The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 6 | Issue 1 | Jan 01, 2008

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The United States and Sino-Vietnamese Relations

Brantly Womack

The United States and Sino-VietnameseRelations

Brantly Womack

In 1944 President Franklin Rooseveltdispatched vice president Henry A. Wallace tomeet with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek andoffer him the “return” of Indochina to China.Chiang wisely declined the offer. [1]

Henry Wallace in China

Although the idea was as far from the historyand realities of East Asia as a comet passingoverhead, it was not without its reason. Theidea stemmed from Roosevelt’s general anti-colonial views and his awareness that theSecond World War would provide anopportunity to transform world politicalgeography. Moreover, relations between Chinaand Vietnam had never been so close as in theprevious half century. Oppression by Westernimperialism had for the first time in their long

intertwined history given China and Vietnam acommon threat. Vietnam provided the base formost of Sun Yat-sen’s numerous unsuccessfuluprisings in 1907-8 against the Qing Dynasty,and similarly Guangzhou was an importantbase for early Vietnamese revolutionaries.Later, the Guomindang (GMD) worked with itssister party the Vietnam Nationalist Party(VNQDD), and the Communist Party of China,and occasionally the GMD, were in intimatecontact with Ho Chi Minh and the IndochineseCommunist Party. From the distant office of abusy and powerful leader trying to shape apost-war world, the idea seemed attractive.

Roosevelt was not the last American leader tomisunderstand the Sino-Vietnameserelationship. From 1950 to 1971 United Statespolicymakers, assuming that the alliancebetween China and Vietnam was permanent,made containing the spread of “worldcommunism” in Vietnam the major justificationfor American military involvement. Similarly,from 1979 to 1990 they assumed that Sino-Vietnamese hostility was permanent. Since2000 the analysis of the relationship hasbecome somewhat more complex.

Understanding American perspectives on Sino-Vietnamese relations requires a familiarity withtheir evolution and with current Americanperceptions of the relationship. But in order tograsp their fundamental dynamic, it isimportant to analyze how America’s situationas a distant global power affects its judgments.Distance makes Americans impatient withcomplex and conditional interpretations of theSino-Vietnamese relationship. The relationshipis seen as important insofar as it affectsAmerican global interests and its regional

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presence in East Asia. At present, theemergence of China as a regional power and itsincreasing global presence increases thesalience of the “China connection” in Americanpolicy toward China’s neighbors. However,America’s distance from Asia and theasymmetry of its relationships with both Chinaand V ie tnam cont inue to d is tor t i t sunderstanding of their mutual relationship.

Evolution of the American perspective

As Roosevelt’s idea suggests, before the victoryof the Communist Party of China the UnitedStates assumed the existence of a benignrelationship between China (the Republic ofChina) and Vietnam. At the PotsdamConference (July 1945) China was designatedas the occupying force of Vietnam above the16th parallel, while Britain was in charge to thesouth. From the Vietnamese point of view, theChinese presence was problematic. Althoughthe Guomindang had always preached an anti-colonial policy, it agreed in 1946 to the returnof French troops to northern Vietnam inexchange for France’s renunciation of itsclaims to extraterritoriality in China. [2]American support in 1946-1949 for the Frencheffort to reestablish its colony had little to dowith the Sino-Vietnamese relationship; it wasthe result of efforts to influence domesticFrench politics. Since the French CommunistParty was anti-colonial, the United States wasinterested in the success of French colonialpolicies.

By May 1949, China again became central toAmerican policy in Vietnam, but it was adifferent China. [3] World communism had nowreached the Vietnam border, and it was thesame world communism that the US wasfighting in China and would soon engage inKorea. The stubborn resistance of the VietMinh to French pacification and the victories ofthe People’s Liberation Army led the UnitedStates to imagine a “domino effect” ofcascading regimes falling to communism and

therefore to fully commit American militarysupport to the French. By the time of the fall ofDien Bien Phu, which occurred in the middle ofthe Geneva Conference of 1954, the UnitedStates was resolved to support any anti-communist government in Vietnam in order tocontain the spread of communism.

Captured French soldiers following defeat at DienBien Phu

It should be noted that US leaders did not thinkthat China was responsible for the success ofthe Viet Minh against the French. Instead, theyheld the French responsible for creating apolitical vacuum in which the nationalism of theViet Minh could flourish. Therefore, the UnitedStates thought that by supporting anindependent, anti-communist government inthe South they could hold the line against thefurther spread of Communism. But theassumption of a close relationship between theChinese communists and the Vietnamesecommunists, as well as among other not-yet-successful communist parties in the region, wasessential for raising the importance of Vietnamto global levels.

In the 1960s it became clear that the UnitedStates and its Saigon ally were even lesssuccessful than the French had been inrepressing the forces of independence andrevolution. From 1955 American militaryassistance crept past the limits imposed at theGeneva Accords, to direct involvement in the

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early sixties under President Kennedy and thefull-fledged Americanization of the war underPresident Johnson. However, containing worldcommunism remained a global priority, and somore and more destructive effort was appliedto Vietnam.

Zhou Enlai (left), Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh,official portrait

Moreover, since the increasing instability couldno longer be attributed to the mistakes ofFrance, trouble in the South was attributed tothe interference of the North, and in turn thestrength of the North was attributed to Sovietand especially to Chinese support. [4] Theimmediate result of this analysis was thebombing of the North and attempts to interdictsupply lines. More generally, containmentbecame “collective defense against armedaggression,” although the United States wasconcerned to limit to Indochina the “hot war”implications of this formulation, that is, to avoiddirect US-Soviet or US-China armedconfrontation. [5]

Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh, May 1960

The turning point in US-China relations, thevisits by Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon in1971-2 and the signing of the ShanghaiCommunique, was premised on the linkagebetween China and Vietnam. Although theAmerican attempt to induce China to cut itsassistance to Vietnam was unsuccessful, thetransformation of the US-China relationshipmoved American thinking beyond the dominotheory and containment.

The American perception that China hadceased to be a global threat reduced US fearsconcerning China’s relations with its neighbors.Without the specter of unif ied worldcommunism, Vietnam and indeed the wholeregion of Southeast Asia seemed less importantto Washington. In the 1970s Americandiplomatic attention was diverted to specificallyanti-Soviet Cold War conflicts in Angola, theHorn of Africa, and Afghanistan, and toresource issues in the Middle East. Contrary tosome interpretations, the United States did notshift to the Chinese side as Sino-Vietnamesehostility grew in the second half of the decade.Rather, the United States saw no reason toshift from its post-war posture of resentful butpassive hostility toward Vietnam at a time whenits relationship with China was improving. Iattribute the failure of the 1978 US-Vietnamesenormalization negotiations to American hostileinertia and relative indifference regarding

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Vietnam rather than to an American preferencefor the China side in the growing tensionsbetween China and Vietnam. [6] From 1979American passive hostility toward Vietnam wasincreased by Vietnam’s alliance with the SovietUnion [7], its treatment of the “boat people,”and its invasion and occupation of Cambodia.

In the 1980s the United States rathercomplacently perceived Sino-Vietnamesehostility as a permanent return to age-oldhatreds. [8]

Historic boundary marker between China andVietnam

The United States became a passive partner inthe entente against Vietnam led by China andASEAN. The Reagan administration devoted itsdiplomatic attention to Europe-centered ColdWar issues, and the succeeding Bushadministration was preoccupied with thecollapse of the Soviet Union and Europe’stransition to post-communism. The United

States was sluggish in adjusting to resolution ofthe Cambodia problem. When it finallyrecognized the Socialist Republic of Vietnam inJuly 1995 it was at the end of the diplomaticreceiving line. [9] Indeed, it was Vietnam’simpending entry into ASEAN that same monththat provided the incentive for the US to act,and lingering resentment of Vietnam continuedto influence the relationship even afternormalization.

The normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relationsin 1991 was little noted in the United Statesand did not affect American attitudes towardeither country. The prior hostility between thetwo had laid to rest any concerns thatrapprochement might lead to alliance, and inany case both China and Vietnam hadestablished friendly relations with theirneighbors. As a global actor with pressingmilitary and security preoccupationselsewhere, the United States was happy toleave a peaceful neighborhood alone.The present stormy era of American diplomacyhas been defined by the “war on terror,” theoccupation and continuing wars involvingAfghanistan and Iraq, and general tensionswith the Islamic world. Neither China norVietnam is central to these acute problems, butin the background of these urgent concerns therise of China has raised long-range strategicissues. The question of whether the UnitedStates should engage with China hasundergone a subtle change from the aftermathof June 4, 1989 to the present. In 1989 theAmerican choice was whether to engage Chinaor to punish it with isolation. Now the choice iswhether to engage China or to contain it. TheAmerican diplomatic answer in both cases is“both/and” rather than “either/or.” However,China has now become a global presence and amultifaceted mainstay of the US economy. Evenfor a distant global actor like the United Statesthis has increased the significance of China’srelationships with its neighbors.

American Prospects in East Asia and the

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Sino-Vietnamese Relationship

In itself, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship isnot a concern for the United States. In contrastto the 1950s, there is no expectation ofcommunist dominos spreading to SoutheastAsia and beyond, and the il lusion thatcommunist countries are natural collaboratorswas shattered by the struggle over Cambodia.[10] Neither country has been confrontationalover major American concerns such asterrorism, Afghanistan, and Iraq. As BronsonPercival has observed, “With improved US-Chinese bilateral ties, Beijing has taken fewdiscernible steps since 2002 that can beportrayed to have had a direct impact on USinterests in Southeast Asia.’ [11] Since bothcountries are governed by communist partiesthe United States is exceptionally sensitive tohuman rights issues, but the sensitivity is notdue to the relationship, but rather stems fromAmerican perceptions of the nature of theregimes. The United States is sensitive abouthuman rights in Cuba and DPRK as well.

Moreover, American policy with regard to bothChina and Vietnam is governed primarily bybilateral or global interests and concernsrather than by triangulation, that is, a matter tobe resolved among China, Taiwan and the US.This applies to US-China trade and balance ofpayment frictions and to the question ofTaiwan. Similarly for US-Vietnam relations,issues such as the continuing search forAmerican soldiers missing in action (MIA) [12]and improved trade and transportationrelations have little to do with China. Assummarized in the Joint Statement Between theSocialist Republic of Vietnam and the UnitedStates of November 2006, the US-Vietnamrelationship “encompasses significant andgrowing trade and economic ties, an emergingmilitary-to-military relationship, successfulcooperation on health and development issues,growing cultural and educational links, acommitment to resolving remaining issuesstemming from the war, a shared interest in

ensuring peace, stability, and prosperity in theAsia-Pacific region, and frank and candiddiscussion of differences.” [13] There is nothingin the main threads of the relationship thatrequires or implies a reference to China.

Nevertheless, the rise of China has influencedfundamentally the American perception ofChina as a global power, and more recently itsperception of the global ramifications of Chinaas a regional power. American attitudestowards China’s rise can be divided into threecategories: “China threat,” China challenge,”and “China opportunity.” The “China threat”perspective anticipates inevitable conflictbetween the United States and China andtherefore views any progress by China as arelative loss for the United States. The “Chinachallenge” perspective sees the rise of Chinaaffecting indirectly the global political,economic, and military situation of the US.China’s gain does not necessarily presume anAmerican loss, but it changes the existingproportions of power. The “China opportunity”perspective sees the growth of China ascreating new opportunities for the UnitedStates, primarily in economics but also inpolitics and even security. Although the threeattitudes are distinct, individual Americans maycombine two or even all three attitudes whenconfronting different aspects of China’s rise.Within the American government all threeattitudes are visible. It is tempting to say thatthe military tends toward “China threat,”presidential diplomacy toward “Chinachallenge,” business interests toward “Chinaopportunity,” and that Congress exhibits a mixof all three, but in fact elements of all threeattitudes run throughout the Americangovernment and broader public opinion. Thephenomenon of China’s rise, viewed from theperspective of the current superpower, is acomplex event that necessarily evokes mixedresponses.

The various American attitudes toward the riseof China have definitely affected attitudes

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toward Vietnam. Despite the normalization ofSino-Vietnamese relations in 1991, manyAmerican analysts and politicians continue toassume that Vietnam is innately hostile toChina and would willingly join with the UnitedStates in containing China. [14] Sucharguments were made, for example, by SenatorJohn McCain, a leading proponent ofnormalization of relations with Vietnam in the1990s. More recently, however, the increase inChina’s “soft power” in Southeast Asia hasattracted attention and increased Americaninterest in the region. As New York Timesreporter Jane Perlez put it in 2003, “More than50 years of American dominance in Asia issubtly but unmistakably eroding as Asiancountries look toward China as the increasinglyvital regional power.” [15] Many observers,including Ms. Perlez, blame the erosion ofAmerican influence in the region as much onthe unpopular policies of the United Statesgovernment since 9-11 as on actions by theChinese government. [16] In any case,however, along with the rise of China, theimportance of the region for the United Stateshas also risen in the context of the “war onterror”.

There are many ambiguities concerning themeaning of “soft power” and its application tothe relative positions of the United States andChina in Southeast Asia and more specificallywith regard to Vietnam. The discussion ofAmerican soft power often ranges from thespread of Barbie Dolls and Kentucky FriedChicken to ideals of democracy and humanrights. Bronson Percival points out that softpower has a quite different meaning inSoutheast Asia, and that the generalimprovement of attitudes toward China isbased on China’s careful and sympatheticinteraction with the region. [17] There is agrowing confidence in the region that Chinawill pursue mutual interests rather than insiston its own advantage. There is considerablymore substance to the improvement of China’sprofile in the region than the often-used term

“charm offensive” might suggest. [18] Chinahas been generous and non-intrusive with itsaid to Laos and Cambodia, it has negotiated itsland border disputes and joined efforts atpeacefully managing island disputes, and theASEAN-China Free Trade Area is ahead ofexpectations in developing regional trade.Nevertheless, many Americans view thegeneral improvement of China’s image as adeliberate and strategic move to displaceAmerican influence. As a New York Timesheadline puts it, “China moves to eclipse USappeal in Southeast Asia.” [19] A more subtleversion holds that China is inhibited by itscurrent relative weakness from expressing itsanti-Americanism. [20] Moreover, China’srelationships in the region are often portrayedin the American media as cynical and sinistersupport for corrupt governments that frustratemore high-minded American efforts to furtherdemocracy and human rights. The most obviousexample is the American perspective onMyanmar. At a minimum, the rise of China’sinfluence is viewed as a reduction in therelative influence of the United States.

In the context of China’s increasing soft power,Vietnam is seen by some as a key point inreducing the further erosion of Americaninfluence and encouraging a critical distancebetween China and Southeast Asia. Moreover,improvement in US-Vietnam relations can bejustified from any of the three Americanattitudes toward China. If China is seen as athreat, then Vietnam could help block China’sinfluence and contain China. If China is achallenge, then part of the American responseis to improve its own soft power in countrieslike Vietnam. If China is an opportunity, thenVietnam is a similar opportunity, thoughsmaller. Hence it can be predicted confidentlythat the rise of China will continue to be apositive influence on US-Vietnamese relations,regardless of the direction taken by US-Chinarelations in the future. However, if US-Chinarelations take a fundamental turn for theworse, then American interest in containing

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China could present Vietnam—and itsneighbors--with a painful choice. [21]

In sum, the rise of China as a global actor hasincreased American interest in China’s regionalactivities, and this has raised the profile ofSoutheast Asia in American foreign policycircles. Despite regime similarity betweenChina and Vietnam and the evident intensity oftheir relationship, Vietnam is not considered aconduit of Chinese regional influence orunusually close to China. Quite the contrary.Some analysts believe that Vietnam’straditional hostility to China and its sensitivityto Chinese encroachment make Vietnam thecountry most resistant to Chinese influence,and thus the most promising target for anAmerican counter-offensive in soft powercompetition.

Nguyen Minh Triet, George Bush and Hu Jintao(right)

Nevertheless, it should be remembered thatVietnam and Southeast Asia remain rather lowon the American agenda of foreign policypriorities. Symptoms of low status includeCondolezza Rice’s absence from the 2005ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, andCongressional approval of PNTR status forVietnam as the final item of business in the lastmeeting of the 109th Congress in December2006. The United States pays much moreattention to its bilateral relationship with China

and to China’s influence on global concernssuch as the North Korean nuclear issue or Iran,and much less to derivative concerns aboutChina’s regional influence.

Explaining American perspectives

From Roosevelt to the present, while Americanperspectives on Sino-Vietnamese relations havebeen shaped by the personalities of leaders andby the broader contours of American globaldiplomacy, it is worthwhile to analyze thestructure of American relations with China andVietnam. Although structure does notdetermine outcomes, i t provides thearchitecture within which history is played out.

Three basic factors shape Americanperceptions vis-à-vis China and Vietnam: First,the remoteness of the United States; second, itsposition as a global power; and third,asymmetries of power between the UnitedStates and both China and Vietnam, as well asbetween China and Vietnam.

Remoteness, the first factor, affects theAmerican perspective in a number of importantways. Most importantly, if a third party isdistant from the other two, then therelationship between the other two tends tobecome less salient than the third party’sbilateral relations with each. The relationshipbetween two neighboring states is inherentlyimportant to a third neighbor. Examples wouldbe the relationship between Vietnam and theSoviet Union in the 1970s for China, or therelationship between China and Cambodia inthe 1970s for Vietnam. One reason thatmultilateral regional institutions like ASEANare important is that they buffer thevulnerabil ity of member states to therelationships of their neighbors with othercountries. The inattentiveness of the UnitedStates to the major watershed in Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1991 would be anexample of an effect of remoteness.

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Similarly, remoteness lessens the inherentsignificance of even the bilateral relationshipsof the remote state with the two neighboringstates. Even in a globalized world, the question,“what does this matter to me?” has a differentanswer in a neighboring state than in a distantone. Indeed, if a remote state becomesinterested, its understanding of the distantsituation is likely to be shaped and distorted bythe reasons for its attention. Greater attentiondoes not automatically produce greaterunderstanding. Similarly, American interest inquestions such as human rights or freedom ofreligion produces information, but it neglectscontextual reality. Question-directed attentionwants clear answers to its questions, and isimpatient with complexity.

Lastly, remoteness reduces the urgency oflearning from mistakes. After its war inVietnam, the United States did not adjust itspolicies in Southeast Asia for twenty years.Similarly, the US hardened its anti-China policyafter the Korean War stalemate. It could affordto become indifferent in part because of itspower, but also because of its distance.

The second basic factor underlying theAmerican perspective is its status as a globalpower. To a certain extent being a global powerhas a contrary influence from remoteness. Aglobal power mixes its national interests withglobal interests. It feels a special responsibilityand authority for such issues as freedom of sealanes and non-proliferation. At a certain level,conflict in any region attracts its attention, andit is sensitive to developments in remote areas.For example, the “war on terror” has broughtAmerican military to the most inaccessibleparts of the Philippines.

However, a global interest is a peculiar sort ofinterest. It is focused on issues important to theglobal power, and therefore its involvement inregional affairs is derivative from their globaldimension. For instance, Vietnam was veryimportant to the United States during the

1950s and 1960s, but only as a venue of theCold War. Similarly, normalization with Chinain 1971-79 was important because of theadvantageous “strategic triangle” thatnormalization created. The initial disinterest ofthe Clinton administration in US-Chinarelations was due in part to the fact that, afterthe collapse of the Soviet Union, the “Chinacard” was no longer necessary. As China risesto global prominence for the United States, sodo its relationships with other countries, butonly insofar as they affect American globalinterests. Hence the American interest inChina’s soft power in Southeast Asia, butprimarily as it affects American interests.Global attention is also attracted by crises,such as the Indian Ocean tsunami of December2004 or the demonstrations in Myanmar inSeptember 2007.

A global power tends to assume that all of itsinterests are global, and that they are sharedby the rest of the world. It also assumes thatglobal interests automatically have a higherpriority than purely local interests. Thus it isoften frustrated and impatient with regionalcooperation, because states in a region usuallyhave more complex interests and concerns withtheir neighbors. The problem of Americansingle-issue focus in tension with the morecomplex interests of neighbors is particularlyevident in the Korean nuclear discussions since2002.

One effect of the mixing of global and nationalinterests is that the global power often projectsnarrow national interests as global concerns, orrequires that other states share its particularinterpretation of global concerns. Conversely,issues that appear of global significance toother states may be downplayed by the globalpower. A recent example is global warming.

While the United States is interested in theglobal aspects of regional and even domesticactions, it is not particularly interested in thelocal effects of global policies. During the Asian

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financial crisis of 1997 there was the relativeindifference of the “Washington Consensus” tothe dislocation and sufferings of the affectedcountries. The entire history of the Americanwar in Vietnam was characterized by theprioritization of global objectives and theneglect of the local effects on Vietnam. Incontrast to the greed of France, whose profitsderived principally rice exports, more globally-minded American involvement turned SouthVietnam into a rice importer by 1969.

Asymmetry, the third factor, is necessarilyimplied by American status as a global power,but its effects can be distinguished. It is aparticular complication of the Americanperspect ive on the Sino-Vietnameserelationship because the United States isstronger in economic and military terms thaneither, but in addition China has an asymmetricrelationship with Vietnam.

Asymmetry has a profound effect on theperspective of participants. [22] Because of thedifference in capacities, the weaker side ismore exposed to the relationship than thestronger. The stronger side by definition hasproportionately less to gain or lose, and thus isless engaged in the relationship. If the strongerside must involve itself in a problem, it willtend to bully the smaller side, trying to push itinto line with its preferences. The ultimate inbullying is what the stronger side views as a“small war,” that is, armed conflict with anopponent who cannot retaliate in a similarmanner. However, what appears to be a smallwar to the stronger is a mortal threat to theweaker, and while it cannot destroy thestronger, it can prolong its resistance until itfrustrates the war aims of the stronger.

At the extreme of war, the best example ofasymmetric differences is the American war inVietnam. The United States continued to“escalate in a quagmire” because it could notaccept failure and it thought it could achieve athreshold of force at which the opponent would

surrender. There are many less extremesituations affected by asymmetry as well. Thevery slow response of the United States toVietnamese normalization overtures can bestbe explained by the fact that the relationshipsimply was not important enough to the UnitedStates to merit the diplomatic re-thinking andpolitical reorientation that normalization wouldrequire. It took Vietnam’s impending entry intoASEAN to place a deadline on normalization.

Despite the imbalance of capacit ies,asymmetric relationships can be stable. [23]Prudence is one argument for stability: bothsides may know from experience that victory ina small war is difficult, and that resistance,even if successful, is costly. But each side hasdifferent requirements for asymmetricnormalcy. The weaker side is vulnerable.Therefore it needs credible acknowledgment ofits autonomy from the larger side. The strongerside needs deference from the weaker. It needsto know that the weaker accepts the existingimbalance of capacities. A normal asymmetricrelationship is not one of domination andsubmission. Quite the opposite . Thenormalization of the Sino-Vietnameserelationship in 1991 was founded on the failureto achieve unilateral goals through force in theprevious twelve years of hostility. Within thegeneral framework of acknowledgment anddeference both sides can negotiate theirinterests.

A triangular asymmetric situation such asWashington-Beijing-Hanoi (WBH) adds newlevels of complexity. There is a naturaltemptation for the strongest and the weakeststate to ally against the middle, since themiddle is the greater potential threat to thestrongest and the weakest can hide behind thestrongest. However, such an alliance puts theweakest in a precarious position. The strongestdoes not need its additional strength, and it isrefusing deference to the middle, therebyjustifying hostility from a power stronger thanitself. Moreover, in the WBH case the strongest

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is operating in a global environment quitedifferent from that of the weakest, andtherefore the terms of the alliance couldchange unexpectedly and for reasons unrelatedto the actions of the weakest. The mostrelevant example of such a shift would beGorbachev’s new Pacific policy in 1986 and itseffect on the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance.

Conclusion

The American perspective on the Sino-Vietnamese relationship may be more“objective” than those of the participants, but ithas its own characteristics and limitations.Indeed, as the example of Roosevelt’s initiativeindicates, it is possible for the United States tobe more wrong about the relationship thaneither of the parties directly involved. TheAmerican perspective is not one-sided, but it isremote, global, and asymmetric. Because it isremote, American interest will tend to be issue-driven; because it is a global power, the focuswill be on global issues, and because ofasymmetry, the United States will tend to pushfor solutions to problems rather than to engagein sustained multilateral management of issues.

In the current situation of a normal Sino-Vietnamese relationship within a broadercontext of normal East Asian relationships, it isto American global interests to be supportive.In contrast to the relationship in the 1950s and60s, the current Sino-Vietnamese relationshipis neither exclusive nor unique. Therefore theissues that arise between the United States andChina and Vietnam are likely to be bilateral orpossibly regional, and they are not likely tofocus on the Sino-Vietnamese relationship perse.

Nevertheless, the rise of China changes theglobal structure of power, and a major part ofthe change is the increase in China’s influencein its three regions of Northeast Asia,Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. While China’simproved relations have not been targeted at

the United States, they do affect the relativestrength of American influence. To the extentthat China’s global presence is founded on itsregional presence, the global importance ofChina’s regional relationships has increased,and with it American interest.

An earlier version of this paper was presentedat the Second United States-China-VietnamTrilateral Conference in Sanya, HainanProvince, China, organized by the AsiaFoundation, the China Institute of InternationalStudies, and the Vietnam Institute ofInternational Relations. Posted at Japan Focuson January 19, 2008.

Brantly Womack is Professor of Foreign Affairsat the University of Virginia and author ofChina and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry(http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_ss_b/104-449 6 0 8 9 - 3 6 7 4 3 0 8 ? u r l = s e a r c h -a l i a s % 3 D s t r i p b o o k s & f i e l d -keywords=brantly+womack&x=0&y=0).

Brantly@gmail.com

Notes

[1] According to Wallace, “He [FDR] told me[Wallace] to inform Chiang that he proposed tosee that both Hong Kong and Indo-China wouldbe returned to China, and that he wanted tosee a strong, truly democratic government inChina, willing and anxious to live at peace withits neighbors.” Henry Wallace, Toward WorldPeace (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948),p. 97. Bernard Fall confirmed the story (andChiang’s declining of the offer) with Wallace.See Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams (NewYork: Praeger, 1964), pp. 54; 453n.

[2] King Chen, Vietnam and China, 1948-1954(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969.The major French retrocession was FortBayard, now Zhanjiang, Guangdong.

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[3] History of the Indochina Incident,1940-1954 (Washington: Historical Division,Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, originallyprepared February 1955, 2nd ed. 1971,declassified edition 1981).

[4] US Department of State White Paper,Aggression from the North, the Record ofNorth Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer SouthViet -Nam (Washington: GovernmentPublications Office, 1965)

[5] "Viet-Nam Action Called 'Collective DefenseAgainst Armed Aggression,'" [DepartmentStatement read to news correspondents onMarch 4, 1965 by Robert J. McCloskey,Director, Office of News], Department of StateBulletin, March 22, 1965, p. 403.

[6] The classic account of these negotiations isNayan Chanda, Brother Enemy (New York:Macmillan, 1986).

[7] Vietnam joined the Soviet led Council forMutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) inJune 1978, and signed a treaty of friendship inNovember.

[8] See for instance Douglas Pike, Vietnam andthe Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance(Boulder: Westview, 1987)

[9] More than 160 countries had recognizedVietnam by that time. See Bui Thanh Son,“Vietnam-US Relations and Vietnam’s ForeignPolicy in the 1990s,” in Carl Thayer, ed.,Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition (NewYork: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 202-214.

[10] An even more spectacular transformationoccurred in US attitudes toward China andNortheast Asia. China went from being theimplacable, inhuman enemy in the Korean Warto the respected regional convener of the SixParty Talks.

[11] Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks

South: China and Southeast Asia in the NewCentury (Westport: Praeger, 2007), p. 10.

[12] According to the US State Department,“The United States considers achieving thefullest possible accounting of Americansmissing and unaccounted for in Indochina to beone of its highest priorities with Vietnam.”Summary o f US -V ie tnam re l a t i ons(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4130.htm#relations) .

[13] White House, Office of the PressS e c r e t a r y , N o v e m b e r 1 7 , 2 0 0 6 .http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061117-4.html

[14] Henry Kenny, Shadow of the Dragon:Vietnam’s Continuing Struggle with China andthe Implications for US Foreign Policy(Washington: Brassey’s, 2002).

[15] Jane Perlez, “Asian Leaders Find China aMore Cordial Neighbor,” New York Times,October 17, 2003.

[16] See for example Joseph Nye, Soft Power(New York: Public Affairs, 2004). For a critiqueof Nye’s notion of soft power, see BrantlyWomack, “Dancing Alone: A Hard Look at SoftP o w e r(http://japanfocus.org/products/details/1975),”Japan Focus (November 2005).

[17] Percival, The Dragon Looks South, chapter7.

[18] Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: HowChina’s Soft Power is Transforming the World(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). Theterm “charm offensive” was first used in 1986to refer to Mikhail Gorbachev’s diplomacytoward the West.

[19] Perlez, New York Times, November 18,2004.

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[20] Robert Sutter, “China’s Regional Strategyand Why it might not be Good for America,” inDavid Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China andAsia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 2005), pp. 289-306.

[21] Brantly Womack, “China and SoutheastAsia: Asymmetry, Leadership and Normalcy,”Pacific Affairs 76:3 (Winter 2003-4), pp.

529-548.

[22] Brantly Womack, "Asymmetry andSystemic Misperception: The Cases of China,Vietnam and Cambodia during the 1970s."Journal of Strategic Studies 26:2 (June, 2003),pp. 91-118.

[23] Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: ThePolitics of Asymmetry (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2006).