The Theory of Collective Security and Its Limitations in Explaining International Organization

THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

BY

LAWRENCE MWAGWABIMA DIPLOMACY

Claude Jr., notes that the idea that a peaceful and stable world order can be maintained

without the benefit of a collective security system has been seen by most persons concerned

with international organization as a far-fetched idea1. The theory of collective security deals

directly with the issue of how to cause peace2. It takes cognisance of the fact that military

power is a central fact of international politics and is likely to remain the case for some time.

Thus, the key to enhancing stability in the world is to manage properly military power. For

advocates of collective security, it is institutions that are vital in managing power

successfully3. This essay will critically analyze the theory of collective security and its

limitation in explaining international organization. There will be explanation of concepts such

as “collective security”, “balance of power”, “global government” and “international

organization” which are terms that feature prominently in the theory of collective security. An

in-depth analysis of the theory of collective security will be provided with a view of

providing its key arguments, relevance, strengths and limitations. Relevant examples will also

be given in relation to and explaining the theory. A conclusion will be drawn explaining the

significance of this theory and its relevance in present times.

According to Danchin, the concept of collective security is “notoriously difficult to

define, as the term is associated with a loose set of assumptions and ideas and its continued

existence remains a contested concept” 4. Claude Jr., agrees and further suggests that when

1

1

I. L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th edition., (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 245

2

2

L. L. Martin, “Institution and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict, “International Security, Vol. 14 No. 4 (Spring, 1992), pp. 174-175

3

3

J. J. Mearscheimer, “The Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/1995), pp 26 -27

4

4

P. G. Danchin, “Things Fall Apart: The Concept of Collective Security in International Law” P. G. Danchin and H. Fisher (eds.) United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 40

the term collective security if used loosely, appears to be a synonym of peace or world order

while it has also been used to refer to any and all multilateral efforts to deal with the problem

of international peace and security, rather than a specifically to the system that gained

prominence after the First World War5. Roberts and Kingsbury define collective security as

“an arrangement where each state in the system accepts that security of one of them is a

concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression”6. It is the

foundational principle of the League of Nations: namely that member states would take a

threat or attack on one member as an assault on all of them.

Kupchan et al defines collective security as, “an agreement between states to abide by

certain norms and rules to maintain stability and when necessary, band together to stop

aggression” 7. This definition captures three distinct ideas: the purpose or end of stopping

“aggression”; the reliance on legal norms to determine both the meaning of that term and the

appropriate response; and the rejection of self-help in favour of collective action8. Thus,

collective security rests on the idea of institutionalizing the legal use of force, “to reduce

5

5

I. L. Claude, Jr., Collective Security In Europe and Asia, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), pp 7-8

6

6

A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury, “Introduction: The UN’s Role in International Society since 1945”, in A. Roberts and B. Kinsgsbury (eds.) United Nations, Divided World, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 30

7

7

C. A. Kupchan and C. A. Kupchan, “The Promise of Collective Security,” International Security, Vol. 20 (Summer 1995), pp 52-53

8

8

P. G. Danchin, “Things Fall Apart: The Concept of Collective Security in International Law” P. G. Danchin and H. Fisher (eds.) United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)University of Maryland School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series (2009), p. 41

reliance of self-help as a rather crude instrument of law enforcement.” 9 When these ideas are

brought together, the concept of collective security may be further defined as:

“... an institutionalized universal or regional system in which States have agreed by treaty jointly to meet any act of aggression or other illegal use of force resorted by a member State of the system.”

The concept is primarily directed against the illegal use of force within the group of states

forming the collective security system rather than an external threat. This idea is captured in

Johnson and Niemeyers definition of collective security as:

“ a system based on the universal obligation of all nations to join forces against an aggressor state as soon as the fact of aggression is determined by established procedure. In such a system, aggression is defined as a wrong in universal terms and an aggressor, as soon as he is identified, stands condemned. Hence, the obligation of all nations to take action against him is conceived as a duty to support right against wrong. It is equally founded upon the practical expectation that a communal solidarity of all nations would from the outset make it clear to every government that aggression does not pay10.”

In order to understand the underlying logic of collective security, it would be important

to distinguish collective security from two closely related terms, namely balance of power

and global government. A balance of power arrangement between states rests on the idea of

decentralization. States act as separate units without subordinating their autonomy or

sovereignty to any central agency established for the management of power relations. Thus,

“singly or in combinations reflecting the coincidence of interests, States seek to influence the

pattern of power distribution and to determine their own places within that pattern.”11 Under

this conception, states may form defensive alliances such as under the North Atlantic Treaty

9

9

J. Delbruck, “Collective Security” in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, (Oxford: Elswevier, 1992), p. 646

10

1

H. C. Johnson and G. Niemeyer, “Collective Security: The Validity of an Ideal,” International Organization, Vol. 8 (1954), pp 19-20

11

1

I. L. Claude, Jr., “The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations”, International Organization Vol. 15 (Spring 1961), pp. 219 - 221

Organization (NATO) against actual or perceived external threats. These sorts of flexible

alliances allow for recurrent shifts of alignment to take place. The promise of order lies in the

expectation that competing claims to power will somehow balance and thereby cancel each

other out to produce “deterrence through equilibration.”12

On the other hand, global government posit the creation of a centralized institutional

system superior to individual states with a monopoly on power and the use of force similar to

that of well-ordered national state. This conception is based on depriving states of their

“standing as centers of power and policy, where issues of war and peace are concerned,” and

superimposing on them “an institution possessed of the authority and capability to maintain,

by unchallengeable force so far as may be necessary, the order and stability of a global

community.” 13 Global government is thus a normative or ideal vision of the international

political community under a universal law which does not currently exist.

The concept of collective security sits uneasily between and incorporates elements of

both these elements (balance of power and global government) thus functioning as a

dialectical notion of “order without government”14 in an effort to manage the problem of

power relations between states by “superimposing a scheme of partially centralized

management upon a situation in which power remains fused among national units.”15 The

hybrid system involves a centralization of authority over the use of force to the extent that

states are deprived of the legal right to use force at their own discretion and agree to follow

12

1

Ibid., p., 222

13

1

Ibid., p., 222

14

1

I. L. Claude, Jr. “An Autopsy of Collective Security”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90 (Winter 1975-6), p. 715

15

1

I. L. Claude, Jr., “The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations”, International Organization Vol. 15 (Spring 1961), p. 221

objective rules governing the threat and use of force requires an international organization

with authority not only to determine when a resort to force is illegitimate but also authority to

require states to collaborate under its direction in suppressing such use of force. This is

system of collective security falls short of creating an institution with a centralized monopoly

of force in the full sense implied by world government. The power wielded by a hybrid

collective security system thus can reach no further than that given by the sovereign will of

its members16.

International organization can be defined as “a process; international organizations

are representative aspects of the phase of that process which has been reached at any given

time”17. International organization includes not only interstate arrangements but,

increasingly, arrangements among non-governmental and transitional actors18. Thus, the

landscape of international organizations includes both inter-governmental organizations and

international non-governmental organizations19. Scholars also note that international

organization is a very broad concept, which has evolved with the practice of various forms of

international governance20.

16

1


17

1

I. L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th Ed., (New York: Random House, 1964) p. 4

18

1

A. Thompson and D. Snidal, International Organization, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1999), pp 692 -722; 692

19

1

Ibid., p. 692

20

2

See I. L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th Ed., (New York: Random House, 1964) pp. 4 - 5 and A. Thompson and D. Snidal, International Organization, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1999), pp 692 -722; 692

In order to explain the theory of collective security, it would be important to examine

its key assumptions, relevance and limitations. Organski21, for instance, lists five basic

assumptions underlying the theory of collective security. That in an armed conflict, member

nation-states will be able to agree on which nation is the aggressor. All member nation-states

are equally committed to contain and constrain the aggression, irrespective of its source or

origin. All member nation-states have identical freedom of action and ability to join in

proceedings against the aggressor. The cumulative power of the cooperating members of the

alliance for collective security will be adequate and sufficient to overpower the might of the

aggressor. In the light of the threat posed by the collective might of the nations of a collective

security coalition, the aggressor nation will modify its policies, or if unwilling to do so, will

be defeated.

On the other hand, Claude Jr. 22, points out that the theory of collective security is less

heavily dependent on a set of assumptions about the nature and causes of war and thus claims

to be applicable to wider variety of belligerent (confrontational) situations, assuming that not

all wars occur from similar type of causes.

The first assumption of collective security is simply that wars are likely to occur and

that they ought to be prevented. Conflicts are an outcome of unreflective passion or deliberate

plan. Wars normally represent efforts to settle disputes, or they could be effects of indefinably

broad situations of hostility or calculated methods to realize ambitious designs of conquests.

Collective security is a specialized instrument of international policy in the sense that, it is

not only intended to prevent the arbitrary and aggressive use of force or provide enforcement

mechanisms for the whole body of international law but also assumes the centre piece of

21

2

A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), p. 461

22

2

See I. L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th Ed., (New York: Random House, 1964), pp 249 - 284.

world order is the restraint of military action rather than the guarantee of respect for all

legal obligations. It also assumes that this ideal (that is, restraint of military action) may be

achieved or at least approximated by a reformation of international policy without changing

the structure of international system. Thus collective security holds the belief that

governments are open to (or agreeable with) moral appeals against the misuse of force, and

therefore have a rationalistic approach to peace. The rational appeal suggested by collective

security to potential belligerents is the use of diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions as

tools for inducing rational decision to avoid ‘threatened damage’ to national self-interest.

Collective security also assumes the moral clarity of the situation, the assignability of guilt

for a threat to or a breach of the peace. It focuses on the concept of aggression, with its

implication that the parties to a military encounter can be characterized as an aggressor and

victim. After the identification of the guilty party, collective security rejects primary concern

of international morality in favour of the principle of power. Collective security fails if

either of two assumptions proves invalid: that blame can be confidently assessed for

international crises, and that states are rationally calculating enough to behave prudently.

According to Claude Jr., collective security rests on the proposition that war can be

prevented by deterrent effect of overwhelming power of states that are too rational to invite

certain defeat. In this regard, it is similar to a balance of power system involving defensive

alliances. Collective security also assumes the satisfaction of unusually complex network of

requirements namely: those of a subjective character which are related to the general

acceptability of the responsibilities of collective security, and objective requirements, related

to the suitability of the global situation to the operation of collective security23.

23

2

Ibid., p. 251

On the subjective requirements, collective security is dependent on the positive

commitment to the value of world peace by a great mass of states. Its basic requirement is

that the premise of the “indivisibility of peace” should be deeply established in the thinking of

governments and peoples24. Collective security rests on the assumption that it is true, and that

governments and peoples can be expected to recognize and act on the truth, that the fabric of

human society has become so tightly knit and woven that a breach any where threatens

disintegration everywhere. Unchecked aggression in one direction encourages and helps to

empower its perpetrators to penetrate in other directions. Or, successful use of lawless force

in one situation contributes to the undermining of respect for the principle of order in all

situations.

The remoteness of aggression is irrelevant. This is exemplified by the British Prime

Minister Neville Chamberlain, when he switched from sighing, in the fall of 1938, “How

horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks

here, because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people we know nothing,” to

asserting, one year later, that “If, in spite of all we find ourselves forced to embark on a

struggle ... we shall not be fighting for the political future of a far-away city in a foreign land;

we shall be fighting for the preservation of those principles, the destruction of which would

involve the destruction of all possibility of peace and security for the peoples of the world.”25

Collective security requires rejection of the isolationist ideal of localizing wars, in terms of

both its possibility and its desirability and recommends to all the advice given by the

representative of Haiti in the League of Nations debate concerning Italian aggression to

24

2

Ibid., p. 251

25

2

Alan Bullock, “Hitler: Study in Tyranny”, (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 499, in I. L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th Ed., (New York: Random House, 1964) p. 251

Ethiopia, Alfred Nemours who said, “Great or small, strong or weak, near or far, white or

coloured, let us never forget that one day we may be somebody’s Ethiopia.”26

In requiring assurance of the indivisibility of peace, collective security demands a

factual agreement and then it imposes an ideal requirement, and that is, loyalty to the world

community. That the system will work if the peoples of the world identify their particular

interests so closely with the general interest of mankind that they go beyond just recognizing

the interdepence of nations to a feeling of involvement of all nations. The responsibility of

participating in a collective security system are too huge to be borne by any nation but people

motivated by genuine sympathy for any and all victims of aggression, and loyalty to the

values of a global system of law and order. The operation of a collective security system

must always be unstable unless there is belief that what is good for world peace is necessarily

good for the nation and is deeply engrained in governments and peoples27.

Another requirement of collective security is that all states be willing to entrust their

destinies to collective security28. This implies that confidence is an essential condition of the

success of a collective security system, thus states must be prepared to rely upon its

effectiveness and impartiality. In other words, if they accept the condition that they “entrust

their destinies” to collective security, then they are likely to behave in ways that will

maximise the chances that the confidence they have is justified.

26

2

F. P. Walters, “A History of the League of Nations,” (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 653 in I. L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th Ed., (New York: Random House, 1964) p. 251

27

2

Ibid., p.251

28

2

Ibid., p.255

On the objective requirements of collective security, it (collective security) also

depends upon meeting a number of basic conditions in the external sphere. The external

sphere includes the power, the legal and the organizational situations29. Thus the ideal milieu

for a collective security system is, firstly, a world characterized by a considerable diffusion of

power. This means that the most favourable situation would be one where all states

commanded equal resources, and the least favourable, one marked by the concentration of

effective power in a few major states. The existence of several great powers of roughly equal

strength is essential to collective security.

Secondly, a collective security system demands a substantial universality of

membership. Collective security does not, at the outset know “probable aggressor” and thus

assumes that any state may become an aggressor. Thus, collective security is a design for a

system of world order. The system is intended to provide security for every state against the

particular threat that arouses its sense of national anxiety. The other assumption is that if

every potential aggressor, every state which is or might become the source of the misgivings

of another state, were excluded, they system will have very few members indeed. Thus, a

workable system of collective security cannot afford the exclusion or abstention of a major

power. It is dangerous to have an important commercial and naval power on the outside. This

is because the refusal of these states to cooperate and to agree in the violation of their normal

rights is enough to make it difficult the effective application of economic sanctions to the

aggressor. Therefore, the doctrine of collective security relies heavily on the proposal that

non military measure will be sufficient to control aggression. Military commitments are

acceptable only because they will be invoked but economic sanctions are peculiarly

dependent on the application of universal application for their intended results30.

29

2

Ibid., p. 256

30

3

Ibid., pp. 256 - 257

Thirdly, collective security opts for preponderance (predominance, superiority) of

power being at the disposal of the international community rather than in the hands of a

single state for aggressive purposes. Thus, collective security purports to establish a portable

preponderance ready to be shifted to the defence of any victim of aggression and capable of

making such a victim superior to its adversary31. In an ideal sense, collective security makes

preponderance safe for the world by making use of it to the purpose of guaranteeing security

of members of the international community. This analysis then demonstrates the importance

for a collective security system of meaningful (objective) use of power diffusion and

organizational comprehensiveness32. Thus, if the power arrangements are such that no state

commands more than ten percent of the world’s strength, the possibility is open for collective

security to mobilize up to ninety percent against any state. On the other hand, if one state

controls a very substantial portion of global power resources, forty five percent, for instance,

the collective matching of its strength is doubtful and amassing overwhelming power against

it is clearly impossible33. Collective security system approaches all-inclusiveness, the

possibility of its disposing of sufficient resources to outclass any aggressor grows. However,

the converse of this is that this possibility is correspondingly diminished34.

It is important at this juncture to examine the historical evolution of conceptual and

institutional forms of collective security. Claude Jr., notes that at no time have all or even

most basic preconditions of collective security been realized, and that collective security has

31

3

Ibid., pp. 257 - 258

32

3

Ibid., p. 258

33

3

Ibid., p. 258

34

3

Ibid., p. 258

not become the operative system of international relations. Collective security theoretical

ideas find their origins from the seventeenth century onwards. In ideal terms, collective

security can be traced back to various schemes for perpetual peace proposed by William

Penn, Abbé de St. Pierre and Immanuel Kant. Penn’s Essay Towards the Present and Future

Peace of Europe in 1693 and Abbé de St. Pierre’s Projet pour render la paix perpetuelle en

Europe (Project to Render Perpetual Peace in Europe) in 1713 each advocated, for example,

a legal organization of European powers in a League comparable to modern international

organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations35. A century later, Kant’s

famous essay, On Perpetual Peace in 1875 argued that peace was an aim that mankind could

realize, but only incrementally. In each of these works, the essential ideas of collective

security began to take shape, that in the absence of a central authority for the enforcement of

law and maintenance of peace, it was necessary to provide a substitute solution; a substitute

can only be created by organizing the common defence of all states against the illegal use of

force; and the rights of states to use of force as a form of self-help or law enforcement must

be reduced to a minimum or limited to an interim measure36.

These ideas drew on deeper currents and shifts set in motion by the classicism born in

the wake of the 1648 “Peace of Westphalia” which sought to justify normative order by

building on equal right to sovereignty and independence of states37. Between the sixteenth

and seventeenth century, there was the emergence of the “liberal doctrine of politics” in

35

3

J. Delbruck, “Collective Security:, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law: International Relations and Legal Cooperation, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishers, 1992), p. 646

36

3


37

3

D. Kennedy, “Primitive Legal Scholarship”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 27 (1986), p. 97

international legal thought. In this process, just war doctrine was transformed from ethical to

formally legal as the use of force was recast in legalistic terms as self-help remedy of the last

resort38.

The institutional origins of collective security may be traced back to the efforts of the

European powers to maintain peace and security within the nineteenth century international

system called “the Concert of Europe”. The Congress System or Concert of Europe

comprised of a Holy Alliance between Austria, Prussia and Russia and the Quadripartite

Alliance between Austria, Britain, Prussia and Russia, with France entering in 1818 via the

Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle39. The Concert provided not only for the common defence against

external dangers in the classical form of a defensive alliance, but also for collective action by

the European Great Powers against any potential enemy within their own ranks40. As this

structure gradually collapsed, the peace movement began to advocate at the turn of the

century for renewed conceptions of collective security. Walter Schucking, for instance, was a

prominent advocate institutionalized peacekeeping machinery which, “he visualized as a

universal organization of states for the purpose of collective action and responsibility of

maintenance of international peace and security”41. While it was intended to be a collective

security arrangement, the League was in reality closer to a balance of power arrangement as it

38

3

M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, (Helsinki: Finish Lawyers Publishing Company, 2005), p. 52

39

3

Op. Cit., p. 48

40

4

K. Knipping, H. Von Mangoldt and V. Rittergerger, The United Nations System and Its Predecessors, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 7-9

41

4

J. Delbruck, “Collective Security:, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law: International Relations and Legal Cooperation, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishers, 1992), p. 649

lacked a coordinated, centralized decision-making procedure capable of applying sanctions

against aggressors internal to the system itself42.

It was not until the First World War, however, that an institutionalized system of

collective security was realized by the formation in 1919 of the League of Nation. The

creation of the League of Nations built on long standing efforts since the late nineteenth

century to reduce the effects of war on belligerents and civilians alike by adopting new rules

of humanitarian law and outlawing war and interstate aggression under international law43.

The League was effective in the 1923 Corfu crisis between Greece and Italy; Great Britain

and Turkey over Mosul (in the British Mandate of Iraq); Greece and Bulgaria over border

incursions by both parties; and Lithuania and Poland. The only deployments of the League of

Nations forces were in 1935 Saarland Plebiscite and in 1933 – 34 Colombian force acting

under League authority in the upper Amazon. However, these “successes were due, in small

part, to the fact that the disputes were of relatively minor nature and either concerned two

weak states which lacked powerful allies within the League Council, or alternatively involved

one party with such a preponderance of power that the other had no practical alternative but

to acquiesce in a settlement which the League felt able to endorse.” 44 The inability of the

League to prevent Italy from invading Ethiopia in 1936 provides the classic illustration of this

deficiency. The lesson drawn from the League of Nations was that without a “centralized

authoritative determination of whether an act of aggression has occurred or not, and of the

measures to be taken against the act of aggression, collective security may not become

effective.” Furthermore, it was “essential that the use of force be completely outlawed, except

42

4

H. McCoubery and J. C. Morris, “International Law, International Relations and Development of European Collective Security,” Journal of Armed Conflict Law Vol. 4 (1999), p. 195

43

4

Ibid., p. 649

44

4

Ibid, pp. 199 -200

for the purpose of self defence, in order to exclude any possibility for a State legally to

assume an aggressive policy45.”

After the League’s failure in the period before and during the Second World War, the

United Nations emerged in a renewed effort to realize the idea of collective security. The

United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, united in political terms as the

victorious powers emerging from the war, sought to overcome the weaknesses of the League

of Nations through two main innovations; first, through the drafting of a new Charter that

completely prohibited the use of force except as a means of individual and collective self-

defence; and second, by creating a new Security Council with the authority to determine

whether an act of aggression had occurred and what measures ought to be taken by its

member states in response46. These improvements in collective security were soon

diminished, however, by the onset of the Cold War and ensuing collapse of whatever political

solidarity had previously existed between the Soviet Union and the West47.

There four observations that one can make in the brief history of collective security.

First, historical development of the idea of collective security can be variously be interpreted

and is not a product of any simple or singular process48. The development of international

45

4

J. Delbruck, “Collective Security:, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law: International Relations and Legal Cooperation, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishers, 1992), pp. 650 - 651

46

4

R. B. Russel, “Review: The United Nations and Collective Security: A Historical Analysis,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 69 (1975), p. 928; see also A. Legault, I. Desmartis, J. Fournier and C. Thumerelle, “The United Nations at Fifty: Regime Theory and Collective Security”, International Journal, (Winter 1994-95), pp. 86 - 87

47

4

P. G. Danchin, “Things Fall Apart: The Concept of Collective Security in International Law” P. G. Danchin and H. Fisher (eds.) United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 49

48

4

Ibid., p. 49

legal norms pertaining to collective security in Europe and more generally should be seen as

a succession of responses to war crises with which existing ideal standards have adequately

failed to cope49. As McCoubrey and Morris observe, this process “may be traced historically

through the traumas, inter alia, of the Thirty Years War, the French revolutionary and

Napoleonic wars and the First and Second World War”50. Thus, the most recent efforts of the

United Nations reform are part of a far longer historical continuum of idealistic and

institutional change occurring in the immediate aftermath of a catastrophe51.

Secondly, even though the United Nations was intended to be a new collective

security arrangement remedying the various deficiencies of the League of Nations, its

structure retained elements of the balance of power paradigm52. This is most clear in the veto

rule which allows each of the permanent five Great Powers the capacity to prevent Chapter

VII enforcement measures directed towards either themselves or any other state which may

choose to support or protect, or in other case in which they prefer to participate or to have

others participate in the enforcement measures under UN patronage. The veto provision

“renders collective security impossible in all instances most vital to the preservation of world

peace and order.”53 In this respect, the United States declared openly that, “if a major power

49

4

Ibid., p. 49

50

5

H. McCoubery and J. C. Morris, “International Law, International Relations and Development of European Collective Security,” Journal of Armed Conflict Law Vol. 4 (1999), p.196

51

5

P. G. Danchin, “Things Fall Apart: The Concept of Collective Security in International Law” P. G. Danchin and H. Fisher (eds.) United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 49

52

5

Ibid., p. 50

53

5

I. L. Claude, Jr., “The Management of Power in Changing United Nations,” International Organization. Vol. 15 (Spring 1961), p. 224

became an aggressor the Council had no power to prevent war.”54 Claude Jr., suggests that the

UN Charter is, “a curious amalgam of collective security, dominant in ideological terms, and

a balance of power, dominant in terms of practical of application.”55

Thirdly, the concept of global government has always figured as a distant and

unrealizable ideal in articulation and realization of collective security56. In this respect, World

Federalists and advocates for other forms of supranational organization have long attacked

collective security, “precisely because it neither anticipates nor promises to bring about the

drastic reduction of the role of the nation-state in the international system.”57Fourthly, the

idea of collective security is premised at some level of efficacy of the idea of the rule of law

in international relations58.

The theory of collective security has certain limitations. According to Morgenthau59,

the logic of collective security is flawless provided that it can be made to work under the

conditions prevailing in the international scene. For collective security to operate as a devise

545 UN Information Organizations and US Library of Congress, Documents of United Nations Conference on International Organization, (New York, 1945), p. 514 in P. G. Danchin, “Things Fall Apart: The Concept of Collective Security in International Law” P. G. Danchin and H. Fisher (eds.) United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 50

555 I. L. Claude, Jr., “The Management of Power in Changing United Nations,” International Organization. Vol. 15 (Spring 1961), p. 229

565 P. G. Danchin, “Things Fall Apart: The Concept of Collective Security in International Law” P. G. Danchin and H. Fisher (eds.) United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 50

575 I. L. Claude Jr., “Comment on ‘An Autopsy of Collective Security’”, p. 716

585 D. Kennedy, “ Theses About International Law Discourse”, German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23 (1980), p. 353

595 H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace. 7th Ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2006), p. 435

for prevention of war, three assumptions must be fulfilled. Firstly, the collective system must

be able to muster at all times such overwhelming strength against any potential aggressor or

coalition of aggressors that the latter would never dare to challenge the order defended by the

collective system. Secondly, at least those nations whose combined strength would meet the

requirement under (1) must have the same conception of security that they are supposed to

defend. Thirdly, those nations must be willing to sub-ordinate their conflicting political

interests to the common good defined in terms of the collective defense of all member states.

In practice, these three conditions have never been fulfilled thus rendering collective security

as being idealistic.

Another scholar, Mearscheimer60 criticizes collective security for the following

reasons. He argues that theory of collective security is an incomplete theory because it does

not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome their fears and learn to trust

one another. In other words, it is too ideal. He also argues that it assumes too easily the

satisfaction of an extraordinarily complex network of requirements. Mearscheimer argues on

the contrary that states have abundant reasons to doubt that collective security will work

when aggression seems likely. States that ignore balance of power will perform worse than

others. He also argues that collective security has little support from historical record. That

peacekeeping has no role to play in disputes between great powers, and since it cannot use

coercion, is powerless. To him, concerts often emerge in the aftermath of great wars and are

merely a matter of classical balance of power which is why they only last as long as the

balance of power does not change.

Claude Jr., also points out that collective security is a crafted in such a way that it

provides certainty of collective action to frustrate aggression. Thus, a potential victim is

reassured and the potential law breaker will get deterrence because the resources of

60

6

J. J. Mearscheimer, “The Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 5-49; see pp. 26 – 37 for specific critiques.

international community will be mobilized against any abuse of national power61. This ideal

encourages states to hope for collective support in case they are victims of attacks and the

aggressive state will receive deterrent action for abusing its national power. This is an ideal in

the sense that, it does not provide, “ifs and buts” It also fails to “stimulate the revisions of

state behavior at which it aims and upon which its ultimate success depends”, thus, “if the

hope which it encourages should prove illusory, it stands convicted of contributing to the

downfall of states whose security it purported to safeguard.” Also, “if it merely warns

potential aggressors that they may encounter concerted resistance, it fails to achieve full

effectiveness in its basic function, that of discouraging resort to violence, and if its warning

should be revealed as a bluff, it stimulates the contempt for international order which it is

intended to eradicate”. Therefore, the theory of collective security is filled with absolutes, of

which none is more basic than the requirement of certainty.

Another limitation outlined by Claude Jr., is what he refers to as “dilemma of

circularity”, where collective security cannot work unless policies of states are inspired by

confidence in the system, but requires exceptional act of political faith to repose confidence

in the system without previous demonstration that collective security works. Collective

security theory urges states to assume the application of the notion of self fulfilling prophecy

where if they act as if the collective security system works then it will do so, or else it will

fail. The reality is stakes are very high in the world of power politics that states do not lightly

undertake such experiment in the field of national security. Another criticism to collective

security is the charge that it risks turning every local encounter into a global conflict by

drawing outsiders into the fray62. Ideally, a collective security system would prevent war

616 I. L. Claude, Jr., “The Management of Power in Changing United Nations,” International Organization. Vol. 15 (Spring 1961), p. pp. 252 - 256

626 I. L. Claude Jr., Collective Security In Europe and Asia, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), p. 25

altogether or convert the defeat of every aggressor into an easy police operation by

overwhelming forces. However, the world would prefer localization of clashes to a tactic that

increases the risk o exacerbating and spreading conflict.

In conclusion, it is noteworthy to point out that, it is evident it has been difficult to

realize a collective security system despite the commitment to the ideal. The commitment to

this ideal is a manifestation of yearning for peace and orders as an end rather a belief that the

theory of collective security provides a realistic and acceptable means to that end63. The

world is still very far from the satisfaction of the essential requirements for permitting the

operation of a collective security system, and such a system, even if feasible, is in fact a less

attractive ideal than it has been thought before. However, despite the difficulty of realizing

this ideal, theory of collective security has acquired ideological significance and its basic

elements will continue to influence the approach to peace through international organization.

Claude, Jr., could not have put it more partly when he notes, “the point remains that the

theory of collective security has inspired the growing recognition that a war any where is a

threat to order everywhere, has contributed to the maintenance of the realistic awareness that

it is states which are effective components of international society and which are

consequently the essential objects of a system aiming at control of international disorder, and

has stimulated the rudimentary development of a sense of responsibility to a world

community on the part of the reality of global governments and peoples ... collective security

is a snare as well as a delusion; as a formulation of the reality of global governments and the

ideal of global responsibilities, it may be a vital contribution to the evolutionary development

of conditions of peace through international organization.”64

63

6

Ibid., p. 283

64

6

Ibid., p. 284

BibliographyBullock, A., Hitler: Study in Tyranny, (New York: Harper, 1953)Claude, Jr., I. L., “The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations”, International

Organization Vol. 15 (Spring 1961)

Claude Jr., I. L., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed., (New York: Random House, 1971)

Claude, Jr., I. L., Collective Security In Europe and Asia, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992)

Danchin, P. G. “Things Fall Apart: The Concept of Collective Security in International Law” P. G. Danchin and H. Fisher (eds.) United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)

Delbruck, J., “Collective Security” in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, (Oxford: Elswevier, 1992)

Johnson, H. C., and Niemeyer, G., “Collective Security: The Validity of an Ideal,” International Organization, Vol. 8 (1954)

Kennedy, D., “Primitive Legal Scholarship”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 27 (1986)

Koskenniemi, M., From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument,

(Helsinki: Finish Lawyers Publishing Company, 2005)

Legault, A., Desmartis, I., Fournier, J., and Thumerelle, C., “The United Nations at Fifty: Regime Theory and Collective Security”, International Journal, (Winter 1994-95), pp 71 – 102

Kupchan, C. A and Kupchan, C. A., “The Promise of Collective Security,” International Security, Vol. 20 (Summer 1995)

Martin, L. L., “Institution and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict,”International Security, Vol. 14 No. 4 (Spring, 1992), pp. 143 -178

Mearscheimer, J. J., “The Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/1995), pp 5-49

Organski, A. F. K, World Politics, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958)

Roberts, A. and Kingsbury, B., “Introduction: The UN’s Role in International Society since 1945”, in A. Roberts and B. Kinsgsbury (eds.) United Nations, Divided World, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)

Thompson, A. and Snidal, D., International Organization, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1999)Walters, F. P., A History of the League of Nations, (London: Oxford University Press, 1952)

The Theory of Collective Security and Its Limitations in Explaining International Organization

Documents

Transcript of The Theory of Collective Security and Its Limitations in Explaining International Organization