The Syrian crisis - Update May 2012

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The Syrian crisis Update May 2012

Standard Note: SNIA/6271

Last updated: 9 May 2012Author: Ben Smith

Section International Affairs and Defence Section

On 21 March, the UN Security Council supported a peace plan devised by Kofi Annan thatcalled for a ceasefire, humanitarian access to Syria and the withdrawal of forces from urbanareas. All sides declared their willingness to adhere to the plan. The Annan plan is at presentthe only hope of ending the accelerating violence in Syria, which has now caused more than9,000 deaths, according to UN estimates.

After the Russian and Chinese veto on 4 February, the level of violence appeared toincrease, testing Russias patronage of the regime

Kofi Annan has been appointed special envoy and has proposed a new plan to endthe violence but the Syrian governments sincerity in accepting the plan is widelyquestioned and the UN said in April that the government is failing to keep the truce

It remains difficult to know exactly what is happening in Syria as the governmentrestricts journalists access, but more United Nations observers are due to arrive inSyria, which may damp down the violence somewhat

Syria has become part of larger conflicts between Western powers and Iran, betweenWestern powers and Russia, and between Sunnis and Shiites

It is difficult to see any plan for international military intervention being successfullyimplemented, although the possibility should not be ruled out. Any intervention,including arming the rebels, may have the effect of making the violence worse

UK and EU policy remains the implementation of sanctions and the provision ofhumanitarian assistance where this is possible

The regime enjoys support of perhaps 30% of the population. Whether a negotiatedsettlement can be reached is debatable

This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties and is not intended toaddress the specific circumstances of any particular individual. It should not be relied upon as being up to date; thelaw or policies may have changed since it was last updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professionaladvice or as a substitute for it. A suitably qualified professional should be consulted if specific advice or informationis required.

This information is provided subject to our general terms and conditions which are available online or may beprovided on request in hard copy. Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing with Members andtheir staff, but not with the general public.
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Contents

1 Background 41.1 Religious and ethnic groups in Syria 4

Statistics 4Treatment of minorities 4Kurds and Islamists 5

2 The opposition 52.1 Syrian National Council 62.2 Syrian Revolution General Commission 62.3

National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change 7

2.4 Salafists 72.5 Militant groups 7

3 Other groups in the uprising 83.1 Kurds 83.2 Christians 83.3 Druze 83.4 The business elite 9

4 Political reform 95 Information blackout 10

5.1 Journalists 105.2 Humanitarian missions 10

6 Escalating violence 117 Regional politics 11

7.1 Relations with Russia 137.2 Chinese policy 14

8 The vetoed Security Council resolution 148.1 Arab League 148.2 The vetoed draft 158.3 Further activity at the UN 17

9 The Annan initiative 179.1 Presidential statement on the Annan plan 189.2 Ceasefire 19

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9.3 Security Council resolutions authorise observers 199.4 Atrocities and bombings 19

10 Possible intervention? 2010.1 Safe havens 2010.2 A no-fly zone 2110.3 Humanitarian corridors 2210.4 Arming the rebels 22

11 UK government policy 2211.1 Aid 2311.2 Support for the opposition 2311.3 Diplomatic relations 24

12 EU and sanctions 2412.1 Impact of sanctions 2512.2 Iranian assistance 26

13 Outlook 2614 Conclusion 27

Selected economic indicators 29Chronology 30

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1 Background

1.1 Religious and ethnic groups in Syria

Statistics

Total population (2010 official estimate): 23,695,000.1

Major ethnic groups:

Arabs (90%)

Kurds almost entirely Sunni Muslim (9%)

Armenians, Circassians and Turkmans

Religions:

Sunni Muslims (74%)

Alawis (12%)

Christians who are Arabs (10%)

Druze (3%)2

Small numbers in other Muslim sects, Jews, and Yazidis.3

Treatment of minorities

One of the Assad regimes main claims to legitimacy is that it treats all Syrians alike, reducessectarian tensions and holds the country together. With examples such as Iraq and Lebanon

showing how serious sectarian and inter-ethnic strife can be in the region, the claim shouldnot be dismissed out of hand.

In the years before the uprising began, it appears that the regime did indeed have a relativelygood record in protecting freedom of worship, compared with some countries in the region. Inthe US State Department report on religious freedom around the world, the section on Syriareads as follows for 2010:

The constitution and other laws and policies protect religious freedom; however, thegovernment imposed restrictions on this right. While there is no official state religion,the constitution requires that the president be Muslim and stipulates that Islamicjurisprudence is a principal source of legislation. The constitution provides for freedomof faith and religious practice so long as religious rites do not disturb the public order;however, the government restricted full freedom of practice on some religious matters,including proselytizing.

Although the government generally enforced legal and policy protections of religiousfreedom for most Syrians, including the Christian minority, it continued to prosecuteindividuals for membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist groups, and other faithcommunities that it deemed to be extreme. The Syrian government outlaws not onlyMuslim extremist groups, but also Jehovah's Witnesses. In addition the governmentcontinued to monitor the activities of all organizations, including religious groups, and

1

Europa World Yearbook: Syria2 The Druze religion is considered a version of Islam by some but not others.3 US State Department: Background Note: Syria

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to discourage proselytizing, which it deemed a threat to relations among and withindifferent faiths. There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom bythe government during the reporting period.4

While the authorities made some effort to protect freedom of worship, there were reportedlyfrictions between ordinary Syrians of different religions in 2010.

The record of protecting freedom of worship and keeping minorities relatively safe from inter-communal violence has had its effect. According to two specialists quoted in February, theregime has a solid support base of at least 30%.5 The bulk of this support comes from Alawisand Christians, and includes some Druze, despite the Lebanese Druze leader WalidJumblatts support for the uprising.

Kurds and Islamists

The government has a much worse record when it comes to minority groups that it fears maypose a political challenge to the regime. Essentially, that means two: Kurds and Islamists.

The principal ethnic minority in the country, the Kurds, has consistently experienceddiscrimination based on ethnic origin. The government fears the growth of separatism in theKurdish region of the north east of the country and links some Kurdish activists to the KurdishWorkers Party, the PKK, which is banned as a terrorist organisation by the EU and others.

In 2010, dozens of political activists were sentenced to jail terms. 6 There have beenrestrictions on the use of the Kurdish language and on the expression of Kurdish culture.There are restrictions on giving babies Kurdish names. In addition, some 300,000 Syrian-born Kurds are effectively stateless.7

The fate of Islamists is perhaps even worse: it was to put down violent opposition by the

Muslim Brotherhood that Assad senior killed tens of thousands of residents. It is a capitaloffence to belong to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and many Islamist activists arearbitrarily imprisoned. According to Amnesty International, torture was regularly used by theauthorities, even before the beginning of the uprising:

Suspected Islamists and suspected members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood facedarbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, torture and other ill-treatment, and unfair trials,usually before the SSSC [Supreme State Security Court], which rarely imposes prisonsentences of less than five years. Those convicted of belonging to the MuslimBrotherhood were sentenced to death but their sentences were immediately commutedto 12-year prison terms. Hundreds of convicted Islamist prisoners were held atSaydnaya Military Prison, where conditions were harsh.8

2 The opposition

The opposition has been plagued by divisions and the lack of either a clear strategy on howto bring about change in Syria or a clear picture of what that change should be. Yezid Sayighargues that those oppositionists inside Syria are divided from those in exile and disagree onwhether to arm the opposition, invite outside military intervention or negotiate with the

4 July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report, US Department of State, 13 September 20115 As Syria votes on constitution, Assad retains solid backing, Washington Post, 26 February 20126

Human Rights Watch, World Report 2011: Syria7 Amnesty International, Annual report 2011, Syria8 Ibid.

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regime. There is also a deep class divide: this fracture affects attitudes to Islamism andmilitarisation and sectarianism.9

2.1 Syrian National Council

The SNC is a coalition of opposition groups formed in Istanbul in August 2011. It is

recognised as a legitimate interlocutor representing the Syrian people by the UK and anumber of other European governments. Libya recognises it as the legitimate government inexile.

The Muslim Brotherhood is strongly represented on the SNC. Since the Brotherhoodis outlawed in Syria and membership attracts the death penalty in Syrian law, theleading figures associated with the Brotherhood are in exile. The Brotherhood isSunni Islamist. It had been reluctant to call for outside intervention or to arm theopposition Free Syrian Army but, since the March 2012 massacre in Homs and thefailure of the Kofi Annan initiative to secure a convincing ceasefire deal with thegovernment, it now supports these moves.

Like its Egyptian counterparts the Syrian Brotherhood supports the free market and isstrongly middle class.

The Brotherhood funds armed groups within Syria, particularly in its traditionalstronghold, Hama. The Brotherhood also maintains relief networks within Syria,through which it channels financial aid from abroad (much of it from Saudi Arabia),giving it important political leverage.

The Damascus Declaration for Democratic Change grouping - a movement bornduring the so-called "Damascus Spring" of 2000/2001 which called for broad

democratic reform, and was suppressed by the Assad regime. The group is largelysecular and left-leaning, and this has led to clashes with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Local Coordination Committees - Grass-roots movements that have leddemonstrations across the country.

Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC) - a coalition of 40 opposition blocs.

Kurdish factions, tribal leaders and independent figures make up the rest of thecouncil. The Kurdish factions have repeatedly clashed with the Arab groups over theKurds demands for an autonomous region. 10

The assistant to the leader of the council caused controversy recently when it was revealedthat she had said in a hacked email that Israel was a necessity in the region. This drewcomplaints from the Muslim Brotherhood.

2.2 Syrian Revolution General Commission

The Syrian Revolution General Commission is an umbrella group of more than 40 oppositiongroups that aim to overthrow the Assad regime. It organises protests.

9

Yezid Sayigh, The Coming Tests of the Syrian Opposition, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19April 2012

10 Based on Q&A: Syrian opposition alliance, BBC News Online, 16 November 2011

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2.3 National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change

This group is the main alternative to the SNC. It is based in Syria and opposes foreignintervention or the militarisation of the conflict. It has criticised the Syrian National Council forits support for intervention and for its attempts to mobilise the public. The committee blamesthe government for the crisis and calls for a peaceful solution, but it has supported

negotiations with the regime.

Officials from The national Coordination Committee (NCC) have visited Moscow a number oftimes, wanting to keep channels open with the Russians.

2.4 Salafists

Extreme conservative Islamist forces are gaining ground in Syria. As in Egypt, they maychallenge the more organised Muslim Brotherhood for influence in any post-transitionsystem, and this is based largely on their strength among the poor. While the more middleclass Muslim Brotherhood has organisational strengths, even in post 1981 Syria, theliberalisation of the Syrian economy in the last decade has created a growing class of poorSyrians with no foothold in the formal economy, often migrating to large slum areas on theoutskirts of the major towns. These people have provided many of the foot soldiers of theuprising.11

2.5 Militant groups

Free Syrian Army

The Free Syrian Army is composed mainly of deserters for the regular army and is basedmainly inside Syria, although the groups commander, Riad Asaad, is based in Turkey. It isnot clear how many fighters the FSA has, but they are in general lightly armed, mostly with

Russian AK47s. Weapons are reported to be entering Syria from Iraq, often through theKurdish Region and also to have been bought from corrupt soldiers in the Syrian army.Ammunition is said to be in short supply.12

Western countries have been helping the FSA with communications equipment, includingwalkie-talkies.

Jihadists

The Assad regime maintains that armed opposition to the authorities comes from terroristsand foreign countries conspiring against Syria. While Western governments have largelydismissed these claims as exaggerated, some analysts have been increasingly concerned

about the influence of jihadist groups. Director of US Intelligence James Clapper told theSenate Armed Services Committee in February 2012 that Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) hadprobably already moved into Syria and may have carried out bombings in Aleppo andDamascus, attacks which carried the hallmarks of al-Qaeda operations. He said: We believethat al Qaeda in Iraq is extending its reach into Syria.13

According to reports, there is growing evidence that this is the case, and that AQI may bemerging the Iraqi and Syrian struggles into one theatre of operations. Known jihadist groupsfrom Iraq and another from Lebanon are reported to be active as well as Peshmerga fighters

11 Yezid Sayigh, The Coming Tests of the Syrian Opposition, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19

April 201212 Bullets and home-made bombs; Syria's rebel fighters, Economist, 28 April 201213 The downside of arming Syrian rebels, Reuters, 23 February 2012

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from the Kurdish region of Iraq. 14 It is also reported that Libyan fighters have moved intoSyria. An organisation called the Nasra Front is conducting a propaganda campaign toencourage violent jihad in Syria, one of its messages being "Peaceful demonstrations will getyou nowhere... this regime is supported by Israel and the US... it will only be finished withblood."15 All this raises the prospect of a militant Sunni arc of activism from Lebanon through

Syria to Iraq and Jordan. If order were to break down further in Syria, this prospect looksquite plausible.

3 Other groups in the uprising

The present conflict is largely between the Alawite regime and the Sunni Arab majority. Theother main groups, the Christians and the Kurds, each making up about a tenth of thepopulation, have generally kept a lower profile. The governments policy may have been togarner support from Alawis, Christians and other minorities but, of these, only the Alawisappear to be providing solid support to the regime. Some members of all communities havejoined demonstrations, reportedly younger people in particular.

3.1 Kurds

Christians and Kurds have a very different position in relation to the regime, with theChristians being co-opted to a certain extent, while Kurdish identity has been vigorouslyrepressed (see above). The failure of the Sunni Kurds to join the uprising wholeheartedly isperhaps surprising.

Kurdish representatives have had a stormy relationship with other members of the SyrianNational Council, leaving meetings after arguments over their demands for Kurdishautonomy in a future state.16 It may well be that the general Kurdish population has lowexpectations of what is likely to be gained in an eventual transition to majority rule.

There have, however, been significant demonstrations against the regime, particularly in al-Qamishli, the main Kurdish town. Demonstrators have died in crackdowns by the securityforces, but as yet there has been no full scale assault on any Kurdish city.

3.2 Christians

Christians too have taken a back seat. A Christian priest from Aleppo said recently that thiswas what the Church wanted:

The main struggle is between the Sunnis and Alawites. I know there are someChristians who are demonstrating against the regime and others in the army andworking with the security bodies. However, we do not want to be seen taking sides, we

want to keep our community neutral.17

3.3 Druze

The Druze, too, have stayed out of the conflict. As one of the smallest communities, theDruze are obviously likely to suffer in the event of an outbreak of inter-communal violence.Druze religious leaders have specifically called on their followers to remain neutral.

14 AQI involvement breeds fear that conflicts could merge, Gulf States Newsletter, 26 April 201215

Jihadists put anti-Assad movement on defensive, Financial Times, 10 April 201216 Kurdish opposition quits Syrian National Council, Daily Star (Lebanon), 6 April 201217 Factional fight - Conflicting objectives in the Syrian struggle, Janes Intelligence Review, 12 April 2012

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3.4 The business elite

The attitude of the business elite is crucial in Syria. Businessmen from all communities,mainly based in Damascus and Aleppo, have benefitted from the governments policiesunder Bashar, who privatised state monopolies and gave elites the opportunity to makesizeable profits. The governments reforms, meanwhile, have probably been one of the root

causes of the unrest as nepotistic capitalism and corruption have often been the replacementfor the Soviet-style command economy, and subsidies have been reduced or scrapped.

So far, the business class appears to be remaining neutral. However, the economy is fragile(see Impact of sanctions, below) and there may come a point where the business elitedecides to abandon the regime in its perceived interest.

4 Political reform

The Assad regime early on promised to reform the countrys political system in response tothe unrest. The state of emergency, in place since the Baath party came to power, was liftedin April 2011. The state of emergency allowed the government to ban peacefuldemonstrations, to arrest those suspected of being a security risk, to try political suspects inthe State Security Court and a host of other actions. The scrapping of the state of emergencyappears to have done little to change the situation in Syria.

In a constitutional referendum in February 2012, 89% voted in favour, from a turnout of57.4%, according to government figures.

The Syrian constitution was amended to

Allow multi party elections to the parliament. The Baath Party had been described asthe leading party in society and the state in article 8 of the old constitution. The new

article 8 reads: The political system is based on the principle of political pluralism,and rule is only obtained and exercised democratically through voting.18

Set a limit of two seven-year presidential terms. The new article 88 reads: ThePresident of the Republic is elected for 7 years as of the end of the term of theexisting President. The President can be elected for only one more successive term.The limit would not be applied retrospectively, so Bashar al-Assad would be allowedto continue in office. The President could also do a Putin and come back for a thirdterm after a break.

Despite the reforms in the constitution, the president retains the power to form and dismiss

governments, so reforms are unlikely to change the marginal position the legislature has hadunder the Assad regime. Although the constitutional changes might in the long term loosenthe grip of the Baath Party on power and open up Syrian political system, they were clearlynot satisfactory to the protesters in Syria, who continued to take to the streets.

On 7 May, in the midst of ongoing violence in many parts of the country, a parliamentaryelection was held. The election was boycotted by the opposition. The government said that itwas historic, showing Syria was ''moving forward with the announced comprehensivereform program despite all conspiracies to hinder the development process.''19

An activist in Hama was quoted to have a different view:

18 Draft Constitution for the Syrian Arab Republic, Syrian Arab news Agency, 18 February 201219 Syrians Vote in Election Dismissed by Foes as a Farce, New York Times, 8 May 2012

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Of course they are not serious. They are just trying to lift international pressure andshow the world that they are making reforms, while we are being shelled and killed. It'slike a dance on the corpses of dead people. 20

5 Information blackout

5.1 JournalistsForeign journalists have been extremely limited in what they can do in Syria. They have notnormally been granted permission by the Syrian Information Ministry to enter the country orto report from areas where conflict is taking place. On 9 March the Information Ministrythreatened to take action against Arab and foreign journalists who had entered the countrywithout permission. The Information Minister accused such journalists of issuing false reportsand of collaborating with and justifying the work of terrorists.21 Journalists have also gonemissing.

There have even been suggestions that the Syrian armed forces have intentionally targetedbuildings sheltering foreign journalists. After the death of Sunday Timesjournalist Marie

Colvin, a US citizen, and French photographer Remi Ochlik, French President NicolasSarkozy said that they had been assassinated. There were also reports of house beingused as a press centre in the Homs suburb of Bab Amr being targeted by snipers.22

The Western media have largely relied on mobile phone video recordings made by localactivists for television images. These are obviously difficult to verify, but that has not stoppedthe authorities from attempting to stop them getting out. A number of citizen journalists havebeen killed.

5.2 Humanitarian missions

The Syrian government has also been reluctant to allow international aid and humanitarianagencies to visit the country, perhaps because to limit the amount of information flowing outof the country. UN humanitarian representative Baroness Amos had repeatedly been refusedaccess to Syria. Aid agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and theSyrian Arab Red Crescent Society have had huge difficulty getting to the conflict areas ofSyria in order to get aid on and to get wounded people out.23

On 10 March, Baroness Amos was finally permitted to visit Syria. She visited Homs and theBaba Amr suburb, where she said that the destruction was horrifying:

In Baba Amr I was horrified by the destruction I saw. No building was untouched andthere was clear evidence of use of heavy artillery and tanks. Baba Amr was almost

deserted. A few people in tears, as they tried to salvage a few possessions. I amextremely concerned as to the whereabouts of the people who have been displacedfrom Baba Amr by the shelling and other violence.

I was told that some fifty to sixty thousand people used to live in the area. We need toknow what has happened to them, where they are now and what they need. We alsoneed to know where the wounded are and whether they are receiving treatment. 24

20 Syrians vote in elections boycotted by opposition Washington Post,21 Syria: Foreign media threatened, journalists missing, Index on Censorship press release, 14 March 201222 Were Marie Colvin and journalists deliberately targeted by Syria's army?, Guardian, 23 February 201223

Ground attack launched in Homs, Financial Times, 1 March 201224 Statement to the press on Syria, Under-secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency ReliefCoordinator Valerie Amos, UNOCHA, 12 March 2012

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6 Escalating violence

The level of violence in Syria has risen almost inexorably. Human Rights Watch reports thatfighting around Idlib in late March and April amounted to armed conflict according tointernational humanitarian law and that forces associated with the regime may have beenresponsible for war crimes. The rights group says that government forces attacked townsnear the city of Idlib and arbitrarily detained civilians, esecuting many of them, includingchildren. A survivor is quoted in the report:

My daughters and I went out with buckets, and then my daughters, who were in front,ran to me, saying that my sons were there as well. After we extinguished the fire, wefound their bodies. Bilal was shot in the middle of his forehead, Yousef behind his ear,and Talal was shot by two bullets, in the head and in the back. Their hands looked likethey had been tied behind; the ropes burned, but the hands were still folded behind.We had to leave them in the street for about 10 hours; the shooting continued and wecouldnt take the bodies away. We were only able to bury them after the army left.25

The United Nations now says that more than 10,000 have been killed since the beginning ofthe crisis and, despite some lulls associated with the ceasefire, the overall impression is thatthe violence continues. On 19 April, Ban Ki Moon, UN Secretary General, said that theSyrian government was failing to keep the truce. 26 The opposition still has no heavyweaponry, but the regular use of bombs against government targets is ominous. Theresponsibility for the bombs is disputed, with many opposition claims that the attacks werestaged by the government itself to discredit the opposition and support the claim that it isfighting terrorists. Bomb-making is relatively cheap and easy, however, and for an oppositionstarved of heavier weapons, their use might be a logical step.27

The escalation of violence looks difficult to stop, despite international efforts. Depending on

the arming or otherwise of the opposition, the situation may either develop into one of full civilwar or a prolonged guerrilla campaign against the government.

7 Regional politics

The position of Turkey is crucial to the development of the Syria crisis. Syria and Turkeytraditionally had difficult relations, allies as they were of the Soviet Union and the US,respectively. Turkey also enjoyed warm relations with Israel, while Syria backed hostileHizballah in Lebanon, and Turkeys problems with the restive Kurdish minority in the southeast were not helped by Syrian support for elements of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).

As Turkey lost faith in its prospects of EU membership, the government turned its attention to

its eastern neighbours and instigated the zero problems with neighbours policy. Thisparticularly involved improving relations with Syria, with which Turkey shares a long border.To the dismay of some western politicians, ties with Syria were rapidly strengthened andcommerce flourished.

25 They Burned My Heart, War Crimes in Northern Idlib during Peace Plan Negotiations, Human Rights Watch,

May 201226 Syria 'failing to keep to truce', says Ban Ki-moon, BBC News Online, 19 April 201227 Bullets and home-made bombs; Syria's rebel fighters, Economist, 28 April 2012

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The uprising in Syriacalled that policy intoquestion, however. Whilethe Turkish governmentwas ambivalent about

the Arab uprisings at thebeginning, the ferocity ofthe Assad regimesrepression of theprotests seems to havepersuaded the Turkishgovernment to abandonthe Syrian regime inNovember 2011 and callfor al-Assadsresignation.28

Map courtesy of the Ministry of Defence

Since then, Turkey has been one of the most vocal proponents of action against the Syrian

rpreted the Turkish moves against the Assad regime as a wholesale

Saudi Arabia has likewise taken a strong line against the Syrian government. In November,

In March 2012 a number of bombs were exploded in Damascus and Aleppo, killing some 29

government, suggesting that safe havens should be set up within Syrian territory on theTurkish border, a bold action that would violate Syrian sovereignty. Also in November 2011,Turkey imposed economic sanctions against Syria. Members of the Arab League alsoannounced restrictions.

Some analysts have intereorientation of Turkeys foreign policy towards the West and, crucially, against Iran. On theother hand, practical considerations are crucial to the Turks too: they already have to dealwith more than 17,000 Syrian refugees and that number could be dwarfed by the exodus ifthe conflict deteriorates into a fully-fledged civil war or, perhaps more likely, a viciousinsurgency/counter-insurgency struggle.

King Abdullah told Syria to stop the killing machine and said that the government shouldthink wisely before it is too late and issue and enact reforms. 29 Such strong language andsuch clear backing for reform are both unusual for a Saudi minister. They might also betaken as somewhat hypocritical from a leader often criticised for failing to enact reforms.They should be seen in the light of the Arab/Persian and Sunni/Shia divides in MiddleEastern politics- something that looms very large in the world view of the Sauds.

For Saudi Arabia, the great prize in the Syrian crisis would be to deprive Iran of its only ally inthe Arab world and to weaken the Shiite resurgence whose biggest milestone was the fall ofSaddam Hussein in Iraq and the establishment of a Shiite led government there. To weakenIran in that way would be a significant boost to Saudi Arabias claim to be the dominantregional power.

people. The Syrian government blamed Saudi Arabia and Qatar for arming the rebels and

28 Syria crisis: Erdogan steps up Turkey pressure on Assad, BBC News Online, 15 November 201129 Saudi King Abdullah to Syria: Stop the killing machine, Washington Post, 8 August 2011

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inciting terrorism, while the Syrian National Council said that the government itself was toblame for the attacks, to vindicate its claim that it was fighting al-Qaeda-style terrorists.

Western diplomats are not sure who planted the bombs and doubt that Saudi Arabia hastaken a decision to arm the opposition in Syria.30

Other neighbours Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon are too weak to intervene significantly in theconflict. Israel, which was even exploring the possibility of a rapprochement with Syria beforethe Arab uprisings began, has adopted a low profile on the situation in Syria. In the past,notions that the Assad regime was better than the uncertainty of a possibly Islamic-basedalternative were widespread. However, a number of factors have persuaded Israel that thefall of the present regime would be beneficial. The extent to which Syria backed Hizbollahand the war in 2006; and the discovery of the Syrian nuclear plant which Israel destroyed in2007 have helped to change Israeli opinions. Most of all, the looming crisis with the Assadsally in Tehran means that mainstream opinion has moved against the Syrian regime. Israelisare reported to believe that Assad must eventually fall.31

7.1 Relations with Russia

Syria was long close to the Soviet Union, as exemplified by the 1980 Soviet/Syrian treaty offriendship and cooperation. Russia continued to supply Syria with the bulk of its arms afterthe fall of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union first agreed to install a naval base in Tartus, on the Syrian coast, in 1971.The base gave the Soviet navy its only foothold on the Mediterranean and Russia remainscommitted to the base. In 2009, it started to renovate the base. In January 2012, a flotilla ofRussian naval vessels visited the port. Russia denied the visit had anything to do with theuprising, but the visit was welcomed by the Syrian government.

According to an article in the Economist, Tartus is an important factor in Russian support forthe Assad regime:

The toppling of dictators in Iraq and Libya hurt Russias oil interests and arms sales. Itwants to avoid that in Syria. Its dilemma is that too much support for Mr Assad risks afuture regime booting it out of Tartus, which is valued by Russian spooks andelectronic snoopers. But too little may mean defeat for an old ally.32

There are even more basic reasons for Russian support to the Assad regime: Syria owes$3.6 billion to Russia, due to be repaid by 2015. Russia also has important interests inSyrias oil extraction industry and has $4.5 billion of active arms contracts with the Syrian

government.33

If the Assad regime were to fall, these contracts and debts could well bewritten off.

Russia also opposes any intervention because it is still smarting from the Libyan campaign,where Russia feels that it was outmanoeuvred by the West, allowing Nato to bring aboutregime change in Libya by exceeding the terms of UN Security Council resolution 1973.Added to this is the sense that Russia wants to be an independent actor and it wants to beindispensible for the resolution of the Syrian crisis, which will add to Russian prestige and

30 Syria accuses Saudis over bomb attacks on its cities, Daily Telegraph, 19 March 201231 Israel feels mixed emotions over Syria, Financial Times, 22 March 201132

Syria and Russia: Wait and sea, Economist, 14 January 201233 Matthew Rojansky, The Method to Putin's Syria Madness, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23March 2012

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underline its importance in comparison to the EU, for example, which it sees as acheerleader for US policy.

Lastly, there are clear reasons why Russias elite should be hostile to populardemonstrations being helped to bring down authoritarian governments by international

interventions. Russia itself experienced the biggest anti-government demonstrations in ageneration recently.

7.2 Chinese policy

China denies being an arms supplier to Syria, although there are reports of China assisting inthe development of Syrian ballistic missiles. China participates commercially in Syrian oil: theChina National Petroleum Company owns part of the al-Furat oil company, Syrias mainproducer.34

According to an article from the Jamestown Foundation, a US research institute, China isprimarily interested in Syria as a trade hub, with its strategic location near fast-growing

African and Gulf economies. Its free trade agreements with the EU are particularly interestingto the Chinese (sanctions were not in place at the time):

Other than its geographic location as a terminus node on the ancient Silk Road, andhub for trade between the three continents of Africa, Asia and Europe, there are manyreasons for Chinas interest in Syria. First, it can serve as Chinas gateway forEuropean market access in the face of increasing protectionist pressures from largercountries such as France, Germany and Great Britain within the European Union(EU).35

China also shares Russian concerns about the violation of sovereignty and perhaps aboutencouraging street protests. With the legitimacy of the Chinese system often questioned and

the Tiananmen Square events still very relevant in China, the Peoples Republic remainssensitive about popular uprisings.

China has sometimes appeared reluctant in following the Russian line but, like the Russians,Chinese leaders are worried that the Wests position is encouraging civil war anddiscouraging a negotiated solution. A UK-based academic put it this way:

There is some kind of encouragement of the [Syrian] opposition not to accept any kindof political solution and keep fighting, and this call for Assad to step down. Beijing isvery concerned, obviously, about how the possibility of a peaceful resolution of theSyrian situation is undermined by such rhetoric.36

8 The vetoed Security Council resolution

8.1 Arab League

The Arab League had for some time been working with Syrian representatives. On 2November, it adopted a peace plan and welcomed the Syrian governments agreement toimplement the plan. On 12 November, after the League had come to the conclusion that theSyrian government had no intention of implementing the provisions, Syria was suspendedfrom the League and Qatars foreign minister, chairing the League, said that it wouldconsider sanctions.

34 Oil companies may follow suit after Shell pulls out of Syria, Gulfnews.com, 4 December 201235

Syria in Chinas New Silk Road Strategy, Jamestown Foundation, 16 April 2010.36 Professor Zhang Yongjin of the University of Bristol quoted in China: US and allies push Syria into civil war,Russia Today, 21 February 2012

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An observer mission arrived in Syria on 26 December but it was beset by doubts from thestart. Observers said that it was under-resourced and that it was being controlled by theSyrian authorities in what it could see.

Accusing Syria of failing to take the Arab League initiative seriously and failing to halt the

violence, observers started to leave Syria. On 24 January, the Gulf Cooperation Councilcalled on the Security Council to take responsibility for getting Syria to adopt the peace planand on 28 January, the observer mission was suspended.

The peace plan called for Bashar al-Assad to hand power to a national unity governmentunder the present vice president within two months and for parliamentary and presidentialelections to be held within six months. The plan has similarities to the one under which theYemeni president, Ali Abdallah Saleh, left power recently.

8.2 The vetoed draft

There had been several versions of the draft resolution before the one that was finally

presented for vote by the Moroccan delegation on 1 February.37

Russia was reported to beconcerned that the resolution would be used as an excuse for Western countries to mount amilitary intervention and effect regime change. In response to those concerns, wording hadbeen inserted into the draft explicitly ruling out the use of the resolution as a pretext for futuremilitary intervention.

Provisions had also been removed, one calling for states to prevent the supply of arms toSyria and another calling for Arab League sanctions to be imposed by other states.

The draft finally presented to the Council would have expressed grave concern at thedeteriorating situation in Syria and would have condemned widespread gross violations ofhuman rights and all violence, irrespective of where it comes from. It would also have calledfor the implementation of the Arab Leagues peace plan, which demanded that Syria shouldimmediately stop all violence and protect its population; release all persons detainedarbitrarily; withdraw all military and armed forces from cities and towns; and guarantee thefreedom to hold peaceful demonstrations. The plan also called for an inclusive Syrian-ledpolitical process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation adextremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns ofthe Syrian people.38

There had been some indications that Russia and China might not veto the resolution in theweek leading up to the vote. However, amendments were presented at the last moment bythe Russian delegation; Susan Rice called them wrecking amendments.

French representative said: It is a sad day for the Council, a sad day for Syrians, and a sadday for all friends of democracy. He also described the suggestion that the text would be thebasis of military action as obviously false.39

The United Kingdoms representative, Mark Lyall Grant said that he was appalled by theoutcome, and said the regime must end the violence, warning that, if it continued on itsbloody trajectory, the matter would come before the Council again.

37 Text of Proposed UN Resolution on Syria, Associated Press, 4 February 201238 Security Council fails to adopt draft resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China veto text supporting

Arab Leagues proposed peace plan, UN Security Council press notice, 4 February 201239 Security Council fails to adopt draft resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China veto text supportingArab Leagues proposed peace plan, UN Security Council press notice, 4 February 2012

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Susan Rice, for the United States, said that the US delegation was disgusted that the voteof two members had prevented the Security Council from addressing a serious threat topeace.40 Some Council members, she said, had chosen to sell out the Syrian people toshield a craven tyrant.

The UN summarised the Russian UN delegations comments as follows:VITALY CHURKIN (Russian Federation) said the bloodshed and violence in Syria mustbe ended immediately, adding that his country was taking direct action and planned tohold a meeting with President Bashar al-Assad on 7 February. While the RussianFederation was committed to finding a solution to the crisis, some influential membersof the international community had been undermining the possibility of a peacefulsettlement by advocating a change of regime. The draft resolution voted down todaysought to send an unbalanced message to Syria, he said, adding that it did notaccurately reflect the situation there. No proposal had been made to end attacks byarmed groups, or their association with extremists, he said, adding that his delegationhad, therefore, voted against the text. The Russian Federation greatly regretted the

results of the Councils joint work, and hoped that a successful Syrian political processwould take place, he said, emphasizing that the Russian Federation would continue towork towards that goal.41

Over the weekend of the negotiations at the Security Council, an upsurge of violence wasreported.

On 6 February, the US closed its Syrian embassy and on 7 February, Gulf Arab statesannounced that they were expelling Syrian ambassadors from their capitals and recallingtheir ambassadors from Damascus.

Also on 7 February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Damascus. He was

greeted by cheering crowds of Assad supporters. After the meeting, Mr Lavrov said that theSyrian government was willing to initiate a dialogue:

It is clear that efforts to end violence must be accompanied by the starting of adialogue among all political forces. Today we have received from the Syrian presidenta confirmation of his readiness to facilitate such work.42

He also suggested that Mr Assad had been told that the violence must be controlled:

We have every reason to believe that the signal that we've brought here to move alongin a more active manner along all directions has been heard, In particular, PresidentAssad assured [us] that he is fully committed to the task of a cessation of violence,

from whatever source it comes.43

If Moscow was hoping for a reduction in state violence to demonstrate its influence overDamascus, that appeared not to be forthcoming. Opposition groups in Syria complained thatthe governments assault on their positions, which had already been stepped up over theweekend of the Security Council negotiations, intensified even further.

40 Ibid.41

Ibid.42 Al-Asad ready for dialogue with all Syrian political forces Lavrov, Interfax News Agency, 7 February 201243 Syria opposition dismisses Assad assurances, BBC News Online, 8 February 2012

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8.3 Further activity at the UN

Although the Security Council resolution was vetoed, activity at the United Nations did notstop. Firstly, the General Assembly passed a motion on 16 February that closely mirroredthe language of the vetoed Security Council resolution.44

Secondly, on 1 March, the UN Human Rights Council passed a motion expressing graveconcern at the situation in Syria, and in particular the ongoing human rights violations anduse of violence by the Syrian authorities against its population. 45 The resolution went on tocall on the Syrian government to stop human rights violations.46

In an important demonstration of unity, the Security Council issued a press statement on thesame day calling for UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Valerie Amos, tobe given full access to assess the humanitarian situation in Syria. On 10 March BaronessAmos received permission to visit Syria (see below).

After the failure of the Security Council to pass a resolution on 4 February negotiations

began on a possible new one. The new draft removed references to the Arab League peaceplan, which called on Bashar al-Assad to step aside in favour of a transitional government ledby the Vice President. This smacked too much of regime change for Russia and China.

The main remaining sticking point was the language used to describe the violence andwhether it gives equal weight to state and opposition behaviour. Russias position remainedthat any resolution should criticise the use of force on both sides. Other members of theSecurity Council maintained that the Syrian governments violent suppression of the protestscaused the violence, and that there was no comparison between the heavy weaponry usedby the state and the opposition; they said that there should be no equivalence in thetreatment of the two sides in the draft resolution. Also problematic is the wording of the call

for withdrawal of armed forces, and of the Councils proposed follow-up of the situation andfurther measures.47

9 The Annan initiative

In March, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was appointed as joint envoy by the UNand the Arab League. He visited Damascus on 10 March to hold talks about a possibleceasefire between security forces and protesters. President Assad said that he could support"any honest effort" to find a solution, but refused to enter any political negotiations while"armed terrorist groups" were operating.

After the visit Mr Annan briefed the Security Council on the situation. He said that it would be

helpful if the Council could speak with one voice. He also said that he had proposed settingup a new international monitoring mission and that officials would be visiting Damascus todiscuss those proposals.48

44 General Assembly adopts resolution strongly condemning widespread and systematic human rightsviolations buy the Syrian authorities, UN press release, 16 February 2012

45 United Nations Human Rights Council, The escalating grave human rights violations and deterioratinghumanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/19/L.1/Rev.1), 1 March 2012

46

Ibid.47 Whats in Blue website: Negotiations on a Syria draft resolution, 9 March 201248 Syria crisis: Kofi Annan seeks to set up monitoring team, BBC News Online, 16 March 2012

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9.1 Presidential statement on the Annan plan

On 21 March a Presidential Statement was released by the Security Council. Unlike aSecurity Council resolution, the statement has no legal force. In the statement, the SecurityCouncil pledged to support the Annan plan:

...the Security Council fully supports the initial six-point proposal submitted to theSyrian authorities, as outlined by the Envoy to the Security Council on 16 March 2012,to:

1) commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to addressthe legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, committo appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy;

2) commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nationssupervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civiliansand stabilize the country.

To this end, the Syrian Government should immediately cease troop movementstowards, and end the use of heavy weapons in, population centres, and begin pullbackof military concentrations in and around population centres.

As these actions are being taken on the ground, the Syrian Government should workwith the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its formsby all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism.

Similar commitments would be sought by the Envoy from the opposition and allrelevant elements to stop the fighting and work with him to bring about a sustainedcessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective UnitedNations supervision mechanism;

3) ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by thefighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily two-hourhumanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily pausethrough an efficient mechanism, including at local level.

4) intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, includingespecially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful politicalactivities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all places inwhich such persons are being detained, immediately begin organizing access to suchlocations and through appropriate channels respond promptly to all written requests forinformation, access or release regarding such persons;

5) ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;

6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legallyguaranteed.49

The Security Council would be updated by the envoy Kofi Annan and, importantly, wouldconsider further measures in the light of these updates. However, no deadline was set for theimplementation of any of the conditions. Unlike the Arab League peace plan, the Annan plancontained no call for Bashar al-Assad to step aside.

49 In Presidential Statement, Security Council gives full support to efforts of Joint Special Envoy of UnitedNations, Arab League to end violence in Syria, UN press release, 21 March 2012

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Russia had already signalled some impatience with the Syrian government on 20 March,when Russian foreign minister Lavrov said: We believe the Syrian leadership reactedwrongly to the first appearance of peaceful protests and ... is making very many mistakes," intheir handling of the uprising.50 Analysts said that the statement was a further sign of Russianot wanting to appear too close to Bashar al-Assad and indicated some success in attempts

to present a united front on the Security Council: the statement was passed unanimously bythe 15-member council.

However, the presidential statement would not make much practical difference. One regionalexpert said: "This statement isn't going to push the regime to lessen its repression. On thecontrary, it provides it with more legitimacy."51

9.2 Ceasefire

Kofi Annan announced that al-Assad had told him that he would accept the plan. However,the Syrian government confirmed the suspicions of some that it was still playing for time: atthe same time as indicating support for the plan, it sent troops into northern Lebanon, where

there was fighting with Syrian rebels and some buildings were destroyed.

On 8 April, the regime said that it would pull back from urban areas only after receivingwritten guarantees from opposition that they would lay down their weapons. The Free SyrianArmy immediately dismissed the demand, saying that it did not recognise the regime, andthat the demand amounted to surrender. The ceasefire officially came into force on 11 April,but activists said that shelling continued.

9.3 Security Council resolutions authorise observers

On 14 April, the Security Council passed a resolution authorising a deployment of up to 30unarmed observers to monitor the ceasefire. 52 On 21 April a further Security Council

resolution was passed authorising an increase to 300 observers, 53 to be sent for an initialperiod of 90 days depending on the level of stability in the country. Secretary General Ban KiMoon was charged with reporting to the Security Council every 15 days.

Only a handful of observers arrived at first, with about 30 due by the end of April and the fullcontingent of 300 during May, depending on the state of the ceasefire.

Syrian government forces did pull out of some cities in northern Syria with the arrival of thefirst UN observers. Free Syrian Army fighters also withdrew from the main conflict towns inearly April, many of them reportedly fleeing to Turkey. 54 Dozens of deaths were still beingreported through April, however, and the patchy ceasefire was further undermined by a

series of bomb blasts in major cities.

9.4 Atrocities and bombings

The level of violence in Syria has increased inexorably. In March, there were reports thatcivilians including children had been slaughtered in the Baba Amr district of Homs, as rebel

50 Russia says Syrian leadership has made many mistakes, Reuters, 20 March 201251 UN finally agrees peace plan for Syria but will it end bloodshed?, Independent, 22 March 201252 Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 2042 (2012) authorising advance team to monitor ceasefire

in Syria, UN Security Council press release, 14 April 201253 Security Council establishes UN supervision mission in Syria, with 300 observers to monitor cessation of

violence , implementation of special envoys plan, UN Security Council press notice, 21 April 201254 Free Syrian Army: Sceptical rebels hold their fire, but warn: 'Revolution is not over', Guardian, 14 April 2012

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fighters withdrew from the city. Opposition activists said that pro-government gangs, theShabiha, rounded up men and boys over the age of 14, tortured them and then killed them.In April, a video which appeared to show a man being buried alive as punishment for sendingvideos to television channels hostile to the Syrian government.

While the level of violence on the part of regime forces has increased, there have beenincreasingly frequent bomb attacks targeted at state security installations. In February andagain in March, Aleppo and Damascus saw bomb attacks, directed at governmentinstitutions. On 30 April, two suicide bombs aimed at the Air Force Intelligence headquartersand the Military Intelligence headquarters exploded, killing several people, mainly securitypersonnel. The opposition claimed that the government had staged the attack to support itsown narrative of a terrorist opposition. The government said that the attacks were carried outby armed terrorist gangs.

With reliable information about Syria difficult to come by, it is impossible to say for certainwho is responsible for the bombings. However, al-Qaeda operatives are thought to have

entered Syria from Iraq (see below).10 Possible intervention?

As the death toll has mounted (UN sources put the figure at over 10,000 in April), there havebeen growing calls for some sort of intervention. This remains problematic, however. MostWestern governments have strongly played down the possibility of Western intervention andNATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has said categorically ...we have nointention to intervene in Syria. We're not considering taking action.55 It is possible that Syriawill be raised at the forthcoming NATO Summit in Chicago, perhaps by Turkey, worried abouta potential threat to its territory. However, there has been no indication that Syria is expectedto be a major theme at the summit.

10.1 Safe havens

Calls were made quite early in the conflict for the provision of safe havens for refugees.Turkey has suggested this possibility. An area of Syrian territory (probably close to theTurkish border in the North) would be declared a safe haven and protected militarily. Thiswould allow free access for humanitarian agencies to those government opponents needingtheir help. It would also allow opposition forces a space in which to organise.

Such an area would be a clear violation of Syrian sovereignty and would require a SecurityCouncil resolution to make it legal. This is not likely to happen with Russian support forSyrian sovereignty remaining firm on the Security Council. It would also need a significantmilitary commitment to defend the area against attack by Syrian forces.

The example of the Bosnian safe havens, declared in 1993 by the Security Council, 56remains significant. In Bosnia, the West relied on the good will of the Serb forces. The thenUN Secretary General Boutros Ghali initially requested a force of 34,000 troops to protect thesix zones. The response from European countries was a strong protest, and the UN thenreduced its request to 7,600 troops. In Srebrenica 2,000 poorly-armed Bosnian governmenttroops were supported by some 300 Dutch troops under the UN banner. 57 In 1995, Serb

55 Press point by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen following the joint North Atlantic Council

meeting in Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers session, NATO newsroom, 18 April 201256 UN Security Council Resolution 824 of 6 May 1993 and 824 of 16 April 199357 Srebrenica: A U.N. 'Safe Haven' That Soon Was Not, New York Times, 29 October 1995

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forces overran Srebrenica, took some Dutch soldiers hostage and massacred 7,000 to 8,000Bosnian Muslim men.

US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta said recently that the US military has plans in place forthe establishment of safe havens, should it be asked by the government for that. Indeed, he

said that all military options are under review. However, he also warned of: "the possibilitythat outside military intervention will make a volatile situation even worse, and place evenmore innocent civilians at risk."58

A recent RUSI commentary underlines the difficulties of applying the safe havens concept toSyria:

...it is ironic to hear the same calls for safe havens being made now, when they weresuch a discredited concept in 1995 that, four years later in Kosovo, the West did notbother to declare anything other than a general military campaign against Milosevic'sforces. For while a safe haven is appealing in theory, it is in practice an idea fraughtwith peril. Safe havens must be credible: if they can be starved out, shelled or indeed

overrun, they are worth little and can in the worst case serve only as hellish, glorifiedconcentration camps.

The threat of air strikes might make them credible. But if the Assad regime calls thebluff and attacks safe havens regardless, what then? The intervening powers will becompelled to up the stakes by not only increasing the physical resources committed,but also expanding the mandate of their operation. 59

10.2 A no-fly zone

A no-fly zone would have to be part of a safe haven policy. It would be necessary to have acredible force to prevent aerial attacks on a designated safe area. Not only that, but thesurrounding area would need to be demilitarised to prevent the besieging or shelling of thehaven from outside.

A no-fly zone in Syria would demand very significant air power. Syrian air defences arereported to be much better than Libyas and, given that the Libyan campaign was reported tohave run short of planes and ammunition, stronger US participation at least would probablybe required for a credible no-fly zone in Syria. With Western defence expenditure cuts andconflict with Iran a looming possibility, finding resources for a no-fly zone would becomplicated.

If a no-fly zone mandate were to include authority to mount air strikes against any forcesthreatening civilians, as the UN resolution authorising intervention in Libya did, the difficulty

of intervening from the air in what is essentially an urban conflict would become obvious.

Again, the Russian government is likely to continue to resist a Security Council resolutionauthorising any such action, making it difficult to justify legally.

There may be different levels of intervention from the air. According to a leaked email from asecurity consultancy, the US military has been secretly asked to prepare for air strikesagainst regime forces. These attacks would fall short of providing air cover for rebel forces or

58 Secretary of Defence Leon E Panetta, Statement on Syria to the House Armed Services Committee, 19 April

201259 Adrian Johnson, What Ends a War? The Limits of Bosnia-Syria Parallels, Commentary, Royal UnitedServices Institute, 14 March 2012

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enforcing a no-fly zone, but would be guerrilla attacks, assassination campaigns, to try tobreak the back of the Alawite forces, elicit collapse from within.60

10.3 Humanitarian corridors

A related idea is that humanitarian corridors could be established, allowing agencies to

access to conflict zones. On 6 March the Turkish government called on the Syriangovernment to allow such corridors and the French government has in the past made similarcalls. The corridors idea appears to rely on Syrian forces respecting them voluntarily, andthere is little sign that that would happen. Similarly, the Red Cross idea of having a voluntarydaily ceasefire to allow humanitarian access looks difficult to achieve.

The Assad regime has not responded in any convincing way to the exhortations of theinternational community and it seems that any intervention lite, relying on voluntarycooperation is unlikely to succeed, as set out by an analyst writing for Reliefweb:

Ultimately, protecting of the civilian population in Syria is the responsibility of the Syrian

government, or, if required, the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UNCharter in light of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Considering the recent UNreport alleging ongoing indiscriminate attacks against civilians ordered by the parties tothe conflict, the parties consent to a humanitarian truce to provide assistance tocivilians will be of limited value. Humanitarian organizations may consider entering intotruce and/or corridor agreements only when the Security Council has establishedrobust and credible mechanisms to enforce these arrangements. Despite their neutralcharacter, the success of humanitarian truces, zones, or corridors will inevitably rely onthe international communitys political will to take coercive action in protecting civiliansin Syria.61

10.4 Arming the rebels

Saudi Arabia called early on for the rebels to be armed but Western governments wereinitially reluctant to follow that route. The argument against arming the rebels is that it wouldsimply make it more likely that the conflict would descend into full civil war; it is difficult toimagine raising the effectiveness of rebel fighters to the point where they could challenge theso-far relatively cohesive armed forces of the regime.

While Saudi Arabia and Qatar have called for the rebels to be armed, there is littleintelligence available to suggest that the Gulf nations have decided to send arms themselvesyet.

11 UK government policy

On 6 February the UK recalled the British ambassador to Syria for consultations. Both theSyrian embassy in London and the British embassy in Damascus remained open, however.In his statement on 6 February, Foreign Secretary William Hague set out the steps that thegovernment intended to take:

Continue to support the Arab League.

Widen the coalition of states working for a resolution, with particular referenceto the proposal for an Arab-led Friends of Syria group.

60 Leaked email from the Stratfor security consultancy published in Syria: atrocities recalled by those fleeing

Homs, Guardian blog, 6 March 201261 Claude Bruderlein, Syria: Humanitarian corridors will depend on international commitment to protect civilians,Reliefweb, 24 February 2012

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Intensify contacts with the Syrian opposition.

Maintain a strong focus at the United Nations, both at the Security Council andthe General Assembly.

Increase pressure through the European Union and push for agreement of

further EU sanctions at the Foreign Affairs Council on 27 February.

Work with others to ensure that those responsible for crimes in Syria are heldto account, with particular reference to the UN Human Rights Council meetingin March.

Use the remaining channels of communication between the UK and Syriangovernments to push for an end to violence.62

11.1 Aid

According to a Parliamentary answer delivered in March 2012, the National Security Councilcoordinates the UK response to the Syria crisis.63 The Department for InternationalDevelopment is attempting to contribute to the relief effort for Syrian refugees:

The immediate priority is to ensure that assistance can get to those who need it, and tosupport UN efforts to negotiate access and coordinate the international humanitarianresponse. UK support to humanitarian agencies working in Syria is providingemergency medical services and supplies for injured civilians, food rations for over20,000 people, essential household items for 5,500 people forced to leave their homes,emergency drinking water for 2,750 people, and restoration of damaged water andsanitation infrastructure to ensure access to safe water for over 30,000 people. Inaddition, the UK is supporting UN efforts to help make food available for up to 1.7million people caught up in the ongoing violence in Syria, as well as vital medical

care.

64

The UK has spent some 4.5 million, but the aid effort is hindered by access restrictions:

UK support amounts to 4.5 million of official development assistance. We aresupporting those organisations which are working to get aid to the people most in needin Horns and other areas. However, humanitarian agencies continue to facerestrictions on their access in Syria, which limits their ability to deliver aid to all areasand assess the full extent of humanitarian needs.65

11.2 Support for the opposition

The UK government supports the Syrian National Council and other opposition groups in

Syria in its efforts to make progress towards articulating a coherent transition strategy.However, that does not mean that Britain has officially recognised the SNC or de-recognisedthe Syrian government. The UK counts the SNC as a legitimate representative of the Syrianpeople.66 Foreign Secretary William Hague explained in a recent answer:

The UK is intensifying its support to the political opposition including, but notexclusively, the Syrian National Council to help them develop and set out their visionfor Syria's future. We are encouraging them to work together under the auspices of the

62 HC Deb 6 February 2012, c2363 HL Deb 19 March 2012, c148-9WA64

HL Deb 19 March 2012, c148WA65 HC Deb 19 March 2012, c578W66 UK boosts Syria opposition ties, William Hague reveals, BBC News Online, 24 February 2012

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Arab League to deliver a credible plan for an orderly transition to a different type ofpolitical system.67

Mr Hague went on:

The practical support that we have offered has concentrated on assisting Syrian

human rights activists to record, collate and speak out on human rights violationsconducted by the regime, so that the perpetrators can be held to account.68

However, the government opposes the arming of the Syrian opposition, as explained in arecent Parliamentary answer:

The position of the UK Government are [sic] clear with regard to arming the Syrianopposition: we have repeatedly said that we will not provide equipment or support forany element of the Syrian opposition that does not comply with EU sanctions and ourown export regulations.69

On 13 October 2011, the Syrian Ambassador was called to the Foreign and Commonwealth

Office to discuss reports that Syrian Embassy staff were harassing Syrians living in the UK.On 15 March, Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt said that there had been no further reportsfrom the Metropolitan Police of such behaviour.70

11.3 Diplomatic relations

The UK has withdrawn all of its diplomatic personnel from Syria and suspended the servicesof the embassy in Damascus, although the UK has not formally broken off diplomaticrelations with the Syrian government. In a statement to the House of Commons on 1 March,Mr Hague said that the UK would continue its diplomatic efforts in Syria:

My decision to withdraw staff from the British embassy in Damascus in no way reduces

the UK's commitment to active diplomacy to maintain pressure on the Assad regime toend the violence.71

Any UK nationals still in Syria and needing consular assistance should contact any remainingEU embassy.

12 EU and sanctions

The EU has imposed a wide range of sanctions on trade with Syria and has imposed assetfreezes and travel bans on a number of individuals connected with the governmentsrepression. An arms embargo, together with bans on items which might be used for internalrepression, is in force. There is also a ban on the import of crude oil and petroleum products

and on investment in the oil industry, a ban on the provision of notes and coins and indealing in gold or precious stones and many other restrictions. The measures aresummarised in a list which contains references to the Council Decisions imposing them,where lists of individuals and details of restrictions can be found.72

On 23 March, it was announced that the presidents wife, Asma al-Assad, his mother andsister and several more members of the government would be joining Bashar al-Assad and

67 HC Deb 19 March 2012, c485W68 HC Deb 19 March 2012, c483W69 HC Deb 19 March 2012, c486W70

HC Deb 15 March 2012, c409W71 HC Deb 1 March 2012, c42-3WS72 European Union, Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force, 6 March 2012

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113 other Syrians and 38 organisations on the list of persons subject to asset freezes andtravel bans. It was not clear how the travel ban would affect Mrs Assad, who was born in theUK and is thought to be a British citizen. If she has retained a UK passport, she could not berefused access to Britain, according to reports.73

Commenting on the UK role in getting the EU to impose sanctions, Mr Hague said recently:The UK has been at the forefront of delivering 12 rounds of EU sanctions, subjecting atotal of 114 individuals and 39 entities to asset freezes and travel bans. Thesesanctions are targeted against those supporting, or benefitting from the regime, andthose associated with them. We will continue to work closely with our internationalpartners in considering new ways to increase the economic and political pressure onthe Assad regime.74

US sanctions are listed in the US Department of the Treasury website. 75 Like the EU, the USgovernment has frozen the assets of many government officials.

On 23 April, the US administration introduced a new set of sanctions connected with the useof information technology to commit human rights abuses. The sanctions target theindividuals who carry out such activities and aim to Degrade the ability of the Syrian andIranian governments to acquire and utilize such technology to oppress their people. 76 Theaim of the sanctions is to try to stop the Syrian and Iranian governments from censoring theinternet, which the US authorities consider crucial to assist democratic revolutions.

Also on 23 April, the EU imposed sanctions on the export of luxury goods to Syria, hoping toaffect the lifestyle of top members of the regime. There has been media discussion of thehigh-spending habits of people close to the regime, particularly Asmaa al-Assad, thePresidents wife.

12.1 Impact of sanctions

Economic sanctions are beginning to have a severe effect on the Syrian economy, accordingto reports. Revenue from Syrias oil exports has almost completely dried up, as even Chinaand India are declining to buy it.77 The governments cash position has become so bad that ithas stopped providing government services such as health and education in some areas.Leon Panetta, US Defence Secretary, said in evidence to the House Armed ServicesCommittee that the governments income has been cut by almost a third as a result ofsanctions.

The economic squeeze will not bring the regime down, at least for several months, according

to analysts. The Assad family is reported to have large reserves of cash and income fromillegal economic activities.78

On 2 May, the IMF said that the Syrian economy would experience a significant contractionin Gross Domestic Product in 2012, although it did not give any figures due to the uncertainty

73 Syria: Asma al-Assad to be hit with EU sanctions, Daily Telegraph, 23 March 201274 HC Deb 19 March 2012, c483-4W75 US Department of the Treasury, Syria sanctions76 Fact Sheet: Sanctions Against Those Complicit in Grave Human Rights Abuses Via Information Technology in

Syria and Iran, White House, 23 April 201277

Syria running out of cash as sanctions take toll, but Assad avoids economic pain, Washington Post, 25 April2012

78 Ibid.

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of the situation.79 Unrest and the sanctions on Syrian oil exports would be the main factors inthe decline, according to the body. The Syrian stock market has dropped by 40% since thebeginning of the uprising, while the Syrian pound has lost 25% of its value on officialexchanges and 45% on the illicit markets.

12.2 Iranian assistanceIt is also said to be receiving significant money (as well as technical and moral support) fromIran, which is reported to be helping sell some Syrian oil. According to US officials, Iran hassupplied weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) for surveillance, and given Syriahelp in monitoring and censoring internet traffic, to which the US has responded with furthersanctions (see above).80

13 Outlook

Syrian security forces have made some progress in recent months, as Bashar al-Assadstelevised tour of the Baba Amr area of Homs was intended to demonstrate. The acceptanceof the Annan peace plan will give the Assad regime some political cover and it will allow theregime to continue to play for time. The peace plan was not accepted by many rebels bothinside and outside Syria because it did not call for President Assad to step aside beforenegotiations could begin and this could mean that many opposition elements will refuse toenter into any negotiations. Some armed elements will probably continue to mount attacks.This too will help the government to blame terrorists and foreign conspiracies for anyviolence.

More problematic for the regime might be sixth commitment made under the Annan plan: toallow peaceful demonstration and assembly. If demonstrations were genuinely to bepermitted, the streets could be paralysed by enormous manifestations, underlining the

regimes loss of legitimacy and leading to its ultimate downfall. Some analysts conclude thatthat is why the regime will not be able to comply with the sixth commitment and will continueto use violence to suppress demonstrations and to rely on its security forces to protect it,rather than enter into any meaningful political negotiations.

With the opposition already getting some equipment and other help from outside Syria, thepossibility of a continuing downward spiral of violence and revenge attacks leading to a isworrying. The International Crisis Group recently drew a sombre conclusion:

The fact is that the regimes behaviour has fuelled extremists on both sides and, byallowing the countrys slide into chaos, provided them space to move in and operate.Its security services are likely to do everything in their power to tarnish and vilify the

opposition and the opposition to do whatever it can to avenge the unbearableviolence to which it has been subjected. As a result, conditions have been created inwhich extreme forms of violence may well become routine. In turn, this will furtherempower the most radical elements on all sides, justifying the worst forms of regimebrutality and prompt-ing appalling retaliation in response. Should such trends continue,the conflicts current death toll already in the thousands likely will appear modest inhindsight.81

Marc Lynch, of the Council on Foreign Relations, said in testimony to the US House ForeignAffairs Subcommittee on 24 April that it was too early to give up on the Annan plan:

79

Syria economy faces 'significant' contraction: IMF, Agence France Presse, 2 May 201280 Iran helping Assad to put down protests: officials, Reuters, 23 March 201281 Syrias Phase of Radicalisation, International Crisis Group, 10 April 2012

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The ceasefire for which the United Nations called has not ended the killing, but it hassubstantially reduced the violence even before the entry of the full internationalmonitoring mission. What is more, the number of peaceful protests across Syria hassignificantly increased in the two weeks since the ceasefire began. Economicsanctions are taking a real toll on an increasingly isolated Syrian regime.

It is far too soon to give up on a diplomatic process which has just begun. Rather thanrush into a risky, costly and potentially counter-productive military intervention, theUnited States should give the current plan time to work. It should continue to leadinternational efforts at the United Nations, promote the demilitarization of the conflict,continue to increase the pressure on the Assad regime, build on the efforts underwaywith the "Friends of Syria" group, support the political development of the Syrianopposition, and prepare the ground for future accountability for war crimes.82

Julien Barnes-Dacey, of the European Council on Foreign Relations, argues thatdemilitarisation and a political solution are crucial, but that Russia and other allies of theAssad regime must be persuaded to contribute to the pressure on the Assad regime:

The regime will only succumb to pressure if there is an international consensus on theneed for an immediate end to the violence and for a political process. It is thereforeimperative that Russia, as the key actor hitherto blocking a united international front and thereby giving the regime continued cover be drawn into the process. But a lossof Russian support alone may not be sufficient to push Assad to the negotiating table,particularly if it continues to secure assistance from Iran and Hezbollah, and economicroutes to Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan remain open. Thus all of these actors also need tobe drawn into the process.83

Mark Malloch-Brown, formerly Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations, writes thatinvocations of the War on Terror and interventions such as the Libyan campaign have made

it harder to persuade the parties to a conflict to reach for a negotiated solution. He arguesthat there must be international pressure in support of the Annan plan:

We need to seize hold of the unfashionable idea that diplomacy can do what Nato,arms supplies, intervention or outside bluster cannot do: ease Syria through to ademocratic, law-based future. But to do that, there needs to be a united internationalcommunity that together forces both sides to sit down around Kofi Annans negotiatingtable and compromise.84

Patrick Cockburn argues in the Independent that it is too late for any negotiated solution:Concessions made last spring might have had an impact, but since then too much blood hasbeen spilled.85

14 Conclusion

The divisions among the worlds powers have something to do with commercial interests, butperhaps as much with very different attitudes to power. Russia and China say they do notwan

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