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Transcript of The State of Global Jihad
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The State of Global Jihad OnlineA Qualitative, Quantitative, and Cross-Lingual AnalysisAaron Y. Zelin, Richard Borow Fellow, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy
January 2013
It is only a matter of time before terrorists begin routinely using Twitter, Instagram, and other
services in ongoing operations. We have already seen this in a limited manner from al-Shabaab,which tweets its #JihadDispatches on recent battles. But those delivery mechanisms are unlikely toreplace the forums as the main environment for conversation and information distribution amongjihadis. Twitter and the like provide a more public platform than a password-protected forum, butone critical utility of forums for jihadis is the ability to have relatively private conversations.
IntroductionMore than 11 years after the attacks of 9/11 and nearly a
decade since the rise of popular online jihadi Internet
forums, there is strikingly little empirical research on the
manner in which jihadi activists use the Web to propagate
their cause. Whereas researchers and policy analysts have
systematically collected and analyzed the primary source
material produced by al-Qaeda and its allies, very little work
has been done on the conduits through which that
information is distributedand even to what extent anyone
is accessing that propaganda other than counterterrorism
analysts. As William McCants asserted during testimony in
December 2011 before the House Homeland SecuritySubcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
There is little research to go on, which is striking given
how data-rich the Internet is. In hard numbers, how widely
distributed was Zawahiris last message? Did it resonate
more in one U.S. city than another? Who were its main
distributors on Facebook and YouTube? How are they
connected with one another? This sort of baseline
quantitative research barely exists at the moment.i
This paper begins to fill that gap. First, it quantifies the use
of English-language jihadi forums, which rose in
prominence with the emergence of American-born Sheikh
Anwar al-Awlaki within the jihadi propaganda enterprise
Second, it measures the use of Twitter by online jihadis
This baseline is limited; it would also have been fruitful to
systematically assess the activity in other virtual spaces used
by jihadis, such as YouTube, Facebook, and Archive.org
and to do so over a longer period. Nonetheless, this paper
assesses:
(1) the most prominent English-language forums;
(2) the English-language sections within prominent Arabiclanguage jihadi forums;
(3) how the English-language forums compare to the
Arabic-language forums; and
(4) the current status of the nascent rise in Twitter
activism.ii
New America Foundation
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Findings The English-language forums are far less active than
Arabic-language forums, which suggests that jihadi
ideological penetration into the West is limited.
When more prominent jihadi forums go down, activityincreases on smaller forums, which suggests that the
overall jihadi communications enterprise is durable in
the long term.
While many have worried about the rise of jihadism inthe West, the online architecture is far less active in the
English-speaking universe of jihadis than in the Arabic-
speaking community. This suggests that the global jihad
movement is still very much attached to the Arab
heartland in terms of the majority of individuals active
online.
A wide range of individuals, organizations, and Webforums have established Twitter feeds to promote their
activities. This trend is likely to continue, but Twitter is
unlikely to supplant the forum architecture because it
cannot replace the sense of authenticity and exclusivity
created by the forums.
The data from this study are from a limited, three-month
time frame. Therefore, one must keep in mind that more
information in the future can provide a more
comprehensive picture. Reading too much into such datacould result in misleading analyses.
Comparatively, the jihadi forum ecosystem is not as large as
it once was. From 2004 to 2009, there were five to eight
popular and functioning global jihadi forums. In the past
year, there have been three to five. There are three possible
reasons for this decline: (1) global jihadism no longer has
the same appeal as in the past; (2) social media platforms
are more popular with the younger generation and jihadis
have moved their activism to those fronts; and (3) the cyber
attacks against the forums over the past six years have
degraded online capacity and deterred individuals from
joining new forums.
A coherent policy to counter jihadi activity online should be
twofold:
1. Use the forums and social media platforms only for
intelligence. If counterterrorism analysts use the forums
exclusively for intelligence-gathering, individual online
jihadi grass-roots activists will, on their own, become
burned out and quit the movement in disillusionment over
its failures in battle and because of fighting among activists
online. There is also more benefit in keeping such forums
up, since analysts will then not be in the dark about whos
who and what these individuals are up to.
2. Show the jihadis that it is the intelligence community
that really keeps their sites up. Every once in a while,
conducting cyber-attacks to keep the forums down for a
week or two would show the sites administrators and
participants that the intelligence community is really
controlling their enterprise. This might jostle individuals
into being more wary about their online footprint. It also
could deter individuals from joining the movement or
convince them that being involved is no longer worth the
risks.
One drawback to this strategy may be that driving
individuals into more diffuse networks would also
complicate intelligence-gathering going forward. This could
lead them to search for other venues to propagate theirideology, specifically to social media platforms such as
Facebook and Twitter. They would no longer be in one spot
to follow.
On the one hand, individual online jihadis freelancing on
Facebook and Twitter are no longer as controllable as they
are under a semi-centralized system like the forums. This
may lead to an unorganized and less coherent message put
out to the rest of the Web. On the other hand, there are
upsides for jihadis when they leave exclusive Web arenas
Since they can interact with non-jihadis, they have more
opportunity to recruit new individuals to the cause. This
more diffuse nature, though, makes it harder for
intelligence analysts to track the movement, since the
activists are no longer centralized in a forum. At the same
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time, there are potential benefits that outweigh the need to
monitor more platforms: Social media networks provide
more clues about the circles in which these online jihadi
activists are traveling, through their Facebook friends or
Twitter followers.
Attacking the forums directly would eliminate an important
aspect of grass-roots supporters interactions, but it would
also remove a source of valuable intelligence on the
zeitgeist of the movement. While leaving the sites active is
not ideal, it is better to live with an awkward symbiotic
relationship with al-Qaeda, whereby law enforcement and
intelligence as well as al-Qaeda benefit from keeping the
forums up. It also creates a false sense of security for al-
Qaeda and provides its leaders with an excuse or
opportunity not to evolve their authenticity mechanisms.iii
Choose the devil we know.
MethodologyThe data for this study were gathered over a three-month
period from February 2012 through April 2012. The forum
data were collected without any interaction between forum
users and the researchers.
This project tracked a variety of empirical information
about threads and posts created on jihadi forums, includingthe types of threads posted: news, jihadi media releases,
theological content, and many other categorizations. This
not only allowed for comparison across subsections, but
also helped the researchers assess the relative strength of
various forum subsections: for example, the Ansar al-
Mujahidin English Forum to its Arabic counterpart. For
Twitter accounts, we tracked the number of followers, the
number of accounts it was following, the number of tweets
made by each account, the number of lists on which an
account was included, and whether an account interacted
with or responded to others. This research analyzed the
jihadi movements well-known and popular individuals,
websites, and organizations. It did not attempt to identify
unverifiable accounts.
Several unexpected factors impeded data collection for this
study, though even those setbacks offer insight into the
jihadi virtual environment. First, the login account used to
gain access to the Ansar al-Mujahidin English Forum
(AMEF) was banned by the site administrators a month
into the research. A public version of the site remained
available but did not show as many sub-forums within it
This illustrates the effort by online jihadis not to expose
certain information to the outside world. In other words
jihadis have one version of their forums for public
consumption and another accessible only to the actual
community of certified users. You cannot gain a full picture
of what is happening on a forum without a username and
password.
Additionally, there was a major disruption to the jihad
forums for approximately two weeks in the midst of the
data collection period in late March and early April. During
that time, data could not be retrieved. Nonetheless, this
disruption offered an opportunity to see how jihadis react to
perturbations in their virtual environment.
History of the Online JihadThe specter of jihadi online radicalization came
dramatically to the fore in 2010, largely because of jihad
plots linked to American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, whoat the time resided in Yemen. iv But the importance of al
Qaeda communications long precedes Awlaki. Al-Qaeda
leader Osama bin Laden remarked in a 2002 letter to
Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar that: It is
obvious that the media war in this century is one of the
strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the
total preparation for the battles.v Documents uncovered a
bin Ladens compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, only
reiterated al-Qaedas focus on the media.vi Much of tha
media battle now occurs online.
Four Phases of Jihadi Media
There have been four different phases in which jihad
media have been disseminated since 1984. The dates
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roughly correspond to the adoption of a new medium for
distributing information:
Phase 1 1984: Khutbas (sermons), essays/pamphlets,
printed magazines/newsletters, and videotaped lectures
and/or battle scenes.
Examples:Abdullah Azzams tours in Europe and the
United States at mosques; a variety of old VHS tapes that
came out of Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya; and al-
Jihad magazine.
Phase 2 Mid-1990s: Top-down websites: These were
completely centralized endeavors in which an individual
owning a Web domain (often connected directly with jihadi
organizations) held complete monopoly over what content
was important and would be distributed.
Examples: al-Neda and Azzam Publications.
Phase 3 Mid-2000s: Interactive forums: Administrators of
the forums help facilitate and disseminate content on
behalf of jihadi organizations, but they are not necessarily
directly linked. They post important news items and have
the power to delete threads and ban users, allowing them to
help steer the online community in a certain direction by
preventing users from being exposed to particular content
or dissent. At the same time, users can play a role in
posting a variety of materials, including their own views on
events, and have the ability to converse with like-minded
individuals across a wide geographic area.
Examples: al-Hesbah, al-Ikhlas, al-Fallujah, Ansar, and
Shamukh.
Phase 4 Late-2000s: Social media platforms. A particular
individual is in control of the content. One can post news
articles on Twitter and Facebook, create videos on YouTube
and write articles or essays on ones blog. Individuals, not
an organization, decide what is important and what they
believe should be given the most attention.
Examples: Blogs, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.
Defining the Different Types of OnlineMedia
Diagram 1. The arrows refer to information flow through
the system
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Brief History of These Tools
Top-Down Websites
Picture 1. al-Neda Website Logo
While the first known jihadi presence on the Internet can
be traced back to 1991, with the Islamic Media Center
(IMC), al-Qaedas official debut dates to February 2000,
with the creation of maalemaljihad.com. This was followed
in March 2001 by alneda.com, which was active through
mid-July 2002.vii In the summer of 2001, al-Qaeda created a
media arm, As-Sahab Media Production Establishment, and
released its first video, The Destruction of the AmericanDestroyer [USS] Cole. Several other websites at the time
were not directly connected with al-Qaeda, but sympathized
with its jihadi worldview, including Azzam Publications,
At-Tibyan Publications (which had one of the earliest jihadi-
leaning, English-language, interactive forums), and Sawt al-
Qawqaz.viii This top-down phase allowed al-Qaeda and other
jihadis to control who produced and disseminated jihadi
materials online, which maintained al-Qaeda as an elite and
exclusive organization.
Mustafa Setmariam Nasir, better known by his nom de
guerre Abu Musab al-Suri, heavily criticized this so-called
elitist approach. In his 1,600-page treatise Call to Global
Islamic Resistance, which was released online in January
2005, al-Suri called for producing jihadi media in
languages other than Arabic, including English, and
devising messages that appealed more to the masses.
ForumsThe onset of interactive forums in the mid-2000s,
concurrent with the rise of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the
worlds most notorious jihadi, shattered the elitist nature of
jihadi communications. Web forums still offered
administrators (who were often directly connected with al-
Qaeda) extensive influence over what was posted because
they could delete threads or ban members. But individual
forum members, not directly connected to al-Qaeda, could
not only view what was posted by administrators, but also
comment and post their own content as well.ix
Picture 2. al-Fida al-Islam Forum Banne
The popularization of the online jihadi movement
empowered organizations dedicated to translating material
most of which was still produced in Arabic. The Globa
Islamic Media Front (GIMF), established in August 2004was a key innovator in this regard, and could trace its roots
all the way back to June 2001.x
Social Media Platforms
Picture 3. Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidins Twitter accoun
The most recent Web 2.0 innovations and creation of socia
media platforms (blogging, Facebook, YouTube, and
Twitter) have flattened control over the production of online
jihadi media. Social media platforms have enabled globa
jihadi entrepreneurs to share news items, original articles
and essays, tribute videos, and anashid (Islamically
sanctioned music sung a cappella). The newer technologies
lowered the bar for participation, making the involvement
of low-level or non-jihadis in the online conversation a newfeature of the global jihadi movement. Those so inclined
can talk about jihad all day on the Web, even if they are
geographically dispersed. This was not possible beforehand
Currently, the forums are the hubs where the al-Qaeda
organization meets its grass-roots supporters in a relatively
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safe and exclusive environment. It is a place where the
global jihad is headquartered online. The social media
platforms are where the product or ideas are sold. Social
media can expose the global jihadi message to anyone,
whereas before, one had to knowingly want to be directly
exposed to the message by going to the forums. With the
ability to replicate their message multiple times, individual
entrepreneurs have created a golden age of online dawah
(propagation or call to Islam) for the global jihadi social
movement. The interactive nature of social media
technologies and their early adoption by online jihadis have
exposed a new generation to the global jihad.
This raises the question of whether easy access to jihadi
social media platforms will lead to more individuals joining
the global terrorist movement, or whether the social
movement will dilute or moderate the global jihadi message
by legitimizing the idea that it is okay to cheerlead at home
instead of fighting, especially for individuals in the West.
As the past has shown, some individuals will be zealous no
matter what; therefore, even if a portion of the global jihad
is confined to ones computer, the message is still
spreading, and there will be some people who will go out
and attempt an attack.
Picture 4. al-Fajr Medias Logo
The Process: From al-Qaeda to YourLaptopIt is not easy for a senior al-Qaeda figure to release
information online. Before a video from al-Qaedas emir,
Ayman al-Zawahiri, appears on the Web, numerous steps
must occur. Most likely, it happens something like this:
First, somewhere in Pakistan, Zawahiri records a video.
Couriers then take it to the safe house of al-Qaedas media
outlet, As-Sahab. There, Adam Gadahn and his colleagues
edit the video, adding graphics and anashid, along with any
necessary voice-overs. Following this, As-Sahab sends the
completed product to al-Fajr Media, a transnational online
network that is the official distribution arm of al-Qaeda and
its branches. Al-Fajr then connects the release to online
jihadi forums such as Shamukh al-Islam. Heres an
example of how the process might proceed. The Shamukh
forums administrators obtain the release and then upload
the file(s) to online sharing and downloading services such
as MediaFire, RapidShare, MegaShare, 2shared, Bandango
and FileFlyer, among many others. Usually the file(s) are
encrypted and a random numeric and alphabetical
password is attached to the file(s), which are then included
in the actual forum thread where the Zawahiri video is
posted. The thread will also usually point to several
download options for the quality of the video: high
medium, low, and mobile version. If the propaganda
release is a statement, it will usually be offered in both
Microsoft Word and PDF formats.
In addition, the forum is then responsible for promoting
the new release. Accordingly, the forum administrators
either receive from As-Sahab or al-Fajr, or create
themselves, PhotoShopped .gifs that include the media
outlets name, the name of the individual whose release it is
(sometimes including a picture), and the title of the release
The same .gif is then used in all other forums when they
post it themselves. Once this whole process is complete, anadministrator of the forum, usually using the name Mirasil
al-Shamukh (correspondent of Shamukh), will create a
thread and post it live to the forum (as shown in the above
screen grab) with a special promotional banner placed at
the top of the forums front page. In the subsection of the
forum where the release is posted, the administrators wil
also usually make it a sticky, meaning it will remain as
the first post at the top of the subsection, even after regular
posters create new threads, so it is easier to find. From
there, anyone who has a password to the forum can
download the file(s) and save the release to a computer
With the formal process complete, individual online jihad
entrepreneurs can download this content and then
afterward upload the release to services such as Archive.org
YouTube, and Dailymotion to spread the message to
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individuals who lack access to the forums. In more recent
years, it has not been uncommon to see grass-roots
supporters repost content to their Facebook pages and
Twitter accounts.
How Can the Byproduct Be Assessed in Raw
Numbers?An Example: The Merger
Picture 5. Promotional banner for a new release
On February 9, 2012, al-Qaedas media outlet As-Sahab
released a new audio-visual message from Ayman al-
Zawahiri and the emir of the Somali-based group Harakat
al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, Sheikh Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr.xi
In it, Zubayr pledged bayaa (allegiance) officially to al -
Qaeda, which Zawahiri accepted. On the Ansar al-
Mujahidin English Forum (AMEF), this release had 19
responses (or posts) and 3,715 page views; on the Shamukh
al-Islam Forum, it attracted 183 responses and 5,947 page
views; and on the al-Qimmah al-Islamiyyah Somali Forum
there were 7 responses and 1,600 page views. This again
highlights the primacy and importance of Arabic in the
jihadi milieueven on a topic deeply relevant to the Somal
community. Although the merger involved a Somal
insurgent group, online activity among those who know the
Somali language was still low due to scarce Internet
penetration within Somalia. It is also worth noting that
some of the page views attributed to AMEF were the resul
of analysts and researchers viewing the forum. This could
explain why there was a high number of page views for
AMEF in comparison with al-Qimmah, yet at the same time
both forums had relatively few overall responses to the
thread on the merger.xii
The case of the merger announcement also highlights one
of the weaknesses of Twitter for jihadi organizations. Al
Shabaabs Twitter account did not mention the merger
until three days after it was publicized on the jihadi
forums.xiii This shows that jihadi organizations media
enterprises are not necessarily highly coordinated.
Overall Forum DataA key finding of this report is that Arabic-language jihad
forums are far more active than their English-language
counterparts. Table 1a compares the Ansar al-MujahidinEnglish Forum (AMEF) and the Ansar al-Mujahidin Arabic
Table 1a. Ansar al-Mujahidin English Forum vs. Arabic Forum
Month Forum Posts per day Forum Posts per day
February AMEF (before the ban) 81.23 AMAF 239.68
March AMEF (before the ban) 88.4 AMAF 309
AMEF (after the ban) 56.8
April AMEF (after the ban) 43.86 AMAF 497.2
New threads per day New threads per day
February AMEF (before the ban) 17.83 AMAF 43.92
March AMEF (before the ban) 21.4 AMAF 48.77
AMEF (after the ban) 15.5
April AMEF (after the ban) 12.8 AMAF 63.23
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Forum (AMAF), clearly showing the gap in usage between
English- and Arabic-speaking online jihadis or other
participants. In February, the average number of posts and
threads per day by Arabic speakers was around three times
that of English speakers. There are complications when
comparing the data for March and April because of the ban
at AMEF, as explained in the methodology above, and
because the top two al-Qaeda forums, Shamukh al-Islam
and al-Fida al-Islam, were down for two weeks during this
period, which likely increased the usage of AMAF.
Tables 1b and 1c, located in the appendix, examine the
differences between AMEF and AMAF in total posts found
in subsections. Again, one can see that the Arabic-languageAnsar forum is far more active than its English counterpart.
For example, when comparing discussions on the news
related to the ummah, or transnational Islamic
community, AMEF has 767 total posts to AMAFs 5,251
That is almost seven times as many in the same three
month period. Another critical finding is that both English
language and Arabic-language participants are more
interested in news and new jihadi releases than in topics
related purely to religion. All of the subsections on religious
topics have far less discussion and activity than subsections
devoted to political questions.xiv
In Table 3, the data on the al-Jihad al-Alami Arabic Forum
and its thread-to-post ratio, which is higher than the two
other forums listed above, suggest that al-Jihad al-Alami areprioritizing English-language communications at a higher
rate than they can find an audience. In other words, they
Table 3. English Subsections on Arabic and Somali Forums vs. AMEF
Month Forum Percentage of
English- language
posts
Number of
English- language
posts
Overall number
of posts
February 1 AMEF N/A N/A 108, 313
March 1 AMEF N/A N/A 110, 750April 1* AMEF N/A N/A 87, 185
April 30 AMEF N/A N/A 88, 471
February 1 Shamukh al-Islam 0.32% 4,100 1,260,814
March 1 Shamukh al-Islam 0.31% 4,132 1,316,878
Table 2. Ansar al-Mujahidin Arabic Forum vs. the Top-Tier Forums
Month Forum Posts per day Forum Posts per day
February Shamukh al-Islam 1,933 al-Fida al-Islam 732.67
March Shamukh al-Islam 1,511.12 al-Fida al-Islam 976.5
April Shamukh al-Islam 1,530.76 al-Fida al-Islam 738.3
Threads per day Threads per day
February Shamukh al-Islam 172.07 al-Fida al-Islam 100.74
March Shamukh al-Islam 153.55 al-Fida al-Islam 124.83
April Shamukh al-Islam 153 al-Fida al-Islam 95.3
Table 2, comparing the top-tier
Arabic forums Shamukh al-
Islam and al-Fida al-Islam with
AMAF, which can be
considered a second-tier
forum, underscores the
enormous gap between Arabic-
language and English-
language forum usage.
*The data collected
for April 1 and 30
include the period
after the research user
account had been
banned and therefore
reflect only the data
available publicly
without a user
account.
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want more engaged English-speaking followers than they
are able to attract. Compare that to the much lower ratio at
al-Qimmah al-Islamiyyah and to the Islamic Awakening
table (see Table 4 below), where the percentage of threads is
very close to the percentage of posts, showing that the
threads are being engaged by average users at about the
same pace they are being created by significant active users.
Table 4. Politics, Jihad and Current Affairs
Subsection of Islamic Awakening
Date Forum Percentage
of the
Politics,
Jihad and
Current
Affairs
subsection
posts in the
forum
Percentage of
the Politics,
Jihad and
Current
Affairs
subsection
threads in the
forum
February 1 Islamic
Awakening 33.78% 34.50%
March 1 Islamic
Awakening 33.81% 34.48%
April 1 Islamic
Awakening 33.90% 34.45%
April 30 Islamic
Awakening 33.90% 34.37%
Of particular note is the higher percentage of English-
language posts and threads at the al-Qimmah al-Islamiyyah
Forum, which is predominantly in the Somali language,
unlike the two other mainly Arabic sites. What this tells us
is that jihadi commentators looking at Somalia are more
often conversing in English than are individuals engaged in
Arabic-language forums. In other words, the communityconversing online about jihad in Somalia is more likely to
be in the West.
Islamic Awakening is not a jihadi forum, but it has a
subsection dedicated partially to jihad, so it was worthwhile
to determine the relative importance of this subsection. The
forum contains 26 subsections in total, but the Politics
Jihad and Current Affairs subsection is the largest
containing the most posts and threads. The data in Table 4
show that this subsection represents about 34 percent of the
new posts and threads at the Islamic Awakening forum
indicating that these threads are the most discussed.
The Great Forum TakedownBetween late March and early April 2012, most of the major
jihadi forums were shut down for a period ranging from
three to 16 days. It is not clear why the forums went dark in
such a coordinated manner, but the outage provided an
opportunity to assess how jihadi forum use evolves when
specific forums are no longer available. Two key findings
emerged from this: (1) al-Qaedas distribution network al
Fajr did not release anything during this time period, and
(2) lower-tier forums filled the vacuum of the top-tier
forums.
Table 5. When the Forums Went Down
Forum Dates Down Days
Total
Shamukh al-Islam March 23-April 4 13
AMAF March 24-26 3
al-Fida al-Islam March 25-April 9 16
al-Jihad al-Alami March 28-April 4 8
al-Qimmah
al-Islamiyyah
March 30-April 10 12
The Distribution Network
One of the primary reasons al-Qaeda continues to release
content via online forums is authentication: By distributing
its messages through accredited venues, it assures viewers
that the information is truly an official statement. Because
al-Qaeda has accredited the forums Shamukh al-Islam andal-Fida al-Islam as content providers, these are the first
locations where new releases will appear. As a result, when
the Shamukh al-Islam and al-Fida al-Islam forums wen
down in March 2012, neither al-Qaeda nor its affiliates
distributed any new products. Nothing was officially
released from al-Qaeda until Shamukh al-Islam came back
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up on April 4, 2012.xv It was unprecedented to not hear
anything for such a long time from such a wide range of
jihadi groups. But within six hours of Shamukh al-Islam
being back online, a new release from the Global Islamic
Media Front (GIMF) had been posted,xvi and within nine
hours there was a new release from al-Fajr.xvii
Filling the Void
Although al-Qaedas official media stopped during the
forum takedown, the groups grass-roots supporters
continued to look for environments to discuss jihad. The
biggest winner from this process was AMAF, the largest
second-tier forum, which was dark for only three days, far
less than Shamukh or al-Fida. As Chart 1 illustrates, AMAF
activity surged significantly during the period when AMAF
was live but Shamukh and al-Fida remained dark.xviii
Chart 1. Comparing the Number of Posts Per Day
Red: Shamukh al-Islam; Purple: al-Fida al-Islam; Orange:
AMAF
During this period, al-Qaedas distribution network did not
add AMAF to its stable of accredited forums. While AMAF
filled an important stopgap until Shamukh al-Islam and al-
Fida al-Islam came back online, it did not completely
replace the full functionality of the two top-tier forums. It
remains to be seen how long it would take al-Qaeda and its
affiliates to establish a new authenticated forum, or confer
legitimacy on an already running second-tier forum, since
their longest-running trusted forums had been down for
only two weeks.
Table 6. Before, During, and After the Takedown: Posts Per
Day, on Average
Forum Before:
02/01-
03/22
During:
03/22-
04/04
After:
04/05-
04/30
Shamukh al-
Islam
1,751.18 N/A 1,530.76
al-Fida al-
Islam
851.02 N/A 738.3
AMAF 276.61 603.3* 471.28
*Does not take into account the three days it was down.
Table 6 illustrates that AMAF filled some of the vacuumleft by Shamukh al-Islam and al-Fida al-Islam while the
latter two forums were down. It also shows that when those
two forums did come back
they did not completely
regain their previous levels
of activity. AMAF lost some
of the audience it had gained
while Shamukh and al-Fida
were down, but it was stil
more active than it had been
previously.
How the Jihadis Reacted
When the forums went down, one of the leading online
jihadi essayists, Abu Sad al-Amili, wrote two articles to rally
the online troops and to call out whoever attacked the
forums: He [the attacker] resorts to these childish methods
and he knows with certainty that it is not a solution to stop
the march of the media jihad.xix Amili also explained that
while the online media jihad was vital, there were other
ways to do dawah for the cause of global j ihad, specifically
noting offline recruitment.xx
When Shamukh al-Islam finally came back online after its
two-week hiatus, it echoed Amili in announcing its return
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And here we bring glad tidings to the Muslims in all
countries and places that the forum has returned to work ...
in order to complete the march [to victory] alongside its
sisters [other websites] may Allah reward the hands that
sought and still seek to safeguard one of the media
trenches, and may Allah reward the lions of the jihadi
media.xxi
Picture 7. Logo created by AMAF for its Twitter account
Since the top-tier forums did end up coming back online,
al-Fajr and GIMF did not need to change how they release
content from al-Qaeda and its affiliates. It is possible some
learned from this incident that they should have other
options. Both the Ansar al-Mujahidin Arabic Forum
(@as_ansar) on April 13 and the Somali al-Qimmah Islamic
Network (@AlqimmahNetwork) on April 9 created Twitter
accounts once they returned. Both now feature links to their
Twitter accounts prominently on the front page of their
forums. This may be an effort to diversify the forums
vectors for communicating with the public and deliveringcontent. Since the formal period of this study ended in
April 2012, others also joining Twitter have included Ansar
al-Shariah in Yemens media outlet Madad News Agency
(@W_mdd); Asad al-Jihad2 (@AsadAljehad2), a prominent
online jihadi essayist; Minbar at-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad
(@MinbarTawhed), a library of jihadi scholarly materials;
Jabhat al-Nusrah (@JbhatALnusra), the premier jihadi
organization active in Syria; and Muhammad al-Zawahiri
(@M7mmd_Alzwahiri), the brother of Ayman al-Qaeda
centrals leader and an influential Egyptian jihadi in his
own right .
The migration of jihadis to Twitter is happening, but
Twitter is unlikely to replace the forums because it cannot
supplant the authentication function of the elite forums,
which remains critical. Twitter, however, offers flexibility
and security for times when the forums are under attack or
groups are looking to put out information in breaking news
situations.
Controlling the Message
Picture 8. Screen grab of American Omar Hammami in a video
messag
Following the deaths of Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan
in an airstrike in Yemen in September 2011, Omar
Hammami (also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mansural-Amriki), al-Shabaabs American commander and
English-language propagandist, was poised to become the
most important and influential English-speaking jihadi in
the world. This all came crashing down, though, on March
16, 2012, when Hammami uploaded a video to YouTube
titled Urgent Message, stating: To whomever it may
reach from the Muslims ... I record this message today
because I fear my life may be endangered by [al- Shabaab
because of some differences that occurred regarding
matters of the Sharia and of strategy.xxii
While this sent shock waves through the counterterrorism
field, online jihadis were either silent or censored. A.R
Sayyid, the editor and writer of the Somali War Monitor
confirmed that there were no conversations in Somali on
the al-Qimmah Islamic Network.xxiii Further, any
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discussion of the controversy surrounding Hammami was
taken down from the Islamic Awakening Forum on at least
two occasions.xxiv Conversation on the subject was also
completely banned at the Ansar al-Mujahidin English
Forum.xxv The only content allowed on the forums
regarding this matter was the official response and
statements from al-Shabaab, which downplayed the
controversy by claiming the group was surprised by the
video and looking into its content, and maintaining that
Hammami was safe.xxvi
The urgency of the Hammami controversy does seem to
have affected al-Shabaabs mechanism for releasing
information: Instead of a posting to the forums, the groups
initial response to Hammamis pronouncement came on
Twitter, a much faster way of releasing information. This
change in procedure is likely because Hammami is
American and a figure widely covered by the Western
media. Twitters global and open nature allowed al-Shabaab
to broadcast information to a larger audience more quickly
than if it had coordinated with a forum administrator. This
illustrates the unique utility of Twitter for jihadis when they
find themselves in rapid response situations that are
controversial, fast-moving, and hold the interests of a
Western audience.xxvii
Twitter: Online Jihadis andOrganizations
Jihadis have been highly innovative in their use of the
Internet, but their use of Twitter and social media has
lagged behind the general public, a fact that has drawn
several explanations from specialists analyzing jihadi
propaganda: (1) vulnerability; (2) if it aint broke [the
forums], dont fix it; and (3) loss of authenticity.xxviii
To investigate jihadi use of Twitter accounts, this study
examined a convenient sample of jihadi organizations,
ideologues, blogs, online personalities, and media outlets.
Unlike with the forums, there is difficulty in picking
particular Twitter handles to study because they are not
authenticated and some may be based in the West. Further
not all of the individuals who distribute jihadi material
through Twitter are active al-Qaeda supporters or self
proclaimed jihadis. One example is London-based
ideologue Anjem Choudary (@anjemchoudary).
The data summarized in Table 7 indicate that both Englishlanguage (@anjemchoudary) and Arabic-language
(@Hamed_Alali) ideologues have major audiences, while
some bona fide militant organizations (the Taliban and al
Shabaab) have major Twitter followings, too.
There are reasons to expect that some jihadi forums will be
able to use Twitter effectively. For example, the Ansar al
Mujahidin Arabic Forum (@as_ansar), which joined
Twitter on April 13, 2012, had almost 400 followers only a
few weeks later. But this success varies from forum to
forum. The Qimmah Islamic Network
(@AlqimmahNetwork) Twitter account had a very low
following. This is most likely because of the language gap
as well as Internet and Twitter penetration differences
between the Arab-speaking and Somali-speaking worlds
One also sees this difference when comparing the three al
Shabaab Twitter accounts: @HSMPress
@HSMPress_arabic, and @HSMpress_Somali. The
English language @HSMPress is by far the most popular
with more than 12,000 followers as of April 30. It is
possible that part of this is a result of media coverage of al
Shabaabs English account, but it also hints at an
interesting dichotomy in the jihadi Web world. Whereas
Arabic remains the primary language of jihadi forums
English seems to be more important on Twitter.
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Table 7. Popularity: Number of Twitter Followers (in order
of when they joined Twitter)
Account Who Are They Feb 1 Mar 1 Apr 1 Apr 30
@anjemchoudary Anjem Choudary 1,084 1,396 1,485 1,617
@alemarahweb Afghan Taliban 6,884 6,961 7,020 7,153
@ansaruddin1 Ansaruddin Blog 143 190 221 247
@islamawakening Islamic Awakening
Forum
252 291 322 367
@abusuleiman2011 Forum Activist 76 138 151 171
@HSMPress Harakat al-Shabaab al-
Mujahidin
10,615 11,326 12,088 12,499
@Censored31 Belgian Blogger 80 85 83 87
@ShuraAlMujahid South African Blogger 207 255 284 313
@AMEF3 Unofficial: Ansar al-
Mujahidin English
Forum
36 63 86 104
@forsanealizza French Group Forsane
Alizzza
388 393 412 438
@Al_nukhba Jihad Media Elite 836 1,041 1,196 1,359
@Hamed_Alali Kuwaiti Hamid bin
Abdullah al-Ali
20,879 23,519 26,427 28,728
@Alvizier Taliban spokesman 314 462 544 609
@alfaroqmedia al-Faruq Media 0 0 41 94
@HSMPress_arabic al-Shabaab in Arabic N/A N/A 644 752
@HSMpress_Somali al-Shabaab in Somali N/A N/A 128 146
@AlqimmahNetwork Al-Qimmah Islamic
Network
0 0 0 17
@as_ansar Ansar al-Mujahidin
Arabic Forum
0 0 0 372
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Table 8. Twitalyzer
Account Type Impact Influence
@anjemchoudary Ideologue 8.7% 13.6%
@alemarahweb Organization 1.9% 0.3%
@ansaruddin1 Blog 2.1% 0.4%
@islamawakening Forum N/A N/A
@abusuleiman2011 Forum
Activist
N/A N/A
@HSMPress Organization 6.8% 6.8%
@Censored31 Blogger 0.1% 0.1%
@ShuraAlMujahid Blog N/A N/A
@AMEF3 Online
Activist
0.4% 0.1%
@forsanealizza Organization N/A N/A
@Al_nukhba Media Outlet 1.1% 0.8%
@Hamed_Alali Ideologue 55.5% 77.9%@Alvizier Organization 0.6% 0.5%
@alfaroqmedia Media Outlet 0.2% 0.1%
@HSMPress_arabic Organization 1.8% 1.3%
@HSMpress_Somali Organization N/A N/A
@AlqimmahNetwork Forum 0.1% 0%
@as_ansar Forum 5.5% 7.9%
Table 8 shows whether a Twitter account has impact and
influence, according to Twitalyzer, a social media analyticsapplication.xxix The accounts with higher follower counts
generally also have higher impact and influence. There are
two exceptions, though: the Talibans English-language
account (@alemarahweb) and the media outlet Jihad Media
Elite (@Al_nukhba). This suggests that having a high
follower count does not necessarily mean one will make a
difference, and that content and messaging may be
important, too. Ideologues have the highest impact and
influence. This is possibly a result of them being human
beings, rather than organizations, allowing individual
recipients to feel as if they have a more intimate
relationship with the tweeter. The impact and influence
statistics also confirm the above hypothesis that the Ansar
al-Mujahidin Arabic Forum, while new to Twitter, was
gaining popularity and reach at the time of this study, even
at such an early stage.
This would suggest that top jihadi forums, organizations
and ideologues might increasingly join Twitter and
communicate beyond the password-protected forums. It
also highlights potential losses in influence and reach for
local organizations, media outlets, bloggers, online activists
and accounts that are not in English (or to a lesser extent
Arabic). Because of the publicity that al-Qaeda, its affiliates
and popular jihadi ideologues would likely get from joining
Twitter, they could gain a following, as well as impact and
influence, similar to that experienced by al-Shabaab.
Imagine how much more of a spectacle it
would have been if the Mumbai attacks and
hostage-takings had been live-tweeted
alongside instantly uploaded pictures and
video of the events.
Compared to al-Shabaab or Jabhat al-Nusra, the name al
Qaeda evokes a more visceral reaction, which might mean
al-Qaeda would not use its formal name as an account since
it likely would be taken down. Using the names of its media
outlets might be a loophole. At the same time, al-Shabaab
and the Jabhat al-Nusra, both designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) under U.S. law, are still online with
their Twitter accounts. Twitter has never publicly
commented on this.xxx Further, as of December 12, 2012
there is nothing in Twitters terms of service related to
terror organizations using its platform.xxxi It remains to be
seen whether al-Qaeda or its leaders would risk their
security to do use Twitter, when their time-honored process
for releasing information may not be worth changing or
evolving.
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#Hashtags
Jihadis, like other Twitter users, use hashtags. Hashtags are
a popular way for Twitter users to follow tweets about
specific topics and for tweeters to expand their audience. Al-
Shabaab uses a custom hashtag (#JihadDispatches) to draw
attention to events in Somalia. Unsurprisingly, other
favorites of jihadis are #jihad and (jihad in Arabic).
Pictures 9 and 10. Screen grabs of jihadis using hashtags in English
and Arabic
Future Utility of Twitter to Jihadis
Picture 11. Custom art created by online jihadi in
remembrance of Merahs attack
The morning of March 19, 2012, will be remembered with
horror and sadness in France. That was the day Mohamed
Merah, a French-Algerian, opened fire and killed four
people, including three children, at the Jewish Ozar
Hatorah school in the southern city of Toulouse.xxxii For
jihadis, though, this was a day to celebrate. They lauded
Merah, who had killed three other people in previous days
as the Knight of Toulouse and pointed to him as an
example for others to follow. In particular, jihadis marked
this raid with celebratory PhotoShopped artwork (as in
the example above) and poems (see the appendix).
The episode also highlighted the utility of Twitter for
ongoing attacks.xxxiii
As Merah was holed up in his
apartment, awaiting the final assault by French security
forces that killed him, he allegedly created a Twitter accoun
(@mohamed__merah) and was live-tweeting. He eerily
tweeted, I changed my life on video.
It is only a matter of time before terrorists begin routinely
using Twitter, Instagram, and other services in ongoing
operations. We have already seen this in a limited manner
from al-Shabaab, which tweets its #JihadDispatches on
recent battles. Twitter offers a useful communication
mechanism for events in progress. Imagine how much
more of a spectacle it would have been if the Mumbaiattacks and hostage-takings had been live-tweeted alongside
instantly uploaded pictures and video of the events.
ConclusionsThis study suggests several conclusions about the nature of
jihadi activity online:
The Arabic-language online jihadosphere far outpaces
similar activities in other languages.
When top-tier jihadi forums are shut down, usage on lower
tier forums fills some of the vacuum. This suggests that
coordinated intervention strategies combining attacks on
leading forums while tracking the migration of users
elsewhere could be useful.
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If accredited al-Qaeda forumscurrently only Shamukh al-
Islam and al-Fida al-Islamare shut down, then content
from al-Fajr Media and the Global Islamic Media Front
distribution networks will not be released online, thus
hindering al-Qaeda, its branches, and affiliates from
putting out official releases in a credible manner. Al-Qaeda
does not currently appear to have a reliable backup
mechanism.
More jihadis continue to be attracted to Twitter, but that
distribution mechanism is unlikely to replace the forums as
the main environment for conversation and information
distribution among jihadis. Twitter provides a more public
platform than a password-protected forum, but one critical
utility of forums for jihadis is the ability to have relatively
private conversations.
Twitter does, however, provide a means for jihadi
organizations and individuals to provide information when
breaking news occurs. Jihadis are likely to turn to Twitter
for rapid response and to live-tweet extended violent events.
Area for Future Study
This study has established some basic techniques for
quantitatively assessing jihadi Web forums, but it is
adequate in neither breadth nor duration. It would beworthwhile to build upon this study for a longer time
period as well as to take a closer look at the Arabic-language
forums and their contents. Further, there should be a more
systematic review of jihadi Twitter accounts and #hashtags,
which have proliferated since these data were collected. It
would also be useful to incorporate information from
Facebook, YouTube, and Archive.org. Another important
area where study would be beneficial for both academic and
policy perspectives is the jihadi translation networks online.
These provide vital services to individuals who cannot
understand Arabic, the lingua franca of the movement.
Understanding how these networks bring the movement to
broader audiences could provide crucial clues about the
ways individuals in the West are recruited and ultimately
join the global jihad.
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Appendix
Table 1b. AMEF Total Posts Per Subsection
Ummah News Jihad Publications Muslim Captives Jihad-Related Media Mujahidin Press Releases
767 263 41 421 323
Purification,Manners, and
Morals
Quran andSunnah
News Related Media Fiqh Clarifications and Refutations
25 47 165 79 49
Media Posting Martial Arts Requests Information And
Communication Technology
Support Center
38 17 53 48 12
Prose and
Poetry
Aqidah Health and Medical Archive Ilm and Dawah
14 47 6 18 42
Redeployments Links and Activities History and
Biography
Training and Preparation Physical Fitness
7 32 20 11 4
E-Books
1
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Table 1c. AMAF Total Posts Per Subsection
Events and Issues
of the Ummah
General Computer Science and the
Internet
Statements and Releases
Correspondents of Jihad
Tawhid and Jihad
5,251 810 183 1,018 668
Images and
Designs
Audiovisual Communications and
Electronic Warfare andMilitary
The Caucasus Department of
Languages andTranslation
599 1,135 221 263 92
Department of
Pictures
Literature Archive of Ansar al-Mujahidin
Forum
Technical Security Department of
Books and Shariah
Research
68 151 11 161 61
Department of
Distinctive Threads
Department of
Martyrs and
Prisoners
Archive of Foundations and
Other Media Centers
Archive of the Islamic State
of Iraq
Archive of al-Qaeda
in the Islamic
Maghrib
29 121 30 6 11
Archive of Other
Jihadi Groups
Archive of al-Fajr
Media Center
Archive of the Global Islamic
Media Front
Archive of al-Masadat
Media Foundation
Bag Designer
4 5 8 12 55
Archive Jihad
Media Elite
Requests for
Programs and
Serials
Archive of the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan
Archive of Statements and
Releases Correspondents of
Jihad
Archive of al-Furqan
Media
9 23 57 4 2
Archive of As-Sahab
Media
Archive of al-
Qaeda in the
Arabian
Peninsula
Archive of al-Malahim Media
5 1 2
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Forum Members Poem in Honor of Mohamed
Merahs Attack
You Organized in Toulouse a Martyr Wedding
You were bleeding a well smelling crimson perfume
Whom who set fighting as a must
Make your indulgent in fighting the attackers allowed
The dogs of the West assured Kozi [Sarkozy] every time
he bleeds
You can tell them about thousands of calamities on their
capitals coming soon and lots of loss
Damage to the Westerners may appear as a joke
We will fight those who make the Jews their God
And we will let America taste the blood of slaughter
And we will walk in the proud path of those with esteem
Who made out towers like a leafy gardenxxxiv
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i William McCants, Testimony, U.S. House of
Representatives: Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence, Jihadist Use of Social Media - How to Prevent
Terrorism and Preserve Innovation, December 6, 2011,
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20McCants.pdf
ii More specifically it focuses on the Ansar al-Mujahidin
English Forum (AMEF), the largest English language jihadi
forum, the English sections in the Shamukh al-Islam
Arabic Forum, the al-Qimmah Islamic Network (which
focuses almost exclusively on Somalia), the al-Jihad al-
Alami Arabic Forum, the al-Fida al-Islam Arabic Forum,
and the Politics, Jihad and Current Affairs section in the
Islamic Awakening English Forum, which seems to serve
as crossing point between mainstream online discourse and
the jihadi facilitation media networks mentioned above.
iii There is some evidence to suggest that jihadi
organizations that are not affiliated with al-Qaedas al-Fajr
Media distribution network are indeed adapting. For
instance, when the forums were down in early to mid-
December 2012, Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin and
Jabhat al-Nusra released new video messages via their
official Twitter accounts. See:
https://twitter.com/HSMPress/status/278251262678552577and
https://twitter.com/JbhatALnusra/status/27925171156512358
4 (Accessed December 13, 2012).
iv Thomas Hegghammer, The case for chasing al-Awlaki,
Foreign Policy, November 24, 2010,
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/24/the_cas
e_for_chasing_al_awlaki(Accessed November 24, 2010).
v Letter to Mullah Mohammed Omar from Usama bin
Ladin, June 5, 2002. Located in USMAs Combatting
Terrorism Centers online Harmony Database, Document
#: AFGP-2002-600321, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP-2002-600321-Trans.pdf
(Accessed May 24, 2011).vi Unknown (probably Usama Bin Ladin or Atiyyatullah
Abu Abd ar-Rahman) Letter to Nasir al-Wihayshi, Date
unknown, Located in USMAs Combatting Terrorism
Centers online Harmony Database
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/SOCOM-2012-0000016-
Trans.pdf (Accessed May 3, 2012).
vii Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al-Qaeda
London: Saqi Books, 2006, pp. 127; Patrick Di Justo, How
Al-Qaida Site Was Hijacked, Wired Online, August 10
2002,
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2002/08/54
455(Accessed May 24, 2011).viii For more see: Hanna Rogin, Al-Qaedas online media
strategies- From Abu Reuter to Irhabi 007, Norwegian
Defence Research Establishment (FFI), January 12, 2007
http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2007/02729.pdf
(Accessed October 6, 2010).
ix One individual who excelled in this phase was Younes
Tsouli, better known by his online handle Irhabi007
(Terrorist007). In 2004, Tsouli joined two prominent but
now defunct jihadi forums, Muntada al-Ansar al-Islami (the
Islamic Supporters Forum) and al-Ikhlas (Sincerity). Quite
Web-savvy, Tsouli remotely engaged Abu Musab al-Zarqaw
and became an important asset by helping AQI (al-Qaeda in
Iraq) post and spread its content online. Tsouli was
eventually arrested in the United Kingdom on October 212005. Gordon Corera, Al-Qaedas 007, The Times
January 16, 2008
http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women
/the_way_we_live/article3191517.ece (Accessed May 24
2011).
xRogin, Al-Qaedas online media strategies, pp. 56. The
previous names the GIMF went by were the Global Islamic
Media (GIM) and the Global Islamic Media Center (GIMC).xi Dr. Ayman al-Zawhir and Shaykh Mukhtr Ab al
Zubayr: Glad Tidings: Announcement of Harakat al
Shabb al-Mujhidn Officially Joining al-Qidah, As
Sahab Media, February 9, 2012. Available at
http://jihadology.net/2012/02/09/as-sa%E1%B8%A5ab-
presents-a-new-video-message-from-al-qaidahs-dr-ayman-al
%E1%BA%93awahiri-and-amir-of-%E1%B8%A5arakat-al-
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/24/the_case_for_chasing_al_awlakihttp://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/24/the_case_for_chasing_al_awlakihttp://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/24/the_case_for_chasing_al_awlakihttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP-2002-600321-Trans.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP-2002-600321-Trans.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP-2002-600321-Trans.pdfhttp://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2002/08/54455http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2002/08/54455http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2002/08/54455http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2007/02729.pdfhttp://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2007/02729.pdfhttp://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/the_way_we_live/article3191517.ecehttp://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/the_way_we_live/article3191517.ecehttp://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/the_way_we_live/article3191517.ecehttp://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/the_way_we_live/article3191517.ecehttp://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/the_way_we_live/article3191517.ecehttp://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2007/02729.pdfhttp://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2002/08/54455http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2002/08/54455http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP-2002-600321-Trans.pdfhttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP-2002-600321-Trans.pdfhttp://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/24/the_case_for_chasing_al_awlakihttp://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/24/the_case_for_chasing_al_awlaki -
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shabab-al-mujahidins-shaykh-mukhtar-abu-al-zubayr-glad-
tiding/ (Accessed February 9, 2012).xiiAbdul Hameed Bakier, Watching the Watchers: A Jihadi
View of Terrorism Analysis Websites, Terrorism Focus,
Volume 5 Issue 33, September 18, 2008,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnew
s%5Btt_news%5D=5159&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=246&
no_cache=1 (Accessed August 24, 2012).xiii Tweets by @HSMPress, February 12, 2012,
https://twitter.com/HSMPress/status/1686345609790095
36
https://twitter.com/HSMPress/status/1686368293802598
40
https://twitter.com/HSMPress/status/16863789162549657
6
https://twitter.com/HSMPress/status/16863878705068441
6
https://twitter.com/HSMPress/status/1686401020320972
81
xiv Based on these data, one can also point out which
subsections on AMEF are not public. Since the banning at
AMEF, there were no more posts from these sections:
media posting, martial arts, requests, information and
communication technology, support center, prose and
poetry (likely shown in public, but just not discussed),health and medical, links and activities, training and
preparation, and physical fitness. All these areas are
apparently related to topics the forums might want to
publicly hide because of their sensitive nature.xv Shamkh al-Islm Arabic Forum: On the Return of
Shamkh al-Islm, April 4, 2012. Available at:
http://jihadology.net/2012/04/04/new-statement-from-
shamukh-al-islam-arabic-forum-on-the-return-of-shamukh-
al-islam/ (Accessed April 4, 2012).
xvi Harakat al-Shabb al-Mujhidn, Killing a Number of
Ethiopians With An IED in the City of Hudur,al-Kataib
Media, April 4, 2012; Harakat al-Shabb al-Mujhidn,
Implementation of the Hadd Penalty of Stoning to a Girls
Rapist in the City of Dinsoor, al-Kataib Media, April 4,
2012; Harakat al-Shabb al-Mujhidn, A Kenyan Aircraft
Bombed an Area Near the Village of Fafahdun, al-Kataib
Media, April 4, 2012; Harakat al-Shabb al-Mujhidn
Assassination of An Officer of the Militias of Apostasy in
the Neighborhood of Laba Daqah, al-Kataib Media, Apri
4, 2012. Available at: http://jihadology.net/2012/04/04/al
kataib-media-presents-four-new-statements-from-
%e1%b8%a5arakat-al-shabab-al-mujahidin-7/ (Accessed
April 4, 2012). Also see
https://twitter.com/azelin/status/187666579872419840.xvii Shaykh Ab Ubaydah Ysuf al Anb, A Message To
Our People in Syria: With the Edge of the Sword ash-Shm
(Syria) Will Be Liberated,al-Andalus Media, April 4, 2012
Available at: http://jihadology.net/2012/04/04/al-andalus
media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the
islamic-maghribs-shaykh-abu-ubaydah-yusuf-al-anabi-a-
message-to-our-people-in-syria-with-a-sword-you-liberate-
ash/ (Accessed April 4, 2012). Also see
https://twitter.com/azelin/status/187709075419709440.xviii Table 6 in the appendix highlights how this has
happened previously as well. Forums have come and gone
due to severe technical issues, cyber attacks, or
administrators deciding to shut them down over security
concerns. As a result of these changes, previously second
and third-tier forums started attracting new followers and
eventually filled these voids, becoming the premierforum(s). The cycle has occurred a few times.xix Ab Sad al mil, Duty of the Ansr (Supporters) in
Light of the Interruption of the Jihd Forums, Ansar al
Mujahidin Arabic Forum, March 27, 2012. Available at
http://jihadology.net/2012/03/27/new-article-from-abu-sad
al-amili-duty-of-the-an%e1%b9%a3ar-supporters-towards-
the-phenomenon-of-the-interruption-of-the-jihadi-forums/
(Accessed March 27, 2012).xx Ab Sad al mil, Jihd Media Has Abated, But I
Does Not Die,Ansar al-Mujahidin Arabic Forum, April 1
2012. Available at: http://jihadology.net/2012/04/01/new
article-from-abu-sad-al-amili-jihadi-media-has-abated-but-it
does-not-die/ (Accessed April 1, 2012).xxi Shamkh al-Islm Forum, On the Return of Shamkh
al-Islm, April 4, 2012. Available at
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http://jihadology.net/2012/04/04/new-statement-from-
shamukh-al-islam-arabic-forum-on-the-return-of-shamukh-
al-islam/ (Accessed April 4, 2012).
xxii Omar Hammami, Urgent Message, March 16, 2012.
Available at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAr2srINqks.xxiii Interview with A.R. Sayyid via Twitter, March 17, 2012.
Available at:
https://twitter.com/SomWarMonitor/status/181087306097
246209.
xxiv Here are the two links of threads that were taken down:
http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/shabaab-may-kill-
abu-mansoor-al-amriki-57239/ and
http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/abu-mansor-al-
amriki-alive-and-well-58851/.
xxv Tweets by @inteltweet, March 18, 2012,
https://twitter.com/IntelTweet/status/181418575922335744
https://twitter.com/IntelTweet/status/203531323187535872
https://twitter.com/IntelTweet/status/2035314682894909
45
https://twitter.com/IntelTweet/status/203531914043342848xxvi Tweets by @HSMPress, March 17, 2012,
https://twitter.com/HSMPress/statuses/1810291970645852
18
https://twitter.com/HSMPress/statuses/181029361552588800
https://twitter.com/HSMPress/statuses/1810297815743856
64;
Harakat al-Shabb al-Mujhidn, On the Video Attributed
to the Brother Ab Mansr al-Amrk (Omar Hammami),
al-Katib Media, March 17, 2012. Available at:
http://jihadology.net/2012/03/17/al-kataib-media-presents-
a-new-statement-from-%e1%b8%a5arakat-al-shabab-al-
mujahidin-on-the-video-attributed-to-abu-
man%e1%b9%a3ur-al-amriki-omar-hammami/ (Accessed
March 17, 2012).xxvii Furthermore, in mid-May, an alleged spokesperson for
Hammami named Abu M American created a Twitter
account: @abumamerican. The individual running the
account also conversed with journalists and specialists,
creating a unique opportunity for them to communicate
with someone close to Hammami or perhaps Hammami
himself. It was unprecedented in some respects. Since May
26, though, @abumamerican has been offline. This
highlights how social media can lead to less top-down
control relative to the forums. This episode also shows how
the forums can shut out and control a situation that they do
not want to expose to their followers. For more on this see
J.M. Berger, Me Against the World, Foreign Policy, May
25, 2012
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/25/me_aga
inst_the_world?page=full (Accessed May 25, 2012).xxviii William McCants, Why Dont Jihadi Orgs Tweet?,
Jihadica, April 11, 2011, http://www.jihadica.com/why-dont
jihadi-orgs-tweet/ (Accessed April 11, 2011); Tweet by
@webradius, February 6, 2012
https://twitter.com/webradius/status/166564721800122368xxix Twitalyzer calculates impact based on: the number of
followers a user has, the number of references and citations
of the user, how often the user is re-tweeted, how often the
user is re-tweeting other people, and the relative frequency
at which the user posts updates. It calculates influence as
the likelihood that Twitter users will either a) re-tweet
something another user has written or b) reference the
user. For more information on its methods seehttp://twitalyzer.com/.xxx Interview with Jillian C. York via Twitter, August 24,
2012. Available at
https://twitter.com/jilliancyork/status/2390939066738974
72.
xxxi Terms of Service, Twitter. Available at
https://twitter.com/tos (Accessed December 12, 2012).xxxii For more on Merah and the attack, see: Jytte Klausen
Frances Jihadist Shooter Was No Lone Wolf, The Wal
Street Journal, March 23, 2012
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023046364
04577299550343286104.html (Accessed March 23, 2012).
xxxiii Interestingly, one of the Twitter accounts examined in
this study was run by the French jihadi organization
Forsane Alizza (Knights of Pride) (@forsanealizza)
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allegedly connected with Merah. Yet when the attack
occurred, its Twitter account remained silent and the group
did not mention anything related to the attack.
xxxiv Al-Qinasah, Wa-Aqamta fi Tuluwiz Arsa Shahadatin,
Ansar al-Mujahidin Arabic Forum, April 2, 2012. Available
at: http://as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=58448
(Accessed April 2, 2012). I would like to thank @Nervana_
and @sameh_b for helping with parts of the translation.
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2012 New America Foundation
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