The U.S. and Irish Credit Crises: Similarities and ... · – Low cost of funding (Eurocurrency)...
Transcript of The U.S. and Irish Credit Crises: Similarities and ... · – Low cost of funding (Eurocurrency)...
The U.S. and Irish Credit Crises:Similarities and DifferencesSimilarities and Differences
Thomas FlavinNUI MaynoothNUI Maynooth
Irish Financial CrisisIrish Financial Crisis
• Ireland has experienced a severe financialIreland has experienced a severe financial crisis
• Our leading financial institutions had to be• Our leading financial institutions had to be saved from extinctionC i i h ill d t th l• Crisis has spilled over to the real economy and the Irish recession is most severe
d d iamong advanced economies
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Financial Equity Index growth relative to TotalFinancial Equity Index growth relative to Total Market
2 5
3
3.5
1.5
2
2.5
IRLUS
0.5
1
0
02/0
1/19
95
02/0
7/19
95
02/0
1/19
96
02/0
7/19
96
02/0
1/19
97
02/0
7/19
97
02/0
1/19
98
02/0
7/19
98
02/0
1/19
99
02/0
7/19
99
02/0
1/20
00
02/0
7/20
00
02/0
1/20
01
02/0
7/20
01
02/0
1/20
02
02/0
7/20
02
02/0
1/20
03
02/0
7/20
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02/0
1/20
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02/0
7/20
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02/0
1/20
05
02/0
7/20
05
02/0
1/20
06
02/0
7/20
06
02/0
1/20
07
02/0
7/20
07
02/0
1/20
08
02/0
7/20
08
02/0
1/20
09
02/0
7/20
09
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Motivation of this studyMotivation of this study
• Ireland – victim of global crisis or author ofIreland victim of global crisis or author of its own downfall?
• “We are exposed to the harsh winds that are blowing in the Anglo-American worldare blowing in the Anglo American world at present”. Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan, June 08Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan, June 08
• Was it that simple or was there more?05/11/2009 Presentation at the CenFIS conference on Regulating Systemic Risk 4
Was it that simple or was there more?
Economic BackgroundEconomic Background
• The Irish economy became the great ragsThe Irish economy became the great rags to riches story over the period 1994 –20062006. – Average annual economic growth of approx
7%7%– achieved full employment at about 4% – increases in standards of living– increases in standards of living – population increased by about 20% to 4.2m.
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Timing of the CrisisTiming of the Crisis
• Irish Financial Crisis started later than inIrish Financial Crisis started later than in the US
• Irish house prices began to slow down• Irish house prices began to slow down from March 2007 but mainly due to uncertainty about future tax policyuncertainty about future tax policy
• Economy grew strongly during 2007 and it d th t fi i l t h dappeared that our financial sector had
avoided the worst of the crisis
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Common Root causeCommon Root cause
• As in the US the root cause of the IrishAs in the US, the root cause of the Irish crisis lay within a financial sector that was over-exposed to the property sectorover exposed to the property sector – In Ireland, major problems lay in lending for
property development and constructionproperty development and construction • Bank funding mis-match
International Euribor borrowing funding long– International Euribor borrowing funding long-term property development loans
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Irish House Price Series
€500,000
€600,000
Second‐hand ‐Dublin
New ‐ Dublin
€300,000
€400,000
New Dublin
Second‐hand ‐ whole country
New ‐ whole country
€100,000
€200,000
€0
€100,000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
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Irish v US House Prices 1996-2009
350
400
450
200
250
300
50
100
150
0
May
-96
Sep
-96
Jan-
97
May
-97
Sep
-97
Jan-
98
May
-98
Sep
-98
Jan-
99M
ay-9
9
Sep
-99
Jan-
00
May
-00
Sep
-00
Jan-
01
May
-01
Sep
-01
Jan-
02
May
-02
Sep
-02
Jan-
03M
ay-0
3
Sep
-03
Jan-
04M
ay-0
4
Sep
-04
Jan-
05
May
-05
Sep
-05
Jan-
06
May
-06
Sep
-06
Jan-
07M
ay-0
7
Sep
-07
Jan-
08M
ay-0
8
Sep
-08
Jan-
09
May
-09
CA NY USA IRE
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Where did it all go wrong?Where did it all go wrong?
• “We drank too deeply from the nationalWe drank too deeply from the national cup of, I suppose, confidence . . . The national mood of self-confidence brewednational mood of self confidence brewed itself up into overdrive.”
AIB chairman Dermot Gleeson May 2009– AIB chairman, Dermot Gleeson, May 2009
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Role of the financial sectorRole of the financial sector
• Financial InnovationFinancial Innovation– Little securitization– Banks typically retained loans on balanceBanks typically retained loans on balance
sheet– Originate & hold NOT Originate & distribute
• Declining standards applied to lending– Low cost of funding (Eurocurrency)– Battle for market share – Huge increase in credit extended
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Mortgages on Balance Sheets ofCredit Institutions in Ireland
€120 bn
€140 bn
Credit Institutions in Ireland
€80 bn
€100 bn
€20 bn
€40 bn
€60 bn
€0 bn
€20 bn
Mar‐02 Mar‐03 Mar‐04 Mar‐05 Mar‐06 Mar‐07 Mar‐08 Mar‐09 Mar‐10
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Breakdown of Mortgages by Loan‐to‐Value
80%
90%
100%
50%
60%
70% >=100%
<99%
<95%
10%
20%
30%
40% <90%
<80%
<70%
0%
10%
2004 2005 2006 2007
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Breakdown of Mortgages by Loan Maturity
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
70%> 35 years
< 35 years
< 30 years
10%
20%
30%
40%< 25 years
< 20 years
0%
2004 2005 2006 2007
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Undiversified Loan BookUndiversified Loan Book
• Woods (2007) shows that as a proportionWoods (2007) shows that as a proportion of lending to the private sector, property-related lending grew from 38% in 2001 torelated lending grew from 38% in 2001 to over 62% in 2007.
• Increasing proportion to Commercial• Increasing proportion to Commercial property where income yields were very low relative to other Euro zone countrieslow relative to other Euro zone countries
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The role of the EuroThe role of the Euro
• Ireland signalled their intention to join theIreland signalled their intention to join the Euro project at the earliest opportunity
• As date of single currency approaches• As date of single currency approaches, nominal rates fallTh h t i d f E l t h• Throughout period of Euro, real rates have been very low as Irish inflation outstripped th t f E tthat of Euro partners
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Mortgage Rates: Nominal and Real
12
14
16
8
10
12
Nominal
4
6
Nominal
Real
-2
0
2
Jan-
85
Jan-
86
Jan-
87
Jan-
88
Jan-
89
Jan-
90
Jan-
91
Jan-
92
Jan-
93
Jan-
94
Jan-
95
Jan-
96
Jan-
97
Jan-
98
Jan-
99
Jan-
00
Jan-
01
Jan-
02
Jan-
03
Jan-
04
Jan-
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Jan-
06
Jan-
07
Jan-
08
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Role of GovernmentRole of Government
• Encouraged people to invest in propertyEncouraged people to invest in property through a series of tax-incentive schemes
Hotels– Hotels– Rural regeneration
F il t l t• Failure to regulate– Importance of stamp duty to public finance– Cronyism– ‘Bureaucratic gambling’
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Manifestation of the CrisisManifestation of the Crisis
• In late September 2008, Irish financialIn late September 2008, Irish financial sector and government have to acknowledge severity of the crisisg y
• Freezing of Interbank lending markets after Lehman Brothers collapsep
• At least one bank unable to roll-over their foreign borrowingsg g
• The crisis then moves to a Resolution phase
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p
Resolution PhaseResolution Phase
• The government provided a blanketThe government provided a blanket guarantee to the depositors and all creditors of six domestic bankscreditors of six domestic banks
• Government feared that contagious effects due to the concentrated nature of Irishdue to the concentrated nature of Irish bank could create systemic risk
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Resolution PhaseResolution Phase
• Government promise a recapitalizationGovernment promise a recapitalization programme
Jan 09: Nationalization of Anglo Irish Bank– Jan 09: Nationalization of Anglo Irish Bank– Feb 09: €7bn injection for BOI and AIB
E t bli h N ti l A t M t• Establish National Asset Management Agency (NAMA)
(B d) A h h– (Bad) Asset purchase scheme• No fiscal stimulus package
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Euro Membership in the CrisisEuro Membership in the Crisis
• Avoided a currency attackAvoided a currency attack• ECB has been an important provider of
liquidity to Irish banksliquidity to Irish banks
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SummarySummary
Causes of the Crises US IrelandSecuritization X
ff i l f k diEffective closure of market trading XDecline in Lending standardsE ditEasy creditLack of diversification ?I ti l bIrrational exuberanceGovernment Policies
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ConclusionConclusion
• Although the US credit crisis precipitated it,Although the US credit crisis precipitated it, the Irish crisis is identifiably separate
• Many common features but these are often• Many common features but these are often arrived at by differing routesGl b l t h t d I i h i i b t• Global events hastened Irish crisis but fundamental weaknesses already existed
• Resolution of crisis has common elements but important differences
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