The Twins before the Twin Towers: the Hudson Terminals and ...

342 THE ART OF ARCHITECTURE/THE SCIENCE OF ARCHITECTURE

The Twins before the Twin Towers: the Hudson Terminalsand their Bifurcated Form

DARIUS SOLLOHUBNew Jersey Institute of Technology

When completed in 1908, these twins were as wellknown in their day as their successors would be.The terminals were the flagship structures for theHudson & Manhattan Railroad (H&M), which hadcompleted the first tunnels below the Hudson River.The H&M also overcame fierce resistance from ri-vals to pioneer a customer-focused attitude towardthe public, a management practice rooted in Pro-gressivism. The railroad adopted this practice todistance itself from its rival railroads that the pub-lic perceived to be corrupt, greedy and arrogant.The facilities the H&M built reflected its idealism,shunning the monumentality typified by Pennsyl-vania and Grand Central Stations, the other sta-

tions built in New York in the first decade of thetwentieth century. The H&M also resisted the urgeto build a skyscraper. Instead, the H&M’s archi-tects designed the terminals for comfort and con-venience, without ostentation, hierarchy orgrandiosity. Their twinning embodied pluralism in-stead of singular monumentality.

After their shear size, the most distinguishing fea-ture of the World Trade Towers was that there weretwo, that they were twins. Yet, in the chronologyof the their design, the rationale for why their plan-ners and designers made this choice remains tan-talizingly vague.1 In the media blizzard thatfollowed their destruction, it is often cited that thestructures they replaced, the Hudson Terminals,were also twins. While the reasoning for the twin-ning of the Trade Towers remains limited, this pa-per explores how the earlier twins are the directoutcome of remarkable technological achievement,surpassed only by how their built form reflectedthe Progressive management practices of the com-pany that built them. These forces made them whatthey were: bifurcated buildings.

When completed in 1908, these twins were as wellknown in their day as their successors would be.The terminals were the flagship buildings for theHudson & Manhattan Railroad (H&M), which hadcompleted the first tunnels below the Hudson River.The H&M overcame fierce resistance from rivals topioneer a customer-focused attitude toward thepublic, a management practice rooted in progres-sivism. The railroad adopted this practice to dis-tance itself from its rival railroads that the publicperceived to be corrupt, greedy and arrogant. Thefacilities the H&M built reflected its idealism, shun-ning the monumentality of the other stations builtin New York in the first decade of the twentieth

THE TWINS BEFORE THE TWIN TOWERS 343

century. The H&M’s architects designed the termi-nals for comfort and convenience, without osten-tation, hierarchy or grandiosity. Their twinningembodied pluralism instead of singular monumen-tality.

To comprehend why the Hudson Terminals weretwins, one must first trace what brought themabout, as their physical form directly reflected theengineering innovation and management practicesof the organization that built them. The comple-tion of the H&M’s sub-aqueous tunnels that theTerminals were the principal portals for took morethan forty years to complete. When finished, theNew York Times described the tunnels as: “one ofthe greatest engineering feats ever accomplished,greater perhaps than the Panama Canal will bewhen opened, considering the obstacles which hadto be overcome.”2 The tunnel project was firstenvisioned in the spirit of pervasive technologicaloptimism after the Civil War, a period that saw thetranscontinental railroad completed in 1867, thesame year construction of the Brooklyn Bridgebegan. An individual who had worked on the Trans-continental Railroad, Dewitt Haskin formed a com-pany that started digging in 1874. Almostimmediately, a court injunction initiated by a com-peting railroad stopped his work, the first in a pat-tern of corporate obstructionism that would plaguethe project for its duration. Five years passed be-fore construction resumed.

When the Brooklyn Bridge opened to a starburstof fireworks in 1883, work was again halted be-neath the Hudson as intractable difficulties, hor-rific accidents called blowouts, caused when thecompressed air failed to prevent river water fromentering the tunnel, plagued the project. One ofthese entombed twenty-one workers in 1880. Amysterious crippling disease called the Benz (airbubbles in the blood) affected twenty five percentof tunnel workers until project engineers discov-ered a remedy in 1889. The project developed adark aura about it, which in part led to Haskin’sinability to procure financing after his primarybacker died in 1882. His efforts eventually ceasedin 1887. A well-capitalized British engineering com-pany that employed improved technology took overin 1889 and made significant progress, but theworldwide financial depression of the early 1890’scaused work to cease yet again.3

The project remained stalled until 1902 when Wil-liams Gibbs McAdoo took over. McAdoo not onlyfinished one pair of tunnels, initiating train servicein 1908, he began the second pair that terminatedin the Hudson Terminals on Church Street in lowerManhattan. The Terminals became the railroad’sprimary station and corporate headquarters andthe H&M would grow to become a seventeen-mileurban mass transit network. The H&M became aparagon of rail operation and made McAdoo a na-tionally recognized figure. Because of his manage-ment success and critical involvement in WoodrowWilson’s 1912 presidential campaign, he left theH&M and accepted the post of Secretary of theTreasury in Wilson’s cabinet. There he initiated theFederal Reserve and became wartime Director ofRailroads during World War One. McAdoo later cam-paigned vigorously but unsuccessfully for theDemocratic Presidential Nomination in 1920 and1924. He became a senator from California in 1930at the age of 70, serving until he died in Washing-ton in 1941.4

McAdoo’s politics were those of the Progressivereform era. Progressivism was not a single coher-ent movement but an issue-oriented effort born atthe local level. Generally, it sought government andelectoral reform, fair business practices and socialequity. While essentially a practical man, McAdoo’sProgressivism inflected towards its social aspects,but in ways that complemented the practicality ofbusiness. The principles of Progressivism thatMcAdoo brought to bear most on building andmanaging the railroad were a general distrust ofcorporate monopolies, a similar distrust of thecronyism of municipal governments, faith in newideas, science, engineering and the power of ex-perts, and an extremely high regard for the com-mon man.5

Born in Georgia in 1863, McAdoo rose from postcivil war southern poverty and trained as a lawyerin Chattanooga. In 1889, he raised money fromnorthern financiers to buy the Knoxville street rail-way in order to use then cutting-edge technologyand electrify it, but McAdoo miscalculated and even-tually lost control of the railroad, loosing his per-sonal savings as well. Then 29, McAdoo moved hisfamily to New York City, deciding that it was theonly place where he could recoup his loss. Arrivingin 1892, in the midst of a financial depression, heand his family struggled. Without work, McAdoo


used the time to reflect, read and scheme. Even-tually, he sold bonds, mostly for railroads. All thewhile, knowledgeable about electrification from hisexperience in Knoxville, McAdoo daydreamed abouta tunnel under the Hudson, unaware of the darkhistory of the failed project now dormant. McAdooknew electrification could solve the problem ofevacuating smoke from the tunnels, a problemHaskin never fully resolved. While casually describ-ing his tunnel daydream to a business associate in1901, he was astonished to find that a partial tun-nel already existed. McAdoo decided to purchasethe tunnel and in a remarkable campaign offundraising successfully solicited aid from J.P. Mor-gan and other financiers to resume construction in1902.6

When completed, the tunnels Haskins began andMcAdoo finished provided the critical link for railpassengers traveling between Manhattan and themainland, providing a much faster alternative tothe slow ferries, which were often impeded by fogor ice. The H&M trains connected the large rail-road termini along the Hoboken and Jersey Cityshoreline with the elevated rail network in New Yorkand continued underground beneath the shoppingdistrict along Sixth Avenue to Nineteenth Street.But plans to continue tunneling to Astor Place andGrand Central Station at 42nd street and Park Av-enue were never realizes. Instead, the H&M com-mencing an entirely new pair of tunnels connectingNew Jersey to a new terminal in lower Manhattan.By the time McAdoo left for Washington in 1912,the H&M had extended further into Jersey City andto Newark. The total cost incurred by the H&M by1912 exceeded $70 million, over one billion intoday’s dollars, all with privately raised capital.7

The engineering required to complete parts of therailroad was the stuff of heroic modern engineer-ing bravura,8 equaled only by McAdoo’s skill atoutflanking the robber baron corporate rail andutility monopolies whose treacheries repeatedlytried to thwart his efforts. The better financed, longhaul railroads, most of which were monopolies,perceived the H&M as a threat. These corporationsowned the ferries and did not want to loose pas-sengers, even if the tunnels saved their rail pas-sengers considerable time. Profit, not the customer,was their primary motive.9 When railroads usedcourt injunctions to block the H&M, McAdoo coun-terattacked by threatening to build new parallel

service to undermine their monopolies. Powerfulreal estate figures in Manhattan, allied withManhattan’s surface railroads, tried to influenceNew York’s Rapid Transit Commission in denyingthe H&M a permit to operate. The real estate mag-nates feared easy access to New Jersey would de-preciate Manhattan property values. The surfacerailroads, which would later merge with the sub-ways, feared the H&M’s competition. But McAdoocarefully courted public opinion and prevailed in aseries of public meetings.10

Hardened by this assault, McAdoo publicly vilifiedhis tormentors as a strategy to build ridership. Hecast the H&M as different from these monopolies,which subordinated passenger needs to profit be-cause other viable transportation alternatives sel-dom existed and passengers simply acceptedabuse. ” The public be damned”, the notorious ad-age of the time made by William H. Vanderbilt ofthe New York Central family, stood for this preva-lent attitude. McAdoo’s marketing strategy ex-ploited this arrogant quip by announcing,’“Let thePublic Be Pleased”, as the H&M’s official policy.11

Customer satisfaction would be the H&M’s mea-sure of service, as McAdoo became a hands-onmanager who spent hours touring the system,keeping watch and talking to employees.12 TheH&M also had the luxury to learn from the mis-takes of New York’s first subway, the InterboroughRapid Transit (IRT) system, which opened in 1904.As the H&M would become, the IRT was a new andevolving system that was electric, high speed andbased on generally short trips. But like the horsedrawn trolleys and elevated railroads that precededit, the IRT became infected by the notoriously cor-ruption of Tammany Hall, corrupting influences thatthoroughly pervaded the running of the subways.Surliness amongst its staff and inefficiencies thatled to chronic overcrowding and breakdowns werethe accepted norm. McAdoo mandated politenessand forbade surliness. In his opening day speechto H&M employees, he announced that he wouldsummarily fire any who used the phrase “steplively”, well known from the surface railroads andIRT. Cleanliness and safety were also importantconcerns as employees cleaned cars and stationsdaily. When the H&M experienced its first break-down, McAdoo established a new standard for hon-esty. The H&M’s reputation for engineeringexcellence became synonymous with safety andcomfort, using innovative technologies in every-


thing from its switching to its automatic doors toits cars. The steel cars of the H&M offered a quiet,smooth ride, starkly different from the noisy, roughjourney on the IRT’s wooden cars.13

As a provider of transportation services to themasses, McAdoo recognized that the H&M musttake every measure to be inclusive and advertis-ing in all foreign language newspapers, includingGerman and Yiddish.14 The H&M’s openness con-tinued the company’s overture to the public but italso made business sense. McAdoo needed to re-pay $70 million in debt and needed to maximizeridership. The H&M’s policy may have been con-sistent with McAdoo’s progressive ideals, but toassure conservative shareholders like Morgan, italso had to rank as solid business practice.McAdoo’s insistence on customer service paid off.When the H&M had to raise fares in 1911, it en-countered scant resistance. Many wrote that theincrease was worth it, a comment that any otherrailroad in New York at the time could never gar-ner.15 The H&M’s most pioneering inclusivity ex-tended toward women, as both patrons andemployees. In doing so, the H&M was setting thebar of customer service by effectively saying to alate-Victorian populace that if women would ridethe H&M alone, then it must be safe and the expe-rience must be without discomfort. In addition tooverall courtesy, the company provided amenitiesspecifically directed at women. The H&M installeda large powder room in the Hudson Terminal Sta-tion supplied with free powder and hairpins andfor five cents, any rest room patron, man orwoman, was supplied with a towel and a bar ofsoap. It initiated a system in which a wife couldleave packages purchased in the city at the H&Mbaggage office for her husband to pick up later inthe day.16 The overture toward women was anaspect of Progressivism which showed a willing-ness to try new ideas. When a New York women’sorganization suggested a special subway car forwomen riding H&M and IRT trains, only McAdoowas willing to try.17 At the Hudson Terminals, theH&M hired only women to sell tickets, a practicebrought from Chicago by the H&M’s general su-perintendent.18 It was when McAdoo decided topay female employees the same wage as men thatthe same superintendent criticized him. “Whyshould you pay more for your labor than is neces-sary when you want the road [railroad] run witheconomy?” His superintendent knew, as McAdoo

did, how critical operating costs were to a com-pany with such a massive debt burden. McAdoowas firm. “I want the road [railroad] run witheconomy, but not at the expense of justice.”19

McAdoo later cited a second motive that inequityin pay would harm morale. If employees weretreated inequitably how could they be asked to treatpatrons with decency?20

As McAdoo became well known for the engineer-ing and management success of the H&M and hisown sense of social justice, he lectured extensively.In his lectures, McAdoo used his own experiencewith the H&M as he continued his attack on bigbusiness. “The hostility of the public to corpora-tions, especially transportation corporations, somuch in evidence during the past few years, is thecumulative effect of years of indifference,oftentimes contemptuous, on the part of corpo-rate managers to the interests and just grievancesof the public.”21 As an antidote, he argued thatcorporations should be accountable to the public.Individual executives could not escape guilt be-hind a corporate shield. “I assert that no corpora-tion is soulless…” he lectured, “…the managementof the corporation is the soul of its dominant indi-vidual - usually the president; if that soul be self-ish, little, and narrow, the policy of the corporationwill be selfish, little, and narrow.“22 If, as McAdooargued, the organization reflected the nature ofits leader, then McAdoo put himself under consid-erable scrutiny as president of the H&M. He roseto his own challenge through expressions of hu-mility. He later dispelled notions that the tunnelsmade him a wealthy man by announcing what hemade, which was modest when compared to whatcorporate figures of the age earned.23 When thetunnels were first finished, the press began callingthem ‘The McAdoo Tunnels’. McAdoo wrote to eachnewspaper and asked that they stop this practice.’“Ido not like to be praised for other people’s work,”he wrote.24 For McAdoo to accept that the tunnelsbe named for him, his achievements would bemonumentalized at the expense of others. In hisview, this would be “selfish, little and narrow” andwould ultimately hurt the company.

As a reflection of its customer-oriented philoso-phy, the H&M’s built its facilities to be inclusive,comfortable, clean and safe. The H&M made animportant station planning decision at the threestations on Manhattan’s Sixth Avenue in 1908. The


H&M learned from the experience of the IRT, whosenarrow station entrances located within the spaceof the sidewalk immediately drew public criticismbecause of overcrowding. This furthered the IRT’sreputation for having a general disregard for rid-ers.25 Instead, the H&M stations opened directlyto the basement concourses of what were then NewYork’s most desirable department stores, with ad-ditional stairways leading to storefront passagesat street level used when stores were closed. Pas-sengers would emerge from trains into a bustlingcommercial environment rather than the dank,crowded and potentially sinister stations of the IRT.The merchandisers welcomed these entrances astheir sales boomed and responded in kind by lin-ing station platforms with display windows, recog-nizing as the H&M did the emerging and newlymobile female market.26 When the H&M extendedthe line to 33rd street, it took an even more directapproach by constructing the Gimbels departmentstore for the merchandiser above its terminals.27

Accommodation of passengers was the H&M’s para-mount functional concern; facilities were designedfrom the inside out, or better put, from the tracksup. Despite their neo-renaissance garb, The HudsonTerminals were proto-modern buildings with inno-vative ideas that focused on function, safety, com-fort and ease of circulation. Inside the three levelstation, the H&M’s customer focus was most evi-dent in its circulation. Ingress and egress were viaopposing platforms, thereby avoiding conflictamong passengers. Someone trying to board a trainwould never collide with an onslaught of rush-hourcommuters disembarking.28 Learning from theIRT’s cramped stairways, the Terminals featuredbroad ramps and elevators that eased circulationand created a more gracious environment. The sta-tion had four entrances marked by glass marqueeson the side streets off Church, one each fromCortland and Fulton and two from Dey. The stationconcourse was replete with retail establishments,with everything from butchers to barbers, similarto the department stores at H&M stations uptown.29

Completed in 1908, the twin, twenty-two storybuildings above the station, housing mostly officespace, would be the most prominent structures theH&M would build, and for a time, the largest build-ings in the world. Because of the difference in sizeof the two blocks upon which they stood, the Ter-minals were not identical, as their successors would

be, but as the difference was made up in the spac-ing between windows, it was not immediately ap-parent; contemporary descriptions refer to themas twins. High land cost prompted the H&M to buildspeculative office space atop the rail terminal inorder to gain the highest possible return, the firsthybrid of this type to be built in New York (fig. 1 &2). The venture paid off. The Terminals were fi-nancially successful, housing a who’s who of promi-nent corporations. Tenants entered both buildingsthrough identical lobbies from Church Street onopposite elevations from the station portals, con-tinuing the Terminal’s discrete circulation systems.Thirty-nine elevators served both buildings with acombination of express and local service, with threeelevators descended directly to concourse level.Two bridges connected the buildings at the thirdand seventeenth floors. Street level retail, occu-pying available street frontages, continued thecommercial focus of the station below. Two pro-fessional clubs, the Mechanics Club and the Rail-road Club (chartered by McAdoo) occupied the topfloors of each building. Each featured extensivedining facilities and garden terraces with views ofthe Hudson. In keeping with the pro-female over-tures of the H&M, the Railroad Club had its ownWomen’s Dining Room.

The architectural firm of Clinton and Russell de-signed the Terminals. Before working for the H&M,they had produced many large office and residen-tial structures, many features from which appearedin the Terminals. Although they competed with themore prominent New York firms of Carrere &Hastings and McKim, Mead and White for impor-tant civic projects, such as the New York MunicipalBuilding, these had eluded the firm. Instead, theysucceeded at producing many of the infill commer-cial buildings that were beginning to fill out theManhattan grid. These buildings shouldered inamong their neighbors, despite their sometimes-massive bulk, taking on an almost demure quality.The twenty-seven story 60-62 Wall Street was themost significant of their mid-block infill office build-ing, blending in with its adjoining street wall in-stead of striving for singularity. The contemporaryarchitectural press described it as “at best a pilas-ter, without the force or sculptural presence of acolumn.” Commentary regarding their MercantileBuilding, that it “attracts but little interest fromthe public eye unless its plainness is noted in con-trast to the magnificent façade of the Metropolitan


Life Building,”30 aptly characterized the firm’s com-mercial work, as Clinton & Russell’s infill buildingsgenerally acted more in a supporting than leadingrole. At the Mercantile Building, the firm was con-tent to express their design ingenuity below groundwhere an arcade connected the building elevatorswith the IRT. One side of the arcade’s entire lengthincluded shop windows of the first large basementstore in New York.31 This connectivity, the first ofits kind in New York, foreshadowed the H&M’sembrasure of retail along 6th Avenue and the un-derground concourse at the Terminals.

Many of Clinton & Russell’s uptown hotel and resi-dential designs drew critical acclaim and werewidely copied. In their Astor Hotel (1904), theydeftly incorporated many different programs intoa massive single block, creating a new type of ho-tel that was a tremendously successful.32 The Astorfeatured a highly developed rooftop with wintergardens and outdoor planting which connected toballrooms directly below, versions of this arrange-ment, complete with similar twin-pavilions, gracedthe Terminals. Clinton & Russell also designedapartment buildings for the Astor Family and oth-ers on Manhattan’s upper west side. Most, occu-pied full block frontages along the city’s wideavenues. Two of these, Graham Court and theApthorp, were modeled after the Italian Renais-sance Palazzo, built around large courtyards andoccupying an entire block. From the exterior, theyappeared as a single solid mass, rising in one con-tinuous wall from base to cornice. Like the Termi-nals, the Apthorp was reputed to be the largestbuilding of its type in the world when built. De-spite their mass and separation from other struc-tures, Clinton & Russell designed these in keepingwith their downtown infill strategy. Rather thanbecoming the monumental urban palaces they werebased on, they played an ensemble role, integrat-ing with the surrounding residential neighborhoods,generally respecting nearby building heights andfollowing the proscribed neo-classical canon of turnof the century New York, with clearly defined bases,middles and tops, and with symmetrical, highlyarticulated entryways. Where budgets limited,Clinton & Russell typically substituted brick andterra cotta for stone. The Hudson Terminals wouldbe an amalgam of many of these Clinton & Russellbuildings. Both in their basements and on theirroofs, they included the programmatic features thatthe firm had pioneered. Like the Astor Hotel, they

were hybrids of complex programs rendered assolid blocks and like the Apthorp, theses blockswould seek to blend rather than stand out, cladlike their neighbors with stone base, brick shaftand terra cotta top.. Despite their mass and hugesize, they were supporting infill rather than singu-lar monuments.

The Terminals, located at the edge of Manhattan’shistoric center in an area that was experiencingprofound change, would soon find themselves waistdeep amongst towers. Pioneering among thesedevelopments was Ernest Flagg’s Singer Building,diagonally across Church Street from the Termi-nals, which opened in 1908 as the tallest buildingin the world, a title it soon lost.33 The SingerCorporation, fearing the literal and figurativeshadow cast by the massive City Investing Build-ing (Francis H. Kimball 1908) being planned nextdoor, turned to Flagg to add a tower to the head-quarters he himself had designed in 1898 (Fig.3 ).The result established a type that was widely cop-ied and codified by the city in its landmark Plan-ning Resolution of 1916. Blending practicality withthe capacity for corporate self-promotion, theSinger Building would become the corporate ty-pology of choice for rivalrous companies such asWoolworth (whose tower would supplant Singer’swithin 5 years), Chrysler and City Services. Thiscorporate rivalry would fuel a building war thatlasted for decades.

Development was not limited to downtown Man-hattan. Dynamic change was evident citywide. TheTerminals were one of three important multi-blockrail facilities under construction in New York in thefirst decade of the twentieth century. The othertwo stations, Pennsylvania (Penn) and Grand Cen-tral, were tactical campaigns in built form, archi-tectural volleys in an intense war betweencompeting railroads. These were major monumen-tal facilities built by the kinds of corporations thatMcAdoo normally castigated and had carefullycrafted his own company’s public image to oppose.The New York Central was, after all, the originof’“public be damned” quip that McAdoo so care-fully manipulated. Since the H&M’s managementphilosophy directly opposed these corporations, itsbuildings were the opposite of those the larger rail-roads built, almost by default, the H&M had to takea different form, a response that ultimately ren-dered them as two, twin towers.


The Pennsylvania and the New York Central Rail-roads built these stations as monuments of corpo-rate prestige. The intense competition escalatedin 1903 when the Pennsylvania Railroad hiredMcKim, Mead and White, with Charles Follen McKimas partner in charge, to build its new station.McKim’s architectural expression reflected theambitions of his client; the station was to be monu-mental, based on European imperial structures. Itsscale borrowed from ancient Rome’s Baths ofCaracalla, and its imperial iconography fromLanghans’s Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. McKimbased all his work on the low-slung classical monu-ments that he was exposed to in his training at theEcole des Beaux Artes in Paris. At Penn Station,

McKim argued strongly for horizontal monumen-tality despite objections from his client, who wantedto build a hotel atop the structure to maximizeinvestment. McKim argued against the hotel fortwo reasons: the first, his horizontal conviction;and second, that adding program, whether it be ahotel or office, would debase the station and di-lute its singular monumentality. Fortunate that afaction at the railroad supported him, McKim pre-vailed and the station was built as a single, mas-sive, multi-block structure.34

In response, the New York Central resolved that itwould amend modernizing renovations alreadyunderway and build an entirely new station. In1903, the railroad announced a closed competi-

Figure 2. Section showing Station below the Terminals.

Figure 1. Ground floor plan of Terminals showing DeyStreet passing through.


tion35 won by Reed & Stem whose design featureda twenty-story hotel atop the station, the revenue-producing capabilities of which William H. Newman,the railroad’s president, especially favored. Butwhile “Newman was looking at the bottom line”,William K. Vanderbilt (the Chairman of the Rairoad),“had his eye on Penn Station.””36 When the PennStation design was published in 1904, he inter-vened and instructed the architects to remove thehotel. “Vanderbilt had no intention of allowing acrosstown rival to eclipse the grandeur of GrandCentral.“37 Vanderbilt’s demand for a freestandingmonument seconded McKim’s belief that the in-clusion of any other program would violate thestation’s singular presence, resulting in loss of cor-porate prestige. Vanderbilt also forced Reed & Stemto collaborate with the firm of Warren andWetmore.38

While the competing railroads carefully plannedtheir respective stations to be corporate symbols,their ambitions extended to the station’s surround-ings. While McKim looked to Rome and Berlin,Whitney Warren, the partner in charge at GrandCentral, preferred Paris.39 From the south on ParkAvenue, the new Grand Central would rise like agrand Parisian Palaise at the end of one of BaronHausman’s alles.40 From the opposite side the rail-road created an entire new neighborhood of full-block office and apartment buildings rising to aconsistent cornice height to dignify this approach.41

Carefully framed by these surroundings, the sta-tion sat as an imperial palace with every measure

taken to underscore its importance. Across town,the Pennsylvania strove for similar ends.42 Therailroad absorbed 32nd street, buying the propertyfrom the city and placing its primary entry on thestreet’s axis facing Seventh Avenue and the mostdeveloped areas of the city to the east. The origi-nal plans called for massive urban reconfigurationthat was never realized. These included wideningSeventh Avenue to form an urban square thatMcKim’s copy of the Brandenburg gate would domi-nate; widening and building arcades on 32nd Street;cutting new avenues north to 42nd Street and southto 23th on the centerline of the monumental wait-ing hall; and building a diagonal boulevard andunderground trolley to connect with its rival sta-tion across town.43

The monumental ambitions of both railroads werebest exemplified in their respective cavernous in-teriors. The Pennsylvania’s promotional literaturedescribed its Waiting Hall as the “the largest roomof its kind in existence,”44 but while its spaces mayhave been dimensionally generous, Penn Station’soutward expression of power and highly disciplinedinterior procession was intentionally uninviting.“Pennsylvania Station did not aim to please. Itaimed to impress, to overwhelm, and to dignifythe visitor through the grandeur of its architec-tural forms and the ceremonial quality of its plan.Penn Station did not make you feel comfortable, itmade you feel important.”45 From the street tothe platform, the marshaled effect of its spatialsequence was meant to express the railroad’s might

Figure 3. The skyline of lower Manhattan: Hudson Terminals at center, Singer Building tallest at right.


and an overriding sense of control to dissolve anyof the chaos common to train stations, “ One doesnot rush to catch a Pennsylvania train“– one pro-ceeds to it in orderly but expeditious fashion.”46

Counter to its name, its Waiting Hall had no seatsin which to sit and wait. Shortly before the build-ing opened, its superintendent recommended add-ing seats to the waiting hall, citing that passengerssat on the floor in its Jersey City Terminal and mightdo the same in New York. But the railroad, clearlyfollowing McKim in lockstep, did not comply, re-sponding that the seats would dilute the hall’smonumentality. Instead, seats were crowded intoother waiting spaces nearby. The station was notdesigned for the people who would think to sit onthe floor, but for the elite; it was a place whereone contemporary critic described: “well gownedwomen… would sweep up and down his broad stair-cases.”47 Grand Central Station’s spaces matchedPenn Station in scale, While the Pennsylvaniaboasted that New York’s City Hall could fit inside’‘thelargest room of its kind’, the New York Centralclaimed that its concourse was larger than the naveof St. John the Divine, New York’s recently begunmassive cathedral. In this skirmish, metaphysicstrumped political power. 48

McAdoo watched quietly from the sidelines and wasconscious not only of both corporate giant’s prac-tices, but how both station designs reflected thosepolicies.4950 As such, the Terminals would shapethe Terminals as the opposite of the uptown sta-tions in almost all regards, as if they sought toreform those structures by example. At the HudsonTerminals, the needs of the customer subordinatedany corporate symbolism, monumentality or senseof grandeur. The H&M professed no designs on itssurroundings. Instead, its buildings blended withthe urban fabric as infill, they were more back-ground then foreground, playing supporting insteadof lead roles. Moreover, despite their immense bulk,any notion of monumentality -whether as a slen-der tower, or as a sprawling granite or marblemonolith, set back from and framed by its sur-roundings – was avoided. It would have been hypo-critical of McAdoo, given his publicpronouncements, to build a monument either tothe corporate prestige of the H&M, or to himself.

While the wealthier railroads went to great lengthsto make their buildings visible, locating them alongvisual corridors, proposing to increase exposure

by widening or creating new streets, and by re-shaping the immediate surroundings to frameviews, the H&M resisted almost all opportunitiesfor increased exposure, no small feat for the larg-est buildings in the world. The H&M opted not todevelop adjacent real estate. To be perceived as aspeculator would have tarnished his image. McAdoowould later write that others would make millionsfrom investments around H&M stations, somethinghe could have done but did not.51 The H&M alsoshied away from any axial visibility for the Termi-nals, whose conditions were similar to those at PennStation, straddling two city blocks. Rather thanplace an eye-catching Beaux Art architectural fea-ture where Dey Street passed through, the H&Melected to keep it as a thoroughfare, even thoughthe entire two-block site had been excavated fourstories below grade to accommodate the station.They rejected the ornate bridge that Clinton &Russell designed for them, which bore a resem-blance to the sculpture that would sit atop GrandCentral (Fig.4 ). The H&M deliberately avoided theedifice on which to ascribe monumentality. Mostother railroads of the time would have filled thespace of Dey Street with a tall, light filled hallthrough which passengers would pass. However par-simonious, McAdoo’s creditors would have certainlyconsidered this a fitting and necessary amenity.52

McAdoo also resisted Flagg’s example - a justifi-able precedent that could have actually increasedthe H&M’s income - to build a tower. While McAdoowas unafraid to build the largest building in theworld at the time, concern about his image and byextension the image of the company left him withno desire to build the tallest. In his memoirs,McAdoo considered the tall building as unneces-sary and generally disparages the American ten-dency towards bigness.53 He was especiallysensitive to how the American public regarded bigbusiness, concerned “that they look upon high fi-nance, and the concentration of authority in thehands of wealthy men and powerful corporations,as a public menace.””54 McAdoo recognized that inthe public’s mind big buildings stood for big busi-ness. McAdoo must also have recognized from hisneighbor across the street the connection betweenskyscrapers and the capitalists that built them, aSinger, Woolworth, or later, a Chrysler. His experi-ence with’“McAdoo’s Tubes”, of having the pressname the tunnels after him without his prompting,showed him how a singular achievement, whether


an engineering or architectural one, could be con-nected with his name. That he had to campaign tohave the practice stopped proved how indelible itcould be. As a tall tower next to Singer’s, a’“McAdooBuilding” might be impossible to play down. Evenworse, a skyscraper might suggest that his em-brasure of the public was insincere that, in the end,he was just another corporate villain, that his wasa”“selfish, little, and narrow” company.

McAdoo wanted to avoid at all cost the monumen-tality tendencies that the railroads of the dayshared. Despite the Terminal’s massive bulk, thestation was as invisible a public piece of infrastruc-ture could be and still signify as a station. In thehierarchical grain of streets in Manhattan, entry tothe station was from the secondary street whilethe office lobbies were given the preferred entryfrom the wider north-south streets. The Terminalswere deliberately anti-hierarchical and anti-monu-mental. Even if the financial necessity of includingoffices were not an issue, it would be difficult toimagine McAdoo arguing, as McKim and Vanderbiltdid, for singular, monumental purity. All H&M fa-cilities in Manhattan were hybridized, integratingwith either offices or department stores. The H&Meven considered a hotel for the Gimbels and pos-sibly other sites. Their interweaving with otherbuilding types diluted the essential singularityMcKim’s definition of monumentality required.55

While Dey Street split the site of the station, theanti-monumental concerns of McAdoo and the H&Mcontributed to the twin bifurcation of the Termi-nals. With customer needs subordinating any dis-plays of corporate symbolism, monumentality orgrandiosity, and with no designs on surroundingreal estate, the buildings blended, even receded,as infill into the urban fabric. Dividing the build-ings helped them blend. But in their dual nature,any difference, one being taller than the other, alarger entry, might be perceived as giving greaterhierarchy to one, construed as the singularity thatMcKim and Vanderbilt sought. One could enter thestation from four equivalent entries: two pairs ofmirror images in plan and cross section. Architec-tural treatment of both office blocks was identicalso as not to prioritize entry to the H&M’s corporateoffices. Since McAdoo’s own club was in one of thetowers, care had to be taken to occupy its twinwith the Mechanics Club, a club of equal stature.In speaking engagements, McAdoo used the mul-

tiple unit train, an innovation of electric railroads,as a metaphor. The traditional steam train con-sisted of a locomotive capable of propulsion, pull-ing many motor-less, passive cars. In contrast, themultiple unit train, common to today’s subways, isa joining of many identical cars that all propel them-selves. Any car is capable of leading the train,whether there be two or ten. McAdoo used thismetaphor to describe the make-up of the H&M andsaw himself as only the motorman of the corpora-tion, steering from one of the cars.56

The theme of democratic equivalence and sup-pression of any hierarchy was an underlying prin-ciple of the H&M and clearly one transmitted in theform of the Terminals, which like the multiple unitcars, are equivalent, identical.

By using metaphors to describe the H&M, McAdoounderstood the power of symbols. From the timethe decision was made to build the sub-aqueoustunnels in pairs of inbound and outbound tubes,they were referred to as twins. When McAdoo pe-titioned the press to stop using his name, the tun-nels were subsequently called the Hudson Tubes

Figure 4. Unbuilt bridge across Dey Street.


or simply, the Twin Tubes. They are still referredto as the Twin Tubes today

(Fig. 5). Whether they were called the HudsonTubes or the Twin Tubes, like the Hudson Termi-nals, they were always described in the plural. Theuse of the plural implies the pluralistic, inclusiveand democratic as opposed to the singular the ex-clusive and monopolistic. A rendering made for theinvitation to the celebration marking the openingof the downtown tunnels shows a composition ofpairs, the twin tubes, the twin terminal towers,the seals of the two states and two ships, one asteamship and one a ferry. All four pairs are sym-metrically placed about a common verticalcenterline. A second centerline, suggested by thesurface of the Hudson River, creates another pair-ing between the towers and the tubes, as mirrorimages of one another.

The underlying theme that the H&M employed increating a new kind of railroad was one of integra-tion. The railroad stepped in to integrate Manhat-tan with the continent, New York with New Jersey,different modes: steamships and ferries, subwaysand transcontinental rail. In this sense, the twinsrepresented joining instead of exclusion; a plural-istic view of Progressive optimism instead of thestatus quo and isolation of monopolies. In the end,the idealism and the rivalry would be all for naught.Within fifty years, the H&M, the Pennsylvania andthe Grand Central would all succumb to bankruptcy.Beginning in the 1960’s, Penn Station and theHudson Terminals were slowly and systematicallydemolished. Both left the rail that caused them tobe in the first place. From the taproot left in lowerManhattan, another set of twins would grow.’

NOTES

1 Heyer, Paul. Architects on Architecture: New Directionsin America (New York: Walker, 1966): 186 MinoruYamasaki recounted that “given the required programone tower became unreasonable in size” and that “sev-eral towers…looked too much like a housing project.”Others on the team recall that two simply “felt right”.Glanz, James and Lipton, Eric.”“Towering Ambition. TheRise of the World Trade Center: A History with Life andDeath Implications””The New York Time Magazine, Sun-day, September 8, 2002 / Section 6: 382 The New York Times, February 26, 19083 Cudahy, Brian J.. Rails Under the Mighty Hudson (NewYork: Fordham University Press: 2002) 10-26

4 Ibid: 145 Broesamle, John J.. William Gibbs McAdoo; A Passionfor Change 1863-1917 (Port Washington, NY/ London:Kennicat Press, 1973); 25-26. McAdoo lionized the com-mon man. In a Speech at the Press Club on January 21,1911 he stated that “The ‘common people’ possess insome ways a highly developed instinct or common sense,which enables them to decide rightly…so-called ‘compli-cated’ questions. They have, through this instinct or com-mon sense a comprehension second only in its accuracyto mathematics or an exact science.”6”McAdoo William G.. Crowded Years: The Reminiscencesof William G. McAdoo (Boston/New York: HoughtonMifflin: 1931): 1-887 The Ravenswood Gas Company completed thefirst sub-aqueous tunnel in New York beneath the EastRiver in 1894. One of the few benefits of the decade-long delay in construction was that significant advancesin tunneling technology gave the H&M and its bondhold-ers the confidence to start a second pair of tunnels even

Figure 5. A contemporary postcard showing the twinTerminals and tubes.


before the first pair were completed.8 Watchorn, Robert.

“The Builder of the Hudson Tunnels,””The Outlook, vol.90 (December 26, 1908): 913. Workers carefully dyna-mited a rock reef that blocked the tunnel’s path, usingkerosene torches to harden a scant fifteen feet of siltholding back millions of gallons of Hudson River water,while engineers dropped sails from the America’s Cupyachts, the strongest water-tight fabric known at thattime, to strengthen the seal from above. In excavatingfor the terminals, workers dug out treacherous quick-sand to bedrock, a feat that anticipates the PortAuthority’s innovative, daring excavations years later.9 Cudahy: 27-9. One notable exception, the Penn-sylvania Railroad, cooperated with the H&M but only be-cause it was simultaneously planning its own tunnels(using the H&M’s engineers) to their monumental sta-

11 McAdoo. Crowded Years: 104-512 Hendrick: 495 The railroad encouraged comments butcomplaints were rare. Of the 49 million passengers inthe first year, less than 50 complaints were received,which McAdoo himself investigated and personally re-sponded to.13 Hendrick: 496-50014 McAdoo. Crowded Years: 121-22 McAdoo went so faras to distributed H&M timetables in foreign language time-tables on ocean liners. He later successfully championedrevoking a treaty with Russia because of its anti-Semitism.15 “A Business Man in Politics.””The Outlook, vol. 102(September 28, 1912): 22716 Fitzherbert: 517 Ibid: 6. A car equipped with a specially dressed guardwas run on the tube trains for the ladies, but most womenwanted to ride with the men. The “old maid’s retreat”, asthe newspapers dubbed the idea, was dropped after afew months, but not after a complete public explanationby the H&M for why it was done18 McAdoo. Crowded Years: 105-6; Fitzherbert: 5. InChicago, women were perceived to be friendlier than menand better at handling change. In New York, this be-came a key element of the H&M’s customer-orientedagenda. In order to minimize lines and congestion, thesefemale clerks were deployed in groups of movable ticketbooths called “flying squadrons”. According to one railhistorian, the women were typically attractive, whichcasts the’“let the public be pleased” motto in a differentlight. Although there is no record of any intentions, thispractice of deliberately using attractive women may havehad a psychological motive. The dark history of the build-ing of the tunnels was still in many people’s minds. Fortyfive years of horrific stories about blowouts and the mys-terious crippling of the Benz had created a collective senseof dread about underwater tunnels. Going below theHudson in a tunnel could be a source of enormous anxi-ety. To make the experience as anxiety-free as possibleand using women to do so may have been a companystrategy. Whether this is true may never be known, butif so, it anticipates the strategic use of women steward-ess in the early days of air travel fifty years later.19 Synon, Mary. McAdoo the Man and His Times: A Pan-orama in Democracy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1924):3820 Fitzherbert and McAdoo, p. 105. The H&M’s gesturewon it, and McAdoo, a place in the women’s rights move-ment. The Interborough Teachers Association used theprecedent to secure equal pay legislation at the statelevel, but it quickly earned a governors veto. McAdoo,who claims to only have had passing knowledge ofwomen’s rights struggles before his decision, was drafted

Figure 6. Invitation showing the composition of twins.

tion uptown. Cooperating with the H&M and relying ontheir service to downtown allowed the Pennsylvania toconvert its ferries to automobile use.10 Fitzherbert, Anthony.

“The Public Be Pleased: William G. McAdoo and theHudson Tubes,””Headlights (New York: ElectricRailroader’s Association, June 1964): 2; Hendrick, Bur-ton J.. “McAdoo and the Subways,” McClure’s Magazine,vol. 36 no. 5 March, 1911): 491-4’


as a champion by women’s groups. He was asked to ad-dress a Carnegie Hall convention, which he declined formedical reasons21 McAdoo William G.. The Relations Between Public Ser-vice Corporations and the Public: A Lecture given to theGraduate School of Business Administration, HarvardUniversity, April 6, 1910 (New York: Alexander HamiltonInstitute, 1910): 922 McAdoo. The Relations Between Public Service Corpo-rations and the Public: 723 McAdoo. Crowded Years: 10124 Ibid: 9825 Stern, Robert A.M., Gilmartin, Gregory and MassengaleJ. New York 1900: Metropolitan Architecture and Urban-ism 1890-1915 (New York: Rizzoli, 1983): 46; Real Es-tate Record and Guide 74 (November 5, 1904): 94926 Fitzherbert: 5; These stores, Siegel Cooper, Simpson-Crawford Store and James McCreery, all occupied a por-tion of Sixth Avenue then known as Ladies Mile.27 Hilary Ballon. New York Pennsylvania Stations (NewYork: Norton, 2002): 55, Charles Moore, The Life andTimes of Charles Follen McKim (Boston/New York:Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929): 87.28 Watchorn: 914 The three-level station beneath the twinbuildings combined the best features of both the newsubway station type and the older rail terminals. As at atraditional terminal, tracks split, allowing multiple plat-forms serving different destinations, but instead of com-ing to a dead end, the tracks connected in a loop, similarto the design of the IRT at City Hall Station. This com-bined arrangement allowed for more efficient operation.29 Davies, J. Vipond and Wells, J. Hollis. “A TerminalStation””American Architect and Builder’s News vol. 97(January 19, 1910): 36 Originally, ramps at the Courtlandand Fulton Street portals were solely meant for egressand those at Dey Street for ingress, continuing the seg-regation of circulation from below. In practice, however,these passages eventually allowed circulation in both di-rections30 Stern, Gilmartin, and Massengale. New York 1900: 48.31 “New York’s First Underground Sidewalk””Architects’and Builders’ Magazine vol. 6, October 1904: pp 29-3632 “The Hotel Astor””Architects’ and Builders’ Magazinevol. 6, November 1904: pp 49-71; Stern, Gilmartin, andMassengale. New York 1900: 223, 267-9, Its success ledmany to believe it to be as a replacement for the legend-ary Waldorf Astoria. Because of its success, the Astorwas immediately expanded and its design influenced thebuilding of other hotels including the Knickerbocker(Trowbridge & Livingston 1906) and the Rector (DanielBurnham 1910-11)33 As ambitious as it was, Flagg’s design represented a

complete reversal by the architect. Flagg had once spo-ken out vehemently against the building of skyscrapers.He wrote in 1896:”If the beauty of the city is a matterworth considering of, it certainly would not be improvedby these gigantic monuments to greed rearing their headsat intervals above the other buildings.” “As an architectI will never have anything to do with buildings of thiskind.” (Flagg, Ernest.”“Against Tall Buildings”, Architec-ture and Building, vol. 24, no. 3 pp 82-3) Flagg was joinedin his rebuke by many of his contemporary architectsand their patrician New York clients, who found skyscrap-ers offensive; invading other’s airspace and putting thestreet and immediate neighbors in perpetual shadow.Capitalist greed, especially that of the newly wealthy WallStreet entrepreneurs, was the perceived motive:

“the only advocate of high buildings are those who havea direct pecuniary interest involved.” )Flagg, Ernest.”“TheDanger of High Buildings”, The Cosmopolitan, vol. 29 (May1896) no. 3 p 70) Flagg and others rallied civic leadersto restrict height, but they never achieved an outrightban. Over time, Flagg’s position softened into a compro-mise. Flagg’s tower had been a long time in coming.Against the tower typology for may years, Flagg eventu-ally developed a hypothetical model that included a baseroughly consistent in height with its surroundings, sur-mounted by a slender tower, no more than one quarterthe footprint of the base in proportion. These could riseas high as practical, resulting in a skyline that would bea ‘tiara of towers’. (Goldberg, Paul, The Skyscraper (NewYork: Alfred p. Knopf, 1981): 10) Flagg’s contributionwould become “one of the most important developmentsin the evolution of the skyscraper. It simultaneously sat-isfied the need for dense concentrations of office space,the requirements for reasonable light and air inside theoffices and on the street and the need for a permanent,visible and memorable icon that would function as a sym-bol of a corporation.”(Stern, Gilmartin, and Massengale.New York 1900: 170)34 Ballon, New York Pennsylvania Stations: 42 The col-umns needed to support the hotel would have decreasedthe number of tracks from 21 to 19. The railroad sawitself as a transportation provider first and a hotelier sec-ond, even though the hotel would offset cost.35 Roth, Leland M.. The Urban Architecture of McKim, Meadand White: 1870-1910 (Unpublished Ph.D Manuscript,Yale University, 1973): 697The Grand Central invited fourfirms to participate, including McKim, Mead and White.McKim’s more flamboyant partner, Stanford White, de-signed the entry. Unconcerned with McKim’s low-slungmonumentality and need for programmatic purity, White’sdesign featured a fourteen-story block mix of hotel andoffice space surmounted by a sixty-story tower on theaxis of Park Avenue that would have been New York’stallest building. The tower would have featured a jet ofsteam driven three hundred feet into the air and illumi-


nated red at night. But Newman found the McKim, Meadand White design to be “far too expensive and impracti-cable” and rejected it.36 Ballon, New York Pennsylvania Stations: 79.37 Ibid: 7938 This was due in part to the perception that, as a Min-nesota-based firm they were too provincial, lacking theability to match McKim, Mead and White’s monumentalstandard. Like McKim, Whitney Warren, the firm’s leadpartner, had studied at the Beaux Arts. He would useevery measure to surpass every quality of McKim’s PennStation.39 The placement of the stations and the manipulation ofthe surrounding environment followed City Beautiful prin-ciples, the urban design practice of those educated atthe Beaux Arts. Each railroad sought to create an envi-ronment akin to the grandiose drama and forced regu-larity of Daniel Burnham’s Columbian Exposition of 1893in Chicago, echoing its master planner’s famous chargeto “make no small plans”.40 Stern, Gilmartin, and Massengale , p. 3741 Ibid., p. 153. The railroad’s squeamishness regardingtowers and office space was short lived. In 1929, Warrencompleted the towering New York Central Building northof station, thus completing the “urban room” that ParkAvenue had become. From the south, the tower was setback far enough so as not to detract from the station’smonumental singular presence.42 If one of the battles between the railroads was forphysical hegemony over the city, the New York Centralclearly won it. For while McKim and his client’s ambitionsequaled that of their rival, they began at a disadvantageand their achievements fell far short of their goals. Theytoo sought to reconfigure the surrounding streets to pro-vide access and views, and to influence the architecturalcharacter along those streets to provide a backdrop tothe station, all to underscore the station’s, and by exten-sion the railroad’s importance. But unlike the New YorkCentral, the Pennsylvania did not own property in Man-hattan and had to purchase land to build. This provedexpensive and the railroad would eventually balk at thecost of expanding around the station. Despite this, themonumental expression of the station was an overarchingpriority, achieved at any cost.43 Ballon, New York Pennsylvania Stations: 85-92 Noneof these were ever realized as the railroad was hesitantto invest the necessary capital to spur nearby real estateinvestment. Pennsylvania Station never really fully inte-grated into the surrounding city, a fact that contributedto its tragic demolition within sixty years. Instead, thePennsylvania naively expected its neighbors and the cityto follow its intentions under their own volition. Ironi-cally, McKim’s insistence on monumental purity played arole in inhibiting development nearby. The station’s set-

backs from the street and lack of retail on the streetfacades inhibited the kind of retail development aroundthe station that was natural to New York. Some develop-ment did occur however, a U.S. Post Office built acrossEighth Avenue and over the tracks, and finally the Penn-sylvania Hotel across Seventh Avenue as the railroad fi-nally relented and built a hotel. Both were designed byMcKim, Mead and White and possessed the necessaryarchitectural complimentarily, but neither could catalyzethe critical mass necessary to match the New YorkCentral’s extraordinary success. Instead, the Pennsylva-nia naively expected its neighbors and the city to followits intentions under their own volition. Ironically, McKim’sinsistence on monumental purity played a role in inhibit-ing development nearby. The station’s setbacks from thestreet and lack of retail on the street facades inhibitedthe kind of retail development around the station thatwas natural to New York. Some development did occurhowever, a U.S. Post Office built across Eighth Avenueand over the tracks, and finally the Pennsylvania Hotelacross Seventh Avenue as the railroad finally relentedand built a hotel. Both were designed by McKim, Meadand White and possessed the necessary architecturalcomplimentarily, but neither could catalyze the criticalmass necessary to match the New York Central’s extraor-dinary success. Little of this was ever realized as therailroad was hesitant to invest the necessary capital tospur nearby real estate investment. Pennsylvania Sta-tion never really fully integrated into the surrounding city,a fact that contributed to its tragic demolition within sixtyyears.44 Ibid: 6245 Ibid: 5346 Ballon, New York Pennsylvania Stations: 55,47 Ibid: 54.48 Ibid: 81. While Penn Station’s processional excludedseating for those waiting, Grand Centrals waiting room,with a full complement of seats, held a prominent posi-tion, the first space one encountered. While Penn Sta-tion was intended to have one primary entry with theothers treated more as clearly secondary, or as exits,Grand Central was designed as porous, with many en-tries of equal stature. Where Penn Station did incorpo-rated retail, it was in a very controlled manner. Retaillined many of the processional paths in Grand Centraland even lined the street front of the primary elevations,a feature irreconcilable with McKim’s severe colonnadealong Seventh Avenue. In the end, Grand Centralemerged as a much friendlier station, monumental yetaccessible where’“ceremony was subordinated to effi-ciency.”49 While Warren, Vanderbilt and the New York Centralwere extremely conscious of what was built at Penn Sta-tion, they were probably equally aware of the Hudson


Terminals downtown. The Vanderbilts were investors inthe H&M and among the dignitaries who rode the firsttrain under the Hudson on opening day. Renderings ofGrand Central clearly show accommodations of theplanned H&M extension as “McAdoo’s Tubes.”(www.hudsoncity.net/tubesenglish/index.html) WilliamK. Vanderbilt certainly must have been aware of boththe company’s policies and how their facilities embodiedthem. The friendliness of Grand Central - its efficiency,multiple entries, ramps, embrasure of retail, and overalldemocracy of its spaces’– is arguably as indebted to theH&M’s precedent as it is a response to Penn Station’sshortcomings. After all, the Terminals were completedtwo years before Penn Station and during a period thatGrand Central was still being designed. And whileVanderbilt and his architects may have been very muchaware of the published designs for Penn Station since1904, they surely would have been aware, as most NewYorkers were, of the successful operations of the H&Mand its functionally innovative terminal well before con-struction began on Grand Central.50 Fitzherbert: 3; Cudahy51 McAdoo: 10252 That financial concerns prevented the H&M from ab-sorbing Dey Street is improbable. It is true that the H&Mwould have had to, as the Pennsylvania did, purchasethe city land that Dey Street occupied. (Ballon, New YorkPennsylvania Stations: 38 ) But the city had asked thePennsylvania to pay a relatively modest amount, sincethe railroad was providing so significant an urban ame-nity. The H&M could have made the same argument fora similar discount. The company paid to restore the street,why not put that towards rentable space? The H&M couldhave been easily offset the cost of Dey Street with therevenue from the added floor area added in the air space.McAdoo clearly wanted the gap to remain and the build-ings to remain separate. Clinton & Russell had originallydesigned an ornate stone bridge at the third floor thatwas never built. In its stead, two, unadorned utilitarianones were. This flourish may have either been too ex-pensive or ostentatious, inconsistent with the populistimage that McAdoo was projecting for the H&M and itsfacilities.. McAdoo clearly sought to avoid even the slight-est suggestion of unnecessary display, especially one seendown Dey Street, which might invite comparisons withhis arrogant rivals.53 McAdoo. Crowded Years: 11054 Ibid: 11155 Collins, Glenn. “Postmodern, In a Manner Of Speak-ing; A Shape Out of 1908 Is Offered Downtown”, TheNew York Times, Tuesday, January 21, 2003: B1 A for-gotten account, which resurfaced in the aftermath of 9/11, tells that the Catalan expressionist architect AntonioGaudi designed a hotel for the Terminal site or in itsvicinity. Like his more business-focused and less sym-bolic minded counterparts at the larger railroads, McAdoo

may have even considered a hotel for the Terminal site.Gaudi was purportedly approached in 1908 by a groupof American businessmen, led by McAdoo, to build a ho-tel. Unfortunately, virtually all records and drawings ofthis structure were lost in a fire, with only a few sketchesthat bear some resemblance to Gaudi’s Sagrada FamiliaChurch remaining. It is conceivable that this story mightbe true; McAdoo did travel annually to Europe, usuallyto spas in Germany to restore his health, but if the 1908date is correct, the Terminals were already completed. Ifthe date is wrong and the trip had occurred earlier, onecan draw several conclusions. It supports McAdoo’s dis-regard for monumental purity that McKim and Vanderbiltrequired of their stations in rejecting the hotel proposalsby others. If intended for a site adjacent to the Termi-nals, it might show that McAdoo’s intentions were, afterall, closer to those of his uptown rivals and that like thePennsylvania and the New York Central, he did makereal estate plans around the Terminals. The hotel couldhave served a higher public purpose than offices, andeven produce more revenue. But the scale of the build-ing is entirely inconsistent with McAdoo’s stated aver-sion to big business and big buildings. The renditions ofthe project produced after the fire by Gaudi devotee JuanMatemala show a massive tower, taller than the Eiffel.These phantasmagoric drawings, which appear in RemKoolhaas’s Delirious New York of 1978, depict a buildingwith cavernous interior spaces, with floors so large thatit would be difficult to operate as a hotel. Given McAdoo’sessentially pragmatic nature, it remains a mystery howthis project could have fit with his plans.56 McAdoo. The Relations Between Public Service Corpo-rations and the Public: 8

REFERENCES: BOOKS

Ballon, Hilary. New York Pennsylvania Stations (New York:Norton, 2002)

Broesamle, John J.. William Gibbs McAdoo; A Passion forChange 1863-1917 (Port Washington, NY/ London:Kennicat Press, 1973)

Broesamle, John J.. William Gibbs McAdoo; Businessmanin Politics, 1863-1917 (Unpublished Ph.D Manuscript,Columbia University, 1970)

(Port Washington, NY/ London: Kennicat Press, 1973)

Croly, Herbert. The Promise of American Life (New York,Macmillan, 1911)

Cudahy, Brian J.. Rails Under the Mighty Hudson (NewYork: Fordham University Press: 2002)

Goldberg, Paul, The Skyscraper (New York: Alfred p.Knopf, 1981)

Heyer, Paul. Architects on Architecture: New Directionsin America (New York: Walker, 1966)

Lippmann, Walter. Men of Density (New York: Macmillan,


1927)

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McAdoo, William G.. The Relations Between Public Ser-vice Corporations and the Public: A Lecture given to theGraduate School of Business Administration, HarvardUniversity, April 6, 1910 (New York: Alexander HamiltonInstitute, 1910

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Pease, Otis ed.. The Progressive Years; The Spirit andAchievement Of American Reform (New York, G. Braziller,1962)

Powell, Kenneth. Grand Central Terminal: Warren andWetmore (London: Phaidon Press, 1996)

Roth, Leland M.. The Urban Architecture of McKim, Meadand White: 1870-1910 (Unpublished Ph.D Manuscript,Yale University, 1973)

Schlichting, Kurt C. Grand Central Terminal: Railroads,Engineering, and Architecture in New York City (Balti-more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001)

Stern, Robert A.M., Gilmartin, Gregory and MassengaleJ. New York 1900: Metropolitan Architecture and Urban-ism 1890-1915 (New York: Rizzoli, 1983)

Synon, Mary. McAdoo the Man and His Times: A Pan-orama in Democracy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1924)

Willis, Carol. Form Follows Finance: Skyscrapers andSkylines in New York and Chicago (New York: PrincetonArchitectural Press, 1995)

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Bender, Thomas and Taylor, William, “Culture and Archi-tecture: Some Aesthetic Tensions in the Shaping of Mod-ern New York City,” in William Sharpe and LeonardWallock, eds., Visions of the Modern City (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1987), pp. 185-215

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