Uygarlık (Central Asia: History and Civilization), p. 353.

39. Jean-Paul Roux, Moğol Imparatorlugu Tarihi (History of the Mongol Empire), tr. Aykut Kazancıgil and Ayşe Bereket, Istanbul: Kabalcı Publications, 2001, pp. 443–445.

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40. D. Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols during the Ming Dynasty from 1368 to 1631, Arlington, Virginia: University Publications of America, pp. 48–51. Ming Shi, pp. 8500–8501.

41. Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols, Vol. 2, Taipei: Cheng-wen Publishing Company, 1970, pp. 688–689. Konuralp Ercilasun, “Batı Moğollarını I fade eden Terimler Üzerine” (On the Terms related to the Western Mongols), Türk Tarihçiligine Katkılar: Mustafa Kafalı Armag anı (Contributions to the Turkic History - Dedicated to Mustafa Kafalı), edited by Üçler Bulduk & Abdullah Üstün, Ankara: TKAE Publishing, 2013, p. 106.

42. Rene Grousset, Bozkır Imparatorlug u (Empire of the Steppes), p. 460. Muhammed Bilal Çelik, Yarkent Hanlıgı’nın Siyasi Tarihi (Political History of Yarkent Khanate), I stanbul: IQ Publications, 2013, p. 226.

43. Jean-Paul Roux, Orta Asya: Tarih ve Uygarlık (Central Asia: History and Civilization), p. 385. Konuralp Ercilasun, Tarihin Derinliklerinden 19. Yüzyıla Kâsgar (Kashgar till the 19th Century), p. 34.

44. Isenbike Togan, “Islam in a Changing Society: The Khojas of Eastern Turkistan”, Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change, edited by Jo-Ann Gross, Durkham, London: Duke University Press, 1992, pp. 137–138. Isenbike Togan, “Chinese Turkistan Under the Khojas (1678–1759)”, Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. 5, California: Mazda Publishers, 1991, p. 475.

45. Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols, Vol. 2, p. 623.46. Rene Grousset, Bozkır Imparatorlugu (Empire of the Steppes), pp. 493–496.47. Lin An-hsien, Qingchao zai Xinjiangde Han Hui Geli Zhengtse (The

Segregation Policy of the Qing Dynasty in Xinjiang), Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Publishing, 1988, p. 57. L. J. Newby, “The Begs of Xinjiang: Between Two Worlds”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 61 (1998), No. 2, pp. 286–287.

48. Konuralp Ercilasun, Tarihin Derinliklerinden 19. Yüzyıla Kâs gar (Kashgar till the 19th Century), p. 128.

49. Joseph Fletcher. “The heyday of the Ch’ing order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet”, in The Cambridge History of China: Late Ch’ing 1800–1911 (Part 1), vol. 10, ed. John K. Fairbank. Cambridge, London, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 377–378.

50. Demetrius Charles Boulger. The Life of Yakoob Beg, Athalik Ghazi and Badaulet, Ameer of Kashgar. London, 1878, p. 253. There is a detailed study on this period: Ahmet Rıza Bekin, Yakup Bey Devrinde Çin Türkistanında Siyasal ve Kültürel Durum (Social and Cultural History of Chinese Turkistan in the Yakup Bek Era), PhD. Thesis, Ankara University, 1968.

51. Mehmet Emin Buğra. Dogu Türkistan—Tarihî, Cografî ve Simdiki Durumu (Eastern Turkistan: History, Geography and Current Situation). Istanbul. 1952, pp. 27–28.


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52. James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, pp. 137–139. Millward indicated that the “Chinese annexation” concept of Xinjiang was not a Chinese annexation, but rather “a fundamental shift in governing principles of the Qing empire as a whole” (p. 138). Indeed, this fundamental shift was a result of the gradual sinicization of the dynasty and was not lim-ited to the Western Regions only. Thus, Millward continued with the debate in the Chinese court on provincialization, mentioning that for the advocates of provincehood “sinicisation of the local non-Chinese population went hand-in-hand with provincialization” (ibid).

53. For a detailed study of this period, please refer to Andrew D. Forbes, Warlords, and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. For a Chinese study of the period until the end of 1920s, please refer to Li Xincheng, Yang Zengxin zai Xinjiang (Minguo yuan nian—Minguo shiqi nian), Taibei: Guoshiguan, 1993.

54. James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, pp. 201–202. Millward provided a good analysis on the name and the character of the republic.

55. Amaç Karahoca, Doğu Türkistan—Çin Müstemlekesi, I stanbul, 1960, pp. 15–16.

56. For the general republican trend in Asia, please refer to Konuralp Ercilasun, “Türk Uygarlığında Cumhuriyet Evresinin Başlangıcı (1910–1950)” (The Beginning of the Republican Era in the Turkic Civilization), Turkic Civilization Studies I in commemoration of Professor Karybek Moldobaev, edited by I lhan Şahin & Güljanat Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun, I stanbul: I STESOB Publications, 247–255.

57. A. Merthan Dündar, Panislâmizm’den Büyük Asyacılıga: Osmanlı Imparatorlugu, Japonya ve Orta Asya (Ottomans, Japan and Central Asia: From Panislamism to Great Asianism), Istanbul: Ötüken Publications, 2006, pp. 235–250.

58. There are a handful of studies on this second republic and afterwards, includ-ing the following: Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944–1949, London: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1990. Iklil Kurban, Şarki Türkistan Cumhuriyeti (1944–1949) (Eastern Turkistan Republic 1944–1949), Ankara: TTK Publications, 1992. Gülçin Çandarlıoglu, Özgürlük Yolu: Nurgocay Batur’un Anılarıyla Osman Batur (Path to Freedom: Nurgocay Batur’s Memories on Osman Batur), Istanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2006.

59. Konuralp Ercilasun, “Doğu Türkistan—1” (Eastern Turkistan), Türk Yurdu, No. 93 (May 1995), p. 21.

K. ERCILASUN


A View from the Nineteenth Century: Eastern Turkistanese-Chinese Cultural

Relations in Chokan Valikhanov’s Works

Güljanat Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun

Chokan Valikhanov (Shoqan Walikhanov) was born in 1835 at Kusmuryn Fort in the Kazakh steppes. His great-grandfather was Abylai Khan, a famous Kazakh Khan. Chokan’s grandfather was Wali Khan, who is known as the khan of the Kazakh Middle Horde. Chokan’s surname came from his grandfather. Chokan’s father was Sultan Chinggis, and his mother’s name was Zeynep, the daughter of the famous Kazakh nobleman Shorman. Chokan’s real name was Muhammed Hanafiya; Chokan (Shoqan) is the name that he was called by his loving mother in his childhood.

Chokan started his education from the local traditional sources. When he was around 12 years old, he was sent to Tsarist Russia to be educated and trained. Later, he served as an officer in the Russian army. Chokan became acquainted with prominent scholars and artists while studying in Russia. He soon became a well-educated, well-trained, extremely knowl-edgeable, and exceptional figure at a young age. Chokan wrote valuable works on the social, ethnographic, political, and juridical issues of the Kazakhs. He also traveled to the Kyrgyz people around Ysykköl, explored

G. Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun (*) Department of Modern Turkic Studies, Gazi University, Ankara, Turkey

18

the importance of the Manas epos, and, for the first time, recorded some parts of the traditional oral narration. Furthermore, Valikhanov fulfilled a dangerous duty to travel to Kashgariya (Eastern Turkistan) and kept notes during his journey. All of his records and articles are considered to be important sources of information. He died before the age of 30 as a result of illness. Valikhanov succeeded in leaving a significant scholarly legacy behind, despite his death at a young age.

Valikhanov joined the research expedition of Colonel Khomentovsky to Ysykköl in 1856. During this trip, he also stayed in Gulja for three months. Furthermore, he successfully entered Kashgar with the fake identity of a trader with the Khokandese trade caravan in 1858–1859, fulfilling a dan-gerous mission on behalf of the Russian Empire. During that time, these lands were under Chinese domination, so it was difficult for foreigners to visit. He therefore used the name Alimbay Abdillabayev in the caravan and introduced himself as a relative of Musabay, who was the head of a caravan and a respected person.1

Valikhanov kept a diary throughout his journey to Kashgar, despite the risks. These lands were described by Chokan as terra incognita, meaning unfamiliar places not explored by anyone previously.2 He established friendly relations with local people, scholars, and the authorities. Thanks to these acquaintances, he could wander around freely and had an opportunity to observe the magnificent country. His trip took approximately a year, five months of which were spent in Kashgar. During that time, he tried to observe and get to know the community. Along with strategic, geographic, and economic information, he also recorded significant information about the history, ethnography, and sociocultural sphere. As stated by Chokan, the information gathered during the voyage consisted primarily of personal observations, as well as information and materials received from reliable sources. These included oral sources, such as traders and government offi-cials, and written sources, such as official documents and books.3

This chapter discusses Uyghur-Chinese cultural relations and interactions in the mid-nineteenth century based on Chokan Valikhanov’s observations and travelogues. Two main editions of Chokan Valikhanov were used to write this chapter. One of them is the St. Petersburg edition, which was published under the editorship of N. Veselovsky in 1904. The other source is a five-volume edition that was published in 1984–1985, in Almaty. The following works of Valikhanov were considered to be relevant and were also used: “Gulja and Western Regions of the Chinese Empire [Diary of Gulja Trip in 1856],” “Essays on Dzungaria,” “On the Situation in Altyshar or Six Eastern Cities of Chinese Province Nan-lu (Little Bukharia) in 1858–1859,”

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“[A Draft about Russia’s Trade with Western China and Central Asia in the First Quarter of the 19th Century],” “[On Trade in Gulja and Chuguchak],” and “On the Western Region of the Chinese Empire.”

It is worth saying a few words about a terminology issue. Valikhanov, as was already mentioned, was Kazakh; he also served in the Russian army as well as the research institutions of Tsarist Russia. Thus, as a result of his education and upbringing, he accepted the Russian Empire as his own state. Therefore, when Valikhanov referred to “we,” “us,” or “our” in his reports, diaries, and essays, the terms should be evaluated within this con-text; sometimes he mentions the Russian Empire, and sometimes by “we/us/our” he refers to the Kazakhs, or Western Turkistan/Central Asia. To specify the people of Eastern Turkistan, Valikhanov used the terms “Kashgarians,” “Small Bukharians,” “Asians,” or “Turkistanese.”

When examining cultural interrelations, data derived from Valikhanov’s writings can be classified as material or nonmaterial cultural elements. Material culture here refers to physical appearance, clothing and apparel, food, and trade. Nonmaterial culture refers to language issues, cultural interrelations, and how these two cultures identify and recognize each other. In this way, it is aimed to produce an understanding of the mutual relationship between the Turks and Han Chinese, how much they knew about each other, and how they had cultural interactions in the mid- nineteenth century. Furthermore, there were some remarks regarding the relations between the Eastern and Western Turkistanese, especially in trade. These aspects are also mentioned in this chapter.

Physical aPPearance, clothing, and aPParel

According to Chokan Valikhanov, the people of East Turkistan were influ-enced by the Chinese to a certain extent in terms of appearance and cloth-ing, but this varied depending on the social class and status of the East Turkistanese. Valikhanov mainly described three social strata. He indicated that East Turkistanese aristocrats were all dressed in Chinese style and drove wagons harnessed to mules in a Chinese style.4 Chokan observed that khakimbeks (administrators) and nobles were unnecessarily excessive wannabes of China. They consumed a large amount of alcohol, used hash-ish, and also acted as Chinese administrators in everyday life and during the ceremonies.5 Subordinate officials and city residents were affected to a relatively lesser degree. They wore caftans that were close to Chinese clothes in terms of color and cut (Fig. 1).6

A VIEW FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: EASTERN...

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However, Valikhanov stated that the clothing of the ordinary Eastern Turkistanese was not much affected by Chinese influence. The impacts of Chinese civilization on the external appearance of the ordinary people were limited to a knife adorning the waist of each taranchy, chopsticks being used to eat food, and a Chinese hat with a pompom being worn on their heads.7 By taranchy, he referred to East Turkistan farmers. Valikhanov’s observations and records are significant. However, considering that historically and even contemporarily the knife has been an important branch of local traditional crafts in East Turkistan and generally in Central Asia, this record seems to be challenging. Perhaps Valikhanov’s observation was because the knife carried on the waist of the farmers was produced in China or because of its Chinese style. The next challenging point is related to the hats. Even today, Uighur traditional hats remain an important element of identity. Although all of these traditional hats at first seem similar, they vary locally and indicate the town to which they belong. Hats (doppa) are a crucial part of maintaining identity. Thus, this record stating that Chinese hats were spread among the farmers in the past is interesting. Perhaps Chinese hats used to be fashionable in some parts of East Turkistan and subsequently lost their appeal (Fig. 2).

Valikhanov also provided information regarding women’s clothing in East Turkistan. East Turkistanese women preferred vivid colors. They

Fig. 1 Clothes of the Uyghurs of Eastern Turkistan. Source: Ch. Valikhanov, 1859 (Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 169)


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wore cotton or silk dresses, as well as Chinese collar blouses or dresses. When going out of the house, women wore silk coats with gold brocades on the chest and long white scarves. Valikhanov indicated that black or white netting was a mandatory accessory of city clothes to hide the face, but East Turkistanese women used that perfunctorily; in reality, the faces were always open.8 It can be inferred that because Valikhanov’s observa-tions are related to urban women, the Chinese-style clothing was common among urban women, with traditional scarves on the others (Fig. 3).

Food and Beverage

In Chokan Valikhanov’s writings, there is specific information about nutri-tional habits, foods, and beverages that were significant components of the material culture. The traveler claimed that “the culinary art of East

Fig. 2 Uyghurs of Eastern Turkistan. Source: Ch. Valikhanov, 1859 (Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 159)


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Turkistan bears a Chinese influence”. The lunch of Eastern Turkistanese consisted of vegetable soup, lagman, samsa, dumplings, and various mari-nated vegetables. Chokan stated that the foods prepared with marinated vegetables were adapted from China. Valikhanov reviewed the impact of China on the region as follows: “Chinese influence in East Turkistan seems rather formal but quite strong.”9

Furthermore, not only the Eastern Turkistanese people were affected by Chinese—the reverse effects could also be observed occasionally. For example, Valikhanov noted that boza (i.e., a fermented beverage) was one of the elements that the Chinese learned from the Turks. He recorded that the Chinese kept liquor stores and several boza factories in the outskirts of the city. Restaurants serving boza had more clients. Furthermore, there were no government restrictions for wine and boza in Kashgar.10

Fig. 3 Hairstyles and hats of Uyghur women of Eastern Turkistan. Source: Ch. Valikhanov, 1858 (Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 170)


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trade

Trade was one of the objectives of Valikhanov’s trip; therefore, very com-prehensive and detailed information related to trade is provided in his writings. The items, prices, and many other details were carefully recorded by Chokan. In this chapter, only trade interrelations are discussed.

Trade commodities brought to Kashgar from Khokand and Bukhara were dye, cotton and silk fabric, dried apricots, raisins, and iron. In addi-tion, livestock such as sheep, cows, and horses were also traded. Trade was realized by the gold and silver coins of Bukhara, Khokand, and Russia.11 Various products from different regions of Western Turkistan arrived at Kashgar. For example, Swiss, British, and Indian fabric as well as opium was brought from Bukhara.12 Nomadic Kazakhs traded with livestock, pelts, wool, leather, wild animals’ fur, and animal products.13

Various types of tea were brought for trade from Kashgar to the towns and villages of West Turkistan.14 In addition, fabrics, rice, and Chinese silk were commodities of trade for the Kazakhs.15 Cotton, Khotan silk, Kashgar almonds, felt, carpets, rugs, pots and pans, poppy,16 and jade were trade goods brought from Kashgar to Central Asia.17

language

One of the important elements of nonmaterial culture is language. During his visit to East Turkistan, Valikhanov examined Eastern Turkistanese–Chinese language interactions. Turkistanese learned some arts and crafts of Chinese arms from the Chinese; they also borrowed many words. Words loaned from Chinese appear in architecture, decoration, dresses, and lux-ury consumption, and especially in bureaucracy and correspondence.18

Furthermore, according to Valikhanov, a unique trade language was formed in Gulja; it was a mixture of the Tatar and Chinese languages. As it is known, Tatars were actively engaged in commercial activities. Therefore, in East Turkistan, there were many Tatar merchants; consequently, they might have had an impact on this. However, some words shown by Chokan as an example are also used in other Turkic languages, such as Kyrgyz. For this reason, although Valikhanov named it as the Tatar language, perhaps it should be understood as a general eastern Turkic language.

Valikhanov indicated that this mixed language was very interesting for an orientalist.19 In addition, he stated that a few Turkic words were bor-rowed by the local dialects of Chinese, such as biker (no avail) and bibuda


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(nothing). He also claimed that the mixed language was mainly formed from a small number of nouns and verbs and there was no conjugation. The same nouns and verbs had many (homonymous) meanings; at the end of verbs, “n-bar” was added. For example, if a Chinese person said kilen- bar, it could have various meanings, such as “I come,” “come,” “go,” or “I will go.” The exact meaning could be understood from the context. Another widely used verb was tashlan-bar (tashlamak: “leave,” “throw away”); this verb had such meanings as “bad,” “I do not agree,” and “not good.”20 Thus, Turkic words and phrases were used by the Chinese. The lack of conjugation, polysemy, and homonymy that were reflected in the mixed language were also features of the Chinese language.

Some words in the mixed language included the following:

jandurle: both to praise too much and to damn very badlychon: bigchon-kchi: gentleman, misterishmrut-kchi: poor personhatun: spousekulakaychy: thief

Moreover, consider the word shu-yanzi (“this type”). Here, shu was taken from Tatar (Turkic) and yanzi was derived from Chinese. Another mixed word was ashfuzul/ashbuzul, which meant “eatery.” This word was a combination of ash (Tatar) and budzo (Chinese).21

interrecognition and identiFication

Chokan Valikhanov also paid attention to what degree the Turks and the Chinese knew and defined each other. The Han Chinese called the emperor of China Huang-di or Tien-zi (meaning “the son of heaven”), whereas the Kazakhs and other Muslims used ijen-khan, borrowing it from the Mongolian word bodo-ijan.22 Moreover, there are some records concerning the question of how much the Chinese knew and described the Turkistanese: “Here [in Gulja] all round-faced, black-bearded and tur-baned Central Asians are called Andijanese”.23 Valikhanov stated: “Han Chinese refer to all Central Asians as Andijanese, all Ottomans as Hunkars, Russians as Ulus, Mongols as Toytszys, Kazakhs as Hasaks and call all Kyrgyz Buruts”.24


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According to Chokan, although the moral characteristics of the East Turkistanese are worthy of much praise, the Chinese accused them of mis-trust, cunning, deceit, laziness, and ignorance. Meanwhile, the East Turkistanese accused the Chinese of being cowards, faithless, and immoral. Valikhanov’s views regarding East Turkistan and its people are as follows: However, these people were subject to continuous pressure, slavery and injustice; as a result of this, some bad habits, such as mistrust and deceit ensued. In spite of this, the East Turkistanese people still have many great features that do not exist in all other Muslims. If the circumstances had been different, it is for sure that these people would be in a better condi-tion than all other people of the same religion.25 “Local people [East Turkistanese] have good characters; they are social, hardworking and extremely polite”.26

conclusion

Chokan Valikhanov left behind a tremendously important scholarly legacy. He shed light on political, administrative, economic, sociocultural, and ethnographic aspects of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. His travelogue on Eastern Turkistan contains significant data, especially for the nineteenth century. His analyses were and still are valuable and valid. Valikhanov underlined several times that one of the best features of the Eastern Turkistanese was their patriotism. To express it in his words, “[The East] Turkistanese hate the Chinese, but it is not an obstacle to adapting to Chinese civilization to their culture.”27 Valikhanov also stated: “The Chinese do not have many features that we have, yet there are many char-acteristics that we need to take from them: a propensity for hard work, national pride and straightforwardness”.28

The interesting and important information based on personal observa-tions by Chokan Valikhanov in the nineteenth century has not lost its valid-ity. Indeed, the topic of cultural interaction continues to attract attention. In the mid-nineteenth century, the higher-echelon East Turkistanese were dominated by and subject to Chinese cultural influence in their clothing and behavioral code. Furthermore, Eastern Turkistanese cuisine has also adopted various aspects of Chinese influence. Moreover, as a result of Chinese domi-nation, Chinese goods were in abundance in the region: they were both used and marketed towards western regions. Another result of the cultural interaction recorded by Valikhanov was the formation of a local mixed lan-guage from Chinese and Turkic. Nevertheless, despite all of this, the Chinese


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and Eastern Turkistanese did not know each other’s cultures well enough and humiliated each other. This mutually negative approach indicates that the degree of cultural interactions was superficial. Consequently, although the communities were affected by each other and have been found in a number of formal cultural exchanges, the two groups remained strangers to each other in the mid-nineteenth century.

notes

1. Veselovsky, N.I. (1904). Sochineniya Chokana Chingisovicha Valikhanova. Sankt-Peterburg. pp. 43–56.

2. Veselovsky, N.I. (1904). p. 53.3. Veselovsky, N.I. (1904). pp. 53–54.4. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). Sobranie sochineniy v pyati tomakh, Almaty:

Akademiya Nauk Kazakhskoy SSR, vol. 3. p. 169.5. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. pp. 164, 167, 173.6. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. pp. 169.7. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 2. p. 192.8. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. pp. 169–170.9. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 170.

10. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 167.11. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 91.12. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 207.13. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 2. p. 255.14. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 211.15. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 91.16. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. pp. 197–216.17. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 2. p. 244.18. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 170.19. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 2. p. 240.20. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 2. pp. 240–241.21. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 2. p. 241.22. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 2. p. 226.23. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 2. p. 210.24. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 2. p. 217.25. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 165.26. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 227.27. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 3. p. 171.28. Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. (1985). vol. 2. p. 228.



Factors and Challenges of Uyghur Nationalism in the Early Twentieth Century

Nabijan Tursun

The origin, formation, and strengthening of Uyghur modern identity and nationalism have strong roots in the historical, political, social-economic and cultural processes of the Uyghur homeland of East Turkistan (or Xinjiang, as known by China, who always had demographic dominance). Uyghurs are the indigenous people of the land now known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (also called East Turkistan). Uyghurs have a long and rich ethno-political and cultural history with ancient and middle- age states established in this region of Central Eurasia. The Uyghurs con-stituted 75 percent of the population of the province and kept their demographic dominance in the region until the 1950s.1

Modern Uyghur ethnic identity and nationalism can be described as having two distinct stages, with 1949 as the year of division between the periods. In the two different stages, Uyghur ethnic identity and national-ism experienced formation, development, frustration, and prosperity that were strong enough to attract not only China’s attention but also the attention of the international community. In the formation, development, and strengthening of Uyghur nationalism, interior political, demographic, and social-cultural policies, as well as other factors, played conclusive roles;

N. Tursun (*) Uyghur Service of Radio Free Asia, Washington, DC, USA

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however, external factors that had strong ethnic, cultural, and political ties with Uyghurs and their land also played critical roles. One of the most important external factors came from neighboring parts of the Uyghur region, especially from Central Eurasia. This is because Uyghurs are geo-politically located in the Central Asian landscape and the chessboard of the Great Game, which was for a long time under Russian dominance. As a result, Uyghurs share a common culture with Central Asian Turkic peo-ples, who are very close to Uyghurs in many aspects.

In the 1920s, modern Uyghur nationalism started to grow with the introduction of new ideas and a reformist education system, but it did not become the dominant force in society due to the Uyghurs’ backwardness, superstitions, and Yang Zengxin’s2 political dictatorship. Nevertheless, more and more people began to spread nationalistic views. The increase in the number of Uyghurs who understood Uyghur nationalism laid the founda-tion for a national independence movement that became popular in 1930s and 1940s.

At the beginning of the 1920s, Yang Zengxin realized development in Central Asia and other parts of Islamic world would influence Uyghurs and play an important role in the formation of Uyghur nationalism, which in turn would result in a demand for more political rights for Uyghurs. Therefore, he pursued a policy that would thwart the new education move-ment and perpetuate ignorance among the population. He took advantage of the superstitious and fundamental beliefs of Uyghurs in implementing his tactics. He stirred up the most adamant and ignorant people against the new education system by labeling the movement as antireligious. He built mosques in every village and confined people in those mosques to keep them ignorant of what was happening outside. He brainwashed reli-gious hardliners to stand up against intellectuals who opened new schools by offering them petty government positions. Furthermore, he stopped domestic and foreign scholars’ attempts to interpret Islam in a more pro-gressive and liberal way to develop Uyghur culture. He eventually suc-ceeded in his campaign against Uyghur national independence. M. Bughra, a prominent Uyghur political leader and historian of twentieth century, pointed out that the religious hardliners and community elders who ben-efited from the Chinese had played a crucial role in keeping East Turkistan under the control of the dictatorship.3

The factors described in the following sections played an important role in the formation of Uyghur nationalism during the early and mid- twentieth century.

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Jadidism movement with turkic nationalism

One important factor in the formation of Uyghur nationalism was Jadidism, an education movement to open a new style of school at the beginning of the twentieth century. The origins of the Uyghur new educational move-ment have strong ties with the Central Asian, Turkish, and Tatar Jadidist movements in the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Central Asian and Tatar Jadidism belong within the broad framework of reformist and revolutionary movements among the Muslims of Russia and the neighboring Islamic countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The efforts among the Volga Tatars and Crimean Tatars beginning in the 1880s and by Ismail Gasprinskiy (the founder of a new-method school in Bakhchisaray in the Crimea in 1884 and the publisher of the influential reformist newspaper Terjüman beginning in 1883) were crucial sources of ideas for the Jadids.

Uyghur businessmen, who had the opportunity to witness the new development in the Russian Central Asia and Volga-Ural regions, Germany, and Turkey, played a very important role in spreading the new educational movement among Uyghurs. Being the first representative of Uyghur Jadidism, or new educational movement, among Uyghurs, brothers Hussein Bay (1844–1926) and Bawudun Bay (1855–1928) laid the foun-dation for the new education system and developed it among Uyghurs.

All of the new Uyghur schools opened at the beginning of the twentieth century had teachers educated in Kazan, Istanbul, and other Central Asian cities who were determined to liberate people in Xinjiang by educating them with modern ideas. Central Asian Uzbek Jadidists normally referred to themselves by the Turkic terms Taraqqiparvarlar (progressives), Ziyaliylar (intellectuals), or simply Yäshlär/Yoshlar (youths).4 In the Uyghur region, local people also called Uyghur Jadidists by such terms as Ziyali (intellec-tual), Ependi (teacher), Maaripchi (educationalist), or Meripetchi (educa-tionalist) and their movement Aqartish Herikiti (enlightenment movement), among others. The Jadids were also inspired by political movements in the Islamic world: the anti-colonial struggles in India, the constitutional move-ment in Persia (1905–1911, q.v.), and above all, the Young Turk movement in the Ottoman Empire. They could not help but feel a strong sense of soli-darity with their fellow Muslims.

The Musabayev brothers, so called by their Russian counterparts and later referred to by that title among Uyghurs, were the first representatives of Uyghur capitalists. They were influenced by Tatar capitalists and accepted their ideas of Jadidism when they were doing business in Russia.

FACTORS AND CHALLENGES OF UYGHUR NATIONALISM IN THE EARLY...

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With the help of their strong financial capabilities, they started to educate Uyghurs by using what they had learned from Tatars so that the Uyghurs could be liberated with new ways of thinking. They established a new European style school, Hüseyniye, in the Iksak village of Artush in 1885.5 Huseyin and Bawudun also opened new schools and teacher training cen-ters in the cities of Kashgar and Ghulja. In 1904, they started to send students to Russia and Turkey in order to train more supporters of the new education system in Xinjiang.

In 1910–1915, Dr. Mesud Sabri (1887–1952) and Tursun Ependi (1886–1937), among the first round of students who were sent by Musabayevs to Turkey, came back to teach at the Hüseyniye School and trained new teachers so that they could go to other parts of Xinjiang to establish new schools. In 1907, the Musabayevs imported factory machin-ery from Germany and opened the first leather factory in Ghulja, which was the first of its kind in all of China.6 At the same time, they invited Russian, Tatar, and German technicians to work in the factory and trained new workers at the new vocational schools they established.7 In 1890, they imported printing technology from foreign countries and built the first publishing house Metbei Xurshid, Metelli Nuri in Kashgar to publish new books.8 In 1912, when the Chinese republic was founded after the fall of the Qing Empire, the Musabayevs not only supported the revolutionary party of Yang Zuanxu in the Ili region9 but also helped it by publishing the Uyghur version (Ili Wilayitining Geziti) of a Chinese newspaper (Baihua Bao) that was created by the new Chinese republic.

Another Uyghur cultural activist and intellectual, Qutluq Shewqi (1876–1937), who was educated in India and Egypt, returned to Kashgar and published a newspaper called Ang (Thinking).10 He printed articles and literature that encouraged Uyghurs to adopt new developments and a liberal awakening. In 1914, Hüseyin Bay invited Ahmet Kamal, a member of Turkish Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (The Committee of Union and Progress), from Turkey to establish schools in Artush to train teachers.

In 1915, Dr. Mesud Sabri, who received more than 10 years of medical education and influence under the Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti in Istanbul, came back to Ghulja. With the help of some others from Turkey, he estab-lished schools called Turan and Dernek. In the 1920s, he opened eight schools. These schools had 68 classes with 68 teachers and more than 2000 students.11 Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti began as a secret society established as the Committee of Ottoman Union (Ittihad-ı Osmanî Cemiyeti) in Istanbul on February 6, 1889 by a group of medical students,

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including an Albanian medical doctor named Ibrahim Temo and others. They were originally devoted to overthrowing the absolute rules of Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II. All of the founders of this organization belonged to a non-Turkish ethnic group.12 In the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti forced Abdul Hamid II to restore constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman Empire, starting with the Second Constitutional Era.

After that, works of the Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti had a great impact on Muslims in other countries, including Turkic Muslims in Central Asia. For example, the Persian community in Turkey founded the Iranian Union and Progress Committee. Indian Muslims imitated the Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti oath administered to recruits of the organization. The leaders of the Young Bukharians Movement were deeply influenced by the Young Turk Revolution and Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti.13

Between 1914 and 1917, Ahmet Kamal, a member of the Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, used textbooks produced in Istanbul at the Hüseyniye School. In addition to their courses in religious subjects, history, and geog-raphy, the students performed a play written by Ahmet Kamal and sang Turkish marches. Pedagogy at Hüseyniye School reflected both the Jadidist curriculum and Pan-Turanian ideology, which was then popular in Turkey.14 However, Yang Zengxin, Xinjiang’s provincial warlord, strictly monitored the education movement spearheaded by Ahmet Kamal, the Musabayevs, and Mesud Sabri. In due course, Yang would close their schools and jailed Ahmet Kamal and Mesud Sabri for their activities.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, many new schools were opened in the cities of Ghulja, Kashgar, Artush, Kucha, and Turpan. Tash Akhun (1865–1928) and Mekhsut Muhiti (1885–1933), who were the first few representatives of Uyghur capitalists with liberal views, also opened new schools with their personal funds. Tatar and Turk teachers from Kazan and Istanbul, as well as Uyghur teachers who were trained there, played very important roles at those schools. Apart from their regular European-style education, the students also learned to play volleyball, basketball, and soccer as a part of their physical education. In 1927, soccer teams from Hüseyniye School, the British Consulate in Kashgar, and the Swedish Missionary Hospital competed in a soccer tournament. Hüseyniye School’s team won the championship.15 The curriculum of these schools included foreign lan-guages and religion courses in addition to their regular science and art courses. One of the Uyghur Jadids’ principal aims was educational reform for the Uyghur people. They wanted to create new schools that would teach


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quite differently from the medrese (primary schools) that existed throughout the southern and northern regions of East Turkestan.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the new thinking that appeared in the Muslim world reached Uyghurs through education. Furthermore, it reached Uyghurs through publications, which were brought to Xinjiang by the people who had witnessed the changes in Central Asia and the Middle East during their pilgrimage to Mecca. One Uyghur religious scholar, Abduqadir Warisi (1862–1924), spread new ideas in places like Kashgar. He urged people to educate themselves so that they could strengthen their reli-gious beliefs and fight against superstitions. His teaching and books became very popular among people and played a very important role in the develop-ment of new education reform in Xinjiang.16

Feudalist Yang used everything in his power to ban and eliminate new ideas and liberal changes in Uyghur society. In that fairly backward society, religious hardliners and community elders who had benefited from Yang Zengxin were still the dominant force; they resisted new ideas and a new education system. Yang closed schools and killed many representatives of the new education movement through manipulation of religious hardlin-ers and corrupted village elders. Yang used exactly the same method that the Russians used against the Tatars to control Uyghurs by supporting religious hardliners. Yang appointed Imams and recruited religious elders to spread anti-education propaganda. He used his proxies to capture and persecute representatives of Jadidism. Despite his 17 years of dictatorship, he was not able to stop Uyghurs’ desire for national freedom and new ideas. On the contrary, his brutal oppression had cultivated Uyghurs’ political awakening and led to the Uyghurs’ national independence movement in the 1930s, which resulted in the establishment of an inde-pendent republic called the Islamic Republic of East Turkistan.

The Uyghurs’ new education movement restarted again in 1934 when Sheng Shicai allowed temporary new development plans to strengthen his rule over Xinjiang after the downfall of Jin Shuren’s government.17 Under pressure from the Soviets, Sheng Shicai’s government created an unprece-dented environment for the development of the Uyghurs’ new education movement from 1933 to 1937. Newspapers were published in the cities of Kashgar, Aksu, Urumqi, Khoten, and Ghulja. Cultural associations for dif-ferent ethnic groups, including the Uyghur Union of Cultural Enlightenment, were established as well. These associations formed an Arts Assembly and opened new schools with the help of public donations. The period between 1933 and 1937 was the second development period of Uyghurs’ new

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education movement. Memtili Tewpiq, who studied in Istanbul, was one of the most prominent representatives of intellectuals of that time. He opened European- and Turkish-style schools in 24 villages in the Kashgar-Artush region.18 Qutluq Shewqi, Memtili Tewpiq, Tursun Ependi, and others con-tinued their educational activities, which were strongly supported by the Uyghur No. 6 army division in Kashgar and by Mahmut Muhiti, who was the commander of this division. Intellectuals such as Tewpiq educated Uyghurs about nationalism through their modern schools. They spread the idea of nationalism and patriotism among young students. They pointed out that Uyghurs, like other nationalities in the world, should stand up for their own rights.19 Then, in 1937, Sheng Shicai decided to stop new develop-ments among the Uyghurs because he saw Uyghur nationalism as a threat to his power. In 1937, he arrested many Uyghur intellectuals, including Memtili Tewpiq, Qutluq Shewqi, and Tursun Ependi. Most of those arrested were killed in jail. He closed schools and accused them of being Pan-Turkist.

All of this created a favorable environment and public inclination toward Uyghur nationalism. With schools as their bases, young people were informed of changes in the outside world so that they could fight for the future of their people by comparing themselves to other advanced nationalities. Besides schools, different gatherings were used to strengthen education among ordinary people. Curricula were designed in a European style. At the same time, materials were published with an aim was to improve Uyghurs’ political rights by educating them with nationalistic ideas. This campaign did not isolate religion but did strongly oppose superstitious and blind beliefs and criticized the negative effects they had on people. These schools’ activities played a central role in the formation of Uyghur cultural development. Chinese scholars accused the new educa-tion movement of that time as being “Pan-Turkist” and “Pan-Islamic.”20 With respect to the historic facts of that time, “Pan-Turkism” was the right idea for the Turkic people living in Central Asia and the Volga-Ural region. It was the ideological basis for them to liberate themselves from Russian occupation. This idea appeared against Pan-Slavism. At the begin-ning, it had clashed with Tsarist Russia’s interests. Later on, it became the enemy of the Lenin-Stalin regime, not only during their Bolshevik revolu-tion, but also after they came to power. During their struggles, Bolsheviks embraced the idea of national independence.

However, the Bolsheviks changed their tone completely right after they seized power. One of the reasons for the formation of Pan-Turkist ideas was that there was no clear distinction between different ethnic groups in


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Central Asia and the Volga-Ural region before 1924. Central Asia was known as “Turkistan.” The people in these regions were called “Turks,” “Kyrgyz,” “Sarts,” “Taranchis,” “Muslims,” or were named after the set-tlements where they lived. Their language was Turkish. Being under the control of Russia politically and sharing a common culture created an environment for Pan-Turkist ideas. In terms of its political future and common culture, Xinjiang shared a lot with Central Asia.

After the collapse of Yakup Bek’s government (1864–1878), the Chinese regime relentlessly oppressed Uyghurs to eliminate their aspirations for national independence. Since then, Uyghurs have lost their nationalistic culture. Their religious views were mixed up with their ethnic identities. The brutal political and cultural oppression daunted the Uyghurs’ political awakening. After Yang Zengxin came to power, he took further steps in the direction of eliminating the Uyghurs’ nationalistic visions. Under such conditions, Uyghur intellectuals chose Pan-Turkism as a way to stimulate a Uyghur political awakening. The Pan-Turkic view spread among Uyghurs was not an idea (as one Chinese scholar called it, “[the] building of a Turkish empire by uniting all the Turks”) but a political call for the Uyghurs to liberate themselves from Chinese occupation. It is impossible for a peo-ple to remain controlled once they have reached a unanimous spirit. No matter what happens, they will appear as an independent political and cul-tural entity at some point in history.

central asian turkic-muslims’ anti-colonial movements

Great political and social changes took place in Central Asia after the First World War, when the monarchy ended in the Russian Empire. The people of the Central Asian, Volga-Ural, and Caucasian regions saw the changes as an opportunity for their national independence and were actively involved in political and social movements. As a result, many political parties that accepted the existing Jadidism appeared in Central Asia. For example, members and activists of such political-social and cultural organization as Shurai Islam, Taranchi-Tunggan Committee, Young Bukharans, Alash Orda, and other organizations advocated that Turkic people should be independent as a nation from Russia’s control. However, liberation was not only for Turkic people; some non-Russian European regions of the Russian Empire had declared independence after the collapse of Imperial Russia. In the beginning, after it came to power for their own interest, the Russian

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Bolshevik party supported anticolonial slogans of non-Russian regions of the Russian Empire.

The existence of these political organizations in Central Asia influenced Xinjiang with their liberal view of independence from imperialistic powers. From 1918 to 1929, many of the members and supporters of various anti- Bolshevik and pro-nationalistic organizations, as well as supporters of Jadidism-nationalistic ideas in the Russian Volga-Ural region and Central Asia and members of the pro-independence Basmachi movement who fought against Soviet Russia, retreated to Xinjiang province. Among them were many Tatar, Bashkurt, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Uyghur intellec-tuals who received a good education in Imperial Russia and other regions of Europe. Some of them even played a key role during the 1931–1934 revolution and in the government of the Republic of East Turkistan.

Representatives of Central Asian and Tatar Jadidism had hoped to form such a unanimous spirit among Uyghurs by educating them with new political ideas. Before and after the First World War, Turkic language newspapers and magazines published in Kazan, Ufa, and other regions of the Russian Empire became the most important sources for Uyghur peo-ple on new political, social, and cultural changes in Eurasia and the history, politics, culture, and other affairs of the Turkic World.

soviet ethnic Political strategy and ethnic nationalism

In the formation and strengthening of Uyghur nationalism, one of the important factors was the formation of Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Kazak nation-alistic ideas under the Soviet communistic ideological frames in the begin-ning of the twentieth century in Central Asia. Since 1924, the Soviets implemented an autonomous and union republic policy in Central Asia. The appearance of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan unions and autonomous republics cultivated the nationalistic views of the people living in those republics. After the Soviets’ intentional division of the different ethnic groups within the Turkic people into dif-ferent republics in 1924, Central Asian Turks started to separate from one another with their unique culture and national values. Under the commu-nist ideology, those different ethnic groups had many developments in culture, education, health care, and transportation in a short amount of time. Uyghurs witnessed the changes in Central Asia. It was quite natural


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for Uyghurs to compare their situation with the situation in Central Asia and to become affected by the changes.

The Soviet Union has always paid particular attention to Xinjiang (East Turkistan), which is an adjoining region to Soviet Central Asia, and to Uyghurs and other Turkic nationalities. They often advanced policies that advocated the superiority of the Leninist-Stalinist view on ethnicities. In the first part of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union considerably influ-enced the minds of many Uyghurs living in the Xinjiang region along with other Turkic-speaking ethnicities, such as the Uzbeks, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, and others. The Soviet style model of ethnic division and ethnic identity of Central Asia was regarded as a model. Moreover, because the Uyghurs did not have a republic of their own, such individual and ethnic-based separa-tion across the border was viewed with envy. The Soviet Union played a major role in propagating the ideas of the creation of a Socialist Republic and a separate ethnic identity among Uyghurs. This movement can be divided into two stages, starting from 1921.

First Period (1921–1937): Uyghur Ethnic Nationalism Takes Root

Uyghurs in Central Asia were actively involved in the political-social changes and formed a political organization called the Revolutionary Uyghurs to emphasize a nationalistic spirit. In the Tashkent congress, which was held on June 2, 1921 they decided to use “Uyghur” to replace the former Taranchi and Kashgari local groups. However, before the 1920s, not many Uyghurs acknowledged their ethnicity as Uyghur. Most of them identified with names such as Turk, Muslim, Sart, Taranchi,21 Taranchi Türkliri (Taranchi Turks),22 Altisheher Türkliri (Six City Turks)23 or with the oasis they came from, such as Kashgar or Turpan.24 Names such as Kashgarliq to mean Kashgari were used.25 The Turkic people also used Musulman (Muslim).26 The Russians and other foreigners used the names Sart,27 Turk, or Turki.28 Russian military intelligence officer in the Russian general consulate in Kashgar L. Kornilov differentiated Uyghurs from other Turkic people of Kashgaria and called them Kashgarians or Eastern Turkistani.29 After the Tashkent Congress in 1921 and when Sheng Shicai established the pro-Soviet provincial government in 1934, the Uyghur name was accepted for all the local Turkic settling people in the Tarim Basin and Ili Valley.

One of the reasons that influenced Uyghurs’ liberal thinking were the changes that took place in Russia, especially in Central Asia after the First World War. The Soviet’s communist ideology of liberating people from

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feudal colonialism, developing a new culture and civilization, also had a very strong impact on Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Sharing a common culture and border with Central Asia made it convenient for Uyghurs to commu-nicate with the people there. According to historical records, at the begin-ning of the twentieth century, a great number of Uyghurs went to Central Asia to look for labor and trade opportunities. Some of them settled down in Tashkent, Andijan, Samarkand, Karakol, Almaty, even in Moscow and St Petersburg. Under the influence of the October revolution, Uyghurs in Russia actively participated in this historical movement by forming various interest groups.

Uyghur intellectuals also published many newspapers and journals, such as Sadayi Taranchi (Sound of Taranchi, 1918), Kembegheller Awazi (Voice of the Poor, 1921), Yash Uyghur (Young Uyghur, 1922–1923), Qutulush (Liberation, 1927–1930), Birinchi Chamdam (First Step, 1924), Inqilapchil Sherq (Revolutionary East), and others. At the same time, they published textbooks for Uyghur schools and many other books about literature, poli-tics, and new ideas.30 Those books, newspapers, and magazines reached Xinjiang by various channels. According to some sources, Uyghurs made very quick progress in education and many Uyghurs graduated from univer-sities. In 1923, more than 500 people finished a university education in different fields from the universities of Moscow, Tashkent, Kazan, and Baku.31 Uyghur communities put a lot of effort into developing education. In June 1921, a Uyghur congress held in Tashkent passed a resolution to send Uyghur youths from Xinjiang to study in universities.32 Some historical sources showed that Uyghur youths from Kashgaria were educated in Soviet universities, including The Communist University of the Toilers of the East, and were sent back to Xinjiang to start a liberation movement. However, they did not succeed in their efforts for various reasons.

After 1921, Uyghur groups from Kashgar and the Ili Valley agreed on using the Ili dialect as the standard for the Uyghur language. According to a report to the Soviet Communist Party Central Asia Bureau by Abdulla Rozibaqiyev (1897–1938), one of the leaders of the Central Asian com-munist party, the purpose of the congress was to train volunteers for the upcoming revolution in Xinjiang and to educate people politically so that they could overthrow the Chinese occupiers and their local accomplices. The nationalistic and political awakening of Uyghurs in Central Asia resulted in their struggle to overthrow Chinese control and establish an independent country in their motherland. They sent many members to Xinjiang with the mission of underground political activity.33 However,


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the Moscow government did not let Uyghur communists succeed in their efforts. They continued with their activities until the Moscow regime purged Uyghur nationalists in 1937. Uyghur intellectuals, especially writ-ers in Central Asia, have written many books with Uyghuristan as their subject. Being an ideological and nationalistic development, the Uyghuristan movement has become the symbol of Uyghur nationalism. During the 1920s, political-nationalistic organizations under the name of Uyghuristan appeared among the Uyghur nationalists in Kashgaria and the Ili-Turpan Valley. They had dreams of liberation of the Uyghur people from Chinese rule and of establishing a Uyghuristan republic such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other Soviet republics.

Uyghur writers, intellectuals, and politicians in Soviet Central Asia, such as Abdulhey Muhemmedi (1900–1938), Nur Israhilov (1910–1938), Nezerghoja Abdusemetov (1887–1951), Abdulla Rozibaqiyev (1897–1938), and Ismayil Tahirov (1900–1938), expanded the Uyghuristan idea and movement. They also developed a Uyghur nationalistic movement. According to their aims, an independent Uyghuristan would naturally become a socialist national republic similar to other republics in Soviet Central Asia. Some activists in Turpan, Kashgar, and Ili who went to Soviet Russia and were connected with the Uyghur movement accepted the idea of an independent Uyghuristan and Uyghur nationalist ideals. Poet Abduxaliq, who was educated in Russia, adopted the term Uyghur and used it as his pen name—Abduxaliq Uyghur. He called his people the Uyghurs and rallied them to fight against Chinese rule and obtain freedom.34 Abduxaliq was also among the first indigenous Xinjiang Turkic thinkers to ponder on the Uyghur national interest.35

The idea of establishing Uyghuristan became part of an official revolu-tionary movement among the Uyghur people, as demonstrated by events at the Congress of Tashkent. The idea of Uyghuristan was not just an ideology promoted by politicians. However, Yang Zengxin described Communism as an enemy of Islam to create anti-Soviet feelings among the Uyghur people. He used the Islamic beliefs of the Uyghurs to success-fully generate anti-communistic emotions among Uyghurs so that they would not accept nationalistic views from Central Asia. Regardless of what happened, nationalism was popular among Uyghurs and it created the right environment for the revolution in 1930s.

Between 1934 and 1941, the Soviet Union had a dominant influence over Xinjiang region; it was manifested in trade, culture, and education. This period is characterized by the predominance of the Soviet ideology in the Uyghur region.

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The Uyghur language newspapers Sherq Heqiqiti (The Oriental Truth), which was published in Tashkent, and other Uyghur, Uzbek-language magazines and books were spread into Xinjiang province under the con-trol of the Uzbek and Kazakh communist party organs. Uzbekistan was a model for cultural, economic, and educational development for Uyghur people in East Turkistan. Many Uyghur students went to Tashkent and received a higher education; there, they saw the cultural, economic, and industrial transformation of Central Asia and the Uzbek people, who are very close to Uyghurs in culture, tradition, and language. Uyghur intel-lectuals could compare their level of development with the Soviet Union, particularly with Uzbekistan and Tashkent. One of the Uyghur students who went to Tashkent from Kashgar, Seypidin Ezizi, described all their excellent impressions in Uzbekistan and the Soviet Union. He assessed the current situation of Kashgaria to Uzbekistan and said it was incomparable, as those Uyghur students saw for the first time buses, trains, electric power, and many other industrial and cultural elements, which they had never seen before in Kashgar and other places.36

The Soviet Union benefited from the Uyghur intellectual class in accor-dance with its own interests. By helping them, it managed to reach its goals of spreading Soviet influence and promoting the national ideas of Lenin and Stalin in particular. The main propagandists for these views were either Uyghurs from the Soviet Union or Uyghurs from Eastern Turkistan who had studied or lived in the Soviet Union.37 In general, after the Soviets’ control over this neighboring province, along with cultural, educational, economic, and some industrial developments, which hap-pened in short period, Uyghur nationalism was strengthened between 1934 and 1943. As declared in a report by the Central Asian Military District’s intelligence division in the Soviet Union about the situation Xinjiang Province in December 1935: “Meanwhile the Uyghur nationalist movement is growing. The idea of an independent Uyghuristan continues to occupy an important place in the minds of Uyghur leaders, even those who are adherents of Urumqi government. In spite of an increase in pay, the army receives paltry supplies.”38

However, in 1937, Stalin’s campaign of “the great purge” of political repression began in the Soviet Union. It involved a large-scale purge of the Communist Party and government officials, Soviet Red Army leaders and commanders, repression of peasants, and widespread police surveil-lance and suspicion of “saboteurs,” as well as imprisonment and arbitrary executions.39 This great purge was widespread in Central Asia and many


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local Turkic political, cultural, military leaders, including the first Soviet Turkic scholars, cultural activists, and former Turkic nationalists who coop-erated with Soviet Government after 1918–1924, encountered repression and execution. A large number of Uyghur political leaders, cultural-educa-tional activists, writers, and poets who supported Uyghur nationalism and the Uyghuristan movement and are mentioned above also met repression from the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). Most of them were accused of such crimes as nationalism, pan- Turkism, espio-nage, and cooperation with Japanese imperialism. Uyghur political leaders such as as Abdulla Rozibaqiyev, Ismayil Tahirov, the first Uyghur university professors, writers, and cultural activists such as Burhan Qasimov (?–1938), Abdulhey Muhemmedi (1901–1937), Nur Israhilov (1910−1938), Mömin Hemrayev (1907–1956), Hezim Iskendirov (1906–1970),40 Turdi Hesenov (1909–1937), and many others were repressed by the Soviet NKVD. As a result of the great purge, Central Asian Uyghur schools, Uyghur cultural centers, publishing houses, newspapers, and magazines were closed by the Soviet government and many Uyghur diaspora members in the Fergana Valley changed their ethnic identity to Uzbek.41

Even during those times, after the anti-Sheng Shicai uprising of the Sixth Uyghur division of Mahmut Muhiti’s army in 1937, Sheng Shicai used the cooperation of the Soviet Red Army and cruelly suppressed the uprising of the Uyghurs and Hui Muslim troops. At the same time, he started a great purge as witnessed in the Soviet Union against Uyghur nationalism and anti-Sheng Shicai feelings of various ethnic groups, including Han Chinese. Even though Uyghur nationalism saw a crack-down at this time, nationalistic feelings and ideas of a national flourishing of Uyghurs never disappeared. On the contrary, the repressive policy of Sheng Shicai and Kuomintang nationalists during 1937–1949 advanced Uyghur nationalism and resulted in the founding of East Turkistan Republic in 1944. Uyghur nationalism emerged as an East Turkistan Republic and a widespread national liberation movement between 1944 and 1949.

Second Period (1933–1949): East Turkistan Republic—Manifestation of Uyghur Nationalism

After 1912, the oppressive, discriminatory, and chauvinistic policies toward Uyghurs and other ethnic groups by Chinese warlords should be mentioned when addressing the formation of Uyghur ethnic nationalism.

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It is quite natural for the oppressed to come together as a group to protect themselves and fight for self-rule. During the years of 1931–1933, all towns and cities in Xinjiang were up in arms against Jin Shuren’s rule. The culmination of those rebellions was the declaration of the establishment of the Islamic Republic of East Turkistan on November 12, 1933. The estab-lishment of the East Turkistan Republic was evidence of the formal birth of Uyghur nationalism and the realization of Uyghur national aspirations. Through founding this independent republic, Uyghurs asserted their dis-tinct national identity and showed their determination to control their own destiny. In the beginning, the new republic was named the Republic of Uyghuristan.42 It struck its first cooper coin in the name the Republic of Uyghuristan, but later on it was changed to the Islamic Republic of East Turkistan.43 The short-lived Republic of East Turkistan (1933–1934) established and dispersed its own political platform and educational and social-economic policies. It also established a publishing house and pub-lished newspapers, textbooks, and magazines, which freely dispersed nation-alistic ideology.

Muhammed Emin Bughra consistently called the uprisings staged by Uyghur, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and other nationalities in 1930s as the Sherqiy Türkistan Milli Inqilabi (East Turkistan National Revolution) and did not describe them as an Islamic Revolution in his work. Regarding the pur-pose of these rebellions, he stated the following in his book: “The purpose of East Turkistan national revolution is to get rid of foreign dominance from East Turkistan, restore the basic rights of the people, establish a national government that represents the native people and gain a respected seat among the assembly of world’s different nationalities.”44 As for the Khoten government for which he was the Emir, he consistently called it Khoten Hökümiti (Khoten government) throughout his book. However, the Khoten government issued coins under the name of Khoten Jumhuriyeti Islamiye (Khoten Islamic Republic). He pointed out that the Khoten Government was organized administratively and militarily completely in native character. Just after its establishment, the new government set out to implement the following tasks: improve the welfare of the people, establish a just financial system, establish a new educational system, build new schools, formulate new administrative disciplines, and oversee the performance of government officials.45

As for the foreign policy of the Khoten Government, Bughra stated that “the goal of this new government was to solve the East Turkistan problem in a political way by negotiating with the Chinese government.


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Also, the new government sought to establish friendly relationships with India and Great Britain.”46 According to the descriptions of many other historical eyewitnesses to the events of 1930s, this revolution was a national revolution, not an Islamic rebellion. It did not preach pan-Islamic ideol-ogy at all, but combined Islamic religious slogans with nationalism against Chinese warlords’ rule.47

Between 1933 and 1944, Sheng Shicai ruled Xinjiang with an iron fist. He refused to recognize the distinct national character of the Uyghur and other ethnic groups and suppressed their national aspirations. In reality, his rule had a strong flavor of Chinese chauvinism as seen with previous warlords such as Yang Zengxin and Jin Shuren. Such policies triggered a new wave of nationalism among Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and non-Han groups.

On November 12, 1944, the second East Turkistan Republic (ETR) was declared in the city of Ghulja. The founders of this new republic pro-moted the idea of East Turkistan patriotism. All non-Han inhabitants of Xinjiang, including the Turkic peoples, Russians, Tajiks, Tungans, Mongols, Xibo, and Daghurs, quickly embraced that patriotism. Their active participation in the revolution was a strong indication of their sup-port. The composition of the East Turkistan army and government was multiethnic; that army fought the wars under the flag of the “Charge for the Independence of East Turkistan.”

The ideas and principles of self-determination, as well as the policies of the national liberation movement, were discussed by leading intellectuals such as Ehmetjan Qasimi and Abdukerim Abbassof. The 5-year liberation experience provided a lot of ideas and enforced indoctrination by Soviet- style unionism in forging the national ethnic-based republics. However, they strongly criticized Pan-Turkism and narrow nationalism. On the con-trary, they supported unity of all the ethnic groups under national libera-tion movements and supported state nationalism and patriotism of East Turkistan. For example, the President of the East Turkistan Republic, Elikhan Töre, the second leader of the revolution Ehmetjan Qasimi, and others in their speeches and articles always used terms such as Sherqiy Türkistan Xelqi (People of East Turkistan), Xelqimiz (our people), and Millitimiz (our nation), which were common for all the ethnic groups in the East Turkistan Republic. Ehmetjan Qasimi called movements of Uyghurs and other allied ethnic groups in this period national liberation movements or national liberation revolutions. He expressed the goal of the national liberation movement in the following way: “The main aim of our

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movement for national liberation: the elimination of the colonial system, the achievement of genuine equality and political democracy.”48 Ehmetjan Qasimi clearly pointed out that main goal of the national liberation move-ment was to establish a national democratic government.49 Abdukerim Abbasof, one of the leaders of ETR, pointed out that the “goal of the national liberation movement is against the Kuomintang counterrevolu-tionaries and foreign imperialists.”50 He expressed the main mission of national revolution as “ending the rule of the Kuomintang counterrevolu-tionaries in Xinjiang and to turn politically oppressed, economically poor, culturally undeveloped Xinjiang into a politically equal, economically flourishing and powerful, culturally progressive region.”51

However, Ehmetjan Qasimi, Abdukerim Abbasof, and others in their speeches and articles after 1946—in the new circumstances of the Ili rebel-lion, developing Sino-Soviet ties, and the international political atmo-sphere, including the beginning of the Cold War—never mentioned what kind of political democratic government would take shape in Xinjiang province after the end of Kuomintang rule. They never officially urged or encouraged Uyghurs and other ethnic groups to unify with Kuomintang government or Chinese communists. Ehmetjan Qasimi’s main slogans were: “long live the liberation of oppressed peoples,” “long live the demo-cratic line,” “long live the fortress of world peace, the great Soviet Union,”52 “long live the real equality of nationalities,” and “long live the democratic policy which guarantees real equality of nationalities.”53

Ehmetjan Qasimi was strongly against narrow nationalism and worried about its use by Kuomintang Han nationalists for raising interethnic con-flicts between Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other ethnic groups in the territory of the East Turkistan Republic or three districts, as it was known. Therefore, the ethnic issue was very sensitive. Ehmetjan Qasimi and others carefully paid attention to ethnic issues and supported ethnic unity and solidarity in the three districts. The Ili government supported a multiethnic society and system of government. For example, in August 1947, they invited some Han Chinese leaders of an anti-Kuomintang underground organiza-tion in Urumqi to Ghulja and started publishing a Chinese-language newspaper, Newspaper Democracy, for Han minorities in the Ili region and other parts of the province.

However, Ehmetjan Qasimi, Abdukerim Abbasof and others recog-nized themselves as nationalists, but not narrow nationalists; they strongly criticized narrow nationalism. Ehmetjan Qasimi wrote: “We are national-ists, we are strong (powerful) nationalists; but, we are nationalists, because


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our nationality is in unequal circumstances.”54 Abdukerim Abbasof highly praised nationalism and gave the following definition: “A nationalist is for us real friendly, close and lovely. The cruel crimes and actions of the Kuomintang counterrevolutionaries stimulated our brothers’ national feel-ings and created real nationalists. Each person is ready to sacrifice himself for liberation of his nationality. First of all, the peoples of Ili, Tarbaghatay and Altay have thrown themselves into the struggle and in result for the price of blood of many nationalists and national heroes they gained today’s rights.”55

According to Abdukerim Abbasof, the national liberation revolution in three districts and other parts of province belongs to the revolutionary movement of nationalists and national heroes. He understood their revo-lution as a nationalistic movement and their victory as a victory of nation-alism. He explained that revolutions in the three districts and in other places established models for national heroism and nationalism.56 He con-cluded: “Now, in our province, there were no more people left who didn’t respect nationalists and didn’t become friends with them.”57

Ehmetjan Qasimi, Abdukerim Abbasof, and others used terms in Uyghur such as Milletchi or Milletperver. These terms’ definitions are the same as “Nationalist” in English. However, after the 1950s, the political definition of the anti-local nationalist movement Uyghur-language term Milletchi was changed to have narrow nationalism and anti-Han mean-ings. After that, Uyghurs started to use the words Milletperver (national-ist) and Milletperverlik (Nationalism).

During the period of the East Turkistan Government (or the Ili Government; 1944–1949), the cultural aspects of Uyghur nationalism achieved significant developments. Furthermore, Uyghur nationalism took deep root among the masses and permeated all spheres of political life in the republic. Political terms such as national independence, national lib-eration, and self-determination rights become very much part of the public discourse. All in all, Uyghur nationalism developed into maturity in this period.

The government of East Turkistan, or the Ili government, put great emphasis on improving education and cultural development. In the terri-tories under its rule, many books and eleven newspapers in five different languages were published. Those publications promoted native cultures, patriotism, and East Turkistani nationalism. Students were taught in all ethnic languages in the East Turkistan Republic. Those schools started to train technical, political, and even military personal. At that time, national

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liberation, patriotism, and independence were the ideological foundations of the schools.

As mentioned earlier, Uyghur nationalism permeated all levels of politi-cal and cultural life in East Turkistan. It reflected itself in the articles of the newspaper Azat Sherqiy Türkistan (Free East Turkistan), magazines such as Küresh (The Struggle) and Ittipaq (The Union), materials written by Uyghur historians, and speeches given by the leaders of the young repub-lic (Elikhan Töre, Ehmetjan Qasimi, and others). It was also expressed in folk songs, military marches, and the theater as well as the works of various writers and cultural activists. During these 5 years, the government pro-moted patriotism. Uyghur nationalism, Uyghur ethnic identity, ethnic consciousness, and ethnic unity were the key themes of newspapers, maga-zines, and education organizations. Historical topics were related to ancient and medieval Uyghur political history, flourishing of historical Uyghur states, and anti-Qing uprisings of Uyghurs. National and cultural heroes and symbols were one of the main ideological educational tools.

Starting in 1943, the Soviet attitude toward China and specifically toward Sheng Shicai changed dramatically. Therefore, the Soviet Communist Party Politburo decided to assist the national liberation movement in Xinjiang and to support it. Soviets paid particular attention to propaganda. To this end, they published in Tashkent from 1943 Sherq Heqiqiti (The Truth of Orient) and Qazaq Eli (Kazakh’s Land) in Almaty; these journals were to be distrib-uted in Xinjiang. In them, the ideas of self-determination, national libera-tion, and political and cultural contributions of Uyghurs in history were advanced. The Soviets were also engaged in propagating and advertising the benefits of Soviet-style economic and cultural developments of neighboring Central Asia.

The Soviets supported the republic by providing cadres, military, politi-cal, and trade support and thus helped to establish the East Turkistan Republic and its military action against the Kuomintang between 1944 and 1945. According to secret Soviet archives that were opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Stalin’s politburo decided to organize and support the national liberation movements in Xinjiang province. Until July 1946, high-level Soviet political and military advisers came from Moscow and regularly stayed in Ghulja, providing aid to the East Turkistan Republic.58 More than 2000 soldiers and 500 officers from the Red Army served in the National Army of the East Turkistan Republic.59 Soviet sup-port helped to strengthen the ideas of national ethnic state building and enforce the ideas of national liberation.


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In the three liberated districts of East Turkistan from 1944 to 1949, all sorts of Soviet printed materials in Uyghur, Kazak, Uzbek, and Russian were distributed openly. Soviet-minded officials who cherished a special relationship with the Ili government were promoted. Moreover, starting in 1947, the Tashkent-based Soviet foreign radio began its Uyghur lan-guage broadcasting into the Uyghur region directly, as well as its anti-Pan- Turkism propaganda.60

Between 1945 and 1949, some Uyghur intellectuals in Urumqi, who were trained and travelled in Muslim countries of the Middle East and to Turkey, including Mesud Sabri, Muhammed Emin Bughra, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Qurban Qoday, and Abliz Chinggizxan, engaged in a fierce bat-tle with the intellectuals of the Eastern Turkistan Republic, including Ehmetjan Qasimi, Rehimjan Sabir Haji, Seypidin Ezizi, and Abdukerim Abbasof, who accepted the influence of the Soviet Union. Among these groups, proponents of the ideas of the Ili faction, including the leaders of the Eastern Turkistan Republic, were labeled as radicals, whereas propo-nents of the Üch Ependi (three misters) in Urumqi were called conservatives by Zhang Zhizhong, chairman of the coalition provincial government in 1946–1947.61

Although they had a common final goal, their disagreement on which external power to use temporarily created a major rift between them. Intellectuals referred to as Üch Ependi—namely Mesud Sabri, Muhammed Emin Bughra, and Isa Yusuf Alptekin—preferred to negotiate with the Chinese Kuomintang government, through which they planned to gain rights to a high level of autonomy within China and to reform the Chinese constitution in order to change the name Xinjiang to Turkistan.62 They were against the nationalities policies of the Soviet Union, which paved the way for a division of territories and for classifying groups as Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek, and were in favor of a common Turkic national ideology. From their perspective, Uyghur, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tatar, and others are only tribes of Turks.63 They were against the Soviet-style ethnic separation policy in East Turkistan enacted by Sheng Shicai and the Kuomintang and the Soviets’ national delimitation that started in 1924. In fact, the Üch Ependi’s nationalistic viewpoints are a continuance of the Turkic nation and Turkic Jadidist viewpoints of Ismayil Gasprinskiy (1851–1914). Their thinking has some similarities to ideas on establishing a common Turkic republic for Turkic peoples in Russia, as well as the Turkic nationalistic viewpoints of Mustafa Choqayev (1890–1941), Turar Rysqulov (1894–1938), Munewer Qari (1880–1933), Zeki Velidi

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(1890–1970), Feyzulla Khojayev (1896–1938), and many other Uzbek, Kazakh, and Tatar Turkistan nationalists who were against the Soviets’ national delimitation policy in Central Asia.

The President of the Khokand Autonomy in 1918, Mustafa Choqayev, wrote that in 1931: “The Turkish tribes of Turkestan who aspire to unite have been split up into separate ‘nations’ and in place of national self determination there took place inter-tribal demarcation within one nation-ality.”64 The difference of viewpoints of Turkic nationalists of Russian Turkistan and East Turkistan is that Uyghur Turkic nationalists only tried to establish an independent Turkic republic in the 1930s in their own land. However, in the 1940s, they changed political strategy. The first step was a highly autonomous system of government; the next step was indepen-dence for Uyghurs with other Turkic people together in East Turkistan. No historical evidence exists about such Uyghur Turkic nationalists as Mesud Sabri, Muhammed Emin Bughra, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, and others who were criticized by the Soviets and Chinese communists as Pan- Turkists regarding their attempts to establish a worldwide independent state for all Turkic people, including in Soviet territory, China, and other places. They only fought for political and cultural rights, even higher autonomy rights for Uyghur people and other Turkic people, only in Xinjiang province’s territory. They never recognized themselves as Pan- Turkist; they said they were Milletchi (Nationalist). They decelerated their political identity in their official newspaper Erk (Freedom) with the following three slogans: “Biz Xelqchimiz (We are democrats), Biz Milletchimiz (We are national-ists), Biz Insaniyetchimiz (We are humanists).”65 Their ethnic and geo-political identity is also understood from the following three slogans: “Irqimiz Türktur (Our nationality is Turk), Dinimiz Islamdur (Our reli-gion is Islam), Yurtimiz Türkistandur (Our homeland is Turkistan).”66

According to the Üch Ependi, the geographic term “Turkistan” signi-fies East Turkistan or Xinjiang, They differentiated Russian Turkistan or Soviet Central Asia from Xinjiang province or East Türkistan under Chinese control. Therefore, they tried to change Xinjiang to Turkistan or Chinese Turkistan via legal means and through dialog with Nationalist China’s parliament and government system. On several occasions, they demanded Chang Kai-shek to change Xinjiang to Turkistan and establish high autonomy under the name of Chini Türkistan (Chinese Turkistan). Most of members of the Üch Ependi group were Uyghur youths in Urumqi, Kashgar, and other regions. Uyghur youths, but not all Kazakhs, mostly welcomed their Turkic nationalistic ideas. In March 1948, they


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established the Türk Milletchi Partiyesi (Turkish Nationalist Party) in Urumqi. Its main political goals were first higher autonomy for Turkistan and, secondly, independence.67

The Üch Ependi group was strongly opposed to the Soviet Union and the Soviet ethnic policy. They used their media, journals, and organizations sustained a strong anti-Soviet and anti-Ili revolution propaganda campaign from 1945 to 1949. However, they were more favorably disposed toward the central government of China. Chang Kai-shek’s Nationalist govern-ment for their anti-Soviet strategy and cooperation with western allies in 1947–1948 adopted a policy of support toward these Uyghur nationalists. The Uyghur nationalist leader Mesud Sabri was appointed by Chang Kai-shek to a position as governor of Xinjiang province. He became the first Uyghur governor of Xinjiang province after 1884. Isa Yusuf Alptekin was appointed general secretary of the provincial government and M. Bughra as vice governor. During the 1-year period, they adopted stronger Turkic nationalistic and anti-Soviet propaganda; supported countries such as the United States, Britain, and Turkey during the Cold War; and promoted the idea of cooperation with these countries. The Soviets strongly criticized them as Pan-Turkists and demanded that the Chinese nationalist govern-ment limit their anti-Soviet propaganda. As a result of Sabri, Alptekin, and Bughra’s strong Turkic nationalistic and anti-Soviet propaganda in 1947, the Kazakhstan Communist Party submitted to Moscow a proposal to establish an Uyghur Autonomous Oblast (Prefecture) within Zharkent (Panfilov) as an administrative center of Autonomous Oblast (Prefecture). In the justification of its creation was the idea to help and inspire the libera-tion movement of 3 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang.68 Nevertheless, the Ili Group, under the leadership of Ehmetjan Qasim, continued a pro-Soviet ethnic policy and did not openly support the Üch ependi Turkic nationalis-tic viewpoint. They also supported the unity of all Turkic, non-Turkic, and non-Muslim ethnic groups under the Ili government’s leadership against Kuomintang Nationalist China.69

Some Western and Chinese scholars regard the president of East Turkistan Republic, ethnic Uzbek Elikhan Töre—a religious figure, famous scholar of Islam, and well-known imam in Central Asia, with a high reputa-tion among the Muslim in Xinjiangs, and who had played significant role in calling for anti-Hanism and the independence of the ETR70—as being Pan-Turkist, Pan-Islamist,71 or a Turkish-Islamic Separatist.72 They also charac-terize the beginning phase of the East Turkistan Republic as being Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic. However, what they say does not fit the facts.

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In the beginning, the newly formed government was called the Interim Government of the East Turkistan Republic, not the Turkistan Islamic Government. During the peace talks between the East Turkistan Republic and the Kuomintang from December 15–17, 1945, the East Turkistan Republic interim government held a congress of delegations from various nationalities in Ghulja and officially called the interim government the Government of the East Turkistan Republic.73

Ehmetjan Qasimi, Abdukerim Abbasof, Qasimjan Qembiri, and Seypidin Ezizi were appointed as members of government committees; all of them were appointed by President Elikhan Töre to different ministries of the republic. They and other many high-ranking Uyghur, Kazakh, Tatar, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Mongol, Russian, and Xibo officials of the East Turkistan Republic were later recognized by the Chinese communists as leaders and high-ranking cadres of Three District Revolution and partici-pators in the revolution. This rejects claims about the East Turkistan Republic’s Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist ideology allegedly adopted by Elikhan Töre and members of his cabinet. Abdurewup Mekhsum, who was the secretary of the government of the East Turkistan Republic and a member of the cabinet, refuted that allegation:

The East Turkistan Republic was not founded on the philosophy of Pan- Islamism or Pan-Turkism. The East Turkistan Republic allowed other reli-gions and religious beliefs. It also advocated the equality of different ethnic groups. It endorsed modern education, cultural and economical develop-ment, industrial renovation, public health and safety, and a free press. The nine-point East Turkistan Republic Declaration was very good material proof. Apart from Muslim, Uyghur, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tatars and Tungans, Christian Russians, Lama Mongols, Shamanist Xibo and Daghurs also took part in that revolution. They fought for the East Turkistan Republic regardless of their religious beliefs. How can we preach Pan- Islamism and Pan-Turkism to them? We were the first government that endorsed religious freedom. We accomplished what previous and later Chinese governments could not accomplish.74

From 1944 to 1950, East Turkistan’s education system was modeled after the Soviet experience; even most of the teaching materials were imported from the Soviet Union. The Ili Government media paid particu-lar attention to newspapers and journals that were published in the Uyghur, Kazakh, Russian, Mongol, and Xibo languages. The Uyghur language newspaper Free East Turkistan, which started publishing in November


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1944, was changed to Revolutionary East Turkistan after July 1946. The journals for Uyghur youth, The Struggle and The Union, were busy propa-gating the successes of Soviet-style governance in the fields of education, culture, and economy; they were constantly bringing up questions of eth-nicity, national liberation, and self-determination; the history of medieval independent Uyghur states and Uyghur cultural flourishing in the past; as well as questions of international politics.

conclusion

In August 1949, the former leaders of the East Turkistan Republic were killed in a mysterious plane crash in the Soviet territory on their way to a meeting with Chinese Communist leaders (which was later officially called the Three Districts Revolution by China). Mao Zedong sent a telegraph to the Ili leaders, recognizing that the national liberation movement was “part of whole Chinese people’s democratic revolutionary movement.”75 He invited leaders of this national liberation movement, who directly assisted in establishing the independent East Turkistan Republic and became leading members of ETR government, to join the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference in Beijing. In October 1949, the Chinese communist govern-ment took control of Xinjiang province and declared that all of the nation-alities, including the Uyghurs, were liberated and ethnic conflicts were over.

After 1950, the PRC recognized the autonomy rights of the Uyghurs, but they did not recognize the self-determination rights of Uyghurs, which Chinese communists had promised since 1922 via its party congresses and documents. Since 1949, with its various political, social, economic, demo-graphic, cultural, and ideological policies, the PRC consolidated its control over this province. Uyghur nationalism entered a period of development and Uyghur nationalism was strongly related to various political, ideologi-cal, and social movements in this region after 1949.

The formation and strengthening of Uyghur Nationalism started in the early twentieth century under the ethnonyms “Uyghur” or “Turkic.” It was related to the concepts of national liberation and self-determination of Uyghurs. The Uyghur nationalist ideas started to form in the early twenti-eth century under the influence of interior and exterior factors. The aim for the Uyghur nationalist movement is independence—that is, independence from China whether under the name of East Turkistan or Uyghuristan.76 The goal of independence conceived by the Uyghur nationalist movement was a typical expression of the early twentieth century; in other words, this

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aim was typical for the period of development of the national liberation idea and movements from 1921 to 1933 and 1944 to 1949. During this period, it had much more the character of political nationalism than cul-tural nationalism.

In the 1930s and 1940s, through overwhelming revolutions and the establishment of the two Eastern Turkestan Republics, it was demonstrated that the final political aim of Uyghur nationalism is an implementation of the principle of self-determination. Two independent Eastern Turkestan Republics marked the official appearance of the Uyghur nationalism and the beginning of its competition with Chinese nationalism. During the existence of the two East Turkistan Republics, especially that of 1944–1949, Uyghur nationalism flourished under the idea of Eastern Turkistan patrio-tism. National feelings, national differences, national freedom, and national independence became widespread elements of everyday life of all nationalities in Eastern Turkistan, including the Uyghurs at that time. The Uyghur nationalist intellectuals and leaders offered a theoretical basis for Uyghur nationalism.

In the first half of the twentieth century, Uyghur national identity was dynamic and flexible. The construction of Uyghur nationalism responded to the changing political circumstances in which it had been evolving. During the emergence and development of Uyghur nationalism, different ideological currents; including communism, Turkism, and Islamism, influ-enced Uyghur intellectuals; they tried to apply these theories to the national liberation movement. Intellectuals played prominent roles in the two Eastern Turkistan Republics. These intellectuals formed the leader-ship cadres of these states and also constituted the core of the government and the military. The rise of historical consciousness was targeted as a means of strengthening ethnic sentiments; articles on the Uyghur classics were frequently published in the East Turkistan republic-sponsored media.

The division of the Uyghur intellectual class in the first half of the twen-tieth century was a reflection of international and regional ideological and political competition in Eastern Turkistan and among the Uyghurs. The leadership of the first Eastern Turkistan Republic was formed by the indi-viduals who were influenced by Turkist and Islamist awakening move-ments, which emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, their statist ideology based on Turkism turned out to be a victim of the complicated external and internal political situation in Eastern Turkistan and Central Asia, as well as of the conflict of interests and power struggles between the great powers.


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At the beginning of the twentieth century, educated Uyghurs, intel-lectuals, and merchants with nationalist ambitions established modern schools and initiated an enlightenment movement throughout East Turkistan, contributing to the rise and development of Uyghur national-ism. Modern Uyghur ethnic identity and nationalism are a creation of the first half of the twentieth century. Its evolution as a political force is one of the crucial factors in any analysis of political and cultural change in China’s Uyghur region and Russian Central Asia.

The Uyghur nationalists brought to East Turkistan books on the his-tory of Turkic peoples from Russian cities such as Kazan and Orenburg and from Turkey, realizing that it would be impossible to cultivate national sentiments without introducing their own history and cultural traditions and without having people be proud of the glorious parts of their history. National history and national symbols frequently became the most impor-tant ideological base of Uyghur nationalism in the first and second half of the twentieth century.

In the beginning of the twentieth century, Turkic-language magazines, such as Shura; the newspaper Vaqit; and other Uyghur-, Uzbek-, Tatar-, and Kazakh-language newspapers, magazines and books that were pub-lished in the Russian Empire and the Soviet period, played an important role in the Uyghurs’ understanding of their history, ethnic identity, cul-ture, and relations with other Turkic people. The Tatar-Turkic language press in the Russian Empire was an important external factor in the forma-tion of Uyghur Jadidism and nationalism.

In the formation and strengthening of Uyghur nationalism, the Soviet Union played a significant role in its political, ideological, and national strategy. Its state interest provided a national delimitation policy in Central Asia. Under the Bolsheviks’ “world revolution” slogan, since 1919 the Soviets started to support the national liberation ideas of the Asian people, including Muslims of Russian Turkistan and East Turkistan/Xinjiang. The Uyghur intellectual class of Russian and Chinese Turkistan were strongly influenced by this slogan in the national liberation movement. Even though Soviet Russia was against the realization of any Turkic nationalistic idea and an independent Turkic republic in this province, it always sup-ported the liberation movement and strengthened Uyghur political and cultural nationalism against Chinese chauvinism and China’s anti-Soviet political strategy. This strategy and Soviet national interests in the twenti-eth century took advantage of Uyghur and other local peoples’ nationalis-tic ideas and their liberation movements.

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Uyghur nationalism in the twentieth century has characteristics of state and cultural nationalism. However, it never took on any ideological charac-teristics of chauvinism or racism. Uyghur nationalism always supported and called for the unity and solidarity of all ethnic groups, not only Turkic and non-Turkic but also Muslim and non-Muslim, who were a major population of the province. Uyghur nationalism was always against extreme nationalism, radicalism, and narrow nationalism and never spurned other ethnic groups.

Special thanks go to Mr. Henryk Szadziewski for his English editing of this chapter.

notes

1. Stanley Toops (2004) Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949, East-West Center Washington Working Papers. No. 1. Washington, DC. p. 1.

2. Yang Zengxin (1867–1928) was a Han Chinese warlord and ruler of Xinjiang province after the Xinhai Revolution in 1911 until his assassination in 1928. Yang came to power after he defeated the revolutionaries who caused the last Qing dynasty governor, Yuan Dahua, to flee during the Xinhai Revolution in Xinjiang. His rule was recognized by Yuan Shikai, President of the Chinese Republic and later the Nationalist Government in Nanjing.

3. Muhammed Emin BughraMusabayevs and Their Activity of New Education and Sport Among the Uyghurs (1997) Sherqiy Türkistan Tarixi (History of East Turkistan). Istanbul. pp. 358–71.

4. Adeeb Khalid (1998) The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. p. 93.

5. Shirip Xushtar (2000) ‘Uyghur Yéngi Maaripi we Tenterbiyisini Tartqatquchi Aka-uka Musabayoflar’ (Brothers Musabayevs and Their Activity of New Education and Sport Among the Uyghurs) in Seypidin Ezizi et al. (ed.) Hüseyniye Rohi: Teklimakandiki Oyghinish (The Hüseyn Musabayow Spirit: Awakening of the Taklimakan). Urumqi: Xinjiang Xelq Neshriyati. pp. 210–15.

6. Shirip Xushtar (2000) ‘Musabayov we Uning Soda Karxanisi’ (Musabayev and His Trade Company) in Seypidin Ezizi et al. (ed.) Hüseyniye Rohi: Teklimakandiki Oyghinish (The Hüseyn Musabayow Spirit: Awakening of the Taklimakan). Urumqi: Xinjiang Xelq Neshriyati. pp. 24–5.

7. Ibid. pp. 32–6.8. Tursunjan Abduljan (2000) ‘Hüseyniye mektipi dewridiki Neshiryatchiliq,

Metbechilik we Hösnixetchilik’ (Activity of Press, Publishing and Calligraphy in period of Hüseyniye School) in Seypidin Ezizi et al. (ed.) Hüseyniye Rohi: Teklimakandiki Oyghinish (The Hüseyn Musabayow Spirit: Awakening of the Taklimakan). Urumqi: Xinjiang Xelq Neshriyati. p. 172.


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9. Ghulja in 1912: A Chronicle from the Russian Muslim Press. Introduced, translated and annotated by David Brophy. www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/scholarship

10. Tursunjan Abduljan (2000) ‘Hüseyniye mektipi dewridiki Neshiryatchiliq, Metbechilik we Hösnixetchilik’ (Activity of Press, Publishing and Calligraphy in period of Hüseyniye School) in Seypidin Ezizi et al. (ed.) Hüseyniye Rohi: Teklimakandiki Oyghinish (The Hüseyn Musabayow Spirit: Awakening of the Taklimakan). Urumqi: Xinjiang Xelq Neshriyati. p. 174.

11. Chen Chao (1993) ‘Fan Tujuezhuyi, Fan Yisilanzhuyi zai Xinjiangde Zaoqi Chaunbo yu Yang Zengxinde Duice’ (Early spreading of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism in Xinjiang and Yang Zengxin’s Strategy) in Yang Faren (ed.) Fan Yisilanzhuyi Fan Tujue Zhuyi Yanjiu Lunwenji. Urumqi. p. 43.

12. A. Şerif Aksoy (2013) I ttihat ve Terakki. Istanbul: Nokta kitap. p. 10.13. Sherali Turdiyev (1998) ‘Rol Rossi v podavlenii dvizhenii Djadidskogo

divizhenia’ in Tsentralnaya Asia 1, No. 13.14. James A. Millward (2008) Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang.

New York: Columbia University Press. p. 173.15. Shirip Xushtar (2000) ‘Uyghur Yéngi Maaripi we Tenterbiyisini Tartqatquchi

Aka-uka Musabayoflar’ (Brothers Musabayevs and Their Activity of New Education and Sport Among the Uyghurs). pp. 226–8.

16. Muhammed Emin Bughra (1997) Sherqiy Türkistan Tarixi (History of East Turkistan). Istanbul. pp. 357–71.

17. Jin Shuren was a Han Chinese warlord governor of Xinjiang, succeeding Yang Zengxin when Yang was assassinated in 1928. He ruled Xinjiang for 5 years starting in 1928 to 1933.

18. Mirehmet Seyit and Yalqun Rozi (1997) Memtili Ependi (Mr. Memtili), Urumqi: Xinjiang Uniwersiteti Neshriyati, p. 217.

19. Ibid. pp. 212–253. See also the personal interview with Seley Haji Artishi, a well-known Uyghur figure in Turkey and former student of Memtili Tewpiq in 1933–1937. According to him, Memtili Tewpiq taught many poems about Uyghuristan. One of them is ‘Uyghuristan baliliribiz’ (We are sons of Uyghuristan). Personal interview, October, 2008.

20. Chen Chao (1993) ‘Fan Tujuezhuyi, Fan Yisilanzhuyi zai Xinjiangde Zaoqi Chaunbo yu Yang Zengxinde Duice’ (Early spreading of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism in Xinjiang and Yang Zengxin’s Strategy) in Yang Faren (ed.) Fan Yisilanzhuyi Fan Tujue Zhuyi Yanjiu Lunwenji.

21. All the Russian scholars of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century referred to Uyghurs in Ili Valley and Semirechya as “Taranchi.”

22. Uyghur historian Nezerghoja Abdusemetov used this term. See his article; N. Uyghur balası (1914) ‘Taranchi Türkleri’ (Taranchi Turks) in Shura, 15 (August 1, 1914): 455–57.

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23. Tatar Journalist Nushirvan Yavshev, who visited Kashgar in 1914, used this term. See his article ‘Altı sheher Türkleri’ (Turks of Altishahr) in Shura, 24 (December 15, 1915): 747–48.

24. Owen Lattimore (1973) ‘Return to China’s Northern Frontier’ in The Geographical Journal 139 (2): p. 237.

25. Kim Ho-dong (2004) Holy war in China: the Muslim rebellion and state in Chinese Central Asia, 1864–1877. (illustrated ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 3.

26. James A. Millward (2007) p. 9.27. Linda Benson (1990) The Ili Rebellion: the Moslem challenge to Chinese

authority in Xinjiang, 1944–1949. London: M.E. Sharpe. p. 30.28. Ildikó Bellér-Hann (2008) Community matters in Xinjiang, 1880–1949:

towards a historical anthropology of the Uyghur (illustrated ed.). Leiden: Brill. p. 50.

29. L. Kornilov (1903) Kashgaria ili Vostochnyj Turkestan: Opet Voenno-statisticheskogo Opisania (Kashgaria or East Turkistan; Experiences of Military –statistic materials). Tashkent: Published by Command staff of military district of Turkistan.

30. M. I. Erzin (1980) Uyghur Sovet Metbuatining Tarixi (History of Soviet Uyghur Press). Alma-Ata. pp. 31–105.

31. A. Rozibaqiyev (1994) ‘Tengriqut Qutluq’ in Pervaz. Alma-Ata. pp. 3–13.32. M. Rozibaqiyev, N. Rozibaqiyeva (1987) Uyghur Xelqining Munewwer

Perzenti (Educated Son of Uyghur People). Alma-Ata: Qazaqistan Neshriyati. pp. 34–35.

33. M. Rozibaqiyev (1997), ‘A. Rozibaqiyev Sherqi Turkistan Mesililirige Köngül Bölgen’ (Abdulla Rozibaqiyev Concerned about East Turkistan Problems) in Uyghur Awazi. Alma-Ata. October 31.

34. Justin Rudelson (1997) Oasis identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China’s Silk Road. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 149.

35. Ondrej Klime (2015) Struggle by the Pen: The Uyghur Discourse of Nation and National Interest, c.1900–1949. Leiden: Brill Academic Pub. p. 107.

36. Seypidin Ezizi (1990) Ömür Dastani Zulum Zindanlirida. Eslime 1 (Poem of Life). Beijing: Milletler Neshiriyati. pp. 428–52.

37. Nabijan Tursun (2014) The influence of intellectuals of the first half of the 20th century on Uyghur politics. Central Asia Program. George Washington University, Uyghur Initiative paper. No. 11, December, 2014. p. 8.

38. Russian State Military Archive (hereafter RGVA) F. 25,895, Op. 1, D. Citing, Pavel Aptekar, Ot Zheltorosii do Vostochno-Turkestanskoj Respubliki (From Yellow Russia to the East Turkestan Republic). http://rkka.ru/oper/sinc/sinc.htm

39. Orlando Figes (2007) The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia. Lon’don: Allen Lane. pp. 227–316.


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40. 20-esir Namayendiliri (Famous People of 20th Century) (2005) prepared by Yoldash Azamatov. Rond. Almata. pp. 29–97.

41. Xelem Xudaberdiyev (2003) Zaman Izghirinlirigha Shungghup Xatirename (To Dive into Winds of Times—Diary). Tashkent. pp. 94–116.

42. Chen Huisheng (1999) Minguo Xinjiang Shi (History of Xinjiang in Chinese Republican Period). Urumqi: Xinjiang Renmin Chubanshe. p. 283. Millward (2007) p. 203.

43. James A. Millward and Nabijan Tursun (2004) ‘Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884–1997’ in Frederick Starr (ed), Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. London, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, p. 78. Personal interview with Mr. Gholamidin Pakhta, son of Ehmet Pakhta, one of the members of the ETR government delegation that was sent to the Soviet Union by ETR in January 1934.

44. Muhammed Emin Bughra (1997) p. 468.45. Ibid. pp. 462–3.46. Ibid. p. 464.47. Emin Wahidi (1938) Inqilab Xatirisi (Memoir of the Revolution). Istanbul:

Taklimakan Uyghur Printing House (printed in 2008). M. I. Bughra (1997). Polat Qadiri (1948) Ölke Tarixi (History of Province). Urumqi: Altay Neshiriyati. Hemdulla Tarim (1980) Türkistanning 1931–1937-yilliridiki Inqilab Tarixi (History of the Revolution of Turkestan in 1931–1937). Handwritten copy by Hemdulla Tarim in Istanbul.

48. Ekhemetjan Qasimi (1949) ‘Milliy Mesilidiki Bezi Xataliqlirimiz’ (Our some Mistakes in Ethnic Issue) in Ittipaq journal, issue: 6 June 1949, Ghulja.

49. Ibid., 1949, and see: Nabijan Tursun (forthcoming) Sovetskij Soyuz i Natsionalno-Osvoboitelnoe Dvizhenie Ujgurov Pervoj Poloviny 20 veka (Soviet Union and National Liberation Movement of Uyghurs in first half of 20th Century). p. 37 (Uyghur version: Uyghur Milliy Azadliq Herikiti Mesilisi).

50. Abdukerim Abbasof (1948) ‘Xelq Azadliq Urushi we Shinjangdiki Milliy Mesile’ (People’s Liberation War and National Issue in Xinjiang). Printed in Shinjang üch wilayet Inqilabi Rehberlirining J K P Merkiziy Komitétigha Yollighan Doklati we Maqaliliridin Tallanmilar (Selections of Articles of Leaders of Xinjiang Three District Revolution and their reports to Center of Chinese Communist Party). 1997. Shinjang Xelq Neshiriyati. p. 166.

51. Ibid. p. 166. nationalists, but not narrow nationalists; they strongly criti-cized narrow nationalism

52. Ehmetjan Qasimi (1949) ‘8-april Milliy Armiye Muntizimlashqan Künining Tentenlik Yighinida Qilinghan Söz’ (Speech in meeting on April 8, National Army Day) in Algha newspaper, issue: April 17. Ghulja.

53. Ehmetjan Qasimi (1949) ‘Ghuljidiki Shinjangda Tinchliqni Qoghdash Xelqchil ittipaqi Aktipliri yighinida qilinghan söz’ (Speech in Ghulja meet-

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ing of activists of Union of Democracy and Peace of Xinjiang) in Algha newspaper, issue: May 24, 1949. No. 117.

54. Abdukerim Abbasof (1948) ‘Milletchilerning Ghayiwi ilhamchiliri’ (Ideal supporters of Nationalists) in Algha newspaper, issue: September 11, 1948.

55. Ibid.56. Ibid.57. Ibid.58. A. Kamalov (2010) ‘Uyghur Memoir Literature in Central Asia on East

Turkestan Republic (1944–1949)’ in James A. Millward, Shinmen Yasushi, Sugawara Jun (ed.) Studies on Xinjiang Historical Sources in 17–20th Centuries. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko. pp. 264–275. V. A. Barmin (1999) Sintszian v sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnosheniiakh 1941–1949 gg (Xinjiang in Soviet-Sino Relations in 1941–1949s). Barnaul, Russian Republic: Barnaulskii gosu-darstvennyi pedagogicheskii universitet. pp. 79–81.

59. V. A. Barmin. ibid., p. 80.60. According to Isa Yusuf Alptekin, the Soviet government established a

Uyghur radio program in Tashkent and broadcasted news and various arti-cles accusing him and others of Pan-Turkism. Isa Yusuf Alptekin (1985) Esir Doğu Turkistan Için (For the Captured Eastern Turkistan), Istanbul: Doğu Türkistan Neşriyat Merkezi, pp. 509–10.

61. Zhang Zhizhong (1987) Zhang Zhizhong Hui Yilu (Memoires of Zhang Zhizhong) Volume 2 in Uyghur Translation: Urumqi Söhbiditin Shinjang Tinch Azad Bolghan’gha Qeder (From Urumqi talks to peaceful liberation of Xinjiang). Urümchi: Shinjang Xelq Neshiriyati. pp. 234, 236.

62. Muhammed Emin Bughra (2015) ‘Siyasiy Hayatim’ (My Political Life) in Muhammed Emin Bughra Eserliri (Works of Muhammed Emin Bughra). Istanbul: Teklimakan Uyghur Neshiriyati. pp. 44 and 72–3. Zhang Zhizhong (1985) Zhang Zhizhong Hui Yilu (Memoires of Zhang Zhizhong) Volume 2. Beijing: Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe. p. 571.

63. Muhammed Emin Bughra (2015) ‘Qelem Kürishi’ (Struggle of Pen) in Muhammed Emin Bughra Eserliri (Works of Muhammed Emin Bughra). Istanbul: Teklimakan Uyghur Neshiriyati. pp. 283–313.

64. Mustafa Chokayev (1931) ‘Turkestan and the Soviet Regime’ in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 18, Issue 3, p. 414.

65. See Newspaper Erk (Freedom) of these Uyghur Nationalists. Newspaper Erk (Freedom). November 8, 1947. Urumqi. Owner of newspaper Isa Yusuf Alptekin, editor Muhammed Emin Bughra.

66. Ibid.67. Muhammed Emin Bughra (2015) ‘Siyasiy Hayatim’ (My Political Life).

p. 73.68. Arkhiv Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan (Presidential Archives of Republic

of Kazakhstan). Fond 708, Opis 2, Delo 171, Listy 59–60. This material prepared by B.T. Kuppayev. http://www.ctaj.elcat.kg/tolstyi/a/a027.htm


http://www.ctaj.elcat.kg/tolstyi/a/a027.htm

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69. For more information in Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Muhammed Emin Bughra and Mesud Sabri, see Linda Benson (1991) ‘Uyghur Politicians of the 1940s: Mehmet Emin Bugra, Isa Yusuf Aliptekin and Mesud Sebri’ in Central Asia Survey 10, 4 (1991), pp. 87–114.

70. David D. Wang (1999) Clouds Over Tianshan: Essays on Social Disturbance in Xinjiang in the 1940s. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. p. 25.

71. Shinjang Üch Wilayet Inqilabi Tarixi (History of Xinjiang Three Districts Revolution) (2000) Beijing: Milletler Neshiriyati. p. 232.

72. Andrew D. W. Forbes (1986) Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911–1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 179.

73. Shinjang üch Wilayet Inqilabigha Dair chong Ishlar Xatirisi (Big Events of Three District Revolution in Xinjiang) (1996) Urumqi: Shinjang Xelq Neshriyati. p. 181.

74. Abdurewup Mekhsum Ibrayimi. Interview with him in November, 2004.75. Shinjang Üch Wilayet Inqilabi Tarixi (History of Xinjiang Three Districts

Revolution) (2000) Beijing: Milletler Neshiriyati. pp. 1, 422.76. Robert Guang Tian (2004) ‘Cultural Rights and Uyghur Nationalism’ in

High Plains Applied Anthropologist No. 2, Vol. 24, Fall, 2004. p. 144.

N. TURSUN


Religion and the Uyghurs: A Contemporary Overview

Colin Mackerras

IntroductIon

According to the 2010 census, the total Uyghur population in China was just over 10 million, almost all of whom lived in Xinjiang. The overwhelm-ingly dominant religion of the Uyghurs is Islam. There is a secular, even atheist, tradition among Uyghur intellectuals in parts of Xinjiang, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still exercises political influence and power. Although secularism, atheism, and communism share some fea-tures with religions, they are not normally regarded as such; thus, they are not considered as religions for the purposes of this chapter and are there-fore beyond its purview. Some pre-Islamic religious elements survive in contemporary Uyghur Islam.1 However, non- or anti-Islamic religions are very weak and almost nonexistent in contemporary Uyghur society. Although there are followers of Buddhism, Christianity, and other faiths in

C. Mackerras (*) Griffith University, Nathan, QLD, Australia

Colin Mackerras is professor emeritus at Griffith University, Queensland. The present article is a greatly revised, expanded and updated version of Colin Mackerras, “Religion in Contemporary Xinjiang,” a chapter published in Ken Parry, ed., Art, Architecture and Religion along the Silk Roads. Silk Road Studies Series (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), pp. 199–220.

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Xinjiang, the overwhelming majority of them are not Uyghur; they belong to other ethnic groups such as the Hans, Mongolians, Russians, or Xibes.

This chapter presents a “contemporary” overview of Uyghur Islam in Xinjiang, meaning mainly since the end of the twentieth century. However, it is never sensible to ignore history altogether; thus, the chapter provides some minor historical background coverage. The aims of the chapter are to summarize the state of Islam among the Uyghurs since the end of the twentieth century; to discuss some links between religion and ethnicity in Xinjiang; and to discuss some areas where Uyghur Islam interrelates with contemporary Chinese politics.

There are two categories of sources for this information presented in this chapter. The first kind is visits to Xinjiang in 1982, 1994, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2010, mostly in the northern autumn. During all six visits, I took a particular interest in religious matters, visiting mosques and churches and talking to clergy, lay people, and religious officials as far as I could, as well as to families I met about their attitudes toward religion and religious mat-ters. My 2003 fieldwork was the most extensive of the six; it included visits to Altay in the north of Xinjiang, the capital Ürümqi and Turpan in the center, Kucha and Aksu further to the south, and the highly religious cen-ters of Kashgar, southwest of Aksu, and moving southeast from Kashgar to Yarkant, Hotan and Yutian. My second main source was printed materials, mostly in English, but also a few in other languages, including yearbooks and handbooks, and the accounts of journalists and scholars. In recent years, especially since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Xinjiang has attracted a good deal of scholarly and nonscholarly attention; it has also been caught up in the general international increase of interest in Islam since the September 11, 2001 incidents.

HIstorIcal context

From the start, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was insistent that Xinjiang was an integral part of China. Policy toward ethnic minorities was a limited autonomy. This dictated that minorities could maintain their own culture but not secede from China. A member of the ethnic group implementing autonomy must lead the government, but only under the leadership of the CCP—the head of which could belong to any ethnic group, including the majority Han. Under this pol-icy, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was set up in October 1955, with the Uyghurs being considered the ethnic group that was implementing autonomy.2

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Under PRC law, religion is free. However, in 1954, the State Council established a Religious Affairs Bureau; this set up the Chinese Islamic Association, with which all mosques and other religious places must regis-ter. Islam continued to be openly practiced in Xinjiang and even the Sufi orders “experienced an explosion of popularity” in the early 1950s.3 The authorities left the Islamic clergy and education in place, while expanding the comprehensive secular education their political predecessors had insti-tuted. At the same time, however, the CCP took several measures that undermined the extensive social control and political and economic influ-ence of the Islamic clergy. These measures included land reform, which abolished Islamic taxes and eliminated rents from land, and the substitu-tion of PRC secular law for Islamic law everywhere.

In the late 1950s, PRC policy became considerably more radical. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) saw the fiercest persecution of religion in modern Xinjiang (as well as Chinese) history. Mao Zedong and his fol-lowers appeared determined to uproot all traditional thought and culture, which included religion and anything to do with it, especially the influence of its clergy. As a monotheistic religion with a socially highly influential clergy, Islam was a prime target of their attacks. The Islamic Association discontinued operations, but revived after Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978.

Since the 1980s, there have been dual and contradictory processes among China’s ethnic minorities. One is the assertion of ethnic identities, whereas the other is Chinese national integration. These two have not operated with equal force in all parts of China. In Xinjiang, ethnic identity has been prob-ably the strongest among all Chinese province-level units, with the possible exception of Tibet, and especially powerful among the Uyghurs. On the other hand, the Uyghurs of the XUAR definitely appear much more ambiv-alent about being integrated into China than other ethnic minorities.4 There will be more to say about this later.

Islam has benefited from this newly arisen ethnic consciousness. Dru Gladney associated it with an ethnic nationalism that, together with state policy on nationalities, goes a long way toward explaining the “fourth tide of Islam” in China that has developed since the 1980s.5 Gladney’s termi-nology derived from an idea advanced by the noted specialist Joseph Fletcher, who proposed “three tides” of Islam in China that spanned the seventh to the twentieth centuries.6

Raphael Israeli had a similar but somewhat darker view. In a book pub-lished in 2002, he wrote that Deng Xiaoping’s “relaxation of policies has seen a growth in Islamic rituals and a movement toward Islamic roots,”

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amounting to a new wave of Muslim revivalism.7 However, more ominously, he also predicted that a combination of the Chinese government’s “lax policy” toward the Muslims combined with “the pressing interests of the Muslim world and the world at large” could lead to demands for outright secession from China, arising first in “outlying areas” such as Xinjiang.8 There will be more to say about this later in this chapter. Developments since Raphael Israeli’s publication have indeed seen greater tensions and some demands for outright secession, but few signs that successful inde-pendence is on the horizon.

The Overall Growth of Islam

Official statistics claim that there were 8.1 million religious believers in Xinjiang at the end of the twentieth century, along with more than 20,000 mosques and 29,000 “religious personnel.”9 An official figure from 2009 puts the number of mosques a little higher at 24,300, but the number of clergy slightly lower, at 28,000.10 The great majority of the 8.1 million religious believers are Muslims, and the figure assumes that a little over 80 percent of the people of the Islamic ethnic groups are indeed Muslims, which is probably reasonably accurate. In the 2005 sample survey census, about 12 million of a total of 20.4 million people belonged to one of the seven ethnic groups counted as Islamic, namely Uyghurs, Kazaks, Hui, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Tatars. Assuming about four-fifths of 12 million are Muslims, the number in 2005 would be approximately 9.6 million.

The 2010 census had the Xinjiang population at 21,813,334, of whom approximately 12.8 million belonged to a Muslim ethnic group, meaning approximately 10.2 million Muslims in that year. Among the Muslim eth-nic groups, the Uyghurs have long had the reputation for greater devotion to Islam than most others in Xinjiang regarded as Muslim. What this means is that the just over 10 million Uyghurs counted in the 2010 census probably include a higher proportion of Muslims than the 80 percent cited above, and it is likely that the number of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang in 2010 was not too far short of 9 million.

Most villages in the south have active mosques and many in the north, while there are mosques in cities all over Xinjiang. I have personally seen in Xinjiang new mosques, mosques under construction, and mosques that have been demolished. The official statistics cited above suggest that the number of mosques has risen, but I suspect that all these figures are to be taken as approximate only.

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The clergy are only those officially registered as such. That may include a number who are willing to work for the Chinese state although they are secretly against it, but not the underground clergy who are actively hostile to Chinese rule as infidel and foreign. During my 2010 visit, an informant told me that the government appoints the imams for the main mosques; they are called “red imams” because they follow the government line. In the smaller mosques, imams might be chosen popularly, even if not exactly by election; these individuals sometimes cause trouble for the government.

Sufism survives quite strongly, with one scholar claiming that all over northwestern China the Sufi orders “are reclaiming land confiscated dur-ing the collectivisation programme” of the 1950s,11 to the benefit of their social influence. Edmund Waite, who carried out field research in Kashgar in 1993–1994, with two shorter visits in 2003 and 2004, claimed a growth in “reformist” Islam, being defined as “any Islamic movement that chal-lenges existing patterns of religious authority, knowledge and practice.”12 It is thus generally hostile to the Chinese state, and its challenges to the status quo tend to be conservative-minded.

Extent of Adherence to Religious PracticeConcerning the extent of worship at mosques, impressional and interview evidence from my several visits to Xinjiang suggests somewhat different patterns in various parts of the XUAR. In the south, especially in places like Kashgar, Yarkant, and Hotan, and in the capital Ürümqi, many adult men visit the mosque for prayer at least on Fridays, and quite a few visit five times a day. In the great Idkah Mosque in Kashgar, the largest in China, I heard during my 2010 visit that approximately 45,000 people attend the main prayer session on Fridays, while on holy days and festivals about 100,000 people attend the mosque itself and the square outside. Kashgar was the seat of the Karakhanid prince Satuq Bughra Khan (died 955), whom an Ottoman source claimed as the earliest Turkic ruler to convert to Islam; to this day, Kashgar has the reputation for being the most fervently Muslim city in China.

In the north, which is mainly a Kazak area, the number of men who go to the mosque for prayer is much smaller than in the south. My 1994 visit to Gulja (Yining) found one very active mosque, but it appeared to have been closed down when I returned in 1999, possibly because of distur-bances that occurred in the city in 1997. In my 2003 Altay visit, I visited two mosques where I saw but little sign of prayer; the resident clergy claimed only few Friday attendants, let alone daily ones.


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In all parts of Xinjiang, women are barred from the prayer-halls and rarely visit any part of the mosque. If and when they pray, it is usually at home. During a visit to Hotan in 2007, I visited a large mosque beside the market, the latter thronging with people, overwhelmingly men. The mosque prayer hall had quite a few men praying, and there were three women well separated from the prayer hall.13 Waite cited a restaurant waiter he interviewed in July 2003 as saying that many reformist Muslims in Kashgar, even some of his friends, practice polygamy, keeping their wives secluded “like in a cage.” He also claimed that Muslim reformism has led to an increase in the veiling of women; by the early twenty-first century, it had become “particularly pronounced among younger women,” not only in Kashgar but throughout Xinjiang.14

Islam is still very active in such practices as rituals pertaining to the dead or to weddings. Based on 1990s fieldwork, Ildikó Bellér-Hann remarked on the persistence of “rituals and daily practices which link the world of the living to the world of the dead.”15 Another example is alms to the poor. In one of the mosques I visited in Altay, people kill a sheep every year, giving the sheep’s skin for sale to the mosque. The mosque then gives the money earned to the Muslim poor.

Since the 1980s, pilgrimage to Mecca has become very widespread and open, especially among men but even among some women. An official 2009 document claimed that “in recent years, the number of people from Xinjiang who make the pilgrimage each year has been around 2700”.16 At the same time, Xinjiang has opened to ties with other Muslim societies, including exposure to ideas from the Middle East and access to the scrip-turalist traditions of Islam. These have resulted in what one researcher called “impetus towards Muslim orthodoxy.”17

However, if this material shows a vibrant Islamic life in the XUAR, there is another, darker, side to this picture showing deviation from Islamic practice. One author, Allessandra Cappelletti, writing in 2015, made the following observation:

Alcoholism represents a social problem among the Uyghur male population ranging from 16 to 55 years old. A traditionally mild form of Islam … is also a factor which does not help Uyghur society to protect themselves from habits which are usually strictly forbidden by the Muslim religion, like alco-hol abuse and prostitution.18

This passage requires comment. In calling Uyghur Islam “mild,” Cappelletti means that traditionally Uyghurs have been less rigid in

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following prescriptions, such as that on alcohol, than many other Muslim ethnic groups. However, in Xinjiang itself, my finding over several field trips was that the Kazaks have a reputation for being even more lax. Such matters are very difficult to demonstrate conclusively without rigorous surveys of a kind very difficult to undertake, let alone under present circumstances.

There is nothing new about alcohol abuse in Uyghur society. However, based on the surveys she undertook on alcohol-related illnesses such as acute pancreatitis and liver disorders, Cappelletti believed that alcohol abuse may have worsened with the onset of modernization and urbaniza-tion and the increase in Han influence. This last factor comes in part from the different wine cultures of Han and Uyghur, based on different societ-ies and attitudes.19

Just as in other societies, prostitution is very old among the Uyghurs. What is new is that it is among many causes for the rise in the incidence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in Xinjiang. There is now a growing literature on acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) in Xinjiang,20 which is the worst afflicted province-level unit in China, with the Uyghurs being particularly badly affected. Injection drug usage is the main source of the spread of HIV in Xinjiang, as in the rest of China. However, the virus is also spread through sexual contact, especially with prostitutes, to whom visits are made easier by the greater mobility that goes with modernization and rising living standards. Cappelletti offered analyses on the reasons for the severity of the AIDS situation in Xinjiang from support projects on HIV awareness and treatment, such as AusAid and UNAID. High among these reasons is the “cultural and religious environment, which is Islamic and male-centred and does not allow women to expect men to use AIDS-preventive contraceptives like condoms’”.21

Restrictions on Islamic Practice

Although Islam is practiced openly and has flourished to an increasing extent, especially in southern Xinjiang, there are many restrictions. People are allowed to pray only in officially recognized mosques or churches. Underground clergy and mosques are regarded as linked to separatism or terrorism (which will be discussed in much more detail below) and are banned.

In a September 1993 law that claims to protect minors, there is an article stating that parents and legal guardians are forbidden to allow chil-dren under 18 years of age to participate in religious activities.22 In China,


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this law appears to be unique to Xinjiang. Many mosques I visited had signs both in Chinese and Uyghur containing rules associated with the mosque, one of them being that nobody under the age of 18 years was allowed to enter. In fact, children frequent mosques freely in China, both boys and girls, but I only once saw boys going into a mosque during prayer time. I discussed this ban with a range of laity and clergy. All defended it (probably at least in part out of fear), the argument being that young people should be getting an education, not learning about Islam. Although this rule against under-18 entry applies in Xinjiang not only to mosques but also churches and temples, it appears to be aimed more against Islam than other religions.

Nowhere in Xinjiang, or indeed elsewhere in China, are secular schools allowed to propagate religion, although children can learn about religious traditions as part of cultural history. Therefore, Uyghur children can learn about how Islam has affected their own history, culture, and literature. As in France, girls may not wear religious clothing in school. There are some officially recognized theological schools and many mosques have space for such schools. However, I found fewer signs that they were functioning actively during my 2003 visit than earlier ones, when I was able to inter-view students there more freely.

The wearing of any religious clothing is banned not only for students but also for civil servants and public-sector employees, at least while they are on the job. One specialist claimed that women are forbidden to wear headscarves in “public institutions, like schools, universities and public offices.”23 Members of the CCP cannot attend prayers, in the words of Fuller and Lipman, “without serious consequences” because the official ideology of the CCP is atheist. These two scholars claimed that the rule against attending prayers or religious instruction “has also been enforced for anyone on the state payroll, except for publicly employed imams,” but stop short of claiming such enforcement as general.24

One item of clothing that has caused particular controversy is the burqah (full headcover). This has long been discouraged as an obstacle to women’s ability to work and hence to equality for women. However, in southern cities such as Kashgar, it is very common as a sign of adherence to Islamic prescriptions. In January 2015, the wearing of the burqah was formally banned for public places in the Xinjiang capital Ürümqi. The context was of an upsurge in terrorist attacks inspired by Islamic funda-mentalism, in particular that on the Charlie Hebdo headquarters in Paris. The ban was justified as a means of preventing criminals from covering

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their heads to hide from authorities. As officials pointed out, there are similar bans elsewhere, including in several European countries. However, there were reports that the ban incited resentment among Uyghurs, who protested that it was an attack on their religion and culture.

In an extensive report on the repression of Islam among the Uyghurs released in April 2005, Human Rights in China claimed that “Since the mid-1990s, state control of Islam has evolved from a focus on clergy to harassment of laity”.25 It claimed reports that mosques were under com-prehensive government surveillance and control to prevent attendance by children or young adults. It also mentioned hearing of people losing their jobs on the grounds of appearing too religious. It concluded: “Hardly any young practicing Uighur Muslim we spoke with was without a story of harassment.”26 A comment from a specialist writing nearly a decade later than the ones just quoted reached a similarly bleak conclusion: “My field-work experiences in Xinjiang since 2006 suggest that any form of Islamic practice, or even display, beyond the structures of institutional religion is regarded as damaging to the harmonious society.”27

PoPulatIon, etHnIcIty, and Islam

There has been very significant demographic change in Xinjiang under the PRC. The two main factors are that (1) the overall population has risen greatly; and (2) extensive Han immigration has changed the balance in favor of the Han drastically (although they are not yet as numerous as the Uyghurs, let alone of the minorities combined). Moreover, at least if the census is to be believed, the balance between Han and Uyghur has stabi-lized since the 1980s.

The population of Xinjiang has risen greatly under the PRC. The six censuses show the following population figures: 4,873,608 (1953 census), 7,270,067 (1964), 13,081,681 (1982), 15,155,778 (1990), 19,250,000 (2000), and 21,813,334 (2010). The Xinjiang proportion of the whole of China increased consistently in each of the censuses, from 0.84 percent in 1953 to 1.63 percent in 2010. The fact that its proportion of China’s total population nearly doubled suggests that it more than shared in the coun-try’s increased population.

Possibly important reasons for Xinjiang’s rise in the proportion of China’s total population include extensive Han immigration and the greater leni-ency for minorities after the introduction of the one-child-per- couple policy at the end of the 1970s. In Xinjiang, the rule for Uyghurs was a maximum


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of two children in the cities and three in the countryside. The fact that Islam regards children as gifts of Allah may be an additional factor. In my 1999 fieldwork in Xinjiang, despite the rules requiring smaller families, I ran-domly came across several rural Uyghur families with nine children, as well as other large families.

The proportion of Han within the whole population has risen dramati-cally, while that of the Uyghurs has fallen greatly. Of the total 1953 census figure of 4,783,608, 75.42 percent were Uyghur and only 6.94 percent were Han.28 In 1954, the CCP established the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps from demobilized troops for purposes of economic development and security. Almost all members were Han immigrants. From the late 1950s, they were joined by rusticated Han youth. There was no formal policy of immigration during the Cultural Revolution, but young Han continued to migrate to Xinjiang.29 Most of this immigration was to central or northern Xinjiang.

The proportion of Han immigrants in Xinjiang reached its highest point of 41.6 percent in 1978.30 After that, many Han returned to their original provinces. The 1982 census put the Han proportion of the total Xinjiang population at 40.4 percent. The introduction of the one-child- per-couple policy at the same time affected natural growth rates among the Han in Xinjiang much more than that of the minorities, for whom a much more lenient, although changing, policy applied.

The 1990 and 2000 censuses show a 3 percent increase in the Han pro-portion of the population from 37.6 percent to 40.6 percent and a decrease of the Uyghur proportion from 47.5 percent to 45.2 percent. The primary cause of this is almost certainly a resumption of Han immigration. In con-trast to earlier times, however, the immigration has been largely unofficial, with many people thinking they can make more money in Xinjiang than in their original provinces.

The 2010 census showed an interesting turnaround. The Han propor-tion of the population actually fell to 39.0 percent, although the absolute numbers in a rising population were higher. The proportion of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang population was 46.4 percent, an increase from the 2000 cen-sus. The Han proportion in the overall Xinjiang population has more or less stabilized since the early 1980s.

Han immigration continues, but there is a great deal of rotation, with Han going to work in particular projects and then returning to the east. Xinjiang also has been much affected by the Great Western Development Strategy, which began in 2000 and aims to develop the economy of the

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western provinces by such means as expanding outside investments. Large parts of Xinjiang have undergone an intensive modernization process, which has increased Han influence greatly whether the Han proportion in the population has expanded or not.

Ethnicity, Ethnic Relations, and Islam

Among Xinjiang’s ethnic groups, the Uyghurs, Kazaks, Hui, Kirgiz, Tajiks, and Uzbeks are Muslims and all Sunni. The Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kirgiz and Uzbeks are ethnically Turkic, with the Uyghurs and Uzbeks being very similar culturally. The Hui are like the Han, except in being Islamic,31 whereas the Tajiks speak an Iranian language (the only ethnic group in China to do so). Although the Iranians of Iran are actually Shi’ite, the Tajiks are mostly Sunni.

While changing the demographic balance in Xinjiang, Han immigration has eliminated the overwhelming predominance of Islam, simply because the Han are not Muslim. Islam remains a major factor in ethnic conscious-ness and ethnic relations. However, two points might be added. One is that Islam is not necessarily the most important factor in determining relations between an Islamic and non-Islamic ethnic group. The other is that Islam does not necessarily make for good relations between or among ethnic groups that are themselves Muslim.

The most important ethnic relationship in Xinjiang today, at least in the sense of being the one between the two most populous ethnic groups, is that between the Uyghurs (most of whom are Muslims) and the Han (who are non-Muslim or sometimes even anti-Muslim). Unlike the earlier groups of Han immigrants, who had an ideological motivation for going to Xinjiang and usually made some attempt to respect Uyghur culture and get along with the Uyghurs, the new influx is more profit-motivated and high-handed in its approach to Uyghurs. The Uyghurs nowadays distinguish between first- and second-generation Han, feeling quite warmly toward the former but resenting the latter.32 A particular set of events that must be mentioned is the interethnic rioting in the capital Ürümqi in July 2009, which did great damage to Uyghur–Han relations.

One survey carried out in 2001 showed not only strong ethnic and local identity feelings among the Uyghurs, but also mutual distrust and prejudice between Uyghurs and Han.33 There is a range of religio-cultural, as well as economic and political, reasons for these feelings. These include dietary factors, especially the Muslim proscription on eating pork, which is commonly consumed among the Han.


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Another full-length study, which found an extensive degree of subjuga-tion of Uyghurs to Han with the image “under the heel of the dragon,” considered that Han-Uyghur relations “are colored by racist attitudes.”34 The author cited interviews with the Han and stereotypically negative atti-tudes among them toward the Uyghurs. There are records, also, of equally or more hostile attitudes from Uyghurs against Han. One writer who taught English in Yining early in the twenty-first century put forward many exam-ples of hatred and hostility among Uyghurs for Han. In 2010, he met a Uyghur in Ürümqi who was prepared to cite the Qur’an in defense of killing Chinese to take revenge for the wrongs they had committed against the Uyghurs, especially during the July 2009 riots.35 It is not clear how wide-spread these terrorist sympathies are, but the evidence apparent in incidents since 2010 suggests that they are strong enough to arouse great concern.

Another matter relevant to relations is Han–Uyghur intermarriage. In cases where Muslims marry non-Muslims, the latter are usually required to convert. One specialist claimed that public disapproval among Uyghurs has made this “practically impossible in recent years.”36 A survey carried out in Ürümqi in 2000 showed results somewhat less negative than this blanket statement, but still found the Uyghurs much less accepting of intermar-riage than the Han: only 32.4 percent of Uyghurs thought marriage with Han was acceptable, whereas 77.9 percent of Han had no objection to marriage with a Uyghur.37 An official figure from 2009 claims that, in the XUAR capital Ürümqi, “the percentage of intermarriages in the city’s reg-istration” was 2.1 percent (218 couples) in 1980, while the figure rose to 5.9 percent (811 couples) in 2003.38 These figures show that intermarriage is increasing, at least in Ürümqi, but give no indication of the ethnic groups involved.

The long-standing religious and cultural factors in Han-Uyghur rela-tions might have been manageable. What has changed since the 1990s is that urban Uyghurs “have begun to emphasise religio-cultural differences and use them as symbols to demarcate ethnic boundaries … in what is actually an articulation of demands for ethnic equality in education and work, and the control of Xinjiang’s natural resources.”39 In other words, economic factors have been primary in the deterioration of relations at the grassroots level.

Despite these generally poor relations, there are bright sides. Uyghurs and Han do work together in the same units, and often quite cordially. If they eat together, which is quite frequently, especially at lunch, it is the Han who make the compromise by agreeing to go to halal or no-pork

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restaurants, which are usually managed by Hui or Uyghurs. Joanne Smith claimed that Uyghur and Han small entrepreneurs often establish good working relationships and help each other’s business.40 Uyghurs still take initiatives for social contact with Han neighbors, although the converse is less common.41

In the absence of major research work on the relations between other ethnic groups in Xinjiang, I have only impressional comments concerning the role of Islam. The Han and the Hui get on reasonably well, despite the fact that the Hui are Muslims. Ethnically and culturally, the Han and Hui are very similar and speak the same language. Unlike the Uyghurs, they have been reasonably loyal to the Chinese state since before the PRC’s establish-ment. On the other hand, relations between Uyghurs and Hui and Uyghurs and Kazaks are poor to bad, even though they are all Muslims. Uyghurs tend to distrust Hui as being too close to the Han42 and look down on Kazaks as inferior. One specialist aptly wrote that the Hui, “who have blended fairly well into Chinese society, regard some Uyghurs as unpatriotic separatists who give other Chinese Muslims a bad name.”43 Both Uyghurs and Kazaks are deeply hostile to intermarriage with each other.44

Uyghurs and Hui generally attend different mosques, although by habit not policy direction. Some imams I interviewed were irritated at any question on such a matter, probably because they saw a slightly insulting overtone, but acknowledged the reality that in any particular mosque con-gregants tend strongly to belong to one ethnic group. In cities such as Ürümqi and Turpan, where both groups are quite populous, there are “Uyghur” mosques and “Hui” mosques. The language of sermons or instruction is Uyghur in the Uyghur mosques and Chinese in the Hui. There are often differences in architectural style, with Hui mosques more likely to follow Chinese or Arabic patterns and Uyghur more similar to mosques in the oases of Central Asia, with the prayer halls lacking exterior walls on the side where the congregants enter and the minarets being short and broad-based.

Islam and PolItIcs

We turn now to the highly vexed area of the relationship between Islam and politics. The PRC may be prepared to tolerate the open practice of religions in general and Islam in particular, but it has never allowed them political space. In particular, any signs that religion is used for separatist activity are completely anathema to the PRC’s ruling party and government.


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In April 1990, a small-scale rebellion for Xinjiang independence erupted in Baren Township, Akto County, near Kashgar in southwest Xinjiang. A follower of its leader Zahideen Yusuf told a Western journalist with pride that Yusuf was inspired by the doctrine of the “holy war” or jihad, as it was currently being practiced by the mujahideen in Afghanistan.45 Even a human rights body bitterly hostile to CCP rule in Xinjiang has acknowledged the Baren Township incident as “a major, Islamic-inspired insurrection.”46 The rebellion was quickly suppressed and its leader killed, but it nevertheless produced continuing violent resistance to China based on Islamic extrem-ism. One important result was a body called the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), established at a religious school in Pakistan by some Uyghur students who had fled Xinjiang after the failure of the Baren upris-ing.47 Another flow-on from Baren was a whole series of anti-government incidents throughout the 1990s, most notably serious disturbances in Gulja (Yining) in February 1997. Most were separatist in intent.

At all times, government reaction was to suppress all disturbances. However, 1996 saw a particular hardening of policy. In March, the coun-try’s most powerful small body, the elite CCP Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee, issued a confidential document accusing “separatist organizations abroad” of intensifying efforts to infiltrate and carry out sab-otage in Xinjiang. “Within Xinjiang, illegal religious movements are ram-pant,” the document continued.48 Early in May, a major CCP work conference was held in Ürümqi, with Xinjiang’s main official daily immedi-ately claiming there had been a surge in subversion, bombings, and terror-ist activities and that almost all “had a background of ethnic splittist activism, and not one was not linked to illegal religious activities.”49 The May work conference was clearly echoing the March directive, with “reli-gious” meaning “Islamic.”

Two international events relevant to Islamic extremism took place in 1996. One was the first meeting, in April, of the presidents of China, Russia, and the three former Soviet Central Asian Republics bordering China to the west: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Held first in Shanghai, these meetings became an annual event; the 1997 to 2000 meetings took place in the capitals of the four participants other than China. The next meeting, held in Shanghai in June 2001, resulted in the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which added Uzbekistan to the five orig-inal participating countries. Chinese President Jiang Zemin claimed the SCO would lay the foundation for cracking down on “terrorism, separatism and extremism,” by which he meant Islamic extremism.50 The other 1996

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event relevant to Islamic radicalism was the capture of the Afghanistan capital Kabul by the militant Taliban on September 26.

Islam and Politics in Xinjiang from September 2001 to July 2009

The September 11 incidents of 2001 again altered the situation substantially. The United States led a war against terrorism, beginning with the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which had sheltered Osama bin Laden, the chief suspect for the September 11 attacks. By the end of 2001, the United States had overthrown the Taliban, putting into power a regime sympathetic to itself led by Hamid Karzai.

Along with the other SCO members, China supported the American war against terrorism. As it had hoped, this attitude won it plaudits from the United States for its efforts against terrorism in Xinjiang, with the Americans acknowledging terrorists from Xinjiang among those captured in Afghanistan and imprisoned in Cuba’s Guantanamo Bay. In August 2002, the United States actually froze all ETIM assets because of its activi-ties as a terrorist organization.

The SCO has continued to expand in scope and influence, adding many dialogue partners and in 2015 actually agreeing to add India and Pakistan as members. The SCO has encouraged trade and exchange of various kinds in the region at the same time as it tried to prevent harmful interna-tional phenomena, such as Islamist terrorism. For China, the benefits have been significant. It has, for example, increased its influence and trade in Central Asia and gained greater cooperation from other countries to sup-press separatist movements both inside and outside the XUAR.51

In Xinjiang itself, the Chinese leadership’s reaction to the September 11 incidents was to intensify its crackdown on terrorism, separatism, and Islamic extremism. It issued a strongly worded document in January 2002, claiming various separatist bodies were conducting terrorist activities in densely populated areas, most notably the ETIM.52 It continued to publi-cize attacks on terrorism. For instance, on September 13, 2004 XUAR CCP Secretary Wang Lequan claimed in a press conference that, in the first eight months of the year, authorities had broken 22 groups involved in terrorism and separatism and sentenced an unusually high figure of over 50 people to death for the same crimes. He defended the actions on the grounds that worldwide terrorism was actually worsening, and vowed that China would persist in suppressing terrorists as long as needed. He also rejected suggestions that the attacks on terrorism were to some extent


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actually attacks on the Uyghurs, their culture, and their religion.53 In a report issued in April 2005, the organization Human Rights in China alleged “vast increases” in the number of Uyghurs “imprisoned or held administratively for alleged religious and state security offenses.”54

The first few years of the twenty-first century saw fewer disturbances in Xinjiang than the 1990s. However, this relative calm was broken in 2008, when there were several violent incidents in Xinjiang. The Chinese author-ities claimed them as attempts to disrupt the Olympic Games that took place in Beijing in August the same year.

By far the most serious incidents to take place in Xinjiang were in July 2009. A protest demonstration by Uyghurs in Ürümqi on July 5 devel-oped into the worst ethnic rioting in the PRC’s history. According to official figures, the final death toll was 197, with over 1600 injured. Among the dead, 156 were termed “civilians,” and among these 134 were Han, 11 Hui, 10 Uyghurs, and 1 Manchu.55 There was also great damage to property. The causes of this ethnic rioting were extremely complex, including both internal and external factors.56 This incident merits men-tion here for its importance and effects on the XUAR. However, because it is discussed elsewhere in the volume and not directly related to Islam in Xinjiang anyway. I abstain from analysis here beyond saying that the Chinese media blamed terrorists linked to the Uyghur diaspora, especially President Rebiya Kadeer of its main representative body the World Uyghur Congress, which will be briefly discussed later.

Islam and Politics Since the July 2009 DisturbancesA political fallout from the July 2009 riots in Ürümqi was the replacement of Wang Lequan with Zhang Chunxian, who assumed office as Xinjiang’s CCP Secretary in April 2010. In September 2009, there were unprece-dented demonstrations by Han calling for Wang to step down. At first he averted blame to others for the instability Xinjiang had suffered. However, the next year he resigned anyway, while the already very powerful Vice President Xi Jinping went to Ürümqi and gave a speech praising him, thereby showing that the resignation was not a dismissal.

Zhang Chunxian has a reputation for being a bit more conciliatory than Wang Lequan. However, incidents involving Uyghur Islam have continued since 2009 and tended to get worse over the years. As of August 2015, no specific incident matches the July 2009 incidents for violence- related casu-alties. However, the cumulative and deleterious effect of persisting distur-bances both on Chinese politics and ethnic relations in Xinjiang has become

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more intense and worrying to all concerned. Authorities have regularly blamed terrorism, while anti-government sources tend strongly to put the blame on repression.

One form of violence affecting Islam very closely is the assassination of imams who support the government. One was the distinguished Uyghur imam Abdurehim Daomalla, who was killed in August 2013. Abdurehim was 74 at the time of his death and had become deputy chairman of Turpan city’s government-affiliated Islamic Association. He was returning home from leading evening prayers at the Kazihan Mosque, the most important in Turpan for the Uyghurs, when he was killed by his own people. Abdurehim was known as a government supporter and in particular had followed authorities in accusing the perpetrators of a serious incident in June 2013 of being terrorists. What was particularly sad was that Abdurehim had a reputation for being able to ease ethnic and other ten-sions and to find solutions to disputes.57

A series of violent incidents in July 2014 at the end of the holy month of Ramadan included the assassination of Jume Tahir, the imam of the great Idkah Mosque in Kashgar, the largest in China. Tahir was stabbed to death and “found in a pool of blood outside the prayer house” at the end of the month. The reason for the murder was unclear, but he was known as a Party supporter and “patriotic religious person.”58 The murder of senior Muslim clergy, apparently for no other reason than support for the current political order, sends a signal that can only be extremely alarming, especially to authorities.

Secondly, violence due to Uyghur terrorism has spread outside Xinjiang. Although this is not completely unprecedented,59 it shows clearly that the reach of Xinjiang terrorists extends far from their home. One incident occurred in October 2013. It was a suicide attack in Tiananmen Square, right in the center of the Chinese capital. Three Uyghurs—a 33-year-old man, his wife, and his mother—drove a vehicle into a crowd, killing the three and two others, and injuring about forty people. The other incident occurred at Kunming Railway Station on March 1, 2014. Eight men and women with knives charged into the ticket office, killing some 30 people and wounding about 140 others. One Western academic drew attention to “a flood of anti-Uyghur invectiveness on Chinese social media sites” a well as “a sustained, high-profile, beefing up of security measures around the coun-try” that followed the incident, which he described as “the country’s own September 11.”60 Whether the parallel is apt or not, it definitely highlights the dramatic effect this incident produced all over China and even outside.


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Thirdly, the rise of the Islamic State and the claimed revival of the caliphate in 2014 both add a new highly disturbing international factor to the situation in Xinjiang. Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi gave a speech in the Iraqi city of Mosul on July 4, 2014, in which he listed China among a number of countries where “Muslim rights are forcibly seized,” adding that Muslims “all over the world are waiting for your res-cue, and are anticipating your brigades.” Observers are not in agreement over how realistic Islamic State intervention in Xinjiang would be or its chances of success, or even how seriously to take the speech. However, it would be irresponsible of any government to ignore such an explicit threat and it is hardly surprising that the Chinese government found it alarming and used it as a reason for adding to security measures in Xinjiang.61

Some Reactions to the Disturbances, Especially from Outside ChinaSince September 11, the United States Administration coupled its state-ments praising China for its struggle against terrorism in Xinjiang with warnings that it should not use the war as a green light for repression of minorities.62 Reaction from the Uyghur diaspora and human rights groups against its freezing of ETIM’s assets was both hostile and strong, with many Uyghurs feeling that the United States had let them down. American policy maintained its support for China’s anti-terrorism struggle, but also began to show a kinder face to Uyghur opposition to China, even includ-ing some financial support.

Opinion on China’s policy toward Islamic extremism was, and remains, highly divided. It is obvious from the above that the Chinese government puts the main blame for the disturbances and rioting that flared in China after the 1990s on terrorism, inspired by Islamic radicalism and hostility to China, especially Uyghur separatism. I have argued above that the Baren Township uprising, which sparked the new wave of troubles, owed its inspi-ration to the Islamic “holy war.” However, it does not necessarily follow that all the subsequent disturbances were based on the same notion. Other possibilities include resentments due to economic and cultural inequalities, perceived lack of control over one’s own territory, ethnic nationalism, and Chinese oppression. The suppression of rebellion can sometimes prove counterproductive, spawning further resistance.

Human rights activists and many others are far from certain that Uyghur separatism is based on Islam. Becquelin, for instance, sees Islam not as a source of separatism, “but rather as a vehicle for the expression of increased social and political frustrations.”63 Proponents of this kind of view acknowledge an association with Islam, if it is a “vehicle for the expression”

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of frustrations, but believe that China has been unnecessarily harsh in its crackdowns on terrorism, especially since 1996. The severity of repression gives the impression to some observers that the Chinese leadership is tar-geting not merely Islamic extremism, separatism, and terrorism, but Uyghurs and Muslims themselves. The fact that Wang Lequan felt called upon to deny this view in his September 13, 2004 press conference cited above shows his sensitivity toward such criticism.

Nationalists among Uyghurs are very fragmented and have been so throughout most of their history.64 There is consequently a wide range of opinions in Xinjiang among Uyghurs. British journalist Hugh Pope claims to have met “Uyghurs who seemed bitter enough to follow the old Turkic proverb of suicidal rebellion: ‘Better to be a wolf for a day than a mouse for a hundred.’”65 There are many secular nationalists who have no time either for Islam or its clergy or for violence. Many Uyghur nationalists do not seek full independence, but rather some form of genuine autonomy within China. However, it is possible that many actually want full independence but are afraid to say so, because the Chinese have shown repeatedly that they will not stand for any hint of separatism.

Like their counterparts inside Xinjiang itself, the Uyghur diaspora groups are generally strongly divided in their opinions. However, since the late 1990s, they have attempted to present a more coherent face. A large meeting held in Munich in April 2004 actually set up a World Uyghur Congress, which in 2006 elected Rebiya Kadeer as its president. Although she strongly denied responsibility, it was on her that the Chinese authori-ties heaped the main blame for the 2009 ethnic rioting in Ürümqi. The Uyghur diaspora organizations overwhelmingly favor independence and are bitterly hostile to China and its policy toward Xinjiang. On the other hand, they are firmly secular and nonviolent in their public statements. It is possible that some members favor a violent religious war but keep the view to themselves for fear of alienating potential American supporters.

China has tried to use the growing influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to cooperate with the governments of Central Asia to counter Islamist terrorism.66 It has persuaded these governments to curb or suppress Uyghur activist groups with separatist aims, and in general they have com-plied. The Chinese government has also tried to persuade governments to return Uyghurs it believes are using outside locations to plot terrorist threats against China, especially those based on Islamic radicalism. As China’s eco-nomic influence has grown, it has enjoyed some success in its attempts.

A spectacular example of the repatriation of Uyghurs occurred in July 2015. At the request of the Chinese government, Thailand sent back 109


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Uyghurs who had fled their homeland. There was protest from various quarters on the grounds that these Uyghurs would likely be persecuted in China. However, China immediately claimed it had evidence that these Uyghurs were planning to join jihadist movements in Turkey, Syria, or Iraq and that Thailand’s action was in accordance with international law and helped to prevent the spread of jihadist violence in Xinjiang.

Islam does not enjoy a very good image in the West. What this means is that the United States and Western countries are very unlikely to do much more to assist the Uyghurs than make condemnatory pronouncements against China. One writer very sympathetic to the cause of the Uyghurs wrote in 2015 that they were “increasingly isolated and alone,” with a new generation finding themselves “squeezed between a repressive Chinese government and the temptations of radicalism.”67

conclusIon

The Uyghurs are highly unlikely to be able to establish an independent Xinjiang in the near- to mid-term future unless the Chinese state collapses altogether. Economic growth has been successful enough to buy off most of the kind of Uyghurs who might be prepared to die for an independent East Turkestan. While the riots of July 2009 showed very serious tensions, even hatreds, between Han and Uyghurs, suicidal rebellion is flat against the interests of most people in Xinjiang. Increased radicalism is possible, even likely, but no outside power will be intervening in favor of an inde-pendence war. This includes the United States and Islamic State.

However, to suggest that independence is not on the horizon is very different from predicting the decline, let alone demise, of Islam in Xinjiang. It is clear from the above material that the twentieth century saw a good deal of repression of Islam in Xinjiang. This did not prevent the “fourth tide of Islam” in China from affecting Xinjiang, along with other parts of the country. The repression of Islam in contemporary Xinjiang is just as likely further to strengthen as to weaken it. It is very unclear how long the “fourth tide” will last, but I do not see the signs of its ending in the near future.

The relevance of Islam to ethnic identities applies in Xinjiang as much as elsewhere in China. Certainly, these associations vary. For example, Uyghurs see Islam as much more tightly linked with their ethnic consciousness than do the Kazaks. Moreover, Uyghur ethnic identity has strengthened at the same time as Uyghur Islam.

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Despite the attention they receive, Islamic extremists account for only a small proportion of Muslims in Xinjiang. The great majority appear to want nothing to do with extremism or terrorism in any form—a wish made stronger through the knowledge that such views will get them into trouble with Chinese authorities. It is very unfortunate that some people in official positions, especially Han, allow fear of separatism to coincide not only with Islamic extremism but even with Islam itself. All this does is cause a reac-tion that exacerbates tensions and inflames ethnic relations.

A top priority for China and its neighboring countries is social stability. Radical Islam is as much the enemy of Uyghur and other Muslims in gen-eral as it is of the Chinese people as a whole or of the Chinese state. Ethnic disturbances, including those connected with religion, are strongly against the interests of the overwhelming majority of people.

Many factors are of great importance in Xinjiang that are independent of Islam but in which Muslims and states share interests. Water resources and environmental issues as a whole could create great and unfavorable impacts on Xinjiang’s economic and social development. Another factor is HIV/AIDS or another epidemic like avian influenza. The spread of HIV/AIDS in Xinjiang led two specialists on the region to write in 2004 that the Uyghurs were “in a fight for their very survival” against it.68 The fact that such a disease could spread so quickly in the twenty-first century highlights two points relevant to Uyghur Islam. It shows that Islamist ter-rorism may not be at or even near the top of the problems facing Xinjiang; and it pinpoints the importance of cooperation and dialogue between Muslims and authorities there.

notes

1. See especially I. Bellér-Hann, ‘“Making the Oil Fragrant”: Dealings with the Supernatural among the Uyghurs in Xinjiang,’ Asian Ethnicity, vol. 2, no. 1 (March 2001), pp. 9–23.

2. For a major full-length study of Xinjiang politics at this period, see Donald H. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977 (Boulder: Westview, 1979). In PRC English-language publications, the official spelling of the ethnic group called Weiwuerzu 维吾尔族 in Chinese is Uygur, which is why the formal name of the Autonomous Region fol-lows the spelling Uygur. In this book, however, the editorial policy spells the ethnic group Uyghur, which is actually much more typical of English-language publications not published in China.


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3. James A. Millward and Nabijan Tursun, ‘Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884–1978,’ in S. Frederick Starr, ed., Xinjiang China’s Muslim Borderland (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 89.

4. For some discussion of this matter, see Colin Mackerras, China’s Minority Cultures, Identities and Integration Since 1912 (Melbourne: Longman Australia, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995), especially the conclusion, pp. 207–21. An excellent book dealing extensively with the Uyghurs of the twenty-first century, including attitudes toward being part of China, is Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). There is a collection of a few relevant articles regarding Xinjiang in Colin Mackerras, ed., Ethnic Minorities in Modern China, Critical Concepts in Asian Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), vol. IV, in Part 7.2 (“Xinjiang”) of the section entitled “China’s minorities: separatism; implications for interna-tional relations.”

5. Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, and Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 6–7, 62–3.

6. The term comes from a Harvard paper never published in its original English but translated into French and published under the title ‘Les “voies” (turuq) soufies en Chine’ (‘The Sufi Orders (turuq) in China’, in A. Popovic and G. Veinstein, eds, Les orders mystiques dans l’Islam (The Mystical Orders in Islam) (Paris: Édition de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales 1986), pp. 13–26.

7. Raphael Israeli, Islam in China, Religion, Ethnicity, Culture and Politics (Lexington Books, Lanham, 2002), p. 261.

8. Israeli, Islam in China, p. 276.9. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,

‘Fifty Years of Progress in China’s Human Rights’, Beijing Review, vol. 43, no. 9 (28 February 2000), pp. 48–9. A 1990 figure says there were 17,000 mosques and 43,000 other places of religious activity, probably referring to officially registered shrines and madrasas. Wang Wenheng, Xinjiang zongjiao wenti yanjiu (Studies on Religion in Xinjiang) (Ürümqi: Xinjiang People’s Press, 1993), pp. 93–5.

10. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Development and Progress in Xinjiang, VI. Protecting Citizens’ Rights of Freedom of Religious Belief’, 21 September 2009, at http://www.china-daily.com.cn/ethnic/2009-09/21/content_8717461.htm

11. Michael Dillon, China’s Muslim Hui Community, Migration, Settlement and Sects (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1999), p. 182.

12. Edmund Waite, ‘The Emergence of Muslim Reformism in Contemporary Xinjiang: Implications for the Uyghurs’ Positioning Between a Central

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Asian and Chinese Context’, in Ildikó Bellér-Hann, M. Cristina Cesàro, Rachel Harris and Joanne Smith Finley, eds, Situating the Uyghurs Between China and Central Asia (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007), p. 166.

13. For discussion of education and status of women in Islam in Xinjiang, see Maria Jaschok and Vicky Hau Ming Chan, ‘Education, Gender and Islam in China: The Place of Religious Education in Challenging and Sustaining “Undisputed Traditions” Among Chinese Muslim Women’, International Journal of Educational Development, vol. 29, no. 5 (September 2009), pp. 489–91.

14. Waite, ‘The Emergence of Muslim Reformism in Contemporary Xinjiang’, p. 172.

15. Bellér-Hann, ‘“Making the Oil Fragrant”’, p. 9.16. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,

‘Development and Progress in Xinjiang, VI. Protecting Citizens’ Rights of Freedom of Religious Belief’, 21 September 2009, at http://www.china-daily.com.cn/ethnic/2009-09/21/content_8717461.htm

17. Waite, ‘The Emergence of Muslim Reformism in Contemporary Xinjiang’, p. 173.

18. Allessandra Cappelletti, ‘Developing the Land and the People: Social Development Issues in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1999–2009)’, East Asia, no. 32 (June 2015), pp. 152–3.

19. See the discussion in Cappelletti, ‘Developing the Land and the People’, pp. 151–2.

20. For example, see Abduresit Qarluq and Anna Hayes, ‘Securitising HIV/AIDS in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’, in Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 2 (March 2011), pp. 203–19.

21. Cappelletti, ‘Developing the Land and the People’, p. 150.22. Human Rights in China, ‘Devastating Blows, Religious Repression of

Uighurs in Xinjiang’, Human Rights Watch, vol. 17, no. 2(C) (April 2005), p. 58.

23. Cappelletti, ‘Developing the Land and the People’, p. 155.24. Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, ‘Islam in Xinjiang’, in Starr,

ed., Xinjiang China’s Muslim Borderland, p. 324.25. Human Rights in China, ‘Devastating Blows’, p. 5.26. Human Rights in China, ‘Devastating Blows’, p. 5.27. Rachel Harris, ‘Harmonizing Islam in Xinjiang: Sound and Meaning in

Rural Uyghur Religious Practice’, in Trine Brox and Idikó Bellér-Hann, eds., On the Fringes of the Harmonious Society, Tibetans and Uyghurs in Socialist China (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2014), p. 294.

28. See Zhou Chongjing, et al., eds., Zhongguo renkou, Xinjiang fence (China’s Population, Xinjiang Volume), (Beijing: Chinese Political Economy Press, 1990), p. 283.




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29. See Stanley W. Toops, ‘The Demography of Xinjiang’, in Starr, ed., Xinjiang China’s Muslim Borderland, pp. 245–7.

30. See Yuan Xin, ‘Renkou qianyi yu liudong’ (‘Migration and Floating Population’, in Qiu Yuanyao, Yilifan Abudureyimu, Zheng Bingrui, Yuan Xin et al., eds, Kua shiji de Zhongguo renkou, Xinjiang juan (China’s Population at the Turn of the Century, Xinjiang Volume) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chu-banshe, 1994), p. 275.

31. One specialist used the term “Sino-Muslim” to refer to these people, except for the PRC period. See Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers, A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. xxiv. He argued that the term “combines Chinese linguistic and material culture and Islamic religion,” without lumping them together with other ethnic groups.

32. See Joanne Smith, ‘“Making Culture Matter”: Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries Between Uyghurs and Han Chinese’, Asian Ethnicity, vol. 3, no. 2 (September 2002), p. 173. This article is one of quite a number of studies carried out on Uyghur–Han relations in Xinjiang since the 1990s.

33. Herbert S. Yee, ‘Ethnic Consciousness and Identity: A Research Report on Uygur–Han relations in Xinjiang’, Asian Ethnicity, vol. 6, no. 1 (February 2005), pp. 35–50, especially p. 50. This article is very unusual in being based on surveys, which are very difficult to undertake in contemporary Xinjiang, mainly for political reasons, as the author admits (pp. 35–6).

34. Blaine Kaltman, Under the Heel of the Dragon, Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2007), p. 128.

35. Nick Holdstock, The Tree that Bleeds, A Uighur Town on the Edge (Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2011), p. 348.

36. Smith, ‘“Making Culture Matter”’, p. 172.37. Herbert S. Yee, ‘Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: A Survey of Uygur-Han

Relations in Urumqi’, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 12, no. 36 (August 2003), p. 437.

38. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Development and Progress in Xinjiang, V. Upholding Ethnic Equality and Unity’, 21 September 2009, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/eth-nic/2009-09/21/content_8717461.htm

39. Smith, ‘“Making Culture Matter”’, p. 172.40. Smith, ‘“Making Culture Matter”’, pp. 170–1.41. Yee, ‘Ethnic Consciousness and Identity’, p. 40.42. See the comments of Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak, ‘Acculturation

and Resistance, Xinjiang Identities in Flux’, in Starr, ed., Xinjiang China’s Muslim Borderland, pp. 311–13.

43. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, Ruling, Resources and Religion in China, Managing the Multiethnic State in the 21st Century (Houndmills, Baskingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 100.

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44. See also Colin Mackerras, ‘Ethnicity in China: The case of Xinjiang’, Harvard Asia Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 11–12.

45. Michael Winchester, ‘Beijing vs. Islam’, Asiaweek, vol. 23, no. 42 (24 October 1997), p. 31.

46. Human Rights in China, ‘Devastating Blows’, p. 14.47. Rudelson and Jankowiak, ‘Acculturation and Resistance’, p. 318.48. See Nicolas Becquelin, ‘Xinjiang in the Nineties’, The China Journal, no.

44 (July 2000), p. 87.49. Xinjiang Daily, May 7, 1996, as quoted by Reuter News Service on May 12,

1996. On May 10 and 14, the same newspaper claimed that, among Xinjiang’s village-level organisations, some were under the control of “illegal religious forces,” which had set up “fortified villages of national splittist and illegal religious activities.” See “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,” The China Quarterly, no. 147 (September 1996), p. 1026.

50. See the account in Colin Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 167–8.

51. For instance, see Ann McMillan, ‘Xinjiang and Central Asia, Interdependency—Not Integration’, in Colin Mackerras and Michael Clarke, eds, China, Xinjiang and Central Asia, History, Transition and Crossborder Interaction into the 21st Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), especially p. 111.

52. Information Office of the State Council, ‘“East Turkistan” Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity’, Beijing Review, vol. 45, no. 5 (31 January 2002), p. 15.

53. See, for instance, John Ruwitch, ‘China Convicts 50 to Death in “Terror Crackdown”’, Reuters from Urumqi, 13 September 2004.

54. Human Rights in China, ‘Devastating blows’ p. 4.55. Xinhua, ‘Innocent Civilians Make Up 156 in Urumqi Riot Death Toll’, China

View, 5 August 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/05/ content_11831350.htm, retrieved 29 November 2009.

56. There is now a substantial literature on these July 2009 events. I have given my own analysis in Colin Mackerras, ‘Causes and Ramifications of the Xinjiang July 2009 Disturbances’, Sociology Study, vol. 2, no. 7 (July 2012), pp. 496–510.

57. Rachel Vandenbrink, “Imam Stabbed to Death After Supporting Crackdown Against Uyghurs.” Radio Free Asia, 16 August 2013, at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/shootout-08252013134303.html, accessed 16 October 2013.

58. Parameswaran Ponnudurai, ‘Imam of Grand Kashgar Mosque Murdered in Xinjiang Violence’, 30 July 2014, Radio Free Asia, at www.rfa.org/eng-lish/news/uyghur/murder-07302014221118.html, accessed 9 July 2015.


http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/05/content_11831350.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/05/content_11831350.htm

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/shootout-08252013134303.html

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/shootout-08252013134303.html

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/murder-07302014221118.html

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/murder-07302014221118.html

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59. In March 1997, a bus explosion attributed to Uyghur terrorists occurred in Beijing near the leadership headquarters of Zhongnanhai.

60. Allen R. Carlson, ‘China’s Xinjiang after the Bombings: Going from Bad to Worse’, The National Interest, 23 May 2014, web version at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-xinjiang-after-the-bomb-ings-going-bad-worse-10524, accessed 11 July 2015.

61. See Alexa Olesen, ‘China Sees Islamic State Inching Closer to Home’, Foreign Affairs, 11 August 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/11/china-sees-islamic-state-inching-closer-to-home/, accessed 11 July 2015.

62. For instance, see U.S. Department of State Counterterrorism Office, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 (Washington: Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2002), pp. 16–17.

63. Becquelin, ‘Xinjiang in the Nineties’, p. 89.64. Rudelson and Jankowiak, ‘Acculturation and resistance’, p. 314.65. Hugh Pope, Sons of the Conquerors: The Rise of the Turkic World (New

York: Overlook Duckworth, 2005), p. 150.66. For instance, see Kilic Kanat, ‘Repression in China and Its Consequences

in Xinjiang’, Hudson Institute, Washington D.C., July 2015, at http://www.hudson.org/research/10480-repression-in-china-and-its-conse-quences-in-xinjiang, accessed 12 July 2015.

67. Kanat, ‘Repression in China and Its Consequences in Xinjiang’.68. Rudelson and Jankowiak, ‘Acculturation and resistance’, p. 318.

C. MACKERRAS

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china’s-xinjiang-after-the-bombings-going-bad-worse-10524



http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/11/china-sees-islamic-state-inching-closer-to-home/

http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/11/china-sees-islamic-state-inching-closer-to-home/

http://www.hudson.org/research/10480-repression-in-china-and-its-consequences-in-xinjiang




Constructing the Uyghur Diaspora: Identity Politics and the Transnational Uyghur

Community

Isık Kusçu Bonnenfant

Diasporas have become important actors in international politics. Despite the increasing importance of diaspora, there have been few attempts to incorporate diaspora studies within the theories of international relations. As a review of the literature on diaspora and international theories sug-gests, constructivism is the best approach to study diaspora. Constructivism’s focus on identity and its impact on international politics can help us to define and understand the diaspora as a non-state actor. In a similar way, the study of diaspora, with an added emphasis on diasporic identity forma-tion and the implications of such identities in shaping the discourses and actions of diaspora, will contribute to the theory of constructivism.

A constructivist perspective will help us to understand the phenomenon of diaspora not as a bounded and pre-political entity; rather, it will enable us to treat diaspora as a category of practice, as socially constructed through elite action. Diaspora elites are key to the construction of a diasporic com-munity. To do this, elites use particular mobilizing strategies and practices, as well as particular frameworks to organize migrant communities around a

I. Kusçu Bonnenfant (*) International Relations Department, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

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particular cause. The political opportunity structures that are available to the diaspora elite are also important to analyze the limitations on diasporic mobilization practices.

This chapter will analyze Uyghur diaspora formation from a constructiv-ist perspective. By treating the Uyghur diaspora formation as a process that was constructed by the elite, I aim to analyze how Uyghur diasporic iden-tity and activities evolved in time through various mobilizing discourses, practices, and frameworks effectuated by the elite. Today, Uyghurs reside in various host states, including Central Asia, Europe, and North America. The formation of the Uyghur diaspora began in Turkey with mobiliza-tional activities of its diaspora leaders, and later spread to other host states where Uyghurs resided. This chapter analyzes the activities of the Uyghur diaspora in three major time periods. The first period covers the mobiliza-tion practices of the diaspora leaders in Turkey from the 1960s to early 1990s. The second period covers the diasporic mobilization efforts in the 1990s in Turkey and in Europe. Finally, the last period covers 2000 until now—a time period in which the mobilization practices gained a more transnational form. Such an analysis will also provide the tools to observe how mobilization practices and frameworks evolved over time according to changing political opportunities.

The fieldwork for this research was conducted in Turkey (Ankara and Istanbul) and in Europe (Germany, the Netherlands, and France) over a period of one year (January 2013–January 2014). In-depth interviews with diaspora members (mainly the leaders of the diaspora organizations) and participant observations were used in the fieldwork. In addition to the field research findings, I use the publications and websites of diaspora groups as well as visual materials produced by the Uyghur diaspora as primary sources.

In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the growing role of diaspora in international politics with a review of the literature. I also try to combine diaspora studies with the theories of international relations. In the next sec-tion, I show that the constructivist theory is the most convenient and useful tool for studying diaspora. To analyze the constructed nature of diasporic identities and discourses, I use the framework and concepts borrowed from the social movement theory. In the second part, I analyze Uyghur diaspora activism in three major time periods on the basis of varying mobilization practices and discourses as well as different frames employed by diasporic agents. I also examine diverse political opportunities in different host states with their impact on Uyghur diaspora activism.

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Defining Diaspora as a non-state actor in international relations

Today, the traditional dominance of states in the international system has been challenged by a variety of non-state actors. Diaspora communities have now become prominent non-state actors in today’s increasingly globalized world, and these groups have come a long way from being the victimized diasporas of the past. They are now significant transnational entities whose actions may have important consequences for international politics. The word “diaspora” no longer signifies a group of passive, persecuted people who are forced to live outside their homeland. Today, many diaspora groups show strong organization, momentum, and political will based on a trans-national network of relationships.

As an international actor, a diaspora group has the potential to affect homeland politics, influence host state foreign policy towards the homeland, and build advocacy networks around the homeland cause.1 Sarah Mahler emphasized that it was transmigrants settling abroad that first struggled for national independence and led to the formation of new nation states in the past.2 Diasporas have also been influential actors in homeland conflicts either as peace-spoilers or peace-builders.3 As such cases suggest, diaspora actions can influence international politics profoundly. In addition, within the light of recent technological advancements, diasporas’ potential to affect global politics has increased more due to densely formed transnational networks.

Despite the increasing role of diaspora communities in international poli-tics, the theories of international relations did not adequately investigate this. The state-centric tendency of the discipline has ignored the potential of non-state actors to influence international politics. Despite this trend, a few scholars have recently presented diaspora as an important non-state actor and attempted to incorporate the phenomenon into the theories of interna-tional relations. Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth’s article ‘Diasporas and International Theory’ is one such work. It claims that “diasporic activities can be best understood by setting their study in the theoretical space shared by constructivism and liberalism.”4 For these scholars, both theories recog-nize the changing nature of state interests and preferences, the positioning of states in a larger social context, as well as the importance of non-state actors. Shain and Barth argued that constructivism, with its focus on the issue of identity, can best explain the identity aspect of diasporic actions because diaspora activism is related to the perception of a shared identity with individuals residing in the homeland. According to Shain and Barth,

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liberal theory, on the other hand, is relevant to the study of diaspora in terms of its emphasis on the interaction of identity with domestic politics, in addition to the implications of such interaction for the foreign policy behav-ior of host states.5

Chris Ogden is another scholar who attempted to incorporate the phe-nomenon of diaspora into international relations theory. Ogden argued that the study of diaspora has the potential to strengthen constructivist theory in terms of its focus on the analysis of identity. Diasporic identity is a particular kind of identity that is formed as a result of previous homeland and current host state experiences. This shared identity is a transnational one. According to Ogden, “these symbolic ties of shared religion, ethnic-ity and homeland nationality create opportunities for social cohesion, characterized by high degrees of solidarity, even if the diaspora is spatially dispersed.”6 It is in this identity juncture that constructivism and diaspora studies share common ground. Ogden emphasized that this common ground also includes the process of identity construction, which is con-stantly being shaped by actors’ perceptions.7

In “Remapping the Boundaries of ‘State’ and ‘National Identity’: Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing,” Fiona Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou also focused on the identity dimension of diaspora. They defined diaspora as a transnational social collectivity that contain many identity components similar to that of the territorialized nation- states.8 For them, constructivist scholarship has not sufficiently addressed the issue of “the existence of deterritorialized identities and transnational processes of iden-tity formation which operate parallel to and in conjunction with the ter-ritorial system of nation-states.”9 In their attempt to incorporate diaspora into international relations theory, Adamson and Demetriou claimed that the diasporic process of identity construction actually operates parallel and in relation to the state in terms of forming and mobilizing political identi-ties. Hence, with a deeper involvement in diasporic identity formation processes, constructivism can greatly benefit from diaspora studies.

Diaspora is a legitimate non-state actor in international politics and can contribute to our understanding of the complex organization of contem-porary transnational politics. As the above discussion of the works of scholars who attempt to incorporate diaspora studies with international relations theories suggest, the analysis of diaspora activism in relation to theories, particularly to constructivism, can help us better make sense of the world in which we live. Understanding the process of diasporic iden-tity formation with the implications of such identities in shaping the


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discourses and actions of diaspora will enrich our perception of the signifi-cance of identities in international politics. A constructivist view of dias-pora will enable us to analyze how identities influence world politics and how they are, in turn, influenced by it.10

The study of diaspora from a constructivist approach will also contribute to diaspora studies. It is possible to distinguish primordialist and construc-tivist perspectives in the literature on diaspora. Similar to the primordialist perspective in nationalism, primordialism in diaspora studies treats diaspora as a bounded and pre-political entity that is formed innately as a result of its move away from the homeland. On the contrary, a constructivist per-spective suggests that diaspora is socially constructed through elite action. Rogers Brubaker argued that diaspora should be viewed as a category of practice. For Brubaker, “As a category of practice, ‘diaspora’ is used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilize energies, to appeal to loyalties.”11

Fiona Adamson also emphasized the constructed nature of diaspora as social collectivity. She argued that “Diasporas as products or outcomes of transnational mobilization activities by political entrepreneurs engaged in strategic social identity construction.”12 According to Adamson, political entrepreneurs play an important role in constructing diasporas as rational and strategic actors through “the strategic deployment of identity frames and categories.”13 Janine Dahinden also singled out the importance of the cultural and political elites and their conscious and organized efforts, par-ticularly in the making of the diaspora.14

From a constructivist perspective, diaspora can be defined as an “imag-ined community.” It is the consciousness of the group that binds this com-munity. Martin Sökefeld suggested replacing consciousness with discourse as it is difficult to define consciousness and “consciousness needs to be expressed in discourse in order to produce social and political effects.”15 Sökefeld argued that treating diaspora as an imagined community “helps prevent primordialist and essentialist ideas slipping into the analytical and conceptual level.”16 The imagining of a community as diaspora is done by the political and cultural elite and not necessarily accepted by everyone. For scholars of diaspora, the constructivist perspective is useful to under-stand when and how the diasporic community is imagined and by whom.

As the review of the literature on diaspora studies suggests, constructiv-ism is the theory that is most conducive to explaining the diaspora’s role in international politics. However, researchers of diaspora still need tools to analyze diaspora from a constructive perspective. In other words,


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scholars need to focus on approaches that treat diaspora not as a bounded entity but as a practical category in which the political and cultural elite is involved in an identity project to mobilize people. In “Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora,” Martin Sökefeld argued that the social mobilization approach can provide us with the necessary tools to accomplish this. Sökefeld argued that “the crucial question becomes why and how a diaspora discourse arises among a certain group of people and how people are made to accept a cer-tain discourse and to participate in it.”17 For Sökefeld, only through the prism of a social mobilization perspective can we answer this core question.

Social movement perspective, when applied to diaspora studies, will help the researcher to understand the complex process of diaspora discourse con-struction by the elite and help explain the mobilizing impact of such dis-course on normal people. Social movement theory delineates three major issues: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and practices and fram-ing.18 When applied to diaspora studies, political opportunity defines the context in which the diaspora discourse and framing activities can take place. Host states` legal and institutional framework, media, communication, and transportation means can all be included in the political opportunity structure.19

Mobilizing structures and practices is the second major issue for the social movement theory. When applied to diaspora, mobilizing structures are the diaspora networks and organizations around which they mobilize. It is the political entrepreneurs who carry out the task of mobilizing diaspora through the creation of a diasporic discourse and constructing identity cat-egories. As a result, this component of the social movement perspective analyzes the discourses, activities, and strategies of the diaspora elite to orga-nize people around a common cause.20

The final component is framing. Framing includes all of the ideas around which mobilization takes place. Framing enables individuals in the diaspora to feel that they are part of a larger, transnational diasporic group. There are master frames that are particularly important, such as human rights and identity.21 It is often the identity, more specifically national identity, master frame that is most frequently used by the elite to mobilize diaspora. Through the use of such frames, certain events and conditions can provide a common framework of interpretation and representation for the diaspora members.22 Increasingly, it is the diaspora elite who strategically deploys such frames for diaspora mobilization.23


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To analyze Uyghur diaspora formation, I apply the social mobilization theory in the following section. By concentrating on political opportuni-ties, mobilizing structures, and practices and framing, I plan to answer the following questions: How has the Uyghur diaspora elite been able to mobi-lize people? What are the master frames that helped its diaspora leaders to construct a certain discourse to mobilize its diaspora? What is the nature of this discourse? What kind of networks and organizations has the Uyghur diaspora established? What are activities and strategies of the diaspora elite? What kind of political opportunity structures does the Uyghur diaspora have? Finally, how has the legal and institutional context of different host states and technological developments within these countries affected Uyghur diaspora activities? By answering such questions, I plan to analyze the process of Uyghur diaspora formation and the different phases the movement has experienced.

construction of the uyghur Diaspora as a Mobilization project by the Diaspora elite

Uyghurs had to leave their homeland after the takeover of Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) by the Chinese Communist Party troops in 1949. Many Uyghurs, along with Kazakhs, another ethnic group that had to migrate from Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang), made the decision to migrate due to the changing regime in Xinjiang. Uyghurs were welcomed in Turkey beginning in 1952. This first wave of Uyghur migration to Turkey was followed by subsequent migration flows up until the present time. In the decades following 1952, Uyghurs migrated to various locations in the world, including Central Asia, Europe, and North America. The formation of the Uyghur diaspora started in Turkey with the mobilizing activities of the diaspora leaders there and later spread to other host states where Uyghurs resided. In this section, I analyze the activities of the Uyghur diaspora under three major time peri-ods. The first period covers the mobilization practices of the diaspora leaders in Turkey from the 1960s to early 1990s. The second period covers the diasporic mobilization efforts in the 1990s in Turkey and in Europe. The last period covers the 2000s until now—a time period in which mobilization practices gained a more transnational form. Through this analysis, I aim to observe how mobilization practices and frames evolved in time according to changing political opportunities.

After settling in Turkey, the Uyghur diaspora leaders Mehmet Emin Bugra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who were prominent leaders of the homeland


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political struggle, took the lead in mobilizing the diaspora. As agents of mobilization in an earlier period, Bugra and Alptekin made use of the traditional tools of diaspora politics, such as the publication of books and journals as well as the establishment of organizations. Bugra and Alptekin published journals such as Türkistan (Turkestan), Türkistan’ın Sesi (Voice of Turkestan), and Dogu Türkistan’ın Sesi (Voice of Eastern Turkestan). The two leaders wrote numerous books as well in order to construct a discourse around the Uyghur culture and identity and to unite the dias-pora.24 In addition to their publishing activities, Alptekin and Bugra pro-moted the institutionalization of diaspora politics in Turkey by establishing organizations. The Association of Eastern Turkistan Emigrés (Dogu Türkistan Göçmenler Dernegi) and the Eastern Turkistan Foundation (Dog u Türkistan Vakfi) were among those founded in 1960 and 1978, respectively. The Association of Eastern Turkistan Emigrés was established together with a group of Kazakhs.

In this first period of Uyghur diaspora mobilization, Alptekin and Bugra used Uyghur identity as the master frame. They emphasized Islam and Turkicness as major components of Uyghur identity. In this way, they attempted to differentiate their identity from the Chinese. A central theme in their mobilization discourse is that the Uyghur identity faced the threat of assimilation due to the Chinese government’s policies.25 Alptekin and Bugra devoted a lot of their time and efforts to construct the political his-tory of the homeland in order to show that the Uyghur people are indig-enous to the land. Emphasizing the people and land connection provided them with a legitimizing claim in the homeland.26

The political opportunities in the first period of Uyghur diaspora mobi-lization were limited compared to later periods. Turkey, as the host state, was restrictive towards diasporic activities in its territory because it did not want to be part of the struggle of diaspora communities against their homeland regimes. Furthermore, because the Turkish republic instigated policies promoting Turkish identity, the development of separate national identities was not allowed.27 Despite such limitations by the host state government, Turkey was a good geographical context for the diaspora considering the common or shared ethnic and religious roots of its society with the Uyghur people. One reason that diaspora leaders emphasized the Muslim and Turkic identity in their writings was perhaps to receive the support of the host society.

Although the origin of Uyghur diaspora formation took root in Turkey, Uyghur diaspora mobilizing practices of the time targeted an international


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audience as well. To create awareness, Alptekin visited organizations such as the Arab League and participated the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Afro-Asian Conference in 1960 and 1965, and the World Congress of Islam in 1964.28 Because this was a period when the Cold War was its height and decolonization was an ongoing process, Alptekin used an anti- Communist and anti-imperialist discourse in his appeals to the international commu-nity.29 Disappointed with a disinterested international audience, Uyghur diaspora leaders showed discontent with Turkey’s passive attitude as well as with the Islamic world and rest of the international community for their indifference to the situation of Uyghurs.30

In the second period of diaspora activism in the 1990s, we can observe changes in mobilization practices, master frames, and political opportuni-ties. The end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union had a major impact on Uyghur diaspora activities. With the passing away of Isa Yusuf Alptekin in 1995 (Mehmet Emin Bugra died much earlier in 1965), the main mobilizing agents of the diaspora movement of the first period were gone. However, Uyghur diaspora activities flourished not only in Turkey but also in Europe in the 1990s.

In this period, new diaspora organizations were established in Turkey, such as the Eastern Turkistan Cultural and Solidarity Association (Dogu Türkistan Kültür ve Dayanısma Dernegi) in 1989 in Kayseri, an Anatolian city where many Uyghurs of the 1965 migration wave had settled. Another organization, the Eastern Turkestan Students Union (Dogu Türkistan Ögrenci Birlig i), was established in in 1994 in Ankara by Uyghur students studying in Turkey. The core members of this organization were the stu-dents who participated in the Uyghur student movement of 1985 in Beijing. Many of these students later came to Turkey to study. The Students Union organized the World Uyghur Youth Congress in Almaty in 1995 with the participation of many young diaspora members from the world. The aim of this Uyghur youth was to bring a new momentum to the Uyghur diaspora movement after the deaths of Alptekin and Bugra.31 After the first Kurultai (meeting), there was a drive to organize a second one in Kyrgyzstan, yet this could not be realized because of pressures from China. Due to such restrictions, the Youth Congress together with the main organizers of the movement moved to Munich in 1996.32

An important development in the second period was the first National Kurultai of Eastern Turkestan, which convened in Istanbul in 1992 with the participation of diaspora members from other host states. In 1998, the Eastern Turkestan National Center was established in Istanbul, followed


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by the second National Kurultai in 1999 in Munich.33 The Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe was also founded during this period in Munich with the initiation of Uyghurs such as Erkin Alptekin (the son of Isa Yusuf Alptekin), Enver Can, Asgar Can, and Ömer Kanat.34

One crucial feature of the second period was the move to change Uyghur diaspora activities to Europe, as the Eastern Turkestan Union and World Youth Uyghur Congress both operating in Munich indicates. Starting in the 1990s, this trend would become permanent and Uyghur diasporic mobili-zation practices would be centered more in Europe and the United States. An important factor that contributed to this trend was the increasingly lim-ited political opportunities in Turkey at the time. Due to pressure from the Chinese government, the Turkish government issued a circular in 1998 banning many activities of the Uyghur diaspora community.35 Although this development was an important factor in the movement of the diaspora activities to the West, there were other influential factors as well. As of the mid-1990s, small but active Uyghur diaspora groups began to form in countries of Western Europe such as Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, and Sweden. Active members of the diaspora residing in Europe thought that Europe could provide more political opportunities with its liberal political context for Uyghur diaspora activities.36

The change in the host state context influenced the frames used in Uyghur diaspora mobilization. Although in Turkey diaspora leaders mostly used Uyghur identity as the master frame with the shared Turkic and Muslim components emphasized, in Europe the Uyghur diaspora used a rights-based frame along with the identity frame. The importance of human rights in global politics increased after the Cold War, as many countries were put under pressure for the violation of their citizens’ human rights. China was exposed to increasing criticism, especially after its Open Door Policy. Therefore, the Uyghur diaspora adopted a new rights-based frame in this new period.

By the early 2000s, Uyghur diaspora activism spread to various host states with an increasing number of diaspora organizations and increasing visibility. However, in the third period, it became apparent that the flour-ishing of organizations and activities created a new problem: the lack of coordination and unity among these numerous organizations. The need for a coordinating, central organization became urgent, especially after the death of Alptekin and with the spread of diaspora activism to diverse loca-tions. Erkin Alptekin, Isa Yusuf Alptekin’s son, who lived in Europe at the time, took the lead to remedy this problem. He took the initiative to merge


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the Eastern Turkestan National Congress and the World Uyghur Youth Congress in 2004 after a major meeting in Munich, which many diaspora organization representatives attended. The idea to establish an all-inclusive, umbrella organization was finally realized and the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) was born as an outcome of this meeting. Erkin Alptekin was elected as the first president of the Congress.37 Later, after the release of Rabia Kadeer from prison in China, Erkin Alptekin offered the presidency of the organization to her. In November of 2006, Rabia Kadeer was elected unanimously to the presidency of the WUC.38

During interviews in Turkey with Uyghur diaspora members, many of my informants expressed their content with the WUC becoming an umbrella organization that coordinates their organizations` activities and thus helps Uyghur diaspora voices better reach the international commu-nity.39 Although more than 90 percent of Uyghur diaspora organizations are currently under WUC’s umbrella, which indicates strong unity among diaspora communities, there are also different viewpoints regarding its mobilization goals and strategies. Still, Rabia Kadeer, who has been WUC president since 2006, seems to fulfill the leadership gap that emerged after Alptekin’s death.

In the third periodic stage of Uyghur diaspora movement, new organi-zations continued to be established. In Turkey, the Eastern Turkestan Education and Solidarity Association (Dogu Türkistan Maarif ve Dayanısma Dernegi) was established in 2005. Active mostly in the field of education, the organization aims to help Uyghur students studying in Turkey along with offering weekend Uyghur language classes for young Uyghur chil-dren. A representative from the organization informed me that they pre-ferred not to be affiliated with the WUC because they are more conservative in their worldview. Yet, he added that they share some of the goals of the WUC.40 The Satuk Bugra Khan Science and Education Foundation (Satuk Bugra Han Ilim Medeniyet Vakfı) is another such organization. It was established in Istanbul in 2012. This organization is also active in educa-tion and helps the Uyghur students with their education needs.41 A repre-sentative from the organization underlined that, in the past, activities of organizations like Eastern Turkestan Foundation (DTV) covered political, cultural and education realms, while today there is a need for separation of these realms; therefore, their organization only focuses on education.42

The flourishing of Uyghur diaspora organizations during the third period also continued in other host states. One such organization, active in the United States, is the Uyghur American Association (UAA), which


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defines its goal as “working to promote the preservation and flourishing of a rich, humanistic and diverse Uyghur culture, and to support the right of the Uyghur people to use peaceful, democratic means to determine their own political future.”43 Based in Washington, D.C, the organization is effective in its lobbying activities. The Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP), working under the UAA, aims specifically to raise awareness about human rights problems in Xinjiang by preparing reports on many issues related to Uyghur women, Uyghur asylum seekers, and Uyghur cultural heritage.44

A major development in Uyghur mobilization practices in the last period is the use of the Internet. Unavailable to previous generations, the new technology provided Uyghurs with a stronger tool to disseminate the Uyghur issue to a global audience as well as making communication among diaspora members easier. The use of the Internet has proliferated among all diaspora groups in the past few decades. For Victoria Bernal, “the inter-net is a transnational space where diaspora members produce and debate narratives of history, culture, democracy and identity.”45 The Internet encouraged the involvement of more people in diaspora activities and pro-vided the diaspora elite with a means to reach their target audience easier. For the last decade or so, Uyghur diaspora members have been using this platform effectively to reach a global audience, as well as for greater cohe-sion and participation among members.46

The mobilization frames used in the third phase continued to be related to human rights along with issues pertaining to Uyghur national identity. Since July 2009, a specific event has also served as a master frame. This event concerned the uprisings of Uyghurs in the city of Urumqi on July 5, 2009, followed by the protesters’ subsequent clashes with the police. The 5th of July uprising symbolized a critical event for Uyghur diaspora mem-bers. Each year, commemoration events are organized by diaspora organi-zations around the world marking this event. Many of my informants stated that through commemorating such events not only were they able to preserve their identity and unity but also help the host society know about the conditions of Uyghurs in the homeland.47 Each diaspora orga-nization organizes its own event in coordination with the WUC.

As the mobilizing practices and frames evolved in the third stage of Uyghur diaspora mobilization, so did the political opportunities. Already having become active in Europe in the second stage, the Uyghur diaspora community utilized the political opportunities in Europe even more dur-ing the third period. An informant residing in Germany talked about the


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convenient liberal political context that their host state provides them with. He added that as long as they remain in the legal framework of their host state, they are allowed to organize meetings and demonstrations. Despite the host state’s liberal environment, my informant complained about the low interest of German society for the Uyghur issue.48 Uyghur diaspora members in the Netherlands shared a similar discontent about Dutch soci-ety’s unawareness about the Uyghurs’ conditions. However, as in the case of Germany, the Netherlands, as a host state, provides appropriate political opportunities for their activities.49 Especially after the 5th of July, more Uyghurs have come to the Netherlands to seek asylum, which, according to my informant, has led to a more vibrant environment for mobilization.50

Turkey, as the birthplace for Uyghur diaspora activism, has evolved over time in terms of the political opportunities provided to the Uyghur dias-pora. At the societal level, the Turkish public has generally remained sensi-tive to the Uyghur issue. Particularly the more conservative and nationalist segments of the Turkish public participated actively in the meetings and demonstrations organized by Uyghur diaspora organizations. The com-memoration of the 5th of July events provided a convenient frame for rais-ing awareness in Turkish society by emphasizing the violation of the rights of their Turkic and Muslim brethren in Xinjiang.51

While at the societal level Turkey has provided a conducive environ-ment for Uyghur diaspora activism, at the state level tolerance towards Uyghur activism has often been ambivalent and often depended particu-larly on the relations between Turkey with China. In the last stage of Uyghur diaspora mobilization, the previous period’s difficulties regarding diaspora activism were now improved. Informants in Turkey stated that especially under the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rule, they have had a more flexible political opportunity structure. Although there are still some problems such as of Rabia Kadeer not having been granted a visa to visit Turkey, my informants were generally content with the AKP government’s tolerance towards their activities.52 They evaluated the then Prime Minister Erdogan’s calling of the response of the Chinese security forces to the 5th of July uprisings “practically genocide” as supportive of their cause.53 My informants also stated that other political parties in Turkey have also shown interest in the Uyghur cause. While the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) has traditionally been interested in the plight of Uyghurs in Xinjiang on the basis of common Turkic and Islamic roots, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) has recently showed a growing interest on the issue primarily as a human rights problem.54


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In terms of the political opportunities of the Uyghur diaspora in the last period, a more convenient environment emerged at the level of interna-tional organizations also. Especially after the July 5th events, the WUC president, Kadeer, was able to visit international organizations to talk about the conditions of Uyghurs in China. The WUC representatives had the chance to present the Uyghur case at different intergovernmental organizations, such as the European Parliament (at the Foreign Affairs and Human Rights Committee) and the UN Human Rights Council.55 In addition to such governmental organizations, the Uyghur issue has been widely discussed in the annual reports of international nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.56

In this chapter, I have treated the Uyghur diaspora as a category of practice by analyzing the process of diaspora formation, agents of Uyghur diaspora mobilization, mobilizing practices, and master frames used by these agents in three major time periods. The first period, starting almost a decade after the first Uyghur migration to Turkey, witnessed the initial stages of diaspora formation. Largely due to these attempts by diaspora agents during this first period, diasporic mobilization took root in Turkey. Mehmet Emin Bugra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin used Uyghur national iden-tity as the master frame to mobilize diaspora members and relevant actors in the international community. Confined to the available means of the period, Bug ra and Alptekin made use of publications to construct a par-ticular Uyghur identity by underlining the differences between theirs and the Chinese one. Through their construction of the political history of the region, they attempted to prove that Uyghurs are indigenous to the land. Despite the limited means and political opportunity structures available to them, the first-generation Uyghur diaspora elite successfully constructed an identity frame, which would be developed by later generations.

The second period of Uyghur diaspora mobilization covers the decade starting ın the early 1990s. After the death of the diaspora elite of the previous period, Uyghur diaspora activities fragmented. Various diaspora organizations were established not only in Turkey but also in Europe. This period symbolizes the movement of the main Uyghur diaspora activities to Europe as the establishment of the Eastern Turkestan Union and the World Youth Uyghur Congress in Germany indicates. The flexible politi-cal opportunity structures found in Europe played a large role in this deci-sion. The change in the host state context, in turn, affected the frames used in the second phase. The Uyghur diaspora centered its discourse


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more on a rights-based framework because this had more appeal for the European host states and societies.

In the last period of Uyghur diaspora mobilization, important changes in the mobilization agents and practices also emerged. First of all, with the founding of the WUC as an umbrella organization for Uyghur diaspora organizations in the world, the problem of coordination and unity was resolved to a certain extent. With Rabiya Kadeer becoming president of the WUC in 2006, the leadership problem of the Uyghur diaspora was also solved. Another development that affected the mobilization practices was the use of the internet by diaspora members. Through the use of this technology, Uyghur diaspora members were able to coordinate easier and the dissemination of the Uyghur issue to a larger audience was facilitated. In the last period, while the diaspora continued to use the master frames of the previous stages, a critical event, the 5th of July Urumqi Uprisings, became another frame that helped diaspora members mobilize.

Starting almost half a century ago, Uyghur diaspora mobilization evolved in time as the changing diaspora leadership, mobilization discourses and practices, mobilization frames, and political opportunity structures indicate. By using the tools provided by the social mobilization theory, I argued that the Uyghur diaspora was formed in a particular time, under particular con-ditions, and is largely a mobilization project constructed by the Uyghur diaspora elite. As this particular case suggests, approaching diaspora as a stance and category of practice mainly driven by the elite and evolving in time can help us better understand the role of diaspora in international politics.

notes

1. K. D. Butler (2001) ‘Defining Diaspora: Refining a Discourse’ Diaspora, 10:2, p. 10; G. Sheffer (1986) ‘A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics’ in G. Smith (ed.) Modern Diasporas in International Polities (New York: St. Martin’s Press).

2. S.J. Mahler (2000), ‘Constructing International Relations: The Role of Transnational Migrants and Other Non-State Actors’ Identities, 7:2, p. 208.

3. Y. Shain and A. Barth (2003) ‘Diasporas and International Relations Theory’ International Organizations, 57, p. 450.

4. Y. Shain and A. Barth (2003), p. 451.5. Y. Shain and A. Barth (2003), p. 450.6. C. Ogden (2008) ‘Diaspora Meets IR’s Constructivism: An Appraisal’

Politics, 28:1, p. 4.


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7. C. Ogden (2008), pp. 4–7.8. F.B. Adamson and M. Demetriou (2007) ‘Remapping the Boundaries of

“State” and “National Identity”: Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theoriz-ing’ European Journal of International Relations, 13:4, pp. 496–497.

9. F.B. Adamson and M. Demetriou (2007), p. 492.10. M. Koinova (2010) ‘Diasporas and international politics: Utilising the

Universalistic Creed of Liberalism for Particularistic and Nationalist Purposes’ in T. Faist and R. Bauböck (eds) Diasporas and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), p. 150.

11. R. Brubaker (2005) ‘The “Diaspora” Diaspora’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28:1, p. 12.

12. F. Adamson (2008) ‘Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social Movements’ Paper Prepared for Presentation at the 49th Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, March 26–29.

13. F. Adamson (2008) ‘Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social Movements.’

14. J. Dahinden (2010) ‘The Dynamics of Migrants’ Transnational Formations: Between Mobility and Locality’ in T. Faist and R. Bauböck (eds) Diasporas and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), p. 54.

15. M. Sökefeld (2006) ‘Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora’ Global Networks, 6:3, p. 267.

16. M. Sökefeld (2006), p. 268.17. M. Sökefeld (2006), p. 268.18. M. Sökefeld (2006), p. 269.19. M. Sökefeld (2006), p. 270.20. M. Sökefeld (2006), pp. 270–272.21. M. Sökefeld (2006), p. 270.22. M. Sökefeld (2006), pp. 270–271.23. F. Adamson (2008) ‘Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics

and Transnational Social Movements.’24. I.Y. Alptekin (1967) Memorandum Concerning Great Turkestan (Istanbul:

Sehir Matbaası), I.Y. Alptekin (1976) Dog u Türkistan Davası (Istanbul: Otag Yayınları), I.Y. Alptekin (1976) Dogu Türkistan’ın Hür Dünyaya Çagrısı, (Istanbul: Otag Matbaası), I.Y. Alptekin (1979) Dogu Türkistan’da Kızıl Çin Vahseti (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Arastırmalar Merkezi), I.Y. Alptekin (1992) Unutulan Vatan: Dogu Türkistan (Istanbul: Seha Nesriyat), I.Y. Alptekin and M.E. Bug ra (1955) Dog u Türkistan Kızıl Muhtariyeti Reddeder (Ankara: Son Havadis Matbaası), M.E. Bugra (1959) Tibet ve Dog u Türkistan Hakkında Bilinmeyen Siyasi Konular, (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası).

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25. I.Y. Alptekin (1967) Büyük Türkistan Hakkında, (Istanbul: Sehir Matbaası), p. 12; M.A. Tasçı, Esir Dogu Türkistan Için: Isa Yusuf Alptekin’in Mücadele Hatıraları, (Istanbul: Dogu Türkistan Nesriyat Merkezi), p. 35; I.Y. Alptekin (1976) Dogu Türkistan Davası, p. 66, I.Y. Alptekin (1979) Dogu Türkistan’da Kızıl Çin Vahseti, (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Arastırmalar Merkezi), pp. 3–4.

26. I.Y. Alptekin (1976) Dog u Türkistan Davası, pp. 80–88, (1989) ‘Komünizmin Dogu Türkistan’a Girisinin 40.Yılı Münasebetiyle Isa Yusuf Alptekin’le Yaptıg ımız Röportaj’, Dogu Türkistan’ın Sesi, 23:6.

27. L. Bezanis (1992) ‘Soviet Muslim Emigres in the Republic of Turkey’ Report for the Department of State Washington D.C Office of External Research.

28. Y. Shichor (2003) ‘Virtual Transnationalism: Uyghur Communities in Europe and the Quest for Eastern Turkestan Independence’, in S. Allievi and J.S. Nielsen (Eds.), Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe, (Leiden, Boston: Brill), p. 290.

29. I. Kuscu (2013), ‘Origins of Uyghur Long-Distance Nationalism: The First Generation Uyghur Diaspora in Turkey’ Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Arastırmaları Dergisi, 8:16, p. 86.

30. I. Kuscu (2013), p. 88.31. E. Emet (2009), 5 Temmuz Urumçi Olayı ve Dogu Turkistan (Ankara:

Grafiker Yayınları), p. 104.32. E. Emet (2009), pp. 108–109, Interview with a WUC representative,

Munich (Germany), July 2013.33. Y. Shichor (2003) ‘Virtual Transnationalism: Uyghur Communities in

Europe and the Quest for Eastern Turkestan Independence’, pp. 292–294.34. Interview with a leader of the Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe, Munich

(Germany), July 2013.35. E. Emet (2009), p. 59.36. Interview with a representative of the Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe,

Munich (Germany), July 2013.37. E. Emet (2009), p. 110.38. Interview with a representative of the Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe,

Munich (Germany), July 2013.39. Interview with a representative of the Eastern Turkestan Culture and

Solidarity Association, Ankara (Turkey), January 2013, Interview with a representative of the Eastern Turkestan Youth Culture and Solidarity Association, Istanbul (Turkey), February 2013.

40. Interview with a representative of the Eastern Turkestan Education and Solidarity Association, Istanbul (Turkey), February 2013.

41. Interview with a representative of the Satuk Bugra Khan Science and Education Foundation, Istanbul (Turkey), February 2013.


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42. Interview with a representative of the Satuk Bugra Khan Science and Education Foundation, Istanbul (Turkey), February 2013.

43. Website of the Uyghur American Association, http://uyghuramerican.org/about_uaa, date accessed 28 August 2015.

44. ‘Deception, Pressure, and Threats: The Transfer of Young Uyghur Women to Eastern China’ UHRP Report, 2008, ‘They Can’t Send Me Back: Uyghur Asylum seekers in Europe’ UHRP Report, 2011, ‘Living on the Margins: The Chinese State’s Demolition of Uyghur Communities’ UHRP Report, 2012.

45. V. Bernal, ‘Diaspora, Cyberspace and Political Imagination: the Eritrean Diaspora Online’ Global Networks 6: 2, p. 162.

46. I. Kuscu (2014) ‘The Uyghur Diaspora in Cyberspace: Identity and Homeland Cause’ Bilig: Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkish World, 69, p. 150.

47. Interview with a representative of the Eastern Turkestan Youth Culture and Solidarity Association, Istanbul (Turkey), February 2013, Interview with a representative of the Uyghur Women’s Committee in Germany, Munich (Germany), July 2013, Interview with a member of the diaspora in the Netherlands, Amsterdam (the Netherlands), July 2013.

48. Interview with a WUC representative, Munich (Germany), July 2013.49. Interview with a representative of the Uyghur Education Association in

Europe, Amsterdam (the Netherlands), July 2013, Interview with a mem-ber of the diaspora in the Netherlands, Amsterdam (the Netherlands), July 2013.

50. Interview with a member of the diaspora in the Netherlands, Amsterdam (the Netherlands), July 2013.

51. ‘Çin Konsoloslug u Önünde Protesto Eylemi’ http://www.haber7.com/hukuk/haber/1446304-cin-konsoloslugu-onunde-protesto-eylemi, date accessed 25 August 2015, ‘Çin Konsoloslug u Önünde Urumçi Protestosu’ http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-cin-konsoloslugu-onunde-urumci-protes-tosu-476759/, date accessed 25 August 2015.

52. Interview with a representative of the Eastern Turkestan Culture and Solidarity Association, Ankara (Turkey), January 2013, Interview with a member of the diaspora in Turkey, Ankara (Turkey).

53. ‘Erdogan ‘Adeta Soykırım’ dedi’ http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan_adeta_soykirim_dedi-944592, date accessed 27 August 2015, ‘Basbakan: Çin’de Olanlar Adeta Soykırım’ http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/12046635.asp, date accessed 27 August 2015.

54. Interview with a representative of the Eastern Turkestan Culture and Solidarity Association, Ankara (Turkey), January 2013, Interview with a member of the diaspora in Turkey, Ankara (Turkey), January 2013, Interview with a representative of the Eastern Turkestan Youth Culture and Solidarity Association, Istanbul (Turkey), February 2013.

I. KUS ÇU BONNENFANT

http://uyghuramerican.org/about_uaa

http://uyghuramerican.org/about_uaa

http://www.haber7.com/hukuk/haber/1446304-cin-konsoloslugu-onunde-protesto-eylemi

http://www.haber7.com/hukuk/haber/1446304-cin-konsoloslugu-onunde-protesto-eylemi

http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-cin-konsoloslugu-onunde-urumci-protestosu-476759/

http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-cin-konsoloslugu-onunde-urumci-protestosu-476759/

http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan_adeta_soykirim_dedi-944592

http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan_adeta_soykirim_dedi-944592

http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/12046635.asp


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55. Emet (2009), 5 Temmuz Urumçi Olayı ve Dogu Turkistan, p. 61, Interview with a representative of the Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe, Munich (Germany), July 2013, Interview with a WUC representative, Munich (Germany), July 2013, C.Gessant (2010) ‘Pe/Chine: Le Parlement Europeen Soutient Le Peuple Ouïgour Dans Sa Demande De Dialogue Avec La Chine,’ http://www.agenceurope.com, date accessed 24 August 2015.

56. Amnesty International Report 2014/15, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china/report-china/, date accessed 24 August 2015, Uighurs http://www.hrw.org/tag/uighurs, date accessed 24 August 2015.


http://www.agenceurope.com

https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china/report-china/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china/report-china/

http://www.hrw.org/tag/uighurs


Bordered Conscience: Uyghurs of Central Asia

Suchandana Chatterjee

The purpose of this chapter is to “put the local back into Uyghur history.”1 The attempt is to situate Uyghurs not within historical time frames or geo-graphical spaces, but bringing in aspects of interconnectedness across shared spaces as a subject of analysis. Today’s indigenous Uyghur histories of Xinjiang are seen as “local” from the Chinese perspective, which consid-ers the Uyghurs and the province of Xinjiang to be part of the Chinese state. From the Uyghur nationalist perspective, the same history is national rather than local. This chapter seeks to demonstrate the importance of understanding the influence of the local in Uyghur historical writing, a tradition strongly influenced by local history. An alternative body of knowl-edge, belief, and practice emanating from Central Asia has shaped Uyghur identity, which needs to be seriously considered.2 Over the years, scholars have not only dealt with specifics of current political situation in Xinjiang but have also tried to map the Uyghurs’ identity transformation in a holis-tic way.3

Keeping such divergent traditions of scholarship in mind,4 this chapter tries to look beyond the common perception of the Uyghurs as a minority nationality inhabiting the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of the People’s

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Republic of China. Generally speaking, scholarship about the Uyghurs in China is factored on the binary relationship between the majority Han population and its minority nationalities, such as the Hui and the Uyghurs.5 Such a perception is factored on the Chinese penetration in the western borderlands. The Uyghurs, in a sinologist’s view, have a territorial focus (i.e., Xinjiang or New Dominions/Eastern Turkestan). At the same time, contested notions of Uyghur history centering the western prefectures of Xinjiang bordering Kazakhstan (Ili, Tarbagatay and Altay) have been artic-ulated in the Soviet historical writings of the 1940s.6

The Uyghurs of Central Asia have regained attention in the context of growing interest in narratives about margins with diasporic communities7 that, at different points in time, have been exiled or displaced from their homelands and have adopted meaningful roles in their newly adopted sur-roundings. Semirechie is identified as the diaspora Uyghurs’ original home-land from where their successors (no less than 200,000) migrated to Kazakhstan in the 1950s and 1960s. The earliest inhabitants of Semirechie are called the yärlik (“locals”). The Uyghur migrants of the 1950s and 1960s call themselves kegänlär (literally, “newcomers”) but other commu-nities call them kitailik (“Chinese”). Now, the more commonly used term is köchäp kegän. Kitailik instead has come to refer to the latest Uyghur newcomers (who have arrived since the 1990s), also called wätändin (“peo-ple from the homeland”). Today, Kazakhstan is often a transit point for Uyghur migration to Western Europe and North America; most Uyghurs in countries such as Norway and Canada come from Central Asia rather than China. Almaty’s Ethnographic Centre of Interethnic Relations of the Ministry of Culture of Kazakhstan has estimated more than 300,000 people of Uyghur origin, corresponding to 15% of the population of Kazakhstan.8

Homeland narratives

A generation of Uyghur historians, who were trained and educated in a Soviet environment, are nostalgic about the Uyghurs’ homeland in Semi-rechie. Notwithstanding their migrant status, they coped well in Soviet sur-roundings. Ablet Kamalov, a Uyghur historian based in Almaty, discussed this generation of Soviet Uyghurs who migrated from East Turkestan in the 1950s and 1960s.9 An estimated figure of about 200,000 Uyghurs are con-centrated in those areas of Kazakhstan and the Ferghana Valley, which are closest to the Chinese border. Kamalov’s Kulja narrative is a case study of the “in-betweenness” of the Uyghurs of Central Asia.

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Ablet was trained in the Oriental faculty environment in Almaty where he had come with his family (his parents, a brother, and two sisters) in 1963 at the age of 2 years. His father knew both the Uyghur and Kazakh languages. Ablet’s mother only knew the Uyghur language. The siblings had trouble adjusting to the Russian environment. His sisters were educated in Uyghur schools in Kulja. Most of the products of daily need were available in Kulja, so moving home and hearth was not easy. The microregion Zarya Vostoka continued to have a Uyghur school, but his sisters could not adjust there. Ablet and his brother were put into a Russian school. Ablet wanted to study in Novosibirsk, but his family sent him to Tashkent where he studied in the Department of Chinese Studies in the Faculty of Oriental Studies. After that, his options were the Academy of Sciences in Kazakhstan (in continua-tion of his Tashkent training) where a Uyghur Studies Department was opened in 1949 and defense departments (like several intellectuals who had opted for military training). He then spent a year in Leningrad as asperan-tura. In Leningrad, he studied medieval Uyghur history based on Uyghur sources. This is a personal experience of Soviet educational institutions emphasizing on istochnikovedenie or study of sources. Klyashtorny, his supervisor, was Head of the Turkic-Mongol study circle in Leningrad and a leading expert in Chinese studies. Ablet defended his dissertation in 1990.

After 1991, Ablet went on his first private tour to his birthplace, Kulja. Until then, Kulja was just a memory. He nurtured a romantic notion of Kulja and he derived his sense of the place’s history from his parents. In Ablet’s narrative, memories are also associated with place names—Xinjiang in China is either Dihua (less used) or Ulumuchi. The name Kulja is used universally by Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and other small nationalities of Central Asia and China, whereas Yining is the official name of Kulja in China.

Kamalov is nostalgic about his roots. His Kulja experience is a nice memory, with Kulja’s history deeply embedded in his mind. The state- managed commercial spaces today are so different from the Oriental mar-ketplaces of the past. His fairytale musings about Urumqi and Kulja are in sharp contrast to the corporate profile of Xinjiang today. Ablet’s genera-tion finds it difficult to come to terms with the major shift in priorities. Today, the focus has shifted to big business. The trade networks among relatives across borders have become relatively unimportant.

There are other tales of belonging among the Uyghurs of Kazakhstan. For example, Roziyeva, who was born and raised in the world of Soviet children’s literature, recounted the literary talent of Kazakh Uyghur poet Ilya Bakhtiya. Bakhtiya was an inspiration among the Soviet youth for his

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poems on “love, labour, motherland, life and death, poetry, humanity, freedom and friendship.”10

Certain myths and phobias about the Chinese presence haunt the Central Asian region. At the same time, due to economic opportunities, attitudes toward Beijing are changing. The Uyghurs and the Dungans are China’s Central Asian minorities. They have displayed their trading skills to a major extent but their competitiveness in Kazakhstan remains modest. These cross-border minorities play a significant role in the development of Sino-Central Asian economic relations and in the cultural mediations between the two worlds.11 Sometimes, there are nuanced views about a historical cleavage that is traced back to the Zhungar period. Otherwise, however, in the permissive environment that exists in Kazakhstan, Uyghur migrants do not feel alienated in their host country, Kazakhstan. Interactive social behav-ior is a universal trait among these communities and Almaty is always con-sidered to be “home” to its resident nationalities.12

twists and turns in uygHur diaspora HistoriograpHy

The Uyghur diaspora dates back to the nineteenth century, when political upheavals in Xinjiang led to the migration of thousands of East Turkestan’s population into Russian territory. In the first decades of the Communist regime, industrial development in Zhetysu/Yettisu/Semirechie and Ferghana also attracted a flow of seasonal laborers from Xinjiang, who worked in the cotton fields, melon cultivation, and oil and coal mining. The group identity of the Uyghurs (as Kyrgyz and Taranchis) was recognized by the Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, in Almaty to expand the support base of the Provisional Government. Further evidence of solidarity among Central Asian Jadidist intellectuals and revolutionaries can be found in the formation of, say, the Taranchi Committee in Almaty (founded by businessman Abusattar), which included representatives from the Dungan (Hui) community and had contact with the Taranchis from China. This committee in Almaty (Umumi Musulmanlar Komiteti) by Muhammadimin Zaynamov and Husainbek Yunusov continued to spurn the Bolsheviks until the White Army was defeated in March 1918 and they fled across the border to Ghulja/Kulja. The newspaper in Semirechie, Sada-i-Taranchi (Voice of Taranchi) was edited by Zarif Bashiri until the early months of the Soviet takeover in Zhetysu in 1918. It was censored by the Soviet authorities. The anti-Bolshe-vik activities of the Uyghurs continued in the form of rebellions in Yettisu/Semirechie by Taranchi peasants and religious leaders raising claims of water

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and land. What followed came to be described as the “Taranchi tragedy” in Uyghur historiography, including the flight of farmers to Kulja, the disarm-ing of alleged bandits, and the massacre of counter-revolutionaries by the Cheka.

After the defeat of the Taranchi rebellion, Soviet Uyghur historiography took a new turn with Taranchi intellectualism, which was centered in cities like Almaty. Since then, the term “Uyghur” has represented an indigenous culture. This was the position of intellectuals like Abdullah Rozibaqiev and Nazarkhoja Abdusemàtov, who had Russian schooling and were inducted in city-based activities of the Communist Party in Almaty oblast. Rozibaqiev became a teacher and was extremely popular for his speeches to metalwork-ers, craftsmen, and teachers. He headed the Zhetisu Commissariat of Nationalities and mentored several youth societies and nationalities’ clubs under the name “Uyghur.” The latter mostly wrote historical and cultural articles for the Tatar journal Shura using the pen name Uyghur Balisi (“Child of Uyghur”) from 1910 onward. While he favored the term Taranchi for his own people of Yettisu/Zhetisu, Abdusemàtov took pride in the ancient “Uyghur” culture of Eastern Turkestan and firmly believed that the banks of the Ili river were settled by Uyghur Turks in ancient times.13

Over the years, the Soviet ideological component was refurbished with features of “Uyghur commonality” and referred to ideas of a Turkic lin-eage. The Soviet Turcologist A.N. Bernshtam emphasized the Uyghurs’ and Central Asians’ common Turkic descent. His view that the Uyghurs were indigenous communities not only of Eastern Turkestan but also of the Semirechie region in the eighth to ninth centuries articulated the Soviet notion of statehood encompassing a wide range of nationalities. However, Bernshtam’s works faded into memory at the time of the Communist take-over of China in 1949. The Soviet concept of statehood was applied to research on medieval Uyghur kingdoms of Turpan and the Qarakhanid khanates and the short-lived independent states of Yatta Shahr (Altishahr) in southern Xinjiang (or the Kashgar Emirate) within the domain of Turcology. In Almaty, at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Uyghur Studies was introduced by a skeletal research group, which transformed in the 1960s into a more vibrant study circle after the exodus of the Uyghurs, Dungans, and Kazakhs from the Kulja region. Soon, Dungan Studies were incorporated into the school of Uyghur Studies.

Thus, there have been twists and turns in the Uyghur content of Soviet historiography. The generic idea of Uyghurs as autonomy seekers is no


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longer the dominant trajectory. It has been superseded by perceptions about settler–migrant relations, as well as Turkic commonality and shared linkages among the Uyghurs of China and Central Asia. The common impression that we get is that Uyghurs have been forced to cope with the past and the present. The settler–migrant quotient has been the dominant element in most of these narratives about Uyghur migration in the aftermath of Qing occupation, Muslim rebellion, the Russian occupation of Ili valley, and Soviet national delimitation. The perspective that Turkic lineage is the single common denominator of ethnohistories among the Uyghurs is shared by both old and new generations of historians. The Uyghur historian Shohrat referred to two periods when Uyghurs enjoyed a flourishing “high” Turkic culture: the steppe Uyghur Empire (745–840 AD) and the Buddhist Uyghur kingdom of Turpan (850–1250).

In their renewed attention to the Ili “crisis” of 1871–1881, when the region succumbed to Russian control, scholars have argued not so much about the competitive relationship between the two realms of control—Yakub Beg and the Russians, as well as Russians versus British (with Yakub Beg as British ally)—but about adverse effects on the trade and environ-ment of the Uyghurs and Taranchis. The livestock, farming, and agricul-tural possibilities of the deltaic Ili region and the enormous potential of the Ili River as a waterway have been advantages and decisive features through-out the Tsarist and Soviet periods as well as of the independent Kazakh Republic. Instead of a Chinese-centric position, scholars have shown aware-ness about Central Asian dynamics in the Ili region. For instance, the settler population in the Ili region comprised the Mongols, Tungusic, and Oirat people as well as nomadic Torghuts from the Volga region. During the Zhungar period, these people had already been relocated from southern Xinjiang (Aksu and Yarkand) to work as peasants in Ili lands and were extorted by the Qianlong emperor through excessive levies (in the form of barley, millet, and rye). These migrant settlers subsequently became involved with the Muslim rebellions in the Ili region.

In addition to the peasants of the Ili region, there was another social category in the Ili region—the merchants, whose fate was altered by Russian occupation. Empowered by the Treaty of Kulja (1851), the Russian mer-chants of tea and textiles entered Ili and Tarbagatay. Despite this treaty, all was not favorable for the Russian trading houses, which had to look for alternative negotiations with the Ili governor (e.g., permission for boat navi-gability along the Ili River, keeping in mind the high fertility of the grazing lands in the Ili region).

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The third feature is the subaltern dynamic in Ili lands, which has always been overlooked even as scholars have written about Xinjiang’s Muslim rebellion. The rebellion reached the outskirts of Russian Empire up to Kobdo, which affected Russian trade. It was Kaufman’s efficient handling of the Turkestan Governor Generalate and the creation of the two oblasts—the Semirechie oblast and the Syr Darya oblast—that solidified the founda-tions of a Central Asian–Russian negotiation in Ili region. The Semirechie and Lake Balkhash water systems were put under the jurisdiction of a mili-tary governor, while the Kazakh tribal union of the Elder Horde was absorbed by the Russian Empire. Many migrants from Qing lands were admitted to Russian territory and negotiations took place between Russian and Qing authorities regarding indemnities for their return. Among them were Kazakhs who roamed in the outskirts of Ili; as members of the Elder Horde, they used to visit Ili for trade purposes during the mid-eighteenth century and moved into the Qing dominions along the borders to escape cold winter winds. Archival records indicate the presence of Kazakh Sultans (e.g., Sultan Tezek) as mediators between Russian and Ili’s governors.14

These are all connected strands in the Taranchi/Uyghur ambience of the Ili region. Imperial geopolitics coordinated and mediated by local gov-ernors and authorities such as Yakub Beg were not the only reality. More interesting was the changing contours of dominant ethnicities in a flour-ishing region like the Ili, from where the Taranchis/Uyghurs as a majority population gradually declined. In what has been called an Ili crisis due to the movement of Taranchis from Qing dominions, space was created for the growing presence of new ethnic groups, such as the Uyghurs and Dungans. Driven out of the Zhungar khanate, these Uyghurs did not have the right of autonomy in Soviet Kazakhstan. Such a position was main-tained throughout the Soviet period. Soviet policies had a decisive impact on the identity of East Turkestani émigrés in the Soviet Union.15 Malik Kabirov’s thesis of 1987 represented the first departure from previous hypotheses, as it considered them as autochthons of Semirechie rather than as migratory Turkic tribes who came to the region after the collapse of the Uyghur Kaganate in 840 AD.

semirecHie: Bordered conscience

Another aspect of this Turkic belonging is related to Semirechie (Kazakh name Zhetysu or the Land of the Seven Rivers) from where the Uyghur community migrated to southeast Kazakhstan in the 1880s. Herein lies


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the new twist in Uyghur Studies: a reappraisal of the Uyghurs as social and cultural actors in the Central Asian space—much different from what ana-lysts have argued about the Uyghurs as a transnational security threat.16 Such nostalgia for places like Semirechie became subject matter for the Kazakh film Zamanai (1998). In the film, the journey of a grandmother and her grandson (Amanai) to their ancestral land in Kazakhstan (Semirechié) and the conversation between her and her dead son Zamanai is the scene of action. The conversation through the end of the journey depicts the con-tested notions of the Kazakh homeland. The mother–son imaginary conver-sation reveals the mother’s longing to be united with her tribal home in Semirechie, while the son is still loyal to the Soviet military service in which he was trained and which cost him his life. It reflects the nostalgia among the Kazakhs for Semirechie, which was their ancestral homeland, the tension between Kazakhs of Kazakhstan and the migrants from China, and the attachment to the new home in China.

Grandmother to Alima (mother of Amanai):I will show Amanai his father’s land.That is what Zamanai would love.My grandson, Amanai, stays with me.He will see the birthplace of his ancestors.

Alima:Grandmother---do as you please.You can stay.Amanai is not staying.You keep saying “home country” but where is it?Neither you nor me have it.One’s home is a place where one feels good.17

These tangled connections have yet to receive the attention they deserve. The Semirechie homeland issue is a muted affair, whereas the Uyghur separatist problem has become a global issue.

The 1990s and the 2000s offered a new window of opportunity for the city-based Uyghurs of Central Asia. The Kazakh city of Almaty became, in many respects, the center of an evolving transnational Uyghur community by the mid-1990s. The city of Almaty was symbolically poised as a city with opportunities for a majority of the Turkic nationalities, including the Uyghurs. Almaty, only a few hours by car from China, had been a city of cross-border interaction for the Uyghurs; they have found themselves in the city negotiating between divergent influences emanating from respective sides of the border for over a century. As a result, the Uyghurs of Almaty

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can be divided into several groups by their respective experiences on each side of the border. The varied experiences of each of these migrant groups are reflected in their different perceptions of what it means to be a Uyghur migrant from China and a Uyghur settled in Almaty.

Sean Roberts has an extreme view about Uyghurs of Almaty trying to showcase cultural unity as their only chance to avoid total marginalization. His stay in a Uyghur neighborhood in Almaty, Zarya Vostoka (Dawn of the East), during his field visit in the 1990s demonstrated the following features: a socialist legacy among the yerlik or the locals, a cultural dis-course among the Uyghurs who migrated to Soviet Russia in the 1950s and 1960s, and a capitalist discourse among all groups. There is also an Islamist discourse that displays a unity of ideas about rituals and religious practice. These discourses interact with each other in the production of a Uyghur identity in Zarya Vostoka. Thus, what emerges here is a collective perception of what it means to be a Uyghur, even though the lived-in experiences are different for each group.18

There are other parameters of the migration dynamics. Yelena Sadovskaya pointed out that there are three categories of migrants—temporary labor-ers (Han Chinese), migrants with residence transfer rights (ethnic Kazakhs) who are repatriated from China, and refugees (Uyghurs from Xinjiang). The entrepreneurial abilities of the Han Chinese have propelled their movements into Kazakh territory for pure business ventures. Therefore, their strategies of marketing and adaptation as a business community in the Kazakh ethnoscape have added a new dimension to the southeastern bor-derlands of Kazakhstan.19 The Uyghur image of the “global modern” is opening many commercial options for Kazakhstan’s southern districts as Xinjiang’s proximate neighborhood.20 In an account of Zawut Mahalla in the suburbs of the city of Yining (known as Ghulja in Uyghur) in northern Xinjiang, which borders Kazakhstan, the ethnographer Dautcher wrote about Yining as a vibrant and thriving market town where connections between Kazakhs, Russians, Han Chinese, Uyghurs, and other minorities crisscrossed ethnic, religious, and linguistic boundaries as well as interna-tional borders on a daily basis. It is an interesting snapshot about how interactions among nondominant minorities in the region take place.21

uygHurs of central asia: contemporary dynamics

Kazakhstani Uyghurs’ economic involvement can also be a factor when judging how well integrated they are. For them, the buying and selling of consumer goods is one of their avenues of opportunity. Since the collapse


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of the Soviet Union, Kazakh–Chinese relations developed and the border became more open for trade. This allowed “shuttle traders” to buy goods in China and return to Kazakhstan on short business trips. The shuttle route trade takes place on the Khorgos road, which runs right through the Uyghur district and is the most direct route for shuttle traders to buy and sell goods, or by rail through the Alatau Pass and then on to Almaty or other parts of Kazakhstan. The Uyghurs were able to secure economic trade opportunities and flourish, especially during the period immediately following the opening of the border. Generally, the Uyghurs are not involved in heavy industrial trade—almost all of which is controlled by Kazakh or Chinese state-run enterprises.

With the increased trade between Xinjiang and Central Asia, Central Asian identities have become more relevant in defining Uyghur identities as exposure to Central Asian culture has taken place in an extended way in Xinjiang. The expansion of Xinjiang’s economy and trade with Central Asia has brought new forms of cultural expression to the Uyghur middle class through consumer choice. Increased trade with neighboring nations gives consumers more access to Central Asian, Russian, and Turkish prod-ucts than ever before. Armaan—once a small, Uyghur-run supermarket—now leads the way in meeting Uyghur demands for Turkic and Russian goods. With its headquarters located at the center of Yan’an Lu, a heavily Uyghur-populated area in Urumqi, Armaan is one of the leading corpo-rations in Xinjiang and greatly contributes to the area’s economy. Uyghur companies, such as Amina, have also begun to produce their own prod-ucts, including cups of noodles and bottled soft drinks. Istanbul Tallabazari, or Istanbul Supermarket (later renamed as Ihlas), has also followed in the footsteps of Armaan in a different way. Ihlas provides foodstuffs, snacks, drinks, and other products mainly from Turkey, suc-cessfully serving the growing demand from Uyghur customers. This ten-dency to identify with Uyghur culture in relation to the Han through their differences and to the non-Uyghur Turkic nationalities through their simi-larities is pertinent to modern Uyghur consumer culture.22

new appraisal: tHe altisHaHri constellation

In the revivalist discourse about the internal dynamics of the early Uyghur states of Eastern Turkestan, the spatial unit comprising the oases settlements of Altishahr (Six Cities south of the Tian Shan Mountains) actually connotes ‘Eastern Turkestan.’ In this new literature, the Yatta Shahr Uyghur State

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(Uygurskoye Gosudarstvo Yettishahr) has been discussed. Rian Thum, in his research about sacred routes of Uyghur history, has indicated that Uyghur history proceeds from the region known among many Uyghurs as Altishahr. Yet, this name is not found on modern maps. In Chinese official discourse, the region is Xinjiang (pronounced/transliterated as Shinjang), although in everyday speech the name Altishahr persists.23

In the new appraisals about Uyghur history, attention has shifted to the more powerful and dynamic actors in Altishahr’s history. The intratribal and intertribal power struggles between the Manchus and Zhungars resulted in Altishahr’s transformation into a Chinese domain. The region constituted a part of the Great Qing Empire in 1759 and the ruler, the Qianlong Emperor as master, extended his control over Manchuria, Mongolia, China, and Tibet. The Emperor attacked the Zhungars by sending his Manchu and Mongol soldiers on hot pursuit toward the steppe region on the western borders of his empire. Even though the Zhungar armies were pushed back, there were traces of the Zhungar legacy within the Manchu domain up to the agricul-tural oases that surround the Taklamakan Desert to the south—namely Altishahr, where the final battle between the Manchu rulers and Zhungar descendants took place. As the final result, Altishahr, the steppe homeland of the Zhungars, became a Chinese administrative unit with the name of Xinjiang (New Dominion). Until 1932, the region was barely known for some mild Altishahri rebellions and moments of independence (1933–1934). The memory of the region was mainly that of a dependency under Qianlong imperial rule. In the monolithic history of Republican China, the previous narrative of Altishahr and its identity were completely lost.

In recent times, the idea of Altishahr as an alternative dispensation has emerged. In an attempt to establish the group identity of southern Xinjiang’s settled Turkic inhabitants, a handful of scholars have argued that the place identity prevailed long before the construction of a Uyghur identity. In the absence of a national history, separate histories were linked together through shrine pilgrimage and manuscript tradition, yielding a broad-based historical tradition that was articulated through regional nar-ratives. What we see here, therefore, is a regional identity that expressed itself in a non-modern context. The Uyghurs also have identified their Turkic places of belonging, such as Qumul not Hami, Ghulja/Kulja not Yining, and so on.

Because the term Altishahr denotes six cities, it is the setting of these cities that constitute the real local dynamic. By being Altishahri, one would mean a Uyghur culture with Uyghur historical tradition and practices


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(textual representations about local heroes, respect for local saints and manuscript technology that defined Altishahr’s past, pilgrimages and pil-grim routes with pilgrims crisscrossing the entire Altishahri space) and with a network of local historical narratives that also connected people as an imagined community, as Benedict Anderson would have us believe. There were transregional connections, such as Altishahri pilgrims making the journey for the hajj to Mecca, businessmen and caravan traders travel-ing to Kashmir and Ferghana, the Altishahri farmers settling in Ili valley, Kokand khans having Altishahri wives as they established permanent resi-dences in Kashgar after coming down from Ferghana, and so on. Therefore, what is defined by Altishahri historical tradition is a combination of vari-ous historical and cultural genres—Persian, Arabic, and Turkic. The argu-ment here is about an Altishahri constellation.

Legends about Uyghur endurance in Qing court are a part of Altishahr’s history. One such legend about a Uyghur woman from Altishahr who entered the Qing imperial harem in 1760 and lived as one of the Qianlong emperor’s consorts until her death in 1788 bears testimony to Altishahr as the emergent alternative in the Qing domain. The several versions of her story impart to her a variety of meanings but share a common denomina-tor: as a Uyghur woman whose marriage to the Manchu emperor coin-cided with the Qing conquest of Xinjiang, she appears as a symbol of Xinjiang; her induction into the palace serves as an allegory for the incor-poration of Xinjiang within the Qing empire, and, later, the Chinese nation. Conversely, her defiance mirrors the perennial resistance of Altishahr to rule from Peking. The different representations of Rong Gei/Xiang Fei in various treatments of the story reflect the authors’ attitudes toward the position of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang in the Qing empire (or, later, in China). Documents produced under Manchu auspices depict a Muslim woman from Yarkand brought into the palace in a marital alliance with a branch of the Makhdiumzada Khojas, religious and secular rulers of Altishahr. This woman, who came to be known as Rong Fei, was a key link in a relationship designed to consolidate politically and reiterates symboli-cally Qing rule in Altishahr. The private historiographies and historical romances written primarily by Han writers at a later date (although record-ing an earlier oral tradition) give a very different picture: “orientalist” in nature, they describe an exotic femme fatale, the Fragrant Concubine, as uneasy in the harem as was Xinjiang in the empire. It is through these sto-ries that Xiang Fei gained her greatest cultural currency.

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The Rong Fei/Xiang Fei tradition is being revisited by scholars to ascertain the contested trajectories among the Uyghurs:

The Xiang Fei legend is one of the most colourful and enduring tales of the Qianlong reign. According to most versions, Xiang Fei was the consort (or daughter) of Khoja Jihan, the “younger Khoja” who with his elder brother, Burhan ud-Din, resisted the Qing conquest of Altishahr (southern Xinjiang). The Qianlong emperor had heard tales of Khoja Jihan’s beautiful consort, whose body was said to emit a mysterious fragrance without recourse to perfumes or powders. The Manchu monarch ordered his general to find the famed beauty and bring her back safely to Beijing. His general Zhao-hui did so-arranging daily butter rubdowns and camel’s milk baths for her on the way-and the woman, Xiang Fei (Fragrant Concubine), was brought to the imperial harem. Qianlong was enraptured, but the steadfast Muslim woman was determined to remain chaste; she greeted the monarch with defiant silence and informed her maids that she intended to seek revenge for her lost country and husband.

…. Xiang Fei remained steadfast and the Empress Dowager Niuhuru soon grew anxious for her son’s safety. One day, when the emperor had left the palace on ceremonial duties, the Dowager confronted Xiang Fei and demanded that she behaves as a proper concubine should. When the Muslim woman remained defiant, Niuhuru “granted her the favour of death.” The emperor got word of this turn of events and hastened back to the palace, only to find that his mother had locked him out while Xiang Fei was stran-gled. When the Dowager finally allowed the emperor in to embrace the lovely corpse, Xiang Fei’s breath was gone—only the mysterious scent remained, hovering over the body. In one version of the story, Qianlong is said to have had Xiang Fei buried with full honour in the Qing Eastern Mausoleum (Qing Dong Ling), 125 kilometers east of Beijing.24

According to another version of the Xiang Fei legend, popular in Xinjiang, Xiang Fei’s remains were transported in a special catafalque across north China and the Taklamakan desert to Kashgar, where they were enshrined in the Khoja Afaq Mazar, the family tomb of the Makhdiumzida Khoja clan. The catafalque may be seen at this tomb site to this day; what is said to be her grave is marked with a crude sign in Chinese and Uyghur. The tomb of Afaq Khoja was appropriated by the local authorities in China dur-ing the socialist era, mainly through utilization of various tales and legends about Xiang Fei (in Chinese) and Eparkhan (in Uyghur). The mistaken claim that Xiang Fei was taken back to Kashgar after her death and buried in the tomb of Afaq Khoja was drawn upon to provide a template for close historical relations between the Uyghurs and the Chinese heartland.25


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summing up

The study seeks to explore the nuances of belonging of borderland commu-nities like the Uyghurs. It takes into account the aspect of “in- betweenness” of the Uyghurs of Central Asia and China, shedding the myopic view of the Uyghurs as a minority community inhabiting the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China. The emphasis here is on the Uyghurs as a dynamic Turkic community having a meaningful presence in the Central Asian region. This aspect opens up a much livelier debate about borderland communities of the erstwhile Soviet Union and their live-in expe-riences rather than a China-centric paranoia about the Uyghur autonomy movement that could have a spillover effect among co-ethnics in Kazakhstan. The attempt is to re-link the past, instead of delinking it, through reappraisals of history and identity. The generation of interest in Uyghur historical leg-ends and genealogical history that connects Central Asia and China is a recent phenomenon that has added a new dimension to Uyghur studies.

notes

1. Discussed by Rian Thum in ‘Beyond Resistance and Nationalism: local his-tory and the case of Afaq Khoja’, Central Asian Survey, No. 1, 2012. Thum explored this subject further in his book The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014. The book revolves around the Uyghur community’s imagination of the past.

2. Peter C. Perdue, “Ecologies of Empire: From Qing Cosmopolitanism to Modern Nationalism.” This article is based on a keynote speech with the same title delivered at the “Bordering China: Modernity and Sustainability” Berkeley Summer Research Institute on August 3, 2012. Also see the spe-cial issue of Central Asian Survey (2009), where some articles have reflected on the local dynamics among the Uyghurs. Adila Erkin, ‘Locally modern, globally Uyghur: geography, identity and consumer culture in contempo-rary Xinjiang’, Central Asian Survey, 28 (4), 2009; Eric Schlussel, ‘History, identity, and mother-tongue education in Xinjiang’, Central Asian Survey, 28 (4), 2009.

3. Andrew Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart, ‘The Complex Pathways of History: Uyghurs and the Formations of Identity’ in Ildiko Beller Hann et al. (ed) Situating the Uyghurs Between China and Central Asia, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2007, p. xvii.

4. Issues of ethnicity, history, nationalism, religiosity, and everyday life have been addressed in a variety of writings. Some examples are: Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities and other Subaltern Subjects, Chicago:

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University of Chicago Press, 2004; Ablet Kamalov, Uyghur Studies in Central Asia: A Historical Review, Toyo Bunko: Asian Research Trends: New Series, No 1, 2006; Frederick Starr, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004; Michael Dillon, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Far Northwest, Durham East Asia Series, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004; James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, Columbia University Press, 2009.

5. Colin Mackerras and Michael Clarke of Griffith Asia Institute in Brisbane have emphasized Xinjiang as an ethnic issue for China and global concerns for such an ethnically disturbed zone. Mackerras, ‘Xinjiang in 2013: Problems and Prospects’, Asian Ethnicity, 2013; Clarke, ‘China, Xinjiang and internationalisation of the Uyghur issue’, Global Change, Peace and Security, 2010.

6. There was the Chinese provincial rhetoric of Uyghurs and Hans as indig-enous settlers of Xinjiang. There was an alternative narrative of Soviet Turcologists, such as A.N. Bernshtam and S.E. Malov, who wrote about indigenousness of the Uyghurs, describing episodes in a national liberation movement such as Turkic Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan in Kashgaria (TIRET, in 1932–1933) and more discreetly about Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR, in the 1940s).

7. ‘In from the margins,’ D.L. Wallace, ‘Alternative rhetoric and moral-ity: writing from the margins,’ www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/.../CCC0612Alternative.pdf, 2008; Barbara Estelle Verchot, Creating margin-ality and reconstructing narrative: reconfiguring Karen Social and geopolitical alignment, MSc Thesis, Department of Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Central Florida, Spring Term, 2008.

8. Explained by Dilfuza Roziyeva, ‘Ilya Bakhtiya’s Role in Uyghur Poetry’, Middle East Journal of Scientific Research 20 (2), 2014.

9. I had this conversation with Ablet Kamalov during my research trip to Kazakhstan in August 2012.

10. Dilfuza Roziyeva, ‘Ilya Bakhtiya’s Role in Uyghur Poetry’, Middle East Journal of Scientific Research 20 (2), p. 147.

11. Konstantin Syroezhkin, ‘Social perceptions of China and the Chinese: A view from Kazakhstan’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2009).

12. I am grateful to Ablet Kamalov and Yulia Goloskokova for taking me on a guided tour of the Zarya Vostoka microregion in September 2012 and giv-ing me this unique experience of interactive social behavior among the Uyghurs and Dungans.

13. David Brophy, ‘Taranchis, Kashgaris and the Uyghur Question in Soviet Central Asia’, Inner Asia, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2005.

14. Jin Noda, Reconsidering the Ili Crisis: The Ili Region Under Russian Rule (1871–1881), Islamic Area Studies, Japan.


http://www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/CCC0612Alternative.pdf

http://www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/CCC0612Alternative.pdf

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15. The East Turkestani people are constituted by group identities as Taranchis and Kyrgyzes and local identities as Kashgarliks, referring not only to people from Kashgar but also to immigrants from southern Xinjiang where Kashgar was the leading economic and political center. This observation was also made by Tsarist Russia’s eminent Kazakh orientalist, Chokan Valikhanov.

16. Natsuko Oka, ‘Transnationalism as a threat to state security? Case studies on Uighurs and Uzbeks of Kazakhstan’, [http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no14_ses/14_oka.pdf].

17. Film Zamanai, cited in Alexander C. Diener, One Homeland or Two? The nationalization and Transnationalization of Mongolia’s Kazakhs, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009, pp. 275–278.

18. Sean R. Roberts, ‘Imagining Uyghurstan: re-evaluating the birth of the modern Uyghur nation’, Central Asian Survey, 28 (4), 2009.

19. Yelena Y. Sadovskaya, ‘Patterns of contemporary “Chinese” migration into Kazakhstan’, Felix B. Chang and Sunnie T. Rucker Chang eds Chinese migrants in Russia, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, Routledge, 2012, pp. 106–107.

20. Adila Erkin, ‘Locally modern, globally Uyghur: geography, identity and consumer culture in contemporary Xinjiang’, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2009.

21. Jay Dautcher, Down a Narrow Road: Identity and Masculinity in a Uyghur Community in Xinjiang, Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press, 2009 (Book Review by Kelly Hammond in The Arab Studies Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 2011).

22. Adila Erkin, ‘Locally modern, globally Uyghur: geography, identity and consumer culture in contemporary Xinjiang’, Central Asian Survey, 28 (4), 2009, p. 422.

23. Rian Thum, The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014.

24. James A. Millward, ‘A Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong’s Court: The Meaning of the Fragrant Concubine,’ The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2, May, 1994.

25. Edmund Waite, ‘From Holy Man to National Villain: Popular Historical Narratives About Apaq Khoja amongst Uyghurs in Contemporary Xinjiang’, Inner Asia, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2006.

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http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no14_ses/14_oka.pdf

http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no14_ses/14_oka.pdf


Dialogue of the Deaf: The Role of Uyghur Diaspora Organizations Versus Beijing

Yitzhak Shichor

Dialogues of the deaf: A discussion in which eachparty is unresponding to what the other says.Monologue is one person talking to himself;

Dialogue is two persons talking to themselves.

IntroductIon

What appears to be a slogan is actually the title of a conference held at the European Parliament in Brussels on April 29–30, 2010: “Uyghurs Call for Dialogue with China—Implementation of the Chinese Constitution to Safeguard and Protect the Rights of the Uyghur People.” The conference was held under the auspices of the World Uyghur Congress, the National Endowment for Democracy (Washington), the Alliance of Liberals and

Y. Shichor (*) University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

This chapter is an expanded and updated version of a paper delivered at this conference. It is part of a more comprehensive study entitled “Uyghur Expatriate Communities: Domestic, Regional and International Challenges”, funded by a MacArthur Foundation grant No. 02-76170-000-GSS, to which I am very grateful.

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Democrats for Europe, and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. Urging Beijing to protect the political rights and respect the religious freedoms of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and to allow an independent international investigation of the July 2009 violence against them, the con-ference declaration concluded with a “call upon the Chinese authorities to open a meaningful dialogue with Uyghur leaders acknowledged to repre-sent the Uyghurs of East Turkestan and urge representatives of the European Union to support such a dialogue.”1 Because Beijing categorically rejects a dialogue with genuine Uyghur leaders inside China, Uyghur diaspora lead-ers try to promote such a dialogue from the outside.

Uyghur diaspora communities had existed, primarily in Central Asia but also in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, long before the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949. However, they have become reflexively meaningful only afterward, as a result of China’s brutal and sys-tematic persecution of its Uyghur minority and the consequential spread of Uyghurs all over the world. Well informed of this persecution and evidently outraged, Uyghur diaspora responses have since then been determined and shaped by three sets of periodically fluctuating considerations: China’s domestic and international situation, international attitudes and policies toward China, and the nature of the Uyghur diaspora in itself and with regard to the international community. Of these determinants, China’s domestic and international situation is the key because it affects both the international attitudes and consequently the nature of the Uyghur dias-pora, whose ability to respond to China’s Uyghur policy depends on the lebensraum it has been given by its host countries.

Given these considerations, the role of the Uyghur diaspora toward the PRC could be divided into three periods: the Maoist period (late 1940s to late 1970s), which offered no opportunity for a dialogue; the transition period (late 1970s to early or mid-1990s), which offered a unique oppor-tunity for a dialogue that was unfortunately missed; and the transforma-tion period (early or mid-1990s and onward), when any potential chance for a dialogue has been blocked, mainly by Beijing. As we shall see, the role that Uyghur diaspora organizations could play with regard to the Chinese was quite limited in the first two periods and has become more articulated only in the third period, for reasons to be discussed later in the chapter. In this period, however, China has become too uncompromising and arrogant to allow a dialogue with the Uyghurs. Yet, to understand the role played by Uyghur diaspora organizations toward China today (and tomorrow), given their claim to represent China’s Uyghur minority, it is

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necessary to become acquainted with the Uyghur diaspora’s role toward Beijing in the two earlier periods.

chIna In revolutIon: no opportunIty

In the first three decades of the PRC, the possibility to conduct a dialogue with China or affect its policies on its Uyghur nationality—either by Uyghur diaspora associations, international organizations, or foreign gov-ernments—was extremely limited by China’s international isolation, espe-cially since the early 1960s following the Sino-Soviet split. Excluded from the United Nations (until October 1971) and many other international organizations, lacking diplomatic relations with many countries (primarily the United States), and largely disengaged from the global economic sys-tem, Beijing was in fact immune to a variety of potential external threats and pressures and mostly shielded from any dialogue. Sponsoring the cause against imperialism and colonialism (West as well as East), China could hardly be indicted for colonizing its own Uyghurs by either the current and former colonial powers of the West (the Soviet Union included), all guilty of the same sin, or by the current or former colonies that regarded China as a paragon of “national liberation.” Furthermore, China’s domestic poli-tics were in constant and cyclic flux, experiencing upheavals that led to occasional policy shifts and leadership changes. These precluded any long-term dialogue because policy outcomes were short-lived and China’s lead-ers were reluctant to assume responsibility for modifying Party or State ethnic (or any other) policy. These confrontational policies, both at home and abroad, left China’s Uyghurs on their own with little hope for outside intervention or help.2

Outside intervention was not forthcoming, not only because of Beijing’s international immunity and isolation but also because there was little interest outside China in the Uyghur fate. In the years of the Cold War, Western governments—led by the United States—cultivated dictators on behalf of the struggle against Soviet communism and displayed implicit, if not explicit, tolerance toward human rights abuse and denial of national liberation and self-determination. In conversations with Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Uyghur Secretary-General of the Xinjiang Provincial Government, held in November 1947—well before the Communist takeover—US Consul- General Shipton (Kashgar) and US Consul-General Paxton (Tihwa [Urumqi]) dismissed the hopelessness Alptekin felt “that the Chinese would ever do anything towards the democratic development of Turkestan

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or granting freedom to its people.” Alptekin added that “the Chinese had not the slightest intention of giving the Turki people the freedom that they, in common with all the people in the world, desired,” to which Mr. Paxton replied by asking him “if he were not taking too pessimistic a view of the situation.”3 Fleeing Xinjiang in late 1949 first to India and then to Turkey, Alptekin became the uncrowned leader of the Uyghur diaspora national movement until his death in 1995. A retrospective outlook shows that his 1947 “pessimist views” were totally justified, more than he could have imagined at the time.

In the late 1940s, the United States realized that Xinjiang would not be detached from the newly established People’s Republic of China. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) said that “the Nationalist Provincial authorities in Sinkiang recently severed connections with the Canton Government and accepted the authority of the Communist regime in Peiping. The Northwest … has now been reduced to a relatively insignifi-cant position as a non-Communist resistance area in mainland China.”4 But the US mission in Xinjiang was less interested in the fate of Uyghurs than in the province’s potential uranium resources and even more so in denying Soviet access to them.5 Still, shortly after the PRC’s foundation, the CIA did become interested in China’s ethnic issues and launched a series of clandes-tine attempts to stir up unrest against Beijing among China’s minorities in Tibet, Manchuria, and the south. These attempts, which failed miserably and stopped, did not include Xinjiang’s Uyghurs anyway.6 On the other hand, the Soviet Union, especially after the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict, made extensive use of its Uyghur minority in Central Asia for radio propaganda broadcasts and also cultivated Uyghur groups for military and espionage purposes.7 According to unconfirmed claims, in the mid-1960s Moscow set up a secret military school for Uyghur refugees in Central Asia to teach them guerrilla warfare and commando tactics and trained a 60,000-strong army that operated out of at Alma Ata. Commanded by for-mer People’s Liberation Army Major General, the Uyghur Zunun Taipov, this army reportedly made 5,000 border raids into Xinjiang in 1966.8 Much like the Western ones, most of these attempts represented Soviet interests rather than Uyghur ones and they failed likewise. The Uyghur diaspora organizations in Central Asia had been engineered, trained, and controlled by Moscow for its own purpose. No dialogue on Uyghur independence or even autonomy was intended—or possible—also because Uyghurs in the diaspora did not have an officially acceptable representative organization.

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Outside the Soviet Union, Uyghur diaspora communities just began to be formed and organizations hardly existed. Turkey, which had fought PRC troops in the Korean War and refused to establish diplomatic relations with China until 1971, became the center of Uyghur diaspora nationalism and political activism. Led by Mehmet Emin Bughra and, after his death in 1965, by Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Uyghur associations in Turkey—supported by Ankara and Riyadh—catered to the domestic, cultural, and economic needs of Uyghur refugees much more than promoting international relations. Nevertheless, it was Alptekin who participated in international conferences, such as the Afro-Asian Conference in New Delhi (1960) and in Mogadishu (1965); the Baghdad Conference of the Islamic Countries (1961); the Islamic Conference in Mecca (1963); the World Congress of Islam in Karachi (1964), and held other visits and personal meetings.9 A special memorandum that he submitted to a number of Islamic meetings in the early 1960s, urged Muslim leaders and “peace- loving countries” to imple-ment resolutions that had already been adopted concerning Turkestan.10 Alptekin did his best to affect the policies and win the goodwill of suppos-edly friendly governments in favor of the Uyghurs. Still, his achievements were extremely limited. Even Islamic governments ignored the Uyghur appeals and failed to promote their cause despite their diplomatic access to Beijing (or because of it). Other governments, including the United States, remained noncommitted.

In early 1970, Alptekin, as President of the National Center for the Liberation of East Turkestan, submitted a six-page appeal to President Nixon “asking for U.S. support, both moral and financial, for the East Turkestani people”. It emphasized the need to denounce China’s “atroci-ties,” to preserve Uyghur national heritage, and, above all, to gain indepen-dence. Alptekin pointed out that the Government of Nationalist China’s refusal to recognize the Uyghurs’ right to independence further legitimized Beijing’s incorporation of Xinjiang. He also warned that in case of an armed clash with China, the Soviets might seize Xinjiang, implying that this would undermine US interests—while an independent Eastern Turkestan would be Washington’s friendly ally. He had a number of interviews with US offi-cers on February 4 and 5, all disappointing. They “explained to him that we would not be able to support his cause” and added: “The Department [of State] feels strongly that the United States should avoid becoming involved in an issue which could seriously damage our efforts to improve relations with Peking and which, in any case, would offer no prospects for success.”11 This was well before Kissinger’s “secret” visit to Beijing (in July 1971); the


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long-frozen Sino- American talks in Warsaw had just been tentatively resumed.

Similar appeals were sent also by other prominent Uyghur figures. Yusufbek Muhlisi, a well-known Uyghur writer from Alma Ata, wrote to former world leaders, including Jimmy Carter, Helmut Schmidt, Bulent Ecevit, and Kurt Waldheim, warning them of China’s threats and drawing their attention to Uyghur persecution.12 In addition to the appeals, Uyghur leaders also traveled, especially between 1970 and 1980, to Turkey, the United States, the Middle East and other countries, promoting anti-Chi-nese propaganda and trying to enlist Uyghurs abroad for a united front against China. Still, these efforts, as mentioned above, represented primar-ily Soviet interests: “By using the Soviet Uygurs, the Soviet Union is stag-ing subversive activities among the Eastern Turkestanis living abroad. The aim is to unite the Uygurs living outside of Eastern Turkestan and to strengthen the anti-Chinese campaign”.13 All of these appeals, whether ver-bal or written, practically without exception, failed.

This Uyghur diaspora’s failure to enlist the support of other govern-ments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) was an outcome not only of China’s isolation and immunity, the lack of interest by the interna-tional community, and the disorganized and uncoordinated nature of the Uyghur diaspora itself, but also of the limited communications technology in those years that constrained Uyghur activism. For one thing, because of China’s seclusion, reports about the Chinese persecution of Uyghurs could not filter out. Few journalists, if any, reached Xinjiang. For many years, it had been closed to foreigners, leaving the international media—and world public opinion—unaware of what was going on there. Furthermore, better informed Uyghur diaspora leaders were totally dependent on the media of the time (newspapers, journals, radio, and television). With few exceptions, their attempts to penetrate them largely failed. Their ability to distribute information about Uyghurs in general and Uyghur persecution in particu-lar was limited mostly to the Uyghur diaspora communities themselves and to Soviet Bloc media, which used it as an ammunition in the conflict with Beijing.14

In sum, from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, the Uyghur diaspora, for a combination of reasons, did not have a real opportunity to promote its cause, enlist international support, or conduct any dialogue with Beijing. This was about to change.

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chIna In transItIon: MIssed opportunIty

Conventional wisdom says that China’s post-Mao reform was launched in December 1978, going on through the 1980s, 1990s, and beyond. However, this is a retrospective reconstruction that should be modified. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, there were still no guarantees that the reform drive would not abort. Although Maoist radicalism led by the Gang-of-Four had been crushed, debates about the course, speed, and contents of the reform went on. Given the cyclic upheavals of the earlier three decades and the occasional reversal of verdicts, many preferred to act cautiously and hold back their commitment to the reform until making sure that no about-turn was in the offing. Also, the Sino-Soviet conflict continued for another decade. Despite the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, some Beijing leaders still perceived an unstable international situa-tion that could have led to another world war. Nevertheless, the 1980s were the honeymoon of Sino-US relations—definitely better than ever before and probably also after.

Implicit until the late 1970s, the common anti-Soviet interest shared by the two countries now became much more explicit. Alarmed by Moscow’s military invasion of Afghanistan in China’s backyard, Beijing needed Washington to counterbalance the Soviets. This had led to unprecedented collaboration—still mostly classified—between Beijing and the CIA that included not only material assistance to the Afghan Mujahidin but also two state-of-the-art stations in Xinjiang (in Korla and Qitai) to monitor Soviet missile launches and nuclear tests.15 “The enterprise was so impor-tant that Beijing recruited, trained and armed its Uighur Muslim citizens from Xinjiang, despatching them via the Wakhan strip, to join the mujahi-deen.”16 This was as close as the Chinese Government and the Uyghurs have ever collaborated and served as an opportunity for dialogue; how-ever, it was not pursued, certainly not by Washington. In fact, a number of military agreements were considered to be the beginning of a beautiful friendship,17 also based on the somewhat naïve belief of the United States that China’s new course was positive and would inevitably lead to democ-racy. This could have been beneficial for China’s Uyghurs.

As China began to open its doors to the outside world, it became potentially possible to conduct a dialogue with China or affect its policies on its Uyghur nationality, either by Uyghur diaspora associations, inter-national organizations, or foreign governments. Emerging from two to three decades of international isolation, China was now a member of the


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United Nations and a permanent member of its Security Council, as well as of a growing number of other international organizations. Enlarged con-siderably, Beijing’s diplomatic relations network, first and foremost with the United States, also provided for greater integration in the international economy. These remarkable achievements, however, terminated China’s immunization. In the 1980s and early 1990s, while only beginning its long march to modernity at home and abroad, China became vulnerable to a variety of potential external threats and pressures. Furthermore, China’s domestic affairs seemed to settle down as the political power struggles appeared to have ended, or at least subsided. All of these developments enabled, for the first time (and, as we shall see, also for the last time), a long-term dialogue. Winds of change were in the air—at least for a while. These supposedly conforming and accommodating policies, both at home and abroad, somewhat mitigated the pressure on China’s Uyghurs and enabled outside intervention or help. Under these circumstances of uncer-tainties, internal and external, and given Beijing’s strategic and military dependence on Washington and its effort to integrate into the interna-tional community, a window of opportunity also opened for the Uyghurs, in and out of China. Could they and would they exploit it?

As the Cold War was drawing to an end, Western countries (primarily the United States) became interested in exposing and fighting violations of human rights and in promoting democracy worldwide. This interest and the fact that in those years China was dependent on the West could have been used for the Uyghurs’ advantage, but were not. The main rea-son is not only that governments did not want to spoil their relations with China but also that the Uyghur diaspora was caught unprepared. New Uyghur or East Turkestani organizations were not yet formed and infor-mation about the Uyghurs’ plight was still difficult to come by—or to disseminate. Advanced media technologies were just beginning to be developed and the borders between China and Central Asia remained closed until the early 1990s. Uyghur outflow from Xinjiang, legal or ille-gal, was still very limited—and so was Western goodwill toward the Uyghurs. Therefore, the opportunity to enlist international support for the Uyghurs, while China was more vulnerable, was missed. Perhaps in those years, when its room to maneuver was much narrower, China might have responded positively to a dialogue with or on Uyghurs (although this was still an unlikely option given Beijing’s sensitivity to issues of minorities and territorial integrity). This, however, is not even a speculation because no such dialogue was offered by any Western government, NGO, the

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United Nations, or the Uyghurs themselves, who were not yet organized for such a mission. In the mid-1990s, many of these shortcomings were overcome. However, by that time, China had become much stronger and more self-confident, to the detriment of the Uyghur cause. Its principle of nonintervention in its internal affairs had been muted before, but now became rock solid and precluded exogenous support for the Uyghurs.

chIna In transforMatIon: denIed opportunIty

By the mid-1990s, the Uyghur cause had become more visible and audible than ever before. This has been an outcome of several developments. For one, China’s Central Asian borders were opened, thereby enabling not only greater Uyghur migration (both legal and illegal) but also greater exposure of Xinjiang to the outside world. In line with its more transparent policies, Xinjiang was opened to tourists and journalists, who began to report widely on Uyghurs and their problems. For another, a number of Uyghur associations were set up all over the world, including in the West, while serious attempts at coordinating them under global umbrella organi-zations were undertaken. Formed in 1992, the Eastern Turkestan National Center, renamed in 1998 as the East Turkestan National Congress, became the first organization of this kind. It was replaced in April 2004 by the World Uyghur Congress (WUC, established in Munich). Six months later, the East Turkestan Government-in-Exile was established in Washington. Freely operating in Western democratic countries, these organizations have kept the Uyghur issue on the world agenda, although from different perspectives.

Established after September 11 and the emerging threat of international terrorism, the WUC opted for a political solution and reliance on democ-racy as the ultimate means to determine Xinjiang’s future. The word “inde-pendence” does not appear in any of its core documents, not only because of the possible realization that it is beyond reach in the near future (or even later), but also because of its potential harmful effects on the attitudes of host governments and NGOs. A week after September 11, the spokesman for the East Turkestan Information Center in Germany stated that if Beijing wants to address the “Xinjiang question” sincerely, then “the only way is to do it through political means under the supervision of the European Parliament. The Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” he continued, “should be allowed to hold a referendum to decide their own destiny: whether to stay in Xinjiang or to choose independence and build their own nation” using democratic means.


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The East Turkestan Government-in-Exile, on the other hand, rejected any compromise clinging to the vision of independence. Beijing, however, could not tell the difference, treating both in the same way: “The so-called ‘political resolution’ is in fact another means adopted by the ‘East Turkistan’ splittist forces under the new circumstances to separate Xinjiang from the rest of China … There is no question about the entitlement and status of Xinjiang … As to the proposal for the approach of ‘political resolution’, it only represents a ‘child-like’ mentality.” Aware of the growing internation-alization of the Uyghur issue, the Chinese said: “How can China, and in fact any state, possibly employ such a method of false democracy to decide … the sovereignty of over one-sixth of its own territory?”18 Beijing had a point, but its response further increased the visibility of Uyghur issues, which in turn has stimulated research. In recent years, an unprecedented number of books and academic publications have appeared and more and more students and scholars worldwide have become interested in Uyghur issues. Although by no means politically identified with Uyghur national claims (something that Beijing fails to understand), they have nonetheless contributed to the Uyghurs’ positive image in the West and to the some-what sympathetic attitudes toward them because they represent the under-dogs. This growing visibility and empathy have been expedited by advanced technology.

The dramatic expansion of computer-mediated communications facili-ties, mainly the Internet, has enabled the Uyghurs’ diaspora communities to create countless websites and to disseminate information, reports, and appeals faster, more efficiently, and more widely than ever before.19 At the same time, Uyghurs have now managed to gain easy access to politicians, parties, parliamentarians, committees, and leaders in an attempt to pro-mote their cause with regard to the Chinese government.20 These attempts, however, have by and large failed, less due to Uyghurs’ shortcomings or wrongdoing and more because of China’s ascendance as a world economic power and the overall reluctance of governments to promote separatism (anywhere) and to upset the Chinese. True or not, Beijing’s association of the Uyghurs with terrorism has inevitably also motivated the international community to keep a distance from the Uyghurs.21

To begin with, Beijing has reiterated all along, and much more emphati-cally in recent years, that the Uyghurs are China’s internal affair in which no foreign entity whatsoever—government, NGO, international organization, or external Uyghur diaspora organizations—has a right to interfere. This attitude applies to other external attempts to interfere in China’s internal

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affairs (e.g., Falun Gong) or in other countries’ (e.g., Sudan) and is by no means a Maoist or post-Maoist innovation. It is fed by China’s pre-modern history and culture and goes back many centuries (e.g., the downfall of the Jesuits in early eighteenth century Qing Dynasty China). China (past as well as present) has always made a clear distinction between the external (wai) and the internal (nei), with the latter being related to “core issues” that fall within China’s exclusive authority. This includes the Uyghur issue. In fact, other governments also have declined to negotiate with diaspora nationality organizations on their domestic ethnic policy, so China is not exceptional. Yet, although many other governments are ready to negotiate with internal (rather than external) minority representative organizations, Beijing does not allow the establishment of such autonomous organizations, thereby leading to a dead end—often literally speaking. Moreover, several Uyghur diaspora leaders have been listed by Beijing as “terrorists.” I believe the Chinese are smart enough to know the truth. So, why do they keep insisting and reiterating that Uyghur leaders are “terrorists” while probably knowing that they are not? Perhaps it is because one does not negotiate with terror-ists, so by its insistence, China precludes any dialogue with Uyghur diaspora organizations and leaders labeled as “terrorists.”

Under these circumstances, foreign governments, international organi-zations, and most official leaders and politicians are unlikely to back the Uyghur demand for a dialogue with Beijing, let alone the claim for inde-pendence. Support for Uyghur independence is out of the question because all governments that maintain diplomatic relations with the PRC also rec-ognize its full territorial integrity, Xinjiang included. Furthermore, many of these governments have their own separatist problems and would not want to legitimize similar tendencies elsewhere. Above all else, foreign govern-ments, officials, and even journalists and academics are careful to avoid upsetting Beijing, which has become an enormous economic power and an important political player. There are a few exceptions to this rule, notably the European Parliament, which has raised Uyghur issues several times through Parliamentary Questions, Motions for a Resolution, and Texts Adopted.22 However, no action has been (or could have been) taken. Needless to say, there has been no Chinese response. Governments inher-ently friendly to Uyghurs did not fare better.

Turkey—a traditional and long-standing supporter of Uyghurs, a source of inspiration for nationalism, and a host of many of their diaspora organizations—is a case in point. In 1971, Ankara recognized China and thereby endorsed its territorial integrity, including Xinjiang. For this


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reason, Turkey (which faces its own Kurdish separatist challenge, not to mention the division of Cyprus) has been careful not to identify with Uyghur claims for independence publicly and officially. However, it still provided Uyghur refugees with shelter, housing, employment, and the freedom of demonstration, expression, and association based on cultural affiliation and ethnic solidarity. Nevertheless, by the late 1990s, Ankara’s official benevolence toward the Uyghurs had eroded substantially under Beijing’s implicit or even explicit pressure.23 Economic development has so far failed to affect Chinese ethnic policies, certainly for the better.

Since the 2009 clash in Urumqi, armed incidents involving Uyghurs—primarily but not only in Xinjiang—have increased in both scale and vio-lence. All of these incidents have been dealt with using unilateral Chinese ways: removal of officials, using force, arrests, trials and occasional execu-tions, heavier crackdown policies, strike-hard strategies, and legislation. However, Beijing has failed to initiate mechanisms for a serious bilateral dialogue with local Uyghur communities, let alone with overseas Uyghur institutions and representatives. Because the Chinese blame international Uyghur organizations of generating terrorism in Xinjiang, it would have been smart to launch a dialogue to block or reduce “Uyghur” terrorist acts in China. Similarly, if the reasons for these acts have to do with domestic grievances (political, economic, social, and religious), as some Chinese scholars claim,24 then a dialogue with local Uyghur leadership could be helpful—but this has hardly been done. Reflecting traditional orientations, China does not negotiate with heretic and sectarian groups, certainly not if they are headquartered abroad and promote universalistic principles of democracy, equality, and human rights.

Unlike the conventional wisdom, Beijing’s adoption of market economy and capitalist methods does not make it more democratic. On the contrary, combining an authoritarian regime with accumulated wealth and advanced technology, Beijing is becoming more totalitarian than ever before. Its capability to control and monitor its population—nationalities included—is steadily growing. Correspondingly, its readiness to appease and accom-modate its nationalities—Uyghurs included—is steadily declining. Puffed-out, arrogant, and self-confident, China is not interested in a dia-logue with Uyghurs, Tibetans, or any other minority. However, this is not a one-sided process. Indeed, China has not responded to the Uyghur com-plaints and protests of persecution, discrimination, and oppression in cul-tural, economic, social, and political terms. Yet at the same time, the Uyghurs have not responded to China’s claims of sovereignty, supremacy,

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and authority in Xinjiang, which could be morally questionable but legally valid and legitimate—and recognized as such by all governments that maintain diplomatic relations with China. Under these circumstances, the two parties conduct a dialogue of the deaf. Instead of talking to each other, they keep talking to themselves.

conclusIon

I would like to end this chapter with a personal note that underlines and reinforces my conclusions. In the summer of 2002, I was invited to Xinjiang by a research institute in Urumqi—my first, and probably last, academic visit to the region. Among others, I met with Prof. Pan Zhiping, a well-known expert whom I respect very much. In addition to his work on Xinjiang and Central Asia, he has also dealt with questions of religion, nationalism, and self-determination issues in a comparative perspective. He noted that self-determination should not necessarily lead to an independent state, which would have entailed a chaotically fragmented world. Instead, the quest for self-determination by minority nationalities should be addressed by greater autonomy. Although pointing at a general situation, he implic-itly admitted that Xinjiang’s Uyghurs still do not enjoy “real” autonomy, which could be a substitute for independence (or separatism). I asked him whether “increased autonomy” might become a basis for negotiation between the Chinese government and Uyghur diaspora organizations, and I understood his answer to be positive. His implied views that Beijing’s maltreatment of Uyghurs is the source of regional instability and unrest are shared by a few other Chinese intellectuals.25

A few days after leaving China, I was in Washington, where I spoke with some Uyghur leaders about this option: Would they be ready to give up their quest of independence in exchange for greater autonomy? I sensed their dilemma and difficulty in accepting such a proposition. Nevertheless, they said yes, which in a retrospective view I understood as reflecting a fundamental disbelief that Beijing would sincerely agree to these terms. They knew China better and they were right. After my return, I got in touch with some respected, well-connected, and US-educated professors I had known before and asked them to deliver the Uyghur diaspora agree-ment to launch a dialogue with Beijing on increased autonomy without claiming independence. To this very day, there has been no reply. Beijing is not interested in any dialogue, either external or internal, with its national minorities. Other governments, despite their misgivings, conduct dialogues


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with separatist groups—London with the Scots, Madrid with the Basques, Jerusalem with the Palestinians, Ankara with the Kurds, and Ottawa with Québéc. Uyghurs were keenly interested in the September 18, 2014, Scottish independence referendum. As Rebiya Kadeer, WUC President, put it: “What is important for me is not the result per se, but the process itself.… The Uyghurs wish to use the same democratic process used in Scotland in East Turkestan.”26 Beijing, however, rejects any dialogue. China is by no means a dialogue power; it has always been, and still is, a monologue power.

notes

1. http://www.unpo.org/content/view/10887/812. On China’s policy toward its Uyghurs, see: James A. Millward, Eurasian

Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Christian Tyler, Wild West China: The Taming of Xinjiang (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004); Michael Dillon, Xinjiang—China’s Muslim Far Northwest (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).

3. Copy of a memorandum of two conversations (November 9 and 17, 1947), dated November 19, 1947, marked “Confidential.” Source: US Archives.

4. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Survival Potential of Residual Non-Communist Regimes in China,” ORE 76–49 (October 19, 1949), p. 6.

5. See: Thomas Laird, Into Tibet: The CIA’s First Atomic Spy and His Secret Expedition to Lhasa (New York: Grove Press, 2002).

6. Data in Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 106; Robert Burns, “Lessons from Failed Cold War Spy Mission in China,” Boston Globe, June 19, 2010.

7. More details in: Yitzhak Shichor, “Pawns in Central Asia’s Playground: Uyghurs between Moscow and Beijing,” East Asia Vol. 32, No. 2 (2015), pp. 101–116.

8. “Rift—Soviet Trained Raiders?” Christian Science Monitor, February 1, 1967; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The KGB and the World: the Mitrokhin Archive II (London: Penguin Books, 2006), pp. 277–283.

9. Eastern Turkestan Information Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 5–6 (October–December 1995), p. 2; See also: Türklük Mücahidi: Isa Yusuf [Turkic Fighter: Isa Yusuf] (Istanbul: Bayrak Basım, 1991).

10. Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: A Study in Irredentism (London: C. Hurst, 1981), p. 146.

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11. Dated February 1, 1970, Alptekin’s letter was sent to President Nixon by Member of Congress John M. Murphy on February 6, 1970. Both docu-ments were declassified on May 19, 2003. The suggested reply was drafted by the Department of State Executive Secretary and was sent to Henry Kissinger on March 12, 1970. It was declassified on November 11, 2003.

12. The letter was published in Bayrak, July 20, 1978.13. Tercuman (Istanbul), August 4, 1981. This is based on an unpublished

report probably written by Erkin Alptekin in Munich on March 4, 1985 for Radio Liberty. RFE Krasnyi Arkhiv, Budapest. See also: Richard Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis: A Survey of Political Change and Communication (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 171–179.

14. Occasional stories, such as the escape of Uyghur General Zunun Taipov, reached the media. See, for example: Brian Crozier, “Chinese General Defects to Soviets,” Sunday Times (London), May 3, 1964.

15. Codenamed CHESTNUT, the stations could also monitor military and KGB communications, air traffic, and radar signals. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), pp. 216–218; Philip Taubman, “U.S. and Peking Join in Tracking Missiles in Soviet Union,” New York Times, June 18, 1981. On Sino-US cooperation in Afghanistan, see: James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), pp. 136–139.

16. S. Mahmud Ali, US-China Cold War Collaboration, 1971–1989 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 177.

17. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 330–331; Thomas L. Wilborn, Security Cooperation with China (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994); Dennis van Vranken Hickey, “America’s Military Relations with the People’s Republic of China: the Need of Reassessment,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, VII:3 (Fall 1988), pp. 29–43.

18. Li Sheng (Ed.) Xinjiang of China: Its Past and Present (Urumqi: Xinjiang People’s Publishing House, 2005), pp. 292–293.

19. Dilmur Reyhan, “Uyghur Diaspora and Internet,” E-Diaspora Atlas (April 2012).

20. Yitzhak Shichor, “Net Nationalism: the Digitalization of the Uyghur Diaspora,” in: Alonso Andoni and Pedro J. Oiarzabal (Eds.), Diasporas in the New Media Age: Identity, Politics and Community (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 2010), pp. 291–316.

21. Yitzhak Shichor, “See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: Middle Eastern Reactions to Rising China’s Uyghur Crackdown,” Griffith Asia Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 2015), pp. 62–85.


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22. For example, European Parliament Resolution of November 26, 2009, on China: “Minority Rights and the Application of the Death Penalty”, P7_TA(2009)0105. See also: Yitzhak Shichor, “Nuisance Value: Uyghur Activism in Germany and Beijing-Berlin Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, No. 82 (July 2013), pp. 612–629.

23. Yitzhak Shichor, Ethno-Diplomacy: the Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations, Policy Studies No. 53 (Washington: East West Center, 2009).

24. For example, Xia Congya and Li Na, “‘Dongtu’ kongbuzhuyi fenzi fanzui de yuanyin tanxi” [Analysis of the Causes of ‘East Turkestan’ Terrorist Criminals], Zhongguo Shiyou Daxue (Shehui kexue ban) [Journal of China Oil University (Social Sciences Edition)], Vol. 28, No. 1 (February 2012), pp. 53–58.

25. Pan Zhiping (Ed.), Minzu zilue hai shi minzu fenlie: minzu he dangdai minzufenlizhuyi [National Self-Determination Is Still National Separatism: Nations and Contemporary National Separatism] (Urumqi: Xinjiang ren-min chubanshe, 1999).

26. “Interview: China Can Learn from Scottish Independence Referendum,” Radio free Asia (September 22, 2014), at: http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/learn-09222014092739.html

Y. SHICHOR

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/learn-09222014092739.html

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/learn-09222014092739.html


Urumqi Clashes: The Reactions and the Aftermath

Erkin Emet

On July 5, 2009, clashes took place in Urumqi, the capital of Eastern Turkistan (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, or XUAR) that is under the administration of the People’s Republic of China. Between 1000 and 3000 Uyghurs participated in this clash. According to a statement from the Chinese Government, at least 192 people were killed and 1721 people were injured. Most of the people killed and injured were Han Chinese. After the incident, thousands of Han Chinese carrying sticks clashed with Uyghurs in the streets of Urumqi on July 7, 2009.1 Earlier, on June 26, 2009, two Uyghur workers were killed by Han Chinese at a Gangzi toy factory in a brawl between Chinese and Uyghur workers in Shaoguan city, Guangdong State, which led the outbreak of the Urumqi incident.2 Before the July 5th incident, when 200–300 Uyghur were gathered in the Public Square for a peaceful activity, 70 of them were arrested by the police.3 Three hours later, some of the Uyghurs attacked police, military forces, and people and destroyed the shops in the streets such as Azatlık Road, Dabaza, and Xinhua nanlu in Urumqi public square. According to fig-ures released by official Chinese authorities, more than 1000 people were injured and many cars were burnt on the first day of the incident. The Chinese government stated that they used tear gas and pressurized water

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and shut off telephone and internet services to quash the riot.4 However, the Uyghurs taking part in the incident and other witnesses alleged that China used real bombs and bullets to deal with the clash.5

Statement of the ChineSe Government

Nur Bekri, the Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party of XUAR, stated the following in a televised speech:

At around 17:00, on July 5th, almost 200 Uyghur youth gathered in Urumqi public square. Xinjiang security forces arrested almost 70 people and took the incident under control in order to prevent it from being more severe. Afterwards, many people gathered and started to shout slogans in the neighborhoods such as Azatlık Road, Döng köwrük, Sansihangze where Uyghurs are intensive. Some of them gathered in front of a hospital in Sansihangzi. The number of these people was above one thousand. At around 19:40, almost 300 Uyghur were gathered and they blocked the roads in Renmenlu and Nanmen and the police forces scattered them in a short period of time. These people started to attack everybody at around 20:18 and they broke the gratings on the wayside and they broke the glasses of three public buses. The attacks became more severe at 20:30 and the attackers overturned the police cars in around Azatlık Street and Longchuan Street and they beat the passers-by. Between 700 and 800 people killed the Chinese people randomly on the way to the Public Square. At around 21:00, almost 200 Uyghur youths wanted to enter the town hall in the Public Square shouting slogans and when they were not allowed, they moved away. After the incident, the military commandership deployed almost ten thou-sand of soldiers in the places such as the Public Square, Nanmen, Ittipak Street, Atbeygi square, Xinhua Nanlu, Xinjiang University, Hong Yingqi power plant. These conflicts which had been kept on until 22:00 o’clock were completely taken under control at around 24:00. The attackers changed their tactics and separated into groups and they randomly killed the Chinese people on their way. The army completely changed its tactics and the security forces captured the attackers scattering into the by-streets in groups. The situation could be taken under control towards morning.6

XUAR authorities made another statement on July 6th. In that state-ment, the authorities expressed that the incident was a violent one orga-nized with the help of external powers. The World Uyghur Congress, under the chairmanship of Rebiya Kadeer, was behind the incident.7 Nur

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Bekri stated that this conflict originated from the brawl between Uyghur workers and Chinese workers at the toy factory in Shaoguan City, Guangdong State. He said that three forces—terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism—provoked people to pour into the street, using the brawl at the toy factory in Shaoguan as an excuse. Kadeer called for people to gather in the Public Square and in Urumqi Nanmen to hold a demon-stration via mobile phones and internet. In his speech, Bekri stated that Kadeer provoked these people to organize this demonstration, calling the people in Urumqi on July 5th. He also claimed that those people were instigated via biliwal.com, a Uyghur website.8

On July 7, 2009, Jerli Hisamiddin, the mayor of Urumqi city, gave information on the incident and stated the following in his press release:

Almost 200 people having gathered in the Public Square at around 18:20 on July 5th were scattered by the police forces. Almost 300 Uyghurs who barricaded the roads off in public street and Nanmen at around 19:40 were scattered. Some people started to attack other people randomly at 20:18 and three public buses were set afire. The conflict became severe and between 700 and 800 attackers killed the Han Chinese people who were passing by in Cenubi Azatlık Street and Long Chuan Street and according to the determination at 21:30, the attackers beat three people to death and 26 people were injured. Six of the injured were policemen. The conflicts were taken under control at 22:00 sending the security forces to the scene of incident immediately for the security of Urumqi city. However, the attackers changed their tactics and and divided into groups and they ran-domly killed the Chinese people on their way and they set fire to the cars. Urumqi was taken under control by our security forces.9

Li Zhi, the Secretary General of Urumqi Municipality Communist Party, stated that the majority of the attackers came from places such as Kashgar and Hoten, which were 1500 km away. According to his speech on July 11th, this situation proves that the incident was caused by Rebiya Kadeer.10

the reply of the World UyGhUr ConGreSS

Rebiya Kadeer, the Chairman of the World Uyghur Congress, rejected the blame of Nur Bekri by stating that the World Uyghur Congress was not responsible for this event. She said that Uyghurs organized a peaceful activity to protest the policy of oppression of China. Kadeer continued her

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http://biliwal.com

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speech by stating that tens of Chinese workers attacked Uyghur workers in the toy factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong State, and several Uyghur youth were killed in this brawl. The Uyghur people organized a demonstration to demand that the Chinese government find the responsible people. The World Uyghur Congress stated that the Chinese Government quashed this peaceful activity using violence and firing upon people and then this escalated into an ethnic conflict. Kadeer stated that what triggered this event was the ethnic discrimination policy that China had been following against the Uyghur people. Beijing offices forced many young Uyghur people to migrate to the interior parts of China, while forcing Chinese people to migrate to Turkistan. In her words, “‘I did not do it, but the Chinese government [did].” The Uyghurs had been treated as second- class citizens under the control of China without having human rights, democracy, and religious freedom on their own lands.11

In a press release from Dolkun Isa, the General Secretary of the World Uyghur Congress, to the television station TRT Turk, he underlined that this incident occurred as a result of the policy of oppression that the Chinese Government had been implementing for many years against Uyghurs. China’s habit of regarding all incidents as being due to external powers had been in existence since early times in history. For example, the government alleged that the peaceful activity in Tibet in March 2008 was organized by the Tibet people living abroad.12 In a statement made by Alim Seyitov, a speaker of the World Uyghur Congress, he said that “Rebyia Kadeer is a pacifist, who is against violence and who has been nominated for Nobel Peace Prize for three times. She has already stated that she shared the grief of the people who lost their relatives in the Urumqi incident.”13 In his press release, Dilsat Resit, another speaker of the World Uyghur Congress, claimed that the Chinese Government took a side and made the Han Chinese attack the Uyghur people by giving them sticks and choppers on July 7, 2009.14

UrUmqi inCident in the media

The July 5th Urumqi incident became a very hot issue in the world agenda. It started to be released in the media after they received information from different channels. The Associated Press reported information provided by a girl named Gülnisa Memet, who claimed to be a participant in the Urumqi incident. It was alleged that more than 300 Uyghur people orga-nized a demonstration, asking authorities to find the Chinese people who

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had beaten the Uyghur people to death in the Gangsi toy factory in Shaoguan city, Guangdong on June 26, 2009. According to her informa-tion, when attempts were made to disband their gathering using force, the incident broke out.15

A young Uyghur (who did not reveal his name) told Erkin Tarım, a journalist from Radio Free Asia, the following: “I am among the people involved in the incident, I am hiding at a place very close to the scene of incident now. Now, everywhere is full of Chinese soldiers. We, around 300 students, organized a peaceful demonstration to claim that the unidenti-fied murderers of the Uyghurs killed in a toy factory by the Chinese work-ers in Shaoguan city, Guangdong on June 26th to be found. The Chinese security forces used real bullets and bombs in order to scatter us. I saw seven people collapsed to the ground and many of our friends were arrested. Then, the peaceful demonstration turned into an ethnic conflict. Now, the Uyghur people are clashing with armed Chinese soldiers with the sticks they have in by-streets and a large number of Uyghur were killed.”16

Tarım then asked the anonymous Uyghur, “The Chinese Government alleges that this incident broke out with the provocation of Rabiye Kadeer. Do you have any connection with Rabiye Kadeer or the World Uyghur Congress?”

His answer was definite: “Absolutely no. We have heard about the name of Rabiye Kadeer before. We have even no idea about the World Uyghur Congress. We just organized a demonstration in order for the person who killed the Uyghurs at the toy factory to be found by the state, they quashed us using weapons. Could you tell me in which part of the world they do such an implementation? China correlated the incident with external powers in order to cover up its genocide policy it has been applied to us for centuries. This complaint of the Chinese Government is abso-lutely groundless.”17

An ethnic Uyghur woman who had become a citizen of a European country was on the scene during the Urumqi incident. The woman did not want to reveal her name, but she saw the incident with her own eyes and answered the questions of the Radio Free Asia journalist as follows:

The Chinese people are exploiting the richness of our country; they do not leave anything to the Uyghur, even one percent. The Uyghur are unem-ployed, they do not give the Uyghur the right to live and besides, they deport the Uyghur youth to the inner parts of China and while the Han


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Chinese are given 3000 yuan (450 dollars) of salary, the Uyghur workers are employed for 300 yuan (45 dollars) of salary. What should they do in such a case? They take these young people, regardless of girls or boys, to the inner parts of China and they play with their honour. Do you understand what I mean? The Chinese rape even boys. Have these people gone to these places willingly? No. My father helped a few young people who managed to escape after experiencing such kind of cases and he found a job for them; these are all real and I experienced all of them by myself.18

reaCtionS to the inCident

Chinese Reaction

Wang Lequan,19 who was then the Communist Party Secretary of the XUAR, stated in a televised speech on July 7, 2009, that the clashes were under control and those involved in the incident would be heavily punished.

In a press release from July 8, 2009, after he visited the injured, Meng Jianzhu, the Ministry of Public Security of People’s Republic of China, stated that “the murderers who killed our people will be heavily punished, we will never mercy.”20

Li Zhi, the Communist Party Secretary of Urumqi Municipality, alleged that the incident on July 5th was a terrorist activity and three powers under the leadership of Rabiye Kadeer were responsible for that incident in his speech on television.21

Turkey’s Reaction

While the then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Turkey followed the sorrowful developments with “anxiety, worry and distress,” he took the problem to an international platform in Ankara. The issue was added to the agendas of international organizations such as the United Nations, European Security-Cooperation Organization, and Islamic Conference Organization. Western countries, including the United States, Germany, and England, were contacted.

The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan used harsh words in a speech to guest ministers in Turkey attending The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey-Gulf Cooperation Council in Istanbul. Defining the attacks against Uyghur Turks as an “atrocity,” the Prime Minister stated

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that he followed the incidents feeling “anxious, worried and upset” about them. Stating that the images were sorrowful, Erdogan said that “what we expect these incidents reaching to the atrocious levels to come to an end immediately and rapidly, the common sense to be dominated, the respon-sible people to account for and the necessary precautions to be taken within the framework of universal human rights as soon as possible. We see that our Uyghur brothers who live in Turkey and our people feeling this deep sorrow in their hearts reach this incident and feel anxious about it.” Pointing out the membership of Turkey in the United Nations (UN) Security Council for 2009–2010, Erdogan stated that “what we have to do for humanity is the same kind of duties. We have to and are going to take this requirement to the agenda on this platform.”22

Describing the conflicts in Xinjiang as “horrible,” Köksal Toptan, the then Chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, said: “I wish that these conflicts come to an end at this point and the responsible people have to account for, regardless of their positions.” Toptan expressed that what happened in Urumqi must be illuminated and the human rights breaches must end immediately.23

The then Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, made a state-ment in this regard once again on July 8, 2009. The Chinese authorities were called to action, “giving particular importance to the life security of civil people during the effort they made in order to maintain order and in a cautious way not to breach international human norms and principles.”24

Ankara had been trying to get accurate information since the outbreak of the incidents. The then President Abdullah Gül diplomatically appealed China to prevent the Uyghur Turks in the region from being harmed. Gül stressed that the Uyghur Turks served as a “bridge” between the two countries. An authority who gave information to Zaman, a Turkish news-paper, stated that “the issue was taken to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs sat at the table with Sweden, the EU term chairman, France, England and Iran in this regard… What happened will be taken to the agenda of the human rights related platforms of the UN.” According to the information, Davutog lu stated that the international society should be more interested in the sub-ject. The developments were taken to the meeting in Istanbul in which the ministers of foreign affairs who are members of Gulf Cooperation participated.25


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Apart from the official reactions of Turkey, many nongovernmental organizations also protested in the Turkish cities. The protests in Turkey differed from the Western countries in character. In the Western countries, overseas Uyghur associations mainly organized the protests, whereas in Turkey, mass protests were also organized by non-Uyghur organizations.

Reaction of Organization of the Islamic Conference

The Urumqi incident was added to the agenda of Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The General Secretary of OIC, Prof. Dr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, said he had concerns about the situation, which was increasingly getting worse. Expressing the deep sadness he felt about the situation of Uyghurs who were forced to live in a fear environment, Ihsanoglu called on the Beijing administration to re-establish peace and calm for returning civil society to their normal lives. Ihsanoglu said the problems could only be solved by dialogue because the Uyghurs are a society that resides in the region, struggles with presenting their religious identities, and needs assistance protecting their inarguable economic and social rights.26

Reaction of the West and Opinion of the Overseas Uyghurs on the Reactions

Against the violence in Eastern Turkistan, Westerners harshly condemned the control of protestors pouring into the streets after the presidential elections in Iran. The European Union, which is known for its interest in human rights violations, made a statement expressing concern about the incidents, in which more than 190 people were killed and more than 1500 people were injured, according to the official figures. The United States expressed regret about the ethnic conflicts in XUAR.27 Russia expressed that the violence in Urumqi was a Chinese internal affair.28 Uyghur dias-pora associations were unsatisfied with these reactions of Western coun-tries. This disappointment can be seen in the words of Attorney Nuri Turkel, who worked for the rights of Uyghur Turks in Washington. He posted a letter criticizing the attitude of the West to an English indepen-dent newspaper and asked why Western leaders ignored the Uyghurs. Turkel said, “Western leaders did not miss the opportunity to condemn actions of an oppressor regime while national interests were in danger in

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Iran. But national interests dominated human rights. We expected the statesmen to express their views clearly, but they let us down.”29

The Urumqi incident on July 5, 2009—in which 197 people were killed, more than 1000 people were taken into custody according to the Chinese official figures,30 more than 10,000 people went missing, and more than 3000 people were killed by Chinese,31 according to the claims of the World Uyghur Congress—is a periodic reaction made against the assimilation policy that has been imposed on Uyghur Turks in Eastern Turkistan by China for 60 years.32

the aftermath

Hotan Incident

According to the Xinhua News Agency, mobs of people attacked the Nurbagh Street police station in Hotan at noon at July 18, 2011. The attackers took action while the policemen were out of the station for patrols. As a result, 14 attackers were shot dead and 4 attackers were wounded and captured. A paramilitary officer, a security guard, and two more people were killed by the attackers. The police seized weapons such as axes, knives, machetes, pocket knives, gasoline bottles, stones, a sling-shot and 30 grams of pepper spray. Ablet Metniyaz, chief of the Nurbagh police station, said that the attackers threw gasoline bottles and stones, although they were calling for a peaceful settlement. The police returned fire and killed 14 of the attackers. Hou Hanmin, chief of the autonomous region’s information office, identified the incident as a severe terrorist attack aimed at the police station.33

The Uyghur overseas group World Uyghur Congress had a different interpretation of the incident. In a press release, the Congress stated that “‘the shooting took place not at a police station, but at the close main bazaar of Hotan, in the Nurbagh area, when more than 100 local Uighurs peacefully gathered to protest a police crackdown imposed on the city for the last two weeks. Demonstrators gathered and demanded to know the whereabouts of relatives who had gone missing into police custody. Police opened fire on the demonstrators, killing at least 20 people.”34 Rebiya Kadeer also made a statement and responded to Hou Hanmin’s com-ments. She indicated that the incident is unclear “because no independent media exists in the region” and restated that she and World Uyghur


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Congress were opposed to all forms of violence.35 The Western press regards the reports on the incident as conflicting.36

Kashgar Incident

Another incident took place in Kashgar just a few days after the Hotan incident. The Xinhua News Agency reported that “two suspects hijacked a truck at 11:45 p.m. Saturday, stabbing the driver to death and ramming into pedestrians. The pair later jumped out of the truck and hacked bystanders” on July 30 2011. The report also indicates that “‘six were killed on the spot and 28 others were injured. One of the rioters died while fighting with locals, and the other was apprehended.”37 Just the next day, a group of people who were labelled by the Chinese official statement as armed terrorists broke into a restaurant in the city center, killing the restaurant owner and a waiter and setting fire on the restaurant. The attackers left four dead and 12 injured. Police then opened fire and shot dead four suspects at the scene, while another suspect died later in hospi-tal.38 The Chinese authorities said that the rioters were Pakistan-trained “terrorists.”39

As in the Hotan incident, the overseas Uyghur groups also made a statement. According to the Uyghur American Association (UAA), “Details of the attacks remain unclear, and no independent sources have confirmed the details of the incidents.” The UAA stated that the attacks in Kashgar took place against a backdrop of heavy-handed repression of Uyghurs carried out by the Chinese government. The US-based group also took a stance against violence by indicating that “UAA unequivocally opposes any form of violence. Violent incidents in East Turkestan will only serve to heighten ethnic tensions and increase the suppression of the Uyghur people. UAA mourns the loss of all victims in the attacks in Kashgar.”40

Serikbuya Incident

According to Xinhua News Agency, on April 23, 2013, a violent clash in Serikbuya town of Bachu County (Maralbeshi), Kashgar Prefecture left 21 people dead, including 15 community workers and police officers and six suspects. The news report stated that “three community workers discov-ered suspicious individuals and knives in the home of a local resident. They then reported the situation to their supervisors via phone, but were seized

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by the suspects who had been hiding in the house. Police officers and community officials from the township rushed to the scene, but were attacked and killed by the suspects, who also killed the three community workers they had seized earlier and burned the house.” Xinhua News Agency reported the incident as a clash between suspected terrorists and authorities.41

World Uyghur Congress again contradicted the Chinese official expla-nation of this incident. The Congress spokesman Dilshat Raxit said that “the violence was sparked by the shooting and killing of a young Uyghur by Chinese security forces during an illegal search of homes.” He dis-missed the government’s terrorism claims and stated, “They always use such labels as a way of justifying their use of armed force.” He added that the authorities had flooded the area with Chinese security forces overnight.42

On the other hand, Radio Free Asia reported from its own local sources that “the violence was triggered when a local community watch group ordered a woman to lift a veil covering her face while searching Uyghur houses in the Third Residential Committee area near the People’s Square bazaar.”43

Lukqun Incident

Two months after the Serikbuya incident, another incident occurred in Lukqun Township of Turpan Prefecture. Chinese media reported that “the rioters attacked the township’s police stations, a local government building and a construction site, as well as set fire to police cars. Twenty- one police officers and civilians were injured. The police shot and killed 11 rioters at the scene and captured another four who were injured”; as a result, the rioters killed 24 people and the police killed 11 rioters. The incident took place on June 26, 2013.44 The World Uyghur Congress expressed doubts about the issue and once again underlined that no inde-pendent sources confirmed the official explanation. Furthermore, the Congress called upon Chinese authorities to independently investigate the incident and its root causes and to alleviate the legitimate concerns of Uyghurs so as to avert such incidents in the future.45 Radio Free Asia put the death toll of the incident at 43 people.46

The Urumqi clashes of 2009 resulted in the “strike-hard” policy of the Chinese government with tightened security. Another impact of the clashes is the deteriorating relations between Uyghur residents and the


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Han Chinese. Interestingly, Chinese authorities put the blame on Pakistan, China’s closest ally in the region, for some incidents and asked Pakistan’s government to take measures against these incidents. The outbreak of incidents in different locations throughout the region has increased and no clear reports can be obtained from the region. However, every report of an incident results in tightened security and an increase of the security forces in the region—an action that affects the daily lives of residents and invites more conflicts between civilians and the security forces.

noteS

1. ‘Riots engulf Chinese Uighur city’, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8137824.stm

2. ‘China calls Xinjiang riot a plot against rule’, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-idUSTRE56500R20090706

3. 新疆披露打砸抢烧杀暴力犯罪事件当日发展始末, Chinanews, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/07-06/1762907.shtml

4. ‘Residents say Internet down in Xinjiang riot city’, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/china-xinjiang-internet-idUSPEK33581920090706

5. ‘Armed Mobs Throng Urumqi’, Radio Free Asia, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xinjiang-07072009054344.html

6. 新疆维吾尔自治区主席努尔•白克力谈乌鲁木齐打砸抢烧严重暴力犯罪事件, Xinhua News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-07/06/content_11660959.htm

7. 乌鲁木齐打砸抢烧事件造成140人死亡 816人受伤, China News, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/07-06/1763008.shtml

8. 新疆维吾尔自治区主席努尔•白克力谈乌鲁木齐打砸抢烧严重暴力犯罪事件, Xinhua News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-07/06/content_11660959.htm

9. 乌鲁木齐市市长:7.5打砸抢烧是严重暴力犯罪事件, CCTV, http://news.cctv.com/china/20090707/109923.shtml

10. 乌鲁木齐市委书记:参与打砸抢烧分子相当一部分来自喀什、和田等地, CCTV, http://news.cctv.com/program/C21249/20090711/101814.shtml

11. ‘The Woman China Blames for the Urumqi Unrest’, Time, http://con-tent.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1909109,00.html

12. Speech given to the Turkish television station TRT Turk.13. Erkin Emet, 5 Temmuz Urumçi Olayı ve Dog u Türkistan, Ankara: Grafiker,

2009, p. 33.14. ‘Hatred ‘Simmers’ in Urumqi’, Radio Free Asia, http://www.rfa.org/

english/news/uyghur/hatred-07082010095939.html; 世维大会指控中

E. EMET

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8137824.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8137824.stm

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-idUSTRE56500R20090706

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-idUSTRE56500R20090706

http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/07-06/1762907.shtml


http://www.reuters.com/article/china-xinjiang-internet-idUSPEK33581920090706

http://www.reuters.com/article/china-xinjiang-internet-idUSPEK33581920090706

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xinjiang-07072009054344.html

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xinjiang-07072009054344.html

http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-07/06/content_11660959.htm






http://news.cctv.com/china/20090707/109923.shtml

http://news.cctv.com/china/20090707/109923.shtml

http://news.cctv.com/program/C21249/20090711/101814.shtml

http://news.cctv.com/program/C21249/20090711/101814.shtml

http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1909109,00.html

http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1909109,00.html

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/hatred-07082010095939.html

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/hatred-07082010095939.html

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国官方煽动汉维冲突, Epochtimes, http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/9/ 7/7/n2582146.htm

15. ‘Protest by Chinese Muslims turns violent’, http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2009/07/05/protest_by_chinese_muslims_turns_violent.html

16. Erkin Emet, 5 Temmuz Urumçi Olayı ve Dog u Türkistan, p. 37.-Radio Free Asia, http://www.rfa.org/uyghur/xewer ,ئۈرۈمچى ۋەقەىس ھەققىدە سۆھبەت .17

ler/tepsili_xewer/urumchi-weqesi-heqqide-07082009211342.html; http://www.rfa.org/uyghur/xewerler/tepsili_xewer/urumchi-weqesi-heqqide-07082009211342.html/u0708erkin

18. Erkin Emet, 5 Temmuz Urumçi Olayı ve Dog u Türkistan, p. 155.19. Wang Lequan was the Communist Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur

Autonomous Region during the Urumqi incident. He was also a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, a member of the Politburo, and the Chief Commander of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Production and Construction Corps.

20. 孟建柱看望”7•5″事件受伤干部群众和遇害同胞家属, http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2009-07/08/content_18096064.htm

21. 乌鲁木齐市委书记:对残忍杀人分子要处以极刑, People’s Daily, http://leaders.people.com.cn/GB/9618880.html

22. Erkin Ekrem, ‘Urumçi Olayı: Çin Medyasında Türkiye Kars ıtı Yorumlar’, Türkiye Günlügü, No. 98 (Summer 2009), p. 41.

23. Speech given to Turkish television TRT-Turk on 9 July 2009.24. ‘Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi’nde Meydana Gelen Olaylar Hk.’, Press

release of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey no. 118, 8 July 2009, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_118_-08-temmuz-2009_-sincan-uygur-ozerk-bolgesi_nde-meydana-gelen-olaylar-hk_.tr.mfa

25. ‘Ankara, Sincan için diplomasi atag ı baslatıyor’, Zaman, http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_ankara-sincan-icin-diplomasi-atagi-baslati-yor_867532.html

26. ‘OIC: China needs new understanding for ethnic minorities’, Today’s Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_oic-china-needs-new-understanding-for-ethnic-minorities_186447.html

27. ‘International reaction to Uighur protest violence’, http://www.radioaus-tralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/international- reaction-to-uighur-protest-violence

28. ‘Russia says China Xinjiang riots internal affair’, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-russia-sb-idUSTRE5671SM20090708

29. ‘Nury Turkel: Why Western leaders have failed the Uighurs’, Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/nury-turkel-why-western-leaders-have-failed-the-uighurs-1736225.html


http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/9/7/7/n2582146.htm

http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/9/7/7/n2582146.htm

http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2009/07/05/protest_by_chinese_muslims_turns_violent.html



http://www.rfa.org/uyghur/xewerler/tepsili_xewer/urumchi-weqesi-heqqide-07082009211342.html

http://www.rfa.org/uyghur/xewerler/tepsili_xewer/urumchi-weqesi-heqqide-07082009211342.html

http://www.rfa.org/uyghur/xewerler/tepsili_xewer/urumchi-weqesi-heqqide-07082009211342.html/u0708erkin

http://www.rfa.org/uyghur/xewerler/tepsili_xewer/urumchi-weqesi-heqqide-07082009211342.html/u0708erkin

http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2009-07/08/content_18096064.htm

http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2009-07/08/content_18096064.htm

http://leaders.people.com.cn/GB/9618880.html

http://leaders.people.com.cn/GB/9618880.html

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_118_-08-temmuz-2009_-sincan-uygur-ozerk-bolgesi_nde-meydana-gelen-olaylar-hk_.tr.mfa

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_118_-08-temmuz-2009_-sincan-uygur-ozerk-bolgesi_nde-meydana-gelen-olaylar-hk_.tr.mfa

http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_ankara-sincan-icin-diplomasi-atagi-baslatiyor_867532.html



http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_oic-china-needs-new-understanding-for-ethnic-minorities_186447.html

http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_oic-china-needs-new-understanding-for-ethnic-minorities_186447.html

http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/international-reaction-to-uighur-protest-violence



http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-russia-sb-idUSTRE5671SM20090708

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-russia-sb-idUSTRE5671SM20090708

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/nury-turkel-why-western-leaders-have-failed-the-uighurs-1736225.html

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/nury-turkel-why-western-leaders-have-failed-the-uighurs-1736225.html

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30. ‘Urumçi’de 83 kisi tutuklandı’, Milliyet, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/urumci-de----kisi-tutuklandi/dunya/dunyadetay/05.08.2009/1124963/default.htm

31. www.rfa.org/uyghur, 30/07/2009.32. ‘World Uyghur Congress’ Statement on July 5th Urumqi Incident’,

http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=97533. 警方称“7·18”属严重暴力恐怖事件, Xinhua News Agency, http://

news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2011-07/21/c_121697570.htm; ‘Attack on police station was “long-planned”’, China Daily, http://www.chi-nadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/21/content_12947603.htm; ‘4 dead in Xinjiang police station attack’, People’s Daily, http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90882/7444053.html; ‘Mobs attack Xinjiang police station’, China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/18/content_12928422.htm; ‘China blames “terrorists” for attack in Xinjiang: report’, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-attack-idUSTRE76I0NQ20110719

34. Press Release by World Uyghur Congress, ‘World Uyghur Congress (WUC) Troubled by Witness Accounts on Hotan Incident’, http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=9277

35. ‘Uyghur Leader: Hotan incident was not a terrorist attack’, http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=9466

36. ‘Violence in China’s Northwest’, Washington Post, http://www.washing-tontimes.com/news/2011/jul/20/inside-china-110063105/; ‘Clashes in Silk Road Town’, Radio Free Asia, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/clashes-07182011112500.html

37. ‘At least seven killed in Xinjiang violence’, Xinhua News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-07/31/c_131020517.htm

38. ‘18 killed in Xinjiang weekend violence’, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-08/01/content_23110689.htm

39. ‘China Says Attackers ‘Pakistan-Trained”, Radio Free Asia, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/attacks-08012011150459.html; Erkin Ekrem, ‘Dog u Türkistan’da S iddet Olayları: Sorunlar ve Çözümler’, http://www.sde.org.tr/tr/authordetail/dogu-turkistanda-siddet-olaylari- sorunlar-ve-cozumler/925

40. ‘Kashgar attacks expose deep wounds in East Turkestan’, http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=9672%20Kashgar%20attacks%20expose%20deep%20wounds%20in%20East%20Turkestan

41. ‘21 dead in Xinjiang terrorist clash’, Xinhua News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/24/c_132336588.htm

42. ‘Unlawful house search and arbitrary use of lethal force results nearly two dozen deaths in Kashgar’, http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=20244%20Unlawful%20house%20search%20and%20arbitrary%20

E. EMET

http://www.milliyet.com.tr/urumci-de----kisi-tutuklandi/dunya/dunyadetay/05.08.2009/1124963/default.htm



http://www.rfa.org/uyghur

http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=975

http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2011-07/21/c_121697570.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2011-07/21/c_121697570.htm

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/21/content_12947603.htm


http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90882/7444053.html

http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90882/7444053.html



http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-attack-idUSTRE76I0NQ20110719

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-attack-idUSTRE76I0NQ20110719





http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/20/inside-china-110063105/

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/20/inside-china-110063105/

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/clashes-07182011112500.html

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/clashes-07182011112500.html

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-07/31/c_131020517.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-07/31/c_131020517.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-08/01/content_23110689.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-08/01/content_23110689.htm

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/attacks-08012011150459.html

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/attacks-08012011150459.html

http://www.sde.org.tr/tr/authordetail/dogu-turkistanda-siddet-olaylari-sorunlar-ve-cozumler/925

http://www.sde.org.tr/tr/authordetail/dogu-turkistanda-siddet-olaylari-sorunlar-ve-cozumler/925

http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=9672 Kashgar attacks expose deep wounds in East Turkestan



http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/24/c_132336588.htm


http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=20244 Unlawful house search and arbitrary use of lethal force results nearly two dozen deaths in Kashgar


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use%20of%20lethal%20force%20results%20nearly%20two%20dozen%20deaths%20in%20Kashgar

43. ‘Xinjiang Violence Leaves 21 Dead’, Radio Free Asia, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/maralbeshi-04242013190839.html

44. ‘Rioters kill 24 in Xinjiang’, Xinhua News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/27/c_132492895.htm

45. ‘Today’s Incident Represents Further Evidence of China’s Failed Policies Towards Uyghurs’, http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=20565%20Today%E2%80%99s%20Incident%20Represents%20Fur ther%20Evidence%20of%20China%E2%80%99s%20Failed%20Policies%20Towards%20Uyghurs

46. ‘Xinjiang Violence More Serious Than Reported’, Radio Free Asia, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/violence-06272013230950.html




http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/maralbeshi-04242013190839.html

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/maralbeshi-04242013190839.html



http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=20565 Today’s Incident Represents Further Evidence of China’s Failed Policies Towards Uyghurs




http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/violence-06272013230950.html

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/violence-06272013230950.html


The Uyghur Factor in Turkish-Chinese Relations After the Urumqi Events

Erkin Ekrem

Toward a New Period

To normalize Turkish-Chinese relations, which have been strained since the July 5, 2009 Urumqi events, the Turkish government has initiated a number of reconciliatory steps starting in August 2009. Among these ini-tiatives was the visit of State Minister Zafer Çaglayan to China between the dates from August 30 to September 2, 2009. Çaglayan visited China as a special envoy of the then Turkish Prime-Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and conveyed his message to the Chinese government. The mes-sage was not made public in Turkey but was published by Chinese media. According to the message, the Turkish government pledged to prevent any activity harming Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. The message contained assurances of cooperation with China and an expres-sion of intention to upgrade bilateral relations to the level of a strategic partnership.1 On his side, Chinese Prime-Minister Wen Jiaobao, while hosting State Minister Çag layan, stated that because “China and Turkey are two countries that are facing ‘three evils’ of separatism, extremism and terrorism, and at the same time are developing and multi-national states,” the two sides should support each other and respect each other’s core

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interests.2 Thus, the tension that occurred after the Urumqi events was replaced by a more positive atmosphere. Both countries intended to head toward and maintain strategic cooperation.

Turkish-ChiNese sTraTegiC CooPeraTive relaTioNshiP

After the Cold War, China took into consideration the structural transfor-mation of the international political and economic system and prioritized the reinforcing of relations with non-Western countries. In this new period, these relations were not based on security alliances, but on mutu-ally beneficial economic relations and a priority of development. Nevertheless, in the case of Turkish-Chinese relations, it was Turkey who brought strategic cooperation to the agenda on bilateral relations.3

The Turkish suggestion to upgrade Turkish-Chinese relations to the level of strategic cooperation had been voiced by Turkish officials on numerous occasions since the conveying of the Turkish Prime-Minister’s message to China in August 2009.4 In his message, then Prime-Minister Erdogan expressed his intentions to upgrade Turkish-Chinese relations to the level of a long-term strategic partnership.5

Chinese Prime-Minister Wen Jiabao visited Turkey on October 7–9, 2010 and signed eight agreements in order to develop mutual cooperation in such fields as economy, culture, and transportation.6 The two countries decided to explore opportunities of cooperation in railroad construction, nuclear energy, and the building of a new Silk Road between Europe and Asia. The most interesting result of the negotiations was a joint declara-tion on the establishment of a strategic cooperative relationship. The two parties decided to launch the mechanism of the joint working group that had been established earlier. During the negotiations, Turkey and China declared their intentions to increase their trade volume to 50 billion dol-lars in 2015 and to 100 billion dollars in 2020. Prime-Minister Erdogan announced a bilateral decision to use national currencies in Turkish- Chinese bilateral trade relations in order to simplify them.7 In addition, the two sides decided to celebrate 2012 as Chinese Culture Year in Turkey and 2013 as Turkish Culture Year in China.8

Although in the joint declaration both countries pledged their commit-ments to the principles of the previous joint declarations (“The Joint Declaration of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Turkey and China of 4 August 1971” and “The Joint Turkish-Chinese Declaration of 19 April 2000”), the principles of noninterference in internal affairs,

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cooperation against all types of terrorism, and support for human rights were not included. Thus, the Eastern Turkestan problem (the Uyghur problem) was not included in the scope of the Turkish-Chinese strategic cooperative relationship. As can be understood from the five-point pro-posal that was presented by then Chinese Prime-Minister Wen Jiabao dur-ing the visit, relying on its discourse of the common “three evils” (separatism, extremism, and terrorism), China expected Turkish cooperation against terrorism in accordance with the Chinese understanding of it.9

With the gradual evolvement of Turkish-Chinese relations, Turkey’s Uyghur policy has been taking shape. During his visit to Urumqi in June 2009, the 11th president of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, depicted the Uyghurs’ role in Turkish-Chinese relations just like it was designated in 1995 by then Turkish President Süleyman Demirel during his visit to China: “the friendship bridge.”10 In January 2010, while hosting Chinese Trade Minister Chen Deming, then Prime-Minister Erdogan described the Uyghurs as kin of Turkey, stressed the importance of their well-being and prosperity for Turkey, and stated that Turkey perceives them to be the “friendship bridge” between Turkey and China.11 After the Uurmqi events, Turkey’s Ambassador to China, Murat Salim Esenli, explained the discourse of the friendship bridge for Chinese media. The ambassador said that Turkey wishes to see the Uyghurs as loyal citizens of China, but at the same time expects that their human rights such as freedom of religious practice and education rights will be respected. He also stated that because there are ties of kinship, language, and religion between the Turks and Uyghurs, they are important to Turkey.12 Nevertheless, the friendship bridge policy has not been implemented thoroughly13 and has not been approved by China.14

Trying to capitalize on Turkish intentions to promote strategic coop-eration between two countries, China tended to control Uyghur activities in Turkey and Turkish support for Uyghurs in general. During the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Turkey in February 2012, the Uyghur problem was put at the center of agenda. According to the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Eastern Turkestanist’s problem is a core interest of China that concerns its national security and stability. Xi Jinping called for a more efficient Turkish stance toward Uyghur separatist activities directed against China. According to him, only in this case was there a possibility of the development of healthy relations between two countries. Chinese media stressed that Prime-Minister Erdogan pledged not to allow any activity harming Chinese independence, sovereignty, and territorial

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integrity.15 Prime-Minister Erdogan reiterated the above-mentioned issues during his visit to China in April 2012. The Chinese side emphasized its care for the economic development and prosperity of Xinjiang and stressed the importance of Turkish cooperation concerning this issue.16

Even if Turkey and China state that they are against all types of terror-ism, there are some major differences between their understandings of terrorism and terrorists. In Chinese sources, Eastern Turkestan is directly related to terrorism. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, China has extensively and broadly used the term “Dong Tu” (Eastern Turkestanists) to describe the Eastern Turkestan independence cause. According to this arbitrary understanding, all supporters of independence of Eastern Turkestan are simply terrorists, and all Uyghurs are potential terrorists.17 Turkey recognizes the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization, but naturally does not extend this understanding to all organizations established under the name of Eastern Turkestan. The Turkish understanding of terrorism is close to the Western one. Although the United States excluded ETIM from its foreign terrorist organizations list in 2004, Turkey considers all organizations from the UN terrorist organizations list to be terrorist organizations, including ETIM. Nevertheless, despite Turkish calls, China has not recognized the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization.

In November 2014, the Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Meng Jianzhu, visited Turkey as a special envoy of President Xi Jinping. The aim of this visit was to promote bilateral anti- terrorist cooperation and intelligence sharing. According to Chinese media, Meng Jianzhu attempted to facilitate deeper and more sufficient anti-ter-rorist cooperation between the law enforcement agencies.18 Some Chinese analysts interpreted the above-mentioned negotiations as an anti- terror cooperation agreement. According to them, this cooperation creates a life-line for Pan-Turkism, leads to acceptance of the terrorist nature of the Eastern Turkestan cause, closes the shelter for the Eastern Turkestanists (Dong Tu), and prevents the penetration of radical Islam to the East.19

TeNsioNs BeTweeN Turkey aNd ChiNa, 2014–2015At the end of 2014, a new crisis broke out between Turkey and China. The problem evolved around Turkish endeavors to provide a shelter for hundreds of Uyghurs who were discovered earlier that year in a trafficking camp in Thailand. During the last couple of years, due to political,

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economic, religious, and cultural oppression, thousands of Uyghur men, women, and children have fled China to Southeast Asian countries and Indochina on an unprecedented level. Even if among these Uyghur migrants there were people who escaped to join Jihad in the Middle East, most of them were just ordinary people trying to find a better life. Because the bulk of these Uyghurs did not have passports, there were problems with their registration in the host countries. Consequently, they have experienced problems with the completion of procedures for the UN High Commission for Refugees Agency. In addition, Chinese authorities pressured host countries to repatriate Uyghurs. Although the Uyghur migrants have benefited from some local Muslim charity networks, they have suffered from adverse conditions and health problems.

For humanitarian reasons and because of Turkish public sensitivities regarding Uyghurs, Turkey has been providing shelter for immigrant Uyghurs for years.20 At the same time, news about the execution of Uyghurs in Kashgar sparked concern among the Turkish public in 2014. Regarding this issue, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavus oglu, expressed Turkish concerns to the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister.21 In December 2014, upon the possibility of deportation of the Uyghurs, who were discovered in a smuggling camp in Thailand in March 2014, the Turkish government tried to solve this humanitarian problem. The Thailand Kingdom attempted to negotiate with all parties involved; as a result, the Turkish and Thai ministers of foreign affairs met on the sidelines of an international forum. Although the details of this meeting were not provided, the Thai media stressed Çavusoglu’s words, “If these people will be deported to China, they may face death.”22 The concerns of Çavus oglu are justifiable because the fate of the Uyghurs that had been deported to China from Malaysia and Cambodia is unknown. Out of the fear for their lives, Uyghur organizations asked Turkey to protect the above-mentioned Uyghurs in Thailand.23

These developments sparked concern in Beijing. Hua Chunying, the spokeswoman of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, defined the immigra-tion of the Uyghurs to Thailand as an illegal immigration to be solved between two countries. She urged “the relevant country to immediately stop meddling in placement work for the relevant case, be cautious with words and actions and not send out mistaken signals that connive in, and even support, illegal immigration activities.”24 Although the Chinese media claimed that Çavusoglu’s statement would damage Chinese-Turkish rela-tions,25 Turkish newspapers depicted the Chinese reaction with such


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headlines as “China’s arrogant warning to Turkey,”26 “China’s shocking warning to Turkey,”27 “China’s covert reaction to Turkey,”28 “China warns Turkey about Uyghurs,”29 and “China threatens Turkey about Uyghurs.”30

In addition to the Uyghur immigration problem between Turkey and China, China questioned Turkish sympathy toward Uyghurs in general. On July 2, 2013 the Xinjiang Ministry of Public Security issued an arrest warrant for 11 terror suspects. Two days later, The Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), a tabloid under the auspices of People’s Daily (Remin Ribao) that acts as a voice of the Chinese Communist party, published an article titled, “Who brings disorder to Xinjiang? The US, Turkey and Japan are spoiling and supporting Eastern Turkestan activities.”31 In this article, Qiu Yongzheng blamed Turkey as a spiritual leader and the main base of Eastern Turkestan activists. Legal Uyghur nongovernmental organiza-tions in Turkey were presented as extremist organizations. The article claimed that even if Turkish diplomats from the Turkish embassy in Beijing claimed the presence of cooperation between the two countries regarding terrorist activities, Chinese high-ranking officials dealing with terror issues stated that Turkey rejected the deportation to China of many fugitives wanted by China’s Ministry of Public Security.

Qiu Yongzheng, a journalist from the Global Times, said that he had passed the Turkish-Syrian border from the Kilis border gate twice and claimed that there was a constant flow of foreign fighters through Turkish border of Syria. Moreover, he argued that, since 2012, some members of Eastern Turkestanists traveled through Turkey to Syria and joined some radical groups fighting against the Syrian army. According to the article, some of these militants upon their return to China schemed and imple-mented some terrorist activities.32 Allegedly, Turkey supported these Uyghurs’ inflow to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by providing fake passports.33

In response to these allegations, Turkey’s ambassador to China, Ali Murat Ersoy, objected to the above-mentioned claims on December 12, 2014. The ambassador stated that Turkey has been fighting against any type of terrorism and is an active participator in the struggle against inter-national terrorism. According to him, Turkey has been preventing the transfer of foreign fighters through the Turkish border to Syria, and since 2011 had deported nearly 1000 suspects as potential foreign fighters.34

China’s efforts to present all illegal migrants as terrorists are not con-vincing. The majority of the thousands of Uyghur immigrants are women and children. In addition, Turkey’s concern is not the Eastern Turkestan

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problem but the Uyghur problem—that is, the problem of Uyghur human rights. Uyghurs fighting in Syria presented their own perspective of the problem. The representative of Turkestan Islam Party in Syria, Ibrahim Mansur, explained that Uyghur participation in the Syrian conflict was a reaction to human rights abuses in China, as well as an attempt to live freely, cooperate with “brothers,” and oppose China in Syria.35

Amid the above-mentioned tensions, on January 14, 2015, Chinese media circulated news about the arrest of 10 Turkish nationals supposedly involved in smuggling by providing fake passports to individuals. According to the Global Times, Uyghurs who fled China using this chan-nel later passed from Turkey to Syria and Iraq and joined radical Islamists. The newspaper argued that some of these people, upon their return to China, were involved in terrorist activities.36 Nevertheless, a spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hong Lei, did not mention Turkey in his statements about the events. Thus, the Chinese government chose to overlook these developments.37

Despite these counterproductive developments in bilateral relations, in January 2015, the fifth meeting of Turkish-Chinese joint working group of the Chinese Public Security Ministry and Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs was conducted in Beijing. Both sides reiterated their intentions to promote bilateral security cooperation. The General Director of the Turkish National Police, Celalettin Lekesiz, assured China that Turkey would not permit any activities damaging Chinese interests. On his part, China’s Public Security Minister Guo Shengkun stated that organizations such as the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement threaten the stability of both parties, and that the joint working group will promote security coop-eration between the two countries.38

However, the news about executions and restrictions in Eastern Turkestan during the Ramadan feast in 2015 sparked outrage in the Turkish public, which was especially evident on social media. Some Turkish political parties and nongovernmental organizations condemned the restrictions imposed by China on Uyghur Muslims.39 Turks, Azerbaijanians, Arabs, and Uyghurs living in Europe and the United States expressed their reactions as well.40 From the very beginning, offi-cials in Turkey revealed their stance on the human right abuses of Uyghurs. On June 30, the presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalın stated that “[the] Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs invited [the] Chinese Ambassador to Turkey to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and expressed our concerns about these issues.”41


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On July 2, Thailand sent 173 Uyghurs to Turkey; however, on July 7, they deported the 115 remaining Uyghurs to China. The Thailand repre-sentative of Human Rights Watch, Sunai Phasuk, stated that the deporta-tion of the Uyghurs violated international law.42 The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, relying on the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, defined the Thai government’s actions as a violation of humanitarian law. According to the ministry, “These conven-tions are valid not only for refugees or people who have similar status to refugees but also for people who have a risk for violations of their right to life and torture in the cases of deportation and extradition as well as force-ful extradition.” The ministry also stated that Turkey would keep watch-ing “the fate of our kin.”43

International public opinion criticized Thailand as well. According to Thai political scientist Puangthong Pawakapan, the Bangkok junta govern-ment did not expect such widespread criticism.44 On its side, the Chinese authorities appreciated the cooperation of the Thai government and claimed that the deported Uyghurs’ fates would be decided in accordance with their crimes.45 Nevertheless, from the very beginning, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs defined the deported Uyghurs as jihadists. According to Chinese allegations, Uyghurs who flee China through Southeastn Asian countries later travel through Turkey to Syria and Iraq, where they become terrorists and start to pose a threat to Chinese national security. Similar allegations were voiced previously by some Chinese high-ranking officials.46 In the editorial published by the Global Times, the United States and Turkey were called to “be respectful and shut up.”47

On July 8, a group of the deported Uyghurs’ relatives hurled stones and damaged property inside the Thai honorary consulate in Istanbul.48 A spokesperson of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tanju Bilgiç, stated that the Turkish government did not approve of the attacks threatening Chinese tourists and foreign diplomatic missions.49 President Erdog an speaking during the fast-breaking dinner with the Turkish ambassadors, defined Istanbul protests against Chinese nationals as provocative. Nevertheless, Erdog an assured the Turkish public that Turkey would con-tinue to be interested in the fate of its kin in different countries and voice the Uyghur problem from the highest level.50 Similarly, Prime-Minister Davutog lu warned that problems should not be directed against foreign diplomatic missions and tourists.51 Deputy Prime-Minister Numan Kurtulmus , expressing his support for the religious rights of Uyghurs, also defined the protests as “provocative.”52

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The pro-government newspaper Star, relying on the statements of some Turkish officials from the Turkish prime ministry, pointed out that the exaggerated news about human rights abuses in Eastern Turkestan, which had been circulating during Ramadan in printed and social media, were aimed to sabotage Erdogan’s upcoming visit to China on July 28.53 On July 9, speaking at the fast-breaking dinner with ambassadors, Erdogan stated that Turkish public sensitivities concerning its kin are open to exploitation and that the timing of these provocations is “meaningful.”54

The President of Religious Affairs, Professor Mehmet Görmez, answer-ing journalists’ questions about religious restrictions in Eastern Turkestan, stressed that a person should not be put in such conditions where he or she must choose between loyalty to state and adherence to religious duties. According to Görmez, in this kind of situation, a believer would choose God.55 Mehmet Görmez expressed these views to the Chinese ambassador to Turkey as well.56

The Chinese government was disturbed by the pro-Uyghur feelings and actions of the Turkish public.57 While searching for reasons for these developments, the Chinese media mostly connected them with Pan- Turkism and the influence of the Western media. Some publications claimed that the protests were orchestrated to prevent the Chinese-Turkish air defense deal and get an upper hand in negotiations.58

Chinese authorities perceived the Turkish offering of shelter for Uyghur immigrants in Southeast Asian countries as support for the Eastern Turkestan cause. At the same time, China claimed that Turkey provided fake passports for some Uyghur immigrants who were smuggled into Syria and other Middle Eastern countries.59 Chinese analysts considered that providing illegal passports for Uyghurs and sheltering supporters of Eastern Turkestan would cause damage to Turkey’s international image.60 Chinese analysts wanted Turkey to distance itself from the Uyghurs involved in terror activities.61 Nevertheless, the Chinese government could not explain why and how these Uyghurs have been fleeing the world’s second largest economy.

Tong Bishan, the chief of The Criminal Investigation Department of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, said that Turkish diplomats had provided documents for immigrant Uyghurs, and that later some of the mentioned Uyghurs “were sold” as fighters to some radical groups in Syria.62 Chinese police claimed that the Uyghurs deported to China from Thailand had relations with some terrorist Middle Eastern groups and were planning to travel to Iraq and Syria through Turkey. Tanju Bilgiç, the spokesperson of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,


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denied the accusations, stating that Turkey considers ISIS to be a terror-ist organization.63 According to the presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalın, Turkey had expelled 1600 suspected ISIS fighters and prevented the entry of 15,000 suspected foreign fighters.64 The presence of Uyghurs among the arrested suspects and the deportation negotiations between China and Turkey weakened the Chinese accusations.

The Turkish image in China is mostly negative due to the Uyghur problem and the Eastern Turkestan problem. According to a public opin-ion poll conducted by the Global Times on the internet, among the 11,000 poll respondents who had participated to the poll by July 8, 2015, 71% did not consider Turkey to be a friendly country, 87.2% wanted Turkey’s exclusion from the travel list for Chinese people, and 86% thought that Turkey supported Eastern Turkestan separatism.65 Notwithstanding, the inflow of Chinese tourists to Turkey has increased since the events.66 The sensitivities of Chinese people to the Uyghur issue are based not only on the strategic importance of Eastern Turkestan, but also on the worsening of the security situation in the region.

Turkish president Erdogan’s visit to China aimed to improve strained relations and bolster cooperation between the two countries. During the visit, he conducted comprehensive negotiations covering issues from secu-rity to trade and infrastructure. Erdogan tried to reassure China that Turkey will continue to support Chinese sovereignty and territorial integ-rity, and will not approve any criminal terrorist act against Chinese territo-rial integrity either inside or outside of China. For example, Erdogan stressed that Turkey had recognized ETIM as a terrorist organization. The Chinese side expressed its support for the Turkish struggle against ISIS and PKK.67

Participating in the Turkish-Chinese Business Forum along with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping, Turkish President Erdogan delivered a speech on the perspectives of the bilateral relations. Stating that China is the largest trade partner of Turkey in Asia and the third largest trade partner of Turkey in the world, he voiced concerns about unbalanced Turkish- Chinese trade relations and called for Chinese investments in Turkey.68 Erdogan reiterated Turkish support for such Chinese initiatives as The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and The Silk Road Economic Belt infra-structure project, which aimed to link China with Europe through Central Asia. Erdogan stated that the Chinese Silk Road economic belt project could be combined with the Turkish initiative to link Turkey and China through Central Asia. He particularly mentioned Turkish projects such as

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the Marmaray undersea rail tunnel and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars and Edirne-Kars railroads.69 On his side, Chinese President Xi Jinping defined Turkish-Chinese cooperation, with high-speed trains and energy as priorities.70

Speaking en route to Turkey from China, Erdogan stated that, just like how Turkey carefully approaches Chinese sensitivities about the Uyghur issue, China also pays attention to Turkish sensitivities. He gave an exam-ple of the commemoration of the 1915 events in Yerevan and stressed that China had sent only its charge d’affaires.71 In general, Erdogan’s visit to China contributed to the improvement of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, it is clear that some sensitive issues were just veiled for the time being.

The uyghur ProBlem iN Turkish-ChiNese relaTioNs

In the recent years, violence and terrorist acts in Eastern Turkestan sharply increased and were deliberately directed to security forces. A Chinese national security inquiry report published in May 2014 admitted that the style of terrorist attacks has changed.72 The order issued by the general secretary of the Xinjiang Communist Party, Zhang Chunxian, to persecute acts of violence preemptively, before the crime occurs,73 has been applied for years as an execution on the spot. Despite the fact that an execution on the spot does not have any legal ground, the “Strike Hard” (Yan Da) campaign has been applied to crack down on any act of defiance against the oppression of authorities. The violence emanating from Eastern Turkestan spread to regions of China proper, such as as Beijing and Kun- ming. Nevertheless, the general secretary of the regional Communist Party insisted that the spreading of violence was not related to the Strike Hard campaign.74

On May 23, 2014, a new wave of the Strike Hard campaign was announced. According to information provided by the Urumqi govern-ment, within a month, 32 terrorist cells were destroyed, 315 people were arrested, and 13 people were sentenced to death.75 Later, the Urumqi gov-ernment stated that between the dates of May 23, 2014 and April 30, 2015, a total of 181 terrorist cells were destroyed.76 In a report presented to the Chinese National Congress, the President of the Supreme People’s Court of China, Zhou Qiang, stated that Chinese courts finalized 558 trials related to separatism and terror crimes (a 14.8% increase since the previous year) and penalized 712 people (a 13.3% increase since the previous year) in 2014–2015.77 According to the general secretary of Xinjiang Communist Party, Zhang Chunxian, the regional ratio of police deaths on duty was


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5.4 times more than the Chinese national average. In general, the number of killed police in the region accounted for a third of all deaths on state duty in China.78

Recent attempts to include Uyghurs in the Chinese (Zhonghua) nation79 have not been successful. Furthermore, the concept of a Chinese nation that emerged after the death of Mao (1893–1976)80 has an unsteady nature.81 It is doubtful that enforced teaching of the Chinese language to Uyghur children will provide security in the region.82 According to Chinese analysts, economic and political policies that have been imple-mented in the region increase tensions in the region. Consequently, ten-sions have increased between Chinese nationalism and regional nationalism.83 Today, there are discussions about China’s policy toward its minorities.84

Chinese analysts think that Turkey does not possess sufficient knowl-edge about Eastern Turkestan.85 In fact, humanitarian links between the Turkic population of Eastern Turkestan (Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks, Tatars) and Turkic and Muslim worlds should be accepted as normalcy. Turkish concerns about Uyghurs are of a humanitarian nature and can be compared with China’s concerns and support for Chinese peo-ple living in Southeast Asian countries. Some Chinese analysts are aware of this. Su Hao, a professor at the China Foreign Affairs University, admitted the presence of some ethnic problems between Turkey and China, but pointed out that anti-China protests in Turkey are the activities of certain groups.86 Some Chinese analysts, while accepting special relations between Uyghur people and Turkey, put forward that the Uyghur problem has to be excluded from Turkish-Chinese relations.87 According to Chinese ana-lysts, due to Turkish political and social realities, the Eastern Turkestan problem may come to the agenda of the two countries’ relations from time to time, so China should firmly pursue its national interests but avoid damaging the bilateral relations.88 In the final analysis of the struggle against Eastern Turkestan separatism, Turkish cooperation is crucial.89 In addition, some Chinese analysts think that Turkey’s engagement in Eastern Turkestan will not damage Chinese security interests because Turkey’s ambitions to become a regional power will not be realized.90 Nevertheless, China has serious concerns about the possible use of the Uyghur problem by Turkey as a strategic trump card. As a consequence of this lack of politi-cal trust in bilateral relations, during Turkish president Erdogan’s visit to China, a visit to Xinjiang was not arranged, a joint communiqué was not issued, and a hotline between the two countries was not established.

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At the same time, China is concerned with the possible Turkish obstruc-tion of the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt project. During Erdogan’s visit to China, the Chinese discourse of the community of common inter-ests and fate, which has been used toward other Silk Road states, was not invoked. The Silk Road Economic Belt project is a part of strategic “One Belt, One Road” project that will connect China with European markets, excluding such powers as the United States and Japan and engaging coun-tries such as Russia and India, thus paving the way for the ascendance of China. According to this project, China will be connected to Central Asia through Eastern Turkestan and to Europe through Turkey. Therefore, Turkey and Eastern Turkestan will determine the fate of the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt project. Because the other part of “One Belt, One Road” project—namely, The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road project—has been focused on facilitating the maritime routes between China and Europe, this project is vulnerable to the influence of the United States and its allies, dominating the maritime routes. However, the Silk Road Economic Belt project has the potential to change traditional Heartland theory and to bolster China’s power in Eurasia. Due to the comparative safety of this project and Turkish geopolitical location, which connects Europe and Asia, Turkey’s importance for the Chinese Silk Road project cannot be exaggerated.

In the final analysis, the Uyghur problem and the Eastern Turkestan problem are Chinese problems and must be solved by China itself. A solu-tion guaranteeing the basic rights and interests of Uyghurs will emanci-pate China from the above-mentioned concerns and will provide a Uyghur contribution to the rise of China. Currently, China considers the Uyghur problem to be a problem of the Eastern Turkestan separatism and interprets Turkish human rights concerns regarding Uyghurs as support for the independence of Eastern Turkestan. However, the Uyghur problem is a humanitarian problem, which emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century upon the formation of the Uyghur national identity. The Eastern Turkestan problem has emerged since November 1884, when the Eastern Turkestan region was first incorporated into China as a Chinese adminis-trative region under the name of Xinjiang. Pointing out this date, both leaders of the 1933 and the 1944 Eastern Turkestan republics declared that Eastern Turkestan was liberated from Chinese domination.91 Western countries, including Turkey, are not interested in Eastern Turkestan inde-pendence; however, they are interested in the protection of Uyghur human rights. Because many Uyghurs are involved in separatist activities


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and seek independence from China, the Chinese government considers two problems as one problem of separatism. This misconception leads to inaccurate accusations pointed out by Turkey. If a problem is not defined in the right way, a discussion about this problem will not be fruitful. As Confucius put it, if your definition is not right, then your words will be invalid; if your words are invalid, then your activities will not have results.92 Therefore, Turkish-Chinese relations are doomed to suffer from miscon-ceptions about Uyghur and Eastern Turkestan problems.

The Chinese claim that the Uyghur separatist ideology was imported from Turkey is another controversial issue between the two countries. A report that was prepared by scholars from the Chinese and Xinjiang Academies of Social Sciences claims that the ideologies of the separatist Eastern Turkestan movement is Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, which were disseminated by the Ottoman Turks during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamit.93 This evaluation has been influential on China’s policy toward Turkey. Li Peng, the Chairman of the Chinese National People’s Congress, upon his arrival from Turkey in April 1999, coined the Eastern Turkestan separatists as Dong Tu (Eastern Turkestanists).94 This defini-tion was put into use after September 11, 2001, to define all Uyghur separatist persons and organizations. According to Li Peng, the problem of Eastern Turkestanists (Dong Tu) is related to the activities of a small group of people who fled from Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan) to Turkey. Apparently, Li Peng implied that Mehmet Emin Bug ra (1901–1965), who left Eastern Turkestan in 1949 and immigrated to Turkey in 1951, and I sa Yusuf Alptekin (1901–1995), along with other immigrants from Eastern Turkestan, belonged to this small group of people. China claims that today’s separatism started with the activities of Mehmet Emin Bug ra and I sa Yusuf Alptekin,95 and that the aim of these activities to divide China.96 Chinese analysts consider the book written by Mehmet Emin Bug ra under the title History of Eastern Turkestan (S arki Türkistan Tarihi) to be a theory of Uyghur separatism.97 At the end of the nine-teenth century, Chinese researchers translated Turkestan as “Tu-er-qi Si-tan” (i.e., “Turkeyistan.” The Chinese read this word as being “an eastern part of Turkey.”98 The founders of the Eastern Turkestan repub-lics of 1933 and 1944, consider 1884 to be the date of Eastern Turkestan’s incorporation to China and the date of the beginning of the indepen-dence movement. According to these views, the independence move-ment started before Eastern Turkestan was subjugated by China in the twentieth century.

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China does not accept Turkish feelings of kinship with Uyghurs. According to Chinese historiography, the Turks of Turkey and Uyghurs do not have the same roots. From their point of view, Turks are the successors of the Western Turkic Khaganate that tyrannized Uyghurs. In a contradic-tion to Turkish historiography, Chinese historians claim that all Uyghur political formations in history belong to Chinese history.99 There is no plural form of the word Turk (Türk) in Chinese historical literature. The words Turk and Turks in Chinese are the same—Tu-jue, thus meaning the histori-cal Gök Türks of the Turkic Khaganate. However, the term “Turks” emerged during the Second Gök Türk Khaganate (682–744), and it was Uyghurs who used this term extensively.100 V. V. Barthold (1869–1930) put forward that the term “Türk” was first used by Arabs (i.e., in the Muslim world) in the seventh or eighth century.101 Due to these omissions, Turkish sensitivi-ties about Uyghurs have been presented as either identity confusion102 or Pan-Turkist irredentism.103 According to the Chinese side, the Turkish understanding of kinship between Turks and Uyghurs aims to establish an artificial political relationship.104 Similarly, China cannot grasp the foreign policy discourse of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government, which asserts Turkish support for Muslims out of religious solidarity.

China does not understand the support of the Turkish public for Uyghurs. The sincere feelings of the Turkish public toward Uyghurs have been interpreted as a political play.105 The first known migration of Uyghurs to Anatolia took place during Alâeddin Eretna’s reign (1336–1352).106 Today, there is continued Uyghur migration. After the Urumqi events, the then State Minister and Deputy Prime-Minister Bülent Arınç107 and then State Minister Zafer Çag layan108 pointed out the pres-ence of more than 300,000 Turkish citizens with Uyghur origins. Turkish politicians tried to explain to Chinese politicians Turkish sensitivities about Uyghurs, but were not able to convince them. Respecting international law, Turkey has pledged its support for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, stressed its recognition of People’s Republic of China (not Taiwan) as a legitimate Chinese government, and refrained from support-ing the struggle for Eastern Turkestan independence. Moreover, accord-ing to Chinese media, visiting China as the leader of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated on January 14, 2003, that “Xinjiang [is] an insepa-rable part of Chinese territory.”109 The same expression had been used by then Minister of Interior Abdülkadir Aksu during his meeting with the Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang in October 2003.110 This dis-course toward Eastern Turkestan has been frequently and extensively used


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since the establishment of People’s Republic of China.111 Asserting that “Eastern Turkestan [is] an inseparable part of Chinese territory” is percep-tion management against the 130-year-long independence struggle, and its aim is to facilitate the legitimacy of Chinese control of the region. China has used similar discourse for Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Taiwan and wants the international public to accept it. Many countries abstain from this definition; those who use it may actually say “a part of People’s Republic of China” in order to distance today’s claims from those of his-torical China. Whenever some negative developments regarding Uyghur human rights reach Turkey and cause public reaction, the Chinese side considers it to be a disregard of Turkey’s own promise.

CoNClusioN: aN uNeasy CooPeraTioN

This chapter has attempted to show the extent to which the Uyghur/Eastern Turkestan issue has had an impact on Turkey-China relations. The ongoing independence movement in Eastern Turkestan, at times leading to violence, has become the “soft underbelly” of China, especially given its strategic loca-tion. The Uyghur or Eastern Turkestan issue has not only paralleled China’s rise but has also become an international issue rather than a domestic one, following the events of September 11, 2001, and has created much interest in the world’s public opinion.

Eastern Turkestan is China’s door to the west; in this respect, it also serves as a bridge. Out of China’s fourteen neighbors, eight of them share borders with Eastern Turkestan; thus, the region holds an important geo-political position. At the same time, Eastern Turkestan secures China’s bor-der region. Socio-culturally, Eastern Turkestan can be seen as a part of Central Asia rather than China. Eastern Turkestan is the leading region in its energy reserves (petroleum, natural gas, and charcoal) when compared with other regions in China; it also serves as a transfer point for energy being transported from Central Asia via pipelines. In addition, with the Silk Road Economic Belt project, China’s strategy for the twenty-first century will link China to Europe with land and railway routes. The Urumqi Airport, serving as an international airport since the year 2006, is being prepared as the transit airport station between Western Europe and Eastern Asia.112 The Chinese government has been attempting to render Eastern Turkestan (Kashgar, Urumqi, and Korgaz) into a strategic hub of attraction. In this case, the region may also serve as an advanced base, offering strategic depth with regard to Central Asia and South Asia. Generally speaking, Eastern

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Turkestan’s natural resources, coupled with its strategic importance, affect China’s national security interests as well as its economic development. Eastern Turkestan is a vulnerable spot in China with its prospective impact on China’s future. It is also a sensitive point in Turkish-Chinese relations; any speech or act of Turkey with regard to the Uyghurs draws much interest from China, followed by objections raised via different channels. Despite Turkey’s reassurances, China is uneasy about Ankara’s possible use of the Uyghur issue as a strategic trump card. Yet, China has also prepared its bargaining chips against Turkey—the Kurdish and Armenian issues.113

As a still-developing country, Turkey needs much investment and tech-nology. China may provide Turkey what it needs on these two planes. China is the world’s biggest trade power (4.33 trillion dollars in 2014) and second-largest economic power (10.433 trillion dollars in 2014). China is expected to supersede the United States and become the world’s leading economic power in the near future. China also attracts Turkey with its large market and rich currency reserves (3.843 trillion dollars in 2014). China has also increased its military modernization capacity with its economic power.114 Although China’s military budget for the year 2014 was 129.4 billion dollars, equaling a fifth of the US military budget of 581 billion dollars, China still ranks second in the world. Turkey intends to cooperate with China with regards to missile trade to strengthen its defense and deterrent power. Another point of interest for Turkey is China’s permanent membership on the UN Security Council and China’s political power in the international realm. Perhaps Turkey-China coopera-tion topics are still few in number because their regional and international level interests differ widely, but Turkey will not be able to ignore this rising power, especially with the rise of the political and ideological power of China. Whether China will become a superpower or not is still a contro-versy. However, China has opened up to the rest of the world via eco-nomic cooperation rather than via the power/security notion that has been at the center of the Western-centric international relations. The Westerners had conquered the world and gained a lot of enmity, whereas China is using the economic lever to outreach other countries and attempt to make friends. However, recent criticisms indicate that China’s African and Latin American initiatives are a new form of mercantilism, colonial-ism, and economic imperialism.115

If Turkey is to benefit from this rising power, there is a need for a rec-onciliation and building of trust between the two countries when it comes to the Uyghur problem. China wants Turkey to limit the activity of


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Uyghur and Eastern Turkestan organizations in Turkey, prevent the arrival of Uyghur refugees, tighten visa control to avoid the entry of certain Uyghurs to Turkey, avoid the involvement of Uyghur students in political activities, facilitate the return of Uyghur students to China upon comple-tion of their education in Turkey, and cooperate in security issues, such as the signing of agreements against terrorism (i.e., extradition agreement) and intelligence sharing. Yet, it is hard for Turkey to act in full conformity with China’s wishes due to its political values, international law, and pos-sible backlash in global public opinion.

China intends to facilitate its interests through joint working groups at the level of the two countries’ foreign affairs ministries, the Turkish Ministry of Interior, and the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. The first meeting of this working group took place upon the signing of the “Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of Joint- Working Group Meeting between Turkey and People’s Republic of China” on June 25, 2009 in Beijing; the third meeting took place in April 2014 in Ankara. The second meeting of Turkish Ministry of Interior–Chinese Ministry of Public Security joint working group occurred in 2005, the third meeting took place in 2006, and the fifth was held in January 2015. Sometimes, the meetings were only attended by low-level bureaucrats, so efficacious results were not reached in relation to the Uyghur problem. China wants high-level bureaucrats to participate in these meetings so that the mechanism can work more efficiently as the Uyghur-Eastern Turkestan problem becomes more complex and the Silk Road project reaches matu-ration, paralleling the required increased levels of pragmatic cooperation between China and Turkey. However, China’s impatient efforts in this direction may arouse suspicions of meddling in Turkey’s internal affairs and cause controversy in the Turkish public opinion.

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13:27.30. “Çin’den Türkiye’ye Uygur ‘tehdidi’”, Aksam Gazetesi, 1 Aralık 2014.31. 邱永峥, <谁在帮东突祸乱新疆?美日土耳其纵容支持!>, 《环球时报》2013年07月04 日08:25:00

32. 邱永峥, <「东突」分子从叙交战区潜回新疆>, 《环球时报》2013年07月01 日08:18:00.

33. 邱永峥, <「东突」分子如何潜入IS: 土耳其涉嫌乱发假护照>, 《环球时报》2014年12月11 日09:15:00.

34. 邱永峥, <「东突」分子在IS地位低战死后直接填埋进垃圾坑>, 《环球时报》2014年12月17 日02:35:00.

35. Ümit Erdog an, “Uygur Türkleri Suriye’de Esed’e kars ı savas ıyor”, Anadolu Ajansı, 01 Aralık 2014 16:09.

36. 刘畅, <10名土耳其人组织新疆涉恐人员偷渡出境被批捕>, 《环球时报》2015年01月14 日01:17:00.

E. EKREM

http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20140313.OBS9730/crash-du-boeing-la-chine-hantee-par-le-probleme-ouigour.html

http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20140313.OBS9730/crash-du-boeing-la-chine-hantee-par-le-probleme-ouigour.html

http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/attentats-terroristes-a-paris/20151117.OBS9681/apres-les-attentats-la-solidarite-de-la-chine-n-est-pas-sans-arriere-pensees.html

http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/attentats-terroristes-a-paris/20151117.OBS9681/apres-les-attentats-la-solidarite-de-la-chine-n-est-pas-sans-arriere-pensees.html


http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2014-11/20/nw.D110000zgqnb_20141120_6-01.htm

http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2014-11/5208610.html

http://www.aa.com.tr/en/rss/426790--thailand-requested-to-send-detained-uighurs-to-turkey

http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/gundem/200-uyguru-resmen-istedik-2031332

http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/gundem/200-uyguru-resmen-istedik-2031332

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/427104--uygur-soydaslarimizla-ilgili-gelismeleri-yakindan-takip-ediyoruz

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/427104--uygur-soydaslarimizla-ilgili-gelismeleri-yakindan-takip-ediyoruz

http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/hayat/hem-suclu-hem-guclu-2033430


http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-should-look-after-uighur-turks-in-thailand-says-head-of-uighurs-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=75950&NewsCatID=356

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-should-look-after-uighur-turks-in-thailand-says-head-of-uighurs-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=75950&NewsCatID=356

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/28/us-china-turkey-thailand-idUSKCN0JC0X920141128

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/28/us-china-turkey-thailand-idUSKCN0JC0X920141128

http://news.takungpao.com/world/exclusive/2014-11/2841672.html

http://haber.stargazete.com/dunya/cinden-turkiyeye-kustah-uyari/haber-974240

http://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2014/12/01/cinden-turkiyeye-sok-uyari


http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/cinden_turkiye_uygur_uyarisi-1242240

http://www.aksam.com.tr/dunya/cinden-turkiyeye-uygur-tehdidi/haber-358963

http://mil.huanqiu.com/paper/2013-07/4091053.html

http://world.huanqiu.com/depth_report/2013-07/4077848_2.html

http://world.huanqiu.com/photo/2014-12/2755386.html

http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2014-12/5248553.html

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/428940--uygur-turkleri-suriyede-esede-karsi-savasiyor


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37. <2015年1月14日外交部发言人洪磊主持例行记者会>,《中華人民共和國外交部網站》, 2015年1月14日; <2015年1月15日外交部发言人洪磊主持例行记者会>, 《中華人民共和國外交部網站》, 2015年1月15日.

38. 刘子阳, <郭声琨会见土耳其警察总局局长穆罕默德>, 《法制日报》2015年01月27日第1版; 张洋, <孟建柱会见土耳其警察总局局长穆罕默德>, 《人民日报》2015年01月28日 03 版; 王治国, <孟建柱会见土耳其警察总局局长穆罕默德>, 《检察日报》2015年1月28日第01版.

39. “Uygur bölgesinde Müslümanlara yönelik uygulamalar kınandı”, Anadolu Ajansı, 03 Temmuz 2015 16:32.

40. “Uygur halkına Çin zulmü Fransa senatosunda”, IHA, 03 Temmuz 2015 18:37; “Uygur bölgesinde Müslümanlara yönelik uygulamalar kınandı”, Anadolu Ajansı, 03 Temmuz 2015 16:32; “Ramazan’da 28 Uygur öldürüldü”, Sabah Gazetesi, 04.07.2015 18:54; Ata Ufuk Seker, “Belçika’da Çin protestosu”, Anadolu Ajansı, 05 Temmuz 2015 17:36; “Uygur Türklerine yapılan siddet Lyon kentinde protesto edildi”, Hürriyet Gazetesi, 5 Temmuz 2015; Gülten Özbey, “Paris’te Uygur Türklerine destek eylemi”, Hürriyet Gazetesi, 5 Temmuz 2015; Bilgin Sas maz, “Çin New York’ta protesto edildi”, Anadolu Ajansı, 07 Temmuz 2015 07:21; “AB’den Uygur Türkleri tepkisi”, Anadolu Ajansı, 11 Temmuz 2015 01:44; Seyit Aydog an, “Kanada’daki Türkler Çin’i pro-testo etti”, Anadolu Ajansı, 13 Temmuz 2015 07:04;

41. Aylin Sırıklı, Mehmet Tosun ve Merve Yıldızalp, “Sınır güvenligini sag lamak asli görevdir”, Anadolu Ajansı, 30 Haziran 2015 13:49.

42. CS Thana-Max Constant, “Tayland 90 Uygur’u Çin’e iade etti”, Anadolu Ajansı, 09 July 2015 10:03.

43. TRT World, “Turkey Condemns Thailand’s Deportation of Uyghurs to China”, 10 July 2015.

44. Ron Corben, “Thailand’s Rights Body to Discuss Future Uyghur Policy”, VOA News, July 13, 2015 9:42 am.

45. <2015年7月9日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会>, 中华人民共和国外交部網頁, 2015年7月9日.

46. “Çin’den Uygurlara “cihad” suçlaması”, Cihan Haber Ajansı, 15 Temmuz 2015 13:05:32; Ben Blanchard, “Uyghurs ‘on way to jihad’ returned to China in hoods”, Reuters, July 12, 2015 4:36 am EDT.

47. <社评:中泰依法遣返偷渡者土美闭嘴为尊>, 《环球时报》2015年07月11日 01:10:00.

48. Ug ur Islamog lu ve Ibrahim Halil Çekici, “Istanbul’da Tayland Bas konsoloslug u taslandı”, Anadolu Ajansı, 09 Temmuz 2015 01:13.

49. Sinan Yiter, “Eylemleri tasvip etmiyoruz”, Anadolu Ajansı, 09 Temmuz 2015 19:02.


http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1228248.shtml



http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/549414--uygur-bolgesinde-muslumanlara-yonelik-uygulamalar-kinandi

http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-uygur-halkina-cin-zulmu-fransa-senatosunda-476309/

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/549414--uygur-bolgesinde-muslumanlara-yonelik-uygulamalar-kinandi

http://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2015/07/04/ramazanda-28-uygur-olduruldu

http://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2015/07/04/ramazanda-28-uygur-olduruldu

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/550339--belcikada-cin-protestosu

http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/avrupa/29463059.asp



http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/551191--cin-new-yorkda-protesto-edildi

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/554109--abdden-uygur-turkleri-aciklamasi

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/555031--kanadada-cini-protesto

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/555031--kanadada-cini-protesto

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/547091--sinir-guvenligini-saglamak-asli-gorevdir

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/547091--sinir-guvenligini-saglamak-asli-gorevdir

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/552825--tayland-90-uyguru-cine-iade-etti

http://www.voanews.com/content/thailand-rights-body-to-discuss-future-uighur-policy/2859519.html

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1280006.shtml

http://www.cihan.com.tr/tr/cinden-uygurlara-cihad-suclamasi-1817622.htm

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/12/us-china-xinjiang-idUSKCN0PM00W20150712

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/12/us-china-xinjiang-idUSKCN0PM00W20150712

http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2015-07/6971668.html

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/552758--istanbulda-tayland-baskonsoloslugu-taslandi

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/552758--istanbulda-tayland-baskonsoloslugu-taslandi

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/553365--disisleri-bakanligindan-saldirilara-kinama

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50. Özcan Yıldırım, Yıldız Nevin Gündog mus ve Durmus Koçak, “DEAS rejimin destekledig i bir terör örgütüdür”, Anadolu Ajansı, 09 Temmuz 2015 23:20.

51. Andaç Hongur, Sefa Mutlu, Fikriye Susam Uyar ve Ilkay Güder, “Illk görüs me pazartesi CHP ile yapılacak”, Anadolu Ajansı, 10 Temmuz 2015 11:36.

52. Cem S an ve Sergen Sezgin, “Iyi niyetli çabaları son ana kadar koruyacag ız”, Anadolu Ajansı, 09 Temmuz 2015 22:12.

53. Saadet Oruç, “Hedef Çin ziyaretini provoke etmek”, Star Gazetesi, 10 Temmuz 2015 23:28.

54. Özcan Yıldırım, Yıldız Nevin Gündog mus ve Durmus Koçak, “DEAS rejimin destekledig i bir terör örgütüdür”, Anadolu Ajansı, 09 Temmuz 2015 23:20.

55. “Diyanet Isleri Baskanı Görmez’den Dogu Türkistan’da uygulanan oruç yasag ına tepki”, Diyanet Isleri Baskanlıgı Web Sayfası, 5 Temmuz 2015; Zafer Fatih Beyaz, “Orucun yasaklanması kabul edilecek bir husus degil”, Anadolu Ajansı, 05 Temmuz 2015 10:57.

56. “Oruç ibadetinin yasaklanmasının izahı yok”, Anadolu Ajansı, 26 Temmuz 2015 Pazar 10:58.

57. Tulay Karadeniz, <Turkey says to keep doors open for Uyghur ‘brothers’, irking China>, Reuters, July 3, 2015 12:13 pm EDT.

58. 邹乐、郑金发, <土耳其反思国内「反华」事件>, 《国际先驱导报》2015年07月20日 15:07:47; 王晋, <土耳其极右翼分子缘何以暴力抗议抹黑中国?>, 《国际在线》2015年07月08日 11:27:24; 黄培昭, <土耳其想与中国保持微妙平衡对「东突」势力时有纵容>, 《环球时报》2015年07月08日07:12:00; 萧天飞, <土耳其右翼势力袭击中国游客我使馆发旅游警告>, 《环球时报》2015年07月06日07:54:00; 左璇, <土耳其总统埃尔多安低调访华背后>, 《财经》杂志, 2015年07月30日 18:22:13; 左璇, <土耳其总统埃尔多安为何此时访华>, 《财经》杂志, 2015年07月25日 17:13:39; 王京烈, <土耳其必须保证中国游客安全>,《环球时报》2015年07月06日02:35:00; 梁文, <土耳其总统埃尔多安访华的四大看点>,《多维新闻》2015年07月28日 22:27:16.

59. Humeyra Pamuk, “Turkish help for Uyghur refugees looms over Erdogan visit to Beijing”, Reuters, July 27, 2015 7:49 am EDT.

60. 吐尔文江•吐尔逊, <牵扯涉恐偷渡案有损土耳其形象>,《环球时报》2015年01月15日 08:36:00; 李大光, <「东突」势力蔓延正抹黑土耳其>, 《中国网》 2015年01月15日.

61. <社评:土耳其,请与涉恐偷渡者拉开距离>, 《环球时报》2015年04月29日 02:35:00.

62. Lucy Hornby and Piotr Zalewski, “China accuses Turkey of aiding Uyghurs”, The Financial Times, July 12, 2015 9:01 am.

E. EKREM

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/553431--deas-rejimin-destekledigi-bir-teror-orgutudur


http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/553591--ilk-gorusme-pazartesi-chp-ile

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/553591--ilk-gorusme-pazartesi-chp-ile

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/553417--iyi-niyetli-cabalari-son-ana-kadar-koruyacagiz

http://haber.star.com.tr/guncel/hedef-cin-ziyaretini-provoke-etmek/haber-1043033



http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr/icerik/diyanet-isleri-baskani-gormez’den-dogu-turkistan’da-uygulanan-oruc-yasagina-tepki…/26990

http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr/icerik/diyanet-isleri-baskani-gormez’den-dogu-turkistan’da-uygulanan-oruc-yasagina-tepki…/26990

http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/550110--orucun-yasaklanmasi-kabul-edilecek-bir-husus-degil

http://www.trtturk.com/haber/oruc-ibadetinin-yasaklanmasinin-izahi-yok-142681.html

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/03/us-china-turkey-uighur-idUSKCN0PD1UM20150703

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/03/us-china-turkey-uighur-idUSKCN0PD1UM20150703

http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2015-07/20/c_134428272.htm

http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2015/07/08/8211s5023372.htm




http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2015-07/6855566.html

http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2015-07/6855566.html

http://yuanchuang.caijing.com.cn/2015/0730/3937169.shtml

http://yuanchuang.caijing.com.cn/2015/0725/3933695.shtml


http://global.dwnews.com/news/2015-07-28/59670418.html


http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/27/us-turkey-china-uighurs-insight-idUSKCN0Q10PM20150727

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/27/us-turkey-china-uighurs-insight-idUSKCN0Q10PM20150727

http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2015-01/5409456.html

http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_85_119485.html

http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_85_119485.html


175

63. Meltem Uzun ve Sinan Polat, “60 Uygur’a Türkiye’nin kapısı açık”, Anadolu Ajansı, 15 Temmuz 2015 11:57; Satuk Bugra Kutlugun, “Turkey denies claim it is staffing Daesh with Uyghur”, Anadolu Agency, 15 July 2015 14:42.

64. Ibrahim Kalın, “DAES, PKK ve terörün yeni yüzleri”, Sabah Gazetesi, 25 Temmuz 2015.

65. 郭鹏飞, <超六成网民对土耳其持负面印象认为土为东突提供实质支持>, 《环球网》2015年07月08日 15:24:00.

66. 李琳, <土耳其发生多起反华游行暂未影响中国赴土游>,《国际在线》专稿, 2015年07月08日 13:15:56; 刘文俊, <赴土耳其出境游热度不减中土旅游合作前景广阔>, 《国际在线》专稿, 2015-07-16 15:00:12.

67. Sadi Kaymaz, “Çin ile ilis kilerimize stratejik açıdan bakıyoruz”, DHA, 29 Temmuz 2015 16:47.

68. “Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Demirtas fırsat bulsa abisinin yanına kosar”, Radikal Gazetesi, 30 Temmuz 2015 10:27.

69. Ihlas Haber Ajansı, “Erdogan: “Çin’le Ticaretimiz 22 Milyar Dolara Çıktı”, Ihlas Haber Ajansı, 30 Temmuz 2015.

70. 刘华, <习近平和埃尔多安共同出席中土经贸论坛>, 《新华网》2015年07月30日 16:43:14.

71. Verda Özer, “Erdogan Çin gezisi sırasında uçakta konustu”, Hürriyet Gazetesi, 31 Temmuz 2015; Yusuf Ziya Cömert, “Ne edep var ne hayâ”, Yeni S afak Gazetesi, 31 Temmuz 2015 04:00.

72. 张素, <国家安全报告: 去年中国境内恐怖活动再呈高发状态>, 《中国新闻网》2014年05月06日 16:58.

73. 成立新、隋云雁, <用铁的手腕打击暴力恐怖犯罪, 自治区部署全疆维稳工作, 张春贤要求:切实落实各项维稳工作措施确保全区社会大局稳定>,《天山网》2012年04月12日 14:11:09

74. 刘一, <暴恐「外溢」与新疆严打无关>, 《北京青年报》A10版, 2014年03月07日.

75. 戴岚、胡仁巴, <新疆一个月打掉三十二个暴恐团伙, 公开宣判三百一十五人六位民警殉职>, 《人民日报海外版》 2014年06月24日第 04 版; 潘从武, <新疆一个月打掉32个暴恐团伙, 抓获380余名犯罪嫌疑人公开宣判315人>, 《法制日报》, 2014年06月24日第1版.

76. 李亚楠, <新疆一年打掉暴恐团伙181个, 112名在逃人员投案自首>, 《人民日报海外版》 2015年05月25日第 04 版.

77. 郭金超、欧阳开宇, <周强:中国将依法严惩暴力恐怖犯罪>, 《中国新闻网》2015年03月12日09:50:17.

78. 桂田田, <新疆警察牺牲率是全国警察的5.4倍>, 《北京青年报》A06, 2015年03月11日.

79. 张振华, <论中华民族精神在新疆的培育与弘扬>, 《石河子大学学报:哲学社会科学版》 2009年第2期, 页1–5; 粟迎春, <新疆多民族地区构建中华民族共有精神家园的思考>,《新疆财经大学学报》 2010年第1期, 页


http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/s/556513--60-uygura-turkiyenin-kapisinin-acik

http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/556699--turkey-denies-claim-it-is-staffing-daesh-with-uighur

http://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/ibrahim__kalin/2015/07/25/daes-pkk-ve-terorun-yeni-yuzleri






http://www.dha.com.tr/cin-ile-iliskilerimize-stratejik-acidan-bakiyoruz_990414.html

http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/tayyip_erdogan_demirtas_abisinin_yanina_gidebilir-1406235

http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-07/30/c_1116093947.htm

http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/29690082.asp

http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/ne-edep-var-ne-haya-2209463

http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/05-06/6140215.shtml

http://news.ts.cn/content/2012-04/12/content_6740906.htm

http://news.ts.cn/content/2012-04/12/content_6740906.htm

http://epaper.ynet.com/html/2014-03/07/content_44528.htm?div=-1

http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2014-06/24/content_1444919.htm


http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20140624/Articel01011GN.htm

http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20140624/Articel01011GN.htm


http://www.chinanews.com/fz/2015/03-12/7122455.shtml

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100. Erkin Ekrem, “Gök Türklerden Türklere: Türk Kimlig inin Olusmasına Tarihsel Bir Bakıs”, Türkiyat Arastırmaları Dergisi (Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Arastırmaları Enstitüsü), 5 (Autumn 2006), 5–24.

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102. 余潇枫、徐黎丽, <突厥变迁史中的认同问题>, 《云南师范大学学报》第43 卷第5 期.

103. 潘志平, <论土耳其与泛突厥主义>,《史学集刊》第 4 期2004 年 10 月, 頁60–68.

104. 昝涛, <土耳其与「东突」的「不解之缘」>, 《民族社会学研究通讯》第53期 (2009年 7月10日), 页34–43.

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106. Regarding the migration of Uyghurs to Anatolia in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries, please see Kemal Göde, Sultan Alaeddin Eratna, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlıg ı Yayınları 1990; Kemal Göde, Eratnalılar (1327–1381), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994.

107. “Yasada ‘darbeciler’ diye bir tanım yok”, Yeni Safak Gazetesi, 09 Temmuz 2009.

108. “Çag layan: Urumçi’de alınan tedbirleri olumlu kars ılıyoruz”, Zaman Gazetesi, 2 Eylül 2009, 09:15.

109. 李文云, <朱镕基会见土耳其客人>, 《人民日报海外版》 2003年01月15日第1版.

110. 吕传忠, <周永康: 希望中土加强打击恐怖活动等领域的合作>, 《新华网》2003年10月22日19:54:41.

111. 张东月, <关于新疆历史的几个问题>,《民族研究》1959 年第6 期, 页16–21.

112. 黃玉洤, 《中國大陸的邊疆與安全: 從陸權邁向海權的戰略選擇》, 台北: 秀威資訊科技股份有限公司 2013:156. 许正中, <区域经济新趋势与优势重塑>, 《人民论坛》2011年第3期, 2011年01月21日; <新疆: 构建丝路经济带金融中心>《人民日报海外版》 2014年11月28日第 05 版; 乔文汇, <新疆打造丝路经济带金融中心>, 《经济日报》, 2014年12月2日第07版; <喀什、霍尔果斯—两个国家级开发区>,《光明日报》2012年09月03日 11 版.

113. Erkin Ekrem, “Urumçi Olayı: Çin Medyasında Türkiye Karsıtı Yorumlar”, Türkiye Günlügü, Sayı 98 (Yaz 2009), s. 41–51; <土耳其支持疆獨中國應挺庫爾德>, 香港《東方日報》2009年7月14日; Erkin Ekrem, “Çin, Kürtlerin Bag ımsızlıgına Nasıl Bakıyor?”, The web-site of Stratejik Düs ünce Enstitüsü, 08 Eylül 2014; 霍娜, <中共引库尔德解困新疆土总统访华求放过>, 《多维新闻》2015年07月29日 22:55:18; Hasan Kanbolat, “The Uyghur factor in Turkish-Chinese relations: What should we do?”, Today’s Zaman, July 16, 2015.

114. 黃獻忠、王健民, <中國大陸藉經濟發展軍事事務革新之意涵>,《空軍學術雙月刊》第648期2015年10月, 頁4–17.

115. 张顺洪、孟庆龙、毕健康, <国内外学者对新殖民主义的认识与研究>, 《史学理论研究》1998年04期, 页123–133; 張登及, <中共大國外交的後殖民隨想>,《中國大陸研究教學通訊》(台大政治系陸委會), 2002年1月, 頁11–12; 李安山, <论「中国崛起」语境中的中非关系—兼评国外的三种观点>,《世界经济与政治》2006年第11期, 页7–14; 游智偉、張登及, <中國的非洲政策: 軟實力與朝貢體系的分析>, 《遠景基金會季刊》第12卷第4期 (2011年10月), 頁111–156; 鄧中堅, 新世紀中國大陸與非洲關係展望: 新殖民主義與新自由主義之爭《全球政治評論》第47期(2014)頁 35–58; 鄧中堅, <中國對拉丁美洲的資源外交: 新殖民主義與南南合作之爭辯>, 《遠景基金會季刊》第16卷第3期 (2015年7月), 頁131–180.

E. EKREM

http://www.yenisafak.com/politika/yasada-darbeciler-diye-bir-tanim-yok-197463

http://www.zaman.com.tr/ekonomi_caglayan-urumcide-alinan-tedbirleri-olumlu-karsiliyoruz_887548.html

http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper39/8253/778032.html

http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-10/22/content_1137407.htm

http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2011-01/21/content_734303.htm

http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2011-01/21/content_734303.htm



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179© The Author(s) 2018G. Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun, K. Ercilasun (eds.), The Uyghur Community, Politics and History in Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52297-9

Index

AAbbasof, Abdukerim (1921–1949),

42–44, 46, 49, 56n50, 57n54Abdusematov, Nazarkhoja

(1887–1951), 109Abulkhair Khan, 8Abylai Khan, 17Afghanistan, 9, 12, 72, 73, 127,

135n15Akhun, Tash, 31Aksu, 3, 32, 60, 110, 167Akto County, 72Alash Orda, 34Alatau Pass, 114Alcoholism, 64Almaty, 18, 37, 45, 93, 106–109,

112–114Alptekin, Erkin, 94, 95, 135n13Alptekin, Isa Yusuf, 46–48, 57n60,

57n65, 58n69, 91–95, 98, 100n24, 101n25, 101n26, 123–125, 135n11, 166

Altai, see AltayAltay, 44, 56n47, 60, 63, 64, 106Altishahr, 2, 55n23, 109, 114–117Altisheher, see AltishahrAltyshar, see AltishahrAncient Turks, 5, 6, 11

See also Gök TürkAndijan, 37Andijanese, 24Ang, 30Ankara, 86, 93, 101n39, 102n52,

102n54, 125, 131, 132, 134, 142, 143, 149n25, 169, 170

apparel, 19Aqartish Herikiti, 29Arabs, 6, 93, 159, 167Artishi, Seley Haji (1926–2010),

54n19Artush, 30, 31Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,

162Atbeygi square, 138

1

1 Note: Page number followed by ‘n’ refers to notes.

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52297-9

180 INDEX

atheism, 59Azatlık Street, 138, 139Azat Sherqiy Türkistan (Free East

Turkistan) (newspaper), 45

BBachu, see MaralbeshiBaihua Bao, 30Bakhchisaray, 29Bakhtiya, Ilya, 107, 119n8Baku, 37, 163Balkhash, 111Barchuk Art Tigin, 7Baren, 72, 76Barın, see BarenBarköl, 2Bashiri, Zarif, 108Bashkurt, 35Basmachi, 35Bay, Bawudun (1851–1928), 29Beijing, 8, 11, 50, 55n36, 58n71,

58n75, 74, 81n28, 82n30, 83n45, 84n59, 93, 108, 117, 121, 140, 144, 157–159, 163, 170, 171n12

See also PekingBekri, Nur, 138, 139Belgium, 94Beshbalyk, 7Birinchi Chamdam (First Step), 37Bolshevik

Bolshevik party, 35Bolshevik revolution, 33, 52

Bolshevik party, 35Boza, 22Britain, 9, 42, 48British, 23, 31, 77, 110Buddhism, 59Buddhist culture, 7Bughra, Muhammed Emin, see Bugra,

Mehmet Emin (1901–1965)

Bug ra, Mehmet Emin (1901–1965), 15n51, 28, 41, 46–48, 53n3, 54n16, 56n44, 57n62, 57n63, 57n65, 57n67, 58n69, 91–93, 98, 100n24, 166

Bukhara, 9, 23Bumin, 5Buruts, 24

CCan, Asgar, 94Can, Enver, 94Caravans, 3, 18, 116Censuses, 59, 62, 67, 68Central Asia, 19, 20, 23, 28, 29,

31–40, 45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 57n58, 71, 73, 77, 86, 91, 105–120, 122, 124, 128, 133, 162, 165, 168

See also TurkistanCentral Eurasia, 27, 28Chagatay, 7, 8Chang Kai-shek (1887–1975), 47, 48Chanyu, Modun, 3–5Chen Deming, 155Cherchen, 3China, 1, 12n1, 19, 27, 59, 93, 106,

121, 137, 153Chinese

Chinese authorities, 3, 74, 77, 79, 122, 137, 143, 146–148, 157, 160, 161

Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 56n50, 59–61, 66, 68, 72–74, 91, 158

Chinese government, 11, 41, 49, 62, 76–78, 92, 94, 127, 130, 133, 137–141, 146, 147, 153, 159, 161, 166–168

Chinese Islamic Association, 61, 75

181 INDEX

Chinese media, 74, 75, 147, 153, 155–157, 159, 161, 167

Chinese National Congress, 163Chinggis, Khan, 6, 7Chinggisids, 7, 11Chinggizxan, Abliz (1906–1952), 46Choqayev, Mustafa (1890–1941), 46,

47Christianity, 59Chuguchak, 19Clothing, 19, 25, 66Cold War, 43, 48, 93, 94, 123, 128,

154Communist party, 37, 39, 45, 48, 109,

138, 139, 142, 149n19, 163Confucius, 166Constructivism, 85, 87–89Crimea, 29Crimean Tatars, 29Cultural relations, 17–26Cultural Revolution, 61, 68

DDabaza, 137Daghurs, 42, 49Daomalla, Abdurehim, 75Deng Xiaoping, 61Dernek, 30Dihua, 107Dogu Türkistan

Dogu Türkistan Göçmenler Derneg i (The Association of Eastern Turkistan Emigrés), 92

Dogu Türkistan Kültür ve Dayanıs ma Dernegi (Eastern Turkistan Cultural and Solidarity Association), 93

Dogu Türkistan Maarif ve Dayanıs ma Dernegi (The Eastern Turkestan Education and Solidarity Association), 95

Dogu Türkistan Ög renci Birlig i (The Eastern Turkestan Students Union), 93

Dogu Türkistan Vakfi (The Eastern Turkistan Foundation), 92

Dogu Türkistan’ın Sesi (Voice of Eastern Turkestan) (journal), 92

Döng köwrük, 138Dughlats, 7, 8Dungan(s), 10, 108, 109, 111,

119n12. See also HuiDzungaria, see Zungharia

EEastern Turkestan, see Eastern

TurkistanEastern Turkestani, see Eastern

TurkistaniEastern Turkistan, 1

Eastern Turkestan National Center, 93, 125, 129

Eastern Turkestan problem, 155, 158, 162, 164–166, 170

Eastern Turkestan Republic (see Eastern Turkistan Republic)

Eastern Turkestan Union, the, 94, 98, 101n34, 101n36, 101n38, 103n55

Eastern Turkistan, 78Eastern Turkistan Republic, 10, 11,

46, 51East Turkestan (see Eastern Turkistan)East Turkestan Government-in-

Exile, 129East Turkestan Information Center,

129East Turkestan National Congress,

95, 129East Turkistan Islamic Movement

(ETIM), 72, 73, 76, 156, 162See also Xinjiang

182 INDEX

East Turkestan, 55n38, 57n58, 106, 108, 122, 125, 130, 134, 146, 150n40

See also Eastern TurkistanEast Turkestani, see Eastern TurkistaniEast Turkistan, see Eastern TurkistanEast Turkistani, see Eastern TurkistaniEbinuur, 2Ependi (teacher), 29Erk (Freedom), 47Ersoy, Ali Murat, 158Esenli, Murat Salim, 155Esen Taishi, 8Europe, 35, 86, 91, 93, 94, 96, 98,

101n28, 101n33, 101n34, 101n38, 102n44, 102n49, 103n55, 106, 122, 143, 154, 159, 162, 165, 168

European Parliament, 98, 121, 129, 131, 136n22

European Union, 122, 144Expedition, 18Ezizi, Seypidin (1915–2003), 39, 46,

49, 53n5, 53n6, 53n8, 54n10, 55n36

FFalun Gong, 131Fergana, 4, 40Ferghana, see FerganaFood and beverage, 21–22France, 66, 86, 143

GGangzi, 137Gansu, 8Gasprinskiy, Ismail (1851–1914), 29, 46Germany, 29, 30, 86, 94, 96–98,

101n32, 101n34, 101n36, 101n38, 102n47, 102n48, 103n55, 129, 136n22, 142

Ghulja, see GuljiaGök Türk, 167

See also Ancient TurksGreat Britain, 9, 42, 48Great Game, 4, 28Great Horde, 111Great Khan, 7Great Western Development Strategy,

68Guangdong, 137, 139–141Gulja, 11, 18, 19, 23, 24, 63, 72Guo Shengkun, 159

HHaji, Rehimjan Sabir (1906–1973),

46Halal, 70Hami, see KumulHan

Han Chinese, 4, 5, 19, 24, 40, 43, 53n2, 54n17, 82n32, 113, 137, 139–141, 148

Han dynasty, 4, 5, 13n16Han immigrants, 68, 69Han influence, 65, 69Han proportion, 68, 69

Hanafiya, Muhammed, 17Hemrayev, Mömin (1907–1955),

40Hepthalites, 5Hesenov, Turdi (1909–1937), 40Hong Yingqi power plant, 138Hotan, 3, 60, 63, 64, 145, 146Hoten, see HotanHua Chunying, 157Hui, 62, 69, 71, 74, 106, 108

See also Dungan(s)Hujie, 4Human immunodefiiciency virus

(HIV)/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), 65, 79

183 INDEX

Hunkars, 24Hüseyniye, 30, 31, 53n8, 54n10Hussein (Huseyin) Bay (1844–1926),

29, 30

IIdentification, 24–25Idkah Mosque, 63, 75Iksak village, 30Ili, 2, 7, 11, 30, 36–38, 43, 44, 46,

48, 50, 106, 109–111, 116See also Gulja

Ili Wilayitining Geziti, 30India, 12, 29, 30, 42, 73, 124, 165Indian, 23, 31Inner Mongolia, 168Inqilapchil Sherq, 37Interactions, 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 88,

112, 113Intermarriages, 70, 71Iskendirov, Hezim (1906–1970),

40Islamic clergy, 61Islamic Republic of East Turkistan, 32,

41Islamic rituals, 61Islamic State, 76, 78, 84n61, 158Israhilov, Nur (1910–1938), 38,

40Issyk Köl, see YsykkölIstanbul, 29–31, 33, 56n47,

57n60, 57n63, 86, 93, 95, 100n24, 101n25, 101n39, 101n40, 101n41, 102n42, 102n47, 102n54, 114, 142, 143, 160

Ittihad-ı Osmanî Cemiyeti, 30Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (The

Committee of Union and Progress), 30, 31

Ittipak Street, 138Ittipaq (The Union), 45

JJadidism, 10, 29–35, 52Jadidist movements, 29Jadids, 10, 29, 31Jangshi, 7Jesuits, 131Jiang Zemin, 72Jin Shuren (1879–1941), 32, 41, 42,

54n17

KKadeer, Rebiya, see Kadir, RabiaKadir, Rabia, 74, 77, 95, 97–99, 134,

138–142, 145Kaidu, 7Kamal, Ahmet (1889–1966), 30, 31,

57n58Kanat, Ömer, 84n66, 84n67, 94Karakhanids, 6, 7, 11, 63Kara Khitay, 7, 11Karakol, 37Karakorum Mountains, 2Karluks, 6Kashgar, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, 18, 22, 23,

30–33, 36–39, 47, 60, 63, 64, 66, 72, 75, 109, 116, 117, 120n15, 123, 139, 146, 157, 168

Kashgar-Artush, 33Kashgar Emirate, 109Kashgaria, 2, 36–39Kashgarians, 19, 36Kashgarliq, 36Kashmir, 116Kazak, 10, 17, 19, 23–25, 35, 36, 39,

41–43, 45–47, 49, 52, 62, 63, 65, 69, 71, 78, 91, 92, 107, 109–114, 164

Kazakh, see KazakKazakhstan, 35, 38, 48, 72, 106–108,

111–114, 118Kazakhstani, 113

184 INDEX

Kazan, 29, 31, 35, 37, 52Kazihan Mosque, 75kegänlär, 106Kembegheller Awazi (Voice of the

Poor), 37Keriya, 3khakimbeks, 19Khojas, 8, 9, 116, 117Khojayev, Feyzulla (1896–1938),

47Khokand, 9, 23

Khokand autonomy, 47Khomentovsky, 18Khorgos, 114Khotan, see HotanKhoten, see HotanKhoten Hökümiti (Hotan

government), 41Kirgiz, see Kyrgyzkitailik, 106Kitans, 7Kobdo, 111Kokand, see KhokandKorean War, 125Korla, 127Kornilov, L. (1870–1918), 36,

55n29Kroran, see LoulanKubilay, 7Kucha, 31, 60Kuchluk, 7Kulja, see GuljaKumul, 2Kunlun Mountains, 2Kun-ming, 163Kuomintang, 40, 43–46, 48, 49Küresh (The Struggle), 45Kurultai (meeting), 93, 94Kushan Empire (Kushans), 5Kusmuryn, 17Kyrgyz, 17, 23–25, 34–36, 41, 42, 46,

49, 108Kyrgyzstan, 2, 35, 72, 93

LLagman, 22Language(s), 19, 23–25, 31, 34, 37,

39, 44, 46, 49, 52, 60, 69, 71, 95, 107, 155, 164

Lattimore, Owen, 1, 2Li Peng, 166Li Zhi, 139, 142Lobnor, 2, 3Longchuan, 138Loulan, 3, 4

Loulan Beauty, 3Lukqun, 147–148

MMaaripchi, 29Malaysia, 157Manas, 2, 18Manchuria, 115, 124Manchus, 8, 9, 74, 115–117Mao Zedong (1893–1976), 50, 61Maralbeshi, 146Maritime Silk Road, 165Mawarannahr, 7, 12Mekhsum, Abdurewup (1914–2004),

49, 58n74Meng Jianzhu, 142, 156Mensheviks, 108Meripetchi, 29Mesud Sabri (1886–1952), 30, 31,

46–48, 58n69Metbei Xurshid, 30Middle Horde, 17Mongolians, 24, 60Mongols, 8, 24, 42, 49, 107, 110, 115Moscow, 37, 38, 45, 48, 124, 127,

134n7Mosques, number of, 62, 80n9Muhemmedi, Abdulhey (1901–1937),

38, 40Muhiti, Mahmut (1887–1945), 33,

40

185 INDEX

Muhiti, Mekhsut (1885–1933), 31Muhlisi, Yusufbek, 126Mummies, 1, 3, 12n4Munich, 77, 93–95, 101n32, 101n34,

101n36, 101n38, 102n47, 102n48, 103n55, 129, 135n13

Musabayev brothers, 29Muslim revivalism, 62

NNanjiang (Southern Frontier), 2Nanjing, 53n2Nan-lu (Little Bukhara), 18Nanmen, 138, 139National Center for the Liberation of

East Turkestan, 125Nationalist China, 47, 48, 125Netherlands, the, 86, 94, 97, 102n47,

102n49, 102n50NKVD, 40Non-state actor, 85, 87–91Norway, 94Nurbagh, 145

OOirats, 8, 110One belt, one road (OBOR), 165Open Door Policy, 94Orenburg, 52Orkhon, 11, 12Ottoman, 10, 16n57, 24, 29–31, 63,

166

PPakhta, Gholamidin (1930-?), 56n43Paleolithic era, 3Pan Zhiping, 133, 136n25Paxton, John Hall, 123, 124Peking, 116, 125, 135n15

See also Beijing

People’s Republic of China, 1, 11Persia, 29physical appearance, 19–22Pope, Hugh, 77, 84n65Population policy, 67Prostitution, 64, 65Provisional Government, 108

QQarakhanid, see KarakhanidQari, Munewer (1880–1933), 46Qasimi, Ehmetjan (1914–1949),

42–46, 49, 56n48, 56n52, 56n53

Qasimov, Burhan, 40Qazaq Eli (Kazak Land), 45Qembiri, Qasimjan (1910–1955),

49Qianlong, 110, 115–117, 120n24Qing, 8–11, 16n52, 30, 53n2, 110,

111, 115–117, 118n2, 131Qitai, 127Qoday, Qurban (1920–1952), 46Qumul, see KumulQutulush (Liberation), 37

RRed Army, 39, 45Red imams, 63Renmenlu, 138Revolutionary Uyghurs (organization),

36Rouran Kaghanate, 5Russia, 9, 10, 12n2, 17, 19, 23, 29,

30, 34, 36–38, 46, 55n38, 72, 144, 149n28, 165

Russian, 29Russian dominance, 28Russian Empire, 18, 19, 34, 35, 52,

111Rysqulov, Turar (1894–1938), 46

186 INDEX

SSadayi Taranchi (Voice of Taranchi),

37Sairam, 2Saljuks, 7Samarkand, 37samsa, 22Sansihangze (Sansihangzi), 138Sarts, 34Satuq Bughra Khan, 63Satuk Bugra Han Ilim Medeniyet Vakfı

(Satuk Bugra Khan Science and Education Foundation), 95, 101n41, 102n42

Saudi Arabia, 122Secularism, 59Security Council, 128Semirechye, see ZhetysuSerikbuya, 146, 147Shanghai, 72, 77Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

(SCO), 72, 73Shaoguan city, 141Sheng Shicai (1895–1970), 32, 33,

36, 40, 42, 45, 46Sherq Heqiqiti (The Truth of Orient),

39, 45Sherqiy Türkistan Milli Inqilabi, 41Shewqi, Qutluq (1876–1937), 30, 33Shibanid, 8Shi’ite, 69Shipton, Eric Earle, 123Shura, 54n22, 55n23, 109Shurai Islam, 34Silk Road, 2, 3, 150n36, 154, 162,

165, 168, 170Silk Road Economic Belt, 162, 165,

168Sinkiang, see XinjiangSino-Muslim, 82n31Sino-Soviet conflict, 124, 127Sino-US relations, 127

Socialist Revolutionaries, 108Soviet

Soviet communism, 123Soviet Red Army, 39, 40Soviet Russia, 10, 11, 35, 38, 52,

113Soviet Union, 10, 36, 38–40, 43,

45, 46, 48, 49, 52, 56n43, 56n49, 93, 111, 114, 118, 123–126, 135n15

Stalin (1878–1953), 39, 45Strike-hard policy, 147Sufi orders, 61, 63, 80n6Sufism, 63Sultan Said Khan, 8Sunni, 69Sweden, 94, 143Swiss, 23

TTabgach, 13n16Tahir, Jume, 75Tahirov, Ismayil (1900–1938), 38, 40Taipov, Zunun, 124, 135n14Taiwan, 15n47, 167, 168Tajikistan, 35, 72Tajiks, 42, 62, 69Taklamakan desert, 2, 117Talas, 6Tang dynasty, 5, 6Taranchi

Taranchi Türkliri (Taranchi Turks), 36

Taranchi-Tunggan Committee, 34Taranchy, see TaranchiTaraqqiparvarlar, 29Tarbagatay, 106, 110Tarim

Tarim basin, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 36Tarim region, 7Tarim river, 2, 3

187 INDEX

Tarim, Erkin, 141Tarmashirin, 7Tashkent, 36–39, 45, 46, 55n29,

56n41, 57n60, 107Tashkent congress, 36

Tatar, 23, 24, 29–32, 35, 46, 47, 49, 52, 55n23, 62, 109, 164

Temür, 7, 8Terjüma n, 29Tewpiq, Memtili (1901–1937), 33,

54n19Thailand, 77, 78, 156, 157, 160, 161,

173n43Tian Shan (Tengri Taghliri), 2, 8,

114Tibet, 6, 8, 15n49, 61, 115, 124,

134n5, 140, 168Tibetans, 2, 81n27, 132Tihwa, 123Timurid Empire, 8Togan, Zeki Velidi (1890–1970),

14n36, 15n44Töre, Elikhan (1885–1976), 42, 45,

48, 49Torghuts, 110Trade, 3, 18, 19, 23, 37, 38, 45,

53n6, 73, 107, 110, 111, 114, 154, 162, 169

Transoxiana, see MawarannahrTreaty of Kulja, 110Trip, 18, 23, 65, 114, 119n9Tsarist Russia, 17, 19, 33, 120n15Tungan(s), see Dungan(s), HuiTuran, 30Turgesh Kaghanate, 6Turkestan, see TurkistanTurkey, 29–31, 46, 48, 52, 54n19, 78,

86, 91–95, 97, 98, 101n39, 101n40, 101n41, 102n42, 102n47, 102n52, 102n54, 114, 122, 124–126, 131, 132, 142–144, 153–170

Turki, 36, 124Turkic, 23–25, 28, 29, 34–36, 38, 40,

42, 46–48, 50, 52, 63, 69, 77, 92, 94, 97, 109–112, 114–116, 118, 119n6, 134n9, 164, 167

Turkic language, 35Turkish, 29, 31, 34, 47, 92, 94, 97,

114, 142–144, 149n23, 153–165, 167, 170

Turkistan, 8, 34, 46–49, 52Turkistan (journal), 92Türkistan’ın Sesi (Voice of Turkestan),

92Turkmenistan, 35Turks, 5, 6, 11, 14n26, 19, 22, 24,

34, 35, 46, 109, 142–145, 155, 159, 166, 167

Turpan, 2, 6, 7, 9, 11, 31, 36, 38, 60, 71, 75, 109, 110, 147

Tursun Ependi (1886–1937), 30, 33

UUfa, 35United Nations (UN), 98, 123, 128,

129, 142, 143, 156, 157, 169Ürümqi, 60, 63, 66, 69–72, 74, 77,

80n9Urungu, 2Uyghur

Uyghur activist groups, 77Uyghur American Association

(UAA), 95, 96, 102n43, 146Uyghur appeals, 125Uyghur Balisi, 109Uyghur businessmen, 29Uyghur children, 66, 95, 164Uyghur commonality, 109Uyghur communities, 37, 85, 111,

112, 118n1, 120n21, 132Uyghur culture, 28, 69, 92, 96,

109, 114, 115

188 INDEX

Uyghur (cont.)Uyghur diaspora, 1, 3, 40, 74, 76,

77, 85–99, 108–111, 121–136, 144

Uyghur Empire, 110Uyghur ethnic identity, 27, 45, 52,

78Uyghur historians, 45, 54n22, 106,

110Uyghur history, 107, 115Uyghur homeland, 27Uyghur Human Rights Project

(UHRP), 96, 102n44Uyghur identity, 92, 94, 98, 105,

106, 113–115, 176n91Uyghur immigrants, 158, 161Uyghur Islam, 59, 60, 64, 74, 78,

79Uyghur issue, 96–99, 119n5,

129–131, 162, 163, 169Uyghur Jadidism, 29, 52Uyghur Kaghanate, 6Uyghur leaders, 7, 39, 122, 126,

131, 133, 150n35Uyghur migrations, 14n25, 91, 98,

106, 110, 129, 167Uyghur minority, 122, 124Uyghur Nationalism, 27–53Uyghur nationality, 123, 127Uyghur population, 59Uyghur refugees, 124, 125, 132,

170Uyghur society, 32, 59, 64, 65Uyghur students, 39, 72, 93, 95,

170Uyghur Union of Cultural

Enlightenment, 32Uyghur women, 22, 96, 102n44Uyghur workers, 137, 139, 140,

142Uyghur youths, 37, 47, 50, 93,

138, 140, 141

Uyghur, Abduxaliq (1900–1933), 38Uyghuristan, 38–41, 50, 54n19Uygur, see UyghurUzbekistan, 35, 38, 39, 72Uzbeks, 35, 36, 39, 40, 46–49, 52,

62, 69, 164Uz Temür, 8

VValikhanov, Chokan (Walikhanov,

Shoqan) (1835–1865), 17, 120n15

Vaqit (newspaper), 52Veselovsky, N. I., 18, 26n1, 26n2,

26n3Volga Tatars, 29Volga-Ural, 29, 33, 34

WWakhan, 127Wali Khan, 17Wang Lequan, 73, 74, 77, 142,

149n19Warisi, Abduqadir (1882–1924), 32Wätändin, 106Wei dynasty, 5, 13n16Wen Jiabao, 154, 155Western Regions, 4–6, 10, 12n1,

16n52, 18, 19, 25Western Turkic Khaganate, 167Western Turkistan, 23West Turkistan, see Western TurkistanWorld Uyghur Congress (WUC), 74,

77, 95, 96, 98, 99, 101n32, 102n48, 103n55, 121, 129, 134, 138–141, 145, 147, 150n32, 150n34

World Uyghur Youth Congress, 93, 95

Wusun, 4

189 INDEX

XXianbei, 11Xibes, 60Xi Jinping, 74, 155, 156, 162, 163Xinhai Revolution, 53n2Xinhua Nanlu, 137, 138Xinjiang, 12n1. See also Eastern

TurkistanXinjiang Production and

Construction Corps, 68Xinjiang question, 129Xinjiang University, 138Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous

Region (XUAR), 1, 11, 60, 61, 63, 64, 70, 73, 74, 137, 138, 142, 144, 149n19

Xiongnu, 4, 5, 11

YYakup Bek (1820–1877), 9, 11,

15n50, 34Yan’an Lu, 114Yang Zengxin (1864–1928),

16n53, 28, 31, 32, 34, 38, 42, 53n2, 54n11, 54n17, 54n20

Yang Zuanxu (1873–1956), 30Yangtse, 13n16Yarkand, see Yarkent

Yarkent, 3, 5, 8, 11, 15n42Yärlik, 106Yash Uyghur (Young Uyghur), 37Yettishahr, 115Yettisu, see JetisuYining, 63, 70, 72, 107, 113, 115Young Bukharans, 34Young Turk, 29, 31Ysykköl, 17, 18Yuan Dahua (1851–1935), 53n2Yuan (dynasty), 142Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), 53n2Yuezhi, 4Yunusov, Husainbek, 108Yusuf, Zahideen, 72Yutian, 60

ZZarya Vostoka, 107, 113, 119n12Zaynamov, Muhammadimin, 108Zhang Chunxian, 74, 163Zhang Qian, 4Zhang Zhizhong (1895–1969), 46,

57n61Zhetysu, see JetisuZhou Qiang, 163Ziyaliylar, 29Zungharia, 2, 3Zunghars, 8, 9, 11

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