the US and NATO, an alliance of purpose

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDAU.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS

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J U N E 2 0 0 4

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U.S. & NATOTHE

U.S. & NATOAN ALLIANCEOF PURPOSE

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE JUNE 2004

When President George W. Bush welcomed NATO’s newest members at the accessionceremony at the White House on March 29, 2004, he noted that unity and commitment to freedom had carried the Alliance to victory in the Cold War and would do so again

in the war against terror.

“Today, our Alliance faces a new enemy, which has brought death to innocent people from New Yorkto Madrid. Terrorists hate everything this Alliance stands for. They despise our freedom, they fearour unity, they seek to divide us. They will fail. We will not be divided,” he said. “Together, Europeand America can lead peaceful nations against the dangers of our time. Europe and America canadvance freedom, and give hope and support to those who seek to lift the yoke of isolation and fearand oppression. That is the mission that history has set for NATO — this great and confidentalliance of 26 nations — and we proudly accept this mission.”

The NATO Alliance is today, as it has been since its founding 55 years ago, a unique and invaluableorganization. It is, as NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said, “a place whereNorth America and Europe come together to discuss the most serious political issues on our agenda.It is where the countries that share most profoundly our common values agree on common action.And it is the platform for the most effective militaries in the world to defend our security, our values,and our interests, wherever required, together.”

When the 26 members of the Transatlantic Alliance meet June 28-29 in Istanbul, they will continuethe transformational dialogue begun two years before in Prague and seek profound cooperation tomeet the security challenges of this age.

This issue of U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda examines the newly expanded NATO Alliance through arange of perspectives in articles, commentary, and references from national security experts withinthe administration, the Congress, and the public research and academic sectors.

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THE U.S. AND NATO: AN ALLIANCE OF PURPOSE

(State Department photo — Janine Sides)

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eJOURNAL USAU.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE • JUNE 2004 • VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 2http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm

C O N T E N T S

THE U.S. AND NATO: AN ALLIANCE OF PURPOSE

NATO Remains Our Essential Alliance 5

By R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationFor the summit in Istanbul and beyond, the United States envisions setting five ambitious goals to enable NATO to deal effectively with 21st century challenges.

The U.S. and NATO: A Partnership in Action 8

By A. Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for European AffairsPredictions of NATO’s irrelevance and subsequent demise have repeatedly been proven wrong.

NATO: An Alliance Transforming 10

By Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO AffairsCollective defense remains the fundamental purpose of NATO, but the missions that flow fromthis responsibility have changed dramatically from those planned for during the Cold War.

The New Politics of Transatlantic Defense Cooperation 13

By Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationIn today’s fluid strategic environment, NATO will be an anchor of stability.

NATO’s Role in Bringing Security to the Greater Middle East 16

By Chuck Hagel, U. S. Senator and Republican Member of the Committee on Foreign RelationsTurkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Mediterranean, and Israel-Palestine are five areas in which NATO has the potential to use its experience to good effect.

The Istanbul Summit: Stepping Up to the Challenge 20

By Joseph R. Biden, U.S. Senator and Ranking Democrat on the Committee on Foreign Relations It is time for NATO members to put the debate of Iraq behind them and focus on the joint need to successfully stabilize that country for the security of all.

A Defining Moment in Purpose and Commitment 23

By Dr. Simon Serfaty, Center for Strategic and International StudiesThe United States and its transatlantic partners must acknowledge their mutual dependence to successfully achieve and maintain security and stability and replace adversarial competiveness with the balance of complementarity.

Partnership for Peace: Charting A Course for A New Era 28

By Dr. Jeffrey Simon, Institute for National Strategic StudiesNATO’s highly successful partnership program must be transformed, adapted to other regions, and better resourced to address new security challenges.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE JUNE 2004 • VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 2

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Editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr.

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Western Security Efforts and the Greater Middle East 34

By Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International StudiesBringing security to the Greater Middle East will require, among other things, a commitment to deal with the root causes of instability, violence, and terrorism.

Proposals for Renewing the Atlantic Partnership 41

By Dr. Charles A. Kupchan, Council on Foreign RelationsEurope and the United States must remember the lessons of the past and focus on five tasks to strengthen the Alliance.

Additional Readings 46

Spotlighting other views

Key Internet Sites 47

Internet Links to resources on related issues

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Originally created to shield Western Europefrom Soviet communist aggression, themodern-day NATO has adapted to 21st

century threats, transformed itself politically,acquired new military capabilities, and embarked onimportant new missions confronting the globalterrorism threat on its front lines. For NATO’s Junesummit in Istanbul and beyond, the United Statesenvisions five ambitious goals for the 55-year oldAlliance. This venerable multilateral institutionremains a vital transcontinental bridge linking the United States and Canada to democracies inEurope and extending security across virtually two continents.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States and itsallies have been engaged in a top-to-bottom rebuildingof NATO. At the Prague Summit in November 2002,the allies agreed on a blueprint to create a new NATO— different in mission, membership, and capabilitiesthan the old Cold War institution. The results of ourtransformation efforts will be evident at NATO’sIstanbul Summit in June 2004.

This epochal transformation has been occurringsimultaneously with the Alliance’s greatestenlargement since its founding in 1949. The IstanbulSummit will mark the first meeting of NATO’s heads of state with 26 member nations. The additionto NATO of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia completed the greatest round of enlargement in NATO’s 55-year history.

Those seven nations joined NATO in late March ofthis year, helping to consolidate the democraticrevolution in the former Warsaw Pact countries.Their accession re-energizes the Alliance andreaffirms the importance of security as a conditionfor progress and prosperity. These new members ofNATO, in the words of Latvian President Vaira Vike-Frieberga, “know the meaning and the value ofliberty. They know that it is worth every effort tosupport it, to maintain it, to stand for it, and to fight for it.”

As important as NATO’s political transformation hasbeen its evolution from a defensive and static militaryalliance with a huge, heavy army massed to deter aSoviet threat to Western Europe. NATO’s pastfocused inward on Cold War threats directed at theheart of Europe. NATO’s future is focused outwardon the challenges posed by global terrorist networksand, in particular, to the security of its members fromthe arc of instability that stretches from South andCentral Asia to the Middle East and North Africa.

To meet those new threats, NATO is beginning toacquire modern military capabilities to produce amore deployable force — capabilities such asstrategic airlift and refueling, precision-guidedmunitions, air-to-ground surveillance, and combatservice support. Last summer, NATO created a new,leaner military command structure and a newAlliance Transformation Command in Norfolk toplug European allies into revolutionary new conceptsin training, doctrine, and technology being pioneered

NATO REMAINS OUR ESSENTIAL ALLIANCEBy R. Nicholas Burns

U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

For NATO’s summit in Istanbul and beyond, the United States envisions five ambitiousgoals: a call for troops and resources for a more vigorous NATO presence inAfghanistan; a defined role for NATO in Iraq; expanded practical engagement with theGreater Middle East; improved relations between NATO and the European Union; and to elevate and strengthen NATO’s relations with Russia . The United States remainscommitted to NATO, the essential Alliance, and effective multilateralism in order toachieve the common European and American vision for a secure, peaceful, democratic,and prosperous future.

by the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Mostsignificantly, the Alliance has also developed aflexible, agile, cutting-edge NATO Response Force(NRF) to which France has been a major contributor.The NRF is prepared for any mission — whetherhostage rescue, humanitarian relief, response toterrorist attack, or high intensity conflict —deployable within days to wherever in the world it isneeded, and sustainable once it gets there.

Today, NATO has more troops committed to missionsat greater distances than ever before in its history. Inaddition to ongoing operations in Kosovo and Bosnia,and supporting the Polish-led multinational brigadein Iraq, NATO has embarked on a historic mission inAfghanistan, where it commands the U.N.-mandatedInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul.

As we prepare for the NATO Summit in Istanbul andlook to the future, the United States sees five goalsfor NATO. They constitute an ambitious agenda forour Alliance.

Our highest priority is helping the Afghan peoplerebuild their shattered country. NATO, which hascommand of the U.N.-mandated ISAF, must reinforceits long-term peacekeeping role in Afghanistan. Theallies have agreed that we will move beyond Kabul tobuild a nationwide presence, and help the Afghangovernment extend its authority and provide securityfor nationwide elections. We are moving to createfive new Provincial Reconstruction Teams. ButNATO’s success will depend on having the troops andmilitary resources to do the job. The U.S. calls onEuropean nations to contribute more troops andresources in order to construct a more vigorousNATO presence in Afghanistan.

Our second key goal is to examine how to set thestage for a greater NATO role in Iraq as PresidentBush has suggested. Recent events have clearlymade this task difficult, but the proposal is supportedby a large group of allies. After the interim Iraqigovernment assumes control on June 30, NATO allieswill continue to serve as valued members of thecoalition forces. NATO can offer something ofinestimable value to help Iraqis make the great

transition from dictatorship to a democratic future.Defining such a mission will be a leading issue forNATO’s heads of state to discuss at Istanbul in Juneand in the coming months.

Third, NATO should expand its engagement with theArab world and Israel to help those countries findtheir way toward a more peaceful future in theGreater Middle East. The United States wants NATOto be one of the building blocks for our long-termengagement in this vast region. Recent Allianceconsultations in the region have demonstrated somesupport for an enhanced relationship with NATO.

Long-term change in the Middle East will help toattack the foundations of the terrorism crisis and givedemocracy and civil society a chance to take root.This is a challenge that Europeans and Americansalike must embrace. We can transform NATO’sMediterranean Dialogue into a true partnership,offering military training and exercises and a closerpolitical relationship, and also launch outreach toother countries in the region with the IstanbulCooperation Initiative. Our focus should be onpractical cooperation with those countries that wishto have a closer relationship with NATO.

Our fourth goal is to improve relations betweenNATO and the European Union (EU), the two greatinstitutions responsible for Europe’s future,particularly in the Balkans. The spring 2004enlargements of both organizations have advancedour common goal of a Europe whole, free, and atpeace. Toward that end, both organizations willremain active in maintaining the hard-won peace andstability in the Balkans.

NATO will likely conclude its successful peacekeepingmission in Bosnia in December 2004, and support anew EU mission under the “Berlin Plus” frameworkagreed to by the two organizations last March. ButNATO should maintain a robust presence and amilitary headquarters in Sarajevo to help Bosnianauthorities bring indicted war criminals to justice.

In Kosovo, NATO will continue the KFOR (KosovoForce) mission, maintaining the security and stabilitythat Kosovo needs as it works on an internationally-

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backed plan to expand democratic institutions,protect minority rights, return and reintegratedisplaced persons, and open dialogue with Belgrade.If it makes sufficient progress by mid-2005, theinternational community will then consider beginningto address Kosovo’s future status. Together, NATOand the EU must continue to support the transition tostable, market-oriented democracies in Kosovo,Bosnia, and Macedonia.

Our fifth goal is to elevate NATO’s relations withRussia. Our constructive engagement through theNATO-Russia Council has helped make our citizenrysafer and more secure today than at any time in thelast 50 years. NATO and Russia will participate in amajor civil emergency crisis management exercise inKaliningrad in June. Yet there is much more NATOcan do with Russia — from search and rescue at seato theater missile defense to greater cooperation inthe Black Sea to joint peacekeeping. NATO needs toset its sights on a closer relationship that will put ourpast rivalry behind us forever.

One more obstacle must be overcome if the Allianceis to achieve its goals: the persistent and growing gapin military capabilities between the United States andthe rest of its allies. If NATO’s transformation andlong-term missions are to be successful, ourEuropean allies will need to spend more — and morewisely — on defense. The U.S. will spend $400billion on defense this year; the 25 other alliescombined will spend less than half of that.

In addition, there is the “usability gap” — of Europe’s2.4 million men and women in uniform, only threepercent are now deployed in our priority missions inthe Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Forces that arestatic, untrained, ill equipped, and not deployablemake no contribution to NATO or to the larger causeof peace and stability in Europe and beyond.

After terrorist attacks in the United States onSeptember 11, and later in Istanbul and Madrid, there is no doubt among NATO allies that oursecurity is indivisible. The most dangerous securitythreats of our globalized 21st century are themselvesglobal: sophisticated terrorist networks seekingaccess to weapons of mass destruction. PresidentHarry Truman, who led the United States into NATO,could have been speaking of the present day when he said in 1951, “no nation can find safetybehind its own frontiers … the only security lies incollective security.”

That is sound advice for the U.S. role in today’sNATO. The United States will remain committed toNATO and to effective multilateralism in our effort torepair transatlantic divisions and rebuild NATO forthe future. Allied cooperation on issues ofinternational peace and security helped NATO winthe Cold War, and will be indispensable to winningthe global war on terror. The new NATO remains our essential alliance for achieving the commonEuropean and American vision for a secure, peaceful,democratic, and prosperous future. _

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U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE JUNE 2004U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE JUNE 2004

Despite recurring predictions that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has outlived itsusefulness and is in decline, NATO is larger and more active than ever. The discussion atIstanbul will not be about whether NATO still has a purpose or whether NATO should betransformed. It will be about the military operations and outreach activities that NATO isundertaking around the globe to safeguard and promote the common values that are theAlliance’s foundation: freedom and democracy.

THE U.S. AND NATO: A PARTNERSHIP IN ACTIONBy A. Elizabeth Jones

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

There is a cottage industry of critics who make their living off the premise that NATO’sdemise is imminent. They’ve been predicting

this since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The criticismdied down after NATO’s successful intervention in the Balkans, but was out in force again last year with divisions over Iraq. These critics argue thatNATO is an alliance in decline, hopelessly riven by transatlantic differences that can no longer be bridged.

There is just one problem with these analyses: theyaren’t supported by the facts. As we approach theJune 28-29 NATO Summit in Istanbul, Turkey, theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization has just expandedby seven new members, with more countriesknocking on its door, and it is more active than it hasever been:

• Former NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertsonsaid last year that NATO must go “out of area or itwould go out of business.” In Afghanistan, NATOhas accepted this challenge, agreeing to lead andexpand the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF). NATO’s number one priority is stabilizingAfghanistan and providing the security needed fordemocracy to take root. A successful mission maytake years, but it will establish NATO’s ability toplay a key security role wherever necessary — notjust in Europe but throughout the world.

• In Iraq, NATO is already playing an important rolein support of the Polish-led multinational divisionin south-central Iraq. There have been many calls

for it to do more, and President Bush agrees thatNATO should explore options do so. At Istanbul,we look forward to an in-depth discussion of whatrole the Alliance could most usefully play.

• In Bosnia, NATO has laid down the blueprint forsuccessful nation-building exercises. NATObrought peace and provided the security umbrellafor reconstruction and democratization. AtIstanbul, NATO will announce that SFOR (theStabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina), itsmission complete, will terminate at the end of2004. But NATO’s role will not end. It willprovide critical support to a combinedmilitary/police mission the EU will send to Bosniain 2005 to help maintain stability and to fosterfaster integration with European institutions.

• In Kosovo, NATO intervened to stop genocide andthen stayed to once more provide the securityneeded for reconstruction and development toproceed. Recent events have demonstrated thefragility of the situation in Kosovo and the need for NATO to remain engaged to ensure a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo, no matter what itsfinal status.

• In the Mediterranean, NATO has establishedOperation Active Endeavour (OAE) to interdictmaritime traffic and prevent the movement ofterrorists. Through OAE, NATO warships andmaritime patrol aircraft have conducted anunprecedented degree of surveillance of shippingof all kinds in the Mediterranean.

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• NATO is undertaking an unprecedented expansionand deepening of its relations with its immediateneighbors to the south and to the east. With theMiddle East, the Alliance plans to announce theIstanbul Cooperation Initiative as well as a deeperrelationship with the seven counties in theMediterranean Dialogue (Algeria, Egypt, Israel,Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia). Both of these initiatives will bring the Alliancecloser to the countries of the Greater Middle Eastand contribute NATO’s expertise to helping realize President Bush’s vision of a reformed,democratic region.

• NATO will make the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus the focal point of the Partnershipfor Peace (PfP), the Alliance’s most successfuloutreach initiative, reflecting their importance inthe war on terror. As part of this shift, PfP willrefocus on its original goal of increasing militarycooperation between NATO and its partners, ratherthan its recent focus of preparing partners formembership. As part of this initiative, NATO plansto announce at Istanbul its intent to open regionaloffices in both the Caucasus and Central Asia.

• NATO is pursuing closer cooperation with Russia,through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) andlaying the foundation for future joint operations. In April, NATO and Russia agreed to establish apermanent Russian mission at SHAPE (Supreme

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), and to expand the access of NATO’s mission in Moscow.We hope to have a successful NATO-Russiameeting at Istanbul that will further cement thisimportant relationship.

• The Alliance is also making progress in developingthe new capabilities needed to win the war onterror, including developing expeditionarymilitaries that can meet threats wherever they arise.NATO took a major step in this direction lastOctober when it “stood-up” the NATO ResponseForce (NRF). The NRF will eventually constitute aforce of some 30,000 soldiers, able to react to acrisis in a matter of days and deploy virtuallyanywhere in the world.

This is quite an agenda for an alliance supposedly indecline. The discussion at Istanbul will not be aboutwhether NATO still has a purpose or whether NATOshould be transformed. It will be about the militaryoperations and outreach activities that NATO isundertaking around the globe to safeguard andpromote the common values that are the Alliance’sfoundation: freedom and democracy.

“Partnership,” in the words of Secretary of StateColin Powell, “is the watchword of U.S. strategy inthis administration,” and NATO remains our vital partner. _

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE JUNE 2004U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE JUNE 2004

The Prague Summit of 2002 and the Istanbul Summit of 2004 stand as bookends to aperiod of unprecedented progress by the NATO Alliance in transforming itself to meet the new and very different challenges found in the post-9/ll world. As NATO leadersconvene the Istanbul Summit they will be directing an Alliance bound by common values,energized by a shared vision, and more responsive to the global challenges and opportunities that lie ahead.

NATO: AN ALLIANCE TRANSFORMINGBy Ian Brzezinski

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’sfundamental purpose remains collectivedefense, but the missions that flow from this

responsibility are very different than those theAlliance planned for during the Cold War — andeven from those executed in the last decade.Unpredictable, seemingly wanton terrorist attacksmake clear the danger to open societies posed bythose with a bent toward causing mass casualties.The scale of danger posed by terrorist organizationsis especially alarming, given their desire for weaponsof mass destruction (WMD).

NATO protects the transatlantic community from thisthreat, and is working hard to improve the strength ofits shield and the reach of its spear to confront andrepel this global challenge.

Two NATO summits — Prague in 2002 and Istanbulin 2004 — serve as bookends to a period ofunprecedented activity in the Alliance. In fact, moreconstructive change has occurred at NATO over thepast two years than in any 10-year period of Alliancehistory. The Prague Summit set the stage formilestone initiatives in military transformation, andAlliance operations have been implemented withremarkable speed.

NATO invited seven partners to join the Alliance.In April 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia became newmembers. Each has made contributions to the globalwar on terrorism. Soldiers of these Central Europeandemocracies serve with those of other NATO allies in

Afghanistan and Iraq. Their integration into NATOrepresents a significant step toward the common goalof building a Europe whole and free, where securityand prosperity are shared and indivisible.

NATO took charge of the International SecurityForce (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. NATOagreed at the Prague Summit to take over the UnitedNation’s mission to ensure security in Kabul. This isthe first NATO mission outside of Europe. Todaythere are over 6,000 NATO troops deployed toAfghanistan to provide stability in Kabul andKonduz. The Alliance is considering an expansion ofthe ISAF mission, to include ensuring stability in thenorthern and western parts of Afghanistan andcreating five new Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

NATO provided support to Poland when the lattertook leadership of the multinational division inIraq. When Poland stepped up to the difficult task ofleading the 16-nation multinational division, NATOprovided force generation, planning, andcommunications support. NATO’s actions inAfghanistan and Iraq have decisively ended thedebate over whether NATO “will go out of area or outof business.” NATO is in both.

NATO continues Operation Active Endeavour.While launched before Prague, Operation ActiveEndeavour (OAE) was one of the first Allianceefforts to confront terrorism. As an importantelement of NATO’s Article 5 response to the terroristattacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States,allied ships and aircraft contribute to the global war

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on terrorism through maritime patrols in theMediterranean and compliant boarding of suspectedterrorist vessels. To date, OAE forces have led to theidentification, tracking, and boarding of 48 shipssuspected of terrorist-related activities in the EasternMediterranean Sea, and have escorted 421 civilianships through the Strait of Gibraltar.

NATO has also established the NATO ResponseForce (NRF). The NRF, which is scheduled to reachinitial operational capability in October 2004, is a21,000 person joint force that is lethal, technicallysuperior to any envisioned threat, and readilydeployable on short notice (five to 30 days). TheNRF is a vehicle for providing NATO with adistinctive, high-end capability for the full spectrumof Alliance missions, with allies committing forceson six-month rotations.

The NRF has already proven itself to be a profounddriver of transformation. NATO military authoritiesare developing readiness and capability standards thatNRF forces must meet, as well as a process to certifytheir ability. Alliance doctrine for NRF deploymentwill be standard curricula at NATO schools.

NRF-inspired transformation is being felt in Alliancecapitals as well. Nations recognize the need tochange laws that restrict employment of their troopsdedicated to the NRF. Allies are ensuring thatnational laws smooth the way for quick dispatch oftroops; most allies are increasing the number offorces that can be legally deployed.

A more nimble NATO command structure hasbeen created. To efficiently handle quickly movingcrises with deployable and joint military forces, theAlliance decided at the Prague Summit to modernizeand streamline its command structure. This newstructure, approved in June 2003, eliminated nineheadquarters and provides for command and controlof NATO operations anywhere in the world.

The Allied Command Transformation (ACT) hasbeen established by NATO. As part of thecommand structure reform, ACT is developing newforce planning and generation approaches, as well asdeveloping Centers of Excellence and a certification

process for the NRF. As a driver of Alliancetransformation, ACT promises to be the backbone ofmilitary interoperability within Europe and across the Atlantic.

NATO instituted a Chemical, Biological,Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) battalion. Themultinational CBRN Defense Battalion, led by theCzech Republic, is already conducting readinesstraining and exercises. When fully “stood up,” it willbe able to react rapidly to a CBRN attack, eitheralone or with a NATO force, such as the NRF. It willreach initial operating capability on 1 July.

What started at Prague will not end at Istanbul.

Allied contributions to military operations in theBalkans, the Mediterranean, Afghanistan, and Iraqreflect the increasingly demanding global agendabefore NATO. These operations are strainingAlliance resources and underscore the urgency ofNATO’s transformation. They highlight long-recognized defense shortfalls in areas such as airliftand precision-guided munitions. Moreover, whilesome allies are reforming their force structures toincrease their deployability, sustainability, andlethality, overall allied forces are still stuck withexcessive numbers of static, territorial defense forces.

To help address this situation, the Alliance needs togive renewed emphasis to the Prague CapabilityCommitment, particularly in areas such asdeployability, sustainability and combat effectiveness.NATO is also developing a set of initiatives forIstanbul that will improve the way the Alliancedetermines its future force requirements, and hownations can meet them. Allies need to eliminateCold-War era forces no longer appropriate to NATO’scontemporary missions, and to reinvest any freed-upresources in deployable, usable forces.

As NATO moves into the future, it faces an agendathat is both regional and global in character. We mustremember that Europe is still not complete. Sevennations tapped for membership at the Prague Summitwill take their seats at the table for the IstanbulSummit, but Europe will still feature democraciesseeking NATO membership. Our vision of a Europe

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whole and free will not be fulfilled as long ascountries like Ukraine, Albania, Macedonia, andCroatia are not full members of the transatlanticcommunity. Allies new and old have an interest inassisting these nations to meet the political,economic, and military requirements of NATOmembership.

In a region of Europe better known in past years for its violence, the Alliance will consider thesuccessful termination of one of its first “out of area”missions — the SFOR (Stabilization Force) missionin Bosnia. The European Union (EU) is consideringa new, follow-on mission in Bosnia under the “BerlinPlus” arrangements, which governs cooperationbetween the EU and NATO. Even if the SFORmission is ended, NATO will remain engaged inBosnia to help foster Bosnian defense reform, among other missions.

From a global viewpoint, NATO must consider how itcan contribute to peace and stability beyond Europe.The Bush administration’s forward strategy forfreedom in the Middle East recognizes that as long as

freedom does not flourish in that part of the world, it will, as the president said, “remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export.”

NATO can contribute to reform and democracy inthis region by enhancing the Mediterranean Dialoguein which Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania,Morocco, and Tunisia currently participate. NATOcan also create a wider set of relationships withselected nations of the Greater Middle East, workingwith them in the areas of counter-terrorism, counter-WMD, interdiction, and stability operations.

NATO recognized at Prague that it had to transformitself to successfully meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world. Toward that end, unprecedentedprogress has been made. As NATO heads of stateand government convene at the Istanbul Summit, they lead an Alliance bound by common values,energized by a shared vision for a Europe whole andfree, and more responsive to the global challengesand opportunities before the transatlanticrelationship. _

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The Istanbul Summit will demonstrate how NATO confronts new threats in a new way —by projecting stability. The Alliance’s commitment to Afghanistan is the top priority. Also on the agenda are strengthened and expanded partnerships, better force generationand planning procedures in the transformation process, and follow-through on currentmilitary operations. Territorial defense remains a core function, but providing securityrequires addressing the potential risks and threats that arise far from our homes. Either these problems are tackled when and where they emerge, or they will end up onour doorstep.

THE NEW POLITICS OF TRANSATLANTIC DEFENSE COOPERATION

By Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The NATO Summit will cap a month ofintensive, top-level diplomatic activity,including the Group of Eight (G-8) meeting,

the U.S.-EU (United States-European Union) Summitand the Normandy commemoration. So the NATOSummit will have distinct goals andaccomplishments, but will be part of a wider picture.In today’s fluid strategic environment, this is as itmust be. NATO will act with its partners and otherinternational organizations to defend against newthreats in a new way — by projecting stability.

For the transatlantic community, projecting stabilityhas become the precondition for our security.Territorial defense remains a core function, but wesimply can no longer protect our security withoutaddressing the potential risks and threats that arise farfrom our homes. Either we tackle these problemswhen and where they emerge, or they will end up onour doorstep.

The Istanbul Summit will demonstrate how the newNATO projects stability:

• By strengthening our relationships with an ever-growing list of partners, from the Balkans to theCaucasus, from Central Asia to the Mediterraneancountries and the wider region;

• Through military operations in the Balkans, inAfghanistan, and through Operation ActiveEndeavour in the Mediterranean Sea;

• And by modernizing the way we organize anddeploy our forces for the new operations, far awayfrom home.

My first priority for Istanbul — NATO’s priority — isAfghanistan. The importance of Afghanistan to oursecurity is clear. Afghanistan may be halfway aroundthe world, but its success matters to our security.

That is why NATO’s governments have committed toAfghanistan. Since NATO took command of theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) lastAugust, things have turned for the better. Thanks toISAF’s patrols, Kabul is safer than it has ever been.We are helping to secure heavy weapons in the capital.We have now started to expand our presence beyondKabul. We are helping to retrain Afghan fighters, tohelp them reintegrate into civilian life. In short,NATO’s presence is making a tangible difference.

But we need to do more. I intend to be able toannounce, at our summit, and alongside 26 heads ofstate and government, that we will further expand ourpresence in Afghanistan by increasing the number ofProvincial Reconstruction Teams. I want NATO toplay a strong role in supporting the elections that theUnited Nations is organizing for later this year.

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This article is adapted from a May 17 speech on “DefendingGlobal Security: The New Politics of Transatlantic Defense Co-operation” delivered at the New Defense Agenda conference.

I want NATO to be able to say to President Karzai,and the Afghan people, that the Alliance is helpingthem toward a better future. A future of peace andsecurity. A future of increasing prosperity. And afuture where their country is contributing tointernational security, rather than threatening it. AndI am confident that this is achievable. Operationslike Afghanistan and Active Endeavour are important,and the ability to conduct such robust militaryoperations makes the Alliance unique. Butoperations are only one tool available to NATO. Weare also a forum for political consultations, especiallyregarding security issues.

So let me be clear: projecting stability means, firstand foremost, building partnerships to maximize ourcollective ability to defend the peace. That’s what ourPartnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil have always been about. And they arecertainly delivering. Our partners are with us inBosnia. They are with us in Kosovo. And they aremaking a very important contribution, indeed, inmeeting NATO’s priority number one: Afghanistan.

At Istanbul, we will enhance our partnerships todeliver more. We will concentrate more on defensereform to help some of our partners continue withtheir democratic transitions. We will also focus onincreasing our cooperation with the Caucasus andCentral Asia — areas that once seemed very far away,but that we now know are essential to our securityright here.

One crucial partner is Russia. The NATO-Russiarelationship alone is a vital bridge of security acrossEurope. Both NATO and Russia are safer now thatwe are partners. We are working on a range ofprojects, including terrorism, proliferation, civilemergency planning, and military-to-militarycooperation. I visited Moscow recently, and I toldPresident Putin that I hope the conditions will beright for him to come to Istanbul.

Ukraine is another vital partner. Its geographicposition alone makes its success a key strategic goal.We are, and will remain, closely engaged with thisnation, helping it build its democracy and helping

build our mutual security. We want to help Ukraineto integrate further into our Euro-AtlanticCommunity.

NATO is also working hard on building strongerrelationships with the Mediterranean countries, and isreaching out to those in the wider region.

No one today can doubt that these regions matter.Demographics, economics, and transnational threatscreate an ever-closer interdependence between us.

Recently, my deputy went to countries in the regionin order to explore the best way forward. We want tohear what these countries have to say, what they wantin terms of dialogue and cooperation. Above all, wewant to engage the countries in the region and tomake sure that there is “joint ownership” of any newcooperative efforts to enhance our common security.

This is an ambitious undertaking. While the strategicnecessity of our engagement is not in doubt, somemay say that with things as they are in the MiddleEast, it is not the right time. Others argue, morepersuasively, that we have no time to lose. The Groupof Eight and the European Union are also consideringnew initiatives, and we will need to complement eachother’s efforts. The time has come to build newbridges to this pivotal region.

Let me add a word about Iraq. Our summit will takeplace just 48 hours before Iraq becomes, once again,a sovereign nation. Iraq will be in the news, and itwill certainly remain on our agenda. But, as we allknow, developments there are fast-paced. I cannotspeculate now on what the situation will look like atthe end of June. That depends on a range ofvariables, including necessary U.N. Security Councilaction, events on the ground, and last, but not least,the nature and views of the new government. Manyallies have forces committed in Iraq, and NATO willcontinue to support the multinational division andfollow events closely. Beyond that, I cannot rule out,or predict, possible decisions by the Alliance.

Istanbul will certainly also highlight the strategicvalue of a strong partnership between NATO and the

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EU. Clearly, as NATO continues to transform, andthe EU is finding its own distinct role as a securityactor, our relationship will continue to evolve as well.We welcome a European Security and Defense Policyas a means to enhance Europe’s contribution to ourcommon security.

At Istanbul, we expect to announce that NATO’smission in Bosnia — Stabilization Force (SFOR) —can be successfully concluded at the end of the year.The EU has already stated that it would be ready todeploy a mission into Bosnia, in full cooperation withthe Alliance, and with NATO’s continuing support.

This will be a major step forward in a NATO-EUrelationship that is increasingly guided bypragmatism, close consultation, and transparency.And it will help to advance NATO-EU cooperation inother critical areas, notably in combating terrorismand preventing proliferation.

The likely assumption by the EU of additionalsecurity responsibilities in Bosnia, plus NATO’sgrowing engagement in Afghanistan, has led some tobelieve that NATO might depart from the scene in theBalkans. We will not. We will retain a NATO presencein Bosnia even after the handover to the EU. We willcontinue to help the country in its defense reforms —because our goal remains to welcome Bosnia andHerzegovina, as well as Serbia and Montenegro, intoour Partnership for Peace program in due course.

Our commitment to Kosovo also remains unflinching.Kosovo remains an enormous challenge. But therecent outbreaks of violence have only strengthenedour resolve to see this through. When violence flaredup in mid-March, we were able to quickly reinforceour presence and put out the flames. And we are nowfar more deeply engaged in the political process thanever before. There simply is no trade-off between

our missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. We cando both. Indeed, we are doing both.

Finally, Istanbul will also demonstrate that NATO’smilitary transformation is delivering results. TheNATO Response Force is up and running. We willhave completed various initiatives from our PragueSummit, including enhanced airlift and sealiftcapabilities and a package of counter-terrorism andmissile defense measures. And we will mark the full operational capability of our new Chemical,Biological, Radiological and Nuclear DefenseBattalion.

But transformation means more than new militaryhardware. It also means deployability and usability.I intend to ensure that when nations agree to amission, we also have the forces we need to carry itout. Our credibility depends on delivering on ourpromises. And better force generation and forceplanning procedures are critical in this regard.

Our Istanbul Summit will bring home that NATO istackling the new challenges of the 21st century. It will bring home that the new NATO, the NATO of26 members, is an Alliance that acts. It acts in theBalkans and Afghanistan, where our troops make thedifference between war and peace. It acts in theMediterranean, where our ships engage in anti-terrorist operations. It acts together with partners —old and perhaps new partners. And it cooperates evermore closely with other international institutions.

That is the new NATO we will showcase in Istanbul:an Alliance in which Europe and North America areconsulting every day on the key security issues beforethem — acting together, in the field, to defend ourshared security, and reaching out to build securitywhere it is needed. _

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NATO’S ROLE IN BRINGING SECURITY TO THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

By Chuck HagelU. S. Senator from Nebraska and

Republican Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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The durability of the Atlantic Alliance beginswith the shared values, interests, and destinyof its members. At its inception in 1949,

Europeans and North Americans understood thecommon purpose of the Alliance. There was nosignificant debate about whether the Soviet Unionrepresented a threat to security and world peace.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)became the most successful alliance in historybecause it matched purpose with power and servedthe interests of its members. And in building theAlliance, the Alliance helped build a better world.

The end of the Cold War and the reunification ofGermany raised new questions. Some argued that theEuropean Union (EU) could not adjust to thereintegration of a united Germany into Europe.Some predicted that NATO could be a victim of itsown success. In the absence of the threat from theSoviet Union, NATO’s fate was uncertain. What nowwas its purpose?

The durability and vision of the Atlantic Alliance,however, was captured well by Henry Kissinger in hisbook, Diplomacy:

“The architects of the Atlantic Alliance would havebeen incredulous had they been told that victory inthe Cold War would raise doubts about the future oftheir creation. They took it for granted that the prize

for victory in the Cold War was a lasting Atlanticpartnership. In the name of that goal, some of thedecisive political battles of the Cold War werefought and won. In the process, America was tied toEurope by permanent consultative institutions andan integrated military command system — astructure of a scope and duration unique in thehistory of coalitions.”

During periods of historic change, alliances andinstitutions must adapt to remain vital and relevant.During the 1990s, NATO began a process ofadaptation as it sought to define a new role in worldaffairs — including an expansion of membership,welcoming new countries from Eastern Europe, andestablishing a new relationship with Russia.

September 11, 2001, brought NATO’s purpose intoclearer focus. Today, the greatest threat to the AtlanticAlliance, NATO, and the world comes frominternational terrorist groups and networks, and thepotential for these groups to obtain and use weaponsof mass destruction.

The threat to NATO today does not come from greatpowers, but from weak ones. Terrorism findssanctuary in failed or failing states, in unresolvedregional conflicts, and in the misery of endemicpoverty and despair. No single state, including theUnited States, even with its vast military andeconomic power, can meet these challenges alone.

The threat to NATO today does not come from great powers, but from weak ones. The world does not have the luxury of choosing the challenges that it faces. Terrorism,poverty, endemic disease, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing states,and protracted conflicts are complex and interrelated. The future success of NATO willbe determined by its ability to deepen and expand cooperation in intelligence, lawenforcement, economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian action, especially in theGreater Middle East.

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The struggle in which we are now engaged is a global struggle that does not readily conform to our understanding of military confrontations oralliances of previous eras. It is not a traditionalcontest of standing armies battling over territory.Progress must be made in these countries with humanrights, good governance, and economic reform,beyond military force, before we can expect lastingsecurity and stability.

Military power will continue to play a vital role;however, the future success of NATO will bedetermined by its members’ ability to deepen andexpand their cooperation in the intelligence, lawenforcement, economic, diplomatic, andhumanitarian fields.

Adapting to this new strategic environment will notcome easily or cheaply and will require a new NATOstrategic doctrine. As the Alliance adjusts to both anexpanded membership and a new global strategicenvironment, NATO must address the gaps inmilitary expenditures and capabilities of its members.The tough decisions cannot continue to be deferred.

It is essential that NATO members not allowthemselves to drift into adversarial relationships overdisagreements. The challenges and differences thatwill always exist among members must be resolvedinside — not outside — of NATO. NATO can onlybe undermined by its own internal distractions.

President Bush has offered a plan for the GreaterMiddle East that is potentially historic in scope, andconveys the strategic importance of this region forU.S. foreign policy. America’s support for freedom inthe Greater Middle East must be matched withoperational programs of partnership with the peoplesand governments of the region to promote moredemocratic politics and more open economies. NATOis critical to this success.

Let me suggest five specific areas where NATO canplay a larger role in bringing security and stability tothe Greater Middle East: Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq,the Mediterranean, and the Israeli-Palestinian problem.Tom Friedman, the Pulitzer Prize winner columnistfor the New York Times, has described this era in world

politics as a “hinge of history.” And Turkey hangs onthat hinge. Our course of action with Arab andIslamic societies must emphasize building bridgesrather than digging ditches — and the NATOAlliance can provide that mechanism. As Europe andNATO have reached out to a united Germany and thestates of the former Warsaw Pact, we must nowensure that we apply the same inclusive approach toTurkey. Turkey has been a vital member of NATO.Its government has been a strong and honest force forthe people of Turkey. It deserves credit andrecognition for this effort.

Turkey is also a cultural and geographic bridge to theArab and Islamic world. By drawing Turkey closer,the Atlantic Alliance will have a better chance ofencouraging continued political and economicreforms and improving the prospects for resolutionof disputes involving that country. If we were to pushTurkey away, we would jeopardize our interests inbringing peace and stability to the entire region.

In Afghanistan, the Loya Jirga recently completeddrafting a new constitution that sets a course forelections later this year and holds the promise of ademocratic transition and the rule of law. Thegovernment of President Hamid Karzai and thepeople of Afghanistan have come a long way in thepast two years. But the job in Afghanistan is far fromcomplete. Reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda forcescontinue to threaten the fragile progress that has beenmade there.

NATO has assumed leadership of the United Nations-mandated International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF), the Alliance’s first mission beyond theEuro-Atlantic region. And NATO Secretary GeneralJaap de Hoop Scheffer has said more than once that “Afghanistan is the number one priority for the Alliance.”

NATO’s goal should be to eventually assumeresponsibility for all military and reconstructionoperations in Afghanistan, including OperationEnduring Freedom. The expansion of ISAF beyondKabul, and of NATO-led provincial reconstructionteams throughout the country, will strengthen effortsto manage the transition to stability and democracy in

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Afghanistan. It is also critical that NATO assetspromised for Afghanistan be there — on the groundand operational.

Third, NATO will need to play a significant role inhelping bring security and stability to Iraq. Last year,NATO committed to providing support for Polishforces in Iraq. However, NATO should initiatediscussions to take over the duties of the Polish sectorin central Iraq, or possibly assume responsibility for a division in northern Iraq.

Bringing security and stability to Iraq is a sharedglobal and regional interest for all NATO members.There may have been disagreements over how best todeal with Saddam Hussein’s regime prior to the war,but that is behind us. The Alliance must be able tomanage disagreements, as it has in the past. Suez,Vietnam, and the deployment of intermediate-rangenuclear missiles in Germany in 1983 come to mind.Iraq should be put in the same light.

If Iraq becomes a failed state, the liberation of Iraqwill be a historic opportunity squandered — for Iraq,for the Greater Middle East, and for the world. Ourcommon policies and interests throughout the GreaterMiddle East and the Islamic world — including thewar on terrorism, resolution of the Israeli-Palestinianconflict, and global energy security — will bedirectly affected by the outcome in Iraq.

There is limited hope for Iraq’s future without the fullsupport and commitment of the world community,especially the United Nations and NATO, during thiscritical transition period. The United States cannotsustain a long-term policy in Iraq without the activepartnerships of the U.N. and NATO.

Fourth, NATO should expand and deepen itspartnership with the countries of the Mediterranean.There have been some significant achievements inthis area; however, we should consider a modifiedversion of the Partnership for Peace program for this region.

Over the coming years the Mediterranean will takeon even greater strategic importance for NATO. It

should be considered as a critically important geo-political region with its own dynamics. Terrorism,illegal trafficking in narcotics and persons, and otherthreats from this region are major security concernsfor Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. TheMediterranean draws together Europe, North Africaand the Middle East and is, therefore, influenced bypolitical developments in each area.

There is tremendous potential for expanded securitycooperation, especially intelligence gathering andsharing, and economic and trade development inAlgeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. These countries aretaking important steps toward political and economicreform. They need to do more, but all three countriesare moving in the right direction. This progress canbe undermined by instability in West Africa and byradical Islamic groups and terrorists based in thisregion. These areas require more attention from theAtlantic Alliance.

Fifth, NATO should begin to plan for a role in theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict. I believe a NATOpeacekeeping mission may eventually be called uponto help secure an Israeli-Palestinian peace. The daymay come when NATO troops monitor the birth of a Palestinian state. NATO is the only institution with the credibility and capability to undertake such a critical mission. The time is not yet right forthis development, but I believe we must begin tomove our thinking, policies, and planning in thatdirection. The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinianconflict cannot be separated from our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Change is difficult, especially for institutions. Itforces us to re-examine the foundations of ouridentity, purpose, and policies. The world does nothave the luxury of choosing the challenges that itfaces. They are complex and interrelated —terrorism, poverty, endemic disease, proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, failing states, andprotracted conflicts — and they do not lendthemselves to easy solutions.

The future of NATO will be determined by theoutcome in the Greater Middle East. This is a

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historic burden for all of us in a region that is rich inculture and history, but, so far, at odds withmodernity. Our approach requires subtlety andvision, as well as determination and purpose.

There has never been a partnership or alliancehistorically as well positioned or more politicallycapable of leading the change to a safer and betterworld than this institution called NATO.

One of the great achievements of the last half of the20th century was a reshaping of world order, bringingnew freedoms and prosperity to millions of peoplewho had known neither freedom nor prosperity.NATO helped guarantee much of this progress.

And so it will be for the 21st century. NATO’s markhas been set. Its responsibilities are clear. This is thenobility of its inheritance. This is the reality of its destiny. _


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The Istanbul NATO Summit on June 28-29,2004, comes at a pivotal time for the Alliance.Since the Prague Summit in November 2002,

two momentous developments for NATO haveoccurred: the enlargement of the Alliance to 26members, and the assumption of command of theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) inAfghanistan, the first operation outside of Europe inNATO’s 55-year history.

At the same time, NATO is confronted by an equallymomentous challenge: whether to become active, asan alliance, in the increasingly grave situation in Iraq.I believe that it should.

It seems difficult to believe that little more than sixyears ago NATO was comprised of only 16 members,14 from Europe and two from North America. TheAlliance’s membership had changed only slightlysince the mid-1950s, with the addition of Spain in1982 and the incorporation of the former EastGermany after German unification in 1990. Exceptfor Greece and Turkey, the European members cameexclusively from the western part of the continent.

What a difference today! Poland, the Czech Republic,and Hungary have been NATO members since 1998.This year, at the end of March, they were joined byBulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,Slovakia, and Slovenia. In Central and EasternEurope, NATO territory now extends in an uninter-rupted sweep from the Gulf of Finland in the north tothe southern rim of the Black Sea in the south.

And what an infusion of new spirit and enthusiasm!The citizens of 10 countries that suffered for nearlyfive decades under the yoke of communismunderstand better than anyone else how preciousfreedom is. As a result, all the new members haveparticipated in SFOR [the Stabilization Force inBosnia and Herzegovina], or KFOR [the KosovoForce] in the Balkans, or in Operation EnduringFreedom or ISAF in Afghanistan, or in Iraq — inmany cases in all three theaters.

Moreover, as part of the process of qualifying formembership in NATO, several of the countries haveresolved long-standing disputes with their neighbors,thereby enhancing European stability.

The new members of NATO are closely connected tothe United States by the human ties of more than 25million Americans of Central- and Eastern-Europeandescent. They are also sympathetic to the UnitedStates because of decades of principled Americanforeign policy. Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estoniansknow that the United States, almost alone in theworld, never recognized the forcible annexation oftheir countries by the Soviet Union in 1940. They,and other Central and Eastern Europeans, rememberthe annual “Captive Nations Week” celebrations inthe United States. Thanks to their courage, and toAmerican persistence in opposing Sovietimperialism, Europe is now on the verge of realizingthe aspiration of being “whole and free.”

Does this attachment mean that the new members

THE ISTANBUL SUMMIT: STEPPING UP TO THE CHALLENGE

By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.U.S. Senator from Delaware and and Ranking Democrat on the Committee on Foreign Relations

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the danger to the North Atlantic area hasincreasingly originated in Central Asia and the Middle East. The run-up to the Iraq warinvolved acrimonious debates in NATO. Whatever history’s judgment on the war, the factis that all Alliance members now have a vested interest in the success of the post-warstabilization of Iraq. Failure in this mission is unthinkable.

will uncritically fall in behind the United States inevery intra-Alliance dispute? Of course not. It doesmean, however, that at a time when policy-basedcriticism of the United States has been replaced by areflexive anti-Americanism in many quarters inWestern Europe, the new members of NATO, at thevery least, are likely not to question America’smotives, but rather to give Washington the benefit ofthe doubt in future crises.

The Alliance’s formal assumption of the command ofISAF last August, after several individual members ofNATO had taken turns at the helm, was another path-breaking event. Since the demise of the Soviet Unionand its existential threat, the danger to the NorthAtlantic area has increasingly originated outside ofEurope, in Central Asia and the Middle East. Asearly as the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, agreed uponin November 1991 in Rome, NATO took note of thefundamentally changed environment. That documentmentioned economic, social and political difficulties,ethnic rivalries, and the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction as new threats.1 Moreover, itspecifically declared that “Alliance security must alsotake account of the global context.”2

The Alliance’s sixth and most recent StrategicConcept, approved at the Washington Summit inApril 1999, went further by recognizing “failedefforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and thedissolution of states”3 as factors that could lead tolocal or regional instability. It also prescientlydeclared that “Alliance security interests can beaffected by other risks of a wider nature, includingacts of terrorism....”4

Despite these fragmentary warnings, it took the terrible attacks of September 11, 2001, on theWorld Trade Center and the Pentagon to make clear the mortal threat to the West of failed statesharboring technologically adept and ideologicallyfanatical terrorists.

On the day after the terrorist attacks, NATOresponded by invoking Article 5 of the North AtlanticTreaty for the first time. I believe that the UnitedStates missed an opportunity by not immediatelyutilizing the proffered allied assistance in a more

comprehensive manner in Afghanistan and, once theTaliban and al-Qaeda had been militarily defeated, bynot rapidly expanding ISAF’s area of peace-enforcingactivity throughout the country. Eventually, mostNATO partners did make major contributions to theeffort in Afghanistan, both in war-fighting (OperationEnduring Freedom) and to ISAF.

On May 14, 2002, under the influence of September11th and of the Afghanistan war, the Alliance tookcounter-terrorism to its logical conclusion in the finalcommuniqué of its Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting,when it declared: “To carry out the full range of itsmissions, NATO must be able to field forces that canmove quickly to wherever they are needed (italicsmine), sustain operations over distance and time, andachieve their objectives.”5

Under the Reykjavik mandate, the Alliance assumedcommand of ISAF last summer, thereby “crossing theRubicon” into out-of-Europe operations. As long asthe terrorist threat emanates from outside of theEuro-Atlantic area, NATO must continue to be readyto commit forces to the origin of the problem.

The run-up to the Iraq war in 2002 and 2003 involvedthe most acrimonious debates ever heard at NATO.Whatever history’s judgment of the wisdom, orfoolhardiness, of the war, the stark fact is that all 26Alliance members now have a vested interest in thesuccess of the post-war stabilization of Iraq. Failurein this mission is unthinkable. It would almostcertainly result in civil war in Iraq, which wouldlikely draw in neighbors like Turkey and Iran. Iraqmight well become like Taliban-era Afghanistan, withthe nominal central government ceding de factocontrol to terrorists bent on attacking Europe andAmerica. Democratic Iraqis would be thrown to thewolves, moderates and modernizers in the regionwould be put on the defensive, and radicals would becatapulted into the ascendancy.

In the medium-term and long-term, of course, it willfall to Iraqis to guide their country to democraticstability. In the short-term, however, it is theinternational community that must “step up to theplate.” As the necessary first step, I hope andanticipate that the United States — in concert with

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the other four permanent members of the UnitedNations (U.N.) Security Council — will craft a new resolution that gives the United Nationssignificant powers in the reconstruction of Iraq afterthe transfer of sovereignty on June 30, 2004. Such aU.N. resolution could also specifically authorize arole for NATO in the stabilization process.

Once the resolution is approved, I would urge theNorth Atlantic Council to move immediately to planfor NATO operations in Iraq. Areas of activity thatcome to mind are controlling the borders with Iranand Syria, demining, training the Iraqi army andpolice, and assuming command of northern Iraq and of the south-central sector currently under Polish control.

I am aware of the argument that NATO shouldsuccessfully complete its ISAF mission inAfghanistan before taking on another assignment, but I find it unconvincing. First of all, the stakes inIraq are so high, and the current situation soprecarious, that temporizing is not an option.

Second, as heartening as allied participation inAfghanistan has been, the disinclination of severalallies to make even modest contributions of materielthere has been extremely disheartening. The Alliancecollectively is capable of making available muchgreater capabilities of troops and materiel.

NATO has always risen to the challenge. The need todo so has never been greater than at the present time.Therefore, I urge the Alliance to agree at Istanbul toparticipate in the vital task of stabilizing Iraq. _

1 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO Office ofInformation and Press, 1991), Part I, articles 10 and 13.

2 Ibid, Part I, art. 13.

3 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept” (Washington: PressCommunique NAC-S(99)65, April 24, 1999), Part II, art. 20.

4 Ibid, Part II, art. 24.

5 “Final Communiqué. Ministerial Meeting of the North AtlanticCouncil Held In Reykjavik on 14 May 2002,” article 5 (Reykjavik:Press Release M-NAC-1(2002)59).


NATO is facing a structural crisis resulting from three realities inherited from the ColdWar and affected by the events of September 11, 2001: Europe and its unfinishedcondition, the United States and its preponderant power, and security and its newnormalcy. To renew NATO, its members must make a commitment to a community ofaction for the fulfillment of common goals within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.Within an alliance of purpose, the goal is not for all allies to do everything together;rather the goal is to make sure that all allies together do everything.

A DEFINING MOMENT IN PURPOSE AND COMMITMENTBy Dr. Simon Serfaty

Director of the Europe Program and Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

This is a defining moment, and the UnitedStates and the states of Europe have a blinddate with history. Beginning with the

European Union (EU) and North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) summits that will be held inDublin, Ireland, and Istanbul, Turkey, in June 2004,decisions made on both sides of the Atlantic over thenext five years, and the conflicts waged along theway – in and beyond Iraq – will leave Europe and itsrelations with the United States, as well as the EUand NATO, either much more cohesive and strongeror more divided and, therefore, weaker.

The Alliance of purpose built during the Cold War —and twice enlarged since — as a community ofincreasingly compatible values and compatibleinterests, must now be renewed as its members makethe required commitments to a community of actionfor the fulfillment of common goals within andbeyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

As was seen during the Atlantic crisis of 2003 overIraq, renewing the Alliance will not be easy. Thecrisis, which is hardly over, was neither bilateral —not even between the United States and France or anyother EU country — nor personal — not even overEurope’s mistrust of President George W. Bush andparts of his administration.

These difficulties point to conditions that have oftenexisted in the past, and were readily resolved with asummit meeting (as was done in Williamsburg,

Virginia, in May 1983) or a swift display of U.S.leadership (as was exerted in Paris in October 1954,in Nassau in January 1963, in Washington inFebruary 1973, and in Dayton, Ohio, in the fall1995). Rather, the crisis of 2003 was, and remains, astructural crisis resulting from three broad andoverlapping new realities, inherited from the ColdWar and affected by the events of September 11,2001: Europe and its unfinished condition, theUnited States and its preponderant power, andsecurity and its new normalcy.

COMPLETING THE UNION

The transformation of Europe, from a fragmentedand unstable mosaic of nation-states into an everlarger and peaceful union of member-states, alreadystands as the most significant geopolitical developmentof the latter half of the 20th century. That is cause forlegitimate satisfaction in the United States.

To an extent, the idea of a united Europe is anAmerican idea, not only as an inspirationaldemonstration of what a few hundred Americanswere able to do in the New World 200 years earlier,but also because it is the postwar commitment of U.S.power and leadership that gave the states of Europethe resources, time, and security they needed toengage in a process of integration that its EuropeanFounding Fathers first started out of a shared sense ofpast failures, rather than on behalf of a commonvision of the future.

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For the past four decades, however, Europe’sintegration has depended on several conditions thatdetermined the scope, pace, and effectiveness of eachof its new initiatives:

• Robust and evenly shared economic growth, withprimary benefits going to the most recent membersor the more needy small economies — as shown bythe history of European union after theenlargements of 1973 and 1986;

• Stable and confident centrist national leadershipable to resist pressures from either extreme of thepolitical spectrum — as shown by thetransformation of the European Left in France,Spain, Italy, and Britain; and

• Regional stability, in the East during the Cold War(which now includes some of the new members)and also, especially since 2001, in the South —where lies the Greater Middle East, from thePersian Gulf through the Middle East and intoNorth Africa.

In the midst or on the eve of finality, and threatenedwith a wave of terror to which Europe may well befar more vulnerable than the United States, thesesame features are currently lacking, and the EU may be more challenged — more at risk — than atany time in over 30 years. These are causes forapprehension not only in Europe but also in theUnited States, where the commitment to an ever closer and ever larger Europe paradoxicallylooks often more real than among many EU members.

As the EU nears the 50th anniversary of the RomeTreaties in March 2007, three issues appear to beespecially contentious:

• the ratification debates for the so-called EUconstitution;

• the renegotiation of the Stability and Growth Pactand the negotiation of a new six-year EU budget;and

• the effective integration of the 10 new EUmembers, including — most of all — Poland, andan effective management of current or upcomingadditional applications, including that of Turkey.

This is not a small agenda. How well it is managed— and how — is up to the 25 EU members; but it is,nonetheless, of direct interest to the United States inthe context of its relations with Europe within andoutside the Alliance.

POWER AND WEAKNESSES

Europe’s ability to produce more power of its own,especially military power, is cause for exasperationrather than apprehension. Admittedly, there are someconcerns that a stronger Europe might ultimatelyemerge as a counterweight that would define,together with other ascending states, a new multi-polarity at the expense of U.S. influence. Suchconcerns are exaggerated; and the competitivepressures that could result from a stronger Europeneed not be, and are unlikely to become, adversarial.On the contrary, only a Euro-Atlantic partnership thatescapes its current condition of perceived “power andweakness” can overcome a futile debate over themarginal relevance of European states that lookmostly like dead weights relative to an Americawhose intrusive preponderance makes it lookincreasingly like an imperial bully.

In other words, only a stronger (and, hence, moreunited) Europe can assert itself as a crediblecounterpart within the Alliance, and only an Alliancethat stands on two distinct weights — inevitablyuneven but, hopefully, complementary — can pointto a global order short of the bellicosity thatcharacterized pre-1914 multi-polarity, but extendsbeyond the U.S. preponderance that defines the post-1989 uni-polarity. In short, there is nothingintrinsically wrong about the ideas of counterweightand multi-polarity because both help either side ofthe Atlantic rely on the other to unload or share someof the burdens of collective defense and global order.

However, the multidimensional nature of powerimposes a discussion of weaknesses found in both the

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United States and Europe. While U.S. preponderanceis beyond challenge — on grounds of capabilities,saliency, and (now) zeal — Europe readily qualifiesas a power in the world because of interests that areglobal in scope and vital in significance, capabilitiesthat are at least competitive in all non-militarydimensions, and a widespread reputation forleadership inherited from the past but also renewedfor the better over the past 50 years.

The next few years will show whether the states ofEurope and their Union are willing and able to alsogain the military power, as well as the will to use it,without which they would remain unable to move upto the next level — as a power in the world thatwould also stand as a world power — or, as BritishPrime Minister Tony Blair put it, a superpower butnot a super state.

The reference to Tony Blair is not by chance: the keyto Europe’s development of a common foreign,security, and defense policy is, indeed, theparticipation of the United Kingdom — an ingredientthat is even more indispensable, at least in the shortterm, than Germany’s contributions.

Whatever skepticism or ambivalence there may be inthe United States about the rise of a strong Europe,the decisions ahead will have to be made by theEuropeans themselves — spend better, but also spendmore, on behalf of interests and in defense of valuesthat Americans need not fear, to the extent that these are, indeed, more compatible with U.S.interests and values than with those of any other partof the world.

In an alliance of purpose, the response to thepreponderance of the one over the many lies neitherin the quest for balance (as an adversarial“counterweight”) nor in the acceptance of follower-ship (as a passive “counterpart”). Rather, thecommonality of purpose suggests the feasibility ofcomplementary actions on behalf of policies deemednecessary for the fulfillment of goals that arecommon to each of the allies, even when they are notevenly shared by all of them.

The idea of complementarity is not new. It is an ideathat America and Europe, NATO, and the EU areenforcing every day in Afghanistan, and it is an ideathat has been used repeatedly in Haiti, in the Balkans,in Libya, in Iran, and elsewhere. In the ongoing questfor a new global order in the unfolding century, themost reliable coalition partners remain the like-minded states that populate the Atlantic Alliance —and these states deserve at least a right of first refusalfor any of the missions for which a coalition might be needed.

This means that for Europe to achieve its transitiontoward a complete union — complete geographically,as well as in terms of its access to power, but alsocomplete within the continent as well as across theAtlantic — several key goals will have to be met:

• Complementarity of European membership inNATO and the EU — meaning that any Europeanmember of NATO should ultimately be a memberof the EU, including Turkey, but also Norway (andothers), and every EU member should be a NATOmember, including Austria, but also Sweden (and others).

• Complementarity of NATO and EU relations withcountries that are not members of either institution— meaning especially a more active coordinationof U.S. and European policies toward Russia andother institutional orphans in Europe, as well astoward other countries that are not part of the Euro-Atlantic geographic area but are nonethelessseeking partnerships for peace and prosperity in itscontext — like North Africa.

• Closer U.S.-EU relations — as in Europe’sacknowledgement of the United States’ specialstatus as a non-member member state of the EU,but also as in a U.S. acknowledgement of the EU asa vital, though unfinished, partner. Coming afterthe historical enlargements of both the EU andNATO, a new European Commission, as well as anew or renewed U.S. administration in the fall of2004, ought to permit a new deal in U.S.-EU-NATO relations, including, at the earliest possibletime, an unprecedented summit meeting between

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the heads of state or government of all EU andNATO current members and applicant countries.

• Better coordination between NATO and the EU astwo institutions whose parallel contributions to thewar against global terror are indispensable if thosewars are going to be both won and ended. Thefuture of a European security pillar is tied toNATO, and NATO’s future is dependent on itsability to act globally — on the basis of capabilitiesenhanced by a better coordination of non-militarysecurity tools between the allies, and a commonunderstanding of the priorities they share based ona more compatible strategic view of the world they face.

NEW NORMALCY

That the vital interests of the United States in Europe,and America’s central interest in the Union that is atthe core of the new Europe, remain unaltered afterthe events of September 11, 2001, should be causefor little debate. If anything, the end of one globalconflict and the start of another increased the needfor closer and more closely coordinated Euro-Atlantic actions on questions of home andforeign security.

As shown in Iraq, even a nation without militarypeers cannot remain for long a nation without capableallies. For there, in Iraq, the coalition of the willingthat was organized in early 2003 has proven to beinsufficient to attend to the broader missions it facedafter completion of the major combat phase of thewar on May 1, 2003.

The significance of Iraq cannot be overstated.Failure there is not an option. An abrupt departure ofcoalition forces without delivering on the goals ofstability and reconstruction for post-Saddam Iraq isnot an acceptable choice.

Nor is any sort of blame game helpful — eitherwithin the coalition or with those states that failed tojoin it. This is not a game that can be won by anyoneexcept their common enemies. Time is running outto end counterproductive theological debates and,

instead, bring into the mix the same multilateralframework used to end the war in Afghanistan afterthe Taliban had been defeated — a multilateralframework that adds to the global legitimacy of theUnited Nations the specialized capabilities of NATOand the EU.

Within an alliance of purpose, the goal is not for allallies to do everything together; rather, the goal is tomake sure that all allies together do everything.

During the coming months, the coalition in Iraq will,therefore, have to be enlarged to attend to a missionthat must be deepened. That mission is fourfold:

• Restore security — this may well require additionalforces on the ground, including NATO forces,pending the organization of viable Iraqi militaryand police forces;

• Assert the national legitimacy of an Iraqigovernment that rehabilitates the Iraqi state — thisdemands a direct U.N. role in attending to acredible transfer of sovereignty on June 30, 2004,and national elections no later than January 2005;

• Pursue the reconstruction of Iraq, under the directmanagement of the new Iraqi government, with thesupport of all allies, whatever their disposition atthe start of the war; and

• Ultimately achieve reconciliation not only withinand among Iraq’s main communities, but alsobetween Iraq and its neighbors.

The criteria for solidarity in the new securitynormalcy inaugurated by the events of September 11,2001 (and also of March 11, 2004), need not belimited to Iraq. The wars of 9/11 have many fronts;to argue that Spain, for example, dropped out of thesewars because it withdrew its forces from Iraq istantamount to arguing that the United States did notenter World War II until its forces landed inNormandy in June 1944 — with the qualification,however, that some of the Spanish forces withdrawnfrom Iraq must now be put to good, collective use onanother front, like the front in Afghanistan.

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Beyond the finality debates in Europe, which theUnited States cannot ignore, and beyond the war inIraq, to which the states of Europe cannot remainindifferent because of the unthinkable and indivisibleconsequences of failure, the Greater Middle East isthe defining geopolitical challenge of the newcentury — including, but no longer limited to, itsIsraeli-Palestinian fault line — in a region that issimultaneously of extreme volatility and of vitalinterest to the rest of the world.

The point should be self-evident: there cannot be anysort of global order if there is no order within thatregion. For such an order to emerge, U.S. power,

however indispensable it may be, will not provesufficient unless it can rely on Europe’s power which,however necessary it is, is obviously not sufficientalone either.

That is the challenge that must now be addressedwith the same bold spirit, the same compellingcompassion, and the same common purpose as wasshown when the transformation of Europe began 50years ago as a revolt against a failed past. _

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect theviews or policies of the U.S. government.

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The Partnership for Peace has renewed importance in fulfilling NATO’s wider post-9/11commitments. To retain its relevance and effectiveness, PfP must be transformed,adequately funded, and better integrated with bilateral and regional efforts to addressnew security challenges. The Istanbul Summit should launch an initiative to promotenew, tailored PfP programs in the Balkans, Greater Black Sea region, and Central Asia.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: CHARTING A COURSE FOR A NEW ERA

By Dr. Jeffrey Simon Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

With 10 of the original 24 Partnership forPeace (PfP) partners having achieved fullAlliance membership, questions about the

program’s direction and long-term viability are raised.

The original strategic rationale for PfP — enhancingstability among and practical cooperation with thecountries along NATO’s periphery — has becomeeven more compelling in the context of the Alliance’sfurther enlargement, the war on terrorism, andgrowing Western interests in Southwest and CentralAsia. That said, the key incentive that animatedpartner engagement in the program, that it was the“best path to NATO membership,” is diminishedsince the remaining partners are either not interestedor not likely to enter the Alliance for many years.

To retain its relevance and effectiveness, PfP must betransformed, adequately resourced, and betterintegrated with bilateral and regional efforts toaddress new security challenges. The IstanbulSummit could launch an initiative, backed by seriousresources from allies, to promote new, tailored PfPprograms in the Balkans, Greater Black Sea region,and Central Asia.

POST-9/11 CHALLENGES

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,NATO and many partner governments have struggled,with varying degrees of success, to reshape theirdefense capabilities to deal with the new risks posedby global terrorism. The United States increased

defense expenditures by $48 billion — a sum equal tothe entire defense budget of the United Kingdom. Incontrast, the defense budgets of most other longtimeallies have remained unchanged and, indeed, theoverall capabilities gap between the United States and other NATO countries has widened further. Andyet, in the aftermath of 9/11, NATO committed itselfto a broader functional and wider geographic area of engagement.

The utility of the PfP was demonstrated as thesepartners bolstered and facilitated NATO operations inand around Afghanistan. At its first meeting after the9/11 attacks, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council(EAPC) defense ministers affirmed theirdetermination to use the partnership to increasecooperation and capabilities against terrorism.

In Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the U.S.-ledmilitary operation against terrorists in Afghanistan,many NATO allies —including two of the thennewest — Poland and the Czech Republic — and sixPfP partners rendered substantial assistance.1

And when NATO assumed command of theInternational Security Force Operations inAfghanistan (ISAF) in April 2003, it did so with theparticipation of another six partners.2 After SaddamHussein was toppled in Iraq, NATO providedintelligence and logistical support to the Polish-ledmultinational division, comprised of many memberallies and 11 partners.3

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To better address the new challenges, the 2002Summit approved the Prague CapabilitiesCommitment (PCC), the new Command Structure,and the NATO Response Force (NRF). Thecenterpiece is NRF, with high tech capabilities forexpeditionary missions that would allow NATO’sEuropean allies to contribute small niche units — forexample: police, engineering, demining, chemicaldecontamination, alpine, and special forces units —with secure communications, ample readiness, andthe capability of deploying, sustaining, and operatingwith U.S. forces through the entire conflict spectrum.If implemented, this would provide a moreconstructive burden-sharing arrangement for NATO.

TERRORISM AND EMERGENCYMANAGEMENT

The Prague Summit also endorsed the MilitaryConcept for Defense Against Terrorism that calls for“improved intelligence sharing and crisis responsearrangements [and commitment with partners] tofully implement the Civil Emergency PlanningAction Plan…against possible attacks by…chemical,biological or radiological (CBR) agents.” So too,through the Partnership Action Plan AgainstTerrorism, adopted by the EAPC in November 2002,partners commit to taking a number of steps tocombat terrorism and share their information andexperience. Although the plan has not yet achievedmuch, it does establish a framework upon whichnecessary functions can be built.

A WAY AHEAD

Given that there are now more NATO allies, eachstruggling to transform its own armed forces andsecurity institutions, than there are remainingpartners (20, including the special cases of Russiaand Ukraine) — and these are far weakerinstitutionally and have more diverse interests andbroader needs than those which have already attainedmembership — if PfP is not seriously revived atIstanbul, it will be dead on departure.

Keeping PfP relevant requires focusing on thedevelopment of capabilities to combat terrorism andother transnational threats. New programs could

target sharing more intelligence from interiorministries, police, and border guards, as well asfinance and banking information.

Budgets and functions also need to be re-examinedand updated to support future counter-terroristoperations, including counter-proliferation effortsand missile defense systems.

A STRATEGIC VISION FOR PfP’S REVIVAL

Clearly the Istanbul Summit, marking 10 years sincethe inception of Partnership for Peace, requires a newstrategic vision for PfP to deliver on NATO’scommitment to wider geographic and broaderfunctional engagement.

But for a revival to succeed, the program will need tobe tailored to the needs of NATO’s remaining 20partners and two PfP aspirants who fall into thefollowing eight distinct groups with very diverseneeds, interests, and capacities:

• Five “advanced” partners — Finland, Sweden,Ireland, Austria, and Switzerland — with nointerest yet in joining the Alliance.

• The three Membership Action Plan (MAP) partners— Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia — who doaspire to membership and for whom NATO mustkeep its Open Door credible.

• Ukraine, who claims to be an aspirant with anAction Plan, and aspires to join the MAP.

• Russia, who does not aspire to membership butmaintains a special relationship in the NATO-Russia Council.

• Two relatively inactive partners — Moldova andBelarus.

• Three Caucasus partners — Armenia, Azerbaijan,and Georgia,

• Five Central Asia partners — Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, andUzbekistan; and

• Two Balkan PfP aspirants — Bosnia-Herzegovinaand Serbia-Montenegro.

The incentives for PfP participation vary widelybetween Russia, with no interest in formalmembership, and Ukraine, who aspires to join NATO.

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PfP also provides incentive for Bosnia-Herzegovinaand Serbia-Montenegro because it remains their onepathway to Euro-Atlantic structures and legitimacy.While Moldova and Belarus remain relativelyinactive in PfP, their role could change as they adjustto their altered geo-strategic environment afterenlargement. The remaining 16 PfP partnerscomprise the following four groups:

Advanced PartnersAll of the five advanced partners (exceptSwitzerland) are already in the EU and remainoutside formal NATO membership by choice. Theirincreased participation in PfP in recent yearsprimarily focused on the Balkans and serves as anexample of partnership participation being importantin its own right, while not necessarily being a route tomembership. These five, as well as NATO members,should be encouraged to establish a “buddy” system(as Sweden and Finland have already done with theBaltic states) with Caucasian and Central Asianpartners (similar to what Lithuania has been doingwith Georgia). This may not be easy, as the advancedpartners have been and remain more active in localBaltic and Balkan peace support operations that havebeen inexorably shifting to the EU.4 Hence, it will bea challenge to keep them engaged in NATO’s widergeographic interests. One way might be to makeNATO exercises in the Caucasus and Central Asiamore flexible and allow non-aligned partners to takea greater part in their planning, while encouragingtheir security sector expertise.

Balkan AspirantsNATO enlargement, the MAP process, and PfP haveplayed, and continue to play, a very important butunder-appreciated role in enhancing Balkan stabilityand security. Slovenian, Bulgarian, and Romanianmembership in NATO forms a stable securityfoundation. The MAP — as long as Article 10, theOpen Door policy, remains credible — keepsAlbania, Macedonia, and Croatia positively engagedin activities consistent with NATO principles, and theincentive of joining PfP keeps Serbia-Montenegroand Bosnia-Herzegovina productively focused. Theircontinued engagement has become increasinglyimportant in light of the transfer of NATO’s OperationAllied Harmony mission in Macedonia to the EU

(“Concordia”), and will become even more importantafter the likely transfer of NATO’s SFOR to the EU.

If PfP were to become moribund and lose credibility,security in the Balkans could be severely underminedbecause some nations might be tempted to move inunconstructive directions.

With this in mind, NATO should establish moreprecise goals for keeping its Open Door programcredible for the three remaining MAP members. This is likely to become an issue for Albania andMacedonia, who have been in PfP for almost adecade, have had five years of MAP and annualnational plan experience, and whose patience maywear thin. If NATO is unprepared to offermembership soon, it needs to establish the prospect ofit. NATO might consider some version of a “regatta”to link Balkan MAP partner accession to thecompletion of specific, well-defined NATO “acquis”with a notional time horizon of roughly five-to-eightyears — even though the regatta concept was rejectedfor the 2002 Prague Summit invitees because manypoliticians claimed that accession is ultimately apolitical issue, which it is.

PfP programs, with EU assistance, should becoordinated to security sector reforms to tackle thenew security threats.

PfP needs to be linked to the successful sub-regionalSoutheast European Defense Minister (SEDM)process — which should also be broadened to includeinterior and intelligence functions, the SoutheastEuropean Cooperation Initiative (SECI) to combattrans-border crime, and the Southeast EuropeanBrigade (SEEBRIG) in the Balkans. If this provesdifficult in the Balkans, as it likely will beyond, thenPfP’s mandate, consistent with the Prague Summit’sAction Plan Against Terrorism, ought to bebroadened to include partnership goals with policeactivities. The objective is to improve interagencycoordination and cooperation within and amongBalkan states.

This could be accomplished within the annual SEDMmeetings that began in 19965 and have succeeded inenhancing transparency, cooperation, and security in

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Southeastern Europe. In 1999, the SEDM approvedthe creation of the SEEBRIG, a 25,000-troop forcethat can be assembled as needed by the brigade’scommanders and which might deploy to Bosniasometime in the future.

It is time to build further upon SEDM’s successes todeal with the new risk environment and broadened itto include civil emergency planning and interior andintelligence ministers, creating an annual SoutheastEuropean Defense, Interior, and IntelligenceMinisterial (SEDIIM). This new SEDIIM should beencouraged to further coordinate its work with SECI6

which, among other things, combats trans-bordercrime involving trafficking of drugs and weapons,prostitution, and money laundering. Since Moldovais in SECI and Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina are PfP aspirants, they should allbecome SEDM observers, with the goal of ultimateNATO membership.

Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial andCaucasian PartnersThe Black Sea has acquired increased strategicimportance since NATO assumed command ofAfghanistan’s ISAF in August 2003, and assisted thePolish-led division in Iraq. Coupling the facts thatNATO is now actively engaged out-of-area beyondthe Balkans in the greater Black Sea region, and thatall the Black Sea defense ministers have never mettogether, it is time to apply Central European andBalkan lessons to this region. The first step tostabilization is to build understanding throughdiscussion of security risks, and then to build greaterregional cooperation through implementation ofmilitary activities in support of a transparent agenda.

The Balkan’s SEDM (and potential SEDIIM), SECI,and SEEBRIG can serve as models to further expandto the greater Black Sea littoral beyond the formationof the Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR) that wasestablished in April 2001 among the six Black Seastates7 for search and rescue humanitarianoperations, clearing sea mines, protecting theenvironment, and promoting good will visits. Onecan envision the creation of a Black Sea Task Forceto deal not only with civil emergency contingenciessuch as the earthquakes that perennially strike the

region and potential CBR after-effects, but also tointerdict the trafficking of drugs, weapons, andhumans across the greater Black Sea region,especially with the participation of Ukraine, theRussian Fleet, and the Caucasus. Here, too, since thecontinued engagement of Ukraine in PfP isimportant, the Istanbul Summit might considercommencing intensified dialogues with Ukraine as apre-requisite to joining the MAP, assuming Ukraine’spresidential elections are held in accordance withOSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope) standards and adhere to Ukrainianconstitutional procedures.

The Central and East European experience since thelate 1980s also provides numerous successfulexamples of combined peacekeeping and/or civil-emergency units that should be explored for possibleadaptation to improve interstate relations here.

The likely new United States presence in Bulgariaand Romania can be leveraged to improveinteroperability through joint training and logisticsfacilities and in building an expeditionary Black SeaTask Force. Together with Romania, Bulgaria, andTurkey — NATO’s three Black Sea allies with a richexperience in SEDM and SEEBRIG — the U.S.presence could be beneficial in fostering wider BlackSea stability and cooperation under a revived PfPprogram.

Although all three Caucasus partners were 1994signatories of PfP, their participation has variedconsiderably. This has been particularly evident withthe PfP Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP),which remains the core of transparent defenseplanning, accountability, and democratic oversight ofthe military and provides the foundation to enhancesub-regional cooperation. After 9/11, all threeCaucasus partners joined the PARP.8

Though Armenia participates in PfP, NATOmembership remains controversial because ofunresolved problems with Turkey and Azerbaijan.Armenia has close relations with Greece, Romania,and Bulgaria and remains very close to Russia. Anoriginal signatory of the 1992 TashkentCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

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Collective Security Treaty with Russia, Armenia isthe only Caucasus state to have renewed itscommitment for another five years in 1999.

Both Azerbaijan and Georgia withdrew from the CISin 1999. Azerbaijan remains in conflict withArmenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and has problemswith terrorism, drugs, crime, and human trafficking.It cooperates with the United States in counter-terrorism and participates in KFOR, Afghanistan, andIraq. Georgia participates in KFOR and Black Searegional cooperation, wants NATO to play a role insolving the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflictson Georgian soil, and, in September 2002, itsparliament adopted a resolution claiming the goal ofNATO membership. The U.S. has assisted theGeorgian armed forces through the Train and Equipprogram and in establishing control over the PankisiGorge near the border with Russia.

The U.S. has greater influence among Caucasian (andCentral Asian) partners than NATO because NATOhas been more hampered by what it can offer in termsof assistance.9 But this can change if the NATOSecurity Investment Program (NSIP) were moredirectly focused on the region and the PfP Trust Fundwere made more robust.

The PfP Trust Fund, which has allocated $4.2 millionfor destroying anti-personnel mines in Albania,Ukraine, Moldova and disposing of missile stockpilesin Georgia, must be expanded.

The NSIP, a much larger program with an annualbudget of over $600 million, covers installations andfacilities dealing with communications andinformation systems, radar, military headquarters,airfields, fuel pipelines and storage, harbors, andnavigational aids. Since NATO has assumed the leadin Afghanistan, NSIP funds now ought to be eligiblefor the ISAF operation and be applied to the broaderBlack Sea region to augment NATO air, road, and railsupport. The Istanbul Summit should look atredirecting NATO infrastructure funds in support ofNATO-led operations in Afghanistan.

In addition, the Summit should authorize theSecretary General to restructure the NATO

International Staff to consolidate PfP in onedirectorate,10 perhaps headed by its own assistantsecretary general. This would symbolize theAlliance’s commitment to a revived PfP, and highlightthe program’s renewed importance in fulfillingNATO’s wider commitments.

After PfP’s launch in 1994, when it became obviousthat necessary resources were lacking, the U.S.started its Warsaw Initiative with $100 million inannual funding. The program achieved enormoussuccess with most of the key recipients now membersof the Alliance. But the remaining 20 partners,particularly around the greater Black Sea, in theCaucasus, and Central Asia, have significantlyweaker political, economic, social, and security anddefense institutions and require greater assistance to bring their personnel and institutions closer toNATO standards.

The United States ought to launch a new IstanbulInitiative, funded at roughly the same amount as thecurrent Warsaw Initiative, to focus on a moresophisticated program stressing the PfP basics in thisregion to promote the development of a GreaterBlack Sea Defense, Interior, and IntelligenceMinisterial, and to support a Greater Black Sea TaskForce to deal with civil emergency contingencies andinterdiction operations.

It should challenge other allies to offer similarfunding, including support for Central and EasternEuropean members to transfer the lessons of theirsecurity sector transition to these other partners.

Central Asian Partners Four of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan — wereamong the original signatories of the 1992 CISCollective Security Treaty with Russia. When theprotocol extending the treaty was signed in 1999,Belarus had joined, but Uzbekistan had dropped out.Four of the Central Asian states were among the 1994signatories of PfP: Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Only after 9/11 didTajikistan finally join PfP and Kyrgyzstan andUzbekistan join PARP. Although it had been the intention to extend PfP to the Central Asian

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successor states to bind them to Western values, their practice of political democracy has generallydeteriorated over the past decade.

Though none of the Central Asian partnersparticipated in any of the Balkan operations (IFOR[Bosnia Implementation Force]11, SFOR, KFOR),they have supported U.S. and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq: Uzbekistan in OEF,Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan provided airbases andoverflights for U.S. and coalition troops for ISAF, andKazakhstan supported Poland with demining troopsin Iraq and permitted the overflight and transport of supplies and U.S. troops in Uzbekistan andKyrgyzstan. Increasingly, these activities haveirritated the Russians. Hence, encouraging the activeparticipation of Russia in a revived PfP and in theRussia-NATO Council will be increasingly importantto reduce inevitable frictions and build oncooperative relations.

CONCLUSION

Although faced with greater challenges in therequirements of a post-9/11 era, PfP must remain trueto the enduring values that prompted the originalpartnership a decade ago — that is, to promotepolitical democracy, economic free enterprise, therule of law, equitable treatment of ethnic minorities,good neighbor relations, and democratic oversightand effective management of not just the armedforces, but all security sector institutions.

If the Istanbul Summit fails to revive PfP, there arelikely to be serious destabilizing consequencesthroughout the EAPC region, and NATO will find itincreasingly difficult to fulfill its Balkan, Afghanistanand Iraq missions. If the Summit revives PfP,NATO’s ability to achieve its broader functional andgeographic objectives will be enhanced. _

1 Central Asian partners Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; Black Seapartners Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine; and MAP inviteeSlovakia, with new members Poland and the Czech Republic,participated in Operation Enduring Freedom.

2 PFP partners Finland, Sweden, and Austria; MAP-memberAlbania; and NATO invitees Romania and Bulgaria participatedin ISAF.

3 MAP member Macedonia; MAP invitees Slovakia, Latvia,Lithuania, and Estonia; Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria on theBlack Sea; Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus; andKazakhstan in Central Asia participated in Operation IraqiFreedom (OIF).

4 For example, Austria, Finland, and Sweden participated inBosnia-IFOR, to be joined later by Ireland in SFOR. All fiveparticipate in KFOR. Only Finland, Sweden, and Austria haveengaged in ISAF, and none are in OIF.

5 SEDM members include Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey,Slovenia, Romania, and Macedonia (with the U.S. and Italy asobservers). Croatia joined SEDM in October 2000.

6 Launched in December 1996, the U.S. initiated and supportedSECI to advance Balkan environment, transport infrastructure,and trade cooperation. In Bucharest, SECI includes Balkanmembers (without Serbia-Montenegro) plus Hungary andMoldova.

7 Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia.

8 The first PARP cycle launched in 1995 had 14 participants:Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania,Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland,Sweden, Albania, and Ukraine. The second cycle, launched in1996, which introduced interoperability objectives, had 18partners sign up; and, eventually, there were 19, includingUzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and then Georgia, Azerbaijan, andArmenia.

9 The U.S. has been working closely with Georgia (andUzbekistan in Central Asia) on training forces to deal with theirinternal requirements for over a decade.

10 PfP “drift” has resulted in part to an earlier restructuring of theinternational staff so that PfP is now subordinate to two ASGs— to the Political Affairs Security Policy Division and theDefense Policy and Planning Division (DPP).

11 The following 14 of 26 PfP partners participated in IFOR:Austria, Finland, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Hungary,Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania,Russia, and Ukraine


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There are strong, practical reasons for all Alliance members to cooperate on bringingsecurity to the Greater Middle East, but doing so requires a realistic assessment ofdomestic politics, a true understanding of the long-term political and socio-economicproblems in the region, and a commitment to deal with the root causes beneath theresultant instability, violence, and terrorism.

WESTERN SECURITY EFFORTS AND THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

By Dr. Anthony H. CordesmanSenior Fellow and Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at

the Center for Strategic and International Studies

NATO retains a powerful role in bringingstability to Europe. It still provides astructure for uniting different European

countries through a collective framework of securitywith the guarantee of U.S. military capabilities.

Now, however, the primary challenges to the West are“out of area.” The Balkans remain the only area inEurope that is not militarily stable, but North Africa,the Middle East, and Central Asia all present thethreat of Islamic extremism and terrorism. Friendlyregimes in these regions need security guarantees andassistance from the outside, and the struggles in Iraqand Afghanistan have shown that the West can do farmore to deal with failed regimes and regional threatsif it acts collectively.

FOCUSING ON THE GREATER MIDDLEEAST

The Islamic extremism behind the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, focused the world’s attention onthe threats emanating from these regions. The Bushadministration’s position is that the Greater MiddleEast is a Western, not a U.S., responsibility, and theneed for NATO missions is no longer a theoreticalforce-improvement priority, but, rather, a tangible andimmediate need.

It is not yet clear how aggressively the administrationwill attempt to refocus Western security efforts;

however, it has begun to push for four majorinitiatives:

• A steady build-up of the NATO security presencein Afghanistan, creating a single NATO commandin Afghanistan by 2005 that will effectively putNATO in charge of the peacemaking/nation-building effort, as well as defeating the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaida there.

• Modifying the posture in Iraq so there is a U.S.-ledNATO command to deal with military and securityassistance after the transfer of power, with a U.N.-led political and economic effort.

• Restructuring the U.S. force posture anddeployments in Europe to suit greater interactionwith the Middle East and Central Asia by reducingthe U.S. presence in areas like Germany andcreating new facilities and bases in Eastern andSouthern Europe.

• Shifting from the creation of largely generic powerprojection capabilities in NATO to actualdeployments.

Many European countries disagree with parts of thisprogram, particularly with playing a role in Iraq. Atthe same time, however, both Europe and the UnitedStates have good reasons to cooperate in this regionincluding the need to work together militarily,

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dependency on Middle Eastern oil, and the threat ofterrorism by Islamic extremists.

Force Transformation ProblemsEven $400 billion-plus defense budgets leave theUnited States with some of the defensemodernization problems of its European allies. TheIraq war has shown that the United States facesserious strains in fighting even one prolonged lowintensity conflict. This is not because the UnitedStates cannot use its immense advantages in hightechnology conventional forces to fight additional ormuch larger wars; it is rather because it cannot do sowith its present force structure and maintain thedeployment and rotation cycle necessary to retain itsskilled professional forces. The major shiftsnecessary to enable the United States to fightasymmetric wars efficiently have only begun.

The United States, therefore, needs more thanpolitical coalitions. It needs war-fighting coalitions.

Yet, in spite of America’s problems, Europeancountries are all too aware that U.S. militarymodernization and force transformation is greatlyoutpacing their own. This is partly a result of farmore efficient force structures and much clearer and more functional force improvement priorities inthe United States. It is partly the result of the factthat most European nations are far more concernedabout economic and social priorities and the future of the European Union (EU), than strategy anddefense spending.

However, it is also because the United States devotesmore money to defense. Although Europe cannotafford to replicate anything like the U.S. mix ofintelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets,precision long-range strike systems, infrastructure forpower projection, and development of net-centricwarfare capabilities, it is only spending something onthe order of $140 billion for limited coordinationamong traditional forces with no clear current mission.

Britain is the one European state that has really begunto find an effective compromise between independentaction and the need to depend on U.S. systems and

support in major projection contingencies; but even itis still making gradual cuts in its forces andmodernization plans.

France’s force plans are less mortgaged by underfunding, and more innovative. It has done better thanmany other European powers in finding a newbalance between modernization, reform, and militaryspending — although a large part of French forcesstill lack meaningful deployment to any area wherethey may really be needed.

While Germany still has some highly capable forceelements, it is spending less than half of what it was(by percent of gross domestic product) during theCold War – and much less than France and Britain oreven most of Europe, let alone the United States.This, simply, is far too little to modernize its forces.Moreover, Germany is now politically committed togross under-spending through 2007, and the Germanapproach to preserving outdated force structures andconscription may be politically correct in terms ofdomestic politics, but is extraordinarily wasteful interms of military capability.

Most of the smaller European states have been slowto abandon their traditional approach to forceplanning and, instead, specialize for meaningfulpower-projection capabilities. Norway, for example,is one of the few smaller states to specializeeffectively around missions like Special Forces,rather than try to sustain an unaffordable traditionalmix of land, naval, and air forces. Poland and Spainhave also shown that they can project forces withlimited budgets. But far too many Europeancountries are becoming a military home for the aging.

Energy Dependence on the Middle East1

The Greater Middle East involves truly vital strategicnational security interests for Europe as well as theUnited States. The industrialized nations of the worldare becoming steadily more dependent on a globaleconomy fueled by Middle East energy exports, and this dependence is growing rapidly regardless of whether or not individual states are increasingtheir direct imports from the Persian Gulf and North Africa.

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This is because the size of direct imports ofpetroleum is only a partial measure of strategicdependence. The United States and Europeaneconomies are increasingly dependent on energy-intensive imports from Asia and other regions. TheU.S. Energy Information Administration does notmake estimates of indirect imports of Middle Easternoil — that is, the oil that the nations that exportfinished goods to the United States and Europe mustthemselves import in order to produce those goods.If these imports were included, the resultingdependency figure for the United States, for example,might well be 30-40 percent higher.

Moreover, the industrialized states are increasinglydependent on the health of the global economy. Forexample, with the exception of Latin America,Mexico, and Canada, all of the United States’ majortrading partners are critically dependent on MiddleEastern oil exports.

The Enduring Security Problems of the Middle EastThe threat of Islamic extremism is another unitingstrategic interest, and one that will endure long aftertoday’s problems with Iraq, the Taliban, and al Qaidaare over. The problems of Islamic extremism andterrorism have a deep cultural and ideologicalgenesis. They are affected by the broad failure ofsecular politics and ideologies in much of the MiddleEast, and by the radical social and cultural changesimposed by the collapse of many agricultural sectors,hyper-urbanization, and sweeping changes in mediaand communications like satellite television and the Internet.

The resulting “culture shock” and political problemsalmost ensure a long period of instability as many inthe Middle East try to find security in religion and arebirth of Arab culture. At the same time, the impactof Turkish and Western colonialism, religious tension,the Arab-Israeli conflict, and hostility toward theunaffordable materialism of the West combine tocreate hostility towards the United States and Europe.These problems are affected by major economic anddemographic pressures.

Regional economic development has been poor since

the end of the oil boom in the late 1970s. The WorldBank’s report on global economic development for 2003 shows that growth in per capita income inconstant prices dropped from 3.6 percent during1971-1980 to -0.6 percent during 1981-1990, andwas only 1 percent from 1991-2000 — reflectingstatic income over nearly 20 years in a region withextremely poor equity of income distribution.

Some states like Kuwait, Qatar, and the United ArabEmirates have so much oil and gas wealth per capitathat they may be able to buy their way out of theirmistakes indefinitely. Most Middle Eastern states,however, suffer severely from economicmismanagement and excessive state control of theeconomy. Structural economic reform has begun inAlgeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, SaudiArabia, Lebanon, and Bahrain. This reform,however, remains highly uncertain and none has yetdeveloped it to the point where it has a seriousprospect of success.

The other Middle Eastern states have uncertain near-to mid-term economic prospects, and this is true ofmost oil exporters as well. Saudi Arabia, forexample, has experienced over a decade of budgetdeficits and its oil wealth is becoming increasinglymarginal as its population grows far more quicklythan its economy. The Israeli and Palestinianeconomies have been crippled by war. Egypt, Jordan,Lebanon, and Syria are all experiencing seriouseconomic and demographic problems, and the Iraqieconomy is already weak and could face futureshocks. The Iranian economy is in a serious crisis,compounded by deep ideological conflicts.

The end result is that a combination of fluctuating oilrevenues, high population growth rates, and a failureto modernize and diversify the overall economythreatens to turn the past oil wealth of the exportingstates into oil poverty.

These economic pressures are compounded by major demographic problems. The total populationof the Middle East and North Africa has grown from78.6 million in 1950 to 307.1 million in 2000.Conservative projections put it at 376.2 million in

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2010, 522.3 million in 2030, and 656.3 million in2050. This growth will exhaust natural watersupplies, force permanent dependence on foundimports, and raise the size of the young working agepopulation (15-to-30 year olds) from 20.5 million in1950 to 145.2 million in 2050. With over 40 percentof the region’s population now 14 years or younger,there will be an immense bow wave of future strain on the social, educational, political, andeconomic systems.

In addition, political structures remain fragile andlargely authoritarian regardless of the formalstructure of government. In broad terms, no state inthe region has managed to create a secular politicalculture that provides effective pluralism.

The resulting social turbulence is compounded by theregion’s extremely young population, overstretchedand outdated educational systems, and the failure ofthe labor market to create jobs for many of the youngmen entering the labor force. Emigration createsanother source of social turmoil, while religious andcultural barriers, and the issue of employment ofwomen make greater other problems in productivityand competitiveness with developed regions.

IS 2004 THE YEAR OF NATO AND THEGREATER MIDDLE EAST?

There are serious practical challenges to forgingcooperation within NATO over the Middle East.Several key factors are involved:

IraqRegardless of the genesis and justification of the Iraqwar, the nations of Europe now cannot turn aside andeasily allow the U.S. and British-led coalition to fail.At the same time, Iraq’s problems are as much politicaland economic as they are military, and it is far fromclear what a NATO mission would really entail.

• Iraq simply may not become stable and viableenough for a major U.S./European role of the kindthe United States envisions. Whether it will wantthe United States in any kind of leading advisoryand tutorial role is another issue entirely — and it

may be only marginally more tolerant of NATO anda major European presence, unless it can play thisoff against the United States.

• The United States may well defeat the insurgents,but if it does not, it is asking NATO — specificallyNATO-Europe — to take on an open-endedsecurity mission that will involve real combat. The multinational division has shown that a verydiverse mix of Polish, Spanish, Ukrainian, andother forces can work well in a peacekeepingmission in a relatively stable area using NATOprocedures. Sustained low intensity conflict andterrorism may well be a different story. It is alsounclear whether, even if a number of Europeandefense ministries perceive this mission to bedesirable, they will be able to obtain the necessarypolitical support.

• The United States is talking about seriousEuropean power projection, and the EU and NATOdiscussions to date raise serious doubts about howwell any European country other than Britain reallyunderstands the costs and difficulties of projectinglarge forces at long distances.

• Giving such a mission to NATO does at leastindirectly challenge both the current French andGerman policies on Iraq, and means a majorcommitment to NATO versus other interests. Alarge German or French role also means majorAmerican compromises.

• Mission length will be an issue in both Iraq andAfghanistan. It is easy to get into such roles. Thefact that peacekeeping forces are in their fifth yearin Kosovo and eighth year in Bosnia show it ismuch harder to get out.

• The economic and oil issues in Iraq will becomesteadily more important during 2004, and so willthe questions of who gives and manages what interms of aid, debt forgiveness, and reparations.

AfghanistanEurope and NATO are already playing a major role inAfghanistan. Germany, in particular, has shown

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leadership in dealing with Afghanistan’s economicand political problems. However, there are thefollowing practical issues:

• Progress in the Loya Jirga aside, the challenges oftransforming “Kabulstan” into Afghanistan aregoing to remain serious and involve a host ofnationwide political and economic challenges, aswell as military ones. This nation-buildingpresents more problems in terms of costs andresources. In addition, it simply is not clear thatthere is a feasible plan that can overcomeAfghanistan’s internal divisions, the weakness of itscentral government, and critical economicdevelopment problems.

• The security problem extends deep into Pakistan,and is heavily driven by Pakistani Islamicextremists, al-Qaida, and new Salafi movements.The role of NATO in dealing with these issues mustbe defined, and they may well present as manychallenges as in Afghanistan.

• More generally, it simply is not clear where the“Greater Middle East” stops. If it can includeAfghanistan and Iraq, it can also include Pakistan,the Caspian, and Central Asia. In the process, therisk that new tensions and differences will emergeover given cases grows.

• Afghanistan is in Russia’s backyard, and involvesRussian security interests. Unless Russia has aclear role, it may find the prospect of a majorNATO mission there less than enticing. Alsounclear is that such a mission can be fullydecoupled from Islamic extremist movements inthe rest of Central Asia. China and Iran will also beinterested (and interesting) players.

The Arab-Israeli ChallengeAn equally serious regional challenge is the Arab-Israeli peace process.

No issue does more to polarize the Arab and Islamicworld than the Israel-Palestinian conflict. This aspectof hostility is directed largely against the U.S. and not against the West in general, as European

governments and public opinion are far more criticalof Israel than any U.S. political party or the American people.

The Road Map appeared to offer a way out — acompromise around which the West could unite —but it remains inert. Israel and the Palestiniansalready have two failed leaderships and politicalstructures unable to move towards a real peace. Theymay well have two failed peoples, where the majorityon each side is too angry and fearful to compromiseor see the other’s valid needs.

A combination of the Israeli security fence andsettlements and Palestinian terrorism could pushIsrael into taking steps that make a meaningfulPalestinian state on the West Bank almost impossible— if, indeed, the demographics and economies ofGaza and the West Bank have not already done so.Certainly, the U.S. and European inability to agree on the details of Israel’s borders and issues like thestatus of Jerusalem when formulating the Road Mapare not going to become an easier challenge in the future.

This situation raises the following questions:

Can a NATO/European role in Iraq and Afghanistanbe decoupled from the Arab-Israel peace issue?Probably in American eyes, but not in European ones,and probably not in those of Arab or Islamic peoplein terms of hostility towards missions closely tied tothe U.S. A better option in peace-making would befor the leadership role to be taken by Britain andother European nations the U.S. is willing to trust asfully sensitive to Israeli concerns.

Can NATO ignore the possible need for a jointpeacekeeping mission to deal with the Arab-Israelicrisis? The war is not yet brutal and draining enough for the political leadership and popularopinion on either side to accept a peace of exhaustionand a peace of trust has long been impossible. Theworse the prospects for a peace based on trust,however, the more some form of outside military rolemay be necessary. Reaching agreement on thiswithin NATO is going to be far from easy, however,

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and any military effort will almost certainly have tobe linked to an equally long and expensive economicaid effort.

IranEurope may join the U.S. in seeking to block Iranianproliferation, but it does not see Iran as part of anaxis of evil. Where the U.S. has sought to sanctionIran, Europe has sought dialogue, cultural exchanges,and economic ties — an approach that seems moresuccessful and more likely to give moderate forces inIran influence and power. The Bush administrationmay be turning away from sanctions andcontainment, but any unified security policy towardsthe Greater Middle East must deal with Iran.

The War on TerrorismNone of the previous discussion has come to gripswith the need to deal with the broader problem ofIslamic terrorism, and the need to develop better-integrated and more effective approaches to counter-terrorism and homeland security. In many ways,significant improvements are already taking place.There is far better intelligence sharing andcooperation between countries, better dialogue onhomeland defense, and better cooperation in Interpol.NATO is developing a function as a clearinghouse fornational intelligence and analysis.

The need to continue building on this progress andmomentum is vital, but this raises almost as manyissues about the level of spending, and the ability toagree on common policies as the military securitymission.

The Clash Between Civilizations versus the ClashWithin A CivilizationFinally, hidden away beneath all of these security anddiplomatic issues is the broader question of how theWest should address the conflicts and tensions withinthe Arab and Islamic worlds, and particularly thechallenge Islamic extremism poses to the stabilityand political systems of the nations in the region and,therefore, to others.

The problems in the West’s approach to the GreaterMiddle East are compounded by a lack of

understanding of Islam, Iran, and the Arab world, andsometimes by overt or tacit cultural and racialprejudice. In the case of the United States, both tiesto Israel and the shock of 9/11 add to thesemisunderstandings. In Europe, the issues are coloredby the attack on Spain this past March and the threatof future terrorism, as well as the cultural andeconomic shock of legal and illegal immigration —despite the fact that European demographics virtuallyforce Europe to depend on labor immigration fromthe Arab and Islamic worlds for well beyond thecoming generation.

Yet, Huntington aside [Samuel Huntington, authorof The Clash of Civilizations], the real problem is

not a “clash of civilizations” between the West andthe Arab/Islamic world, but the clash within theArab/Islamic world. The real problem is whether itcan deal with its own political, cultural, economic,and demographic pressures through reform andevolution or if it will face a prolonged period ofviolence and revolution. It is also whether Algeriaand Iran are the avatars of what Islamic extremismwill bring to the region.

It may well be that the forces at work within theArab/Islamic world are so great and have so muchmomentum that the efforts of the West to supportevolution and reform can only have a marginalimpact, as in the past. There has been plenty ofdialogue, some economic aid, a flood of wastefularms sales, and little substantive progress. The same is true of military and security aid efforts. Some ten years of Mediterranean Dialogue in NATOhave so far produced virtually nothing but dialogue.A more meaningful relationship there would be useful.

CONCLUSION

The West cannot hope to deal with the problems ofinstability, violence, and terrorism within theArab/Islamic world unless it makes a real attempt todeal with root causes. It must also develop anideological partnership with moderate regimes andArab and Islamic intellectuals if it is to have anychance at defeating a hostile ideology.

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The Bush administration has touched upon all theseissues in its call for democracy in the Arab world, as have similar European calls for reform, but, so far, there is little evidence that anyone is shapingthe nuanced and practical policies required to meetthe very different needs of the very individual Araband Islamic states. How do regimes with no truepolitical parties or experience with pluralism becomereal and stable democracies? How do they resolvethe need for a matching rule of law and human rightsin secular political cultures? What is to be done todeal with the problems of demography and the needfor major economic reforms? Intended or not,current efforts have generally appeared to those in the region to be calls for regime change favorable tothe United States, rather than support for real,practical reform.

If the West only deals with the Greater Middle East inNATO security terms, the best it can hope for is amix of containment, continued extremism, andoccasional war. To eliminate terrorism or achieveenergy security, the root causes of the region’sproblems must be addressed in as thorough and aspractical a manner as any military mission. _

1 For specific information on global MENA oil dependencyprojections see Energy Information Agency, International EnergyOutlook, 2003, Washington, DOE/EIA-0484 (2003), May 2003,pp. 42, 45, 185, 237;International Energy Agency, World EnergyOutlook, 2002 Insights, Paris, IEA, 2002, pp. 91-93, 106-107;and BP/Amoco, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London,BP, 2003, pp. 6-7,17.


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NATO must adapt to the new geo-political realities and forge new “rules of the road.” Tomove forward successfully, the Alliance must develop common policies on how to dealwith irresponsible states, the use of military force, the role of multilateral institutions,and how to bring political and economic reform to the Greater Middle East. It is alsotime to clarify the purposes and benefits of European integration.

PROPOSALS FOR RENEWING THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

By Dr. Charles A. KupchanSenior Fellow and Director of Europe Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

The accomplishments of the Atlantic Allianceare remarkable. History records few, if any,alliances that have yielded so many benefits

for their members or for the broader internationalcommunity.

Despite these accomplishments, the transatlanticrelationship is under greater strain today than at anypoint in at least a generation. Many Europeansassume malign intent on the part of the United States.Many Americans resent European behavior anddismiss European perceptions of today’s threats. Theconviction that the United States is a hyper-power tobe contained has become fashionable in Europe.Reliance on coalitions of the willing to act when theUnited Nations and the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) will not has become the policyof the United States.

The war in Iraq brought these strains to the point ofcrisis. France and Germany organized resistance tothe United States in the U.N. Security Council —alongside Russia, historically NATO’s chiefadversary. The Bush administration, in turn, soughtto separate these states from other members of theAlliance and the European Union (EU). For a time,rhetoric replaced diplomacy as the primaryinstrument for taking positions, making criticisms,and shaping coalitions.

These events were, to say the least, unusual. Theparticular outcome was influenced by domesticpolitics, personality, miscommunication, and

unfortunate circumstance. What happened, however,was more than an intersection of unexpecteddevelopments, disputes over policy, and bad luck.The roots of the Iraq conflict extend at least as farback as 11/9, the day in 1989 when the Berlin Wallcame down; they were strengthened, in turn, by theevents of 9/11, the day in 2001 when terroristsdestroyed the World Trade Center, attacked thePentagon, and killed nearly 3,000 innocent people.

When the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe collapsed,the greatest reason for NATO solidarity disappeared.If 11/9 increased the scope for disagreementsbetween the United States and Europe, 9/11 createdthe grounds for disagreements that are trulydangerous for the transatlantic relationship. Theattacks of that day produced the most sweepingreorientation of U.S. grand strategy in over half acentury. Washington’s goal now would be not only tocontain and deter hostile states, but also to attackterrorists and regimes that harbor terrorists beforethey could act. European strategies, in contrast,underwent no comparable revision. Indeed, manyNATO allies complained of American unilateralism,while questioning the administration’s insistence thatthe security of all nations was now at risk.

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This essay is an abridged version of the report of an independenttask force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, chairedby Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers. CharlesKupchan served as the project director. For the full text of“Renewing the Atlantic Partnership,” seehttp://www.cfr.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdf.

These shifts in the relationship between the UnitedStates and Europe — the consequences of 11/9 and 9/11 — make it clear that the transatlanticrelationship urgently needs reassessment. In the face of mounting challenges to the integrity ofthe West, what can be done to put the Atlanticpartnership back on a sound foundation?

LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

Europeans and Americans must now work together toensure that the Iraq crisis becomes an anomaly intheir relationship, not a precedent for things to come.To do so, the Atlantic nations should draw from thelessons of their common past:

Lesson One: No alliance can function successfully inthe absence of a common strategy, or in the presenceof competing strategies.An alliance has meaning only when its membersadjust their policies to take into account theirpartners’ interests — when they do things for oneanother that they would not do if the alliance did notexist. If the transatlantic relationship is to continue tomean what it has meant in the past, both sides mustlearn from their failure over Iraq. The Americanswill need to reaffirm the insight that shaped theirapproach to allies throughout the Cold War: that thepower to act is not necessarily the power to persuade;that even in an alliance in which military capabilitiesare disproportionately distributed, the costs ofunilateralism can exceed those involved in seekingconsent. The Europeans, in turn, will need toacknowledge that the post-9/11 world is by no meanssafe for transatlantic societies, that the dangers thatmake it unsafe do not come from Washington, andthat neither nostalgia for the past nor insularity in thepresent will suffice in coping with those threats. Theobjective is not so much a formal consensus — thequest for which can be debilitating and paralyzing —but a common sense of direction.

Lesson Two: A common strategy need not requireequivalent capabilities.Complementarity is an asset, not a liability. If theUnited States is the indispensable nation in terms ofits military power, then surely the Europeans areindispensable allies in most of the other categories of

power upon which statecraft depends. Whether theissues are countering terrorism, liberalizing trade,preventing international crime, containing weaponsof mass destruction, rebuilding post-conflict states,combating poverty, fighting disease, or spreadingdemocracy and human rights, European andAmerican priorities and capabilities complement oneanother far more often than they compete with oneanother.

Lesson Three: The time has come to clarify thepurposes and benefits of European integration.The pace and scope of European integration arematters for Europeans to decide. But the Americanresponse to this process will be affected by how the EU’s leaders and electorates perceive the union’srole. Casting the EU as a counterweight to theUnited States, even if only for rhetorical purposes,will surely fuel transatlantic tension and encourageWashington to look elsewhere for internationalpartners. If, however, the EU frames its policies incomplementary terms, as it has done in the past,Washington should continue to regard Europe’sdeepening and widening as in America’s interest. Adeeper Europe could ensure the irreversibility ofunion and could lead to a more militarily capable EU— one that could in time become a more effectivepartner of the United States. A wider Europe couldensure that peace, democracy, and prosperitycontinue to spread eastward, thereby converging withwhat could be similar trends in Russia.

Both sides of the Atlantic, therefore, have importantroles to play in shaping the future of the EU.American leaders must resolve their long-standingambivalence about the emerging European entity.Europe’s leaders must resist the temptation to defineits identity in opposition to the United States. Thosewho believe in Atlantic partnership need to be heardcalling for a Europe that remains a steady partner ofthe United States, even as it strengthens itself andbroadens its international role.

COMMON TASKS

As the Atlantic democracies work to renew theirpartnership, they should focus on the followingcommon tasks:

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Adapt NATO to New Geopolitical Realities.Today NATO’s principles remain valid, but not all ofits historic practices do. There is no further need for alarge American military presence in the middle ofEurope; redeployments elsewhere are already takingplace. The threats confronting the Alliance are morediverse than they were during the Cold War; henceAmerican and European security interests will nolonger correspond as precisely as they once did.NATO needs to be more flexible in its procedures and more ambitious in its missions than it has been in the past.

Even as the United States draws down the number ofits troops deployed on the continent, it shouldmaintain a sufficient presence to ensure both theinteroperability and the sense of collective purposethat arises from an integrated military structure. Atthe same time, it must be more receptive to EUefforts to assume a more prominent role in themanagement of European security.

The overall direction of policy should be clear: thatthe United States continues to welcome what it hassought since the earliest days of the Cold War — aEurope in which Europeans bear the primaryresponsibility for their own security.

NATO must recognize the extent to which theaftermaths of 11/9 and 9/11 transformed the strategicpriorities of the United States. As the United Statesredeploys its forces outside of Europe, the Alliancemust find the appropriate balance between a newemphasis on out-of-area missions and its traditionalfocus on European security. Although NATO willcontinue to remain active both within and outside thegeographical confines of Europe, there needs to be acommon understanding that NATO must increasinglyconcern itself with threats emanating from outsideEurope if the Alliance is to prove as central to thepost-11/9 (and post-9/11) world as it was throughoutthe Cold War.

Establish New Guidelines for the Use of MilitaryForce.Over the past half-century, a hallmark of transatlanticpartnership has been agreement on basic principlesgoverning the employment of military capabilities.

Today, new challenges require a reassessment ofthose principles. The Atlantic Alliance can help tosolve this problem by establishing “rules of the road”regarding preventive uses of military force. Thesecould begin with a consensus on what not to do: forexample, Europeans could agree not to rejectpreventive action in principle, while Americanswould agree that prevention would be reserved forspecial cases and not be the centerpiece of U.S.strategy. Both parties could then acknowledge theprogress that has already been made in specifying theconditions in which intervention is justified: tocombat terrorism (as in Afghanistan), to backmultilaterally sanctioned inspections (as in Iraq), orto achieve humanitarian goals (as in Bosnia, Kosovo,and East Timor). Recent EU planning documentshave called for robust action to forestall threats fromterrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as hasU.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. These trendssuggest that the United States, NATO, the EU, and theU.N. might find more common ground on this issuethan one might expect from the rhetoric.

Develop a Common Policy toward IrresponsibleStates.Preventive strikes should always be a last resort. The Transatlantic Alliance should also agree on howto forestall situations that might require it. Thatmeans developing compatible policies toward statesthat possess or seek to possess weapons of massdestruction, that harbor terrorists or supportterrorism, and that seek through these means tochallenge the international order that Europeans andAmericans have created and must sustain. Europeansshould acknowledge the need for credible threats, notjust inducements, in dealing with irresponsible states:coercive diplomacy is at times necessary to achieveresults. Americans need to be prepared to includeinducements in their strategy: threats do not in allinstances produce acquiescence.

The Atlantic partners need to ensure that their searchfor common ground does not become a pretext forprocrastination, thereby providing irresponsible states more time to develop their weaponscapabilities. Ongoing initiatives should, therefore, bestepped up — including deepening cooperation onsecuring nuclear materials in the former Soviet

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Union; strengthening links between U.S. andEuropean intelligence services; expanding therecently launched naval search-and-seizure programmore formally known as the Proliferation SecurityInitiative; closing loopholes in the nonproliferationregime that allow countries to legally accumulatestockpiles of nuclear fuel; and tighteningenforcement mechanisms to respond to violations of existing counter-proliferation regimes.

Agree on the Role of Multilateral Institutions.Disagreement over the efficacy and responsibility of international institutions has been a major sourceof transatlantic discord since at least the mid-1990s.In the aftermath of disputes over the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, and theInternational Criminal Court, there is now a growingsentiment in Europe — and among critics of the Bushadministration within the United States — thatAmericans are becoming uncompromisingunilateralists, while Europeans are seen by theirAmerican detractors as uncritical and naïvemultilateralists whose real aim is to constrainAmerican power.

These perceptions miss the nature of the problem.Disagreements on policy, not differences over theutility of international institutions, have caused mostof these clashes. Had Americans and Europeansreached a consensus on the issues involved, disputesover procedure would have seemed much less serious.

As the experiences of World War II and the Cold Warmade clear, when the United States and its Europeanallies agree on policy objectives, the institutionalframeworks for implementing them usually follow.

There are compelling reasons now, on both sides ofthe Atlantic, to revive this tradition of functiondetermining form. Europe will find internationalinstitutions much less effective if the world’s onlysuperpower has stepped away from them. The UnitedStates loses support abroad when it is seen to beacting unilaterally, making it harder for Washingtonto enlist allies in pursuing its objectives and inmarshaling domestic support.

Build a Common Approach to the Greater Middle East.The Greater Middle East is the part of the world withthe greatest potential to affect the security andprosperity of Europeans and Americans alike. Thetransatlantic community must tackle four centralissues, the first of which is Iraq. Europeans andAmericans must set aside narrow political andeconomic ambitions in the region and jointlyshoulder responsibility for stabilizing the country.NATO, already demonstrating its value inAfghanistan, is a natural successor to the currentinternational military presence in Iraq. If a substantialincrease in financial and military support fromEurope is to be forthcoming, the United States mustbe prepared for greater European participation in thepolitical management of Iraq.

Iran is a second issue. Iran is experiencingconsiderable internal debate over the direction of itsdomestic politics and foreign policy. Americans andEuropeans should coordinate their policies — ifpossible, with Russia as well — to ensure thatIranians fully understand how the internationalcommunity will react to their decisions regardingproliferation, support for terrorism, and democracy.The importance of encouraging political reform inIran and neutralizing potential threats should giveEurope and the United States a strong incentive to act in unison.

A third issue is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thewidespread perception in Europe that the UnitedStates one-sidedly favors Israel weakens support forAmerican foreign policy in Europe. Meanwhile,many American policymakers see European policytoward the dispute as reflexively pro-Palestinian.Both sides need to make an effort to achieve acommon position: the United States needs to definemore precisely its concept of a Palestinian state;Europe must take more seriously Israel’s concern for security.

A fourth area for transatlantic cooperation in theGreater Middle East concerns the area’s long-termeconomic and political development. Many countries

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in the region have lagged behind the rest of the worldin moving toward democratic societies and marketeconomies. Addressing this problem requires aconcerted effort by Europe and the United States topromote political and economic reform. The goalshould be not to impose change on traditionalsocieties, but rather to work with local political,economic, and civic leaders in supporting a gradualprocess of reform.

CONCLUSION

Farsighted vision and political courage sustained thetransatlantic partnership for half a century, to theoverwhelming benefit of Europeans, Americans, andthe world. Today’s challenges are different, but the

benefits of partnership are still substantial — as arethe costs if the partnership is allowed to erode.Recent acrimony demonstrates not only thedifficulties that arise for America and Europe whenthey fail to act as partners, but also that pressingproblems are best addressed together.

In the end, Europe and America have far more to gainas allies than as neutrals or adversaries. Withenlightened leadership, governments and citizens onboth sides of the Atlantic are sure to grasp and actupon that reality. _



BIBLIOGRAPHYPlease note that the U.S. Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and availability

of the resources listed below; such responsibility resides solely with the providers.

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Archick, Kristin, and Paul E. Gallis. NATO AND THEEUROPEAN UNION. Washington, DC: Library ofCongress, Congressional Research Service, 6 April 2004. 20 p.

Asmus, Ronald D. OPENING NATO’S DOOR: HOWTHE ALLIANCE REMADE ITSELF FOR A NEWERA. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations,2002. 415 p.

Barany, Zoltan. “NATO’S PEACEFUL ADVANCE.”Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15. No. 1. January 2004.pp. 63-76.

Bensahel, Nora. THE COUNTERTERRORCOALITIONS: COOPERATION WITH EUROPE,NATO, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION. SantaMonica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003. 80 p.

Bereuter, Doug, and John Lis. “BROADENING THETRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27. No. 1. Winter 2003.pp. 147-162.

Campbell, Kurt M. “THE END OF ALLIANCES?:NOT SO FAST.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27.No. 2. Spring 2004. pp. 151-163.

“CAN NATO SURVIVE EUROPE?” The NationalInterest, No. 75. Spring 2004. pp. 65-76.

Gallis, Paul E. NATO’S DECISION-MAKINGPROCESS. Washington, DC: Library of Congress,Congressional Research Service, 8 March 2004. 6 p.

Gardner, Hall. “ALIGNING FOR THE FUTURE:ASSERTIVE UNILATERALISM OR CONCERT OFPOWERS?” Harvard International Review, Vol. 24.No. 4. Winter 2003. pp. 56-61.

Gorowitz, Alan. A REPORT OF THE GEORGE C.MARSHALL EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITYSTUDIES CONFERENCE ON: TOWARD NATOMEMBERSHIP: HARMONIZING EFFORTS INSOUTHEAST EUROPE. Garmisch-Partenkirchen,Germany: George C. Marshall European Center forSecurity Studies, 4-7 November 2003. 4 p.

Kissinger, Henry A., Charles A. Kupchan, andLawrence H. Summers. RENEWING THE ATLANTICPARTNERSHIP. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004. 42 p.

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Robertson, Lord. “OUR GRANDCHILDREN’SNATO.” European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8. No. 4. December 2003. pp. 509-513.

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A G U I D E T O A D D I T I O N A L R E A D I N G


KEY INTERNET SITESPlease note that the U.S. Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and availability

of the resources listed below; such responsibility resides solely with the providers. Internet resources were active as of June 2004.

47

Government Sites

Allied Command Transformation Homepagehttp://www.act.nato.int/

Allied Forces North Europehttp://www.afnorth.nato.int/

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Councilhttp://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studieshttp://www.marshallcenter.org/

Joint Force Command Napleshttp://www.afsouth.nato.int/

NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agencyhttp://www.nc3a.nato.int/

NATO Official Homepagehttp://www.nato.int/

NATO Parliamentary Assemblyhttp://www.naa.be/

NATO Summit - Istanbul 2004http://www.natoistanbul2004.org.tr/

The Partnership for Peacehttp://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europehttp://www.nato.int/shape/

U.S. Air Force, Europehttp://www.usafe.af.mil/

U.S. Army, NATOhttp://www.usanato.army.mil/

U.S. Department of State: Bureau of European andEurasian Affairs: NATOhttp://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/nato/

U.S. Department of State: International InformationPrograms: The U.S. in NATOhttp://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/nato.html

U.S. Embassy Vienna: U.S.-NATOhttp://www.usembassy.at/en/policy/nato.htm

U.S. European Commandhttp://www.eucom.mil/

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europehttps://www.mfe.usmc.mil/

U.S. Mission to NATOhttp://nato.usmission.gov/

U.S. Mission to the European Unionhttp://www.useu.be/

U.S. Mission to the OSCEhttp://www.usosce.rpo.at/

U.S. Naval Forces, Europehttp://www.naveur.navy.mil/

Non-Government Sites

The American Enterprise Institute: New AtlanticInitiativehttp://www.aei.org/research/nai/projectID.11/default.asp

Arms Control Association: Subject Resources: NATOhttp://www.armscontrol.org/subject/nato/

The Atlantic Council of the U.S.http://www.acus.org/

The Brookings Institution: Center on the United States and Europehttp://www.brookings.edu/fp/cuse/center_hp.htm

The Heritage Foundation: NATO and European Defensehttp://www.heritage.org/research/europe/issues2004.cfm _


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