The Trade-offs of Fighting & Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War & Peace Kelly M. Kadera...
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Transcript of The Trade-offs of Fighting & Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War & Peace Kelly M. Kadera...
The Trade-offs of Fighting & Investing: A Model of the Evolution
of War & Peace
Kelly M. Kadera
Daniel S. Morey
Trade Offs
Investment in Economy Spending on Military
Long run, latent power advantage
Immediate war fighting advantage
Risk losing wars Drag on economy
“…states sometimes limit defense spending either because spending more would bring no strategic advantage or because spending more would weaken the economy and undermine the state’s power in the long run.” Mearsheimer 2001
Trade Offs, cont’d
Industrial War Counterforce War
Shorter wars Better chances in head-to-head combat
Resource bases suffer Long, cumulatively costly war
Interestingly, models of conflict developed by economists generally do include a resource trade-off but not an explicit decision to fight or attack ... whereas those developed by political scientists typically do include an explicit decision to attack but not a resource trade-off. (Powell 2006, 193, fn 58)
Question• How do states weigh these options and
ultimately choose a strategy for winning a rivalry?
• States compare the over time consequences of:– Peace-time competitions– Traditional wars– Industrial wars
Modeling Peacetime Rivalry• Growth from investment
)( iiii mrr
Nation i’s aggregate resource base
Nation i’s level of military spending
Growth multiplier
Guns vs. growth (Knorr 1970)
Modeling Peacetime Rivalry
• Limits to growth
ii
iiiii mK
rmrr 1)(
Nation i’s carrying capacity (Cohen 1995)
Modeling Peacetime Rivalry
i
ii
ii
iiiii r
m
mK
rmrr
1)(
Drag on economy from military spending (Kennedy ’91, Morgenthau ’78)
e.g., German armament in width vs. armament in depth
Modeling Peacetime Rivalry
• Military spending for security (Waltz ’79, Morgenthau…)
jii mm
Action-reaction (Richardson ‘60)
Modeling Peacetime Rivalry
i
ijii r
mmm 1
Military allocations limited by resources (Bellany ’99)
Modeling Peacetime Rivalry
i
ii
ii
iiiii r
m
mK
rmrr
1)(
i
ijii r
mmm 1
j
jj
jj
jjjjj r
m
mK
rmrr
1)(
j
jijj r
mmm 1
Modeling Counterforce War
• Counterforce War = targeting military assets
jiji
ijii mm
r
mmm
1
Interaction produces destruction
“A thousand men fire twice as many rounds as five hundred, but of the thousand, more will be hit than of the five hundred, for it must be assumed that the thousand will be deployed more closely. Von Clausewitz Book 2 Chapter 12, page 205.
“power to hurt” (Slantchev ’03)
i is j’s ability to “bear costs in return” (Slantchev ’03)
Modeling Industrial War
• Targeting economic resources
jiji
ii
ii
iiiii mr
r
m
mK
rmrr
1)(
Interaction produces destruction
e.g., Allied bombing of Germany during WWII
Parameters
Parameter State i State j
α .2 .1
β .07 .12
ρ .4 .1
.1 .22
K 40 50
Simulation ProcedurePeacetime Rivalry
25 50 75 100 125 150 175Time
5
10
15
20
25
Power
mj
mi
25 50 75 100 125 150 175Time
510
1520
2530Power
rj
ri
Representative SimulationsPeacetime Rivalry
25 50 75 100 125 150 175Time
5
10
15
20
25
Power
mj
mi
25 50 75 100 125 150 175Time
510
1520
2530Power
rj
ri
Counterforce War
10 20 30 40 50 60Time
0.20.4
0.6
0.8
11.2Power
mj
mi
10 20 30 40 50 60Time
10
20
30
40
50Power
rj
ri
Industrial War
-10-7.5-5-2.5 2.5 5Time
0.60.81
1.2
Power
mj
mi
-10 -7.5 -5 -2.5 2.5 5Time
51015
2025
30Power
rj
ri
Information from Simulations
1. When/why state prefer 1 type of contest over another
2. Who wins1. If anyone wins2. How one side wins
3. Duration
Deduction 1: A state only prefers war when it has fewer resources and a weaker military than does its opponent.
Peacetime Rivalry
10 20 30 40Time
1
2
3
4
Military
mj
mi
10 20 30 40Time
5101520253035
Resources
rj
ri
Counterforce War
20 40 60 80 100Time
0.60.81
1.21.41.6
Military
mj
mi
20 40 60 80 100Time
10
20
30
40
50Resources
rj
ri
Industrial War
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3Time
0.20.40.60.81
1.2Military
mj
mi
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3Time
123456
Resources
rj
ri
“painful peaces” (Powell ’06)
Deduction 2: Counterforce wars result in stalemates.
Peacetime Rivalry
25 50 75 100125150175Time
51015202530
Military
mj
mi
50 100 150Time
10
20
30
40
Resources
rj
ri
Counterforce War
5 10 15 20 25 30 35Time
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5Military
mj
mi
5 10 15 20 25 30 35Time
10
20
30
40
50Resources
rj
ri
Industrial War
-4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3Time
2
4
6
Military
mj
mi
-4 -2 2Time
500
1000
1500
2000
Resources
rj
ri
Deduction 3: Industrial wars lead to the shortest conflict duration
Peacetime Rivalry
20406080100120Time
5101520
Military
mj
mi
20406080100120Time
5101520
Resources
rj
ri
Counterforce War
10 20 30 40 50Time
0.60.811.21.41.61.82
Military
mj
mi
10 20 30 40 50Time
1020304050
Resources
rj
ri
Industrial War
-2 -1 1 2 3Time
246810
Military
mj
mi
-2 -1 1 2 3Time
102030405060
Resources
rj
ri
Conclusions
• Type of conflict matters– Provides advantage (or a chance) to states under
certain conditions
• Not irrational to enter into a losing war• Looking at where preferences come from
Future Directions
1. Process vs. outcome2. Model modifications
1. Shooting2. Mixed military and industrial3. States using different strategies4. Willingness to suffer (breaking points)
3. Empirics