The Structure of Scientific Productivity in Islamic ... · 2 The Structure of Scientific...

The Structure of Scientific Productivity in Islamic

Civilization: Orientalists’ Fables

Asadullah Ali Al-Andalusi

Yaqeen Institute for Islamic Research

Author Bio

Asadullah Ali Al-Andalusi has a Bachelors of Arts from Benedictine University

in Western Philosophy, Masters from the International Islamic University of

Malaysia in Philosophy, Phd. Candidate at University of Malaya in Islamic

Studies.

Copyright © 2017 Yaqeen Institute for Islamic Research

The Structure of Scientific Productivity in Islamic Civilization: Orientalists’ Fables 1

The Structure of Scientific Productivity in Islamic

Civilization: Orientalists’ Fables

Abstract: The popular analysis (promulgated by Orientalists) on the rise and

decline of scientific productivity in Islamic civilization dichotomises the events of

Islamic history as a conflict between religion and reason. This analysis has since

come to be coined the ‘Classical Narrative’ by its critics, and suggests that the

scientific successes of Muslims throughout history were based solely on foreign

influences, whereas Islamic values and ideas were responsible for their decline.

However, recent studies have shown this narrative to be invalid due to its

inconsistent rendering of the historical data, and more valid alternatives have been

offered which point to an overt instrumentalization as the principal motivating

factor behind scientific productivity in the Muslim world. Despite these

developments, the reasons behind the decline have yet to be fully ascertained. As

such, this paper offers a summary and critique of the Classical Narrative, as well

as revisionary constructs towards understanding the influences behind the rise and

decline of scientific productivity in Islamic civilization.

Introduction

Three months after the tragic events of September 11th, 2001, the renowned

Pakistani nuclear physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy penned an article for the Washington

Post titled “How Islam Lost Its Way: Yesterday’s Achievements Were Golden,”

attempting to explain the reasons behind the attacks on 9/11 as well as the

downtrodden state of the Muslim world in the contemporary period. Throughout

the article, he mentions the ‘Golden Age’ of Islamic civilization: a time when

rationality and science triumphed over religious conservatism. He concludes his

analysis by blaming religious orthodoxy for the end of this glorious era – more

specifically, placing the burden on the 11th – 12th centuries C.E. theologian Abū

Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 1111):

But in the 12th century, Muslim orthodoxy reawakened, spearheaded by the Arab

cleric Imam Al-Ghazālī. Al-Ghazālī championed revelation over reason,

predestination over free will. He damned mathematics as being against Islam, an

intoxicant of the mind that weakened faith…Caught in the viselike grip of

orthodoxy, Islam choked. No longer would Muslim, Christian and Jewish scholars


gather and work together in the royal courts. It was the end of tolerance, intellect

and science in the Muslim world.1

Aside from the rather curious claim that Al-Ghazālī was an Arab (he was Persian),

Hoodhboy doesn’t explain how one man was capable of destroying an entire

civilization – much less how said man’s supposed aversion to free will and

mathematics had anything do with 9/11 – but it’s clear that he believes this

illustrious scholar responsible for embedding a debilitating and everlasting

irrationality into the Muslim world which has resulted in extremism, terrorism,

political turmoil, and a lack of Nobel Prizes.

Over a decade later, at the Cannes Lions International Festival of Creativity, the

American astrophysicist and popular science educator, Neil deGrasse Tyson,

would repeat this same tragic story about Islamic civilization’s once enlightened

past and its downfall by this Muslim version of Voldemort, who single-handedly

vanquished rationality through his apparent disregard for the utility of mathematics

and denial of the necessary relationship between cause and effect.2

But is it really the case that all of the problems facing the contemporary Muslim

world are the result of some anti-rationalist and anti-scientific spirit emanating

from the ideas of one man? And how is it that two scientists, from opposite sides of

the world and cultures, are not only in agreement regarding the rise and decline of

scientific productivity in Islamic civilization, but can air their opinions in such a

way as to be taken as authorities on the matter? Because their opinions certainly

have nothing to do with their credentials as historians of science. Rather, their

opinions seem to reflect a popular and long-entrenched view that has remained

unchallenged – at least until very recently.

For the past few decades, a number of historians of science have put this narrative

under the microscope, scrutinizing its foundational assumptions and its incoherent

rendering of the historical data: a projection inspired by the Occident’s own

ideological history (i.e., the Enlightenment vs. the Church).3

1 Pervez Hoodbhoy, “How Islam Lost Its Way: Yesterday’s Achievements Were Golden,” The Washington Post,

December 30, 2001, accessed October 21, 2016,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2001/12/30/how-islam-lost-its-way-yesterdays-achievements-

were-golden/d325ce2a-146f-4791-b5e7-8e662d991cbb/?utm_term=.08b85096dca1 2 Stephen Shankland, “Neil DeGrasse Tyson: US need not lose its edge in science,” CNET, June 20, 2014, accessed

October 21, 2016, http://www.cnet.com/news/neil-degrasse-tyson-the-us-doesnt-have-to-lose-its-edge-in-science/ 3 This is the formal term used to refer to ‘the West’ (i.e., Europe, the Americas, and their subsequent colonies,

territories, etc.).


That said, how did the rise of scientific productivity in Islamic civilization occur?

What were its major influences? And was the subsequent decline a result of an

overt religious conservatism? In order to answer these questions, we will need to

analyze the historical data and the popular conceptions of those data, while

surveying the most recent alternative theories. Prior to this however, we should

begin by defining many of the terms essential to this discourse so as to acquire a

better grasp of this topic.

Defining Terms

The initial question that should be asked regarding the discourse behind ‘the rise

and decline of scientific productivity in the Islamic civilization’ is how it should be

conducted; meaning, what are the primary terms and concepts that need to be

ascertained prior to examining the issue at hand? This same question applies to any

and all intellectual inquiry, whether it regards science, theology, philosophy, law,

or history. Thus, the first term that needs to be defined is ‘science’ itself. However,

despite what one might presume, this is not an easy feat given that the term can

encompass a variety of different meanings depending on the contexts in which it is

used. As a case in point, the philosopher of science, Osman Bakar states:

Science is not an entity that is obvious to everyone…To begin with, there are

disagreements on terminological usage itself, whether the domain of knowledge to

which the term ‘science’ is applied is to be confined to the natural sciences, or to

be extended to cover the humanities and social sciences as well. Some people use

the word in both senses.4

Broadly speaking then, ‘science’ may simply be defined as a “body of knowledge.”

In this respect, another philosopher of science, Alparslan Açikgenç suggests that

anything worthy of being properly deemed a ‘science’ must have four essential

characteristics, the first of which is that it must have ‘subject matter’ or an “object

of study” that “excludes all unrelated subjects of inquiry.”5 Following this, it needs

to have a ‘method’ or “the manner in which a scientific investigation is carried

out.”6 Afterwards, it must have a ‘theory’ or “a formulation given as a provisional

solution to a certain problem.” 7 And finally, it must have a ‘tradition’ or the

4 Osman Bakar, preface to Tawhid and Science, 2nd ed. (Shah Alam: Arah Publications, 2008), xxx-xxxi. 5 Alparslan Açikgenç, Islamic Scientific Tradition in History (Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 2014), 12. 6 Ibid, 13. 7 Ibid, 45.


function of acquiring new information which can be named and organized, leading

to the formation of a scholarly community.8

However, although this definition may be useful in a broader analysis regarding the

decline of knowledge within Islamic civilization generally, contemporary

discussions revolving around the historical phenomena of the rise and decline of

science within any given civilization often stress a more specific understanding of

‘science’ as “the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic

study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through

observation and experiment”9 and its practical applicability (i.e., technology). That

said, it is also relevant to note that embedded into this specification is the popular

conception that science is somehow a value-neutral and objective enterprise;

totally removed from the subjectivity of scientists themselves. However, this is

mistaken and will be expressly challenged throughout this discussion. As the

philosopher of science and polymath Ziauddin Sardar notes:

It can be argued that the ideological and political factors are external to science.

That within science, the scientific method ensures neutrality and objectivity by

following a strict logic – observation, experimentation, deduction and value-free

conclusion. But scientists do not make observations in isolation. All observations

take place within a well-defined theory. The observations, and the data collection

that goes with them, are designed either to refute a theory or provide support for

it. And theories themselves are not plucked out of the air. Theories exist within

paradigms – that is, a set of beliefs and dogmas.10

The implications of such a view may seem counterintuitive; that the nature of

‘facts,’ contrary to being “objective,” are entirely dependent on the theories

scientists construct in order to coherently comprehend their experiences of the

external world. Indeed, the concept of ‘paradigm’ has become integral to

understanding the nature of science today within academic circles and provides a

foundation from which to ascertain the motivations, scope, and research interests

of a scientific community. In explaining the reasoning behind the concept, the

philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (d. 1996) – who coined the term in his

magnum opus, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 11 – explains that while

8 Ibid, 15. 9 “Science,” Oxford Dictionaries, accessed December 6, 2016,

http://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/science 10 Ziauddin Sardar, How Do We Know? Reading Ziauddin Sardar on Islam, Science and Cultural Relations

(London: Pluto Press, 2006), 170. 11 As the reader may easily ascertain, Kuhn’s work was the primary influence behind this paper’s title.


human experiences are indeed universal, our understanding of those experiences

varies in accordance with our background beliefs:

If two people stand at the same place and gaze in the same direction, we

must…conclude that they receive closely similar stimuli. (If both could put their

eyes at the same place, the stimuli would be identical.) But people do not see

stimuli; our knowledge of them is highly theoretical and abstract. Instead they

have sensations, and we are under no compulsion to suppose that the sensations

of our two viewers are the same. (Sceptics might remember that color blindness

was nowhere noticed until John Dalton's description of it in 1794.)12

Thus, far from being neutral, the practice and application of any given science is

entirely dependent on the axiological and metaphysical motivations of scientists

themselves.13 For instance, the essence of scientific productivity within a secular

society may differ tremendously in its goals and output from a more religiously

inclined one, because the principal values and beliefs of the scientists within each

civilization will most certainly differ. While the former may focus on problems and

goals related exclusively to the preservation and functioning of a non-religious

state and its people, the latter will be motivated by an entirely different set of

beliefs and circumstances. In other words, culture, or “the ideas, customs, and

social behaviour of a particular people or society,”14 determine what constitutes

‘science,’ including the theories formed to interpret empirical data (i.e., ‘facts’).15

As such, what we understand as the dominant scientific tradition today is really

‘Western science,’ whereas this research paper discusses the rise and decline of

Islamic civilizations’ perception of science (i.e., ‘Islamic science’) as taking place

within the context of an Islamic cultural framework, projecting the values and

beliefs of Muslim scientists at work.16

But does our understanding of science also affect our analysis of a civilization’s

scientific history? Certainly. For instance, if we were to adopt the aforementioned

‘neutral view,’ the claim that science “rose” and “declined” within Islamic

civilization would really be nothing more than an anachronistic and projected

interpretation of our own experiences with science today. The result of such a view

would bring us to the absurd conclusion that science is either non-existent in the

12 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 192. 13 Axiology is the philosophical study of values. Values are generally considered the cherished beliefs of a people

that guide them in all their affairs (i.e., morals and ethics). 14 “Culture,” Oxford Dictionaries, accessed December 6, 2016, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/culture 15 For a thorough understanding of science in this respect, please refer to Thomas Kuhn’s work The Structure of

Scientific Revolutions. 16 Alparslan Açikgenç, Islamic Scientific Tradition in History (Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 2012), 27.


contemporary Muslim world or is on the brink of extinction. Far from this being

the case, science is alive and well among Muslims – from iPhones to the latest in

medical technology – but is simply no longer being pioneered from the Islamic

perspective. As such, the ‘value-laden’ conception is far more in line with

historical and contemporary realities. This is why some historians of science, such

as George Saliba, define ‘decline’ within the scope of a civilization’s scientific

activity as “an age in which a civilization begins to be a consumer of scientific

ideas rather than a producer of them.”17

Despite the logic, the conception of science as neutral is still the most popular

among laypeople. As such, it may be helpful to reframe certain historical

categories to more properly reflect the cultural elements essential to their

interpretation. Therefore, I propose that the categories of ‘rise’ and ‘decline’ be

reconceptualised as the ‘Age of Productivity’ and the ‘Age of Dependency’

respectively. Neither of these labels imply a neutral perspective of science

independent from their cultural influences nor do they place us in the conundrum

of having to explain how science somehow “declined” in Islamic civilization

despite contemporary Muslims possessing as many products of scientific activity

as their Western counterparts. Rather, they more accurately represent the current

status of Islamic science as a once productive enterprise now eclipsed and reliant

on foreign elements. That said, for the sake of conciseness, the terms ‘rise’ and

‘decline’ will still be referenced throughout, but should be viewed as

interchangeable with these proposed revised constructs.

Finally, it is necessary to know those terms representing the primary influences

behind the rise and decline of any given scientific tradition. These influences are

important in that they help us to not only comprehend the reasons behind the rise

and decline of Islamic science, but also provide us the means by which we can

measure when they occurred. As such, the historian of science, Toby Huff divides

these influences into two categories: ‘internal influences’ and ‘external influences.’

The former represents the “methods, theories, paradigms, and instrumentation of

science,” and the latter represents the “cultural and institutional structures that give

scientific inquiry a secure place in the intellectual life of a society and

civilisation.” 18 In other words, internal influences are simply a particular

civilization’s abstract perceptions and practice of science, whereas external

17 George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007),

248. 18 Toby Huff, The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2003), 19.


influences constitute more material factors which facilitate the manifestation and

application of those perceptions (e.g., government funded research facilities,

libraries, universities, etc.). That said, I would also add to Huff’s definition of

‘external influences’ things like war, economic boom and recession, natural

disasters, plagues, etc., given that these phenomena also play a major role in

determining whether or not a society will be focused on nurturing their scientific

tradition and to what ends.

Figure 1

The ‘rise’ and ‘decline’ of a scientific tradition re-conceptualized.

Following the above discussion, a cursory analysis of the history behind the Age of

Productivity in Islamic civilisation will be given. While it is not within the scope of

this paper to elucidate a full picture of the various opinions regarding this point in

history, a summary of the popular narrative – and the problems associated with it –

shall be given so as to provide a backdrop for explaining the major influences

behind the historical development of Islamic science.


The ‘Classical Narrative’ and Scholarly Dissent

During the advent of Islām in the 7th century C.E. Arabian Peninsula, the power of

the Byzantine and Sassanid (Persian) Empires was beginning to wane in the wake

of internal flaws in administration, military expansionism, economies, and never-

ending conflicts with one another.19 Muslims at that time took advantage of these

weaknesses and conquered both empires within a matter of a few decades. With

the balance of power having shifted, the new Islamic polity was allowed to allocate

its resources and time towards creating a world that would suit its own interests. As

Dimitri Gutas notes:

The historical significance of the Arab conquests can hardly be overestimated.

Egypt and the Fertile Crescent were reunited with Persia and India politically,

administratively, and most important, economically, for the first time since

Alexander the Great...The great economic and cultural divide that separated the

civilized world for a thousand years prior to the rise of Islam, the frontier

between the East and the West formed by the two great rivers that created

antagonistic powers on either side, ceased to exist. This allowed for the free flow

of raw materials and manufactured goods, agricultural products and luxury

items, people and services, techniques and skills, and ideas, methods, and modes

of thought.20

Despite this, Muslims would eventually be unable to sustain their dominance and

begin to resort to dependency on foreign ideas and inventions in order to compete

with their neighbors. As a result, the balance of power would again shift and

Muslims would no longer possess the autonomy and dominance they once had.

This is no better evidenced than in the status of Islamic civilization in the

contemporary period, which struggles to survive in the face of disunity and the

onslaught of Western militarization and its monopolization of the global economy

and technology.

However, when discussing the rise of scientific productivity in Islamic civilization,

historians have often projected a narrative that downplays the internal influence of

Islamic values, while exaggerating these external influences of geo-politics as the

primary motivating factors. On the other hand, these same researchers are not

hesitant to credit the former when explaining its decline. This Orientalist inspired

19 David Deming, Science and Technology in World History, Volume 2: Early Christianity, the Rise of Islam and the

Middle Ages (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2010), 81-82. 20 Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early

'Abbasid Society (2nd-4th/5th-10th c.) (New York: Routledge, 1998), 11.


version of events, 21 otherwise referred to as the ‘Classical Narrative,’ has

unfortunately been the popular framework of analysis for centuries within Western

civilization, and now among Muslims as well, resulting in decades of unchallenged

biases and suppressed evidence. That said, there have been attempts in recent years

to provide alternative accounts. For instance, the historian of science George Saliba

has made great strides in deconstructing this theory and its biases, summarizing its

major assumptions in his monumental work, Islamic Science and the Making of the

European Renaissance:

The narrative seems to start with the assumption that Islamic civilization was a

desert civilization, far removed from urban life, that had little chance to develop

on its own any science that could be of interest to other cultures. This civilization

began to develop scientific thought only when it came into contact with other

more ancient civilizations, which are assumed to have been more

advanced…These surrounding civilizations are usually endowed with

considerable antiquity, with high degrees of scientific production (at least at some

time in their history), and with a degree of intellectual vitality that could not have

existed in the Islamic desert civilization.

This same narrative never fails to recount an enterprise that was indeed carried

out during Islamic times: the active appropriation of the sciences of those

civilizations through the wilful process of translation. And this translation

movement is said to have encompassed nearly all the scientific and philosophical

texts and those ancient civilizations had ever produced.

….

In this context, very few authors would go beyond the characterization of this

Islamic golden age as anything more than a re-enactment of the glories of Ancient

Greece…Some would at times venture to say that Islamic scientific production did

indeed add to the accumulated body of Greek science a few features, but this

addition is usually not depicted as anything the Greeks could not have done on

their own had they been given enough time.

….

The classical narrative, however persists in imagining that the Islamic science

that was spurred by these extensive translations was short-lived as an enterprise

because it soon came into conflict with the more traditional forces within Islamic

society, usually designated as religious orthodoxies of one type or another. The

anti-scientific attacks that those very orthodoxies generated are supposed to have

21 An Orientalist is broadly defined as “someone who studies the Orient [i.e. the East].” However, it is specifically

being used here to refer to those who do so through the lens of a Western bias, viewing other cultures and religions

as static, underdeveloped, and inferior.


culminated in the famous work of the eleventh-twelfth-century theologian Abū

Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. 22

Saliba goes on to reject this narrative as a Western projection of its own history

with the Church (i.e., a war between rationalism and religious dogma and

institutions),23 the first indication of which was the double standard of assigning

zero credit to Islamic values for the rise of science in the Muslim world, while

proposing them as the main culprit in its demise.

The Islamic scholar Muzzafar Iqbal notes that this projection can be traced back to

the Orientalist Ignáz Goldziher (d. 1921) and his paper, “The Attitude of Orthodox

Islam towards the Ancient Sciences,” in which he suggests that the decline

ultimately occurred due to religious scholars’ negative attitudes towards the so-

called ‘foreign sciences’ of the Greeks and Persians, due to their seemingly

antithetical teachings to Islamic doctrine.24 His ‘conflict thesis’ would eventually

gain momentum, seeping into the works of many popular historians from the 20th

century to the contemporary period. For instance, Huff evinces this attitude when

he writes:

If in the long run scientific thought and intellectual creativity in general are to

keep themselves alive and advance into new domains of conquest and creativity,

multiple spheres of freedom – what we may call neutral zones – must exist within

which large groups of people can pursue genius free from the censure of political

and religious authorities. In addition, certain metaphysical and philosophical

assumptions must accompany this freedom. Insofar as science is concerned,

individuals must be conceived as being endowed with reason, the world may be

thought to be a rational and consistent whole, and various levels of universal

representation, participation, and discourse must be available. It is precisely here

that one finds the great weaknesses of Arabic-Islamic civilization as an incubator

of modern science.25

Huff reflects an overt bias against the theological thought and institutions of

Islamic civilization, going so far as to use the phrase “Arabic sciences” so as to

focus on the linguistic/ethnic characteristics of the translation movement over any

perceived influences of religion. According to this view, the only positive

contribution by Muslims during this period was the unification of society through a

shared language and the appropriation of Greek philosophy – the hard-earned

22 Saliba, Islamic Science and European Renaissance, 1-2. 23 Ibid, 234. 24 Muzzafar Iqbal, The Making of Islamic Science (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2009), 73. 25 Huff, Rise of Early Modern Science, 219.


efforts of which would later be paradoxically dismantled by an anti-scientific spirit

inherent to Islām itself. However, this raises the question as to how such a

movement would have been possible if anti-scientific sentiments existed prior to

and during its initiation. In other words, if ‘foreign sciences’ were already

unwelcome due to their contrary nature to Islamic doctrine, then it is difficult to

ascertain how they were tolerated to begin with and over such a long period of

time.

Despite the impact and popularity of the conflict thesis, numerous anomalies have

been found in Goldziher’s research, with some historians even suggesting that his

hypothesis could only be formed through deliberately mining de-contextualized

quotations from Islamic scholarly texts.26 As a result, Sonja Brentjes,27 Dimitri

Guntas,28 Ahmad Dallal,29 and the aforementioned George Saliba have attempted

to offer more nuanced and evidence-based perspectives regarding the history of

Islamic science – the last of whom I believe has provided the most salient

deconstruction, positing that the rise of science was less an accidental

appropriation of Greek thought and more the result of the pragmatic concerns of

the early Muslim community itself.

Saliba begins his critique of the Classical Narrative by first addressing when the

rise actually began, as opposed to simply assuming that it was spurred by the

sudden genesis of translation during the reign of the Abbāsid caliph, Abū Jaʿfar

Abdullāh al-M’amūn ibn Hārūn al-Rashīd (d. 833) between 813-833 C.E.

According to legend, Al-M’amūn’s desire to translate Greek works originated from

a mystical experience in which he met Aristotle in a dream, who informed him that

he should begin acquiring knowledge of science. 30 Despite this account being

largely unconfirmed – and most likely a myth formed as a post-hoc explanation –

this has not deterred supporters of the Classical Narrative from including it as

evidence of how scientific productivity miraculously occurred within Islamic

civilization.

26 Sonja Brentjes, “Reviews: Oversimplifying the Islamic Scientific Tradition”, Metascience 13 (2004): 83-86,

accessed October 17, 2016, doi: 10.1023/B:MESC.0000023270.62689.51 27 See, Sonja Brentjes, “On the Location of the Ancient or ‘Rational’ Sciences in Muslim Educational Landscapes

(AH 500 – 1100),” Bulletin of the Royal Institute of Inter-Faith Studies 4 (2002): 47-71. 28 See, Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture. 29 See, Ahmad Dallal, Islam, Science, and the Challenge of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 30 Saliba, Islamic Science and European Renaissance, 13.


Acknowledging the tenuous nature of this origin story, Saliba discovers the period

of the rise to be much earlier, ironically through examining the source behind the

‘dream account’ itself – the 10th century C.E. Persian Muslim historian Muḥammad

ibn Abī Ya’qūb Isḥāq al-Nadīm (d. 940), who wrote an intellectual history of

Islamic civilization in 987/988 CE called Kitab al-Fihrist (Book of the Index).31

Therein, he not only finds the story of Al-M’amūn’s dream, but various other

apocrypha.

Shifting through the numerous accounts, Saliba concludes that Al-Nadīm was

simply recording popular stories of his time and did not intend for all of them to be

used as a means to derive an authentic historical narrative.32 Upon further scrutiny,

the Orientalists’ use of Al-M’amūn’s dream appears to be quite disingenuous, as

Al-Nadīm himself only saw it as having an impact on the spread of scientific

knowledge, not as its source. This is especially evidenced by the fact that he titles

this particular account “Mention of the Reason Why Books on Philosophy and

Other Ancient Sciences Became Plentiful…” and considers the story to be only

“one of the reasons” behind even this phenomenon.33

Similarly, Al-Nadīm contradicts the Classical Narrative by asserting that the

Byzantines considered their own ancient works impermissible to learn, as they

were “opposed to the prophetic [Christian] doctrine,” and retained this sentiment

up until the rise of the Islamic Empire.34 In other words, Muslims did not desire to

translate these texts based on their sudden encounter with Byzantine culture, rather

they were already scientifically inclined to a degree prior. How else could they

have known about the Greek texts and sought them out had they not already been

aware of their value? As Dallal states:

This translation movement provided the knowledge base of the emergent sciences.

But while this explains part of the picture, and admittedly one of its most

important parts, it does not provide a full explanation of the beginnings. To start

with, what are the socio-political conditions and the cultural aptitudes that

triggered interests in the translation and science in the first place? Second, what

were the cultural conditions and the cultural aptitudes that enabled a significant

community of interest to know how to translate complex scientific texts, to develop

the technical terminology needed for the transfer of scientific knowledge between

two languages, to understand scientific texts once they were translated, and to

31 Ibid, 28. 32 Ibid, 40. 33 Muhammad al-Nadīm, The Fihrist of Al-Nadīm: A Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture, V.2, trans. Bayard

Dodge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 583. 34 Ibid, 579 - 581.


constructively engage the knowledge derived from them? Seen in this light,

translation is not a mechanical process but part of a complex historical process

that is not reducible to the transfer of external knowledge; rather, it involves

forces intrinsic to the receiving culture – most important, the epistemological

conditions internal to Islamic culture at the time of the translations.35

However, it is unsurprising that scholars supportive of the Classical Narrative

would be selective in their reading of these accounts – preferring to mold them in

accordance with their preconceived biases rather than attempt a critical

examination. As noted previously by Saliba, the projection of the Western

experience with religious dogma and institutions has largely served as the

backdrop through which other historical events and cultures have been interpreted.

As a consequence, Orientalists have actively searched out only those evidences

which appear to conform to this understanding. In line with this, the account of Al-

M’amūn’s dream also serves as a convenient means through which to tie in

additional historical data which bolsters the Classical Narrative – as it was during

his reign (813-833 C.E.) that one of the greatest theological controversies within

Islamic civilization occurred: the rise of the Mu’tazilah.

According to the Muslim philosopher Seyyed Hossein Nasr, the Mu’tazilah were a

group of theologians who “dominated the theological scene in Iraq for more than a

century and developed an imposing theological edifice based on emphasis on the

use of reason in matters pertaining to religion and the importance of human free

will.”36 Their ‘rational approach’ towards basic doctrines of the faith led them to

espouse views considered heretical, such as the complete obscurement of Allāh to

a mere abstract concept completely incomprehensible to the human intellect. This

was opposed to the more orthodox view that while the Divine Essence cannot be

comprehended in total, His Attributes – as mentioned in the Islamic source texts –

had a reality that was at least relatively comprehensible to the lay Muslim.

However, the Mu’tazilah acquired their infamy from a far more controversial view:

that the Qur’ān was created and not the eternal Word of Allāh.37

But why was such a theological controversy so important to Orientalists? Because

it was Al-Ma’mūn, so convinced of the veracity of Mu‘tazilism during his reign,

who sanctioned the imposition of its doctrines on the wider Muslim community –

even going so far as to implement it as a litmus test for judging the authenticity of

35 Dallal, Islam, Science, and the Challenge of History, 10-11. 36 Seyyed Hossain Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to its Present: Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy

(New York: State University of New York Press, 2006), 121. 37 Ibid, 122.


an individual’s faith.38 Thus, those looking for an obvious example of the “war”

between rationalism and religion can trace a convenient linearity between Al-

Ma’mūn’s dream account, the establishment of the Mu’tazilah, and the subsequent

rise of scientific productivity in Islamic civilization. However, aside from the

obvious misinterpretation of Al-Nadīm’s records, this sentiment relies on the short-

lived influence (34 years) of a group counteracted and eventually overthrown by

the more religiously conservative elements of society through the ascension of

caliph Abu’ Faḍl Jaʿfar ibn Muḥammad al-Muʿtaṣim bi’llāh al-Mutawakkil (d.

861).39 In other words, it is doubtful that the so-called ‘rationalists’ – governing for

such a meager span of time – could be precursors to the subsequent seven centuries

of Muslim scientific progress and ingenuity, which fell under the control of their

theological and intellectual opponents.

Alternatively then, Saliba finds a more plausible account whereby al-Nadīm recalls

a story regarding how the second Ummayyad caliph, Khālid ibn Yazīd ibn

Mu’āwiya (d. 704) had ordered some philosophers to translate Greek works on

alchemy into Arabic for an unknown purpose. He seemingly connects this event to

the later translation of government records (dīwāns) during the reign of the fifth

Umayyad caliph, ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan (d. 705), who ruled from 685 – 705

C.E., along with his governor in Iraq, Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf (d.

714):

Khalid ibn Yazid ibn Mu’awiyah was called the “Wise Man of the Family of

Marwan.” He was inherently virtuous, with an interest in and fondness for the

sciences. As the Art [alchemy] attracted his attention, he ordered a group of Greek

philosophers who were living in a city in Egypt to come to him. Because he was

concerned with literary Arabic, he commanded them to translate the books about

the Art from the Greek and Coptic languages into Arabic. This was the first

translation in Islam from one language into another.

….

Then, at the time of al-Hajjaj [Ibn Yusuf] the registers, which were in Persian,

were translated into Arabic.

….

38 Ibid, 124. 39 Saliba, Islamic Science and European Renaissance, 13-14.


The records in Damascus were in Greek…The records were translated during the

time of Hishām ‘Abd al-Malik…It has [also] been said that the records were

translated during the time of ‘Abd al-Malik [ibn Marwan].40

The first part of the story is not precisely explained by Al-Nadīm, other than the

mention of Khālid’s “love of science.” This short tale – for which there is little

explanation beyond what is mentioned above – is considered by him to be the very

first attempt at translation. However, when we examine additional sources of this

story, they indicate that Khālid had a part in motivating ‘Abd al-Malik to translate

these works based on the latter’s desire to mint coinage exclusive to the Islamic

polity. Prior to this, Muslims had depended on Byzantine and Persian currencies.

This indicates that the primary motivation behind the desire to translate and learn

works on alchemy was simply a matter of the newly formed Islamic empire

aspiring to become independent of its neighbors and self-sustaining.41

Likewise, government records were similarly translated for pragmatic goals, given

that they constituted the foundation of the state’s operational fortitude. As for the

reasons why these records were originally recorded in Persian and Greek? This had

to do with the simple fact that the Persians and Byzantines were renowned at that

time for their aptitude at “handling arithmetical operations carried over fractions

and the like,” a necessary talent in order to produce such a record to begin with.42

As such, ‘Abd al-Malik felt the need to ‘Arabize’ the dīwāns so as to provide better

access to these records among his officials, as well as produce greater efficiency in

the management of the state and the flow of wealth therein.

As a result, these practical concerns for transparency and the efficient management

of the state’s coffers led to unintended – albeit fruitful – consequences. Since the

recording of the dīwāns not only required skills in arithmetic, but also of

astronomy (for being able to know the times for tax collection), geometry (for land

surveying), and the knowledge of weights and measures (for commerce), this led to

a desire to translate scientific works related to these tasks, as well as the

subsequent education of native Arab speakers who wanted to qualify for

government positions.43 In other words, a civil office within the newly formed

Islamic empire became the springboard by which other scientific texts were sought

out, translated, and learned. This domino effect would eventually facilitate

40 Al-Nadīm, Fihrist, 581-583. 41 Saliba, Islamic Science and European Renaissance, 50-51. 42 Ibid, 53. 43 Ibid, 54-55.


practicalities related to religious practice (ībadah) as well. For example, astronomy

was also necessary for calculating the specific times for obligatory acts of worship

such as prayer (ṣalāt), the month of fasting (Ramaḍān), and holidays (‘Īd) needed

to be performed, thereby effectively organising and administrating the most

essential activities of the Muslim community.

Islām as Values – Science as a Tool

Summarizing the above discussion, the translation movement did not occur

suddenly with the Abbāsids, but was set in motion during the Umayyad dynasty;

for practical reasons related to the Islamic polity at that time. In other words, the

internal influence of Islamic values was the principal motivating factor behind the

initial acquisition and utilization of science. Although never explicitly propagated

in the Qur’ān or sayings and actions of the Prophet Muḥammad (sallAllāhu ʿalayhi

wa-sallam), a form of scientific intellectualism was already being cultivated among

Muslims during the classical period, guided by the desire to implement their values

based in the Islamic tradition itself. For example, the Qur’ān provides a clear

practical motivation for scientific study:

He has subjected all that is in the heavens and the earth for your benefit, as a gift

from Him. There truly are signs in this for those who reflect. (Al-Qur’ān, 45:13)

Furthermore, the Prophet Muḥammad (sallAllāhuʿalay-hi wa-sallam) encouraged

seeking knowledge to the same effect, focusing principally on its utility:

"A servant of Allāh will remain standing on the Day of Judgment until he is

questioned about his (time on earth) and…about his knowledge and how he

utilized it…" (Al-Tirmidhī, #148)

"Knowledge from which no benefit is derived is like a treasure out of which

nothing is spent in the cause of Allāh." (Al-Tirmidhī, #108)

“Allāh, His angels and all those in Heavens and on Earth, even ants in their hills

and fish in the water, call down blessings on those who instruct others in

beneficial knowledge." (Al-Tirmidhī, #422)

These ‘aḥadīth enjoin Muslims to acquire knowledge that is “beneficial” and to

“utilize it,” implying that its value is beyond mere acquisition. As a case in point,

many people know the difference between what is considered morally virtuous and

morally abhorrent, but this knowledge has zero value if it isn’t utilized to

encourage virtue and refrain from vice. Likewise, knowing how to perform open

heart surgery has absolutely no benefit unless one is willing to actually perform it

or teach it to others. As such, according to Islām, just knowing something is not


enough for it to be considered “beneficial.” Sardar notes that it was this pragmatic

view of knowledge – and of science and technology more specifically – that the

early Muslims practiced and implemented:

The classical scholars of Islam were concerned that in the pursuit of knowledge

the needs of the community should not be lost sight of, that ilm should not create

undesirable social effects, that it should not tend to such a level of abstraction

that it leads to the estrangement of man from his world and his fellow men, or to

confusion rather [than] enlightenment. In this framework science is guided

towards a middle path. While it should be socially relevant, the idea of a purely

utilitarian science is rejected. Moreover, there is no such thing as science for

science’s sake; yet the pursuit of pure knowledge for the perfection of man is

encouraged. Science, far from being enjoyed as an end in itself, must be

instrumental to the attainment of a higher goal.44

This perception would eventually result in the establishment of a scientific

tradition quintessentially Islamic (i.e., motivated by the awareness and practice of

Islamic values). But in what way was this new science different from any other? In

this regard, the historian of science Jamil Regep – commenting on the practice of

astronomy during the medieval period – notes the following two approaches

generally adopted by Muslim scientists up until this time:

Broadly speaking, one can identify two distinct ways in which religious influence

manifested itself in medieval Islamic astronomy. First, there was the attempt to

give religious value to astronomy…The second general way in which religious

influence shows up is in the attempt to make astronomy as metaphysically neutral

as possible, in order to ensure that it did not directly challenge Islamic doctrine.45

The first way mentioned is what might be considered an ‘active’ approach towards

the study of the natural world, in that Muslim scientists attempted to directly

associate their values with a particular scientific practice. One such example was

ʿAlāʾ al Dīn ʿAlī ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn al-Shatir (d. 1375), a simple muwaqqit

(timekeeper) in the Ummayad Mosque of Damascus. Despite having no other

career than to simply make sure that everyone knew the correct times for

obligatory prayers, this did not stop him from having greater ambitions

surrounding his own task. During his off time – which he most likely had plenty of

– Al-Shatir constructed more accurate instruments (e.g., sundials) and performed

theoretical studies on celestial motion so as to better perform his duties.

44 Sardard, How Do You Know?, 137. 45 F. Jamil Ragep and Alī al-Qūshjī. “Freeing Astronomy from Philosophy: An Aspect of Islamic Influence on

Science,” Osiris V. 16, Science in Theistic Contexts: Cognitive Dimensions (2001), 50.


Consequently, due to his supplementary activities, Al-Shatir was able to formulate

a model for the upper planets that was conspicuously also used by Copernicus in

his development of the heliocentric theory nearly two centuries later. This has led

researchers to speculate that the former may have played a role in the latter’s

thinking.46

The other way in which Muslim scientists approached their subjects might be seen

as more ‘passive’; rather than associate their values directly with their research and

observations, they would often evade any questions or ideas seen as contrary to

those values. This is not surprising as the very perception of science as a tool

supported by, and in support of, those values would be undermined if any enquiry

collided with the fundamental tenets of Islām. Even so, the practice of such

passivity appears to contradict earlier claims that Islām encouraged the acquisition

of knowledge. However, this sentiment is misplaced in that it reflects the

outmoded view of science as a “neutral” enterprise – for the types of knowledge

acquired are determined by a culture’s values to begin with. In this way then, every

civilization limits itself based on its underlying axiological and metaphysical

beliefs, as each has its own goals and perceptions of reality. Regardless, these self-

imposed limits are not necessarily detrimental. As a case in point, Muslim

scientists eventually were able to develop the field of astronomy in new, more

progressive directions through abandoning the old paradigm of their predecessors

(i.e., Aristotelian natural philosophy) that supported many concepts that ran

contrary to Islamic doctrine, such as astrology. Saliba summarizes this scientific

revolution in the following way:

As for the intersection between religion and astronomy, and through it the

intersection between science and religion…the new astronomy of hay’a was

developed in tandem with the religious requirements of early Islam. In a sense

this new astronomy could be defined as religiously guided away from astrology.

With the pressure from the anti-astrological quarter, usually religious in nature

or allied with religious forces, astronomy had to re-orient itself to become more

of a discipline that aimed at a phenomenological description of the behavior of

the physical world, and steer away from investigating the influences its spheres

exert on the sublunary region as astrology would require.47

One notable example of a successful manifestation of this passive approach may be

found in ‘Ala al-Dīn ‘Alī bin Muḥammad al-Qūshjī (d. 1474), the 15th century C.E.

astronomer who grew up in the courts of Samarkand – one of the scientific centers

46 Saliba, Islamic Science and European Renaissance, 189-190. 47 Ibid, 186.


of the world at that time – and eventually assumed a chair in teaching astronomy

and mathematics at the Aya Sofia madrassa in Istanbul during the latter years of

his life.48 Commenting on the theological opposition to astronomy during this

period, Ragep notes Al-Qūshjī’s attempts at appeasing the theologians while

simultaneously defending his scientific practice:

Qūshjī is clearly sensitive to the Ash’arite [theologians’] position on causality,

and he makes the interesting observation that part of their objection to it, at least

as regards astronomy, has to do with the astrological contention of a causal link

between the positions of the orbs and terrestrial events (especially “unusual

circumstances”). To get around such objections, Qūshjī insists that astronomy

does not need philosophy, since one could build the entire edifice of orbs

necessary for the astronomical enterprise using only geometry, reasonable

supposition, appropriate judgments, and provisional hypotheses. These premises

allow astronomers [in the words of Qūshjī]: “to conceive {takhayyalū} from

among the possible approaches the one by which the circumstances of the planets

and their manifold irregularities may be put in order in such a way as to facilitate

their determination of the positions and conjunctions of these planets for any time

they might wish and so as to conform with perception {ḥiss} and sight {‘iyān}.

....

What makes Qūshjī’s position especially fascinating are some of the

repercussions it had for his astronomical work. Since he claims to be no longer

tied to the principles of Aristotelian physics, he feels free to explore other

possibilities, including the Earth’s rotation.49

As a result of Al-Qūshjī abandoning the ‘old order’ of Aristotelianism for the sake

of his own values, he was not only able to challenge the conventional astronomy of

his time through better substantiated astronomical models, but was also led to

argue that the Earth’s rotation was a possibility, thereby paving the way towards

the construction of the heliocentric paradigm by Copernicus less than a century

later.50 In other words, those boundaries imposed on the Muslim mindset, when

inquiring into the workings of the natural world, also served as liberating

alternatives to outmoded paradigms and helped to advance the sciences in

significant and revolutionary ways.

48 Ragep, “Freeing Astronomy”, 61. 49 Ibid, 61-63. 50 In fact, it has been argued that Qushjī may have been directly responsible for the later findings of Copernicus. For

more on this see, F. Jamil Ragep, “‘Alī Qushjī and Regiomontanus: Eccentric Transformations and Copernican

Revolutions,” Journal for the History of Astronomy 36/4 (2005): 359-371.


However, simply knowing why Muslims approached the sciences the way they did

doesn’t exactly inform us as to how these alternatives were constructed – it’s only

one part of the equation. Knowing the form is significantly different from knowing

its substance. As such, we also need to know what were the specific values that

defined the essence of the Islamic scientific enterprise and what motivated Muslim

scientists to explore the natural world in the ways they did. In this regard, many

contemporary scholars have attempted to offer specific criteria for what constitutes

‘Islamic scientific values.’ As a case in point, Sardar mentions that in 1981 a

seminar was held in Stockholm, Sweden where Muslim scientists from around the

world attempted to construct a list of those very values. What was agreed upon at

that conference consisted of a total of ten concepts.51 The first four are considered

self-contained and foundational to the rest:

1) Tawḥīd (Divine Unity):

“Say, ‘He is Allāh the One, Allāh the eternal. He begot no one nor

was He begotten. No one is comparable to Him.’” (Al-Qur’ān, 112: 1-

4)

The concept of Allāh’s Oneness, or unity, is central to Islamic

doctrine; even an entire surah in the Qur’ān is dedicated to its

explication. As such, Muslims are obligated to not only believe in this

tenet – and all of Allāh’s specific Attributes – but also to not believe

in anything that would contradict it in the slightest. The implication of

this is that Islām reigns supreme in all matters concerning one’s

understanding of reality, along with their perception of science. That

said, this concept also motivates one to infer unity in all other aspects

of creation, such as all of humanity (i.e., anti-racism, anti-xenophobia,

etc.), and between knowledge and values.

2) Khilāfah (Trusteeship):

“[Prophet], when your Lord told the angels, ‘I am putting a successor

on earth,’ they said, ‘How can You put someone there who will cause

damage and bloodshed, when we celebrate Your praise and proclaim

51 Sardar, How Do You Know?, 184.


Your holiness?’ but He said, ‘I know things you do not.’” (Al-Qur’ān,

2:30)

“‘David, We have given you mastery over the land. Judge fairly

between people. Do not follow your desires, lest they divert you from

Allāh’s path: those who wander from His path will have a painful

torment because they ignore the Day of Reckoning.’” (Al-Qur’ān,

38:26)

The concept of human trusteeship on earth is important in that it

dictates the way in which humanity should understand their place in

existence: as a responsibility and duty towards the rest of creation

entrusted to them by their Creator. Because Allāh has put humans on

earth for this task, we must take this status seriously. The implications

of this concept manifest themselves in humanity’s concern for the

environment, their impact on the planet’s health, animals, and other

human beings, as well as the ends science and technology should be

used for.

3) Ībadah (Worship):

“I created jinn and mankind only to worship Me.” (Al-Qur’ān, 51:56)

Following the concept of trusteeship, Muslims have also been

informed by the Creator that their purpose in life is to worship Him. In

other words, the obligation to nurture and preserve the earth, and all

living and non-living things, is explicitly seen as an act of worship

itself. Thus, understanding the natural world and applying that

knowledge in an ethical manner, whether it be through biology,

chemistry, physics, engineering, medicine, etc. are all acts that fulfill a

Muslim’s purpose in life in accordance with Islām.

4) ‘Ilm (Knowledge):

“Surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and in the

alternation of the night and the day there are signs for men possessed

of minds who remember Allāh, standing and sitting and on their side,


and reflect upon the creation of the heavens and the earth…” (Al-

Qur’ān, 3:190-191).

As mentioned earlier, the acquisition of beneficial knowledge is one

of Islamic teachings’ most prominent traits. Muslims are constantly

asked through the Qur’ān to “reflect” on the signs of creation and to

use their reasoning towards ascertaining the wonders of the world and

the wisdom behind their existence.

Although considered equally important, the subsequent six values depend on

the four aforementioned and function as three contrasting pairs:

5-6) Ḥalāl (Permissible) v. Ḥarām (Impermissible):

“You who believe, intoxicants and gambling, idolatrous practices, and

[divining with] arrows are repugnant acts – Satan’s doing – shun

them so that you may prosper.” (Al-Qur’ān, 5:90)

What Islām considers ‘praiseworthy’ and ‘blameworthy’ are essential

to how Muslim scientists approach their fields. For example, Muslims

are obligated to develop medicines that do not involve intoxicants nor

certain animals determined as ‘unclean’ (e.g., pigs). As a result,

physicians coming from the Islamic tradition will more likely search

for alternative ingredients that may have more beneficial effects on

their patients. Furthermore, impractical and unsubstantiated practices

involving divination (e.g., astrology) are prohibited, allowing for

Muslims to concentrate on more realistic and effective means of

experimentation and its subsequent applications.

7-8) ‘Adl (Justice) v. Ẓulm (Tyranny):

“You who believe, uphold justice and bear witness to Allāh, even if it

is against yourselves, your parents, or your close relatives. Whether

the person is rich or poor, Allāh can best take care of both. Refrain

from following your own desire, so that you can act justly – if you

distort or neglect justice, Allāh is fully aware of what you do.” (Al-

Qur’ān, 4:135)


The establishment of justice against tyranny is another essential aspect

of a Muslim scientist’s worldview and leads to the development of

only beneficial and non-harmful scientific practices. For example, any

approach to the natural world that leads to injustices against people or

the environment must be immediately shunned; and any science

performed for strictly personal benefit at the expense of others is also

prohibited.

9-10) Istislah/Maslahah (Public Interest) v. ‘Isrāf/Tabdhīr (Waste)52:

Give relatives their due, and the needy, and travelers — but do not

squander your wealth wastefully: those who squander are the

brothers of Satan, and Satan is most ungrateful to his Lord – but if,

while seeking some bounty that you expect from your Lord, you turn

them down, then at least speak some word of comfort to them. (Al-

Qur’ān, 17: 26-28)

This last pair of concepts continues to establish a humanitarian and

environmentalist ethic in Muslim scientists by limiting their goals to

the betterment of humanity and restricting them from excesses that

would cause unnecessary harm. For example, the production of a

particular energy or fuel, food source, or construction material, should

be for the sake of facilitating human survival and welfare, but should

not be overproduced to the extent that they create unnecessary

pollutants that eventually damage the very people they were made to

benefit nor the environment from which they were cultivated.

Although this list may not be considered exhaustive by some, it has been one of the

only attempts at constructing a list of definitive Islamic scientific values. These

constructs also help to exemplify the essence of the Islamic scientific enterprise,

reflecting the historical realities of the early Muslim community and its approach

towards the natural world. In many ways then, Muslim scientists’ attempts at

understanding reality and benefiting from it were the manifestation of strictly

following their own ethos. So while Islam itself is not explicit in constructing a

52 Sardar mistranslates the word for ‘waste’ here as ‘dhiya’. Thus, I have changed it to reflect the correct

terminology.


particular understanding of science, it may certainly be credited as the central

paradigm which motivated Muslims to form the scientific practices and theories

that they did – both actively and passively– and facilitated genuine scientific

discoveries outside of Greek thought, which had been dominant for many centuries

prior.

How Muslim scientists practiced their fields and perceived the world through their

own values is not a novel phenomenon in the history of science, nor is it

anomalous to how contemporary science is practiced today. On the contrary, many

influential thinkers have subscribed to this perception. One such philosopher, by

the name of John Dewey (d. 1952), even coined the term ‘Instrumentalism’ to

describe this historically normative scientific praxis:

The office of physical science is to discover those properties and relations of

things in virtue of which they are capable of being used as instrumentalities;

physical science makes claim to disclose not the inner nature of things but only

those connections of things with one another that determine outcomes and hence

can be used as means.53

Dewey was among the forerunners who challenged the notion of scientific realism,

or the idea that theories and their subaltern facts correspond entirely to reality.54 As

an anti-realist, he believed that science was not an approximate measure of truth,

but was goal-oriented and limited by the intentions and desires of scientists

themselves. No one can possibly have a full account of the physical world because

no one has a full account of the data, nor can they perceive beyond the cultural

contexts by which they meaningfully define and organize their experiences. Thus,

the construction of theories is an entirely subjective enterprise where ‘truth’ is not

defined in an absolute sense, but in accordance with what works towards an

aspired end; the best theories are those which produce the best results.

Dewey’s views would go on to inspire other philosophers of science, including

Willard Quine (d. 2000) and the aforementioned Thomas Kuhn, forming the

philosophical tradition known today as ‘Pragmatism.’ And despite this

understanding of science being considered relatively new – as it was in response to

a set of problems emanating from the 20th century C.E. – philosophers drawing

from this tradition have promoted their ideas as the most coherent and workable

understanding of the normative historical scientific praxis. Unfortunately, the view

53 John Dewey, preface to Experience and Nature (London: George Allan & Unwin, LTD., 1929), v. 54 Michael Liston, “Scientific Realism and Antirealism”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed January 12,

2017, http://www.iep.utm.edu/sci-real/


of science as being “neutral” and “objective” is still the dominant paradigm among

the lay community. This raises the question as to why and how such an alien

relationship exists between these two groups (an analysis that is beyond the scope

of this paper). That aside, the Pragmatists’ conception appears to more accurately

represent the historical realities of early Muslim scientific practice, if only because

the Classical Narrative – which is based on scientific realism – is so obviously

wrong in its central assumption that Islamic values were irrelevant or averse to

scientific productivity.

Thus, it would be appropriate to summarize Islamic science as an enterprise which

adopts an instrumentalist approach with regard to Islamic values. In the same way,

we may define contemporary science as one which adopts a form of secular

instrumentalism, given that the Western ethos is the dominant and most influential

in the contemporary period.

However, now knowing the internal influences in the rise of scientific productivity,

how did this correlate with those influences external to Islamic civilization?

Working in symbiosis with Islamic values, the environment Muslims lived in at the

time also played a major factor. In other words, the desire to efficiently function as

a community through the unification of language and administrative protocols was

also motivated by the need to survive and compete with other hostile empires (i.e.,

the Byzantine and Sassanid) which surrounded the Islamic polity. Thus, the

acquisition of the sciences and their subsequent translation were spurred not only

by the shared values of the Muslim community, but by the conditions that

provoked those values to be expressed and protected.

Al-Ghazālī: Villain or Scapegoat?

Given the Classical Narrative’s inability to adequately represent the historical data

on the rise of scientific productivity in Islamic civilization, it is also likely

inadequate in representing its decline. In other words, to suggest that the values

which spurred scientific inquiry and ingenuity were simultaneously responsible for

their stagnation is nothing less than an archetypal example of incoherency.

However, as simple as it may be to dismiss the Classical Narrative on the basis of

logic alone, I still find it necessary to address some of its finer points regarding the

decline, if only for the sake of accentuating the efficacy of an alternative theory.

It is generally agreed upon that the inauguration of the Age of Dependency began

roughly around the 16th century C.E. as scientific productivity in the Muslim world


noticeably started to wane. The initial phases of the decline coincided with an

increased reliance on the scientific institutions, technologies, and theories

emanating from Europe. Gradually, this dependency became an enduring feature of

Islamic civilization, culminating in its utter intellectual subservience to foreign

powers by the 19th and 20th centuries C.E. – a reality most apparent to Muslims

today.55 How this all occurred is still undetermined by historians of science, largely

due to an only very recent skepticism towards the definitive conclusions offered by

the Classical Narrative. This scrutiny has not been without its merits, the most

prominent example of such being towards the Orientalist’s portrayal of the

aforementioned Al-Ghazālī, as the archetypical antagonist in the historical drama

between ‘rationality’ and ‘religion.’

Though it has not been made clear to why this eminent scholar is always singled

out as the primary culprit, promoters of the Classical Narrative suggests it has

something to do with his now (in)famous refutation of Aristotelian philosophy

titled Tahāfut al-Falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). As the story goes,

Muslims were scientifically productive due to having adopted the rational

framework of Greek philosophical thought (read ‘Western’), and then suddenly

one scholar came along, expressed his ideas, and that was the end of reasonable

thinking as we know it. Aside from the curious circumstance of a supremely

rational society succumbing to one man’s supposed irrationality, there are a

number of issues with this perspective; the first being Al-Ghazālī’s openly stated

intentions behind his treatise.

In the very introduction of the Tahāfut, Al-Ghazālī lists the views of his

contemporaries which he finds problematic and clarifies those views he is in

agreement with. In particular, he mentions astronomy and mathematics as

examples of the latter, even going so far as to denounce anyone who tries to argue

against them:

Another example [of what I agree with] is their statement: "The solar eclipse

means the presence of the lunar orb between the observer and the sun. This

occurs when the sun and the moon are both at the two nodes at one degree." This

topic is also one into the refutation of which we shall not plunge, since this serves

no purpose. Whoever thinks that to engage in a disputation for refuting such a

theory is a religious duty harms religion and weakens it. For these matters rest on

demonstrations—geometrical and arithmetical—that leave no room for doubt.

Thus, when one who studies these demonstrations and ascertains their proofs,

deriving thereby information about the time of the two eclipses [and] their extent

55 Saliba, Islamic Science and the European Renaissance, 247.


and duration, is told that this is contrary to religion, [such an individual] will not

suspect this [science, but] only religion. The harm inflicted on religion by those

who defend it in a way not proper to it is greater than [the harm caused by] those

who attack it in the way proper to it. As it has been said: "A rational foe is better

than an ignorant friend."56

So, if Al-Ghazālī was not opposed to our conventional understanding of science,

then what was he arguing against and how was he responsible for bringing about

the Age of Dependency? To answer the first question, Al-Ghazālī makes it very

clear that his criticisms of the philosophers is in regards to nothing more than their

abstract non-empirically verifiable beliefs that run contrary to Islām:

When I perceived this vein of folly throbbing within these dimwits, I took it upon

myself to write this book in refutation of the ancient philosophers, to show the

incoherence of their belief and the contradiction of their word in matters relating

to metaphysics; to uncover the dangers of their doctrine and its shortcomings,

which in truth ascertainable are objects of laughter for the rational and a lesson

for the intelligent—I mean the kinds of diverse beliefs and opinions they

particularly hold that set them aside from the populace and the common run of

men. [I will do this] relating at the same time their doctrine as it actually is, so as

to make it clear to those who embrace unbelief through imitation that all

significant thinkers, past and present, agree in believing in God and the last day;

that their differences reduce to matters of detail extraneous to those two pivotal

points (for the sake of which the prophets, supported by miracles, have been

sent); that no one has denied these two [beliefs] other than a remnant of perverse

minds who hold lopsided opinions, who are neither noticed nor taken into account

in the deliberations of the speculative thinkers, [but who are instead] counted

only among the company of evil devils and in the throng of the dim-witted and

inexperienced. [I will do this] so that whoever believes that adorning oneself with

imitated unbelief shows good judgment and induces awareness of one's quick wit

and intelligence would desist from his extravagance, as it will become verified for

him that those prominent and leading philosophers he emulates are innocent of

the imputation that they deny the religious laws; that [on the contrary] they

believe in God and His messengers; but that they have fallen into confusion in

certain details beyond these principles, erring in this, straying from the correct

path, and leading others astray. We will reveal the kinds of imaginings and

vanities in which they have been deceived, showing all this to be unproductive

extravagance. God, may He be exalted, is the patron of success in the endeavor to

show what we intend to verify.57

56 Muhammad al-Ghazālī, second introduction to The Incoherence of the Philosophers, trans. Michael E. Marmura

(Provo: Birmingham Young University Press, 2000), 5-6. 57 Ibid, religious preface, 3.


This statement alone should already attract suspicion towards the Classical

Narrative’s accusations against Al-Ghazālī. Regarding the second question then, it

is claimed by critics that his metaphysical views were what ultimately altered

Muslims’ perceptions of rationality and science for the worse. More specifically,

their ire is often focused on three positions he adopted in opposition to the

Aristotelian philosophers at the time. Those positions are as follows: 1) There is no

necessary connection between causes and their effects; 2) The study of

mathematics can be detrimental to one’s beliefs; and 3) Knowledge should only be

acquired and practiced if it possesses utility (i.e., instrumentalism).

1) Al-Ghazālī and Causality

In order to examine Al-Ghazālī’s views on cause and effect, we should begin by

peering through the eyes of his critics – one such being the aforementioned

advocate of the Classical Narrative, Pervez Hoodbhoy.

In his book, Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality,

Hoodbhoy attempts to explain the decline by simply echoing the Classical

Narrative in full form; his entire argument rests on vilifying Islamic religious

orthodoxy (the established scholarly tradition) by targeting Al-Ghazālī as its

apparent archetype. In a chapter solely dedicated to the scholar, Hoodbhoy begins

by both summarizing and chastising Al-Ghazālī’s views on causality:

Fire causes burning, lightning causes thunder, winds cause waves, and gravity

causes bodies to fall. Such connections between an effect and its cause form the

cornerstone of scientific thinking, both modern and classical. But this notion of

causality is one which is specifically rejected by Asharite doctrine, and the most

articulate and effective opponent of physical causality was AI-Ghazzali.

According to AI-Ghazzali, it is futile to believe that the world runs according to

physical laws. God destroys, and then recreates, the world after every instant of

time. Hence there cannot be continuity between one moment and the next, and one

cannot suppose that a given action will definitely lead to a particular

consequence. Conversely, it is false to assign a physical cause to any occurrence.

In AI-Ghazzali's theology, God is directly the cause of all physical events and

phenomena, and constantly intervenes in the world.58

58 Pervez Hoodbhoy, Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality (London: Zed Books

Ltd., 1991), 105.


Hoodbhoy subsequently concludes that the acceptance of Al-Ghazālī’s perspective

leads to a “fatalistic attitude” that denies the possibility of making predictions and

demotivates people to enquire into the workings of the natural world.59 However,

while it is certainly the case that Al-Ghazālī believed the connection between

causes and their effects was not a necessary or permanent feature of such

relationships – as all things were ultimately determined by Allāh – the notion that

such a belief leads to intellectual lethargy is a questionable one. Hoodbhoy’s

conclusion are especially dubious when one notices his failure to address Al-

Ghazālī’s response to his objections. In other words, Al-Ghazālī had already

played his own devil’s advocate and anticipated this criticism well in advance in

the Tahāfut :

[To this] it may be said [by our detractors]: This leads to the commission of

repugnant contradictions. For if one denies that the effects follow necessarily

from their causes and relates them to the will of their Creator, the will having no

specific designated course but [a course that] can vary and change in kind, then

let each of us allow the possibility of there being in front of him ferocious beasts,

raging fires, high mountains, or enemies ready with their weapons [to kill him],

but [also the possibility] that he does not see them because God does not create

for him [vision of them]. And if someone leaves a book in the house, let him allow

as possible its change on his returning home into a beardless slave boy—

intelligent, busy with his tasks—or into an animal; or if he leaves a boy in his

house, let him allow the possibility of his changing into a dog; or [again] if he

leaves ashes, [let him allow] the possibility of its change into musk; and let him

allow the possibility of stone changing into gold and gold into stone…Indeed, if

[such a person] looks at a human being he has seen only now and is asked

whether such a human is a creature that was born, let him hesitate and let him

say that it is not impossible that some fruit in the marketplace has changed into a

human—namely, this human—for God has power over every possible thing, and

this thing is possible; hence, one must hesitate in [this matter]. This is a mode

wide open in scope for [numerous] illustrations, but this much is sufficient.

[Our] answer [to this] is to say: If it is established that the possible is such that

there cannot be created for man knowledge of its nonbeing, these impossibilities

would necessarily follow. We are not, however, rendered skeptical by the

illustrations you have given because God created for us the knowledge that He

did not enact these possibilities. We did not claim that these things are necessary.

On the contrary, they are possibilities that may or may not occur. But the

continuous habit of their occurrence repeatedly, one time after another, fixes

unshakably in our minds the belief in their occurrence according to past habit.

59 Ibid, 120-121.


….

If, then, God disrupts the habitual [course of nature] by making [the miracle]

occur at the time in which disruptions of habitual [events] take place, these

cognitions [of the nonoccurrence of such unusual possibilities] slip away from

[people's] hearts, and [God] does not create them. There is, therefore, nothing to

prevent a thing being possible, within the capabilities of God, [but] that by His

prior knowledge He knew that He would not do it at certain times, despite its

possibility, and that He creates for us the knowledge that He will not create it at

that time. Hence, in [all] this talk [of theirs], there is nothing but sheer

vilification.60

Al-Ghazālī’s rendition of his critics’ ridicule includes a number of absurdities that

could be derived from misunderstanding his position: from dramatic changes in

perception to fruit spontaneously morphing into a human being. Apparently, given

that such possibilities are endless, this makes it infeasible to expect any sort of

consistency from the observable world.

However, Al-Ghazālī answers his fictional opponents by emphasizing the fact that

possibilities are not actualities; just because something could be does not

necessitate that it will be. He bolsters his point by stating that there is a habitual

nature to things that Allāh has created, allowing for the uninhibited acquisition of

knowledge and any potential anomalies that may or may not take place. In other

words, regardless if one thinks there is no necessary link between causes and their

effects, their perception of those habitual relationships will still remain the same.

He goes even further to appeal to Allāh’s Omniscience, suggesting that His

Foreknowledge limits the occurrence of every possibility, preventing mankind

from anticipating and subsequently being paralyzed by them.

But even if one doesn’t find Al-Ghazālī’s reasoning valid, it takes little common

sense effort to demonstrate that the Classical Narrative is incorrect. We need only

recall the number of known possibilities that could happen to us in any given day;

from the moment we wake up to the moment we sleep, the various ways in which

we could be harmed or killed are immeasurable. Whether it be choking on your

food, tripping and breaking your neck, experiencing a heart attack, being struck by

a moving vehicle, being struck by lightning, being mauled by a wild or domestic

animal, having a heavy object fall on you, drowning, dehydration, poisoning,

contracting a fatal disease, being murdered, etc. – and the various ways all of these

can manifest – the majority of people still manage to live their lives without much

60 Ibid, 169-171.


reservation, despite knowing all of these things could happen to them at any given

moment. Thus, the claim that such a perspective nurtures a “fatalistic attitude” is

completely unwarranted, because human beings are just too stubborn to care

otherwise. Perhaps had Hoodbhoy and his cohorts taken the time to read the

Tahāfut beyond a cursory level confirmation bias,61 and used a bit of common

sense, Al-Ghazālī’s fictional opponents may have likewise remained in the realm

of possibility.

Even more incriminating evidence against advocates of the Classical Narrative is

their hypocrisy with regards to Ghazalian causality. While repudiating him for

being “irrational,” they simultaneously lionize their own intellectual figures who

held quite similar views. For example, Hoodbhoy lauds the French philosopher

Renè Descartes (d. 1650) as being the “most important” thinker behind modern

science; for whom we apparently still owe a great deal in terms of our

understanding of science today.62 What’s ironic about this is that while Descartes

believed there was a necessary connection between causes and their effects, he did

not believe that such a relationship existed between perception and knowledge –

arguably a far more essential component to the flourishing of science.

In order to showcase Descartes’ position on this epistemic relationship, we need

only look at a few passages from his seminal work Meditationes de Prima

Philosophia (Meditations on First Philosophy) where he argues that the

indefeasibility of one’s observations and abstract deductions can only be

established by first believing in God:

The fact that an atheist can be ‘clearly aware that the three angles of a triangle

are equal to two right angles’ is something I do not dispute. But I maintain that

this awareness of his is not true knowledge, since no act of awareness that can be

rendered doubtful seems fit to be called knowledge. Now since we are supposed

that this individual is an atheist, he cannot be certain that he is not being deceived

on matters which seem to him to be very evident…And although this doubt may

not occur to him, it can still crop up if someone else raises the point or if he looks

into the matter himself. So he will never be free of doubt until he acknowledges

that God exists.63

61 “The tendency to look for evidence in favor of one's controversial hypothesis and not to look for disconfirming

evidence, or to pay insufficient attention to it.” – Bradley Dowden, “Fallacies,” Internet Encyclopedia of

Philosophy, accessed February 21, 2017, http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallacy/#ConfirmationBias 62 Hoodbhoy, Islam and Science, 11. 63 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies, ed. John

Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 103.


Here, Descartes is quite clear in saying that atheists are incapable of acquiring

“real knowledge” because they don’t believe in God. Although he provides many

reasons for this conclusion, we need only focus on how it reveals a profound irony

emanating from Hoodbhoy’s nomination of the philosopher as a central figure

behind modern science; the idea that atheists are scientifically impotent doesn’t

quite coincide with a narrative that suggests the inherent rationality of anti-

religious thinking.

More importantly however, even if one were to accept Descartes’ reasoning as

valid, his epistemology suffers from a glaring incoherency that actually makes

knowledge virtually unobtainable. This is most evident in his chapter titled the

“Fourth Meditation,” where he suggests that only after having ‘clearly and

distinctly’ ascertained God’s existence can other knowledge be possible:

During the past few days I have accustomed myself to leading my mind away from

the sense; and I have taken careful note of the fact that there is very little about

corporeal things that is truly perceived, whereas much more is known about the

human mind, and still more about God. The result is that I now have no difficulty

in turning my mind away from imaginable things and towards things which are

objects of the intellect alone and are totally separate from matter…And when I

consider the fact that I have doubts, or that I am a thing that is incomplete and

dependent, then there arises in me a clear and distinct idea of a being who is

independent and complete, that is, an idea of God. And from the mere fact that

there is such an idea within me, or that I who possess this idea exist, I clearly

infer that God also exists, and that every single moment of my entire existence

depends on him. So clear is this conclusion that I am confident that the human

intellect cannot know anything that is more evident or more certain. And now,

from this contemplation of the true God, in whom all the treasures of wisdom and

the sciences lie hidden, I think I can see a way forward to the knowledge of other

things.64

A careful examination of this passage showcases a very obvious logical

inconsistency that renders Descartes’ entire argumentation suspect: If one requires

a belief in God in order to have certainty, how is it possible to believe in God with

certainty?

This conundrum, now referred to as the “Cartesian Circle,” did not escape

Descartes and he did attempt to treat the problem.65 Despite this, however, his

64 Ibid, 37. 65 Descartes’ attempt to reconcile his circular reasoning simply amounted to demarcating between immediate

knowledge and recollected knowledge:


critics did not find his solutions convincing and his epistemology would eventually

be eclipsed by more tenable explanations. All this considered, it seems remarkably

nonsensical for Hoodbhoy to accuse Al-Ghazālī of promoting “fatalism” when he

simultaneously champions a thinker who argued himself into intellectual paralysis.

In other words, if the latter can so credulously be regarded as an exemplar of

modern scientific thinking, then it is quite ludicrous to see the former as its

opposite.

2) Al-Ghazālī and Mathematics

After a questionable exposé of Ghazlian causality, Hoodbhoy quickly shifts focus

away from the Tahāfut and goes on to examine the medieval scholar’s views on

mathematics, drawing from his biography, Al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl (Deliverance

from Error). Hoodbhoy more or less begins and ends his analysis by merely

quoting a passage from Al-Ghazālī and then adding some brief commentary:

[Al-Ghazālī states:] “There are two drawbacks which arise from mathematics.

The first is that every student of mathematics admires its precision and the clarity

of its demonstrations. This leads him to believe in the philosophers and to think

that all their sciences resemble this one in clarity and demonstrative power.

Further, he has already heard the accounts on everybody's lips of their unbelief,

their denial of God's attributes, and their contempt for revealed truth; he becomes

an unbeliever merely by accepting them as authorities.”

The argument here is clearly that mathematics is potentially, but not necessarily,

dangerous. The danger exists because those who study the subject may become

inebriated with the power and beauty of precise reasoning, and so forsake belief

in revelation.66

Despite what may appear to be an unambiguous dismissal of the study of

mathematics due to its leading to the “power and beauty of precise reasoning” and

“Lastly, as to the fact that I was not guilty of circularity when I said that the only reason we have for being sure that

we clearly and distinctly perceive is true is the fact that God exists, but that we are sure that God exists only because

we perceive this clearly: I have already given an adequate explanation of this point in my reply to the Second

Objections, where I made a distinction between what we in fact perceive clearly and what we remember having

perceived clearly on a previous occasion. To begin with, we are sure that God exists because we attend to the

arguments which prove this; but subsequently it is enough for us to remember that we perceived something clearly

in order for us to be certain that it is true. This would not be sufficient if we did not know that God exists and is not

a deceiver.” – Ibid, 106.

In summary, ascertaining the existence of God can be made certain within the moment, but the memory of coming

to that conclusion can only be made certain by believing in God. However, the solution is superficial in that it

presumes that one’s memory is already reliable enough to recall having ascertained God’s existence with certainty

prior to believing in Him. 66 Hoodbhoy, Islam and Science, 105-106.


subsequent rejection of religious beliefs, Al-Ghazālī clearly has been

misrepresented. My contention is not about a simple difference of interpretation,

rather it is in contrast to a case of selective attention. Whether due to the fact that

he derived the quote solely from a secondary source,67 or because he didn’t feel the

need to present the entire context of the passage in question, Hoodbhoy is clearly

being disingenuous.

Aside from Al-Ghazālī’s aforementioned approval of mathematics in the Tahāfut,

his opposition to its study here refers specifically to a phenomenon during his time

where the philosophers insisted that the value of pure mathematics rested

exclusively in the appraisal of specific metaphysical doctrines.68 These included

the doctrine of “the world’s pre-eternity,” the doctrine of “the world’s post-

eternity,” the doctrine “that heaven is an animal that moves through volition,” and

the doctrine “that annihilation is impossible for the human soul,” among many

others.69 Moreover, mathematics was also being used as a means to justify the

philosophers’ subaltern sciences, like astral determinations (i.e., astrology),

talismans, and even magic.70 In other words, although mathematics was important

for learning about the natural world, it was predominantly being utilized for the

sake of anything but. As such, Al-Ghazālī warned of studying the discipline since

it was not yet full demarcated from the philosophers’ superstitions. In fact, his

concerns are mentioned in the passage immediately following Hoodbhoy’s

reference:

[…he becomes an unbeliever merely by accepting them as authorities], asserting:

“If religion were true, this would not have been unknown to these philosophers,

given their precision in this science of mathematics.” Thus, when he learns

through hearsay of their unbelief and rejection of religion, he concludes that it is

right to reject and disavow religion. How many a man have I seen who strayed

from the path of truth on this pretext and for no other reason! One may say to

such a man: “A person skilled in one field is not necessarily skilled in every

field…On the contrary, in each field there are men who have reached in it a

certain degree of skill and preeminence, although they may be quite stupid and

ignorant about other things. What the ancients had to say about mathematical

topics was apodeictic, whereas their views on metaphysical questions were

conjectural. But this is known only to an experienced man who has made a

thorough study of the matter.” When such an argument is urged against one who

67 Hoodbhoy quotes from W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazzali (London: George Allen &

Unwin, 1953), 33. 68 Al-Ghazālī, Incoherence, 8-9. 69 Ibid, 10-11. 70 Ibid, 162.


has become an unbeliever out of mere conformism, he finds it unacceptable.

Rather, caprice’s sway, vain passion, and love of appearing to be clever prompt

him to persist in his high opinion of the philosophers with regard to all their

sciences. This, then, is a very serious evil, and because of it one should warn off

anyone who would embark upon the study of those mathematical sciences. For

even though they do not pertain to the domain of religion, yet, since they are

among the primary elements of the philosophers’ sciences, the student of

mathematics will be insidiously affected by the sinister mischief of the

philosophers. Rare, therefore, are those who study mathematics without losing

their religion and throwing off the restraint of piety.71

Surprisingly, Hoodbhoy doesn’t bother to mention the other half of Al-Ghazālī’s

statement and infers an entirely different conclusion from what the scholar was

actually conveying. However, even more contrary to Hoodbhoy’s accusations is

yet another statement by Al-Ghazālī, in which he explains a second reason that

studying mathematics may prove to be problematic:

The second evil likely to follow from the study of the mathematical sciences

derives from the case of an ignorant friend of Islam who supposes that our

religion must be championed by the rejection of every science ascribed to the

philosophers. So he rejects all their sciences, claiming that they display ignorance

and folly in them all. He even denies their statements about eclipses of the sun

and the moon and asserts that their views are contrary to the revealed Law. When

such an assertion reaches the ears of someone who knows those things through

apodeictic demonstration, he does not doubt the validity of his proof, but rather

believes that Islam is built on ignorance and the denial of apodeictic

demonstration. So he becomes all the more enamored of philosophy and

envenomed against Islam. Great indeed is the crime against religion committed

by anyone who supposes that Islam is to be championed by the denial of these

mathematical sciences.72

In summary, Al-Ghazālī also went on to critique the other extreme of those who

reject mathematics altogether. As such, when we go beyond a cursory reading of

the texts, we find that his concern for studying mathematics rested not in its

inherent opposition to religion or science, but in the philosopher’s monopolization

of it solely for the sake of their unsubstantiated metaphysical views. Thus, contrary

to Hoodbhoy’s assertions, Al-Ghazālī was not against the study of mathematics per

71 Al-Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error (al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl), trans. Richard J. Mccarthy, S.J. (Boston:

Twayne, 1980), 8-9. Accessed February 14, 2017,

https://www.aub.edu.lb/fas/cvsp/Documents/reading_selections/CVSP%20202/Al-ghazali.pdf 72 Ibid, 9.


se; rather, he attempted to facilitate it by pointing out its licentious misuse by his

intellectual opponents.

3) Al-Ghazālī and Instrumentalism

Hoodbhoy finalizes his critique of religious orthodoxy by suggesting that the overt

instrumentalism practiced by the early Muslims was another factor which led to the

decline of scientific productivity in Islamic civilization:

A second factor which discouraged learning for learning's sake was the

increasingly utilitarian character of post Golden Age Islamic society.

Utilitarianism - the notion that the only desirable things are those which are

useful - was not an obsession of Islamic society in the early days of its intellectual

development.73

Here, Hoodbhoy indirectly continues his assault on Al-Ghazālī for his opposition

to the Aristotelian philosophers, seemingly unaware that the latter conflated

scientific disciplines with their metaphysical doctrines. Despite having already

shown that instrumentalism was the driving force behind the rise of scientific

productivity in Islamic civilization, this accusation makes little sense and

undermines the Classical Narrative’s conflict thesis of “science vs. religion.” As

such, we should examine the basis on which Hoodbhoy is uncritically drawing this

conclusion.

One of the first critics of the Classical Narrative was the historian of science

Abdelhamid Ibrahim Sabra (d. 2013), who saw the conflict thesis as inadequate

and alternatively posited that, “the decline of science occurred, not in the context

of opposition (as is usually thought) but in the context of acceptance and

assimilation.”74 Despite Sabra offering a different perspective on the subject, his

hypothesis is more a modification of the Classical Narrative, rather than a genuine

critique. For instance, while he views the decline of scientific productivity in the

Muslim world as not being the fault of religion opposing science, he believes it

occurred due to science playing a subservient role (i.e., instrumentalism).

Given that Sabra’s hypothesis still borrows extensively from the Classical

Narrative’s version of events, it’s not surprising that his analysis also projects a

negative view of religious influence on scientific inquiry. More specifically, he

73 Hoodbhoy, Islam and Science, 121. 74 Abdelhamid Ibrahim Sabra, “The Appropriation and Subsequent Naturalization of Greek Science in Medieval

Islam: A Preliminary Statement”, History of Science 25 (1987), 240.


does not resist the temptation to impugn the same historical figures as his

predecessors. For example, in his article, “The Appropriation and Subsequent

Naturalization of Greek Science in Medieval Islam,” Sabra writes:

In a chapter of his Muqaddima devoted to a lengthy refutation of philosophy the

fourteenth century historian Ibn Khaldūn wrote that, “The problems of physics

[he was referring to Aristotelian natural philosophy] are of no importance for us

in our religious affairs or our livelihoods. Therefore, we must leave them alone.”

He was echoing a sentiment already expressed by Ghazālī three hundred years

earlier…There is only one principle that should be consulted whenever one has to

decide whether or not a certain branch of learning is worthy of pursuit: it is the

all-important consideration that “this world is a sowing ground for the next”;

and Ghazālī quotes in this connection the Prophetic Tradition: “May God protect

us from useless knowledge.” The final result of all this is an instrumentalist and

religiously oriented view of all secular and permitted knowledge…[which would]

put a curb on theoretical inquiry.75

Yet again we find Al-Ghazālī shouldering the burden for the decline, only this time

his influence has been reinterpreted as having limited science to a religious

function rather than opposing it altogether. To support his position, Sabra makes a

tenuous connection between the views of the late 15th century C.E. historian Abū

Zayd 'Abd ar-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Khaldūn al-Ḥaḍramī (d. 1406) and Al-

Ghazālī, supplemented by a single ḥadīth. Despite Sabra considering this “strongly

suggested observation,” 76 such scant evidence surely cannot constitute enough

historical data to propound a theory on the decline of a scientific tradition.77 This is

further bolstered by the realization that Al-Ghazālī’s rejection of ‘useless sciences’

cannot possibly be seen as the least bit unwarranted, especially if we recall the fact

that Aristotelian physics (i.e., ‘natural philosophy’) incorporated many erroneous

concepts such as astrology, a stationary Earth, and an incorrect view of celestial

motion. 78 To Al-Ghazālī, subjects such as astronomy were not similar

methodologically to natural philosophy; the former was defined by its devotion to

observation and the precise use of mathematics – much like contemporary physics

– whereas the latter was based almost entirely on speculative reasoning. Despite

the philosophers’ conflations, a lesser form of demarcation did actually exist

75 Ibid, 239-240. 76 Ibid, 239. 77 Perhaps this should not be surprising given that Sabra did not intend for his thesis to be seen as comprehensive or

for Al-Ghazālī to shoulder completely responsibility for the decline. He further claims that it was only “meant as a

relevant and possibly illuminating observation that might help in future research by directing our attention in a

certain direction rather than others” – Ibid, 240-241. 78 Ragep, “Freeing Astronomy,” 59-60.


between the two prior to the advent of Islamic science, and only became more

pronounced as Muslims critically examined the Greek texts for useful material. As

Regep notes:

Islamic scientists inherited an astronomy from the ancients that already had been

differentiated to a lesser or greater degree from natural philosophy. Islamic

astronomers, though, carried this process much farther along, and it does not

seem unreasonable to see this, at least in part, as a response to religious

objections directed at Hellenistic physics and metaphysics, on the one hand, and

to religious neutrality towards mathematics, on the other.79

As such, it should not be an affront to historians that Al-Ghazālī would want to

seek more practical alternatives. Seemingly unbeknownst to Sabra, Ibn Khaldūn

likewise made this distinction. Only a few paragraphs prior to where the former

quotes him, he explains that the “problems” he was referring to revolved around

the philosophers’ assumptions regarding the unequivocal relationship between

Aristotelian abstract universals and sense perception:

The arguments concerning the corporeal existentia constitute what they [the

philosophers] call the science of physics. The insufficiency lies in the fact that

conformity between the results of thinking - which, as they assume, are produced

by rational norms and reasoning - and the outside world, is not unequivocal. All

the judgments of the mind are general ones, whereas the existentia of the outside

world are individual in their substances. Perhaps, there is something in those

substances that prevents conformity between the universal (judgments) of the

mind and the individual (substances) of the outside world. At any rate, however,

whatever (conformity) is attested by sensual perception has its proof in the fact

that it is observable. (It does not have its proof) in (logical) arguments. Where,

then, is the unequivocal character they find in (their arguments)?80

In no way then was Ibn Khaldūn a representative of anti-scientific sentiments

either. That said, perhaps the greatest evidence against Sabra’s – and subsequently

Hoodbhoy’s – assertions are the numerous scientific advancements five centuries

post Al-Ghazālī. Although these discoveries are at the individual level and don’t

appear to be brought about by any institutionalized initiatives, they still reflect a

scientific mentality prevalent within society and one which had no real restrictions.

Such examples include the accomplishments of scholars like ‘Ala' al-Dīn Abu al-

Hasan ‘Alī ibn Abi al-Hazm al-Qarshi Ibn al-Nafīs (d. 1288), who discovered the

pulmonary circulation of blood, Kamal al-Dīn al-Farisī (d. 1319), who discovered

79 Ibid, 60. 80 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah V.3, trans. Franz Rosenthal (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), 251.


how the colors of a rainbow are formed,81 Mulla Fatḥallāh al-Shirwānī (d. 1450)

and Shams al-Dīn al-Khafirī (d. 1550), who both authored astronomical

commentaries critical of the Ptolemaic system, and many more.82 In other words,

the post-Ghazālī age was ripe with scientific discoveries and treatises that most

certainly influenced European scientists and paved the way towards the Western

scientific revolution.

Summarizing all the above discussions, not only is it evident that the Classical

Narrative fails to adequately represent the events and influences leading up to the

Age of Productivity, but also misrepresents the events and influences which led to

its decline. The arch villain chosen to exemplify religious orthodoxy as the reason

behind the Age of Dependency is not only innocent of the crimes he is accused of,

but has proven to be only a scapegoat for Orientalists’ fables.

Towards a New Understanding

The analysis I have conducted thus far on the rise and decline of scientific

productivity in Islamic civilization has not merely been for the sake of critique, but

towards establishing a new understanding of the subject entirely. What has been

determined, up until this point, is that the Classical Narrative can no longer be

considered a valid and coherent means by which to understand the scientific

history of Islamic civilization – the thesis that religion conflicted with or

subjugated science to inoperability is simply untenable. Rather, what we find is

that an overt instrumentalism, spearheaded by religious orthodoxy, actually

nurtured scientific ingenuity through the rejection of the outmoded paradigm of

Aristotelian philosophy. The question remains then: What went wrong?

Islamic science flourished well into the 16th century C.E., only then to decline to a

point where Muslims began to depend solely on European ideas and inventions.

Somehow and somewhere before the end of this period events transpired within

Islamic civilization that took it on a self-destructive trajectory; events which would

see the abandonment of its scientific values altogether. As Açikgenç states:

… a scientific tradition is continuous, as such, it cannot be interrupted. For, if

there is an interruption, it may not continue creatively as it is the case with

Islamic scientific tradition today. Discontinuity will necessarily turn the members

81 Saliba, Islamic Science and European Renaissance, 239. 82 Ibid, 240.


of that tradition to another civilization where they can find a continuous

tradition.83

In line with the previous discussions, Al-Ghazālī and his intellectual progeny were

certainly not to blame for undermining science; they simply believed that rational

knowledge should produce effective results and not remain in the realm of the

abstract.84 Thus, contrary to the Classical Narrative, scientific ingenuity is not

limited by mere opposition towards certain forms of speculative reasoning – as to

afford every theoretical whim the same value would be unrealistic and impractical.

Rather, the limitation in question would need to be far more constraining,

imprisoning theoretical inquiry not by means of utilitarian subservience, but some

form of impervious absolutism. Had the early Muslims’ instrumentalism been

prone to the latter, the result would have been the total abandonment of scientific

research, given the superfluous nature of inquiring further into already resolved

issues. On the contrary, we find instrumentalist-minded scientists struggling to

make their research relevant by formulating more pragmatic models – such as in

the case of Al-Qūshjī and others – making it possible for alternative solutions to be

found later. Therefore, recalling Dewey, we may be able to find clues towards

revealing the culprit:

The history of the development of the physical sciences is the story of the

enlarging possession by mankind of more efficacious instrumentalities for dealing

with the conditions of life and action. But when one neglects the connection of

these scientific objects with the affairs of primary experience, the result is a

picture of a world of things indifferent to human interests because it is wholly

apart from experience. It is more than merely isolated, for it is set in opposition.

Hence when it is viewed as fixed and final in itself it is a source of oppression to

the heart and paralysis to imagination.

….

Since the seventeenth century this conception of experience as the equivalent of

subjective private consciousness set over against nature, which consists wholly of

physical objects, has wrought havoc in philosophy.85

What is fascinating about this passage is that it seems to admit of an ideology that

intimately connects an ailing Islamic civilization to its now dominant Western

83 Açikgenç, Islamic Scientific Tradition in History, 28. 84 For a more thorough discussion on what Al-Ghazālī considers ‘useful’ and ‘blameworthy,’ refer to

Che Zarrina Sa'ari, “Classification of Sciences: A Comparative Study of liJyii' culum aI-din and al-Risiilah al-

laduniyyah”, Intellectual Discourse 7(1) (Gombak: IIUM Press, 1999), 53-77. 85 Dewey, Experience and Nature, 11.


counterpart; what the latter was only beginning to experience by the 17th century

C.E., was what may have very well determined the destiny of the former by the

same period. It is from this passage that I began my journey into discovering how

the decline of scientific productivity in Islamic civilization occurred, and it is

where, I believe, the answer is to be found.

In the next paper, we will examine the actual influences behind the Age of

Dependency and how Muslims may be able to revive the Age of Productivity.

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