The Transformation of Army Intelligence

The year 2001 marks the tenth anniversary of the Gulf War. In the last decade, the Army has reviewed lessonslearned in a number of contingencies and realized the need for transformation. In this issue of the MilitaryIntelligence Professional Bulletin, we examine the transformation from the top down, beginning with the trans-formation “vision,” a three-axis approach (interim force, legacy force, and the scientific and technical axis) toachieving the objective force structure. We examine Army Intelligence, the concepts and materiel aspects of thechange, and finish with a look at transformation training and doctrine.

Our last issue introduced the transformation with four articles about one axis of this change, the interim units.Initiating the Interim Force is the creation of the first two initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs) at Fort Lewis,Washington, based on reorganizing the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (ID), and then 1st Bde, 25th ID (Light).These two brigades are the first two of eight Active and Reserve Component brigades that will transform withinthe Army. The IBCT is a fundamentally new Army organization that will serve as a building block for the Army’smedium force able to fight in the operational environment of the near term.

Leading off this issue, Major General John D. Thomas, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army IntelligenceCenter and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), discusses how transforming organizations, equipment, doctrine, andtraining results in the provision of improved intelligence as part of the combined arms team. Captain Bob Davidsonfollows with “The Vision—Transformation of Our Cold War-Era Force,” outlining the vision of General Eric K.Shinseki (Army Chief of Staff) for our evolving Army and TRADOC’s (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-mand) efforts to build and sustain the IBCTs. Lieutenant General Robert W. Noonan, Jr., Department of the ArmyDeputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), specifically addresses the transformation of Army intelligence,and its goal to achieve situational dominance for Army decision-makers and combat commanders. In the article“Transforming the Army for the Next Century—The Future Is Here Today,” Majors Raul Escribano and PhilipLogan look at why and how the Army is transforming as an organization and institution to remain relevant in thenew century.

Next, Mr. Michael Powell takes a hard-line look at requirements, challenges, and opportunities that MI systemsface during the Army’s transformation. Colonel Charles Atkins discusses the human dimension of transformationand relates how the IBCT reflects several major changes to our “thought patterns” toward support, integration,capabilities, and reach-back operations. COL Stephen Bond and CPT Gregory Young explain that the JointSurveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), Common Ground Station (CGS), and Joint ServicesWorkstation (JSWS) comprise a crucial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system for achiev-ing information dominance and the “now battle” picture in the transformed Army.

Completing the features are four transformation-related training articles and an article presenting IBCT doc-trine. Brigadier General Richard J. Quirk, III, shares his transformation training goals, and COL Gary Parrishexpands on that training with his article outlining the USAIC&FH (specifically 112th MI Brigade ( Provisional))plan for training all MI soldiers to meet all the Objective Force requirements. MAJ Patrick Daniel follows with“Transition Training–IBCT-1 Cadre and Cohort,” in which he discusses the challenges and lessons learned fromthe first IBCT’s transition training. COL Jerry Jones (U.S. Army, Retired) supports MAJ Daniel’s article with hisdetailed account of Kazar Fury, the capstone command post exercise (CPX) incorporated into IBCT-1 training.Finally, CPT Lee Goodman, Jr., uses discussion of current IBCT organization, operations, capabilities, and limi-tations to stimulate input for revision of the IBCT intelligence doctrine.

Colonel Stephen J. Bond and CPT Gregory H. Young are our Writers of the Quarter for October-December2000 with their article “From the High Ground—CGS and JSWS.” Thanks to all of our authors for their greatarticles! Contributions like yours make MIPB the professional development forum for MI professionals.

How to Submit an Material to MIPBMIPB is always seeking good articles on a variety of topics as well as action photographs of MI soldiers. Please

see page 67 for some suggested topics and instructions on submitting your articles, photographs, and book reviews.

FROM THEEDITOR

Writers of the Quarter

STAFF:

Commanding GeneralMajor General John D. Thomas, Jr.112th MI Brigade (Provisional)Colonel Gary L. ParrishEditorElizabeth A. McGovernContributing Editors(Please see the box on page 66 for a list of thecontributing editors and proofreaders.)Art DirectorGregorio O. Figueroa, Jr.Assistant Art DirectorsSpecialist Luis E. EspinalSergeant Richard S. GrimesAdministrationCruz M. MartinezCover photographs:Courtesy of the U.S. Army

Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center andFort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the MilitaryIntelligence Professional Bulletin quarterly underprovisions of AR 25-30. MIPB disseminates mate-rial designed to enhance individuals’ knowledge ofpast, current, and emerging concepts, doctrine,material, training, and professional developmentsin the MI Corps.

Submissions: Please send your manuscripts, let-ters to the editor, photographs, and any inquiriesto: Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-CLM,Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; send via E-mail [email protected]; or telephone(520) 538-1005 or DSN 879-1005.

Subscriptions: Subscription rates are $14.00 peryear (Domestic, APO, and FPO) and $17.50 per year(Foreign). Send changes of address and subscrip-tions (see page 32) to Commander, USAIC&FH,ATZS-CLM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. Forfurther information, telephone (520) 538-1015 orDSN 879-1015 or E-mail [email protected].

Disclaimer: This publication presents professionalinformation, but the views expressed herein arethose of the authors, not the Department of Defenseor its elements. The content does not necessarilyreflect the official U.S. Army position and does notchange or supersede any information in other U.S.Army publications. Use of news items constitutesneither affirmation of their accuracy nor productendorsement. We reserve the right to edit any sub-mitted material.

Check us out on the Internethttp://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/mipb/mipbhome/welcome.htm

DEPARTMENTS

By order of the Secretary of the Army:Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKIGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff0010801

53 Proponent Notes 68 Unit Profiles—IBCT-1: RSTA59 TSM Notes Squadron Surveil. Troop62 Quick Tips 68 —IBCT-1: 209th MI Company

Back Cover 112th MI Brigade (Prov.)

2 MI Is Out Front in Army Transformation

by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

5 The Vision---Transformation of Our Cold War-Era Force

by Captain Robert S. Davidson, Jr.

9 The Transformation of Army Intelligence

by Lieutenant General Robert W. Noonan, Jr.

12 Transforming the Army for the Next Century—

The Future Is Here Today!

by Major Raul E. Escribano and Major Philip J. Logan, AGR

18 Transformation, A Time of Change

by Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

19 MI Systems Transformation

by Michael W. Powell

23 Intelligence Transformation: Beyond Paradigm Shifts, Changes in Ethos

by Colonel Charles Atkins

26 A View From the High Ground—CGS and JSWS

by Colonel Stephen J. Bond and Captain Gregory H. Young

30 Training the MI Force for the Future

by Brigadier General Richard J. Quirk, III

33 Moving to a Digitized Center of Excellence

by Colonel Gary L. Parrish

34 Centerfold Photo Gallery

41 Transition Training—IBCT-1 Cadre and Cohort

by Major Patrick L. Daniel

45 The Kazar Fury Exercise for Training the Initial Brigade Combat Teams

by Colonel Jerry W. Jones (U.S.Army, Retired)

49 Doctrine for the Initial Brigade Combat Team

by Captain E. Lee Goodman, Jr.

64 Glossary of Acronyms Used in This Issue

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

MILITARYINTELLIGENCEPB 34-00-4Volume 26 Number 4October - December 2000

FEATURES

2 Military Intelligence

This special issue of the MilitaryIntelligence Professional Bulletin(MIPB) focuses on transformation.The Chief of Staff of the Army iden-tified transformation as a crucialaspect of his vision. This Armytransformation by design will makethe Army a full spectrum, strategi-cally relevant force. The Military In-telligence Corps plays a key role inArmy Transformation. The basis formany of the initiatives that will movethe Army to the objective force isan assumption of improved situ-ational awareness, which includesan accurate and timely understand-ing of opponents, neutrals, weather,and terrain. Achievement of this in-creased level of situational aware-ness rests, in large measure, on ourability to deliver refined intelligenceproducts across the force. This isan exciting time to be intelligenceprofessionals and promises to moveour Corps into an even closer mem-bership in the combined arms team.

We often think of transformationas focusing on equipment. Although

equipment is important, it is the hu-man dimension—our soldiers andcivilians—that will transform theArmy. Transformation is a new wayof doing our business, not simply a“tweaking” of our Cold War organi-zations, but rather a fundamentalexamination of what the MI Corpsmust accomplish as part of the com-bined arms team. In this issue ofMIPB, we will discuss many aspectsof transformation, but I would firstlike to set the stage.

Enabling and IntegratedIntelligence

The MI Corps has primarily fo-cused on providing “enabling” intel-ligence, which dealt mainly with thedisposition and intentions of oppo-nent formations. This intelligence isessential for conducting the militarydecisionmaking process and criticalto a commander disposing andcommitting his formations. It is pri-marily a planning-focused activity.Once direct combat operations be-gan within the “Red zone,” therewas little direct intelligence contri-

bution. Weapons system capabili-ties often provided the basis for mis-sion effectiveness and stand off.

With changes in the operationalenvironment, especially the prolif-eration of sophisticated weaponssystems and the requirement todeploy forces quickly over long dis-tances, we must change the mis-sion effect iveness equation.Intelligence, surveillance, and re-connaissance (ISR) must becomepart of the overmatch ratio. ISR to-gether with mobility, lethality, andsurvivability must be what guaran-tees overmatch during the closefight on the 21st century battlefield.In addition to “enabling” intelligence,we must provide “integrated” intelli-gence—that intelligence which isclosely linked to the tactical opera-tor engaged in the “Red zone” fight.These intelligence capabilities mustbe a part of the ongoing combat op-eration, not just support planning ofthe operation. Some examples ofthis approach are the—! Integrated human intelligence

(HUMINT) soldiers in the Re-connaissance, Surveillance,and Target Acquisition (RSTA)Squadrons of the Initial BrigadeCombat Teams (IBCTs).

! Provision of enemy situationalawareness information directlyto combat platforms by theForce XXI Battle Command Bri-gade and Below (FBCB2) sys-tem.

! Integration of unmanned aerialvehicles (UAVs) with mannedArmy Aviation helicopters.

Force StructureThe force structure of the MI Corps

must support our mission. We needincreased analysis, HUMINT, andimagery capabilities within our tac-tical organization. Additionally,we need to improve our ability to fo-cus and integrate the myriad ISR

by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

Photo courtesy of SPC Timothy J. Belt.

MI Is Out Front in Army Transformation

October-December 2000 3

capabilities available to a com-mander. These assets include awide range of capabilities operatedacross the battlefield by both MI or-ganizations and other battlefieldfunctional areas such as Army Avia-tion, Special Operations Forces,Field Artillery, Chemical Corps, En-gineers, and many others. This in-tegration role has long been thefunction of the intelligence officerbut in many cases, neither the per-sonnel nor the equipment wereavailable to accomplish the mission.

The varied nature of the futurebattlefield makes this integrationmandatory.

The Reserve Component’s MIforce structure—for the U.S. ArmyReserve (USAR) and the U.S. ArmyNational Guard (ARNG)—must alsotransform. Crucial initiatives includethe organization of additional, fullycapable, divisional MI battalions inthe ARNG and more effective sup-port organizations in the USAR. Thesuperb performance of ARNG andUSAR soldiers in recent operations

and contingencies underscoresboth the value of these profes-sionals and the importance ofproper structure and integration.

Equipment and PersonnelThere is an equipment aspect

to transformation. First, our equip-ment must get to the fight. All equip-ment must be C-130-transportable.We must integrate functions of vari-ous pieces of equipment to reducetactical operations center (TOC)footprint and deployability issues.MI must develop and field sensorsspecifically aimed at the urban en-vironment. Our automation sys-tems—the All-Source AnalysisSystem (ASAS) and the Army BattleCommand System (ABCS)—mustbe able to share a common picturewith all echelons and the joint andnational intelligence community.They must also provide tools acrossthe operational spectrum from sta-bility and support operations,through small-scale contingencies,to high- intensity operations.

The key to successful transforma-tion remains our soldiers and civil-ians. We must continue to developtheir basic intelligence skills ofanalysis, collection, and integration.None of these initiatives in any wayreduces the requirement for first-class individual intelligence skillscapable of operating in the digitalenvironment of the information age.Our military occupational specialty(MOS) structure needs critical ex-amination to ensure it provides thecommander with the expertise andflexibility to operate in the 21st cen-tury and also assures rewarding ca-reer opportunities for our soldiers.Strong leadership by our officers,noncommissioned officers, and ci-vilians will be required during thisperiod of unprecedented change.

ConclusionOur organizations, equipment,

doctrine, and training will change,but the result will be the provisionof improved intelligence as part of


U. S. Army photo.


the combined-arms team. It is im-portant that we all understand themission and environment of today’sArmy and move out to continue ourtradition as the best intelligenceservice in the world.✹

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!Major General John D. Thomas, Jr., en-listed in the U.S. Army in 1968. He re-ceived his commission followinggraduation as a Distinguished Gradu-ate from the Field Artillery Officer Can-didate School and his initial positionswere in the 7th and 2d Infantry Divisionsand command of an AIT (advanced in-dividual training) company. His past

intelligence and electronic warfare as-signments included Field StationAugsburg; the Combined Forces Com-mand and U.S. Forces–Korea; the De-partment of the Army Staff; Deputy Chieffor Intelligence, Special Technical Op-erations Division, J3, Joint Staff; andAssociate Deputy Director for Opera-tions (Military Support) at the NationalSecurity Agency (NSA) and DeputyChief, Central Security Service (CSS).MG Thomas has served in many com-mand positions including C Company(Guardrail), 15th MI Battalion (Aerial Ex-ploitation (AE)), 504th MI Brigade; 3dMI Battalion (AE), 501st MI Brigade;111th MI Brigade (Training); U.S. ArmyIntelligence and Security Command

(INSCOM); and the U.S. Army Intelli-gence Center and Fort Huachuca. Hebecame the fifth Chief of the MI Corpsin June 1998. He is a graduate of theArmed Forces Staff College and theNational War College. MG Thomas is aMaster Army Aviator rated in both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft and is a fixed-wing instructor pilot. He earned aBachelor of Arts degree in History fromWilkes College in Wilkes-Barre, Penn-sylvania, and a Master of Arts degreein International Relations from the Uni-versity of Southern California. Readerscan contact the author via E-mail [email protected] or tele-phonically at (520) 533-1140 or DSN821-1140.

This issue of MIPB focuses primarily on the Army transformation and developing the medium and objective forces but advances andchanges continue in our legacy forces as well. Our first digital division, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), is preparing for majorexperimentation and training in early 2001. Recently, MI tested new equipment and procedures as a part of the Joint Contingency Force–Advanced Warfighting Experiment(JCF-AWE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana. The AWE’s focus was employment of a digitized,light infantry brigade task force (from the 10th Mountain Division (Light)) equipped and trained to execute contingency force opera-tions. Some of the military intelligence objectives in this experiment were to—❑ Improve the intelligence capabilities of the light contingency force.❑ Determine which new systems or linkages improve ISR across the joint, mechanized, and light contingency force structure.❑ Use new and emerging national and joint service capabilities to gain improved situational awareness of geographically distant

objective areas.❑ Expand the battlespace through the use of new sensors in order to improve situational awareness.

JCF-AWE on Employment of the Light Legacy Forces

Photos courtesy of Captain George E. Lewis, III


by Captain Robert S. DavidsonThe Vision: An Army force that ismore responsive, deployable, agile,versatile, lethal, survivable, andsustainable. The Chief of Staff of theArmy (CSA), General Eric K.Shinseki, is calling on the Army toplan and assemble a future forcebased on these standards ofstrength and flexibility.

With the backing of senior militaryleaders and the nation’s highest ci-vilian officials—and with a depen-dence on the capabilities of the U.S.science and technology commu-nity—the CSA and the Army haveembarked on a mission to reshapethe force to counter nontraditionalthreats more readily. It is an en-deavor that the U.S. Army Trainingand Doctrine Command (TRADOC)has stressed “is not an experiment.”

The transformation is already un-derway with two brigades at FortLewis, Washington—3d Brigade, 2dInfantry Division, and 1st Brigade,25th Infantry Division (Light)—reor-ganizing to form the first two InitialBrigade Combat Teams (IBCTs).The 3d Brigade, 2d ID, will convertfirst and expects to be an opera-tional IBCT in 2001, at an estimatedcost of $800 million. Plans call forup to six Active Component IBCTs,

and at least one in the ReserveComponent, to form during the nextfew years.1

Across a Broad Spectrumof Operations

TRADOC is designing the IBCTsas combined-arms forces preparedto take on missions ranging fromstability and support operations tocombat, though IBCTs as the firstunits of an Interim Force will not beearly-entry units according to Ma-jor General Robert St. Onge, whorecently finished a tour as the ArmyDirector of Strategy, Plans, andPolicy. Rather, the brigades will fillthe gap between early-entry forcesand the stronger forces following.2

The Army force transformation (in-cluding the Interim Force and theLegacy Force that will coexist untilwe reach an Objective Force) is aresponse to the increased fre-quency of peacekeeping and otherlow-intensity missions, as well aspersonnel and equipment procure-ment challenges. A 25 May 2000House Appropriations Committeereport on the transformation statedthat—

recent operations have clearlyshown that, in the wake of a 40-percent reduction in personnel

and a 37-percent reduction inbuying power over the last de-cade, and a weapons acquisi-tion process which has provedlacking in many respects, theArmy cannot quickly deploy itsheavy forces, and is not opti-mally equipped or organized tomeet the changing demandsplaced on it in the post-ColdWar era.3

The CSA has set a standard of 96hours for an IBCT to deploy any-where in the world for contingenciesacross a broad spectrum of opera-tions. To meet that requirement, theIBCTs must deploy as quickly as thelight infantry but possess the lethal-ity of armor units.

Some have called the IBCT con-cept “infantry-centric” because thebrigades’ main organizations areinfantry battalions. Colonel PaulMelody, Director of Combined ArmsTactics and Doctrine for the U.S.Army Infantry School, noted that,“It has all the goodness of a lightinfantry brigade with all of the flex-ibility and communications and car-rying advantage of mechanizedinfantry.”

A critical piece in establishing theIBCT as a strong, flexible force isthe adoption of a new armoredvehicle for the core infantry battal-ions. The IBCT is training with ar-mored vehicles borrowed fromCanada4 and other countries until itreceives interim armored vehicles(IAVs).

In November 2000, the Army se-lected the eight-wheeled Light Ar-mored Vehicle III (LAV III) as its IAV.The LAV III manufacturer, GM/GDLS Defense Group, projects de-liveries to the IBCTs beginning thirdquarter, fiscal year 2002. The IAVwill be lighter and more easilydeployable than the M1 Abramsbattle tank, and will serve as theprimary armored vehicle for the In-terim Force.

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The IBCTs will also employ theadvanced technology of the ForceXXI Battle Command Brigade andBelow (FBCB2) digital communica-tions system to improve commandand control (C2). FBCB2 will linkbattlefield elements by using theGlobal Positioning System (GPS) tosend and receive automatic positionlocation reports and will send andreceive C2 message traffic via digi-tal over-the-air radio transmissions.The heart of FBCB2 is a system ofsmall computers, either vehicle- orsoldier-mounted, that provide com-munications. Those communica-tions will move across a tacticalinternet, a network of radios androuters that will link FBCB2 plat-forms across units.5

While the Interim Force and fol-low-on Objective Force will relyheavily on science and technology(S&T) to provide force enablers, thetrue key to the organizations’ suc-cesses will remain the individualsoldier. The Army must resourceand train the forces to perform thebroad range of missions that theCSA envisions for them.

Growing the Future ForceGEN Shinseki has taken the first

step toward fully populating thefuture force with an initiative to fillall units completely by grade andskill. Because of the deploymentand training challenges facingwarfighting units, the Army will fillthem first. According to the CSA—

we will man the divisions andarmored cavalry regiments at100 percent of authorizations bythe end of FY00 (fiscal year2000) and at 100 percent ofMOS (military occupational spe-cialty) and grade level authori-zations by the second quarterof FY01.

Recognizing that not all units canreach a 100-percent work force im-mediately, GEN Shinseki noted thatother TOE (table of organization and

equipment) and then TDA (table ofdistribution and allowances) unitswill reach 100 percent in successiveyears.6

To prepare soldiers to serve andlead in the IBCTs, TRADOC is pro-ducing new doctrine and trainingtechniques, according to TRADOCDeputy Commanding General forTransformation, Major GeneralJames M. Dubik. As the primary pro-ponent for developing doctrine forthe Interim Force, the InfantrySchool Transition Team is workingwith its counterparts at TRADOCschools at Fort Knox, Kentucky;Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and FortHuachuca, Arizona. Their goal is toensure that the doctrine and tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP)developed for Infantry, Armor, Artil-lery, and Military Intelligence (seepage 49) soldiers form one coher-ent and viable package.

The IBCT’s intelligence and signalcompanies trained at Fort Huachuca,Arizona, and Fort Gordon, Georgia,respectively. Their training concludedin September 2000, when companytraining was to begin at Fort Lewis.Brigade and battalion staff-level train-ing also commenced at Fort Lewisin September.7

Doctrinal training is critical for MIsoldiers who will serve in the IBCTbecause the Army has dramaticallyreconfigured the organization of MIelements supporting the brigade.Most significantly, the MI Com-pany—a unit previously in the sepa-rate MI battalion of a division—willbe organic to the brigade. In theIBCT, the company’s mission is toprovide timely, relevant, accurate,and synchronized intelligence, sur-veillance, and reconnaissance(ISR) support to the commander,staff, and subordinate elements.The company will accomplish itsmission with sections focusingon ISR analysis, collection, plan-ning, and execution. The IBCT MIcompany will also contribute a ro-

bust, tactical human intelligence(HUMINT) platoon.

In addition to the MI company,a Reconnaissance, Surveillance,and Target Acquisition (RSTA)Squadron will fill a present void inmost brigade structures, giving theIBCT an organic reconnaissanceand surveillance asset. ThreeGround Reconnaissance Troopsand a Surveillance Troop will com-prise the RSTA Squadron. The Sur-veillance Troop, commanded by anMI captain, will include an AerialReconnaissance Platoon, an NBC(nuclear, biological, and chemical)Reconnaissance Platoon, and aGround Sensor Platoon.

While the Army’s immediate focusis on the IBCTs, it is important tonote that they are only part of thenear-term solution in the CSA’s pro-posed 12- to15-year, estimated 70-billion-dollar effort to transform ourCold War-era force. A Legacy Forcewill continue to operate at the sametime as the Interim Force’s IBCTswhile the Army forms the ObjectiveForce—which is dependent onemerging technology. According toGEN Shinseki—

we will retain portions of theArmy as we know it today—theLegacy Force—and modernizeit through recapitalization andfielding of new, already-pro-grammed equipment. Thus, theLegacy Force will maintain thecapabilities we currently have,to maintain warfighting readi-ness, [and] retain our ability toexecute the National MilitaryStrategy as the transformationgoes forward.On the way to the Objective Force,

with its focus on modernization anddigitization, the Army’s least up-to-date forces will likely transition first.“The digitized corps (III Corps, FortHood, Texas) certainly won’t be thefirst that we would…transition to theobjective force,” MG St. Onge said.“We have to maintain a trained and


ready force today while we transi-tion.”

Army leaders expect to stand up theObjective Force between 2008 and2012. The plan is for the LegacyForce to transition to the ObjectiveForce once the (S&T) communitydevelops the advanced ObjectiveForce equipment and it is ready forfielding.The Interim Force, becauseof its newer IAV and other modernequipment, will follow the legacyunits.In the Objective Force, mecha-nized divisions will get lighter andmore deployable while maintainingtheir current lethality and survivabil-ity.8

Application of TechnologyA future combat system (FCS)

armored vehicle now under devel-opment is the cornerstone to arm-ing the Objective Force. The Armysees it as a replacement for the 70-ton M1 Abrams tank, with the samelethality and survivability, but 50tons lighter. Leaders are relying onscientists and technological expertsto find solutions by 2003.

By the end of 2005 or in early2006, we will have an FCS demon-stration, according to Dr. Michael

Andrews, the Army’s chief scientist.He noted that while there has beena demonstration of a gun smallerthan 105 millimeters with the lethal-ity of the Abrams main gun, “wehave to take it to the next level.”

Active protection systems willlikely enhance the survivability ofthe FCS. “We should have full ac-tive protection systems by the ’06time period that could give us pro-tection against both chemical andkinetic energy,” Dr. Andrews said.Other efforts under way to improvelight force lethality and survivabilitycenter on advanced anti-armor sys-tems and indirect fire systems.

The application of advanced tech-nology in the Objective Force willextend beyond the FCS. Beginningwith the first IBCT, and through theObjective Force, TRADOC says bri-gades will be fully internetted, givinga commander full access to organicreconnaissance and sensor capabili-ties as well as national sources toimprove situational awareness. Anintense focus on C4ISR (command,control, communications, computers,intelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance) will be a defining trait ofthe Objective Force.

Funding and MomentumAs optimistic and ambitious as

the CSA’s vision is, and despitestrong support from military and ci-vilian leaders, there are some whoare concerned that the proposedtransformation is just another well-intended effort. In its report accom-panying the House version of the2001 Defense Appropriations Bill,the House Appropriations Commit-tee stated—

Over the last decade, the Armyhas undertaken a variety of re-structuring initiatives, large andsmall. They include such effortsas the advanced warfightingexperiment process, “ForceXXI,” digitization, the “Army ofExcellence,” the “Army AfterNext,” and most recently, the“Strike Force headquarters”concept. Many of these initia-tives have shown some prom-ise, but have regrettably failedto generate sufficient impetusto bring about transformingchange to the Army. None hadsufficient momentum or budget-ary priority to be completed asoriginally envisioned.Despite its critical commentary, the

House Committee did recommendfunding the Army restructuring effort.In testimony to Congress, GENShinseki noted that “given currentfunding trends, we estimate that theArmy has identified funding for ap-proximately half of the additionalcosts associated with transforma-tion.”

Fully transforming our force willdepend on continued Congres-sional funding. It will also require amomentum that must come from allArmy leaders—a continued visionand dedication to modernizationthat will carry us to a future force.As the CSA stressed to Congress,“We can transform today in a timeof peace and prosperity. Or we cantry to change tomorrow on the eveof the next war, when the window

Photo courtesy of 1SG Bill Kuhns, 122d MPAD.


has closed, our perspective hasnarrowed, and our potential is lim-ited by the press of time and theconstraints of resources.”9 ✸

Endnotes1. TRADOC News Service, ReleaseNumber 00-07-09, 11 July 2000.

2. Ibid.

3. Lawson, Chris, “House Votes To FundArmy Transformation, Committee Points toHistory of Poor Decisionmaking,” ArmyTimes, 5 June 2000, page 10.

4. The Canadian Light Armored Vehicle IIIin the title photograph is similar to thoseleased from Canada for development ofBrigade Combat Team tactics anddoctrine at Fort Lewis. As was notedabove, the Army has chosen the LAV IIIas its IAV. The U.S. Army Communica-tions–Electronics Command and threeprogram executive offices will provide the

command, control, communications,computers, intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance systems, called C4ISR.This photograph is courtesy ofUSACECOM.

5. Martens, Ted MAJ, “The BrigadeCombat Team—The TransformationProcess,” Military Intelligence Profes-sional Bulletin, PB 34-00-3, Volume 26,Number 3, July-September 2000, page 7.

6. Shinseki, Eric K. GEN, personnelresources initiatives message, CSAHomepage, 8 November 1999.

7. TRADOC News Service, 11 July 2000.

8. Shinseki, Eric K. GEN, Army Transfor-mation Campaign (from Senate ArmedForces Committee testimony), 6 March2000.

9. Shinseki, Eric K. GEN, Statementbefore the Airland Subcommittee,Committee on Armed Services, U.S.Senate Second Session, 106th Con-

gress, on the Army Transformation, 8March 2000.

Captain Bob Davidson is currently anMI Captains Career Course (MICCC)student at Fort Huachuca. His past as-signments include service as AssistantBrigade S2, 2d Brigade, 1st InfantryDivision; G2 Operations Battle Captain,Multi-National Brigade–East (MNB-E),Task Force Falcon, Kosovo; ElectronicWarfare Platoon Leader, D Company,101st MI Battalion; and Counterintelli-gence Systems Officer, Plans and Op-erations Division, Office of the DeputyChief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. ArmyEurope (USAREUR). CPT Davidsonearned a Bachelor of Science degreein Journalism from Bowling GreenState University. Readers may contactthe author via E-mail at [email protected].

Recommended Reading Lists from the Center for Military History and General Eric K. ShinsekiCadets, Soldiers, and Junior NCOsBand of Brothers by Stephen AmbroseThe Long Grey Line by Rick AtkinsonThe Greatest Generation by Tom BrokawThis Kind of War by T. R. FehrenbachAmerica’s First Battles by Charles E. Heller and William A. StofftA Concise History of the U.S. Army: 225 Years of Service by David W. Hogan, Jr.The Face of Battle by John KeeganWe Were Soldiers Once and Young by Harold Moore and Joe GallowayOnce An Eagle by Anton MyrerThe Killer Angels by Michael Shaara

Company Grade Officers and Junior NCOsCitizen Soldiers by Stephen AmbroseThe War to End All Wars by Edward CoffmanThe Soldier and the State by Samuel P. HuntingtonEmbattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War by Gerald F. LindermanCompany Commander by Charles B. MacDonaldMen against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War by S. L. A. MarshallFor the Common Defense by Allan R. Millett and Peter MaslowskiCertain Victory by Robert H. Scales, Jr.General George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century by Mark A. StolerBuffalo Soldiers (Black Saber Chronicles) by Tom Willard

Field Grade Officers and Senior NCOsEast of Chosin by Roy ApplemanArmy for Empire by Graham CosmasThe Evolution of U.S. Tactical Doctrine, 1946- 1976 by Robert DoughtyJomini and His Summary of the Art of War byAntoine Henri JominiThree Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt byCharles B. MacDonaldBattle Cry of Freedom by James McPhersonThe Challenge of Command by Roger H. NyeSummons of the Trumpet by Dave PalmerSupplying War by Martin Van Creveld

Senior Leaders Above Brigade LevelOn War by Carl von Clausewitz, edition byParet and HowardCommand Decisions by Kent GreenfieldWar in European History by Michael HowardThe Rise and Fall of Great Powers by Paul KennedyDiplomacy by Henry KissingerMilitary Innovation in the Interwar Period by Williamson Murray and Alan R. MillettThinking in Time by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. MayMakers of Modern Strategy by Peter ParetAn American Profession of Arms by William SkeltonOn Strategy by Harry SummersThe Peloponnesian War by Thucydides

Purpose: To encourage habits of reading and reflection, sustain intellectual growth between attendance at the various formalinstitutional schools, facilitate self-development, and deepen soldiers’ appreciation of their military heritage.

“We can never spend too much time thinking about our profession. There is no better way to develop the sure knowledge andconfidence required of America’s most demanding occupation than a disciplined, focused commitment to a personal course ofreading and study.” —General Eric K. Shinseki, U.S. Army Chief of Staff


by Lieutenant GeneralRobert W. Noonan, Jr.Emerging world trends point to aperiod of unbounded strategic chal-lenges, a wider range of threats,increased unpredictability, and amore complex range of operatingenvironments that will challenge theUnited States at every level of in-tensity. Our country will require aworld-class Army capable of rapidresponse and dominance acrossthe entire spectrum of operations.A broad range of well-balanced,responsive land force capabilities,employed within a joint operationalframework, will be critical to sustainland dominance. To meet this de-mand, the Army is transformingalong three major, concurrent axes:Trained and Ready, Transformingthe Operational Force, and Trans-forming the Institutional Army. Thisarticle provides some perspectiveson the implications of Army trans-formation for the Military IntelligenceCorps (see Figure 1).

Army IntelligenceTransformation

The goal of Army Intelligence is toachieve situational dominance forArmy decision-makers and war-fighters. Key to this is informationsuperiority that enables the sevenoperational characteristics of theArmy Objective Force: responsive-ness, deployability, agility, versatil-ity, lethality, survivability, and sus-tainability. Situation-dominating re-

sults give commanders the ability toacquire, track, engage, and assesstargets, thus dominating the battle-field environments and situationsacross the spectrum of conflict. ArmyIntelligence is already moving out onthe path to achieve this. We aredeveloping and employing a seam-less architecture that provides anenhanced situational awarenessthrough internetted command, con-trol, communications, and computers(C4), and intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.These platforms provide command-ers with a common view of the battle-field across all echelons whileleveraging the capabilities of higherechelons through reach-back capa-bilities.

As the Army builds from the Initialto the Objective Force, Army Intelli-gence will apply lessons learned,incorporate available technology,and make essential changes intraining and doctrine to ensureseamless support (see Figure 2)while accelerating investment andexperimentation with new technolo-gies that support Objective Forcerequirements. The IntelligenceObjective Force will be capable ofproviding enhanced situational un-derstanding, battlespace visualiza-tion, and information superioritythrough collaborative, interactive,integrated, and interoperable intel-ligence databases and networks.Army Intelligence achieves signifi-cant efficiencies operating within theGlobal Information Grid. Improvedsimulations will train intelligence sol-diers anywhere, and collaborativeanalytical tools will give them ac-cess to regional and technical ex-pertise anytime.

Enabling Transformationthrough S&T Investmentand Technology Protection

ISR Modernization. As the Armybegins to shape its future forces andcapabilities under the Transforma-tion Campaign Plan, advanced

The Transformationof Army Intelligence

Figure 1. Transformation Changes in Military Intelligence.

See the glossary on page 64 for expansion of the acronyms.

Regardless of changes, the fundamentals will remaintrue Intelligence must allow warfighters to:Gain greater situational awareness Shape the battlefield

Attain dominant maneuver and precision fires

! Reach-back! Greater interoperability/Jointness! Embedded ISR! Restructured ASCC/theater support! Restructured SIGINT! Focus on CI/HUMINT (SSC)! Pooling of linguist support

---


technology will serve as the crucialenabler for both achieving andmaintaining combat overmatch forArmy elements engaged againstany adversary. Army ISR initiatives(see Figure 3) focus on migratingto fewer, but more capable, multi-discipline platforms with modularsensors, integrated processors andpreprocessors, and global informa-tion access through the tacticalinfo-sphere. Introduction of newtechnology will allow rapid analysis,production, and dissemination of in-telligence to ensure a common op-erational picture on a dispersedbattlefield.

Future Tactical Unmanned AerialVehicle (TUAV) payload upgradeswill continue the trend toward amultidiscipline ISR approach. We willmaximize the value-added potentialof tactical signals intelligence(SIGINT) systems by transitioningmeasurement and signature intelli-gence (MASINT) capabilities from itsscientific and technical (S&T) focusto operational and tactical intelligence

applications in support of warfighters.Advanced technology also enablesus to merge Airborne Reconnais-sance Low (ARL) and GuardrailCommon Sensor (GRCS) into asingle airborne platform, Aerial Com-mon Sensor (ACS), improving the

commander’s view of the battlefielddespite diverse weather, foliage, andlow-light conditions. Similarly, ournumerous TENCAP (Tactical Exploi-tation of National Capabilities) sys-tems will eventually integrate into asingle system, the Distributed

Figure 2. Army Seamless Support.

Figure 3. ISR Support to the Objective Force.

Army CapabilitiesThroughout the

Intelligence SystemSPACE TO MUD!

MIX

MIII

MII

CINCJ2/JIC JTF

J2 ARFORG2

XXXXX

X

902NGIC

ACE

CMISEDISE

DISE

1xx

INSCOM

RC MI

X5XX MI

RSOC

LIWAMGS

DISE

DOD/JCS

DS to BdesSee over next hillGSM/CGS

DS SupportBalanced…All "INTS" +COMMO/ADP

Flexible...TargetableLinked to Joint

LeverageNationalCapabilities

EngagedDailyReal-World...

Seamlesssupportbetweenechelons

Nat’l AgenciesNSA/DIA/CIA

Feed to AllSource Picture

SupportInformation

Ops

Integrated INTELArchitecture

from Space toMud

Focus to theWarfighter

Objective Force Core Characteristics•Rapid deployment and tactical mobility•Decisive action . . . combined armsintegration•Enhanced situational understanding andinformation dominance•Lethal and integrated fires•Holistic force protection and survivability•Commonality of combat platforms andTTP•Exploiting reach-back capabilities in allBOSs•Achieve joint/mulitinationalinteroperability•Flexibility and agility across full spectrumof conflict

TheObjective Force

ISR System Requirements for Objective Force•Surveillance in depth/360 degree overwatch•Precision target location, ID, tracking, BDA•Links to Joint & National capabilities•Shared situational understanding andbattlefield visualization•C2/Information Protect, Attack, and ExploitCapabilities•Full-Spectrum Force Protection•Leveraged S&T to keep AI “Always out front!”


Common Ground System–Army(DCGS-A). DCGS-A will providea multidiscipline, interoperable,common, open systems ISR andtargeting architecture, and criticalsensor-to-shooter links. Addition-ally, Army Intelligence continuesto develop a computer networkexploitation capability supportingboth computer network attack anddefense.

Avoiding Technological Sur-prise. With the need to exploittechnology to shape future ISRcapabilities comes the require-ment to prevent that same tech-nology from falling into the handsof potential adversaries. Tradition-ally, our technology-protectionmethodology centers around twoaxes: first, controlling the distribu-tion and flow of technical informa-tion while securing Army labor-atories and second, monitoringadversaries’ access to advancedtechnology and reporting on theircapabilities to develop battlefieldabilities that threaten U.S. inter-ests and military forces.

Maintaining the Army’s technologi-cal edge in the future will demand anew, holistic approach to technol-ogy protection. This approach willcontinue to rely on traditional mea-sures, but will also demand greaterattention to adversary attemptsto thwart U.S. technological superi-ority through denial, deception, andasymmetric means. Furthermore,we will have to focus significantlymore attention on the exponen-tial growth in technology itself,which—combined with the oftencumbersome military research anddevelopment (R&D) and procure-ment processes—could result inmilitary capabilities that are techno-logically obsolete within a few yearsof initial deployment. Finally, accom-panying the challenges of traditionalforeign disclosure programs will bethe difficult task of managing the dis-closure of advanced technology toallies and industry alike.

The Chief of Staff of the Army(CSA) has charged the Army staff,with DA DCSINT (Deputy Chief ofStaff for Intelligence) lead, to assessour current technology-protectionstrategy and to ensure that theArmy is properly focusing on thecritical technologies essential toachieving Objective Force R&D, ac-quisition, and procurement mile-stones. Crucial to success is ourability to synchronize the technol-ogy-protection programs and priori-ties across a variety of Armyagencies and staffs. We must alsoassess our foreign disclosure pro-grams to ensure that we maintainthe right balance between the com-peting objectives of foreign militarysales and technology protection.The realities of the global economy,and the technological and informa-tion revolutions that underpin it, willrequire great flexibility in Serviceand Department of Defense foreigndisclosure policies. In spite of allthis, the bottom line remains clear.The Army must ensure it maintainsa combat overmatch capabilityagainst all potential adversaries.

ConclusionIn the future, the U.S. Army is

likely to face adaptive enemies us-ing advanced technology to attackus in asymmetric ways in increas-ingly complex situations and ter-rain. To ensure success, Armyintelligence must provide groundcommanders with—" “360 degree” surveillance." Precision target identification,

tracking, and battle damageassessment (BDA).

" Internetted tactical communi-cations and intelligence links thatfacilitate continuous access tojoint and national capabilities.

" Support to command and control(C2) and information-protect,-attack, and -exploit, and full-spectrum force protection.

Army Intelligence recognizes thechallenge posed by the changing

Lieutenant General Noonan became theDA Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence(DCSINT) 17 July 2000. Commissionedthrough the Reserve Officers TrainingProgram, his initial assignment follow-ing graduation from the Infantry and Mili-tary Intelligence Officer Basic Courseswas as a IV Corps intelligence andoperations advisor in Vietnam. His otherstaff positions include Brigade S2, 1stBrigade, 3d Infantry Division (ID); PlansOfficer and Manpower ManagementAnalyst at Fort Devens, Massachusetts;Division Artillery S2 and Deputy DivisionG2, 25th Infantry Division, SchofieldBarracks, Hawaii; Tactical IntelligenceOfficer, Rapid Deployment Joint TaskForce and U.S. Central Command(CENTCOM); G2, 25th ID (Light),Schofield Barracks; Deputy Chief andDivision Chief, Intelligence and Elec-tronic Warfare/Command and ControlCountermeasures, DA, Deputy Chiefof Staff for Operations (DCSOPS);Executive Officer to the DA DCSINT; DADCSOPS, U.S. Army Intelligence andSecurity Command (INSCOM); and theDirector for Intelligence, J2, CENTCOM.LTG Noonan’s command assignmentsinclude company command at FortCampbell, Kentucky, Fort Devens, andSchofield Barracks; Commander, 125thMI Battalion; Commander, 513th MI Bri-gade; and Commanding General,INSCOM. His military schooling in-cludes the Armed Forces Staff Collegeand the U.S. Army War College. LTGNoonan earned a Bachelor of Arts de-gree in Government and InternationalRelations from the University of NotreDame and a Master of Business Admin-istration degree from Western New En-gland College. For more information,readers can contact COL Samborowskivia E-mail at Leonard. [email protected]. mil.

nature of warfare. We are activelyimproving current capabilities tomeet the evolving needs of today’sNational Military Strategy while si-multaneously developing new capa-bilities to meet the requirements ofJoint Vision 2020 and the Army’sTransformation Plan.✹


by Majors Raul E. Escribanoand Philip J. LoganAs the U.S. Army enters the 21stcentury, the one constant in ourworld is change. Advances in tech-nology, emerging threats, and les-sons learned from deploymentsaround the world have led to theconclusion that the Army mustchange both its structure and insti-tution to remain relevant in meetingthe variety of requirements, mis-sions, and threats we face. In thisarticle, we look at why and how theArmy is transforming as an organi-zation and as an institution to re-main relevant in the new century.

Why Must the ArmyTransform?

Technological advances have al-ready and will continue to changethe speed and dynamics with whichwe fight wars. Tools and skills un-known twenty years ago, such asinternetted computer hardware andsoftware, make information readilyavailable to decision-makers at arate unheard of in the past. Conse-quently, the ability to share informa-tion quickly in a collaborative anddistributive manner will ultimatelychange how leaders plan andexecute military missions. This abil-ity to share information throughinternetted communications and in-creased situational understandingwill ultimately affect the seven-stepmilitary decisionmaking process(MDMP), perhaps by performingsome of the steps nearly simulta-neously at multiple levels.

Experience has led to the conclu-sion that the Army must changeits force structure. Deploymentsand operations in Grenada,Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo are justsome examples of the locations in

which the Army has served duringthe last two decades. They all havesome characteristics in common;today we call them small-scale con-tingencies (SSCs). From our expe-rience in these SSCs, we havelearned that undoubtedly one keyfor succeeding in this type of envi-ronment is faster, more capable,and more deployable units.

As the new century unfolds, a va-riety of asymmetric threats has be-gun to emerge, and should continueto evolve rapidly. In the aftermathof the Warsaw Pact, the Army nolonger strictly confronts “enemy or-ders of battle.” During the Cold War,the Army focused its forces and at-tention on places like the Fulda Gapand the Korean DMZ (demilitarizedzone). Units and leaders had a per-spective of a “linear” doctrinal en-emy, and assumed the enemywould fight in set echeloned forma-tions across international borders.Today, the Army rarely enjoys suchtemplated situational awareness

as it reacts to deployments through-out the world. Potential adversariesmay not possess set organizationsor doctrine. The accurate definitionand identification of the “threat” isnow much more difficult, and thiscomplexity is presently the norm.

These emerging threats, coupledwith new SSC environments andadvances in technology, require theArmy to have a more capable andresponsive force to meet globalcontingency situations. Withouta doubt, the 21st century Army’srelevancy will rest in responding ef-fectively to crises.

How Did the Army ReachThis Point?

For the U.S. Army, change hasbeen a hallmark of its existence.During the previous century, rede-signing the divisional structureof the Army took place at leasteleven times, from the “Square Di-visions” of the 1920s and 1930s tothe Force XXI and EXFOR (experi-

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mental force) of the 1990s. One ormore factors drove each of theseredesigns and reorganizations:! Immediate threat from a peer

competitor.! Changes in the geopolitical

landscape.! Changes and development in

science and technology (S&T).! Personnel and financial consid-

erations.! Battlefield “lessons-learned.”

Consequently, the most recentdecision to transform the Army didnot come overnight. In fact, theArmy’s transformation effort hasbeen a developing concept foryears. Since 1992, the Army hasconducted multiple experimentsand analyses that resulted in theneed for a brigade combat team(BCT), capable of rapidly deployingin an SSC environment. These stud-ies have identified the need for aforce with enough combat power toaccomplish missions throughout thelow- to mid-range of the conflictspectrum. Lessons learned from themodern Louisiana Maneuvers in1992, in conjunction with the Ad-vanced Warfighting Experiments(AWEs), Force XXI, and the ArmyAfter Next, have led to the evolu-tion of the current Interim BCT(IBCT) concept, the vanguard of thefuture “Objective Force.”

One cannot overstate the need tohave units capable of deploying atshort notice with sufficient lethal andnonlethal capabilities. The Armydoes not currently have a force thatprovides the regional commandersin chief (CINCs) with this capability.Special Operations and light forcesare able to respond rapidly, but of-ten lack the mobility and combatpower to meet SSCs’ operational re-quirements. Heavy forces train todeploy to a major theater war(MTW), but both the light and heavyforces require significant tailoringand training to meet SSC require-ments. As a result, the Army hasroutinely found itself modifying oneof these two forces to meet the re-cent SSC environment. Hence, theInterim Brigade Combat Team con-cept was born.

The implementation of these units,which will habitually train to addressthe unique challenges of the SSCenvironment, will give the regionalCINCs a force able to respondquickly to any contingency. TheArmy will configure a number ofBCTs with currently available “off theshelf” technology and equipment tosatisfy these requirements. Just asimportantly, it will train soldiers andleaders in the doctrine and organi-zations that will become the Objec-tive Force.

SSC—The “New”Operational Environment

The complex operational environ-ments during the past twenty yearshave meant that the Army deployedforces to austere, undeveloped the-aters with little or no logistic infra-structure. It appears that this willcontinue to be the typical opera-tional environment for the Armybeyond the near term. SSCs en-compass the range of conflictbetween stability and support oper-ations and MTWs. Many factorsdefine this operational environment,but variety, speed, precision, andforce may be the most dynamicones the Army currently faces.

Variety. Variety refers to the manydifferent threats and vast opera-tional conditions U.S. soldiers willface. The days of confronting aclearly defined enemy are likely toend in the near term. Potentialthreats and capabilities include ter-rorist organizations, local police,paramilitary forces, criminals, andgangs ranging from organized con-ventional dismounted infantry unitsto single individuals with no specificalliance. In addition to conventionaland unconventional armed forces,other parties such as civilians, andnon-governmental and internationalorganizations will be present inthe area of operations. Anotherchallenge is the operational condi-tions that affect maneuver. Theforce must be able to operate inmultiple geographic and climatic en-vironments, including deserts,woodlands, mountains, and mostimportantly, complex and urban ter-rain. All of these factors and morewill shape the battlespace for theIBCT.

Speed. The speed at which forcesdeploy to any theater will be para-mount. The sooner a force arriveson the objective with irresistiblemomentum, the faster that forcewill achieve decisive results. How-ever, speed includes more than our



deploying rapidly to a theater. Thepresence of national and interna-tional media will affect all phasesof an operation. The “Cable NewsNetwork Effect” focusing public at-tention on an existing or emergingsituation may lead to a call for mili-tary action. Technology allows in-formation to travel simultaneouslyto a global audience as we executemissions. During contingency op-erations, understanding the speedat which the media makes informa-tion available is crucial.

Precision. The Army must be pre-cise while achieving desired results.Precision has become a critical as-pect of all operations. The impor-tance of minimizing friendly andcoalition force casualties, collateraldamage, and civilian casualties hasalways been important, but takeson increased urgency in the globalinformation environment (GIE). In-cidents such as the bombing of theChinese Embassy in Belgrade dur-ing the 1999 Kosovo conflict haveimmediate and lasting political ef-fects. The precise and appropriateapplication of force, if required, willbe critical across the full spectrumof conflict.

Force. If the United States com-mits forces, the Army’s ability to useforce must be credible, and it must

retain the ability to execute combatoperations and destroy enemyforces if needed. As the Army con-tinues the transformation process,it must never compromise the ba-sic tenets that ensure combat readi-ness. The IBCT will continue theArmy’s capability for credible, lethal,and precise combat power acrossthe entire spectrum as it progressestoward the Objective Force.

The Objective ForceThe end-state of the transforma-

tion effort will be the ObjectiveForce—a responsive, deployable,agile, versatile, lethal, survi-vable, and sustainable force thatachieves full-spectrum dominance.These seven core capabilities arewhat make this force unique. TheArmy expects to field the first ob-jective force in approximately eightto ten years.

The transformation strategy hasthree efforts moving along parallelpaths, to transform the Army in thefuture. First is the Army’s legacyforce (top axis of Figure 1) consist-ing of all current Active and ReserveComponent (RC) combat forces.These units will remain trained andready as they always have, until theArmy decides to transform them intothe Objective Force. In other words,through recapitalization and mod-

ernization, these units will be theguarantors of peace during the ini-tial transformation process.

In the center is the ObjectiveForce. Within this force, we expectthat S&T will develop equipment theArmy will need in the future. Thecurrent thinking is that by a targetdate of 2003, S&T should be ableto provide a concept and timelinesfor a capability to produce the weap-ons platforms and equipmentneeded for the Objective Force. Theintent is to field advanced systemsin propulsion, armor, armament,and communications networkingthat meet each of the seven corecapabilities. Once the platforms andequipment are in production, theArmy will then begin transformingits legacy force.

The primary purpose of the interimforce (lower axis on Figure 1) is todevelop the right doctrine and or-ganization for the objective force bybuilding an organization based onthe current and expected futureoperational environment. The IBCTaccomplishes several missions andit—! Meets a near-term strategic re-

quirement.! Is operational across the spec-

trum of conflict.! Serves as the “bridge” to the

Objective Force.Although primarily designed to op-

erate in the mid-range of the spec-trum, with augmentation the IBCTcan respond to an MTW. The IBCTis not designed to fight by itself, butas a part of a division (perhaps theInterim Division or U.S. Army Force(ARFOR) headquarters. The com-mander, based on threat analysis,would determine which assetsneeded to augment the IBCT. It isaddressed briefly in paragraph 19.It is important to understand someof the things the IBCT does not do:it is neither a forced entry organiza-tion nor a replacement for the U.S.Marine Corps and its established

Figure 1. The Army’s Pathways to the Objective Force.

Note: See the glossary on page 64 for expansion of the acronyms.


missions. The break in the bottomaxis of the figure is intentional. Atsome point in the transition process,the (S&T) effort may dictate that theinterim effort is complete, and thatall assets and efforts should pushtoward the center axis and the Ob-jective Force.

To move toward this objective, theinterim force began its transforma-tion in December 1999 at FortLewis, Washington, with two initialbrigade combat teams, the 3d Bri-gade, 2d Infantry Division, and the1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division(Light). In the second quarter, fiscalyear 2000, they began training andfielding equipment using currentlyavailable off-the-shelf technology.These two brigades are just the firsttwo of possibly eight interim bri-gades transforming within the Army.The first IBCT should reach its ini-tial operational capability (IOC) inearly 2003. The second initial bri-gade combat team, 1/25th ID (L),will likely begin transforming some-time in 2001.

Transformation Context—New Ways of Thinking

Transforming the Army is morethan just changing force structure

and equipment: it entails trans-forming to a “new way of thinking.”Ultimately, it encompasses transfig-uring both the operational and theinstitutional Army to function in a dif-ferent context. The transformationwill be from—! Relatively known environment,

enemy order of battle, and doc-trine to relatively unknown con-ditions and types of threats.

! Adversary as combatants of anation-state’s armed forces toan adversary who could also bea person, organization, agency,or situation that obstructs mis-sion accomplishment.

! Forward-deployed pre-posi-tioned equipment to rapid de-ployment with basic loads.

! A warfighter concept definedsolely in terms of conventionalcombat to a warfighter definedin terms of full-spectrum opera-tions.

! The mature theater with adeveloped infrastructure to anon-mature theater and an un-developed infrastructure.

! “If you might need it, “take it withyou” approach to “take whatyou need initially, the rest willfollow as needed.”

! An alert>train>deploy approachto train>alert>deploy.

! Make contact>develop thesituation>maneuver the force tounderstand the situation>maneuver the force>make con-tact.

! Planning-centric, both sequentialand hierarchical to execution-centric, parallel, and collab-laborative.

! Combined arms at battalionlevel achievable only throughtask organization to organiccombined arms elements downto company level.

! “Leaders are important” to“leaders are essential.”

ISR—The Critical PathA critical aspect of the transforma-

tion is the brigade’s intelligence, sur-veillance, and reconnaissance,(ISR) architecture. No longer willcommanders have to make contactand develop the situation in orderto have enough information to takedecisive action. The ISR architec-ture, by design, allows IBCT lead-ers to enhance situational under-standing, thus maneuvering forcesfor decisive action at the times andplaces of their choosing.

Access to joint- and national-levelintelligence will be possible throughthe flow of digitally transmitted in-formation. Organic communicationsystems will allow the brigade to“reach back” to sources of informa-tion within the Department of De-fense as well as other governmentand non-governmental agencies,thus facilitating the exchange andflow of information. The collabora-tive and distributive intelligencecapability will also facilitate near-simultaneous planning and execu-tion at all levels, greatly reducing theamount of time required to gatherthe intelligence needed to conductan operation. In brief, informationgathered from all sources—whethermilitary, governmental, commercial,or international—will undergo both

Figure 2. Network-Centric Warfare.

Maneuver

SituationalUnderstanding

Fires andEffects; Lethaland Non-Lethal

Effects

Protection ManeuverSustainability

ManeuverSupport

TheNetwork

T/I Reach OPS

T/I Reach OPS

T/I Reach OPS

T/I Reach OPS

T/I REACH OPS

T/I Reach OPS


analysis and distribution in a col-laborative environment.

The MI Company organic to theIBCT and the Surveillance Trooporganic to the IBCT’s Reconnais-sance, Surveillance, and Target Ac-quisition (RSTA) Squadron willprovide a robust intelligence capa-bility never seen before at brigadelevel. The embedded human intelli-gence (HUMINT) capability will begreater than what an Army corpscurrently possesses. AdditionalIBCT intelligence capabilities suchas unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs), multiple sensor teams, andlinkages to overhead platforms willalso complement near-real- to real-time situational understanding.

The NetworkThe network referred to earlier is

structured around the Army Tacti-cal Command and Control System(ATCCS) with multiple supportingsystems operating digitally, de-signed to provide leaders withsituational understanding. The im-portance of a functional network isthe ability to internet communica-tions and provide reach-back, thusreducing the footprint forward. How-ever, there is more to the network.

Figure 2 depicts the way the net-work contributes to and balancessix operational concepts—situ-ational understanding, maneuver,fires and effects (lethal and non-lethal), maneuver sustainability, ma-neuver support, and protection.

Many have paid considerable at-tention to the type of vehicle that willtransport the IBCT. Conceptually,the vehicle is not as important aswhat it represents: an enabler thatallows soldiers to act and fight as

an internetted, networked, com-bined-arms team.

Leader Developmentand Learning

Perhaps the most far-reachingand important aspect of the trans-formation is the impact on the waythe Army will have to develop itsleaders (see Figure 3) and soldiers.Consequently, the Army will alsorefine its training methodology bydeveloping the qualities and capa-bilities of new soldiers.

The Army’s challenge in the com-ing years is to stay the course whilebuilding new organizational habitsas it continues to learn from thetransformation process. The Armyis currently in the Act Phase of theLearning Cycle (see Figure 4),pressing ahead with initiatives tomeet the needs of the future.

It is also imperative to rememberthat this evolutionary process en-compasses much more than merelytransforming a few brigades at FortLewis or elsewhere. The currentplans include transforming up toeight brigade combat teams (includ-ing at least one in the Army NationalGuard). The transformation is oc-curring not only in the operationalforce but in the institutional Army as

Figure 3. Development of Future Leaders.

Figure 4. The Army as a Learning Organization in a Continual ProcessToward an Objective Force.

Operational Concept Requirements:

Tactical and Senior Leader Training

" Distributive and Decentralized Operations

Leaders Who Can Use “Initiative Within intent” " High Tempo and Highly Dispersed Operations

Leaders Who Can Create High Cohesion In/Among Units

" Adaptability and Flexibility For Full-Spectrum OperationsLeaders Who Can solve Problems They’ve Never Seen Before

O&O Behaviors

Carry Potential

• Combined Arms Down to Company Level• “Point and Shoot”; Day & Night Precision• Initiative Within Intent; Cohesion Fires (FA & MORTARS) & Effects as Interdependent Systems• Network as Enabling: Lethality, Survivability, Precision, SU, RSTA, and CSS Operations• Parallel and Collaborative MDMP

Hardware & Software

Soldiers / LeadersOrganization / Process

Sustainment Training For Leaders: “Band of Excellence”Approach

• Army of Excellence• Post-Cold War Environment• Dawn of Info Age

• Louisiana Maneuvers• Army Advanced Warfighting Experiments• Army After Next

• Force XXI• Transformation

• Limited ConversionDivision/III Corps• Initial Bde CombatTeams

Act

Observe

Decide

Orient


well. Units will learn much from theinterim brigades as they help de-velop new doctrine and tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP);in this way, the Army will orient andrefocus itself and apply lessonslearned as it continues to transform.

As in any other institution, chang-ing the way the Army operates willbe difficult and may bring high anxi-ety. Nevertheless, with evolutioncomes opportunity—the opportunityto change the Army into a more ef-fective and relevant force. This pro-cess will be historic. The soldier ofthe future will likely train, equip, anddeploy in a manner much differentthan that of today, perhaps in waysunrecognizable to those of us nowserving. One fact will remain con-stant: tomorrow’s soldiers must beas committed, tough, and proud astheir predecessors. Years from nowsoldiers will look back and realizethat although this transformationwas hard, demanding, and difficult,it was worth every step.✹

Major Raul Escribano is currently withthe Brigade Coordination Cell (BCC),C4ISR (Command, Control, Communi-cations, Computers, Intelligence,Surveillance, and Reconnaissance)Element, Task Force for Transformation,with the U.S. Army Training and Doc-trine Command (TRADOC) at FortLewis. He received a Regular Armycommission in Military Intelligencethrough the Reserve Officer TrainingCorps (ROTC) as a Distinguished Mili-tary Graduate. MAJ Escribano’s past

assignments include Battalion S2,3d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment,8th Infantry Division (ID), Republic ofGermany. Assigned to 1st ID at FortRiley, Kansas, he served as a G2 Op-erations Officer during OperationsDESERT SHIELD and DESERTSTORM, then Brigade S2 with the 2dBrigade, and Commander, Alpha Com-pany, 101st MI Battalion. He servedas the Deputy Chief, Central AmericaBranch, United States Southern Com-mand (USSOUTHCOM); Aide de Campfor the Deputy CINC, USSOUTHCOM,Panama; Chief for Intelligence Opera-tions in support of the Drug EnforcementAgency with the U.S. Embassy Coun-try Team in Lima, Peru; Joint Task Force(JTF) Operations Officer, I Corps; andmost recently, Executive Officer, 502dMI Battalion, I Corps. He earned a Bach-elor of Science degree in BusinessAdministration from the Universityof Puerto Rico and a Master of Admin-istration degree from Central MichiganUniversity. MAJ Escribano completedthe Military Intelligence Officer Basicand Advanced Courses and the U.S.Army Command and General StaffCollege. Readers can contact MajorRaul Escribano via E-mail at [email protected] and telephonically at(253) 966-3735 and DSN 347-3735.

Major Phil Logan, Active Guard andReserve, is an Armor officer currentlyserving with the TRADOC BCC at FortLewis. His most recent assignment wasas Team Leader for an Information Op-erations Field Support Team (FST)whose participation in the December1999 25th ID (L) Warfighter Exercise“Tropic Lightning” marked the first op-erational deployment of an RC FST. He

earned a Bachelor of Arts degree inJournalism and received a commissionas an Air Defense Artillery Second Lieu-tenant through the ROTC program atMarquette University, in Milwaukee,Wisconsin. Following assignments asa Vulcan and Stinger Platoon Leader,Battery Executive Officer, BattalionS3 Air, HAWK Battalion Tactical MissileDirector, Brigade S3 Plans Officer,and Battalion S4, MAJ Logan com-manded D Company, 1st Battalion, 303dArmor. He has served as the MilitaryCounterdrug Liaison Officer to theWashington State Patrol, and com-manded the 122d Mobile Public AffairsDetachment (MPAD) during Opera-tions JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINTGUARD, the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) PeacekeepingMission in the former Yugoslavia, andin civil disturbances at WashingtonState University, the Makah Indian Res-ervation, and the Seattle World TradeOrganization (WTO) Ministerial Confer-ence. MAJ Logan is a graduate ofthe Command and General Staff OfficerCourse, the Defense InformationSchool, Combined Arms and ServicesStaff School (CAS3), the Armor OfficerAdvanced Course, and the Air DefenseArtillery Officer Basic Course. Heattended the Graduate School of Com-munications at the University of Wash-ington where he earned a secondbachelor’s degree in International Stud-ies (Eastern Europe) and a Master ofArts degree in Communications; he iscurrently on sabbatical from their Ph.D.program in the School of Communica-tions. Readers can reach MAJ Loganvia E-mail at [email protected] by telephone at (253) 966-4187 andDSN 347-4187.

To improve our service to our readers, the MIPB office is taking over servicing of MI Corps Associationmembers’ subscriptions effective with this issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. Pleasenotify us directly if your address changes or if you have any problem with receipt of your MIPB. You maysubscribe to MIPB through MICA with a new membership or renewal, directly with us, or through the U.S.Superintendent of Documents. You may contact us about your subscription via E-mail at [email protected] and by telephone at (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015. You can also reach us through ourInternet website at http://usaic-huachuca.army.mil/mipb/mipbhome/welcome.htm.

Notice to MICA Members


by Command Sergeant MajorScott C. ChunnThe Army TransformationRecently, we have heard muchabout transformation. Our Army istransforming, so too are the U.S.Army Training and Doctrine Com-mand (TRADOC) and other majorcommands (MACOMs). Even ourown Intelligence Center is trans-forming. The reason is simple: wemust shed the “Cold War” mentalityand ways of doing business in fa-vor of those of a transformed forcecapable of putting a combat forceanywhere in the world within 96hours after liftoff. Although we havethat capability now with our lightforces, we must give our forces thelethality of our heavy units. As tech-nology permits, we must reduce theseparation between heavy and lightforces. Recent history has shownus that in today’s environment, acontingency can quickly escalatefrom a humanitarian or peacekeep-ing effort to conflict within a matterof hours.

In the 20th century, we definedweapons of mass destruction(WMDs) as nuclear, biological, andchemical—they were a powerfuland enormous threat. However,building nuclear weapons requireaccess to both rare and often un-available raw and highly protectedmaterials. Biological and chemicalweapons programs tend to requirelarge-scale activities. In addition,21st century technologies are sopowerful that they can generatewhole new classes of abuses and ac-cidents. Most dangerously, for thefirst time, these abuses are within thereach of individuals or small groups.

The Brigade Combat Teams(BCTs) must be capable of conduct-ing a full range of missions, fromstability and support operations tocombat. They must generate mo-mentum for a warfighting division on

the ground in 120 hours, and fivedivisions in 30 days. We can nolonger afford to take six months toget soldiers and equipment in placeas we did in Operations DESERTSHIELD and DESERT STORM.The seven tenets of the objectiveforce are responsive, deployable,agile, versatile, lethal, survivable,and sustainable—this is what ourforce must become in order to re-main deliberate and dominant.

We must find new and improvedways to educate and train our sol-diers. The accelerated change oftoday’s environment is rapidly trans-forming the traditional methods. Tra-ditional training methods are nowgiving way to digital, distributed, andvirtual methods linked through net-works and technology, reachingacross time, space, cultures, and or-ganizational boundaries.

At a recent conference, our Chiefof Staff of the Army, General Eric K.Shinseki, clearly stated the reasonfor our transformation. “The Armycan do lots of things, but there isone thing it must do and that is de-fend this nation without fail.”

An IndividualTransformation

As with the Army and its organi-zations, there comes a time whenwe as individuals must undergosome transformations as well. I willdepart in January and will retire fromactive duty on 30 April 2001. My wifeand I have enjoyed a career span-ning more than 30 years. We haveseen the world and its people, livedin war and peace, and shared goodand bad experiences with the manysoldiers and their families whom wehave known. I have lived the life ofa soldier and have been led andtrained by great officers and NCOs.Their images and examples haveserved as both a driving force andinspiration throughout my career.

Their tough, demanding, up-frontleadership styles have influencedmy life and love for the Army and itssoldiers.

I have had the opportunity to leadand mentor some of the greatestNCOs that have served and willcontinue to serve our country. I haveseen them grow and excel throughtheir own efforts. I am as proud ofthem as if they were my own sonsand daughters. As a Corps, theNCOs have never let me down. Toeach, I owe a personal debt.

I have led great soldiers. Thesesoldiers have provided the real rea-son for my career. I have seen themexcel, fail, and bounce back with aninconceivable will to win. I have ex-perienced the closeness betweenleaders and soldiers, and the lossof fine soldiers—something I willnever forget. To every soldier, I owea personal debt.

I thank all of you for the tremen-dous support, mentorship, andfriendship you have provided dur-ing the last three years, and urgeyou to give CSM Lawrence Hau-brich the same assistance you havegiven me. I will never forget my timehere at Fort Huachuca, and yoursupport, which has meant a lot andmade my job much easier.

As I leave the active Army, I wantto express my personal apprecia-tion for a great career. My thankstoo, to my leaders for their confi-dence, direction, and support, andto my fellow NCOs for their perfor-mance, trust, and unique ability toguard my backside every time it wasunprotected. To all of these, I dedi-cate my career.

Scott C. Chunn has sucessfully servedas a soldier from 9 April 1971 to 30 April2001. Readers can contact him viaE-mail at [email protected].

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

TTTTTrrrrransfansfansfansfansfororororormamamamamation,tion,tion,tion,tion, A A A A A Time ofTime ofTime ofTime ofTime of Chang Chang Chang Chang Changeeeee


by Michael W. PowellThe fast-paced Army transformationis creating challenges throughoutthe force—challenging our re-sources, time, soldiers, and ourminds. It is also creating opportuni-ties, revolutionary opportunities inthe materiel acquisition and experi-mentation processes, which wehave not experienced for decades.

The History—Changing theWay We Fight

The transformation process is notjust limited to the more visible In-terim Brigade and Interim Divisioninitiatives that we are wrestling withday to day. It marks a fundamentalchange in our approach to the waywe fight, and has a ripple effectthrough how we support and inter-face with joint forces, Army andservice component commands, Re-serve Component units, and the restof the legacy Army forces. Why isthis so? To understand the “why,”one must understand “what” trans-formation is about. At the heart oftransformation are three essentialthemes: how and why we enter con-flicts, the relevance of the data, andthe criticality of integration andinteroperability.

The paradigm of how and whywe enter armed conflict haschanged. We now recognize small-scale contingencies (SSCs) andstability and support operations notonly as types of conflict, but as likelyprecursors to a major regional con-flict. Our forces must enter a re-gional contingency lighter, faster,and with a smaller forward “foot-print,” but with sufficient lethality torapidly respond to a change in hos-tility without waiting for the arrivalof the “main body.” This is the es-sence of the I-Brigade and I-Divi-sion initiatives. Understandably,new capabilities for SSCs and sta-

bility and support operations arereceiving the priority of U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command(TRADOC), Department of theArmy (DA), Office of the Secretaryof Defense (OSD), and congres-sional requirements and fundingmechanisms.

The relevance of data to thecommander is paramount. In-creased speed and space of ma-neuver have combined to create anenvironment in which commandersmust see farther and think faster,with ever-increasing precision re-quired as well. Technology hasadded to this challenge by provid-ing a wealth of available informa-tion—some relevant, some not. It isour responsibility to streamline thisinformation into relevant subjectsand forms, so the commander canunderstand the battlespace frommany dimensions.

Integration and interoperabilityare critical. Stand-alone capabili-ties translate to more “boxes,”people, and money—luxuries of re-sources and redundancy that wecan no longer afford. Moreover, theneed for integration and inter-operability goes beyond just the MIforce, drawing under one umbrellathe entire intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR) mission.The power of integration andinteroperability translates not onlyinto a more flexible, responsive, andcomprehensive intelligence capabil-ity, but also better use of the billiondollar investment in ISR as a whole,rather than major improvements inany one stand-alone or “stovepipe”capability.

MI Started “Transforming”Long Ago

Fortunately for MI, the “seeds” ofour transformation process beganyears ago. The intelligence commu-

nity realized that no one echelon orsystem can do it alone. Because MIis now inextricably linked from tacti-cal through national levels and itsorientation is becoming more jointand multiple component (multi-COMPO), it is imperative that wecontinue and intensify this “change”in all aspects of our MI force. All theabove points that hold true for theArmy transformation of today havebeen at the heart of change withinour Corps since the 1991 MI Relook.Through the inception of such con-cepts as battlefield visualization, andthrough initiatives associated with theIntel XXI and Division AdvancedWarfighting Experiments, good ideashave continued to evolve from experi-mentation in field units and in thelabs. We have gone from good ideasto initial systems in the hands of sol-diers in months, as opposed to theyears it used to take.

MI has powerfully demonstratedits proven ability to—! Share data, both horizontally

and vertically.! Scale capabilities from initial

entry to full operations.! Surge rapidly using all cross-

echelon capabilities.! Introduce and integrate new

processing and collectionmeans.

! Press the operational applica-tion of new technology while atthe same time maintaining therelevance of data as well asthought and assessments tothe commander.

Break any part of this aggregate andwe greatly harm the future of MI, thecommander’s understanding of thebattlespace, and the success of fu-ture Army operations.

The ChallengesIdea competition.The transfor-

mation process has also stimulated

MI Systems Transformation


a new breed of ISR developmentcompetition among several branch-es of the Army. Recognizing theability to see and understand thebattlespace as a crucial operationalmultiplier, a ground swell of ISRideas, experiments, and proposedorganizational change have creptinto all portions of the Army and jointthought processes. To cope andcompete with these “good ideas”means that the MI systems-acqui-sition process must adopt a “busi-ness-like” model…or fail.

Maintaining relevance. Moore’slaw1 suggests that reliance onthe materiel acquisition process ofold will not keep MI relevant to thecommander of the future, becausethe acquisition and testing pro-cesses cannot keep pace with ever-changing technology. Moreover,because changes in technologydrive doctrinal changes, the defini-tion of “relevance” is constantlychanging as well. Evidence of thiscan be seen in links to the FutureCombat System, our ability to fieldan unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),joint interoperability at the ArmyBattle Command System (ABCS)level, and ISR visualization.

The human factor. As we maturefrom stand-alone systems to a fullyintegrated and interoperable archi-tecture, we must also redefine theskills and abilities required of oursoldiers. While we will continue toneed people skilled in specificdisciplines, the number of these“specialists” needed will decreaseas reach-back and collaborationpermit centralization of analysisfunctions. The requirements forthe “generalists” those with the tal-ent to assimilate and compile infor-mation and present it to thecommander for a relevant, multi-dimensional understanding of thebattlespace are still undergoingdefinition, and we further redefinethem with every new “good idea.”As unwieldy as our old materiel ac-

quisition system is, the process ofaccessing, training, and providingintelligence soldiers to the field withthe required skills to resource atransformed MI Corps may presentan even greater challenge.

The OpportunitiesThough painful at times, the pace

of experimentation and changemust continue, because the trans-formation process opens the doorfor revolutionary opportunities. Op-erational change has afforded usthe chance to introduce ideas thathave germinated at the field level,and are now undergoing integrationnot only into MI, but also through-out the force.

New Ideas So FarThe new ideas under consider-

ation include additional abilities inISR integration, a fully compatibleMI sensor family, a combined intel-ligence architecture for better infor-mation flow, and a reduced forwardfootprint. We are also working onincreasing equipment flexibility.! ISR Integration. The ability to

receive and display bottom-upand top-down ISR feeds fromMI and non-MI ISR producerswill enhance ISR integration;

this will be an added capabilityin the future tactical operationscenter (TOC). The ForwardSensor Enclave of the XVIIIthAirborne Corps is a prime ex-ample. This ability will not de-grade the capabilities of theanalysis and control element(ACE).

! Sensors. The movement is to-ward a fully compatible familyof MI sensors that extends fromground (via microsensors, ro-botics, and larger wheeled ve-hicles), to air (both manned andunmanned), to space. In addi-tion, there is a rebalancingtaking place with our collec-tors, with more emphasis on hu-man intelligence (HUMINT) andmeasurement and signature in-telligence (MASINT).

! Processing. Development of afederated architecture linkedcross-echelon will build on thepower of an intelligence disci-pline. At the same time, thisfrees up data for more users,including cross-discipline andcross-branch users, and pro-vides access down to maneu-ver battalion and companylevels.


All Source Analysis System» Army interoperability with the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) and Force XXI Battle

Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)» Joint interoperability with the Global Command and Control System 13 (GCCS-I3)» ASAS-Light in a Windows® NT configuration for battalion operations» MASINT workstation for INSCOM S&T applications» CHATS and CHIMS…for the first time, we have applied technology to the HUMINT problem

set

Common Ground Station (CGS)» Combat aviation linkages (surveillance and reconnaissance integration)» Imagery workstation to brigade (separate workstation, but joined with geospatial data from the Engineers)» UAV TCS integration with CGS (multi-function box and reduced footprint)» Graphic interface with ASAS

Pre-Processors» Development of an S&IP architecture has quickly evolved into the DCGS-A architecture and

migration path» TES-Forward is a major success (will be integrated down to divisions and I-brigades)

Air» Acquisition decision for UAV for maneuver brigade (Shadow 200)» Sensor payload identification beyond EO/IR» Family of UAV requirements from micros to a GS system» TDL/TCDL commitment by Army to tactical units» QUICKFIX capabilities directed by DA to go to UAV» GRCS and ARL migration to ACS (impacts current GRCS and ARL improvements)

Ground» Prophet-Ground on accelerated fielding, with associated legacy systems de-fielding» Migration of Prophet-Ground to a multi-function, MASINT and SIGINT collection platform that

integrates ground surveillance capabilities» QRC integration into doctrine and budget» CART fielding to units at the theater level (complimentary with tactical SIGINT)

Experimentation» JISR ACTD to get at joint interoperability and visualization capabilities» HUMINT ACTD to finally provide CI, interrogation, LRS, and SOF with some of the new

collection, processing, and communications means available» Microsensor and robotics experimentation» Collection management and visualization tools given the demise of JCMT (we cannot wait to

field a “good enough” capability to Army units)


Figure 1. Demonstrated and Planned Advances Due to Implementing New Ideas.


! Reduced Forward Footprint.Achieving this goal mandatessmaller systems, initial entryflexibility—translating to fewersingle- and more multi-functionboxes—and increased empha-sis on reach-back and collabo-ration.

! Quick Reaction Capability(QRC) and Special-Purpose-Built Systems would providethe ability to change rapidly toadd sensor and processing ca-pability to a deploying forcebased on survey of the opera-tional region.

How The Ideas Have GrownInto Specific Changes

The true value of good ideas isonly apparent when they becomeactual good capabilities. The bestway to demonstrate the far-reach-ing effects of the current change isto examine them system by system.So along the lines of “sure, it looksgood, but how does it run?”, Figure1 shows some of the good ideas wehave actually “test-driven.”

The Bottom LineIt must fit. As you can see, there

is a tremendous amount of changetaking place within the MI Corps—change we worked with agencies,joint elements, DA, TRADOC, andmany field units. Gone are the dayswhen we could develop a single ca-pability without considering how itfits, how it interacts, how it commu-nicates. We cannot risk fielding acapability that cannot operate withinthe larger joint architecture.

We cannot work alone becausethere is no single location for ideadevelopment or implementation.For MI to achieve true success inthe future, it requires a federated ap-proach toward ideas, people, anddollars. We are moving down a paththat truly gives the Army of tomor-row a battlespace understanding ofthe adversary never before seenwithin the armed forces.

It is more than just the “thing.”The challenge will be in developingand maintaining a “One Vector, OneTeam, One Voice” approach whendealing with other than MI person-nel. Without a unified approach, wetend to be “divided and conquered.”Unfortunately, when assessing anew idea, it is not as simple as look-ing at the added functionality of the“thing.” We must balance—! Requirements. Do we have it

formally documented? Withoutthis documentation, there is noauthorization to spend dollarsoutside of the QRC lane.

! Personnel resourcing issues.What are the military occupa-tional specialties (MOSs), train-ing complexities, recruiting andretention challenges, and—withtoday’s zero-growth force—whoare the bill payers?

! Architecture. Have we ensuredboth horizontal and verticalinteroperability and integration,now and in the future?

! Hand off. For the greater goodof all MI units, what is the deci-sion point to hand off experi-ments’ results to the largeracquisition process?

Any time we take our “eyes off theball” on one or more of these points,I guarantee we will end up payingthe price several years down theroad. It would be easier to just “de-velop” ideas, without considerationfor the critical second- and third-order effects. What is easier now,however, is not necessarily better inthe future. If we fail to take any ofthese issues into account as wedevelop the objective MI force, wecould end up with a different MICorps capability entirely, one thatmay not be relevant to the rest ofthe force.

We are in exciting though some-times frustrating times! Keep up thegood work.✹Endnote1. Gordon Moore, cofounder of IntelCorporation, first noticed in 1965 that the

number of transistors which can fit on amanufacturer’s die doubles approximatelyevery year, effectively doubling processingspeed.

Mike Powell serves as the Deputy forFutures at the home of the U.S. ArmyIntelligence Corps, located at FortHuachuca, Arizona. He oversees andintegrates the actions of three criticalactivities: the Directorate of Combat De-velopments (DCD), the Battle Com-mand Battle Lab–Huachuca, and thefour TRADOC Systems Managers(TSMs). DCD has responsibility for theconceptual, organizational, and systemsideas for the future of MI, and for howMI interoperates at the Service, joint,and coalition levels. The Battle Com-mand Battle Lab–Huachuca, which isthe focal point for all MI technology in-sertion and experimentation, is also animportant component of Futures. Finally,but perhaps most significant to com-manders in the field, are the four TSMscharged with developing new equipmentand fielding it to our soldiers. Recentchanges within the MI Corps havebroadened each of these activities toencompass the total MI Corps, bothActive and Reserve Components (RC),through all echelons—tactical, opera-tional, and strategic. Mr. Powell hasbeen on the leading edge of creatingchange within the MI Corps. He hasbeen a part of every major MI restruc-ture in the last 15 years and has set thestage for future systems’ development.A few of his accomplishments includeISR integration and visualization, pro-cessor interoperability, Joint AnalysisCenter–Molesworth, tactical HUMINTenhancements, and development of re-alistic ISR simulations. Mr. Powell’scombined military and civilian federalservice began 28 years ago as an intel-ligence analyst with the RC specialforces and light forces. Mr. Powell en-tered the ranks of the Senior ExecutiveService in March 1999; he is one of sixSES employees within the IntelligenceCommunity and the only one in thewestern United States. He is a gradu-ate of Arizona State University and theUniversity of Phoenix, specializing inBusiness and Marketing. Readers maycontact Mr. Powell via E-mail [email protected].


by Colonel Charles AtkinsWe are well into implementing the“Army 2010” vision and achievingrelated transformation objectives.Army Intelligence transformationefforts are synchronized and essen-tial to achieving the Army’s visionof “Soldiers on point for the Nation,transforming the most respectedarmy in the world into a strategicallyresponsive force that is dominantacross the full spectrum of opera-tions.”

As the Intelligence Communitytransforms, we are experiencingchanges that go beyond patterns,models, systems, and technologies.Concurrent with these changes, weare witnessing a fundamental ex-amination of what underlies andactuates the character of who weare as intelligence professionals.We—the entire Intelligence Com-munity—are transforming the “intel-ligence ethos.”

At first glance, this might soundhollow, but there is real substanceto this change. The most recentdoctrine in FM 3-0 (formerly FM100-5), Operations, now recog-nizes information (this includes in-

telligence) as an element of com-bat power. The struggle for informa-tion superiority is now an enablingpart of our operational paradigm.Furthermore, intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) isan interdependent contributor toachieving information superiority.Together, these changes furtherelevate the importance of intelli-gence and provide a significantchallenge for intelligence profes-sionals.

The Human DimensionWe are all familiar with the

changes occurring in the nature of

the threats to our operations. Ourpotential opponents will improvetheir military capabilities and tacticsbased on lessons learned as a re-sult of observing U.S. military op-erations. They will use or threatento use biotechnology, microelectron-ics, and information technologies togain an advantage, “flank” our ad-vanced systems, and negate ourovermatch. The advantage we cur-rently enjoy in information technol-ogy will decrease in the futurebecause of cheaper and fasterimprovements in commercial tech-nologies that cause informationequality rather than superiority.

IntelligIntelligIntelligIntelligIntelligence ence ence ence ence TTTTTrrrrransfansfansfansfansfororororormamamamamation:tion:tion:tion:tion:BeBeBeBeBeyyyyyond Pond Pond Pond Pond Parararararadigm Shiftsadigm Shiftsadigm Shiftsadigm Shiftsadigm Shifts,,,,, Chang Chang Chang Chang Changes in Ethoses in Ethoses in Ethoses in Ethoses in Ethos

For this article, the writer de-fines “ethos” as the guiding be-lief, standards, or ideas thatcharacterize or pervade a group,a community, a people, or an ide-ology. It is the spirit that moti-vates the ideas, customs, orpractices of a people. Ethoscomprises the complex and fun-damental values that underlie,permeate, or actuate major pat-terns of thought and behaviorin any particular culture, society,or institution.


Widespread access to informationand communications will character-ize the global information environ-ment—a truly transparent archi-tecture. This will continue the trendtoward the ability to know what isoccurring around the world almostsimultaneously. The combinationof commercial availability and de-creased cost of off-the-shelf recon-naissance and surveillance (R&S)assets, including space-based sys-tems, will allow potential opponentsto maintain a robust ISR capabilitywithout the associated investmentin research and development.

If this assessment of our future isaccurate, how do we dominate thethreat in full-spectrum operations?The answer lies in not only grap-pling with future technologies butalso making a proportionate invest-ment in our most valuable assets—our soldiers, civilians, and contrac-tor personnel.

The Army has already recognizedthe need for changes in our opera-tional paradigm and “warrior ethos”as acknowledged by the currenttransformation effort and as cap-tured in the new doctrine in FM 3-0.Our ability to gain and to maintainintelligence overmatch in the ex-panding “Red zone” and at tacticaland operational deep zones in anyconflict underpins our operationalovermatch. For us to meet this “tallorder,” we can no longer see our-selves as simply supporters of com-bat operations; we must seeourselves rather as integratedmembers of the battle commandteam at every echelon. This rolerequires renewed self-awarenessand preparedness.

Our Evolving EthosTo achieve the desired end-state,

we must look at ourselves in a newlight and, at the same time, we shouldpresent ourselves in a new way. Sev-eral critical ideas for achieving thisend-state should include—

! Mentally and doctrinally codify-ing intelligence as an integralpart of all operations. This isespecially important within thecomplex environments thathave been present in recentoperations. The basis of thischange is successfully assess-ing and planning the futureacross the broad scope of doc-trine, training, leader develop-ment, organization, materiel,and soldiers (DTLOMS) tobecome truly integrated. Thisconcept marks a subtle yet sig-nificant departure from the ideaof “intelligence support” and in-telligence as a combat supportbranch. We must thoroughlyintegrate intelligence with battlecommand in all aspects, at allechelons, in every instance.

! Clearly articulating (repeatedly,if necessary) the concept thatthe human dimension, to in-clude continuous learning andcareer development, is the es-sential component of ourbranch. This idea should formthe basis for our most funda-mental value—investing in ourprofessionals.

! Reinventing ourselves as adap-tive analysts capable of suc-cessfully performing analysisagainst a threat using asym-metric means in a difficult andunique environment for whichwe may have never receivedany training. At the same time,we must integrate with and pro-vide adequate intelligence forsophisticated information op-erations. In macro terms, weare the ultimate advocates forthe threat (“Red” and “Gray”)and we must maintain a solidfoundation of skills in order tosucceed. We must be proficientand flexible enough to performour core tasks (for example,intelligence preparation of thebattlefield (IPB), situation devel-

opment, and integration withtargeting) to standard for anyenvironment.

! Presenting intelligence and ISRintegration as a part of everybattlefield operating system(BOS) rather than just a part ofthe Intelligence BOS. In short,this means intelligence inte-grates Red- and Gray-focusedassets within the battlespace.

! Integrating MI into decisiveoperations in the “Red zone”and enabling maneuver whileout of contact.

! Changing our mindsets fromdepending on an “intelligencebuildup” to performing intelli-gence readiness checks on adaily basis. This change willallow us to meet the require-ments for strategic responsive-ness through our preparationsin garrison. Intelligence opera-tions must become the norm inall intelligence units.

The BeginningWe have already started down the

path to these changes through anumber of different initiatives. Dur-ing the development of the Initial Bri-gade Combat Team (IBCT), wehave found some solutions that sup-port a thorough integration of intel-ligence across the DTLOMS: neworganizational designs, uniquetraining, emerging doctrine, andnew system combinations. This

we have found somesolutions that supporta thorough integrationof intelligence across

the DTLOMS. Thistrend will continue as

the Army migratestoward Objective

Force 2010


evolution required organizationalchanges to the structure of theIBCTs that have, in the past, sepa-rated intelligence from combinedarms teams (reflecting intelligencesupport, not integration). This trendwill continue as the Army migratestoward Objective Force 2010. Thethorough integration of intelligencewill certainly extend to the transfor-mation of our divisions and corps.

The IBCT reflects several of themajor changes to our patterns ofthought—! Organic Support. Unlike other

units in the past, the MI Com-pany is organic to the brigaderather than being in direct sup-port of it. This organizational dif-ference will truly integrate theMI company and will dedicateit to meeting the brigade’srequirements. The IBCT com-mander’s priority intelligencerequirements (PIR) drive all MIcompany operations. The MIcompany provides an ISRanalysis and ISR integration ca-pability to the IBCT S2 as wellas executing tactical humanintelligence (HUMINT) opera-tions.

! ISR Integration. There areboth an ISR analysis platoonand ISR integration platoon tohelp the brigade S2 integrate,analyze, and plan ISR opera-tions.

! R&S Integration. R&S in theIBCT does not mirror MI, cav-alry, or scout organizations ofthe past. The SurveillanceTroop and ReconnaissanceTroops organic to the Recon-naissance, Surveillance, andTarget Acquisition (RSTA)Squadron consist of an inte-grated mix of what previouslywere intelligence soldiers andsystems and other R&S sol-diers and systems. The surveil-lance troop is composed of theAerial Reconnassance Platoon,a Ground Sensor Platoon, and

Nuclear, Biological, andChemical (NBC) Reconnais-sance Platoon. The integrationextends to the unique teamingof collection systems—Prophetand ground surveillance sys-tems—within the ground sen-sor platoon.

! HUMINT Integration. The in-tegration of all HUMINT collec-tion and counterintelligence(CI) operations in the area ofresponsibility (AOR) forms agood model for all future ISRoperations. In order to coordi-nate, deconflict, and synchro-nize all HUMINT collection andCI operations, the IBCT’s orga-nization reflects a new ele-ment—the S2X. This allows theIBCT to provide focus, techni-cal support, and technical con-trol for all HUMINT and CIactivities when many otherteams may be performing op-erations within the IBCT’s AOR.

! Embedded Capability. Eachreconnaissance troop has or-ganic tactical HUMINT collec-tors that perform a limitedHUMINT collection role (justtactical questioning and limiteddocument exploitation). Eachtactical HUMINT collector is afull member of a reconnais-sance team. This example bestillustrates the mindset of totalISR integration.

! Reach-Back Operations. Wepredicated IBCT intelligenceoperations on the ability to con-duct reach-back operations toaccess intelligence across allechelons in support of tacticalrequirements for longer-termplanning and complex analysis.Collaborative analysis throughreach-back operations is a corequality of the intelligence archi-tecture.

ConclusionIn the future, the spirit that moti-

vates intelligence professionalsshould closely match the mind-

set of the IBCT ISR soldiers—intelligence soldiers on watch, in-tegrated as part of the combined-arms team, enabling full-spectrumdominance across the full range ofpotential military operations. We MIprofessionals must see ourselvesas essential members of the battlecommand team at every echelon.Viewing ourselves through theselenses takes us beyond previouscombat support concepts andguides us to a mental state of totalintegration.✹

Colonel Chuck Atkins received his com-mission through the Officer’s CandidateSchool at Fort Benning, Georgia. He iscurrently the Director of Combat Devel-opments, U.S. Army Intelligence Centerand Fort Huachuca. His important staffassignments include Flight OperationsOfficer, C Company (Aerial Exploitation),Fort Bliss, Texas; Executive Officer, BCompany, 501st MI Battalion (Aerial Ex-ploitation); Chief, Systems Branch, Direc-torate of Combat Developments, U.S.Army Intelligence Center and School(USAICS); Chief, Special Electronic Mis-sion Aircraft (SEMA) Instruction Branch,USAICS; Staff Officer, Office of the JointChiefs of Staff, The Pentagon, Washing-ton, D.C.; Assistant G2, Technical Intelli-gence, III Corps; Assistant G2,Operations, III Corps; and Deputy Chiefof Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Army–South.Colonel Atkins commanded Headquar-ters Company, 3d MI Battalion (Aerial Ex-ploitation), 501st Military IntelligenceBrigade, and the 15th MI Battalion (AerialExploitation), 504th MI Brigade. His mili-tary education inculdes the follingcourses: U.S. Army Military IntelligenceOfficer Basic and Advanced, GeneralElectronic Warfare/Cryptologic Officer,Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer, andU.S. Army Rotary- and Fixed-Wing Avia-tion. He also attended the Armed ForcesStaff College and the U.S. Army War Col-lege. COL Atkins earned a Bachelor ofScience degree in Management fromPark College, Parksville, Missouri, and aMaster of Public Administration degreefrom Shippensburg University, Shippens-burg, Pennsylvania. Readers can con-tact the author via E-mail at [email protected] and telephonicallyat (520) 533-2413 or DSN 821-2415.


by Colonel Stephen J. Bondand Captain Gregory H. YoungBased on the vision of the Chief ofStaff of the Army (CSA), GeneralEric K. Shinseki, for transformingthe Army, we are undergoing mas-sive change. The envisioned trans-formation will increase the Army’sresponsiveness and deployabilitywhile becoming more agile, lethal,versatile, survivable, and sustain-able. To achieve this transformation,three thrusts chart the course:! The “Legacy Force” sustains

and capitalizes on the strengthsof our current, but heavy forces.

! We will simultaneously developan “Interim Force” capable ofdominating the spectrum of op-erations from peacetime en-gagements to war. This forcecenters on the designated Ini-tial and Interim Brigade Com-bat Teams (IBCTs).

! Ultimately, leveraging scienceand technology will transformthe entire Army into a more ca-pable “Objective Force.”

The fundamental principles inachieving these capabilities are tocreate a full-spectrum force thatovermatches threat capabilities andachieves information dominance,capitalizing on the strengths of ourintelligence, surveillance, and re-connaissance (ISR) systems. Mili-tary Intelligence’s flagship systemfor providing this capability with the“now battle” picture encompassesthe Joint Surveillance Target AttackRadar System (Joint STARS) Com-mon Ground Station (CGS), and itsassociated Joint Services Worksta-tion (JSWS). These systems sup-port all three of the CSA’s ArmyTransformation thrusts.

BackgroundThe Common Ground Station is

an evolution of the Joint STARSGround Station Module (GSM)(see Figure 1). Used in supportof actual operations in DESERTSHIELD and DESERT STORM in1990 and 1991, the Interim GroundStation Module (IGSM) receivedand displayed moving target indi-cators (MTIs) and synthetic aper-ture radar (SAR) imagery from theJoint STARS E-8 aircraft. Thissystem greatly enhanced the war-fighting capabilities of the corpscommanders and, as a system,Joint STARS became a “hero” ofthe Gulf War. As the system ma-tured, we downsized and improvedthe ground stations. The platformfor the initial systems, IGSM andthe improved Med ium GSM(MGSM), was a five-ton truck. Triedand proven in Operations JOINTENDEAVOR I and II in support ofour forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina

in 1994 and 1995, the MGSMswere again a success in Kosovo in1999’s Operation ALLIED FORCE.

Today’s Common Ground Station(see Figure 2) is HMMWV- (high-mobility multipurpose wheeledvehicle) mounted and C-130-deployable. The Joint ServicesWorkstation is an easily trans-ported, containerized, stand-aloneCGS workstation. The JSWSs wereused extensively to support the1999 Kosovo operations; excep-tionally proficient XVIIIth AirborneCorps imagery ground station op-erators (military occupational spe-cialty (MOS) 96H) ran many of theJSWSs.

Aside from becoming smaller andmore deployable, the capabilities ofthe ground stations have madequantum leaps over the past tenyears in terms of computer process-ing capabilities and linkages withother sensors. The CGS and JSWSof today receive MTI and SAR im-

A A A A A VVVVVieieieieiew frw frw frw frw from the High Grom the High Grom the High Grom the High Grom the High Ground—ound—ound—ound—ound—CGS and JSWSCGS and JSWSCGS and JSWSCGS and JSWSCGS and JSWS

Figure 1. Evolution of Joint STARS Ground Stations.

See the glossary on page 64 for expansion of the acronyms.

Common Ground Stations (CGS & JSWS)

Programmed Improvements

" APACHE Longbow" MTI/SAR" U-2R/ARL" On the move" Joint STARS: MTI, FTI, SAR" TROJAN SPIRIT" CTT (3-Channel)" Hunter UAV" SIDS" SIPRNET" ASAS " AFATDS

" UAVs direct " IAS (USMC)" COMANCHE " TES" JTT - IBS " WIN-T

" JVMF

1997 to Present

Single Sensor (OV-1 SLAR)

Moving target indicator (MTI)" MCS/TACFIRE

Deployed in Germanyand Korea

1984

Limited Procurement Urgent (LPU)

" Multisensor (OV-1, E-8)" Joint STARS: MTI,synthetic aperture radar (SAR)" TROJAN SPIRIT" MCS/TACFIRE

Deployed in DESERT STORM

1986

Interim Ground Station Module

(IGSM)

Deployed in JOINTENDEAVOR and Korea

1992

Medium GroundStation Module

(MGSM)

Deployed in JOINTENDEAVOR" On the move" Multisensor processing" Joint STARS: MTI, FTI, SAR" TROJAN SPIRIT" CTT (2-Channel)" UHF SATCOM (SCDL-E)" Hunter UAV" SIPRNET" ASAS

1994

Light Ground Station Module

(LGSM)

Warfighter Support:TF XXI, ASCIET, WFX, EFX

" Multisensor processing" Joint STARS:MTI, Fixed target indicator (FTI), SAR" TROJAN SPIRIT" CTT (2-Channel)" UHF SATCOM" Hunter UAV" SIPRNET" ASAS

Notes: Joint STARS ground stations have become smaller and more capable over the past ten years.

"

"


agery not only from Joint STARS,but also the U-2R and the AirborneReconnaissance Low (ARL). Theycan also receive and display imag-ery and video from a variety of otheraerial platforms including the un-manned aerial vehicle (UAV) familyof other aircraft, APACHE Longbow,and other systems. Through the cur-rent, three-channel Commander’sTactical Terminal (CTT) or the neweight-channel Joint Tactical Termi-nal (JTT), the capability to receive,overlay, and display the signals in-telligence (SIGINT) picture from in-telligence broadcasts is alsoavailable to the system.

Inputs from the various collectionplatforms are managed by the 96Hoperators, who assist the com-manders and staff to visualize anddirect the “now battle” from thesystem’s workstations or within thetactical operations centers (TOCs)via remote workstations. Operatorsfrom the CGS and JSWS also feedthe All-Source Analysis System(ASAS) database and provide the“now battle” picture to the intelli-gence operational picture. Theyalso provide targeting information tothe Advanced Field Artillery Tacti-

cal Data System (AFATDS). Thisnow-battle picture can be displayedin TOCs, sent as updates, and in-put into the ASAS database, anddesignated targets can be sent tothe AFATDS.Supporting Legacy Force

The Common Ground Station hasreceived rave reviews from com-

manders at corps level down tomaneuver brigades. CGS is a sup-porting piece of the digitized ArmyBattle Command System (ABCS)force architecture in the AdvancedWarfighting Experiments and ForceXXI testing. III Corps and the 4thInfantry Division (Mechanized) (4ID(M)) have relied on it extensivelyduring testing, experiments, and atthe National Training Center. The4ID (M) is a visionary contributor toCGS tactics, techniques, and pro-cedures, recently demonstratingAPACHE Longbow’s ability to re-ceive digital MTI updates while ondeep attack missions. The 2d Infan-try Division and 501st MI Brigadein the Republic of Korea employCGS with its linkage to ARL on adaily basis for monitoring NorthKorean vehicle traffic. In this theater,CGS has already proven its worthas a valuable contributor to the U.S.Forces Korea indications and warn-ing mission.

The Common Ground Station iscurrently undergoing fielding pre-dominantly to MI battalions andcompanies from echelons abovecorps (EAC) down to armored cav-

The currently fielded Common Ground Station.

Figure 2. CGS obtains information from the ISR sensors and platformsshown above. It can also rapidly overlay and import MTI, SAR,

and SIGINT products, as well as other imagery.

U.S. Army photo.

CGS

JSWS

Sensor Inputs• E-8C Joint STARS–MTI & SAR• U2R–EMTI• ARL–MTI & SAR• UAV Family (Army/AF)

- Video/Telemetry- Still Imagery

• APACHE Longbow– Fire Control Radar• SIGINT Intelligence Broadcasts:

-TRIXS (GRCS)-TIBS (AF/Navy sensors)-TDD (National)-TOPS (National)

• Imagery Systems-National-Tactical-Imagery Product-Libraries

• Simulations

System Output• Battlefield Visualization Monitor/Screen Display• All-Source Analysis System (ASAS)• Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)• Marine Intelligence Analysis System (IAS)• Imagery to Tactical & National Imagery Dissemination Systems• Imagery Workstation-Brigade (IWS-B)


alry regiments (ACRs). At EAC, MIbrigades employ the system in sup-port of their missions, while at corpsand division, MI battalions providethe CGS to support both headquar-ters and maneuver units. At corps,two systems support the corpsheadquarters, and one each at thefire support element (FSE), artillerybrigade(s), and the aviation brigade.At division, two systems support thedivision headquarters, and oneeach for the maneuver brigades andthe aviation brigade. Each ACR willreceive one system at the MI com-pany; the U.S. Army National Guardenhanced separate brigades(eSBs) will each receive one. TheJSWS fielding will be to the Re-gional Unified Commands, U.S.Army Intelligence and SecurityCommand (INSCOM) elements,special operations forces (SOF),simulations centers, and battle labs.Supporting the InitialBrigade Combat Teams

The conceptual employment forthe IBCT spans the spectrum frommilitary operations other than war(MOOTW) through conventionalwar. Organic to each IBCT will be

one CGS and a crew of six 96Hoperators assigned to its MI com-pany. The crew of the first IBCT com-pleted its training at Fort Huachuca,Arizona, in August and moved to FortLewis, Washington, to begin their col-lective training. The second IBCT

cohort is slated to begin its training inthe summer of 2001.

In the uncertain environments inwhich the IBCTs will operate, inno-vative visualization, sensor cueing,and analysis will yield decisive re-sults. Using the CGS MTI capabil-ity, operators, analysts, staffs, andcommanders can review the loca-tions, direction, routes, and speedof movers over time in their areasof interest. MTI support could poten-tially distinguish refugee convoysfrom hostile forces—based on theirspeed, direction, routes, and terraincovered. Sudden and unexplainedchanges in civilian traffic patternsmight indicate curfews, gas ration-ing, or a perceived imminent threatto the civilian population. In this con-text, the MTI data is obviously nottargetable but requires confirmationby other sensors and analysis. TheMTIs, however, can spur and focusthe collection management processand cue other collection assets,such as Tactical UAVs or SIGINTcollectors. The functionality and rel-evance of the CGS extends far be-

The JSWS is a stand-alone, deployable system with thefunctionality of the CGS.

The Joint Tactical Terminal can provide a transmit capability and an eight-channel receive capability. The terminal receives intelligence broadcasts

from TOPS, TDDS, TIBS, and TRIXS.1 It can also receive imagery fromimagery product libraries.

U.S. Army photo.

U.S. Army photo.


yond receiving and exploiting JointSTARS, U-2R, or ARL MTIs. Theflexibility to cue a UAV, based onnear-real-time MTIs or SIGINT, fun-damentally enhances intelligencepotency and timeliness in meetingcommanders’ information require-ments and reducing uncertainty.The Future—Support tothe Objective Force

As the Army transforms to the Ob-jective Force, technology will con-tinue to improve and so will thecapabilities of the CGS and JSWS.Linkages and connectivity with ourcurrent suite of sensor platforms willexpand to more and newer ISR sys-tems and to those of our coalitionpartners. Target recognition andtracking enhancements in the sys-tems will also improve.

In the near term, an ImageryWorkstation–Brigade (IWS-B) teth-ered to a CGS will support theIBCTs. The IWS-B will contain ad-vanced imagery-exploitation soft-ware to facilitate timely imageryanalysis. Two imagery analysts(MOS 96D) will exploit imageryrouted through the CGS from JointSTARS, UAVs, APACHE gun cam-eras, handheld digital cameras, andnational agencies. CGS and theimagery workstation afford theground maneuver brigade com-

manders an unprecedented abilityto visualize their battlefields.

Projected CGS upgrades begin-ning this year will dramatically im-prove CGS hardware, software,communications, and simulationcapabilities. We will upgrade theserver, expand system memory,and add imagery exploitation soft-ware and information security soft-ware. In light of the still relativelysmall number of E-8C aircraft, theadded simulation software and con-nectivity will expand training oppor-tunities, even without live JointSTARS flights.

The increasingly close ties be-tween the CGS and the TacticalUAV heralds unprecedented syn-ergy, operational economy, and ef-ficiencies. While we will continue tolink CGS and the TUAV GroundControl Station in the near term, thelong-term vision is to minimize thesystem’s collective footprint. Byadding a UAV workstation to theCGS, UAV operators (MOS 96U)may work directly through a CGS,executing all required UAV-relatedtasks, except takeoffs and landings.

Looking beyond the next five to tenyears, technology will improve, sys-tem components will becomesmaller, and the hardware and soft-ware will become more capable.Consequently, the processing capa-

bilities and linkages of today’s CGSand JSWS will remain the now-battle link for combat elements tovisualize the battlefield. This capa-bility will migrate into a future sys-tem called the distributed CommonGround System–Army, proliferatebelow brigade level to battalion,company, platoon, and even to in-dividual aircraft, combat vehicles,and soldiers on the battlefield.Conclusion

The evolution of the Joint STARSground stations into our currentCGS and JSWS systems wereideas ahead of their time that eas-ily support the Army Transformationinitiative. The systems currentlyfielded are providing the picture ofthe now battle to our common op-erational picture with feeds fromaerial and space-based sensors.They provide the view from the“high ground” and will ensure over-matching information dominancefor the Legacy and Interim Forces.The requirements embedded in thecurrent systems will endure. TheObjective Force must have a deci-sive advantage of systems provid-ing information dominance, thusenabling it to be more responsive,deployable, agile, lethal, survivable,and sustainable.✹Endnote1. See the glossary on page 64 for expan-sion of the acronyms used in this article.Colonel Steve Bond recently assumed du-ties as the U.S. Army Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) Systems Managerfor Joint STARS, the Common Ground Sta-tion, and the Joint Tactical Terminal. He hasheld significant MI command and staff po-sitions in organizations from tactical throughnational levels. He is a graduate of the U.S.Army War College and holds a Master ofArts degree in History from the Universityof Kansas. Readers can reach him via E-mail at [email protected] Greg Young has extensive experi-ence with the Joint STARS CGS. He is arecent MI Officer Advanced Course gradu-ate and holds a Master of Arts degree inInternational Politics from the University ofPennsylvania. He is currently assigned tothe 501st MI Brigade in Korea.

The power of the system is its ability to process and display MTI,imagery products, and SIGINT in near-real time.1

UAV cued toSA-8 site atcrossroads

SA-8 associatedradar

SIGINT CEPJSTARS MTIindicates activityat crossroads


by Brigadier GeneralRichard J. Quirk, IIIThe intelligence soldier of tomorrowwill require a professional educa-tion; our traditional military trainingwill not be sufficient. The U.S. ArmyIntelligence Center (USAIC) hasbegun to develop a career-longeducational program that will pro-duce the intelligence professionalsthat our nation will require. In theend, all MI leaders will have to ex-ecute that program for it to work.Evolving PersonnelRequirement

We have all seen the requirementemerge over the past years. Thecries for men and women who canmaster large quantities of informa-tion and extract its meaning haveincreased with the loss of an easilytemplated opponent in the SovietBloc. During the same period, wehave begun demanding a deepertechnological understanding by ourforce (see Figure 1), because of thegreat variety of continuously chang-ing hardware and software systemsin use across the MI community.

With the advent of the informationrevolution, our electronic systemshave gained enormous flexibilityand potential for performance. All ofthis emerging potential in our sys-tems has shown us again that ourhuman capital—our soldiers andcivilians—is the independent vari-able in future operations. They willemploy our system of systems inunexpected and unbelievably pro-ductive ways, or they will fail to ex-ploit the great potential of oursystems and units. Antoine HenriJomini once wrote that generalscreate the “Art of War” by the waysin which they build “combinations”

from the tools and possibilities be-fore them.1 In our future, there willbe artists at many levels, making“art” by the combinations they puttogether in a collaborative way onthe digital systems they operate.Educating MI Soldiers

To make these soldiers the artistsof systems, the artists of informa-tion, and most importantly, the mas-ters of the Intelligence Art, we musteducate them. Task-based trainingwill no longer suffice.

With the dissolution of the singleSoviet competitor, we have lost fora time the value of expertise on agiven target or threat. In its placehas emerged great value in thekinds of broader expertise that leadto versatility. This expertise, thisbreadth and depth to cover what-ever emerges in the world, cancome only from education.

We at USAIC are becoming in-creasingly uncomfortable with theidea that any critical task list for any

military occupational specialty(MOS) can do justice to the magni-tude of responsibilities that our sol-diers will face in jobs that range fromnational to mud in their scopes. Theprofessional education program thatMI soldiers and civilians will requiremust be a continuous, career-longeffort. The seemingly magical abil-ity of the World War II officer corpsto mobilize our industry so quicklyand rejuvenate our Army was duein part to the professional educa-tional programs of the 1930s.Today’s high tech, fast-movingworld requires an all-Army effort,with even more rigor than did thatprevious inter-war experience. Eachprofessional must take on his or herown education as a personal re-sponsibility. However, the educationof our MI professionals has becometoo important in the information ageto leave to the individual, so wemust unite Service-sponsored edu-cational efforts with other education.

Training the MI Force for the Future

Figure 1. The Expertise Required of MI Leaders.

The Expertise Required of MI Leaders

Before 1990 Tomorrow

Key Environment

Key Threat

Overall Emphasis

Type Intelligence

Type Team

Systems

Echelon

Type of Operation

Soviet Bloc

Plains of Western Europe

IPB on Known Threat

Conventional/ Nuclear War

Battalion/Brigade

Army Tactical

Battalion S2 Staff

Tactical

Wide Range, Worldwide

Worldwide, all Varieties

SASO, SSC, MTW

Tactical/Joint/ National/Coalition

S2/ACE/JIC/Agency

Tactical/Operational/Strategic

Tactical/Joint/ National/Coalition

Information Superiority overUnfamiliar Threat



Managing EducationUSAIC is laying a foundation for

managing and contributing to theprofessional education of MI sol-diers and civilians. The first chal-lenge we have faced is that ourclassical methods of systems-engineering our training and our oldinstructional techniques might notapply well to the education program.We are studying other managementmodels at present.

In the interest of developing highercognitive levels and more flexibilityin our graduates, we have alreadyreplaced our old, task-based in-structional methodologies with aConstructivist approach. This ap-proach teaches by placing the stu-dents in realistic situations andallowing them to learn by doing, withminimal intervention.

We are functionally redesigningour MOSs, and integrating educa-tional experiences throughout ca-reers to build breadth as well asdepth in MI soldiers. In fact, we areinserting a civilian education pathinto each of these studies that en-able noncommissioned officers(NCOs) to earn bachelor of arts orscience degrees by their atten-dance at the Advanced NCOCourse (ANCOC) and a mastersdegree for those in designated po-sitions. We very likely will specifycertain degrees as meriting re-wards. We have begun a pilot pro-gram which grants an associatesdegree to our 97B (Counterintelli-gence Agent) advanced individualtraining (AIT) graduates by theaddition of a few low-cost, distance-learning college courses. Eventu-ally, all of our AIT students will beeligible to obtain associates de-grees in a similar way.

In order to recognize the need forchange and to make that changequickly, USAIC is instituting an ex-tensive system of field surveys andother assessment devices, tied toour customer base. These auto-

mated devices will, we believe, helpus to discover opportunities aheadand to implement them quickly.Training Tools

We are building web-based toolsto provide more knowledge andskills to our soldiers regardless oftheir locations. Among those initia-tives is “object-oriented doctrine,”which modularizes our doctrinalmaterial, places it on the web, andconnects it to standing operatingprocedures (SOPs); tactics, tech-niques, and procedures (TTP); les-sons learned; and random ideas.This allows the soldiers to gain allgermane information and skills, asthey are required during an opera-tion.2 This “chunky doctrine” will alsoserve as a nucleus for idea sharingon intelligence. From this nucleuswill grow an extensive distance-learning infrastructure and manyother tools for moving informationand knowledge to those who needit.

We are also transforming the In-telligence Center, rapidly changingmost of our courses from manualto digital conditions. The studentswill become fully familiar with thedigital tactical operations center(TOC) and Intelligence Center and

all of their electronic systems bytraining in mockups from the battal-ion to joint levels. They will gain so-phisticated insights that will enablethem to perform their work on anysystem they may find in the field.Leaders will learn how to integratethe systems at hand and how toadapt those systems to accomplishtheir tasks, often in new and differ-ent ways. We have more than 30“plug and play” classrooms at theIntelligence Center now, allowing usto configure our classroom comput-ers to serve as tactical systems oroperations centers. You can readmore about “the digitization ofUSAIC” in the article by ColonelGary Parrish that follows.More Cradle-to-GraveEvolution

We are reprogramming our NCOand warrant officer professionaldevelopment courses to educatetheir students more broadly andmore deeply as well. We may verywell “track” our MOS technical train-ing for some MOSs to other train-ing or educational institutions thatprovide world-class instruction inthe appropriate fields.

Perhaps the evolution of the War-rant Officer Corps will be most ex-



citing. Our MI warrant officer “cradleto grave” study, which delves deeplyinto the unique role of the MI war-rant officers of the future, highlightsthe need for significant educationalpreparation if the warrant officercorps is to provide added value asthe technicians of the future.

Editor’s Note: For more informa-tion on the cradle-to-grave as-sessments of Intelligence Centerfunctional training, please seeour July-September 1998 issueof the Military Intelligence Pro-fessional Bulletin, IntelligenceTraining XXI—Ready Now, andespecially the philosophy and pro-cess article by Colonel George K.Gramer, Jr. You can find it on theInternet at http://huachuca-usaic.a rmy.m i l /M IPB /m ipbhome/welcome.htm.

Achieving the Goal

So, our internal courses are tak-ing on an educational quality, andwe are threading other forms ofeducation into the careers of oursoldiers. We are transformingUSAIC in order to build an MI corpsthat can make its contribution to in-formation superiority anywhere inthe world, under any conditions. AllMI leaders must support this moveto increased education. Command-ers should encourage, even de-mand, professional education andself-directed study programs. Wewill all have to lead by example,challenging ourselves and eachother to rise to the intellectual andtechnological challenges of ourbusiness through study anddiscussion.✹Endnotes1. Jomini, Antoine Henri, The Art of War,Translation of Precis de l’Art de laGuerre (Novato, CA: Presidio Press,1992), 410 pages.

2. This “just in time” training may beavailable on-line, through softwaretutorials, or on-line through mentors.

Brigadier General (P) Richard J. Quirk,III, a native of Boston, Massachusetts,was commissioned into the U.S. Army’sMilitary Intelligence branch. Now theDeputy Commanding General, U.S.Army Intelligence Center and FortHuachuca, Arizona, BG Quirk hasserved in numerous tactical and strate-gic assignments. He has participated incampaigns in the Republic of Vietnam,Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM,and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACYin Haiti. He commanded the 511th MIBattalion, and the 525th MI Brigade, andserved as S2, G2, and J2 in Berlin Bri-gade, 24th Infantry Division, and U.S.Southern Command. Readers may con-tact BG Quirk via E-mail at [email protected] or telephonically at(520) 533-1141 or DSN 821-1141.

exp. date _______

DISCOVER

NEWRATES

Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-BDB, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000

14 7


by Colonel Gary L. ParrishIn order to achieve information superior-ity, the Army’s first modernization goal isto digitize the force.

—United States Army PostureStatement for Fiscal Year 2000

Achieving information superiorityunderpins the intelligence com-munity’s ability to share intelligenceinformation and enables U.S. forcesto undercut the enemy’s decisioncycle while protecting our own. Inkeeping with the guidance of theChief of Staff of the Army, GeneralEric K. Shinseki, the U. S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) Training Centers (notunits in the field) must drive trans-formation of the force. Since intelli-gence is the cornerstone ofinformation superiority, the U.S.Army Intelligence Center and FortHuachuca (USAIC&FH) must bethe institution that leads the Armyin this transformation process. Col-laborative and distributive intelli-gence collection, analysis, andpresentation—executed digitally todevelop an accurate common op-erational picture (COP) of thethreat—are critical for the successof the other digital battlefield oper-ating systems (BOSs).

Our emphasis in thistransformation pro-

cess is to change theconditions of the train-ing conducted by theIntelligence Center,

but not the standardsor tasks

To ensure our intelligence profes-sionals are prepared to meet thechallenges of the more complexenvironment of the future digitalbattlefield, we must begin to changethe training philosophy and environ-ment here at the Intelligence Cen-ter. To accomplish this, we need tobegin immediately to transform theinstitution into one that builds MIsoldiers and leaders who can per-form and manage in a networked,digital, system-of-systems opera-tional environment. Students gradu-ating from the Intelligence Center’scourses must be prepared to oper-ate in digital tactical operationscenters (TOCs) from battalion toechelons-above-corps (EAC) levelsand capable of adapting to the digi-tal tools and intelligence automationin their units.

Phased Transformation ofthe Intelligence Center

The intent of the USAIC&FHCommanding General (CG), MajorGeneral John D. Thomas, Jr., is torapidly phase in and integrate digitaltraining into our courses ofinstruction, and transform the Intelli-gence Center into an automated cen-ter of excellence. The essential tasksduring the initial phases of this trans-formation process are to—! Transform the Center’s instructor

base and teaching methodology.! Upgrade the institution and fa-

cilities into a digital training andlearning center capable of matricu-lating competent soldiers who arecomfortable operating in a digitized

MoMoMoMoMoving to a Digitizving to a Digitizving to a Digitizving to a Digitizving to a DigitizedededededCenter ofCenter ofCenter ofCenter ofCenter of Ex Ex Ex Ex Excellencecellencecellencecellencecellence

MG John D. Thomas, Jr., passes the 112th MI Brigade’s colors to theBrigade Commander, COL Gary L. Parrish, while the Brigade CSM,

Dee K. Barnett, prepares to receive them.

Photographs courtesy of Gregorio O. Figueroa.

(Continued on page 37)


! Develop and provide “sustain-ment” training packages for ourMI soldiers and leaders oncethey depart the IntelligenceCenter.

The Center’s transfor-mation includes an

immediate implemen-tation of a new train-ing methodology andinstructor develop-

ment program acrossthe institution

Our emphasis in this transforma-tion process is to change the con-ditions of the training conducted bythe Intelligence Center, but not thestandards or tasks. The immediategoal was to begin converting to digi-tal training, front-loaded in our cur-riculum, with the initial focus onchanging the conditions of our In-telligence Analyst courses (militaryoccupational specialty (MOS) 96B).To meet the CG’s intent, we initi-ated a four-phase operation in Julyof this year. The end-state of the In-telligence Center’s complete trans-formation is to have a digital centerof excellence operational no laterthan January 2003.

The first phase of the transforma-tion process (immediate action)started in July with changes in theway we taught some of the courses(conditions) within current resourceconstraints. The goal is to beginupdating the blocks of instruction sothat students will learn from the be-ginning of the course on the sameintelligence systems and toolsfound at the units in the field. Wher-ever possible, we will automate all

practical exercises (PEs) at theearliest opportunity, especially inour intelligence analyst and officercourses. The goal of this phase isimmediate change in the analyticalcourses’ training methodology andconditions in the following courses.

! Apprentice intelligence analyst96B10 course.

! Basic Noncommissioned Of-ficer Course (BNCOC) for96B30.

! All-Source Intelligence Techni-cian (MOS 350B) Warrant Of-ficer Course.

! MI Officer Basic Course(MIOBC).

! MI Captains Career Courses(MICCCs).

! Initial Brigade Combat Teams’(IBCT) Cadre and Cohort training.

The second, currently ongoingphase of the Center’s transfor-mation includes an immediateimplementation of a new trainingmethodology and instructor devel-opment program across the insti-tution. The goal of this effort is tobegin preparing and training digi-tally capable instructors and cadreimmediately, to include changingthe “mindset” of the instructorbase. To accomplish this task, the

Intelligence Center developednew training and certificationcourses before beginning trainingin the classroom.

The MI Corps established two15-day All-Source Analysis Sys-tem (ASAS) instructors’ certifica-tion courses and executed themto certify our instructors on theflagship system. Additionally, tobuild on the 15-day course, theOctober ASAS Master AnalystCourse (AMAC) allocated moreinstructors’ slots.

Beginning in September, the Ba-sic Instructor Training Course(BITC) will incorporate the use ofautomated “plug and play” class-rooms. The BITC will completelyrevamp by January 2001, traininginstructors to build lessons, data-bases, and web pages using theplug-and-play classrooms. The in-structor training and certificationcourses emphasize the digital re-sources fielded and training in thedigital environment, and use a sys-tems or network of systems ap-proach. The staff and faculty willlearn to build the databases andweb pages needed to support theirown blocks of instruction. The end-state of this phase is the transfor-mation of the staff and faculty into

Figure 1. Comparative Flows for 96B30 BNCOC.


STX

3 days

Current 96B30

RWS

3 days

US Army OPS

ASAS Overview

5 days

SASO

IPB

7 days

MDMP

CM &TGT

5 days

ResearchPaper &

briefs

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Common Core

17 days

Pilot (Jan 2001)

USASMA

Common Core

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(Integrated training with Info Engineering ,ACE/ACT Configuration, Communications

Architecture)

9 days

Intelligence Analyst Tasks on RWS

(Brigade, Division, and TOC exercise)

20 days

8 Weeks of Training

environment during combat or inmilitary operations short of war.

(Continued from page 33)


a cadre of digitally-capable, certi-fied instructors.

The subsequent phases of theplan will focus on completing thetransformation of the IntelligenceCenter into a fully digitized trainingcenter of excellence. Near termconversion of blocks of instructionwill be concurrent with the trainingdevelopment and implementation ofother digitized courses during theselatter phases. We will continue tochange our other intelligenceblocks of instruction, incorporatingthe digital classrooms and TOCsacross the entire curriculum. As weupgrade facilities, we will integratejoint systems into exercises andbuild a model joint intelligence sup-port element (JISE) configurationfor this purpose. By January 2002,we envision completion of thecourse redesign for all coursestaught by the Intelligence Center.Course Transformation

Intelligence Analyst (96B)Courses. The immediate and mostsignificant change in course designwill occur in the 96B30 BNCOCtaught by the Intelligence Center’sNCO Academy. The new 96B30course, which begins in January2001, will conduct nearly the entireprogram of instruction (POI) on theASAS Remote Workstation (RWS)Block II system. This completely re-designed course will include 29

days of actual hands-on trainingwith the RWS system, as comparedto the three days of RWS training inthe current 96B30 course (see Fig-ure 1).

The NCO will “learn by doing” witheach student encountering a seriesof dynamic, scenario-based trainingenvironments. The design of thescenarios will test the NCO’s abilityto analyze and solve different prob-lems using the military decision-making process (MDMP), intel-ligence preparation of the battlefield(IPB), the intelligence cycle, and theASAS mission cycle. From the start,NCOs will learn and use informa-tion-engineering techniques and willdoctrinally configure an ACE (analy-

sis and control element) and anACT (analysis and control team), toinclude the appropriate communica-tions architectures. The last weekof the course will test each NCO’sability to produce relevant andtimely intelligence products within adivision ACE, brigade ACT, or bat-talion S2 section using the RWSBlock II system.

Likewise, the 96B10 course is un-dergoing restructure to meet theneeds of preparing apprentice-levelanalysts capable of operating in adigital environment. Although ASASRWS instruction consists of twoweeks of instruction, almost all ofthe automated instruction currentlycomes at the end of the course. Byearly next year, the 96B10 coursewill include at least 15 days of ASAStraining in addition to full system in-tegration into the course’s practicalexercises. The goal is to incorpo-rate ASAS training throughout thecourse, beginning with unclassifiedsystems such as ASAS-Light andthen transitioning training to ASASRWS Block II later in the course.

Commissioned Officers Cour-ses. MIOBC and MICCC course de-velopers have already begun thetransformation process of digitizingtheir courses of instruction. Cur-rently, MIOBC trains three dayson the ASAS-RWS and integrates

FIgure 2. MI Officer Basic Course.

Figure 3. MI Captains Career Course (MICCC) Beginning February 2001.

Crisis PEw/RWS

Inprocessing

MOOTWw/ASAS-L

6 days4 days

Intel Support to Operationsw/ASAS-L

24 days

Outprocessing3 days

BASIXw/RWS

6 days

TAC1

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ACT PEw/RWS

5 days

RWS

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2 days

Basic Common Core12 days

Army Operations 6 days

Values1 day

MI CO FTX3 days

IBOSIntel Architecture

3 days

Threat11 days

Range

1 day

TPC + LAND NAV

4 days

Note: Eighteen weeks as of 1 January 2001. Includes 48 training days with RWS/ASAS-Light and 6 days familiarization with system employment and architecture.

Note: Core Competencies: analysis, systems, collection management, Armyoperations, leader skills.

Mission: Train MI CPTs to become proficient S2s, ACE Battle Captains,and Company Commanders in the digital environment.

Intelligence Supportto Division and Corps

Intelligence Support to Brigade Operations

FAST2

22 days 17 days29 days9 days

Leadership

5 days

Merged MOOTW and Bde O&Iblocks and digitized usingASAS-Light and AnalystNotebook for Class 01-02 (Feb01). Integrate into 120 hr PE

Reflowed ASAStraining to earlier in ISDC

Execution began withClass 00-6(25 September 00)

CommonCore

ASASCapstone

Intro toAnalystNote-book

Combined ISDC MDMP (40 hrs) portion and Capstone-CPX (40 hrs) into an 80 hr ASAS integrated CPX

5 days 9 days 29 days 22 days 17 days

3


the system into its six-day capstone,Brigade All-Source Intelligence Ex-ercise (BASIX). The MI Officer Ad-vanced Course (MIOAC) currentlyconducts 12 days of hands-on train-ing on ASAS-RWS, ASAS-SingleSource, and ASAS-All Source cul-minating in their employment on thecourse’s five-day ASAS CapstoneExercise. As a near-term “fix,”MIOBC classes will integrate ASAS-RWS Block II into the four-day Cri-sis-Action PE and the Brigade ACTPE. In the newly redesigned CareerCourse, the amount of practical ex-ercise time using ASAS will doublefrom that of the current course.

Since international officers attendboth the MIOBC and MICCC, thedevelopment and integration ofthe ASAS-Light system into bothblocks early next year will signifi-cantly increase the amount of auto-mation training for all our officerstudents. In January 2001, the re-vamped MIOBC will conduct 48days of systems training (RWS/ASAS-Light) in addition to anothersix days of training on system em-ployment and intelligence architec-

tures (see Figure 2). In February2001, the Career Course will inte-grate ASAS-Light and Analyst Note-book3 in approximately 29 days ofthe POI before transitioning to RWSBlock II for another 28 days duringthe latter phases of the course (seeFigure 3).Facilities Transformation

Key to changing the conditions inwhich we are to train the MI profes-sionals of the 21st century is thetransformation of the facilities inwhich the students will train. Focus-ing on 96B Intelligence Analysttraining as the “center of gravity” forthe near-term transformation ef-forts, Fort Huachuca’s Walker Hallwill be the first Intelligence Centerfacility to undergo a major reengi-neering effort. With a completiondate of 1 April 2001, we will trans-form Walker Hall into an RWS BlockII collateral training complex, witheight plug-and-play classrooms and20 modular, digitized “TOC” rooms.

The real centerpiece of our facili-ties upgrades will be the design andconstruction of these modular, digi-tal “TOC” cells. The digital “TOC”

cells and facilities will support Un-classified and Secret Collateral-level training and scenario-drivenexercises for all intelligence coursestaught at the Center. Initially, we willconstruct a brigade-size digital TOCfacility that represents “what rightlooks like” to train our instructorbase. As resources become avail-able, we will build additional modelTOCs to train our trainers and thenstudents in how to set up and orga-nize division and corps ACEs, to in-clude the integration of the variousmultidiscipline feeds that build aCOP. These feeds will include mul-tiple “INTs” such as signals, human,and imagery intelligence (SIGINT,HUMINT and IMINT, respectively).In the envisioned facilities, thesemodel TOCs will eventually incor-porate such capabilities as theForce XXI Battle Command Brigadeand Below (FBCB2), AdvancedField Artillery Tactical Data System(AFTADS), Common Ground Sta-tion (CGS), Unmanned Aerial Ve-hicle (UAV) Ground Control Station(GCS), and the Maneuver ControlSystem (MCS).

Under this same contract, the re-design of two large classrooms inNicholson Hall will facilitate the useof 105 training systems configuredwith an ASAS-Light package. Pri-marily designed to handle the stu-dent load of the MICCCs, thesefacilities will also provide an auto-mated, unclassified training envi-ronment for our Officer TransitionCourse (OTC) and the visitinginternational officers that we train.The modular configuration of thesesystems will allow the setup of thefacilities in TOC fashion and theirincorporation into a fully digitized In-telligence Support to Brigade Op-erations practical exercise duringthe MICCCs.

Rowe Hall remains one of theCenter’s most automated and digi-tized training environments and itscapabilities will expand during theinitial phases of the transformation.

Preparation for construction of new TOC cells in Walker Hall.


Over the next four months, we willupgrade two rooms to facilitatethe building of a modular and fullydigitized, model brigade TOC. Dur-ing the initial phases, we willreconfigure several classrooms topermit hardware and softwarechanges as we transition to train-ing the students on the RWS BlockII system.OrganizationalTransformation

In order to enhance the Intelli-gence Center’s mission capabilitiesto accomplish the digitized trainingmission, it was imperative that wereconfigure to optimize and econo-mize operations. Part of this reor-ganization was the activation of the112th Military Intelligence Brigade(Provisional) on 28 July 2000. Theactivation of the 112th consolidatedthe 304th MI Battalion, 306th MIBattalion, B Company (MIOBC) for-merly of the 309th MI Battalion, andthe Noncommissioned OfficerAcademy under one command.

This reorganization centralizestraining responsibilities and opti-mizes operating efficiency by plac-ing all MI officer, warrant officer, andsenior NCO courses under onecommander. In addition to focusingresponsibility for all leader trainingand MI unit training support, the re-organization also consolidates thetrainers for these courses with thedoctrine writers and combat devel-opers. The objective of this reorga-nization is to allow the commanderto leverage and synchronize re-sources between the variouscourses and incorporate participa-tion from all senior-level courses onexternally sponsored training exer-cises with joint and Army headquar-ters.

The activation of the 112th MI Bri-gade (Provisional) reduces the re-dundancy of resources and followsthe TRADOC model by consolidat-ing leader training under one orga-nization. The new, streamlinedstructure will allow us to train

smarter, and will posture the U.S.Army’s Intelligence Center to meetour future training challenges.The Future

This article highlights only someof the immediate and near-termchanges we are making in the In-telligence Center as we begin totransform this institution into a digi-tized training center of excellence.The time to transform the Intelli-gence Center is now. To develop MIprofessionals that can contribute tothe full spectrum of operations in the21st century, we must modernize,convert, and transform the traininginstitution immediately. We have along way to go before this transfor-mation process nears completion,but we feel confident that our insti-tution is moving in the right direc-tion. Remaining on a glide path toachieve the Intelligence Center’sstrategic goals for the 2010-2015timeframe will require close man-agement of this transformation pro-cess.

As the Army continues evolving tothe digitized force of 2010, MI mustbe out front of the transformationprocess. Change must begin firstat the Intelligence Center if we areto continue to develop the intelli-gence soldiers and leaders who arecapable of operating in the con-stantly changing strategic environ-ments of the 21st century. We mustbuild an MI force that is morecapable and relevant to the Army,whether in stability and supportoperations or a major theater war(MTW). Implementing the Intelli-gence Center’s transformationstrategy now will have far-reachingimplications on the way our branchorganizes, resources, equips,trains, and supports the force as itconfronts future conflicts acrossthe continuum of warfare. Thechal lenges of the future aredaunting, but we must begin to-day if we are to meet these chal-lenges head-on. We have muchto accomplish in the next few

years, but our approach is soundand the way is clear. ✸

Colonel Gary Parrish is currently Com-mander of the 112th MI Brigade (Provi-sional). In July 2001, he will take com-mand of the 205th MI Brigade inWiesbaden, Germany. He has servedin a variety of intelligence command andstaff positions during the past 22 years.In addition to commanding two MI com-panies, he commanded the 14th MI Bat-talion (Tactical Exploitation Battalion(TEB)) at Fort Lewis, Washington. Hisstaff assignments included serving asan Infantry Battalion S2, Armor BrigadeS2, 2d Armored Division; G2, 3d Infan-try Division (Mechanized); and DeputyI Corps G2. During Operations DESERTSHIELD and DESERT STORM, COLParrish served as the Battalion S3 forthe 511th MI Battalion (TEB), VII Corps.While the J2 Planner at U.S. CentralCommand, he deployed twice in sup-port of military operations in Somalia,serving as a Joint Task Force J2 andlater as the JISE Commander duringOperations PROVIDE RELIEF andRESTORE HOPE. He received hisBachelor of Business Administrationdegree from the University of NorthFlorida and commission in the Infantryin March 1978. COL Parrish also holdsa Master of Arts degree in Managementfrom Webster University and a Masterof Strategic Studies from the Air WarCollege. He is a graduate of the ArmyCommand and General Staff College,Armed Forces Staff College, and Air WarCollege. Readers can contact him viaE-mail at [email protected] orby telephone at (520) 533-2928 or DSN821-2928.

Endnotes1. The TAC (Teach, Advise, Counsel)block of instruction (Figure 2) sets asidetime for the class TAC officer to impartknowledge, experience, and Army valuesto the lieutenants.2. FAST (Figure 3) stands for Fundamen-tals of Analysis, Synthesis, and Threat.3. The Analyst Notebook is a new linkand pattern analysis tool.


by Major Patrick L. DanielShortly after the Chief of Staff of theArmy, General Eric K. Shinseki,made his historic speech to the As-sociation of the U.S. Army (AUSA)convention in October 1999, indi-viduals at the U.S. Army Intel-ligence Center and Fort Huachuca(USAIC&FH) began to wrestle withthe task of training the MI soldiersassigned to the first Initial BrigadeCombat Team (IBCT-1). LieutenantColonel Gus Greene led the intelli-gence organization and operationdocument development effort forthe Directorate of Combat Devel-opments (DCD). The trainerspicked up the concepts, hot off thepress, and developed a plan to trainthe more than 200 MI soldiers ofthe IBCT.Training Development

In February, we brought in a groupof intelligence professionals fromthe field to assist in the develop-ment of IBCT training. The teamleader was Major Jack Myers,the incoming Brigade S2 of the3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division(IBCT-1). The team consisted ofhuman intelligence (HUMINT), sig-nals intelligence (SIGINT), mea-surement and signature intelligence(MASINT), unmanned aerial ve-hicle (UAV), and all-source sec-tions. After several weeks oflearning the organization and op-eration (O&O) concept as they de-veloped the plan to train it, theindividuals that comprised the teamwent their separate ways. The onlytraining developers who stayedwere the few individuals assignedto USAIC&FH. The initial plan thatwas left in their wake was a 15-week plan consisting of six weeksof cadre training for E-6s and abovefollowed by nine weeks of cohorttraining for E-1s and above (seeFigures 1 and 2). The concept wasto train the cadre first and then usethe cadre to train their soldiers dur-ing the initial cohort training. At the

conclusion of the initial cohort train-ing, the cadre and cohorts wouldparticipate in a capstone commandpost exercise (CPX) training event(Kazar Fury) and field training ex-ercise (FTX) (Buffalo Soldier Chal-lenge).Personnel

Beginning in early January 2000,the Office of the Chief of MI (OCMI)began working with the U.S. To-tal Army Personnel Command(PERSCOM) to identify the person-nel for the IBCT and prepare themfor travel to Fort Huachuca, Arizona.The orders came with various re-porting dates, generally 1 May forcadre and 12 June for cohort sol-diers. Approximately 80 percent ofthe soldiers came from all pointsaround the globe and 20 percent ofthe soldiers were local fromUSAIC&FH. Most of the soldierscoming from units outside FortHuachuca were on temporary duty-(TDY) and-return orders with follow-on permanent changes of station(PCSs) reporting to Fort Lewis,Washington. At the start of cadretraining, we had 45 percent of thecadre physically present for train-ing and by the end of their training(4 weeks later), we had 80 percentof them in attendance. The story forcohort soldiers was much the same.

We eventually had better than 50percent of the future IBCT-1 MI sol-diers training together at FortHuachuca.

From all the personnel issues, twomajor personnel challenges sur-faced. First, only one of the 45scheduled S2 personnel actuallyparticipated in the training. Second,the soldiers arrived at various timesover the course of the training andit was very difficult to receive andinprocess new personnel whiletraining their counterparts.Training Resourcesand Equipment

Training a unit that does not yetofficially exist with equipment notyet fielded can certainly be chal-lenging. The TRADOC (U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command)Systems Managers (TSMs), theProject Managers (PMs), and DCDNew Systems Training Office(NSTO) delivered most of the equip-ment to Fort Huachuca for training.We had to use AN/PRD-13s as sur-rogates for the Prophet Ground sys-tem and Hunter UAVs as theTactical UAVs (TUAVs, Shadow200) surrogates. We also used“white box” surrogates for the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS)Remote Workstation (RWS). The In-terim Armored Vehicle (IAV) surro-

TTTTTrrrrransition ansition ansition ansition ansition TTTTTrrrrraining—aining—aining—aining—aining—IBCTIBCTIBCTIBCTIBCT-1 Cadr-1 Cadr-1 Cadr-1 Cadr-1 Cadre and Cohore and Cohore and Cohore and Cohore and Cohorttttt Ph

otograph courtesy of the author.


gate vehicle was the M998 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled ve-hicle (HMMWV), which we usedprimarily for the Ground Sensor Pla-toon of the Surveillance Troop in theRSTA (reconnaissance, surveil-lance, and target acquisition)Squadron.

For the Capstone CPX, we useda “plug and play” classroom in asensitive compartmented informa-tion facility (SCIF) where we fedTactical Simulation (TACSIM) mes-sage traffic into a “white box” RWSarchitecture. This allowed us to con-duct a sensitive compartmented in-formation- (SCI) level exerciseusing “real world” message traffic(slightly modified) imported from

various INTELINK sites. In addition,we fed numerous scripted HUMINTreports to the S2X through organicteams, and adjacent and higherHUMINT organizations. Finally, webuilt an extensive database thatserved as a “reach back” libraryof information and intelligence.Through RWS and the Counterin-telligence/HUMINT Analysis ToolSet (CHATS), we created a collabo-rative and distributed analysis ar-chitecture. The analysts couldcollaborate with each other as wellas with the higher and adjacent or-ganizations replicated by a “whitecell.”

We used the “plug and play”classroom again for the FTX

capstone exercise. The “white box”RWS architecture served as thebase architecture for both the ISRAnalysis and ISR Integration Pla-toons. The HUMINT Platoon de-ployed its teams in the local areaunder the direction of the S2X. Theyused the CHATS for data accessand report writing, and communi-cated with the S2X through theSingle-Channel Ground and Air-borne Radio System (SINCGARS).The RSTA Surveillance Troop de-ployed in the local training area insupport of the ISR integrationplatoon’s brigade ISR plan.

The concept of usingthe cadre to train the

cohort soldiersworked well. [Other-wise,] our trainingwould have failed

The collectors reported back tothe surveillance troop CP usingSINCGARS and the CP usedSINCGARS to report to the MI com-pany and brigade Tactical Opera-tions Center (TOC). We had aTROJAN Special-Purpose Inte-grated Remote Intelligence Termi-nal II or TS II (TROJAN SPIRIT II)with the surveillance troop andTROJAN Lite with the MI companyand brigade TOC. The SINCGARSnetwork served as the backup com-munications architecture. However,the TROJAN Lite was down formaintenance and we never estab-lished the TROJAN link.

We did deploy three AN/PRD-13s,one AN/PPS-5D Ground Surveil-lance Radar, the Remotely Moni-tored Battlefield Sensor System II(REMBASS II), and the TUAV sur-rogate for the FTX. All of these sys-tems were fully operational andperformed well over the course ofthe six-day FTX. The weather co-Figure 2. Cohort Training Plan (IBCT-1).

SELECTEDPEOPLE

HUMINTPLT (>E5)

10 - 16 JulyWeek #4

19 - 25 JuneWeek #1

3 - 9 JulyWeek #3

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Week #617 - 23 July 31 July - 6 August

Week #76 - 11 August

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Figure 1. Cadre Training Plan (IBCT-1). 2

S2XTEAM

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operated and we actually flew eightof ten planned UAV missions.Training Report Card

The concept of using the cadre totrain the cohort soldiers workedwell. In fact, had we not used thecadre as trainers, our training wouldhave failed because we simply didnot have enough dedicated IBCTtrainers to conduct the cohort train-ing. We also had significant extrahelp from outside the 304th MI Bat-talion. Individuals from across theinstallation and the Department ofDefense came in at various timesto lead or participate in trainingevents. We used people from theTSMs, Battle Command BattleLab–Huachuca, 111th MI Brigade,DCD, Directorate of InformationManagement (DOIM), Public AffairsOffice (PAO), and various HUMINTorganizations. We could not havesuccessfully executed the trainingwithout their help.

The O&O and architecture-devel-opment training went very well. Thecadre soldiers were already veryfamiliar with the O&O and architec-ture when the TRADOC BrigadeCoordination Cell (BCC) executedthe Tactical Leaders Course (TLC) inJune. The TLC trainers were very im-

pressed with the level of knowledgeresident among our TLC students.

The systems training also wentrelatively well. The New EquipmentTraining Team (NETT), Battle Com-mand Battle Lab–Huachuca, andTSM personnel conducted most ofthe systems training. The primaryshortfall in this area was due to thedistractions of conflicting training.We had to cut some of the plannedsystems training in order to conductother instruction, and the soldiersparticipating in the capstone exer-cise suffered for it.

The HUMINT training was gener-ally very good. Our major problemin this area resulted from a lack oftrained role-players to support theexercises. We used student casualsto play roles for our HUMINT train-ing, and the IBCT soldiers’ trainingreflected that shortfall. There was adramatic inconsistency among therole-players and the training conse-quently suffered. The S2X trainingwas very good. We augmented thereports from the organic HUMINTteams with reports from adjacentunits and other agencies operatingin the area; we even had actual na-tional agency personnel to write thescripts and play the roles.

The capstone CPX, Kazar Fury,was an outstanding exercise. Thesmall-scale contingency (SSC) sce-nario was very well developed andextremely realistic. The developers,primarily Colonel Jerry Jones (U.S.Army, Retired) and Lieutenant Colo-nel Niel Garra, built a tremendousdatabase of “real world” informationand intelligence. The only problemwith this training event was that theexercise was too advanced for theparticipating students. Because ofthe decision to cut some of the sys-tems training (primarily RWS), thestudents did not receive sufficientsystems training initially. Conse-quently, the students had a slowstart in the exercise. Additionally,the students struggled with apply-ing the intelligence preparation ofthe battlefield (IPB) process in theSSC environment. Consequently,their intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR) plans andoperations suffered because thestudents based them on weak IPB.However, the students made in-credible progress throughout theexercise.

The Buffalo Soldier Challenge FTXwas a slower-paced exercise for theanalysts, but it was very challengingfor the collectors.The slower paceallowed the ISR analysis platoon andISR integration platoon to work outthe many TTP (tactics, techniques,and procedures) they developed inthe preceding CPX. The pace wasnot at all slow for the collectors, how-ever. The HUMINT teams, groundsensor teams, and UAV operatorsgot a good workout pursuing thecompetent and wily opposing forces(OPFOR). The low-signature stabil-ity operations and support operationsthreat proved very challenging for thesurveillance troop’s collectors.Lessons Learned

Overall, the training of the IBCT-1personnel went quite well and taughtus much. Some specifics we willkeep in mind as we develop the train-ing for the IBCT-2 MI soldiers include–

M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S

S2XTEAM

HUMINTPLT

S2 S2 TRAINING


SELECTED HUMINT PERSONNEL


Training

GCS (UAV)

MICO

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! Maintain continuity among thetraining developers and train-ers.

! Personnel must arrive at FortHuachuca before the start oftraining.

! S2 personnel must be involvedin cadre training and thecapstone exercise.

! IPB and ISR in military opera-tions other than war must betaught first.

! We must fence systems train-ing and prevent distracters at allcosts.

! We need trained, skilled role-players to conduct qualityHUMINT training.

IBCT-2 Cadre/CohortTraining

We do not yet have a requireddelivery date (RDD) for the FortHuachuca phase of IBCT-2 training.We estimate that it will be in mid-September, and therefore our cadretraining will begin in mid-April 2001.Until then, we are addressing thelessons learned in our plan forIBCT-2 as personnel and budgetconstraints will allow. We have al-ready hired five contract trainersand training developers, three ofwhom worked on some or all of thetraining for IBCT-1. We are workingwith the Fort Lewis I Corps G2,TRADOC BCC, and the leadership

of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Di-vision (Light), to ensure that the S2sparticipate in the critical training(see Figures 3 and 4). We addedone week of IPB and ISR trainingin stability and support operationsearly in the training. We also movedthe Senior Leader Course to theend of the cohort training to elimi-nate the distraction during systemstraining. We are attempting to hire18 role-players to support theHUMINT training. Presently, we areuncertain that our budget will ac-commodate the $150,000 price tag.Finally, we are working with theOffice of the Chief of Military Intelli-gence (OCMI) to identify the per-sonnel requirements and work withthe U.S. Total Army Personnel Com-mand (PERSCOM) to ensure IBCTsoldiers are present for the start ofcadre training.

We are working hard to improve thetraining for IBCT-2. As with IBCT-1, weneed help from the MI community sincethere is no way that the 112th MI Bri-gade (Provisional) or USAIC&FH canexecute this training alone. From theMI commander in the field facilitatingthe timely departure of a soldier des-tined for IBCT training to the TSMs andPMs providing the equipment, all arevitally important to the execution of thistraining. To train the intelligence soldierswho will serve in an IBCT, it takes anMI village.✹

Endnote1. The title photograph shows the ISRIntegration Platoon’s TROJAN SPIRITteam with contractor support.

2. See the glossary on page 64 for expan-sion of the acronyms used in thesefigures.

Major Pat Daniel is the Brigade S3 ofthe 112th MI Brigade (Provisional) atFort Huachuca. He was the SeniorTrainer for the IBCT Cadre/Cohort Train-ing conducted at Fort Huachuca fromMay through August 2000. MAJ Danielis a graduate of the MI Officer AdvancedCourse and Combined Arms and Ser-vices Staff School (CAS3). His assign-ments included Tank Platoon Leader,Company Executive Officer, BattalionS4, Brigade S2, Company Commander,Intelligence Observer/Controller atthe Joint Readiness Training Center(JRTC), and Tactical IntelligenceInstructor/Trainer. He earned a twoBachelor degrees in Speech Com-munications and Psychology from theUniversity of Arkansas, Little Rock.Readers can contact MAJ Daniel via E-mail at [email protected] orby telephone at (520) 533-4595 or DSN821-4595.

Figure 4. Cohort Training Plan (IBCT-2).

SELECTED

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Fort Huachuca’s garrison head-quarters, Rodney Hall, on a

snowy day.

Photograph courtesy of Gregorio O. Figueroa.


by Colonel Jerry W. Jones(U.S. Army, Retired)

By “intelligence” we mean every sortof information about the enemy andhis country—the basis, in short, of ourown plans and operations. If weconsider the actual basis for thisinformation, however unreliable andtransient it is, we soon realize thatwar is a flimsy structure that caneasily collapse and bury us in itsruins....What one can reasonably askof an [intelligence] officer is that heshould possess a standard ofjudgment, which he can gain onlyfrom knowledge of men and affairsand common sense. He should beguided by the laws of probability.These are difficult enough to applywhen plans are drafted in an office,far from the sphere of action; the taskbecomes infinitely harder in the thickof fighting itself, with reports stream-ing in. At such times one is lucky iftheir contradictions cancel each otherout, and leave a kind of balance to becritically assessed....The commandermust trust his judgment and stand likea rock on which the waves break invain. It is not an easy thing to do.

—Carl von Clausewitz, On War1

The U.S. Army Intelligence Centerand Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH)designed the scenario for the KazarFury exercise to ensure intelligencepersonnel of the first Initial BrigadeCombat Team (IBCT-1) could cre-ate the situational awareness re-quired for maneuver plans andoperations. Clausewitz’s impliedtask, in which the intelligenceofficer strongly influences thedecisions of a maneuver com-mander, was the cornerstone of theexercise. Creating a scenario tochallenge intelligence personneltraining for a small-scale contin-gency (SSC) is never easy. Inthis article, the scenario masteroffers an approach for use in aConstructivist training environment.The trainers thrust the IBCT per-sonnel into an advanced scenariobased on the Constructivist teach-ing philosophy—learning by doing.

The setting for the scenario wasthe fictitious country of Kazar, a“former” province in the FederalRepublic of Slavia somewhere inEastern Europe (see Figure 1). Forcenturies, ethnic diversity createdthe conditions for competition andconflict. With the dramatic changesin the early 1990s, economic com-petition and versions of democracyfueled ethnic policies that causedcivil war. A few leaders from twoethnic lineages chose force of armsto achieve political and economicgoals. Centuries-old ethnic lawstook precedence over legislatedlaws. Western nations chose to in-tervene and stop the atrocitiesbased on requests from one weakerethnic group and with the approvalof the United Nations (U.N.).

Developing The ScenarioA team of contractors, augmented

with officers on casual status, ex-pended approximately 20 work-weeks creating the database andscripted “injects” to drive scenarioactivities. Separate, but equally im-portant, was the creation of data-

bases and files in the simulations tofit the scenario. Two contract com-panies expended approximately 20additional work-weeks setting theJoint Conflict and Tactical Simulation(JCATS) system and the TacticalSimulation (TACSIM) system for theKazar Fury exercise.

The Intelligence Center’s trainingobjectives guided the scripting pro-cess. The capstone objective wasto design an exercise that set thedesired conditions for intelligence todrive maneuver decisions.

Early in the scripting process, wedecided to “morph” real-world intelli-gence products into our fictional sce-nario. While this decision reducedsome of the workload, it moved theexercise into a real-world classifiedenvironment. Except for imageryproducts, we created all intelligencedisciplines and media reports to pro-vide the data and information fromwhich the Intelligence, Surveillance,and Reconnaissance (ISR) AnalysisPlatoon and ISR Integration Platoondeveloped intelligence to drive thebrigade commander’s decisions.

The KThe KThe KThe KThe Kazar Fazar Fazar Fazar Fazar Fururururury Exercise for Ty Exercise for Ty Exercise for Ty Exercise for Ty Exercise for Trrrrrainingainingainingainingainingthe Initial Brigthe Initial Brigthe Initial Brigthe Initial Brigthe Initial Brigade Combaade Combaade Combaade Combaade Combat Tt Tt Tt Tt Teamseamseamseamseams

Figure 1. Locations of CJTF Kazar’s Major Units.2


The friendly force setting includeda combined joint task force (CJTF)comprising six ground maneuverelements (three U.S. brigades, oneU.S. cavalry squadron, and twoNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) brigades). A U.S. ArmyForces (ARFOR) Command con-trolled the U.S. ground maneuverelements. The ARFOR commanderwas dual-hatted as the CJTF com-mander. The “White Cell” replicatedU.S. theater and national elements,U.N. and NATO elements, adjacentunits, the CJTF headquarters, andthe ARFOR.

In addition to the order of battleon conventional forces, the script-ing team created the “Gordian” and“Skandian” paramilitary forces, or-ganized criminal gangs, and devel-oped municipality overviews. Sincethe IBCT intelligence architecture istactical human intelligence- (TACHUMINT) heavy and the simula-tions do not provide HUMINT andcounterintelligence (CI) reporting,the scripters created a source-knowledge database. This data-base was used to create reportingfrom TAC HUMINT teams, alliedHUMINT teams, theater assets, andnational agency resources in the

area of intelligence responsibility(AOIR).

We created a Secure Internet Pro-tocol Router Network (SIPRNET)website for Kazar Fury to replicatethe ARFOR, theater, and nationalsites that the ISR analysis and in-tegration platoons could access.Additionally, controllers encouragedthe ISR analysis and integrationplatoons to search real-world data-bases for static information, such asterrain data. With contractor assis-tance, the scripters crafted morethan one hundred SALUTE (size,activity, location, unit, time, andequipment) reports that were trans-mitted to All-Source Analysis Sys-tem (ASAS) Remote Workstations(RWSs) using the DistributionSimulation Environment (DSE).

Phases of the ExerciseThe scenario contained several

distinct phases (see Figure 2). Theyincluded—❏ A preparation phase set at Fort

Lewis, Washington, when theArmy alerts the IBCT for de-ployment. The preparationphase lasted approximatelythree duty days and coveredthe game period D-14 to D-4.

❏ A deployment phase replicatedmovement from Fort Lewis tothe intermediate staging base(ISB) and into the IBCT’s areaof operations (AO). It lastedapproximately two days andcovered D-3 to D+13.

❏ Dynamic game play initiatedusing the DSE and JCATS todrive TACSIM at the beginningof the Stability OperationsPhase. This phase lasted sevendays and covered D+14 toD+20.

The brigade S2 section, based onrecommendations from the ISR in-tegration platoon, arrayed their col-lection resources in the AOIR. Thebrigade executed collection basedon priority intelligence requirements(PIR), collection emphasis mes-sages, and daily taskings. The bri-gade Hunter unmanned aerialvehicle (UAV)—acting as a surro-gate for the Shadow 200 TacticalUAV—flew from the scenario’s air-port. The ground sensor platoon de-ployed as three separate teams, theProphet Ground system, the GSRs(ground surveillance radars), andREMBASS II (Remotely MonitoredBattlefield Sensor System II). TheS2X divided the TAC HUMINT Pla-toon into three elements. The 1stand 3d Battalion Task Forces eachreceived an operational manage-ment team (OMT) with two TACHUMINT teams in direct support(DS). The remaining TAC HUMINTteams all collocated with the bri-gade; three were in general supportwhile one was designated “GS re-inforcing.”

During the preparation phase, in-formation went to the brigade S2and the ISR integration and ISRanalysis platoons via the Kazar Furywebsite. As the exercise movedfrom Fort Lewis through the ISB intoKazar, the brigade S2, ISR integra-tion platoon, and the ISR analysisplatoon received information fromthe Kazar Fury website and theHUMINT and CI scripting cell, which

Phase I (Predeployment: D-14 to D-4)3d BCT, 2ID conducts planning and preparation for movement to Kazar. (This phase isexecuted without the simulation.)Phase II (Early Entry Operations) D-3 to D+133d BCT, 2ID lands at three airfields, moves north, and secures the Kacanik Corridor inorder to establish presence and facilitate passage of follow-on forces. Uponcompleting handoff of Kacanik Corridor control to 1st Bde, 1st ID, the 3d BCT mainbody moves north to secure lines of communication for 2d Bde, 1st ID, and 1/4 CAV,1st ID, movement to their areas of operation. Upon completion of movement by 2dBde and 1/4 CAV, 3d BCT occupies designated area of operations. (This phase isexecuted without the simulation.)Phase III (Stability Operations) D+13 to TBD3d BCT, 2ID, conducts operations to create a safe and secure environment, whichenables economic and political institutions to establish a democratic infrastructure. 3dBCT conducts operations to detect, identify, and neutralize the Skandian and Gordianparamilitary organizations, and transnational elements with objectives contradictory toU.N. objectives, deter conventional threats, and, if necessary, defeat a conventionalattack.Phase IV (Transfer of Authority to Coalition Peacekeeping Forces) – TBDPhase V (Redeployment) – TBD

Figure 2. Concept of Maneuver for the 3d BCT, 2d InfantryDivision (IBCT-1).


included reports from the TACHUMINT platoon. Upon initiation ofthe simulation (D+14), informationwent to the brigade S2 and the ISRintegration and ISR analysis pla-toons from TACSIM driven byJCATS, DSE, the Kazar Furywebsite, and reports from theHUMINT and CI scripters. JCATStransmitted IBCT Blue situation re-ports and “Blue” SALUTE reports.DSE transmitted pre-scripted SA-LUTE reports. TACSIM created andtransmitted reports from all the“technical” sensors in the battle-space, e.g., Prophet, UAVs, Ad-vanced QUICKFIX, and TRQ-32TEAMMATE.

We provided theater and nationalsignals intelligence (SIGINT) prod-ucts to the students via the KazarFury website. The HUMINT and CIscripters included soldiers from theTAC HUMINT platoon. Based onthe PIR, specific order or request(SOR), and other guidance from theS2X, the TAC HUMINT platoon rep-licated meetings with human con-tacts. The TAC HUMINT platoontransmitted reports to the S2X viathe SIPRNET using the CI/HUMINTAutomation Tool Set (CHATS). Al-lied, theater, and national HUMINTand CI elements in the AOIR pro-vided reports to the S2X, either inhard copy or via the SIPRNET. Ad-ditionally, the White Cell provideda daily intell igence summary(INTSUM) beginning at D+14, andscripted responses to IBCT re-quests for information (RFI).

Next Time3

Based on the lessons learned andparticipant feedback, the design ofthe Capstone Exercise for the sec-ond IBCT (IBCT-2) will help the ex-ercise certify that the surveillancetroop, MI company, and TACHUMINT soldiers “embedded” inthe RSTA squadron are crucialcomponents in IBCT-2.4 The objec-tive of the IBCT Capstone Exerciseis to conduct limited mission re-

hearsal and to refine tactics, tech-niques, and procedures (TTP) andtraining in the brigade combat teams(BCTs) for MI battlefield operatingsystem (BOS) collective tasks andcompetencies in a near-realistic en-vironment. The ultimate goal is toassure that the Intelligence BOSreally influences leaders to makethe correct decisions related tobattle planning and battle execution.

The training objectives for theIBCT-2 Capstone Exercise are—❏ S2s assure that intelligence af-

fects battle planning, decision-making, and battle execution.

❏ Brigade rehearses missionplanning and feedback betweenS2s, the MI company, and theRSTA squadron’s SurveillanceTroop.

❏ ISR integration platoon re-hearses the planning, technicalcontrol, and steerage for all col-lection assets in the AOIR.

❏ Surveillance troop plans, ex-ecutes, and reports the resultsof collection missions.

❏ Surveillance troop rehearsesTTP for interaction between theRSTA S2 and the MI company.

❏ RSTA squadron HUMINT sol-diers, HUMINT teams, andOMTs plan, execute, and reportthe results of collection missions.

❏ OMTs rehearse the TTP for in-teraction with the S2X.

❏ ISR analysis platoon developsits ability to influence decisions.

Additional goals for the IBCT-2 ex-ercise include—❏ Identify TTP issues related to

the development of intelligenceproducts.

❏ Rehearse integration of single-source analysis into all-sourceproducts.

❏ Develop the briefing skills ofleaders and junior soldiers.

❏ Identify TTP issues for the dy-namic retasking of collectionassets.

❏ Identify TTP issues related tosplit-based operations and in-telligence support while theBCT is in transit.

❏ Identify TTP issues related tomovement of the IntelligenceBOS assets from the home sta-tion to the area of responsibility(AOR).

Based on IBCT-1 lessons learnedduring the Kazar Fury and BuffaloSoldier Challenge5 exercises, Fig-ure 3 is a recommended schedulefor IBCT-2’s Capstone Exercise.This figure shows the combinationof the Kazar Fury and Buffalo Sol-dier Challenge exercises into one

Figure 3. Recommended Schedule for the IBCT-2 Capstone Exercise.

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3AAR

Phase 4 Phase 5

M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F

Alert and MDMPat Fort Lewis (D-14

to D-4).

Deployment from FortLewis through the ISB

into the BCT’s AOR(D-3 to D+13).

Stability operations inAOR (D+14 to D+20).

Preparation forSLC and round-

robin session.

Decisionvignettesfor SLC(D+21 &D+22).

Bde S2, RSTA S2,Bn S2s,

Surveillance Troop,and MI Co in RoweHall, Fort Huachuca.

MI Co andSurveillance Troop

conduct FTX. Bde S2,RSTA S2, and Bn S2s

conduct CPX.

Bde S2, RSTA S2, Bn S2sMI Co and leaders fromthe Surveil lance Troop

conduct CPX.

AAR

MI Co and RSTASquadron prepareAnd execute static

displays andbriefings.

Digitizedvignettes

for seniorleaders.

10-hour game days 24-hour game days 12-hour game days 8-hour game days 8-hourgamedays

Note: This figure combines Kazar Fury and Buffalo Soldier Challenge into one Capstone Exercise usingthe same scenario used for IBCT-1 training.


capstone exercise using the samescenario. The philosophy is to buildup to this exercise throughout cadreand cohort training. An essential as-pect is the development of three orfour viable scenarios used duringboth cadre and cohort training.Throughout the cycle, soldiers andleaders learn about the area, likelyadversaries, and potential coursesof action for each scenario. Partici-pants begin the capstone exercisewith knowledge of a building crisisin a specific region. Information pro-vided on Game Days 1 and 2(Phase 1) will focus the BCT intelli-gence architecture on specificevents, and provide additional back-ground information. The MI BOSmoves through a military decision-making process (MDMP) on GameDays 3 through 5 (Phase 1). We willexecute Phase 1 predominantly inRowe Hall at Fort Huachuca.

Beginning on Day 6 (Phase 2), thesurveillance troop and a major por-tion of the MI company executean FTX to replicate ground move-ment from the ISB into the IBCT’sAOR. Except for the UAV, elementswill physically move and remainovernight in field conditions, e.g.,driving around the Huachuca Moun-tains. During this movement, the MIBOS will provide intelligence to theBCT and battalion commanders re-garding movement and the situationin the AOR. (An aggressor force,HUMINT contacts, SIGINT targets,and UAV targets are required.) Thebrigade S2, RSTA squadron S2,

battalion S2, and a portion of the MIcompany remain at Rowe Hall dur-ing Phase 2. JCATS, TACSIM, andDSE can support Phase 2. OnGame Day 12, the exercise beginsstability operations in the AOR. Wewill initiate dynamic game play us-ing the DSE, with the JCATS driv-ing TACSIM. This phase will lastseven days and cover the periodfrom D+14 to D+20.

On Game Day 19, we will conductan after-action review (AAR) thatcovers the previous two weeks andsets the conditions for success inthe Senior Leaders Course. Phase4 prepares the Intelligence BOS forexecution of the digitized vignettesused in Phase 5 for the IBCT se-nior leader training.Conclusion

Two appropriate Army sayingscome to mind that are applicable toKazar Fury: “The first report is neverright” and “No plan survives first con-tact.” We are looking beyond the firstreports to determine what we mustdo to improve the exercise. The planswe created in April and May 2000 didnot survive “first contact” in July andAugust. However, we are now mov-ing forward to create a future itera-tion that will challenge the IntelligenceBOS to influence battle planning andbattle execution.✹Endnotes1. Clausewitz, Carl von, On War,translated by Michael Howard andPeter Paret (Prin-ceton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1989), Chapter Six,Book One.

Colonel Jerry Jones retired from theArmy on 30 May 2000. He began hiscareer as an Armor officer with the 1stArmored Division (1 AD) at Fort Hood,Texas. After Vietnam, he participatedin three REFORGERs with the “BigRed One,” and served with the 32dU.S. Army Air Defense Command(AADCOM), 1 AD, in Germany; specialmission units in the U.S. Army Intel-l igence and Securi ty Command(INSCOM); U.S. Central Command(CENTCOM) J5 in Operations DESERTSHIELD/STORM; and the Allied MI Bat-talion in Bosnia. COL Jones finished hisArmy career at Fort Huachuca as theCommander, INSCOM Training andDoctrine Support (ITRADS) Detach-ment. He was a 35F (HUMINT Officer)with significant 35E (CounterintelligenceOfficer) experience. He was also a strat-egist (suffix designation 6Z) and heserved at echelons from tactical to na-tional. He currently serves as a contrac-tor with the USAIC&FH. Readers cancontact COL Jones via E-mail atjerry.jones@hua. army.mil and tele-phonically at (520) 533-6237 and DSN821-6237.

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Military Intelligence Corps accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame (HOF).Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, and civilians who have served in a U.S. Armyintelligence unit or in an intelligence position with the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination. A nomineemust have made a significant contribution to MI that reflects favorably on the MI Corps.

The MI Corps provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contactU.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CDR (Mr. Chambers), Fort Huachuca, AZ85613-6000. You may also call commercial (520) 533-1178 or DSN 821-1178, or you may contact Mr. JimChambers via E-mail at [email protected].

2. See the glossary on page 64 for expan-sion of the acronyms used in the figures.3. Lessons Learned from the IntelligenceBOS cadre and cohort training for IBCT-1are under review. There are no finaldecisions regarding cadre and cohorttraining for IBCT-2. This section offers theauthor’s view of the training IBCT-2 couldexecute next time.4. The Kazar Fury AAR is at http://www.intel.army.mil/kazarfury/.5. Buffalo Soldier Challenge was an FTXexecuted by the MI company and theRSTA squadron’s surveillance troopimmediately following Kazar Fury. Theleaders suggested that Buffalo SoldierChallenge precede Kazar Fury next time.


by Captain E. Lee Goodman, Jr.The Doctrine Division at the U.S.Army Intelligence Center and FortHuachuca (USAIC&FH) is currentlycoordinating with Fort Lewis, Wash-ington, to develop draft doctrine forthe Initial Brigade Combat Team(IBCT). The latest draft doctrine isin the Doctrine Division’s website athttp://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/doctrine/dlb.htm. The coordinating draftis due in March 2001 and the finaldraft is due one year later. With thisarticle, we seek to stimulate yourinput for the revision of the IBCT in-telligence doctrine.

Introduction to the IBCTA flexible force of intelligence, sur-

veillance, and reconnaissance(ISR) personnel, organizations, andequipment comprises the Initial Bri-gades’ intelligence systems. Indivi-dually and collectively, the compo-nents of this system provide thebrigade with the capability to—! Plan and direct ISR operations.! Collect and process informa-

tion.! Produce relevant intelligence.! Disseminate combat informa-

tion and intelligence to thosewho need it, when they need it.

The brigade and its subordinatebattalions possess organic ISR as-sets that enable each unit to meetthe commander’s requirements.Based on mission, enemy, terrainand weather, troops, and time avail-able and civilian considerations(METT-TC), the brigade will task-or-ganize its organic ISR assets for theoperation. The brigade may receiveadditional ISR assets from corps,joint, and national organizations.

Intelligence OrganizationsAn intelligence staff is organic to the

brigade and its subordinate battalionsand squadron. ISR analysis and ISRintegration elements from the MilitaryIntelligence (MI) Company and theSurveillance Troop, respectively,augment the brigade and RSTA (Re-connaissance, Surveillance, and Tar-get Acquisiton) Squadron staffs. Theintelligence staff in the brigade’s non-maneuver battalions possessesvarying numbers of assigned MIpersonnel, and normally does notreceive additional intelligence aug-mentation. Combat support (CS) andcombat service support (CSS) unitsmay not have any MI personnel.Those personnel designated as an“S2 section” often combine with thebattalion’s operations staff.

The MI company consists of oneISR analysis platoon, one ISR in-tegration platoon, and a human in-telligence (HUMINT) platoon. Thebrigade S2 is the manager of ISRoperations; however, the MIcompany’s support is critical in themanagement of ISR requirementsand planning, and in the analysis,production, and dissemination ofintelligence. The ISR analysis pla-toon provides analytic supportto the development of the bri-gade common operational picture(COP), support to targeting andeffects, and refinement of the intel-ligence preparation of the battlefield(IPB). The ISR integration pla-toon serves as an extension of thebrigade S2 staff for the internal andexternal management of ISR as-sets. The HUMINT platoon con-ducts the br igade’s tact icalHUMINT collection operations. Thecompany has the organic systemsnecessary to interface with ISRsystems resident at the U.S. ArmyForces (ARFOR), joint, theater, andnational levels.

Surveillance and Recon-naissance Organizations

Surveillance and reconnaissanceassets vary by echelon and unit type.The IBCTs have organic assets suchas the RSTA squadron, the HUMINTplatoon of the MI company, and in-fantry battalion scouts to performsurveillance and reconnaissance. Incontrast, CSS units do not possessdedicated surveillance and recon-naissance assets but rely upon adhoc organizations and standard op-erating procedures to perform suchmissions as route reconnaissanceand occupation of observation posts.

Doctrine fDoctrine fDoctrine fDoctrine fDoctrine for the Initialor the Initialor the Initialor the Initialor the InitialBrigBrigBrigBrigBrigade Combaade Combaade Combaade Combaade Combat t t t t TTTTTeameameameameam

The mission of the IBCT intelligence system is toprovide timely, relevant, accurate, and synchro-nized ISR support to the brigade commander,staff, and subordinates...during the planning,preparation, and execution of multiple, simulta-neous decisive actions on a distributed battle-field or area of operations (AO)


The RSTA squadron is thebrigade’s primary source of combatinformation and targeting data. Thesquadron also provides the brigadewith many reconnaissance and sur-veillance soldiers on the ground tohelp the brigade understand theoperational environment in detail.This differs from the traditional scoutfocus primarily on threat forces. Thebrigade S2 integrates the ISR ef-fort through the S3 (to include pro-viding tasks to the RSTA squadron)and is supported by the ARFORanalysis and control element (ACE)or intelligence element in order toprovide situational awareness andunderstanding in the AO.

The surveillance troop possessesan Air Reconnaissance Platoon, aGround Sensor Platoon, and anNBC (Nuclear, Biological, andChemical) Reconnaissance Pla-toon. The unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) enable the squadron to ex-pand its reconnaissance capabilityconsiderably while mitigating risk inthe absence of rotary-based recon-naissance. The NBC reconnais-sance platoon provides thebrigade’s core capability for detec-tion and early warning of chemicaland radiological contaminants, plussome forms of biological agents.

The RSTA squadron closely inte-grates its operations with the activi-ties of the infantry battalion’sreconnaissance platoons and otherISR assets managed at brigadelevel. The squadron operates bystealth throughout the brigade foot-print, and employs HUMINT collec-tion personnel (who perform verylimited HUMINT collection) exten-sively throughout the AO to com-pensate for shortfalls in the existingsensor capabilities, which are moresuited for open terrain and unit- orforce-based threats.

Task OrganizationTask organization allows the bri-

gade to optimize the allocation andcapabilities of its finite ISR assets

based on METT-TC. For example,in a movement to contact, thebrigade may direct the HUMINTplatoon to reinforce the RSTAsquadron with additional HUMINTcollection teams to enhance its in-terrogation and document exploita-tion (DOCEX) capabilities. Thebrigade may also receive divisionalor higher echelon ISR assets suchas a UAV platoon from the division,an air cavalry troop from corps, andcounterintelligence (CI) teams fromcorps or higher echelons when thescope of the mission exceeds thebrigade’s organic capability.

OperationsThe brigade conducts centralized

planning and decentralized execu-tion of operations characterized byrapid mobility, precision fires, ma-neuver, and decisive actions overextended, noncontiguous AOsdominated by complex terrain andurban settings. The planning anddecentralized execution of theseoperations demands continuoustactical- and operational-level IPBto help commanders understand thecontext of emerging information andits relationship (cause and effect)within the overall framework of themission and operations. The natureof the operational environment re-quires the brigade to have en-hanced situational awareness inorder to anticipate threat actionsand identify opportunities for deci-sive employment of the brigade’scombat power. To enable precisionmaneuver and fires, the brigade’stargeting capability requires timely,relevant, accurate, and predictivetargeting data, and intelligence onconventional and asymmetricthreats to the brigade’s systems andorganizations. In addition, entry op-erations (forced or permissive—based on the enemy’s reaction tothe operation) require rapid and de-tailed IPB products, the ability to lo-cate and engage mobile reservesas well as fire support systems, and

situational awareness well beyondthe close combat area.

MI support for the operationsdescribed above includes—

! Planning and executing ISRoperations.

! Analyzing and presenting intel-ligence to support timelysituational understanding andforce protection.

! Supporting the decide, detect,deliver, and assess functions ofthe targeting methodology.

The brigade’s MI elements accom-plish much as part of the brigade’sISR and security efforts. Using theintelligence process as a frame-work, Figure 1 discusses some ofthe IBCT’s specific intelligence ca-pabilities.

Capabilities andLimitations

Inherent in any system are capa-bilities and limitations. The capabili-ties of the Initial Brigades willcontinue to improve as more tech-nologically advanced sensors, pro-cessors, communications systems,and better-trained soldiers enter theforce structure. Its limitations reflectthe impact of force structure limita-tions, advances in adversaries’technologies, and diverse opera-tional environments in which the di-vision must operate.

The IBCTs’ intelligence systemprovides some significant enhance-ments. These improved brigadecapabilities include the following:! The organic RSTA squadron

improves the reconnaissanceand security capability of thebrigade.

! The MI elements supporting thebrigade and the RSTA squad-ron improve the intelligencestaff’s synchronization of ISRactions and access to intelli-gence organizations, products,and databases.


Figure 1. Some Specific IBCT Intelligence Capabilities.

Plan and Direct! Develop ISR tasks in accordance with the brigade’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR), essential elements of friendly

information (EEFI), and intent.! Accept and integrate external ISR planning and execution elements to improve support to situational awareness and target-

ing.! Synchronize and provide technical steerage to organic, supporting, and augmenting ISR assets into the brigade’s ISR effort.! Conduct parallel planning while dynamically tracking and adjusting the overall collection effort for organic and supporting ISR

resources.! Provide near-real-time visibility on external collection resources and capabilities, and request support through the use of

organic communications and processing systems.! Maintain an intelligence communications and processing architecture with multi-level security that enables operations in joint

and multinational environments using digital and analog communications systems.! Conduct dynamic sensor steerage.! Conduct effective requirements management.

Collect! Provide an organic day and night, all weather, and terrain-independent capability to conduct and integrate multidiscipline

reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S).! Leverage time-sensitive information and reporting from joint, interagency, multinational, and commercial collection resources.! Direct the sensor payloads of organic and non-organic collection platforms.! Collect weather information from military and commercial sources.! Fuse vertical and horizontal combat information, targeting data, and intelligence from organic, supporting, joint, multinational,

and interagency organizations.! Receive and process broadcast downlinks from organic and theater assets.! Maintain intelligence databases with multi-level security that safeguards the intelligence sources and permits authorized

access to unprocessed data.! Provide a capability to develop, transmit, and store graphic products with supporting data.

Process and Produce! Develop the threat portion of the COP of the brigade AO and area of interest through the distributed analysis and fusion of

combat information and multidiscipline intelligence using collaborative analytic, development, and visualization tools.! Exchange the results of analysis, discuss issues with external regional experts, and develop a common understanding of the

situation by fusing external collection and analysis products using collaborative tools like desktop video teleconferencing andelectronic “white boards” resident on analyst workstations.

! Access, focus, and tailor the broader technical and analytic products from national and theater analytic centers to meet thebrigade’s intelligence needs.

! Conduct continuous IPB and near-real-time all-source analysis of threat information. Access the information in order to sup-port situational understanding, targeting, and force protection.

! Conduct trend and pattern analysis during IPB and target development, and also as a means of providing predictive intelli-gence support for future operations.

! Access—using organic communications and processing systems—existing databases, products, and analytic expertise resi-dent in Service, joint, and national surveillance and reconnaissance resources. These split-based operations and “reachback” capabilities facilitate collaboration, task sharing, and access to higher echelon databases, as well as IPB products andfocused analysis. Split-based operations provide the capability to have a portion of the ISR analytic element remain outsidethe operational area to support a command post or a command and control (C2) node.

! Leverage local and national weather analysis to produce tailored weather effects products in support of current and futureoperations.

! Provide dynamic targeting support through integration of organic, theater, joint, and national sensors.Disseminate

! Possess secure, redundant, dedicated broad-bandwidth communications with a multi-level security capability that enable theexchange of analytic findings and meta-data (web information that facilitates web searches).

! Disseminate and collaborate between ISR elements internal and external to the brigade, in real time, over an expandedbattlespace.

! Receive broadcast intelligence that provides indications, warning, and locational information.! Receive near-real-time updates on the weather, terrain, and threat activities from a supporting ACE during the deployment

and entry operations. This includes the ability to receive threat situation displays, written updates, video, and imagery tosupport enroute mission planning and adjustments to the plan.

! Dynamically update the situation from sensors, collectors, and processors organic to the brigade that provide a higher degreeof fidelity of the battlespace.

! Present the current threat situation and threat intent to facilitate situational understanding and support the presentation ofthe COP. The presentation uses the best mix of supporting information including imagery, video from UAV, or screencaptures (meta-data) to reinforce the presented analysis.

! Provide near-real-time tools and products to support visualization of the brigade commander’s battlespace across all ISRcapabilities from alert through deployment and execution to redeployment.


! All-Source Analysis System(ASAS) workstations at the bri-gade, battalions, and squadronfacilitate the collaborativepreparation and presentation ofa common threat picture.

! UAVs in the RSTA squadronextend the brigade comman-der’s view beyond the next hill,and optimize the employment ofmaneuver, aviation, and firesupport assets to shape thebattlefield in depth, day or night.

Dependence on non-organic ele-ments results in some of the IBCTs’limitations. Some of their specificlimitations are—! Distribution of ISR reports and

products (imagery, overlays,webpages, etc.) requires a ro-bust, high-capacity communica-tions area network.

! Reliance on a higher headquar-ters for the development of IPBproducts that are full-dimen-sional, continuous, and in near-real time. It has the organicability to tailor products to pro-vide greater fidelity to meet thecommander’s intent and thecommand’s information require-ments.

! Reliance on a force pool of lin-guists to support requirementsbased on the operational envi-ronment. The Army must iden-tify, train, and track theselinguists; it will then place themon call for a period within 24-48hours as the situation dictates.Linguistic requirements will in-clude translation, as well as tac-tical HUMINT and signalsintelligence (SIGINT) support.

! Reliance on the ARFOR ACEto provide situational updates,technical databases, and pre-dictive analysis of the situationto support the force, fromenroute mission planning andrehearsal to successful comple-tion of the mission.

! Inability to operate two UAVsystems simultaneously, and arequirement that the brigadecommand post (CP) locatewithin 40 kilometers of the UAVflight track in order to receivethe video downlink.

FM 34-80-2/ST, Brigade CombatTeam Intelligence Operations,is due in March 2001. The DoctrineDivision intends this publication foruse exclusively by the IBCTsthat are “standing up” at Fort Lewis.

Throughout the process of stand-ing up the IBCTs, we will update thedoctrine to reflect the lessonslearned from the units’ initial train-ing and combat training center(CTC) rotations. To keep up with thechanges, visit the Doctrine Divisionhomepage at http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/doctrine/dlb.htm. Weask the IBCTs to review and com-ment on the published IBCT doc-trine by contacting Captain LeeGoodman via E-mail at edd. [email protected].✹

Captain Lee Goodman is currently aDoctrine Writer in the MI Doctrine Divi-sion, Operational Branch, Directorateof Combat Developments at FortHuachuca, Arizona. He is the point ofcontact for IBCT, information opera-tions, and tactical and Cavalry intelli-gence issues. He has served in 3dSquadron, 4th Armored Cavalry Regi-ment, and 3d Squadron, 2d ACR be-fore his assignment to USAIC&FH. CPTGoodman is a graduate of the ArmorOfficers Basic Course, the MI OfficersTransition Course, and the MI OfficersAdvanced Course. He earned a Bach-elor of Arts degree in History from Mis-sissippi State University. Readers maycontact the author via the E-mail ad-dress above and by telephone at (520)538-0971 or DSN 879-0971.

The National Guard Bureau needs U.S. Army National Guard observer/controller (O/C) augmentees at theJoint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, from 1 through 15 August 2001. The ARNGaugmentees would support JRTC Rotation 01-09 (27th Enhanced Separate Infantry Brigade (27th eSB),NY ARNG). The military intelligence soldiers needed are—

❑ 1 x CPT (35 D – All-Source Intelligence Officer)❑ 3 x SFC (96B – Intelligence Analyst)❑ 2 x SFC (98C – Signals Intelligence Analyst or 98G – Cryptologic Linguist)❑ 1 x SSG (96R – Ground Surveillance Systems Operator)

The National Guard Bureau funds these tours as additional Annual Training. Augmentees’ travel and perdiem expenses are included. Assist fellow Guardsmen and provide yourself a superior professional train-ing experience. The 15-day rotation consists of a 5-day O/C Academy followed immediately by the 10-dayunit rotation. This provides a wonderful opportunity to share valuable professional knowledge with otherswhile taking home important lessons of your own. For more details, contact CPT John Wilson at (703) 607-9154, DSN 327-9154, or [email protected] or CPT Garry Porter at (703) 607-7317, DSN 327-7317, or [email protected].

ARNG O/C Augmentees Needed at JRTC in August


by Sergeant MajorAntonio C. MorenoChange is “to make different,” “tomake radically different: transform.”These are but a couple of the defi-nitions for the process that we in theArmy, and in the Military IntelligenceCorps in particular, are undergoing.We are plotting a different position,course, or direction away from aCold War mentality. New technol-ogy, new training models, and othersophisticated platforms that play im-portant roles in reshaping the TotalForce for the future are driving usto update our doctrine.

Future ConflictsAs the Army wrestles with modify-

ing strategy to fight major theaterwars (MTWs), we must ensure thatour units are robust and flexibleacross the full operational spectrum.We must be capable of rapid transi-tion from domestic disaster relief,civil disturbance control, peace orarmistice, noncombatant evacua-tion operations (NEO), counter-drug, limited war, small-scalecontingencies (SSCs), and stability

operations and support operations.Consequently, it is crucial that wemake these transitions at all ech-elons without suffering a significantloss in coverage or capability.

There is no question that our forceis much smaller. Our operationaltempo (OPTEMPO) has increasedsignificantly, causing our currentforce structure to cope with the de-mands of protecting a myriad ofnational interests, defined and notyet defined, based on world events.For us to be a strategically respon-sive force that will enable combatcommanders to achieve dominanceacross the full spectrum of opera-tions, the Army and its MI soldiersmust acquire and develop skills toperform in a multi-functional man-ner. This is not to say that all sol-diers must be technically proficientin multiple military occupational spe-cialties (MOSs). Rather, each oneshould be able to transition easilyor apply other skills in addition totheir primary MOSs. Information op-erations (IO) and measurement andsignature intelligence (MASINT)skills are prime examples.

Technology ApplicationsAs the Army progresses into the

21st century, we can expect a mul-titude of battlefield challenges de-pending on the terrain, equipment,and tactics employed against us.Increased requirements in applyingMASINT and IO respective to ourgiven MOSs will enhance our ca-pabilities to conduct intelligencepreparation of the battlefield (IPB)and fight military operations inurban terrain (MOUT). The urbanterrain environment will drive re-quirements for high-fidelity intelli-

gence that in turn requires proxim-ity to targets regardless of weatherand day/night conditions. Incorpo-rating MASINT skills and technol-ogy is a force multiplier spanningthe entire electromagnetic spec-trum. Although it is a unique intelli-gence discipline with singularcapabilities that in the future couldevolve into a separate MOS,MASINT provides a different di-mension to the other intelligencedisciplines of human intelligence(HUMINT), imagery intelligence(IMINT), and signals intelligence(SIGINT). Likewise, we must pro-duce a pipeline of well-educatedinformation security specialists. Asintelligence professionals, we mustprovide the ground commanderwith accurate and timely intelli-gence to ensure superior situationalawareness. Timely intelligence iscritical when operating in a rapidlytransitioning environment such asurban warfare. As long as we canachieve and maintain informationsuperiority, apply learned MASINTskills, and simultaneously executeour intelligence missions, we canexpect success in effectively neu-tralizing and then dominating theenemy regardless of the environ-ment. How do we get there fromhere?

TrainingFrom a training standpoint, we

must develop, test, and field newintelligence systems to stay abreastof and be able to counter the tech-nological advances now availableto rogue nations and terroristgroups. The systems we developand field will require that our sol-diers deviate from the traditional

PROPONENTNOTES

The MI Soldier of the 21st Century

No longer can we expect to fightbattles and wars as we did fromWorld War II through Vietnam andOperation DESERT STORM.Those battles, and the way wetrained to fight them, are in the past.Although we must not forget, it isimperative that we build upon thathistory and develop new strategies,employ new systems within differ-ent types of environments, and pro-vide our soldiers with realistictraining enabling them to win andsurvive in ever-changing environ-ments.


one-skilled dimensionality andevolve into multi-skilled individuals.MI must lean toward consolidatinglike functions and integrate associ-ated skills as a matter of routine.The MI soldier of the 21st centurymust possess a variety of un-matched technical and human skillsto both support the combat com-mander and become an organicwarfighting resource.

Our training philosophy must ap-ply more soldier- and team-orientedtraining to improve MI soldiers’ ef-fectiveness in a complex environ-ment. As we transition to a digitizedbattlefield, so must the training tran-sition. We must wean ourselvesfrom such traditional teaching meth-odology as having intelligence ana-lysts plot on paper maps usingacetate and alcohol pens, for ex-ample. We should be analyzingelectronic sensors and activity dis-played on digitized maps in near-real time from intelligence gatheringsystems such as unmanned aerialvehicles (UAVs), the Joint Surveil-lance Target Attack Radar System(Joint STARS), Guardrail CommonSensor (GRCS), weather satellites,and more. As a result, our soldiersmust—❑ Receive training on traditional

intelligence skills.❑ Be capable of understanding

complex sensing and process-ing technologies.

❑ Participate in live and simulatedexercises to sustain their digi-tal warfighting intelligence skills.

The 21st century MI soldier musttransform with the future organiza-tional design to meet the challengesand demands that potentially awaitus.

IBCTThe Initial Brigade Combat Team

(IBCT) provides a transformation-related example. The Army inte-grated a large, organic MI capabilitywithin the IBCT, specifically in theReconnaissance, Surveillance, and

Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squad-ron and the MI Company. RSTAsquadron MI soldiers will providesupported ground commanderswith immediate situational aware-ness. Lessons learned in Somalia,Haiti, and Kosovo all indicate reli-ance on HUMINT. Thus, the IBCT’sdesign includes an increased tacti-cal HUMINT presence. The ArmorCenter Commanding General indi-cated that he wanted a HUMINTsoldier in every squad and in everyInterim Armored Vehicle (IAV). Con-sequently, the ReconnaissanceTroops have embedded HUMINTcapabilities. The RSTA squadronalso includes TROJAN SpecialPurpose Integrated Remote Intelli-gence Terminal II (TROJAN SPIRITII) and a Ground Sensor Platoonwith REMBASS II (Remotely Moni-tored Battlefield Sensor System II)and Prophet Ground.

Eventually, the objective force willhave the multi-mode operator of thefuture embedded within the groundsensor platoon. This increase of sol-diers with MOSs 96B, 97B, 97E,and 98H organic to the RSTASquadron provides intelligence in-formation directly to the RSTA S2.(These are intelligence analysts,counterintelligence (CI) agents,HUMINT collectors, and communi-cations intercept/locators, respec-tively.) This increase in MI soldierswith these specialties attests to thechange in the notion that intelli-gence not merely supports the op-eration, but is inherent to the battleas an organic member. MI soldiersmust demonstrate not only theirtechnical expertise within multisen-sor collection systems and CI andHUMINT tools, but also their soldierskills as well.Conclusion

While the Army transforms into the21st century objective force, and theArmy Development Study TaskForce XXI (ADS TF XXI) reviews thepossibilities of optimizing MOSsthroughout the Army, the MI Corps

is considering how we, too, musttransform within our own structure.We must strongly consider the pos-sibility of combining MOSs with likeskill sets, or possibly splitting skillsets from one MOS and incorporat-ing them into two other MOSs. Weare evolving with the introduction ofnew systems and advancing capa-bilities in order to produce a multi-systems operator. We will field thenew Tactical UAV (Shadow 200)and Common Ground Station sys-tems. MI soldiers have alwaysplayed essential support roles, butwith the Army transformation andmulti-skilled dimensionality, the MIsoldier is now a vital asset organicto the ground commander. Themotto “Soldier First, MI ProfessionalSecond to None” certainly appliesto our Transformation into the 21stcentury Army.

Sergeant Major Tony Moreno is cur-rently the Sergeant Major, Office of theChief of Military Intelligence, at FortHuachuca, Arizona. His previousassignments include SGM, Training De-velopment, 305th MI Battalion; Com-pany First Sergeant in the 305th MIBattalion, 111th MI Brigade, and 721stMI Battalion; S3 NoncommissionedOfficer (NCO) in Charge (NCOIC), 732dMI Battalion; Collection ManagementNCOIC, Army Regional Operations Fa-cility (AROF)/National Security Agency;Plans NCO, 470th MI Group, Panama;and Morse Advisor, 3/7th Special ForcesGroup, Panama. SGM Moreno earnedan Associate of Arts degree from theUniversity of Maryland with a concen-tration in Psychology. His military edu-cation includes the First SergeantsCourse, 25th Infantry Light Battle StaffCourse, CK155 Cryptologic Skills forNCOs, and CY200 Senior EnlistedCryptologic Course. Readers can con-tact SGM Moreno via E-mail [email protected] or tele-phonically at (520) 533-1174 or DSN821-1174 (FAX 821-1186).


by Chief Warrant Officer FiveRex A. WilliamsChanges in both the Army and Mili-tary Intelligence over the past 30years have been dramatic. Onlythree decades ago we were em-broiled in the Vietnam conflict whileat the same time trying to ensurethe containment of communism.Manual typewriters with onionskincarbon paper were the closestmany of us got to automation. Weaccomplished dissemination of in-telligence by typing forms using anoptical character-reader (OCR) fontthat we took to the communicationscenter for transmission. Our abilityto get intelligence into the hands ofour supported commanders wasmeasured in hours or, dependingon the product, sometimes days.Hard copy imagery from OV-1Mohawks or RF-4Cs took hours toprocess through a photo lab beforean imagery analyst could even viewit. This was MI in the 1970s. Itevolved in the 1980s with a largerbudget and a focus on the SovietUnion and North Korea. Does any-one remember the multi-volumeSoviet Battlefield DevelopmentPlan? Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herze-govina, and Kosovo simplywere not on the screen in the1980s. This short history gives abackdrop of how far and how fastwe have evolved in MI. Most of oursenior warrant officers are productsof the 1970s and 1980s, and havewitnessed these changes. Thechanges of the past 30 years wereremarkably slow compared to theexpected changes of the 21st cen-tury.

Our MI warrant officer manage-ment evolved along with the Army—perhaps more slowly than it should

have. We continue to access war-rant officers much the same as wehave for decades. The majorchange in the mid-1980s was theshift from direct appointments to therequirement to attend the WarrantOfficer Candidate School and theWarrant Officer Basic Course be-fore the first assignment. With themerger of military occupational spe-cialties 352D (Emitter Location/Identification Technician) and 352H(Morse Intercept Technician) intoCommunications Interceptor/Loca-tor Technician (352H) on 1 October1999, we have only one less MIwarrant military occupational spe-cialty (MOS) than we have alwayshad. The ability to adapt and em-brace new missions and functionswill be crucial to the future successof MI warrant officers. We musthave a vision to keep our focus onoperating in that environment.

VisionMI warrant officers provide the

technical leadership and advice toensure successful intelligence sup-port across the entire spectrum ofoperations. They focus on—! Adapting to rapidly changing

environments and technolo-gies.

! Managing intelligence systemsand processes.

! Integrating intelligence archi-tectures and communications.

! Developing and maintainingthe technical proficiency of their

By keeping a steadfast focus onthis vision, we can ensure the evo-lution of MI warrant officers to pro-vide relevant support across alldisciplines. As a young noncommis-sioned officer (NCO) once said tome as he noticed my hesitancy to

use the All-Source Analysis Sys-tem, “Chief, don’t make us drag youkicking and screaming into the 21stcentury.” His point was valid.Our warrant officers must embracechange and be the leaders in man-aging the integration into and op-eration of technological advancesin our intelligence units. Warrant of-ficers have always been the recog-nized technical experts; they mustnow add technological expertise tothat resumé.

The MI warrant officers of 2010will require all of the skill sets theyneed today to include communica-tive skills; tactical, technical, andtechnological skills; and a solidbase of ethics and values. How willwe train warrant officers to main-tain their traditional roles as techni-cians and teach the adaptive skillsnecessary o support new organiza-tions such as the Initial and InterimBrigades (I-Brigades)?

Training and ManagingWarrant Officers

The Deputy Commanding General,U.S. Army Intelligence Center andFort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), di-rected a review of all warrant officertraining in the Intelligence Center toput emphasis on training the rightskills at the right time. Emphasis onassignment-specific training will becritical to future success. The diver-sity of jobs we now expect MI war-rant officers to perform does not lenditself to the “one size fits all” trainingstrategy. To better focus training re-sources, USAIC&FH developed apyramid of roles we expect warrantofficers to fill (see Figure 1). Eachlevel builds on those beneath. Aswarrant officers achieve CW5, theyshould be able to perform all of theroles in the pyramid.

The MilitarThe MilitarThe MilitarThe MilitarThe Military Intelligencey Intelligencey Intelligencey Intelligencey IntelligenceWWWWWarrant Officer of the 21st Centurarrant Officer of the 21st Centurarrant Officer of the 21st Centurarrant Officer of the 21st Centurarrant Officer of the 21st Centuryyyyy

soldiers.


The Army Development SystemXXI Task Force is addressing theoverall training and management ofwarrant officers. Discipline-specificmissions and training are a moredifficult area to address. The intelli-gence-specific aspects are com-plex, with varying requirements forsignals intelligence, human intelli-gence, counterintelligence, imageryintelligence, analysis, and mainte-nance. We must also integrateintelligence support to informationoperations (IO) and measure-ment and signature intelligence(MASINT) into our training. Train-ing warrant officers to keep pacewith known and projected changesin structure, missions, and equip-ment will remain one of our biggestchallenges.

Our training strategy also recog-nizes that warrant officers will becrucial leaders in the digitization ofintelligence functions. Warrant offic-ers must be at the forefront in de-veloping the tactics, techniques,and procedures to make digitizationa reality. It will be the warrant offic-ers who will not only integrate digi-tal processes into daily operationsbut will also be able to brief sup-ported commanders from digital dis-plays with the same ease they

would have if they were briefingfrom maps with grease pencil mark-ings. Operating in a digital environ-ment requires a more thoroughknowledge of the tools and the pro-cess. Automation does not make apoor analyst good, but it will makean excellent analyst better. Thisrequires future MI warrant officersto have solid grounding in the auto-mation aspects of their sections,and to have a firm grasp on intelli-gence architectures and operations.Once we achieve a comfort leveloperating in a digital environment,acetate and grease pencils will gothe way of the manual typewriterand onionskin paper. As the techni-cal and technological experts, war-rant officers must make digitizationtheir normal mode of operations.

To populate the objective force,there are three critical challengeswe must address. They are—! Maintain technical skills.! Access new warrant officers.! Retain senior warrant officers.

Maintain Technical Skills. Sincethe Army downsized, there arefewer individuals to perform the nec-essary functions for a unit to accom-plish its mission. Warrant officerswill have to balance the technicalrequirements with increasing re-

quirements outside their MOSs. MIhas always relied on warrant offic-ers to provide the continuity of op-erations while the commissionedofficers rotated at a more rapid rateto fulfill other training and assign-ment obligations. Our future man-ning documents must ensure thatthe placing of warrant officers in thestructure allows the best use andmaintenance of their technicalskills.

Access New Warrant Officers.The system used to access warrantofficers today cannot support futurerequirements. We must develop in-novative ideas that break the cur-rent mold. Future warrant officeraccessions must occur much ear-lier in their careers and selecteeswill need substantially more train-ing before reporting to their firstunits. We must find more juniorNCOs who have shown outstand-ing potential and invest in the train-ing needed to build their technicalskills.

Retain Senior Warrant Officers.MI is having great difficulty fillingsenior warrant officer (SWO) posi-tions. Future operations will haveeven greater need for this exper-tise. Retaining SWOs will continueto be a priority that requires addi-tional emphasis. Based on thenumber of years that NCOs havecompleted when we currently ac-cess them as warrant officers, theyhave about a nine-year lifecycle aswarrant officers. We need to in-crease that lifecycle to 14 or moreyears to help alleviate our SWOshortages. One way to increasethat lifecycle is to develop criteriaand training to reduce the numberof years of service at accession.

ConclusionMI warrant officers will continue

to be an integral part of future or-ganizations, with an ever-expand-ing role to provide the technicalleadership needed to accomplishintelligence missions. The techni-

Figure 1. Roles of MI Warrant Officers.

WO1/CW2 Tech Team Leader, Supervisor/Manager, Trainer

CW3 Advisor, Integrator, Staff Planner,

Instructor, Mentor, Joint Operations

CW4 Inspector, Evaluator,

Facilitator, Joint Planner

CW5 Policy Advisor,

Mediator


cal complexity of our systems andprocesses will continue to expandas we move toward a fully inte-grated digital environment. The MIwarrant officers of the future will looksimilar to the warrant officers of to-day but with a vast array of newtools with which to perform theirduties. They must adapt and evolvemore rapidly than ever, as smallerforces significantly increase theneed for accurate, timely intelli-gence. A tremendous challenge—but one the MI warrant officer standsready to meet.

Chief Warrant Officer Five Rex Williamsis the Senior Warrant Officer with theOffice of the Chief of Military Intelligence(OCMI), and the Chief Warrant Officerof the MI Corps. After completion oftraining at Fort Huachuca as an Imag-ery Analyst, he served with the 2d MI

Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance andSurveillance) in Zweibrucken, Ger-many; Section NCO in Charge, 1st MIBattalion at Fort Bragg; and ImagerySection Sergeant, 704th MI Detachment(Aerial Surveillance) in Camp Hum-phries, Korea. Attaining the rank of staffsergeant before his appointment as anImagery Warrant Officer, he worked asa project officer for airborne imagingsystems in the Directorate of CombatDevelopments (DCD) at Fort Huachuca,where he transitioned to All-Source In-telligence Technician (350B) and com-pleted the MI Warrant Officer AdvancedCourse. CW5 Williams served as theChief of the All-Source Production Sec-tion, 102d MI Battalion at Camp Casey,Korea, then as a Primary Threat andIntelligence Analysis Instructor for theMI Officer Advanced and TransitionCourses as well as all warrant officercourses. CW5 Williams reassigned tothe Intelligence Center–Pacific, CampSmith, Hawaii, where he served under

the auspices of the Defense IntelligenceAgency (DIA) Delegated Producer Pro-gram as the Chief of the Pacific The-ater Order-of-Battle (OB) ProductionSection. Reassigned to the U.S. ArmyIntelligence Center, he again served asthe Chief of Warrant Officer Training;he managed all warrant officer coursesand taught leadership, professional de-velopment, and various intelligencesubjects. Then he became the Chiefof an inter-Service intelligence pro-duction section and acted as a Se-nior Intelligence Analyst during crisisperiods at the U.S. Central CommandJoint Intelligence Center at MacDillAir Force Base, Florida. During histour, he attended the Warrant OfficerSenior Staff Course at Fort Rucker,Alabama, and achieved his currentgrade. Readers can contact CW5 Wil-l iams via E-mai l [email protected] or tele-phonically at (520) 533-1183 or DSN821-1183.

The Military Intelligence Officer in the 21st Century

by Charlotte I. BorghardtAs the Army transforms into theArmy of the 21st century, MilitaryIntelligence must also evolve. OurMI officers must be able to functionin a network-centric warfare envi-ronment and be comfortable work-ing with the digital technologyrevolutionizing the way we do busi-ness. MI officers must be able tounderstand the future battle envi-ronment, which will often be in com-plex urban terrain, and must havea better understanding of national-level intelligence assets and capa-bilities. Because of improved “reachback” capability, the officer must beable to synchronize multiple sys-tems to ensure adequate coveragewith all available intelligence sys-tems. The Officer Personnel Man-agement System (OPMS), training,and professional development of MIofficers need transformation to cre-ate and maintain an MI OfficerCorps capable of meeting thesenew demands.

One Last Look BackThe last thirty years saw many

changes in both OPMS and the re-quirements for our officers. At onetime, all officers were required tohave a basic branch and an addi-tional specialty but this proved to becumbersome, and many officersnever served in their additional spe-cialties. The criteria for a normal ca-reer progression (formal trainingand command) made it difficult forthe officer to be successful in boththe basics and a specialty.

With advances in technology, theArmy saw the need for both the tra-ditional officers who can lead, com-mand, and perform in their basicbranches, and those officers whohave a solid foundation in basicbranch functions but focus on spe-cific aspects of the Army like tech-nology, information operations (IO),or strategic intelligence. Thus, theArmy developed OPMS XXI to al-low these officers to be competitivein either area and still meet the ever-changing demands of the Army.

The Future of theMI Officer Corps

The personnel requirements forour 21st century MI officers willinclude better management andassignments that allow them tomeet the intelligence needs ofcommanders at every level. As theArmy transforms into a more mo-bile, quick-moving digital force,traditional officer career pathsmust change to meet these chal-lenges. OPMS XXI will satisfyboth Total Army and joint require-ments in this century, developingofficers who expertly employ ap-propriate skills, knowledge, andattributes, inculcating behaviorthat reflects the Army values. Thisnew system wil l balance theArmy’s diverse personnel require-ments while providing Army XXIwith a tactically and technicallycompetent officer corps. Whilewarfighting remains the preemi-nent skill of the Army, the need fortechnological skills runs a closesecond.


Our MI officers now have the op-portunity to remain on the traditionalMI track, the Operations CareerField (OP CF) or specialize in an-other CF. A percentage of each of-ficer year-group selected forpromotion to Major will receive des-ignation into other CFs. Officers whoremain in the OP CF will serve in tra-ditional branch assignments (S3s,executive officers (XOs), battalionand brigade commanders, etc.).They can expect to see more tacti-cal assignments as the Army meetsthe “manning the force” directive offilling tactical units to 100-percentstrength. They will serve more timein MI assignments than in branchimmaterial jobs.

Traditional intelligence assign-ments will change as we implementthe Brigade Combat Team (BCT).For example, a human intelligence(HUMINT) officer (area of concen-tration 35F) will be the BCT G2X, anew concept under the TacticalHUMINT Initiative. We can expectto see an increase in the need forHUMINT-trained officers. The G2Xstaff officer (35F) will be the singlefocal point for all counterintelli-gence- (CI) and HUMINT-associ-ated matters in the area ofresponsibility. This staff officer willbe responsible for coordinating anddeconflicting CI and HUMINT activi-ties with national agencies. WhileMI officers will fill the traditionalpositions (company command andplatoon leader) in the Surveillance

Troop of the Reconnaissance,Surveillance, and Target Acquisi-tion (RSTA) Squadron, the XO willbe an armor officer. This will inte-grate combat arms expertise withinthe MI unit.

MI officers designated for CFsother than the OP CF will serve intheir previously designated func-tional areas (all officers receive aspecific functional area designationduring their fifth year of service).These officers will become world-class specialists serving in theirdesignated functional areas only(with the chance of a few tours inimmaterial positions). Some MI of-ficers may migrate to other CFs, butbecause of the closely associatedfunctions and technical nature ofthe jobs, many will opt to work inthe IO CF. It is clear that MI exper-tise is necessary in these functionalareas.

For many years, the MI Corps hasstruggled with a shortage of fieldgrade officers. While we knew wehad an obligation to ensure intelli-gence support for the combat com-mander, we also had the majorityof the joint requirements. Manytimes, the joint world won out. Wealso saw the necessity to train andmaintain a population of strategicintelligence specialists who are asproficient as their Navy and AirForce counterparts. The establish-ment of Functional Area 34, Strate-gic Intelligence Officer, will helpsolve both these problems. The cre-

ation of FA 34 and the resultingrecoding of billets allow the Army toaddress its crucial shortage of fieldgrade MI officers. The ability to as-sign other than MI branch officersinto those echelons-above-corps(EAC) positions will enable theArmy to fill more of its TOE (table oforganization and equipment) intel-ligence billets while at the sametime “growing” the joint and strate-gic intelligence officers it requiresat EAC.

OutlookThe changes in officer personnel

management will help the MI Of-ficer Corps meet the challenges ofthe future. Our officers will be ascomfortable in a fully digitized en-vironment as they are in a general-purpose medium tent. They will bemore flexible and adaptable to suc-ceed in a constantly changing worldenvironment and be adept at work-ing in the Army of the future.

Charlotte Borghardt (Major, USAR, Re-tired) is an Intelligence Specialist in theOffice of the Chief of Military Intelligence,at Fort Huachuca. While on active duty,she served as a Signals Intelligence andElectronic Warfare (SIGINT/EW) Officerwith assignments at the Army SecurityAgency and 3d Armor Division. Ms.Borghardt earned a Bachelor of Arts de-gree in German at State Universary ofNew York at Oswego. Readers can con-tact her via E-mail at [email protected] and by tele-phone at (520) 533-1188 or DSN 821-1188.

The Worldwide Military Intelligence CSM/SGM Conference 2001 will meet at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, from 5 through 9March 2001 in Fitch Auditorium, Alvarado Hall, from 0800-1700 daily. This year’s conference will include briefings anddiscussion on topics ranging from changes in MOS structure, National Cryptologic School and U.S. Army IntelligenceCenter and Fort Huachuca training updates, the new Prophet collection system, the new Shadow 200 Tactical Un-manned Aerial Vehicle, to a variety of language issues. There will be a special presentation to recognize the first winnerof the CSM (Retired) Doug Russell award. There will also be a challenging sports event on Thursday afternoon, so bringyour competitive spirit. The conference will culminate with an exchange of ideas between the conference attendees andseveral MI generals. For administrative details and updates, please visit the Conference website at http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/CSMFolder/SGMConf2001/Main.htm or send an E-mail to [email protected].

Worldwide Military Intelligence CSM/SGM Conference 2001


by Colonel William M. Knarr, Jr.Initial Brigade CombatTeam UAV SupportIn line with the Army’s move totransform itself to a highly mobile,more rapidly deployable force tomeet current and projected militaryneeds, the first Initial Brigade Com-bat Team (IBCT) was organized atFort Lewis, Washington. The IBCThas begun to train and develop thetactics, techniques, and procedures(TTP) necessary to explore how itwill meet the goals set forth by theChief of Staff of the Army in Octo-ber 2000. A key tenet of the IBCTconcept is for the unit commandersto have the necessary organic in-telligence assets to provide the criti-cal information needed to enablethe effective and optimum use oftheir forces. A vital piece in this con-cept is organic tactical unmannedaerial vehicle (TUAV) support.

As the Shadow 200 TUAV is stillin the materiel acquisition process,the Army has directed that the firstIBCT (IBCT-1) receive the HunterUAV as an interim solution for TUAVsupport. Delta Troop (the Brigade’sReconnaissance Troop in the Re-connaissance, Surveillance, andTarget Acquisition (RSTA) Squad-ron), 1/14th Cavalry Regiment(IBCT-1), at Fort Lewis has takendelivery of a TUAV-size slice of theHunter baseline. Unit resourcing forthe UAV Reconnaissance Platoonwill consist of 17 military and 8 de-fense contractor personnel. Theywill operate and maintain the Hunterequipment from Gray Army Airfield,and provide UAV support to troopsin training at both the Rainier Train-

ing Area, near Fort Lewis, and atthe Yakima Training Center, nearYakima, Washington. The last of theunit’s personnel and equipmentwere in place by early September2000, and will begin support to IBCTdoctrine and TTP development inearly fiscal year 2001.

JOTBSIn September 2000, the Army

selected Fort Huachuca, Arizona,as the home for the U.S. JointForces Command’s Joint Opera-tional Test Bed System (JOTBS).The JOTBS is a full-up, UAV testbed capability undergoing initialdevelopment, fielding, and opera-tion under a partnership betweenthe Program Executive Office forStrike Weapons and UnmannedAviation (PEO-W) and U.S. JointForces Command (JFCOM). TheJOTBS combines UAVs (initiallytwo Predator air vehicles), a Tacti-cal Control System (TCS) UAVground station, and maintenance,operations, technical, engineering,and JFCOM staff support to providea mobile, self-contained UAV oper-ating capability.

This unit will enable JFCOM torealize fully its role as the advocatefor “jointness,” joint interoperability,and for joint force integration of UAVand TCS capabilities. The JOTBSwill provide the joint commanderswith an operational experimentationand test capability to develop theTCS so that it supports both Ser-vice UAV program needs and jointwarfighting requirements. It will alsoserve as a tool for exploring newconcepts, tactics, and proceduresto assure maximization of UAV ca-

pabilities. The JOTBS will operatefrom Libby Army Airfield with flightoperations beginning in February2001.

TUAV TestingThe Army’s new Shadow 200

TUAV will begin testing soon at FortHuachuca. The Shadow UAV sys-tem is undergoing two phases ofdevelopmental testing (DT). Thefirst phase, designated Test Series200 (TS-200), is a contractor testusing the corporation’s own assetsto prove out changes to the exist-ing system that incorporate the ca-pabilities required by the Army. Thesecond phase, designated TestSeries 300 (TS-300), will be underthe direction of the Army TUAVProject Management Office. Thecontractor will also perform TS-300testing, but will use the first Army-owned production Shadow system.TS-200 testing is currently ongoingat Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) inMaryland, while we plan for the TS-300 to take place at Fort Huachucabeginning in November 2000. Thecontractor wishes to complete theTS-200 testing at ATC; if inclementweather persists, an alternative isto move to Fort Huachuca for theremainder of the testing.

Colonel Bill Knarr is the U.S. Army Train-ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)System Manager (TSM) for the Un-manned Aerial Vehicle/Aerial CommonSensor (UAV/ACS). Readers may con-tact him via E-mail at [email protected] and telephonically at (520)533-2165 or DSN 821-2165. The TSMUAV/ACS Internet website is at http://huachuca-dcd.army.mil/tsmuav/tsm-uav.htm.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Support to a Transforming Armyand Update on Other Actions

TSMNOTES


by Colonel Kevin C. Peterson“The Prophet system is far betterthan the AN/TRQ-32 TEAMMATE inboth operational capabilities andease of use.” This was a commoncomment made by the soldiers ofAlpha Company, 110th Military In-telligence (MI) Battalion, 10th Moun-tain Division (Light), during a critiqueof the Joint Contingency Force–Ad-vanced Warfighting Experiment(JCF-AWE) exercise. After fourmonths of operator training and fieldexercises, the soldiers of the 110thMI Battalion finally had the chanceto deploy two Prophet Ground sys-tems into the “Box” at the JCF-AWE.Throughout the exercise—con-ducted at Fort Polk, Louisiana, from9 to 21 September 2000—the twoProphet systems remained fullyoperational and provided continu-ous force protection to the sup-ported brigade commander.

The soldiers praised the increasein mobility that Prophet’s on-the-move (OTM) capability gave them.The operators masterfully employeda modified OTM technique whileconducting electronic warfare sup-port (ES) operations. During sup-port to convoy operations, theProphet teams moved with the sup-ported columns, stopped at desig-nated way points, raised the ESantenna, and conducted collectionand direction-finding operations in

support of the convoy. When theconvoy moved, the Prophet teamslowered their antennas and movedout promptly with the columns. Theyalso used the traditional ProphetOTM mode (antenna down) whilesupporting maneuver operations.

ObservationsThe 110th MI Battalion soldiers

provided good insight on how toimprove the operational effective-ness of the Prophet Ground system.They stated that their Transcriptionand Analysis (T&A) Section wasoverwhelmed while performingnodal analysis and line-of-bearing(LOB) plotting on Prophet informa-tion. They believe that to streamlinethis process and ensure rapid for-warding of Prophet products, addi-tional automation is required in boththe Prophet vehicles and the T&Asections. The operators presentedsome problems and recommendeda few improvements for the systemto increase operator proficiency.For example, the operator is cramp-ed in the right-rear seat when oper-ating the system with field gear, andthe operators need pilots’ knee-boards so they can write while op-erating the system OTM.

The Prophet Ground system is a“new” system that departs from theolder legacy systems’ concepts ofoperations. The unit leaders andstaffs need to understand the nu-

ances of Prophet employment fullyto optimize the capabilities of theProphet system.

The program has come a long wayin two years. Prophet Ground Engi-neering and Manufacturing Devel-opment (EMD) began in July 1999,using extensive off-the-shelf com-ponents and technology. The Sys-tem Acceptance and First ArticleTests were from May to July 2000.We will field three Prophet systemsto each of the two Initial BrigadeCombat Teams (IBCTs) during fis-cal year 2001. The Prophet systemis critical to the Chief of Staff of theArmy’s Transformation program andhas the capability for growth to meetits Objective Force requirements.The Prophet Ground’s successes atthe JCF-AWE stand as a testamentto everyone who has helped definethe new signals intelligence para-digm to keep tactical SIGINT rel-evant today and into the future.

Colonel Kevin Peterson is the TRADOC(U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-mand) System Manager–Prophet (TSMProphet) at the U.S. Army IntelligenceCenter and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH).Readers may contact him via E-mail [email protected] and tele-phonically at (520) 533-5579 and DSN821-5579. You may also contact theDeputy TSM, Major Mark Oleksiak, atmark.oleksiak @hua.army.mil.

Prophet’s Debut at the JCF-AWE

ASAS and the Initial BrigadeCombat Team

by Colonel Jerry V. ProctorAs the equipment, personnel, anddoctrinal training materials begin toassemble so that the first BrigadeCombat Team (BCT) or Initial BCT(IBCT) can begin its collective train-ing at Fort Lewis, Washington, emo-

tions are running high. Since theChief of Staff of Army (CSA) an-nounced his vision for a transformedArmy a year ago, the U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command(TRADOC), the U.S. Army MaterielCommand, and U.S. Total Army Per-

sonnel Command have been work-ing at a significantly acceleratedpace to provide the first BCT withthe right tools to ensure its success.

One of the tenets of the CSA’s in-structions for the transformation bri-gade was that it was not to be an


experimentation test bed. However,within the organization and opera-tion (O&O) plan and concept of op-erations (CONOP) are somerequired tasks that the “fielded” andeven the “experimental” Army can-not perform. In order to satisfy thesetasks, some developmental solu-tions (hardware, software, and doc-trinal concepts) will likely benecessary.

How ASAS Fits Into ThisNew Brigade

Today the All-Source AnalysisSystem (ASAS) is a system of sub-systems. Whether you think ofASAS as being those all-source andsingle-source boxes resident insidethe SCIF (sensitive compartmentedinformation facility) or as the mostprolific box, the ASAS RemoteWorkstation, you are only half cor-rect. There are six ASAS sub-systems that support the IBCT—! ASAS Remote Workstation

(ASAS RWS).! ASAS–Light (ASAS-L).! Analysis and Control Team–

Enclave (ACT-E).! CI/HUMINT (counterintelli-

gence and human intelligence)Automated Tool Set (CHATS).

! CI and Interrogation OperationsWorkstation.

! Individual Tactical ReportingTool (ITRT).

The Box CountsWithin the first IBCT, “non-devel-

opmental” ASAS consists of 15RWS and 16 CHATS systems. Ad-ditionally, there are two systems thatshould move to the “non-develop-mental” column soon, one ACT-Eand six ASAS-Ls (a laptop designedfor battalion S2s that acts like a mini-RWS). The ACT-E simplistically isa HMMWV- (high-mobility multipur-pose wheeled vehicle) mountedshelter containing two RWSs, someradios, and other communicationsequipment.

I will define the “developmentalcategory” as any system that is notyet in or successfully through its op-erational test and evaluation andsubsequent fielding decision, andtherefore has not received a “stamp

of approval.” Only two systems fitthis category: the 44 ITRTs—thatbasically provide a “CI flavored” per-sonal data companion (PDC)—andone CI and interrogation operationsworkstation. The CI and interroga-tion operations workstation is aheavy-duty HUMINT-analysis work-station allowing in-depth CI analy-sis.

Future articles will cover the ac-tual functions of these systems.Suffice it to say that the All-SourceAnalysis System is well placed inthe brigade of the future.

Colonel Jerry Proctor is the U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command (TRA-DOC) System Manager (TSM) forASAS. Readers can contact himvia E-mail at [email protected] and telephonically at (520)533-3504 or DSN 821-3504. TheDeputy TSM is Mr. Michael Strack; hisE-mail address is [email protected] and his telephone number is(520) 533-3507 or DSN 821-3507. TheTSM ASAS web-site is at http://www.tsmasas.army.mil/.

Applicants are required to have a current Top Secret security clearance with Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)access and be qualified in these military occupational specialties. Unit members typically drill at Fort Gillem, Georgia, forinactive duty training (IDT), active duty for training (ADT), and annual training (AT). However, they also participate inmission work at the Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom and at other assignments outside the continental UnitedStates (OCONUS) on an as needed basis. In addition, this unit offers good training, challenging work (supporting real-world intelligence missions), flexible scheduling, and combined IDTs. Interested soldiers should contact Sergeant Campbell,the JAC/JRISE recruitment noncommissioned officer (NCO), at (404) 362.3151) or DSN 797.3151.

RC Assignments with JAC/JRISE in United Kingdom and OCONUS

The Joint Analysis Center/Joint Reserve Intelligence Support Element (JAC/JRISE) located in Atlanta, Georgia, islooking for Reserve Component (RC) branch-qualified military intelligence officers, warrant officers, and enlisted per-sonnel. The specialties needed include—

! 35B Strategic Intelligence Officer! 35D All-Source Intelligence Officer! 350B All-Source Intelligence Technician! 350D Imagery Intelligence Technician! 96B Intelligence Analyst! 96D Imagery Analyst


by Captain Robert S. DavidsonDuring its June 2000 Combat Ma-neuver Training Center (CMTC) ro-tation in Hohenfels, Germany, the2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT),1st Infantry Division, employed itsBrigade Reconnaissance Troop(BRT) (E Troop, 4th Cavalry), withremarkable success. As the BrigadeTAC (forward tactical commandpost) S2, I was fortunate to benefitfrom the BRT’s collection efforts,and learned several lessons aboutdeploying an organic brigade recon-naissance asset in cooperation withbattalion task force (TF) scouts.Formation of the BCT

The 2d BCT formed its BRT inJanuary 1999, about six monthsbefore its deployment as the initialentry force into Kosovo. The Troopcomprised two platoons of scouts(military occupational specialty 19D)led by Infantry or Armor lieutenants.Artillery Combat Observation andLasing Teams (COLTs) often aug-mented the platoons for an addi-tional target acquisition capability.The BCT has armed the BRT with.50 caliber M2 and lighter weapons,and the Troop conducts mountedmovement using hard-backedHMMWVs (high-mobility multipur-pose wheeled vehicles). Both Armorand Infantry captains have servedas the Troop commanders.Parallels with the RSTASquadron ReconnaissanceTroops

In both peacekeeping and combatscenarios, the BRT provides theBCT with an unprecedented organicreconnaissance and surveillance

(R&S) asset. One can draw paral-lels between the missions of the 2dBCT’s BRT and the Ground Recon-naissance Troops that will comprisethree-quarters of the Reconnais-sance, Surveillance, and Target Ac-quisition (RSTA) Squadron in theInitial Brigade Combat Teams(IBCTs) now forming at Fort Lewis,Washington. The end-strength ofthe IBCT’s RSTA Squadron will ob-viously be much greater than thatof a single troop.

Witnesses to combat training cen-ter (CTC) opposing force (OPFOR)use of Soviet-style multiple wavesof reconnaissance can attest to theireffectiveness in observing thebattlefield. A U.S. heavy BCT armedwith a BRT, or other organic R&Sassets in addition to battalion TFscouts, can achieve similar layer-ing effects resulting in exceptionalreconnaissance of a brigade areaof operations (AO).Maximizing Effectiveness

At the CMTC, the 2d BCT foundthat its BRT was most effectivewhen deployed several kilometersforward of the TF scouts in the bri-gade AO. Typical BRT targets in anadversary defense included ob-stacles under construction, tanksand infantry fighting vehicles indeep-hide positions, and the adver-sary reserves, both antitank (AT)and tank. Interdiction of enemy en-gineer efforts proved most effective.During adversary attacks, the BRTdeployed forward of the TF scoutsto provide early warning of enemyreconnaissance and main body el-ements, handing them off to thescouts. While placing the BRT at

somewhat greater risk of compro-mise, the BCT achieved great depthin its R&S fight.

While the BRT was most effectivewhen deployed against deep tar-gets, we learned that concentratingtoo many BRT teams deep couldresult in a “black hole” on the battle-field between the shallowest BRTelements and the deepest TF scoutteams. Particularly during an enemyattack, elements that the BRTtracked and attempted to hand offto TF scouts could become “lost”and change direction, or drop dis-mounts undetected in the gap be-tween the R&S echelons. We foundthat deploying both BRT and TFscout teams in depth is critical forcontinuous observation. Joint train-ing of the BRT and TF scouts be-fore deployment also improved theircommunication and coordinatedobservation of enemy elements.

Because the BRT deploys far for-ward in the brigade AO, early andquiet movement is crucial to theTroop’s preservation. The BCT sentthe BRT forward as early as the“Division” (CMTC Commander, Op-erations Group (COG)) would al-low—36 to 48 hours before thebattle and up to 24 hours earlierthan the TF scouts. While spend-ing that much time in listening postand observation post (LP/OP) po-sitions is taxing on the soldiers, itmaximizes their observation of thebattlefield and reduces their risk ofexposure during infiltration.Lessons Learned

We learned that rapid and quietinfiltration also increased BRT sur-vivability. Whenever possible, the

R&S Lessons Learned—Brigade Reconnaissance Troop Employment

QUICKTIPS


platoons were air-inserted withina couple kilometers of their plannedLP/OP sites. If the adversary did notfind the teams on the landing zone(LZ), they most often survivedthe entire mission by using strictlight and noise discipline. The BRT’sHMMWVs were useful only for tak-ing teams to the vicinity of the lineof departure (LD) since any deepvehicular movement, even usingconcealed trails at slow speed,tipped off the enemy to the teams’locations. If airlift was not available,the BRT left its vehicles near the LDusing camouflage, and moved onfoot several kilometers to their LP/OPs. BRT use of vehicles in real-world missions would depend onthe adversary’s collection capabili-ties.

When first using the BRT far for-ward in the brigade sector, mostleaders were concerned about en-emy elements finding the Troop’steams. The teams reported obser-vations but did not engage even softtargets or call for fire because ofconcerns that the OPFOR mightfind them. However, the BCT dis-covered that with careful selectionof routes and LP/OP sites, enemyelements had great difficulty inter-cepting the BRT—even if it was

more active. The value gained bythe Troop’s destruction of adversaryLP/OPs with direct fire and disrupt-ing enemy obstacle construction ormaneuver rehearsals with observedindirect fire was more significantthan the loss of the few teams thatthe enemy engaged. Prompt casu-alty evacuation and “re-seed” ofcompromised Troop teams assuredus sustained R&S operations.

Also worth noting is the fact thatthe command, control, and commu-nications (C3) tying together theentire BCT R&S effort paved theway to success. A junior Infantrycaptain, a former scout platoonleader assigned to the brigade staff,served as Chief of Reconnaissance(COR). The COR executed the BCTR&S plan, coordinating with thebrigade staff, BRT commander,TF S2s, and TF scout platoon lead-ers. He oversaw rehearsals anddeconflicted movement and report-ing during the R&S fight. The CORworked with the Fire Support Officer(FSO) to protect the teams from ar-tillery by covering them with no-fireareas (NFAs) or critical friendly zones(CFZs)1 that allowed the BRT’steams room for limited relocation oftheir LP/OPs when necessary. Be-cause of his immersion in the R&S

mission, the COR was also instru-mental in assisting the BCT S2 sec-tion to develop the enemy picture.

Thanks to 1LT Kevin Kingsley,former Assistant S2 of the 2d BCT,1st Infantry Division, and CPT JimMoreno, former Assistant S2 of the1-77 Armor Battalion, 2d BCT, fortheir contributions to this Quick Tip.

Endnote1. See the article by Captain Andrew T.Johnson and Major John E. Della-Giustinain the July-September 2000 issue of MIPBfor definitions of these terms if they areunfamiliar.

Captain Bob Davidson is currently anMI Captains Career Course (MICCC)student at Fort Huachuca. His past as-signments include service as AssistantBrigade S2, 2d Brigade, 1st InfantryDivision; G2 Operations Battle Captain,Multi-National Brigade–East (MNB-E),Task Force Falcon, Kosovo; ElectronicWarfare Platoon Leader, D Company,101st MI Battalion; and Counterintelli-gence Systems Officer, Plans andOperations Division, Office of theDeputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). CPTDavidson earned a Bachelor of Sciencedegree in Journalism from BowlingGreen State University. Readers maycontact the author via E-mail [email protected].

New Website for Future LeadersCompanyCommand.com is a website dedicated to company-level leaders wanting to learn and share ideas on topicssuch as command philosophies, Army policies, leadership counseling, officer professional development (OPD), andprofessional reading programs. Eight staff and faculty officers at the United States Military Academy at West Point, NewYork, operate the website during off-duty hours without remuneration.

The website meets its goal to improve institutional knowledge at the company-level by facilitating lateral informationflow and serving as a user-driven forum whereby former and current company commanders share ideas, products, andlessons learned with others. Majors Nate Allen and Tony Burgess, the site’s founders, commented that their sole pur-pose is helping leaders grow great units and soldiers.

CompanyCommand.com has a section organized by branch that links the experiences and competencies of formerand current commanders. For example, it lists for the intelligence community some Military Intelligence contacts includ-ing three former MI company commanders who are volunteer mentors. The operators of the site plan to expand it withplatoon leader tools for junior leaders.

Among the website’s other offerings are a “command tools” section with professional presentations, lessons learned,and stories. It also contains quizzes, after-action reviews, tactical scenarios, monthly updates, links to other militarywebsites, and much more. Popularity of the site has increased since its debut in February 2000. The number of “hits” hasincreased from 11,114 to more than 600,000 as of 30 September.


A/I–Analysis/integrationAADCOM–U.S. Army Air Defense CommandAAR–After-action reviewABCS–Army Battlefield Command and Control SystemAC–Active ComponentACE–Analysis and control elementACR–Armored cavalry regimentACS–Aerial Common SensorACT–Analysis and control teamADS TFXXI–Army Development Study Task Force XXIAE–Aerial exploitationAEPDS–Advanced Electronic

Processing andDissemination System

AFATDS–Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

AIT–Advanced individual trainingAMAC–ASAS Master Analyst CourseANCOC–Advanced NCO CourseAO–Area of operationsAOIR–Area of intelligence responsibilityAOR–Area of responsibilityARFOR–U.S. Army ForcesARL–Airborne Reconnaissance LowARNG–U.S. Army National GuardASAS–All-Source Analysis SystemASAS-L–ASAS-LightASCC–Army Service Component CommandASI–All-Source IntelligenceASW–All-Source WorkstationATC–Aberdeen Test CenterATCCS–Army Tactical Command and Control SystemAUSA–Association of the U.S. ArmyAWE–Advanced warfighting experi- mentBASIX–Brigade All-Source Intelli- gence ExerciseBAS–Battlefield Automated SystemBCC, BC2–Brigade coordination cell; Battlefield command and controlBCT–Brigade combat teamBDA–Battlefield damage assessmentBDE, Bde–BrigadeBITC–Basic Instructor Training CourseBLOS–Beyond line of sightBN, Bn–BattalionBNCOC–Basic Noncommissioned Officer CourseBOS–Battlefield operating systemBRT–Brigade reconnaissance troopC2–Command and controlC3–Command, control, and communications

CAS3–Combined Arms and Services Staff SchoolC4ISR–Command, control, communications, and computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceCAV–CalvaryCDR, Cdr–CommanderCENTCOM–U.S. Army Central CommandCEP–Circular error probableCFSO–Counterintelligence force protection source operationsCFZ–Critical friendly zoneCG–Commanding GeneralCGS–Common Ground StationCHATS–Counterintelligence/HUMINT Automated Tool SetCHIMS–CI/HUMINT Information Management SystemCI–CounterintelligenceCIA–Central Intelligence AgencyCINC–Commander in chiefCJTF–Combined joint task forceCM–Collection managementCMO–Collection management officerCMTC–Combat Maneuver Training CenterCO–CompanyCOA–Course of actionCOG–Commander, operations groupCOLT–Combat Observation and Lazing TeamCONOP–Contingency operationCONUS–Continental United StatesCOP–Common operational pictureCOR–Chief of reconnaissanceCP–Command postCPX–Command post exerciseCS–Combat supportCSA–Chief of Staff of the Army; Corps support activityCSS–Central Security ServiceCTC–Combat Training CenterCTT–Commander’s Tactical TerminalDA–Department of the ArmyDCD–Directorate of Combat DevelopmentsDCGS-A–Distributed Common Ground System–ArmyDCSINT–Deputy Chief of Staff for IntelligenceDIA–Defense Intelligence AgencyDMZ–Demilitarized zoneDOCEX–Documentation exploitationDOD, DD–Department of DefenseDOIM–Directorate of Information ManagementDS–Direct supportDSE–Distribution simulation environment

DSN–Defense secure networkDT–Developmental testingDTLOMS–Doctrine, training, leaders, organizations, material, and soldiersEA–Electronic attackEAC–Echelons above corpsEEFI–Essential elements of friendly informationELINT–Electronic intelligenceEMD–Engineering and manufacturing developmentEO–Electro-opticalES–Electronic supportESB–Enhanced separate brigadeEW–Electronic warfareEXFOR–Experimental forceFAIO–Field artillery intelligence officerFAST–Forward Area Support TerminalFBCB2–Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and BelowFCS–Future combat systemFLIR–Forward-looking infrared radarFSE–Fire support elementFSO–Fire support officerFST–Field support teamFTX–Field training exerciseGCCS–Global Command and Control SystemGE–GermanyGIE–Global information environmentGPS–Global Positioning SystemGRCS–Guardrail Common SensorGS–General supportGSM–Ground Station ModuleGSR–Ground Surveillance RadarHMMWV–High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled VehicleHQ–HeadquartersHUMINT–Human intelligenceIAV–Interim Armored VehicleIAW–In accordance withIBCT–Initial brigade combat team or Interim brigade combat teamIBOS–Intelligence BOSIEW–Intelligence and electronic warfareID–Infantry divisionIDM–Improved Data ModemIGSM–Interim Ground Station ModuleIMINT–Imagery intelligenceINSCOM–U.S. Army Intelligence and Security CommandINFO–InformationINTREP–Intelligence reports”INTs”–Intelligence disciplines (e.g. IMINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and SIGINT)INTSUM–Intelligence summaryIO–Information operationsIOs–International organizations

Glossary of Acronyms Used in This Issue


IPB–Intelligence preparation of the battlefieldIR–Information requirements; InfraredISB–Intermediate staging baseISDC–Intelligence support to division and corpsISR–Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceITRADS–INSCOM Training and Doctrine SupportITRT–Individual Tactical Reporting ToolIWS-B–Imagery Workstation- BrigadeJAC–Joint Analysis CenterJCATS–Joint Conflict and Tactical SimulationsJCF AWE–Joint Contingency Force AWEJCISO–Joint CI Staff OfficerJCS–Joint Chiefs of StaffJDISS–Joint Deployable Intelligence Support SystemJFCom–Joint Forces CommandJIC—Joint Intelligence CenterJISE–Joint intelligence support elementJMICS–JWICS Mobile Integrated Communications SystemJoint STARS–Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar SystemJOTBS–Joint Operational Test Bed SystemJRTC–Joint Readiness Training CenterJSWS–Joint Services WorkstationJTF–Joint task forceJTT–Joint Tactical TerminalJWICS–Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications SystemKF–Kazar FuryKFOR–Kosovo ForceKIOWA-W–KIOWA WarriorKL–Klieglight reportLAV–Light Armored VehicleLBA–APACHE LongbowLD–Line of departureLGSM–Light GSMLIWA–U.S. Army Land Information Warfare ActivityLNO–Liaison officerLOB–Line of bearingLP/OP–Listening post/observation postLPU–Limited procurement urgentLRS–Long-range surveillanceLZ–Landing zoneMACOM–Major commandMASINT–Measurement and signature intelligence

MCS–Maneuver Control SystemMDMP–Military decisionmaking processMETT-TC–Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time available, and civilian consider- ationsMGS–Magnetic grid systemMGSM–Medium Ground Station ModuleMI–Military IntelligenceMICCC–MI Captains Career CourseMIOAC–MI Officer Advanced CourseMIOBC–MI Officer Basic CourseMIPB–Military Intelligence Profes- sional BulletinMOOTW–Military operations other than warMOS–Military occupational specialtyMOUT–Military operations in urban terrainMPAD–Mobile public affairs detach- mentMS–MultisensorMTI–Moving target indicatorMTOE–Modified table of organization and equipmentMTW–Major theater warNAI–Named area of interestNATO–North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNAV–NavigationNBC–Nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCO–Noncommissioned officerNCOIC–NCO in chargeNEO–Noncombatant evacuation operationsNETT–New Equipment Training TeamNFA–No fire areaNGIC–National Ground Intelligence CenterNGOs–Nongovernmental organiza- tionsNIMA–National Imagery and Mapping AgencyNIST–National Intelligence Support TeamNSA–National Security AgencyNSTO–New System Training OfficeO&I–Operations and intelligenceO&O–Organization and operationsOB–Order of battleOCMI–Office of the Chief of Military IntelligenceOCR–Optical character readerOMT–Operational management teamOP CF–Operations career fieldOPFOR–Opposing forces

OPMS–Officer Personnel Management SystemOPORD–Operations orderOps, OPS–OperationsOPTEMPO–Operational tempoOSD–Office of the Secretary of DefenseOTC–Officer Transition CourseOTM–On the movePAO–Public affairs officerPCS–Permanent change of stationPDC–Personal Data CompanionPE–Practical exercisePEO-W–Program Executive Office for Strike Weapons and Unmanned AviationPERSCOM–U.S. Total Army

Personnel CommandPIR–Priority intelligence requirementsPLT–PlatoonPM–Project managerPOI–Program of instructionPSYOPS–Psychological operationsQRC–Quick-reaction capabilityR&D–Research and developmentR&S–Reconnaissance and surveillanceRC–Reserve ComponentRDD–Required delivery dateREMBASS II–Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System IIRFI–Requests for informationROTC–Reserve Officer Training CorpsRSOC–Regional SIGINT Operations CenterRSTA–Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisitionRTIP–Radar Technology Insertion ProgramRWS–Remote WorkstationS&T–Scientific and technicalSALUTE–Report; size, actions, location, uniforms, time, and equipmentSAR–Synthetic-aperture radarSASO–Stability and support opera tions [not an approved acronym]SCI–Sensitive compartmented informationSCIF–SCI facilitySDC–Sample data collectionSEMA–Special Electronic Mission AircraftSIGINT–Signals intelligenceSINCGARS–Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

Glossary of Acronyms Used in This Issue (Continued)


SIPERNET–Secure Internet Protocol Router NetworkSIR–Specific information requirementsSLC–Senior Leader’s ConferenceSOF–Special Operations ForcesSOR–Special orders and requestsSOP–Standing operating procedureSOUTHCOM–U.S. Southern Com- mandSSC–Small-scale contingencySSE–Single-Source EnclaveSTX–Student training exerciseSU–Situational understandingSWO–Senior warrant officer; Staff weather officerT&A–Transcription and analysisT/I–Tactical internetTAC–Teach, advise and counselTACSIM–Tactical SimulationTBD–To be determinedTCDL–Tactical Common DatalinkTCS–Temporary change of station; Theater communications System; Tactical control stationTDA–Tables of Distribution and Allowances

TDDS–Tactical Data Dissemination SystemTDL–Tactical DatalinkTDY–Temporary dutyTEB–Tactical exploitation battalionTENCAP–Tactical Exploitation of National CapabilitiesTES–Tactical engagement simulationTF–Task ForceTGT–TargetTIBS–Tactical Information Broadcast SystemTLC–Tactical Leaders CourseTOC–Tactical operations centerTOCEX–TOC exerciseTOE–Table of organization and equipmentTOPS–Tactical Onboard Processing SystemTPC–Task performance capabilityTRADOC–U.S. Army Training and Doctrine CommandTRIXS–Tactical Reconnaissance Intelligence Exchange SystemTRRIP–Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package

TS, TS II–TROJAN SPIRIT (Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal) IITSM–TRADOC System ManagerTTP–Tactics, techniques, and proceduresTUAV–Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Shadow 200)UAV–Unmanned aerial vehicleU.N.–United NationsUSACECOM–U.S. Army Communica-

tions–Electronics CommandUSAICS–U.S. Army Intelligence Center and SchoolUSAIC&FH–U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort HuachucaUSAR–U.S. Army ReserveUSAREUR–U.S. Army, EuropeUSASMA–U.S. Army Sergeants Major AcademyVHS–Video home systemVTC–Video teleconferenceWMD–Weapons of mass destructionXO–Executive officer

Contributing Editors and ProofreadersWe thank the following officers for their many contributions to the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin forOctober-December 2000. They all worked in the MIPB Office while on casual status. We wish them all the best in theirclasses and their follow-on assignments!

Contributing Editors: CPTs Robert S. Davidson, Jr., Brian E. Jackson, Timothy W. Johnson, Thomas H. Nguyen, andCayla W. Slusher.

Editing, Proofreading and Other Contributions: 2LT Jason R. Campbell, 2LT Bridget T. Carter, CPT Sung Chon, 2LTLaurel M. Denniston, 2LT Michael N. Desmond, 2LT Jesse L. Falk, 2LT Cheryl A. Martin, CPT Demetrius “Mac” McClarty,CPT Maura K. McGrane, 2LT Susan M. Meggars, 2LT George P. O’Malley, 2LT Cory D. Poppe, CPT Mark G. Reardanz.

Glossary of Acronyms Used in This Issue (Continued)

Attention MICA Members MIPB Subscriptions through MICAIn its quarterly newsletter (4th Quarter 1999), The Vanguard, the MI Corps Association notified its members that theywould only continue receive the published copy of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin if they returned aform by 1 March 2000. (This action was due to a price increase for MIPB to $10 and $12.50 foreign.) MICA sent us only110 names for continued receipt of the published magazine effective with the April-June issue of MIPB. The rest of youmay contact the MICA Administrator, Ms. Janet Klucsarits, via E-mail at [email protected] (include “MIPB Subscrip-tion” in the subject line) or you can call her at (520) 459-5012. Their website address is http://www.micorps.org. Themailing address is MICA, P.O. Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020.

The Vanguard stated that MIPB is available on line; that fact appeared to be part of MICA’s justification for this action.MIPB is available at our website but our policy since 1995 has been to load an issue on the Internet when the printermails the following issue. Thus, the Internet issues will not include the current one.

MICA is now charging $11.50 for MIPB subscriptions with MICA membership. If you wish to subscribe to the magazinedirectly rather than through MICA, you may contact Mrs. Cruz Martinez via E-mail at [email protected] by telephone at (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015; the fax number is (520) 538-1007 or DSN 879-1007. Her mailingaddress is Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), ATTN: ATZS-CLM (Martinez),Building 61730 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca AZ 85613-6000.

Our October-December 2000 issue of MIPB, “MI Out Front in Transformation,” will be a special issue devoted entirelyto the transformation of the Army and MI’s part in that change. MICA members should contact the organization if theywant copies of that issue.

How to Submit an Article to MIPBSelect a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community. For example, it could be aboutcurrent operations and exercises, equipment, TTP, or training. It could be historical, explain lessons learned,or it could be an essay-type thought-provoking piece. It could be a short “quick tip” on better use ofequipment or personnel, or fast “work-arounds” for problems. Articles from the “hot spots” are alwayswelcome. Seek to add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a newtheory to dispute an existing theory, explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice ona specific topic, or explain how a new piece of technology will change the way we operate.

Write an outline to organize your work and include a working title and headings. Plan to write 1000-2500words (about 2-4 pages single-spaced text with normal margins, not counting graphics) and include graphicsthat enhance understanding of your topic. Quick tips should be 300-800 words. Put the “bottom line upfront” and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs. Follow proper rules of grammar.Consult DA Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders, or William A. McIntosh’s Guide toEffective Writing.

When writing for MIPB, several stylistic pitfalls to avoid for a clearer, more forceful article are—! Maintain the active voice as much as possible. Write, “The soldier performed the task” rather than

“The task was performed by the soldier.”! Make your point. Avoid writing about internal organization administration. If your topic is a new piece

of technology, tell the readers why it is important, how it works better, and how it will affect them.Avoid lengthy descriptions of who approved the new system, quotations from senior leaders des-cribing how good the system is, the reports your organization filed regarding the system, etc.

! Use the fewest words to state your points. Write “Leaders must emphasize training” rather than “Itis imperative for Military Intelligence professional leaders to refocus their attention to training issues.”

Please send the article via E-mail to [email protected] or mail it (with a soft copy ondisk) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-BDB (MIPB Editor),[expedited shipping: Bldg 61730, Room 102], Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. (Please do not use specialdocument templates and do send the graphics separately if by E-mail). We can accept articles in MicrosoftOffice 97, Word 6.0, Word Perfect 6.0a, and ASCII and PowerPoint, Corel, and Adobe graphics. Pleaseinclude with your article—! A cover letter with your work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your wish

to have the article published. Please include your social security number (SSN) so that we can findyou if you transfer, PCS, or ETS/retire before we publish your article; we will protect your SSN andmake no other use of it. Also, indicate whether we may put your article on our Internet web site evenif we do not publish it in the printed magazine.

! Pictures, graphics, and crests/logos with adequate descriptions. Try to find good “action” photos thatillustrate your article; photos and other graphics really enliven an article. We need complete captionsfor the photos (the who, what, where, when, why, and how); the photographer credits; and include theauthor’s name on photos. We can return photos if so requested—be sure to include an address to

which you want the photos sent after we use them. We will gladly accept photos without articles too.! A release signed by your local security officer or SSO stating that your article is unclassified, nonsen-

sitive, and releasable in the public domain. (MIPB is available for sale by the Government PrintingOffice and posted on the Internet.)

! The full name of each author in the byline and a biography for each. The biography should include theauthor’s current duty position, other related assignments, civilian degrees (degree, school, major),and advanced military education (CGSC, War College, SAMS, MSSI, SEIP, PGIP, etc.). (Tell us if wecan print your telephone number and E-mail address with the biography.)

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles. We will send you an acknowledgmentthat we received your article. We may notify you again when we get ready to run it. Please inform us ofyour current E-mail, telephone numbers, and postal addresses if you change jobs, move, or PCS. It can


Constituted in the regular Army on 2 February 1901 atFort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1903 the 14th CavalryRegiment had its baptism in fire during the insurgencycampaign of the Philippines. Upon the successfulcompletion of that campaign in 1906, the Regiment thenreturned to the United States and took up garrisons inthe Pacific northwest, where it assumed peacetimeduties. The Regiment returned to the Philippines in1909.

Then in 1912, the Regiment served in the Mexicancampaign, joining General Black Jack Pershing’s ex-peditionary forces in the summer of 1916, chasing ban-dits throughout the dust and the heat of the Mexicanplains. The Regiment then returned to Texas, where itpatrolled the border until 1918, when it was called intoservice in Europe. The signing of the Armistice atVersailles occurred before the Regiment could crossthe Atlantic, so it reassumed its border patrol mission.

In 1920, the 14th Cavalry Regiment moved to Iowaand served in a peacetime capacity for approximately

two decades. In 1942, the Army inactivated the Regi-ment, and from its lineage came the 14th ArmoredRegiment. On 28 August 1944, the 14th Cavalry Groupsailed for Europe, landed on Omaha Beach 30 Sep-tember 1944, and pressed east. On 18 October, theunit split, with the 18th Squadron attached to the 2dInfantry Division, and the 32d Squadron attached tothe 83d Infantry Division.

On 12 December 1944, the headquarters element re-gained its autonomy, and began guarding the Gap inBelgium. Then, on 16 December, its turrets rang as the14th Cavalry Group received the full brunt of the Ger-man winter counteroffensive in the “Battle of the Bulge.”After two days of savage fighting, the unit reassembledat Vielsam, Belgium, and attached to the 7th ArmoredDivision. On 23 December, the unit held the southernflank of the perimeter, and allowed friendly troops towithdraw. On 25 December, the unit re-equipped, at-tached to the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, and moved backinto the “Bulge” to push back the Nazi foe.

1st Squadron, 14thRSTA Squadron, First In

Constituted on 25 September 1950 in the United StatesArmy as the 209th Counter-Intelligence Corps Detach-ment, the unit activated in the Republic of Korea on 6October 1950. It participated in a number of campaignsduring the Korean War. On 1 November 1954, the unit inactivated until 3 Au-gust 1961, when the U.S. Army redesignated it as the209th Military Intelligence Detachment and activated itin Okinawa on 25 August 1961. The unit again inacti-vated on 25 June 1969. The Army reactivated the unit inthe Republic of Korea on 1 January 1978 and redesig-nated the unit as the 209th MI Company in the ROK from1 April 1983 until 16 October 1988, when it inactivated.In line with the Army’s transformation, the unit reorga-nized and activated as part of the Interim Brigade Com-bat Team (IBCT) at Fort Lewis, Washington, on 15September 2000. The unit’s decorations include Merito-rious Unit Commendations with streamers embroidered

Korea 1952 and Korea 1952-53 and the Republic ofKorea Presidential Unit Citation.The Company formed to support the Army’s first In-terim Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The 209th MI Com-pany is one of four separate companies underneaththe IBCT organization. The 209th MI Company is theorganic military intelligence analysis and integrationmanagement unit that directly supports the brigade S2.The mission of the 209th MI Company is to supportthe 3d BCT’s planning, preparation, and executionof multiple, simultaneous decisive actions across thedistributed area of operations.It will serve as part ofthe brigade as it helps develop doctrine and tactics,techniques, and procedures for the up to eight totaltransformed BCTs. The 209th MI Company will thenconduct intelligence analysis, ISR (intelligence, sur-veillance, and reconnaissance) integration, and

209th Military Int3d Brigade Combat Team

After the bloody and brutal fight in the Ardennes, theRegiment was assigned to the 3d U.S. Army, and endedthe war near the Austrian border. After the Armistice,the Regiment reflagged as the 14th Constabulary Regi-ment in the U.S. Army of Occupation. The Regimentlater redesignated as the 14th Cavalry Regiment in1948, and served on the border, guarding freedom’sfrontier to include the Fulda Gap, until the colors werecased in 1972.

The Army reactivated the 1st Squadron, 14th Cav-alry Regiment, on 15 September 2000 as the U.S.Army’s first Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and TargetAcquisition (RSTA) Squadron in the first Interim Bri-gade Combat Team, as part of the 3d Brigade, 2d In-fantry Division. Delta Troop is the squadron’ssurveillance troop and this is the first time that a recon-naissance squadron has ever had embedded MilitaryIntelligence assets. Equipped with unmanned aerialvehicles, ground surveillance sections, Prophet teams,and NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) reconnais-

sance squads, the troop provides the squadron withaccurate and timely intelligence ensuring the squad-ron and brigade maintain information dominance withinits theater of operation.

The shield is yellow in the color of the Cavalry and thebend is blue for the color of the uniform worn at thetime of the Regiment’s formation. The kris (the knife) isfor the Philippine (Moro) campaigns, and the rattlesnakeis for the Mexican campaigns.

Suivez Moi (Follow Me)!

Cavalry Regimentitial Brigade Combat Team

human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and analy-sis in Korea with the 2d Infantry Division.

A silver-colored metal and enamel device, consistingof a black field with an Indian tomahawk in silver,thereon, with point to dexter, and blade charged with ablue fleur-de-lis; attached to the handle by blue bands,three blue feathers in fanned display to sinister andcontained by a silver scroll bearing the motto “Secondto None” in black letters denotes the 209th MI Com-pany. Blue and white (silver) are associated with theInfantry. The tomahawk alludes to the American originof the unit, as does the Indian head on the sleeve in-signia. The fleur-de-lis symbolizes France, where theunit saw its first combat experience during World War Iwhile the feathers denote the major conflicts in whichthe unit participated.

elligence Company(IBCT), 2d Infantry Division

“First To Know!”

The Transformation of Army Intelligence

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Transcript of The Transformation of Army Intelligence