The Sturdy House That Assad Built

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March 7, 2011SNAPSHOT

The Sturdy House That Assad BuiltWhy Damascus Is Not Cairo

Michael Brning

MICHAEL BRNING is Director of the East Jerusalem office of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a

German political foundation affiliated with Germanys Social Democratic Party. He is the

author of The Politics of Change in Palestine: State-Building and Non-Violent Resistance.

As revolutions rocked authoritarian regimes from Tunis to Manama, pundits were quick to

identify Syrias leadership as the next to fall. Like other countries in the region, Syria is

deeply impoverished. And on the face of it, the similarities between Damascus

authoritarian system and those of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are striking. Just as in Tunisia

and Egypt, a single-party regime has ruled Syria with an iron fist for years. For the past five

decades, it has kept the country under permanent emergency law, which, like in its North

African counterparts, has been used to suppress calls for greater political participation. Yet

despite various parallels, a closer look at Syria reveals that the Assad regime -- led for the

past decade by Bashar al-Assad -- is unlikely to fall. Paradoxically, Syrias grave economic

situation and its Alawi minority rule, which has been safeguarded by repressive

mechanisms, will prevent oppositional forces from gaining critical mass in the near future.

Syria has recently experienced annual economic growth rates of around four percent, but

the country is still plagued by staggering unemployment, increasing costs of living,stagnating wages, and widespread poverty. Although official data from Damascus (which is

notorious for its overly optimistic calculations) lists unemployment in the first quarter of

2010 at eight percent, independent estimates hover around 20 percent, with even higher

rates among the younger generation. Because underemployed and disillusioned youth

comprised one of the driving forces of revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, observers have

enthusiastically noted Syrias youth unemployment rate as a signal of potential revolt.

Syrian youth certainly share the economic grievances of young people in Tunisia and Egypt,

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but widespread poverty and unemployment are unlikely to catalyze sudden regime change

now. Despite the policy of cautious economic liberalization that Assad initiated after taking

office in 2000, Syrian society continues to be defined by its high degree of egalitarianism.

True, Western luxury goods are increasingly available to elites, and some members of

Assads extended family have been accused of nepotism and profiteering. However, the

accumulation of excessive wealth in the hands of an oligarchic political elite has been more

an exception than a rule. Political isolation and domestic authoritarianism have severelyrestricted the development of a politically conscious and economically empowered middle

class. As such, the situation in Damascus differs significantly from pre-revolutionary

Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In all three countries, public fury was fueled by a highly visible

and ever-increasing status gap between a large elite class and a marginalized majority.

Unlike Syrians, protesters in Tunisia, Egypt, and now Libya perceived their poverty to be

relative rather than absolute -- and thus as an injustice caused by the regime.

During its decades of rule, moreover, the Assad family developed a strong political safety

net by firmly integrating the military into the regime. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad, Bashars

father, seized power after rising through the ranks of the Syrian armed forces, during which

time he established a network of loyal Alawites by installing them in key posts. In fact, the

military, ruling elite, and ruthless secret police are so intertwined that it is now impossible

to separate the Assad regime from the security establishment. Bashar al-Assads threat to

use force against protesters would be more plausible than Tunisias or Egypts were. So,

unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, where a professionally trained military tended to play an

independent role, the regime and its loyal forces have been able to deter all but the most

resolute and fearless oppositional activists. In this respect, the situation in Syria is to a

certain degree comparable to Saddam Husseins strong Sunni minority rule in Iraq. At the

same time, it is significantly different from Libya, where the military, although brutal and

loyal to the regime, is a more disorganized group of militant thugs than a trained and

disciplined army.

Indeed, the regimes use of force against opponents has not been merely hypothetical. In

1982, Hafez al-Assad infamously suppressed an uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in the

city of Hama, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths. More recently, in 2004, Bashar

al-Assads security forces violently quelled Kurdish protests, leaving dozens dead. The

likelihood of the regime resorting to such violence again is increased by Syrias isolation.

Unlike in Egypt, where a strong history of friendly bilateral relations and a U.S.-leddiplomatic effort shaped the militarys response to growing protests, or Tunisia, where the

military received intensive U.S.-training, the West has very little leverage over Syria. The

consequences of such political isolation can be seen on the Libyan streets: with no one able

to stop him, the equally ostracized leader Muammar al-Qaddafi has opted to use sheer

force to maintain his hold on power. For many Syrians, the Libyan regimes violent response

is a stark reminder of the suffering a determined tyrant can inflict on his people.

Another Syrian particularity is Assads affiliation with a religious minority: the Alawi sect.


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Political observers have established a near-unanimous consensus that his minority status

has severely jeopardized long-term stability. This assessment is plausible but fails to

account for Syrias specific circumstances.

It is true that Assad has even fewer enthusiastic supporters beyond his small group of

co-opted elites than did former Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and former

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, but the regimes opposition has even less popular

support. Unlike other dictators in the region, Assad is seen by many as a counterweight to

sectarian disintegration rather than as a champion of sectarian interests. Moreover, Syrians

have had frequent and direct exposure to the devastating outcomes of sectarian conflicts in

Iraq and Lebanon. In 2005 and 2006, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese and Iraqi

refugees flowed into Damascus, reminding Syrians of the dire consequences of religiously

fueled carnage. And seeing how sectarianism has stunted Lebanon and Iraq, Syrias equally

pluralist society has good reason to acquiesce to Assads leadership.

Moreover, Assads comparable youth (he is 45, Ben Ali is 74, Mubarak is 82, and Qaddafi is

68) and his record of staunch anti-Westernism give him a layer of protection that the otherleaders did not enjoy. Many Syrians perceive his opposition to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq

and his anti-Israel policies as desirable and in the national interest. In fact, Assads

reputation in the West as an unyielding pariah has translated into popularity in his own

country. In a somewhat twisted way, his willingness to stand up to the United States

comports with the theme of Arab dignity that has rallied protesters throughout the region.

While a similar anti-Western stance was taken by Qaddafi, Syrias geographical proximity to

the Arab-Israeli conflict (and its direct involvement) has lent Assads rhetoric of resistance

much greater credibility than Qaddafis, especially after Qaddafi improved relations with the

United States in the 2000s.

This is not to say that the Syrian regime has demonstrated complete indifference to

regional developments. Indicating at least some uneasiness at the toppling of his

counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, Assad recently promised reforms to open up society

and start dialogue. So far, his reforms have been limited to ad hoc increases in certain

wages and the (surprising) unlocking of social media networks. Still, Syrians will likely

prefer to pin their hopes on a slow but stable process of reform rather than an uncertain

and violent revolution. Calls on Facebook for a day of rage have until now remained

unanswered.

Certainly, an early test of whether Assads promise of reforms was sufficient will be seen in

municipal and parliamentary elections scheduled for later this year. However these elections

turn out, it seems that the current wave of anti-authoritarianism will continue to largely

pass Syria by. Ironically, the one Arab regime Western leaders would probably most like to

see ousted from power may very well end up relatively strengthened compared to the

fledgling regimes in the rest of the region. This is especially worrisome, given the possibility

that an unshaken regime in Damascus might seriously consider a rapprochement with a


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newly elected Egyptian leadership. The question of how the West should engage Assad, now

bolstered by the demise of Western-backed leaders in Tunisia and Egypt, will thus soon

reemerge with even greater acuteness.

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