The State in International Law

8/12/2019 The State in International Law

1/23Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646394

OSGOODEHALLLAWSCHOOLComparativeResearchinLaw&PoliticalEconomyRESEARCHPAPERSERIES

ResearchPaperNo.27/2010

TheStateinInternationalLaw

KarlHeinzLadeur

Editors:

PeerZumbansen(OsgoodeHallLawSchool,Toronto,Director,ComparativeResearchinLawandPoliticalEconomy)JohnW.Cioffi(UniversityofCaliforniaatRiverside)LisaPhilipps(OsgoodeHallLawSchool,AssociateDeanResearch)NassimNasser(OsgoodeHallLawSchool,Toronto,ProductionEditor)



2 CLPERESEARCHPAPER SERIES [VOL.06NO.06

CLPEResearchPaper27/2010

Vol.06No.6(2010)

KarlHeinzLadeur

TheState

in

International

Law

Abstract:Theanalysisofprocessesoftheglobalisationoflawneedsnewparadigmsbeyondthereferencetotraditionalstatebasedlawincludinginternationallaw.Globaladministrativelaw,inparticular,shouldnotbeconceivedasaphenomenonthatisnolongerstatebasedlawandnotyet the lawofacomingworldstate. It isanewheterarchicalorder in itsown right.Thetheoreticalandpracticalchallengesofitsnetworkstructurecanonlybemetbyapproachesthatare focusedonanew relational rationalityofmetarules for themanagementofconflictsofheterogeneous norms. This goes for administrative law as well as for the transnational

cooperationof

courts.

Keywords:globaladministrative law, transnationalnetworksof courts, state in transnationallaw

JELClassification:K10,K33

KarlHeinzLadeurProfessor,UniversityofHamburg,

LawFaculty,Schlterstr.28,D20146Hamburg,Germany,Email:[email protected]

Thispaperisforthcomingin:C.Joerges&J.Falke(eds.),TheSocialEmbeddednessof

TransnationalMarkets(Oxford,HartPublishing,2010)



2010] THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3

TheStateinInternationalLaw*

KarlHeinzLadeur**

I.INTRODUCTION

Jrgen Habermas seems to regard the European nation state as the privileged frame of

referencefordemocracyanditsconstitutionalandlegalstructure.1Accordingtohisassumption

thestatesupportsthe ideaoftheunityofthe legalorderandofdeliberativereflection inapublicrealmaccessibletoallarguments.Itallowsfortheemergenceofalternativeversionsofpoliticsviapoliticalpartieswhichcan finallybe theobjectofparliamentarydecisionmaking.Can Europe be the successor of the nation state under conditions of globalisation? In thecontextof thediscussionof theEuropeanisationof law, and the constitutionalisationof the

EuropeanUnion

in

particular,

this

argument

seems

to

be

quite

appealing

to

many.

Globalisation is interpretedashaving curbed theStates capability2 to imposenormson thetransnationalprocessofexpandingmarkets.3Thisevolutionseemsnotonly tohave reducedtheactionpotentialoftheStatebut,atthesametimeandevenmoreimportantly,italsohasreduced the value of citizenship. Citizenship can no longer be the core element of therelationship between the individual and the State in the postmodern society. It cannot be

constituted via a direct relationship with the State, which at the same time constitutes the

realm of deliberation, because the diffuse networks of transnational interrelationships4beyond theStatecannotbe reflectedby theprocessofpublicdeliberation in the traditionalunderstanding.The spaceof the State is,on theonehand, too small.On theotherhand, it

mightappeartoobig.AgainstthisbackgroundEuropecannotberegardedasthebeareroftheEuropeanacquistatique(stateacquis).

*TranslationbyRoryS.Brown

**Professor, University of Hamburg, Law Faculty, Schlterstr. 28, D 20146 Hamburg, Germany, karl

[email protected]

1 J.Habermas, Dereuropische Nationalstaat unterdem Druck derGlobalisierung,48Bltterfrdeutscheund

internationalePolitik1999,p.425.

2M.Zrn,Facingthe21

stCentury.ChallengetotheState, in:HertieSchoolofGovernance(ed.),TheRoleofthe

Stateinthe21stCentury,April22/232004,p.48.

3Zrn,ibid.,p.48.

4Thenetworkconcept isoftenused ina looseway; itshouldspecifiedwithrespecttosomecombinationof

informality, equality, and commitment P. DiMaggio, Conclusion: The Futures of Business Organization and

Paradoxes of Change, in: idem (ed.), The 21st Century Firm: Changing Economic Organization in International

Perspective, Princeton: Princeton UP 2001, 212I would add its functionality for a mode of generation of

knowledgeandmanagementofuncertainty, cf. for the conceptof the disaggregatedStateA.M.Slaughter,A

NewWorldOrder,Princeton:PrincetonUP2004

freado

como o portador


4/23


Theemergenceofthenewtransnationallawbeyondthestateisnotprimarilyduetoissuesofscale.Neitheristhetransnationalelementoftheglobalizationprocessonlyprivatelaw.Itissomethingbetweennationalandinternationallaw.ThesizeoftheEuropeanCommunityclearly

presents advantages for todays economic and legal systems. However, this advantage is

different from the gains derived by the nation states from that size. Globalisation is not

equivalentto

more

conformity,

greater

harmonisation,

more

and

higher

standards,

or

even

the

convergenceoflegalorders.5

Beyond the traditional forms of territorial separations a new sectoral principle ofdifferentiation,6whichdeploysitseigenrationality(specificrationality)isemerging.Thenewlegalsystemfollowsa logicofnetworking:evermoretransnationallegalregimescometothe

forefrontthatgenerate,observe,andmanagetheirownrules.Thereflexivepotentialofprivateregimesforthemanagementofrulesdiffersfromthenormativesystemsofthepast.

Thisevolutioncorresponds to theabovementioned riseofnetworklikehybridorganisationsand interrelationships (flathierarchies) in theeconomy.7This deep transformation is alsoimportantfortheinstitutionaldesignoftheEU.Theconceptionofsupranationalityhasbeenfunctionallyopenandflexibleinthepast.8ItisaparadoxthatinrecentyearsthisexperimentalopencharacteroftheEuropeaninstitutionshasincreasinglyvanishedandbeensupplantedbyaStatecenteredperspectiveofakindofsuperstateinspiteofthefactthatthisrunscountertothe new relational logic of societal selforganisation and its open dynamic of selftransformation.Thepostmodern legaldiscourseat the levelof theMemberStateshasbeenfocused for quite some time on the value and productivity of divergence.9 The emergent

systemofgovernanceisexperimentalandnetworked,nothierarchical.10

Ofcourse,spaceasa frameofreferenceof theState inparticularhasbeen transformed,yet

thisis

not

aone

dimensional

process.

It

is

also

mirrored

by

internal

processes

of

restructuring

5A.FischerLescano&Teubner,RegimeKollisionen,Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,2006,p.36.

6Forthegeneralprinciplesofdifferentiationintheworldsocietycf.N.Luhmann,DieWeltgesellschaft,in:idem,

SoziologischeAufklrung2,Opladen:WestdeutscherVerlag1975,p.71.

7SeeR.G.Rajan&L.Zingales,TheFirmasaDedicatedHierarchy:ATheoryoftheOriginandGrowthofFirms,

NBER7546,February2000.

8U.DiFabio,DasRechtoffenerStaaten,Tbingen:Mohr1998;idem,DerVerfassungsstaatinderWeltgesellschaft,

Tbingen:Mohr2001.

9

O.

Lobel,

The

Renew

Deal:

The

Fall

of

Regulation

and

the

Rise

of

Governance

in

Contemporary

Legal

Thought,

89

MichiganLawReview2004,p.262,305.

10 C.F. Sabel & J. Zeitlin, Active Welfare, Experimental Governance, Pragmatic Constitutionalism: The NEW

Transformation of Europe, Draft for the International Conference of the Hellenic Presidency of the EU: The

ModernisationoftheEuropeanSocialModelandEUPoliciesandInstruments,May21/222003,p.19.

vanguarda que gera

apesar


5/23


theroleofspace.11Technologyhasalsodeeplychangedtheroleofterritorywithinthenationstate.12IfonetakesthetransformationprocessofsocietyinEuropeancountriesseriously,thereconstructionofEU institutions should follow thenew relational rationality thatemerges in

the differentiated social systems. A postmodern approach to institutionbuilding (and not

nationbuilding)shouldadaptitselftothelogicofplurallegalregimesandtrytoestablishrules

ofcollision

for

the

management

of

different

legal

regimes.

13

It

should

endeavour

to

design

strategies for the irritationof the selforganisationalpotentialprocessed in socialnetworks14

and try tobreakup lockineffectsby the introductionofnew flexibility into thedistributed

poolsofvarietyforwhichnoprivilegedpositionofobservationcanbefound.15Allthisrunscounter to the search for a stable hierarchical position that couldbe used for a strategy ofsteeringsocietybythedemocraticstate.16

Inwhatfollows,boththeevolutionoftheEUandofglobalgovernanceshallbeobservedastheexpression of a new logic of networks which can be regarded neither from a statecentredperspectiveasunderminingdemocraticauthoritynoras something completelynewbeyondthestate.Theacentriclogicofthenetworkstransformsbothstatebasedandinternationallaw(includingsupranationalEuropean law)andopensanewperspectiveonapluralityofhybridlegal orders which might be governed by an emerging logic of experimental metarules ofcollisionnorms.TheEU, the collisionsofjurisdictions (administrativeandjudicial),and theemergenceofagloballaw(includingitsrelationshipwiththetraditionalinternationallaw)shallbeanalysedwithreferencetothenewlogicofnetworks.

II.THEECASANASSOCIATIONOFSTATESANDTHENEEDFORALAWOFCOLLISIONS

OFANEWTYPE

Thesingularity

of

the

construct

of

an

association

of

states

17

,the

EC,

is

marked

by

manifestly

different types of collisions beween national and supranational laws and the absence of a

general harmonising formula, such as the recourse to the unity of a legal order, or the

integratingfunctionofaconstitutionas ina federationofstates.Thisconstellation is thrown

11Forthefundamentaltransformationandflexibilisationofspacecf.S.Sassen,Territory,Authority,Rights.From

MedievaltoGlobalAssemblages,Princeton:PrincetonUP2008.

12K.Ohmae,TheEndoftheNationState:TheRiseofRegionalEconomies,NewYork:SimonandSchuster1995.

13A.FischerLescano&G.Teubner,RegimeCollisionTheVainSearchforLegalUnityintheFragmentationofGlobal

Law,25MichiganJournalofInternationalLaw2004,p.999.

14N.Luhmann,PolitischeTheorie imWohlfahrtsstaat,Olzog:Munich&Vienna1981;K.H.Ladeur,Postmoderne

Rechtstheorie,2nded.,Berlin:Duncker&Humblot1995,p.159etseq.

15Cf.generallyN.Luhmann,ErkenntnisalsKonstruktion,Bern:Benteli1988.

16Cf. foracritiqueO.Lepsius,Steuerungsdiskussion,SystemtheorieundParlamentarismuskritik,Mohr:Tbingen

1999.

17ReportsoftheGermanFederalConstiturionalCourt(BVerfGE)Vol.89,p.155Maastricht.


6/23


into relief,whereEuropeancompetition lawclasheswithnational radio licensing laws.18Thisconflictcanariseinternallywithinthenationstate,butthenationaldivisionofcompetencesinGermany for instance, proceeds from the demarcation of subjects ofjurisdictional conduct,

whereas, in the EC respective authority is determined by the aims of the internal market,

raising the questions of whether the organisation and conduct of radio stations can be

consideredeconomic

activity

and

hence

be

regulated.

ChristianJoerges19andChristophSchmid20havesuggestedthatthistypeofcollisionshouldbe

characterisedasdiagonal anotionwhichfittinglyexpressesapeculiarcollectionofcollisionsbetween laws. Here, neither the classic international private law nor the collisions order ofadministrative law for territoriallydeterminedhorizontalcollisionsand therewitha logicof

referentialitystandachance,norforthatmatterdotherulesofprecedencewhichpertaintoGerman constitutional law (pursuant to Art. 31 Basic Law) and to the EC itself where lawscollidevertically.Rather,neededherearemorenovelrules,thoughstillconceptuallycollisionsrules,ofreciprocalagreementandcooperationwhichmustbedeterminedbythedynamicsofindividual problems and not by stable boundaries. 21 This ordering of the aforementionedconflicttypeasdiagonalcollisionsacquitsitselfascompatiblealsoforthedogmaticconturingofthebordersoftheefficacyofadministrativeactsinEuropeanisedpubliclaw:heretooweareconcernedwith a limitedoverlapofgeneralnationalandparticularEuropean administrative

18 K. H. Ladeur, Die Kooperation von europischem Kartellrecht und mitgliedstaatlichem Rundfunkrecht, 50

WirtschaftundWettbewerb2000,p.965.

19 C. Joerges, The Impactof European Integration on Private Law:Reductionist Perceptions, 3 European Law

Journal1997,

p.

374;

id.,

Europarecht

als

Kollisionsrecht

neuen

Typs,

Festschrift

Rehbinder,

Berlin:

Erich

Schmidt

2007, p. 717; id. & F. Rdl, Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts II: Die kollisionsrechtliche Form einer

legitimenVerfassungderpostnationalenKonstellation,in:Festschrift Teubner,Berlin:deGruyter2009,p.775;id.,

ConstitutionalisminPostnationalConstellations:ContrastingSocialRegulationintheEUandintheWTO,id.&E.

U.Petersmann(eds.),Constitutionalism,MultilevelTradeGovernanceandSocialRegulation,Oxford:Hart2006,p.

491; id., RethinkingEuropean LawsSupremacy:APlea foraSupranationalConflictofLaws, in:BeateKohler

Koch & Berthold Rittberger (eds.), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union, Lanham, MD:

Rowman&Littlefield,2007,p.311;id.,ConflictofLawsasConstitutionalForm:ReflectionsonInternationalTrade

LawandtheBiotechPanelProject,RECONWP2007/03.

20 C. Schmid, Diagonal Competence Conflicts between European Competition Law and National Regulation: A

ConflictofLawsConstructionoftheDisputeofBookPriceFixing,8EuropeanReviewofPrivateLaw2000,p.155.

21Traditionalrulesonconflictoflaws,aswellaspublicandprivatelawcertainlyhasthatorientation,cf.C.Ohler,

Die Kollisionsordnung des allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts. Strukturen des deutschen internationalen

Verwaltungsrecht,Tbingen:Mohr2005;onprivate law,seeR.Michaels,EULawasPrivate InternationalLaw?

ReconceptualizingtheCountryofOriginPrincipleasVestedRightsTheory,2JournalofPrivateInternationalLaw

2006, p. 195 , 211; R. Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46

HarvardInternationalLawJournal2005,p.471,472;Joergessupra,note19.


7/23


law, where the conflict cannot be resolved with a simple rule of supremacy. The duty tovouchsafetheeffetutileis,correctly,derivedfromtheprincipleofcooperation(Art.10ECT).22

Ithasas itsobjectnotapurely instrumentaldutyofeffectivetranslationofthediktatsofthe

particularEuropeanadministrative law,assistedbythenationalgeneraladminstrative law, its

formsand

processes;

rather

it

aims,

properly

understood,

to

render

permeable

the

general

formsofcivilandadministrativelaw(possiblyalsocriminallawinthefuture)fortherealisation

ofthepeculiaritiesofamultipolarlegalorder,which,throughtheapplicationanddevelopment

of instances of general administrative law, may not ignore the interests of the EC, othermemberstates,orcitizensinitsinterpretationofthepublicinterest.Thisnotwithstanding,anexpectation of cooperation obtains reciprocally, by virtueof the diagonal character of the

collision,whichadmitsofnoprecedencebetween theoneand theother legalorder. 23Theexpectationofcooperation isnot therefore tobeunderstoodasunilateral;thusly effetutilecannot aim towards the total setting aside, for instance, of rules on the basis of theenforcement of administrative acts. The principle of effet utile cannot be allowed tocircumventthehigherprincipleofdelimitedisolatedempowerment.

Legitimate expectations are a valid foundation of general public law, which falls within thecompetenceofthememberstates.TheharmonisingexpectationsforEuropeanpubliclawmustbecorrespondinglycurtailed.InthisareaofcooperativeagreementoflegitimateexpectationsofEuropean lawandequally legitimate conserving considerations as to the retentionof theorderingideaoftheprevailingnationalgeneraladministrativelaw24,itmustbesaidthattheECJhasbeenoflittleassistancethroughitsroleinthecasebycasedevelopmentofdecisional,

evidential and balancing rules. 25 This finds its expression many times over in the EU law

literature, in the three schematic categories of general administrative law in the European

multilevel regulatory system: geneneral adminsitrative law of the ECs own administration,

general

national

administrative

law

of

the

member

states

and

Europeanised

national

adminstrativelawthatservestheimplementationofparticularEuropeanadministrativelaws.26

This leaning towardsa schematicdifferentiation sits togetherwithan initiallyproductivebutmore recently increasingly disruptive indiscriminating option for the implementation of the

22Th.Oppermann,Europarecht,3rded.,Munich:Beck2005,No.243.

23 Ladeur,supra,note18.

24E.SchmidtAmann,DasallgemeineVerwaltungsrechtalsOrdnungsidee,2nded.,Berlin:Springer2004.

25Cf.onthemeaningoflearningofgeneraladministrativelawinjurisprudence,C.Harlow,ChangingtheMindset:

ThePlaceofTheoryinEnglishAdministrativeLaw,14OxfordJournalofLegalStudies,p.419;onlearningthrough

the development of ordering ideas, in the exchange between general and particular administrative law, E.

SchmidtAmann&S.Dagron,DeutschesundfranzsischesVerwaltungsrechtimVergleichihrerOrdnungsideen,

45ZeitschriftfrauslndischesffentlichesundVlkerrecht 2007,p.395.

26St.Kadelbach,EuropeanAdministrativeLawandtheLawoftheEuropeanizedAdministration,in:C.Joerges&

R.Dehousse(eds..),GoodGovernanceinEuropesIntegratedMarkets,Oxford:OUP2002,p.167.

outorgar

ditames

no obstante

contornar

cerceada

essa inclinao


8/23


supremacyofEuropeanlawwiththeassistanceofasystematicpenetrationintonationallaw.27Inanyevent the increasingdepthofpenetrationofEuropeanisedadministrative law (which,similarly, applies to civil law) in the general legal structures of the member states wreaks

evermore problematic collateral damage. An example from civil law is provided by the

expanding interpretationoftheproduct liabilitydirectiveasacomprehensiveregulationofall

claimsdue

to

damage

within

the

remit

of

the

directive

28

;by

dint

of

this

the

application

of

all

possiblenational laws fulfillingorextending liability in scenarios touchedbyEuropean law is

excluded29,whilst theycontemporaneouslystillhaveapplication topurely internalsituations.

Thisisacceptedeventhoughthispossibilityofanexpansiveunderstandingofthedirectivewasnotforetoldatthetimeofitsissuance.30

Incivilandinpubliclaw,theECJoughttobemorecarefulwhenscrutinisinganddevelopingtheproductiveaspectof themultipolarEuropean legalorder,whichwill likely result in ithavingevenmore input into thesubstantiveandproceduralcooperationof the legalordersand thecourts of the member states. In that vein, it should, above all, be considered that theEuropeanisationoflawbyitsveryinterferencewithnationallegalorders,interruptstheprocessof theirembedding (bywayofdogmatic selfrestraint) inavariedpractice, inparticularwithrespect to decisions about a multiplicity of cases and the experiences therefrom gained,without for its part being able to dispose of a corresponding structure of case knowledge,patternsofconductandexpectations,normativepriorityandcognitiveexperiential,evidentialandassumptive rules.TheECcan,on thebasisof its sizeand thepluralityof itsexperience,political, cultural and legal traditions never meaningully strive to become a Europeansuperstate.31TheECJseemstoignorethisinitsoverestimationofthemeaningoftheunityof

lawasaninterpretivetool32,threateningtheboundariesofthedivisionofcompetences.

As a preliminary hypothesis it might be held, based on the interpretations of the force of

adminstrativeacts

in

European

administrative

law,

that

aEuropean

general

administrative

law

cannot be conceptualised pursuant to the unitybuilding pattern of the systematising and

reflexive functions of the traditional national generalpublic law. Itmust be conceived of ascollisions law in the sense of an opening of the national general administrative law for

27K.H.Ladeur,RichterrechtundDogmatikeineverfehlteKonfrontation?,79KritischeVierteljahresschriftfr

GesetzgebungundRechtswissenschaft1996,p.77.

28ECJ,Rep.2002, I3901 GonzlezSanchez;C.Schmid,C.,TheECJasaConstitutionalandaPrivateLawCourt,

ZERPDP4/2006.

29

Joerges,

supra,

note

18

at

736.

30Joerges,supranote(2007).

31J.J.Rosa,Lerreureuropenne,Paris:Grasset1998;id.,LesecondXXesicle,Paris:Grasset2000.

32Schmid,supra,note27.

rofundidade

responsabilidade

or fora

enquanto

redito no momento

examinando

nesse sentido


9/23


heterarchicallegalrelationshipsinaEuropeanmultipolarlegalsystem.33Inthissense,ageneralEuropeanadministrativelawmustfollowprinciplederivedfromthelawofcollisionsandmustdirect itself, cooperatively, to the porosity of national law for the realisation of law or the

interests of the supranational leveljust as the laws of other member states. Such a law of

collisionsno longerhearkensto theclassicbutnotpeerlessrulesofrelegation,but is instead

orientedtowards

the

permeability

of

other

legal

orders

and

also

towards

cooperation

with

thoselegalorders.34InthissensealsotheparadoxicalassumptionofAnneMarieSlaughterand

WilliamBurkeWhitethatthefutureofinternationallawisdomestic35isplausible.

With a view to the aporia of the collisions norms of a new type, reference to a possibleambivalence to the concept of a law of collisions is required: in the realm of the European

multilevel system, or rather, the European network of overlapping legal orders we areconcerned on the national level with starkly differentiated sets of rules, whichjostle withEuropean lawwith itsprinicplesofharmonizationandpriority.Thisnewtypeofcollisions law(whichrunscountertothinkinginahierarchicalway)oughttobeconstructeddifferentlytotheconflictsrulesthatoncegovernedtheagreementofvaried,butonlypartiallycrystallisedanddistinct internationalor transnational regimes (e.g.,WTO andenvironmental regimes) andwhichalsoaccording to the interpretationofFischerLescanoandTeubner36spontaneouslydevelopedthroughcivilsocialising.

Howalawofcollisionsistobeunderstoodthatisagreeduponrequiresfurtherinterpretationswhichwouldnecessitatefurtherinterdisciplinarystudy.Alawofcollisionsthatisgeareduptothistypeofregime,mustdistinguishitselffromthetypethatwouldbethinkableforEuropean

law.Howare incomplete trans and international regimesand their rules tobe incorporated

intothinkingaboutalawofcollisions?AreweconcernedhereperFischerLescanoandTeubner

with the lawatall?How can such regimesbedistinguished? 37Towhatextent canwe truly

33 In particular Joerges, supra, note 19; Th. Vesting, Die Staatsrechtslehre und die Vernderung ihres

Gegenstandes: Konsequenzen von Europisierung und Internationalisierung, 63 Verffentlichungen der

VereinigungderDeutschenStaatsrechtslehrer2004,p.41;K.H.Ladeur,K.H.,MethodologyandEuropeanLaw

CanMethodologyChangesoastoCopeWiththeMultiplicityofLaw?,in:M.VanHoecke(ed.),Epistemologyand

MethodologyofComparativeLaw,Oxford:Hart2004,p.92.

34Michaels,supra,note21.,p.232;P.Legrand,EuropeanLegalSystemsarenotConverging,45Internationaland

ComparativeLawQuarterly1996,p.45.;id.,AgainstaEuropeanCivilCode,60ModernLawReview1997,S.40;

K. P. Sommermann, Konvergenzen im Verwaltungsverfahrens und Verwaltungsprozessrecht der europischen

Staaten,55DieffentlicheVerwaltung2002,p.133;J.Schwarze,TheConvergenceoftheAdministrativeLawsof

theEUMemberStates,4EuropeanPublicLaw1998,p.191.

35This is the titleofanarticlebyA.M.Slaughter&W.BurkeWhitewhichappeared inA.Nollkaemper& J.E.

Nijman(eds.),NewPerspectivesontheDividebetweenNationalandInternationalLaw,Oxford:OUP2007,p.110.

36 A. FischerLescano & G. Teubner, G., Regimekollisionen.Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts, Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp2006.

37Theexamplegiven for the territorial stateof the delimitationof theexpansive logicof science (GMOsR.C.

Christensen&A.FischerLescano,DasGanze imRecht,Berlin:Duncker&Humblot2008,p.317etseq.)through

public law isnot terriblyplausible, sincehere, there isasupposition in favourof the freeconfirmationofbasic

nitidamente que se acotovelam


10/23


observe theautopoetic solemnizationof law in international law (for an affirmative takeonworldlawfromapoliticalscientificperspective.38

ItisworthnotingthatthejudgmentoftheGermanConstitutionalCourtontheLisbonTreaty39

mightwellseemantiquated in itsabstraction,where itseemstodefendaformofsubstantial

statehoodagainst

the

assault

of

the

association

of

states,

namely

the

EC.

Yet,

this

corresponds

exactly to the tendencyofsupranationalorgansof theEC (Commission,ECJ), tobuildup the

Europeansuperstatewithoutshowinganyunderstandingthattheeraofstatehood isperhaps

notbehindus,butthatitstraditionalterritorialjuridicalform,basedonhomogeneity,unityandhierarchy cannot thereby be reanimated; that the dimensions of territoriality are beingextended.40Marketshavealwaysbeenembedded,i.e.constitutedbypoliticsandsociety,as

KarlPolanyihasputit.41Theformsofembeddednesshavechangedovertimefromthesocietyof individuals via the society of organisations (and the insurance limiting the risks of thedynamism of economic change42) to the contemporary society of networks.43 Against thisbackground the most recent evolution of the economic system which is driven by a deeptransformation of the technological infrastructure of society demands a new institutional

rights (legal reservations for new technologies); also: R. Wahl & J. Masing, Schutz durch Eingriff, 45

Juristenzeitung1990,p.553).

38 M. Albert, M. & R. SchmalzBruns, Antinomien der Weltgesellschaft. Mehr Weltstaatlichkeit, weniger

Demokratie?,in:H.Brunkhorst(ed.),Demokratie inderWeltgesellschaft(SpecialVolumeof thereviewSoziale

Welt) 2009, p. 57, and distinctly A. FischerLescano & Ph. Liste, Vlkerrechtspolitik. Zur Trennung und

VerknpfungvonPolitikundRechtderWeltgesellschaft,12Zeitschriftfr InternationaleBeziehungen2005,p.

209.

39 FederalConstitutionalCourt (BVerfG),Decisionof30 June2009,published inGerman in:62NeueJuristische

Wochenschrift (NJW)2009,p.2267,andavailableonlineat:http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630;

English translation available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html.Cf. the

commentaries in: German Law Journal 2009, August 2009, pp. 12011308, available at:

http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=2&vol=10&no=8, and the critique in C. Franzius,

EuropischesVerfassungsrechtsdenken,Tbingen:Mohr2010.

40 S.Sassen,Territory,Authority,Rights.FromMedievaltoGlobalAssemblages,Princeton:PUP2008.

41 K.Polanyi,TheGreatTransformation.ThePoliticalandEconomicOriginofourTime (1944),Boston:Beacon

Press, 2001; J. A. Caporaso/S. Tarrow, Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational Institutions and the Transnational

EmbeddingofMarkets,63I.O.2009,p.593,598;J.G.Ruggie,InternationalRegimes,Transactions,andChange:

EmbeddedLiberalisminthePostWarEconomicOrder,36I.O.1982,p.379.

42ForthetranformationbroughtaboutbytheNewDeal(notonly)intheUScf.D.Kennedy,WhattheNewDeal

Did,124PSQ2009,p.251,254.

43Cf.Vesting,supra,note33;at66;id.,Rechtstheorie,Munich:Beck2007,p.57etseq.;generallyK.H.Ladeur,Der

StaatgegendieGesellschaft,Tbingen:Mohr2006.


11/23


frameworkwhichhastobenetworklikeaswellasthegovernancestructureinsociety.44 Beingawareof the embeddednessofmarkets alsomeans respecting thediversityof institutions,rules, norms which have been the product of the different processes of embedding in the

differentcountries,andthismeansthatdiversity isnotasituationwhichhastobeovercome

but has to be managed according to new metarules to be derived from the paradigm of

conflictof

norms.

The

EC

can

only

be

conceived

of

according

to

the

new

paradigm

of

a

heterarchicalnetworkotherwisethecrisisoftraditionalstatehoodwillonlyreproduceitselfin

anamplifiedform.

In this respect, thecontention that theECs socalleddemocracydeficit should (orcould)beeliminatedalsofallsshortofthemark.45 TheEClaboursratherunderanetworkdeficit,itlacks

a productive, collisionsjuridical concept of the processes of plurality, heterogeneity andheterarchy.That thecrisisof thestatehasnothing todowith itssize46,also reveals that thesmallerstatescanadjustthemselvesbettertoglobalisationthanthelargerstates.

III.NATIONALANDEUROPEANBASICRIGHTS

Problemsofcoordinationofplural legalordersrevealthemselves intheagreementsbetweeninternational,Europeanandnationalprotectionoffundamentalrights.Heretoo,itisclearthathierarchichalthinkingis,withviewtotheglobalisationofrights,nolongeradequate.47Collidingandoverlappingprotectionoffundamentalrightsistherulenottheexception.48

Finally, this is incoherent with the idea that the unity of law can no longer be the primary

realisingprincipleof construction in thenationalor the transnationalarena. 49 Law takesonsuchplural forms thatunitycanno longerbeparadigmatic.Thatdoesnotofcourseexcludethat thereareareas inwhichunitycanbeanordering tool (fordefinitemarketrelatedrules

which should facilitate a unified market). The European Human Rights Convention expresslyrecognises thisdifferencewith respect to infringementsofhuman rights,but inamistakenly

44 Cf. R. Mayntz, ber Governance. Institutionen und Prozesse politischer Regulierung, Frankfurt/New York:

Campus2009.

45K.H.Ladeur,We,thepeople...Relche?,15EuropeanLawJournal2008,p.147.

46Rosa,supra,note31.

47N.Krisch,ThePluralismofGlobalAdministrativeLaw,17EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw2006,p.247;

P.SchiffBerman,P.,FromInternationalLawtoGlobalizationandLaw,43ColumbiaJournalofTransnationalLaw

2005,p.485.

48N.Krisch,TheOpenArchitectureofEuropeanHumanRightsLaw,71ModernLawReview2008,p.183.

49 A. FischerLescano & G. Teubner, Fragmentierung des Weltrechts statt etatistischer Rechtseinheit, in: M.

Albert&R.Stichweh(eds.),WeltstaatundWeltstaatlichkeit.BeobachtungenglobalerpolitischerStrukturbildung,

Wiesbaden:VSVerlag2007,p.37.


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statefixatedform,whenitgrantstheconventionstatesamarginofappreciation.50Thisisanerroneousplatformforconstructionsince,incentralquestions,theissueisnottherelationshipbetween state and societybut rather the socialgenerationof conventions that concern, for

instance,themeaningofrightstofreedomofinformationandtheirrelationshiptocompeting

rights(righttofreedomofconscience).51

Why in Europe, where the mediumistic public phenomena are to a large extent separated,

should there not also be diverse regimes for the agreement between the conflicting

fundamentalrights?Theapproachbasedonthestatalmarginofappreciationisaredherring.It concerns diverse social stocks of knowledge, rules and values, which originate in variousfundsofnormativedevelopment.52Theimpressionofunityinalegalorderismisleadinghere.

This isnotamatterof recognising the independenceof thenational legalordersper sebutrather of societal trajectories this is afortiori the case as the differences are not exactlyprimarily determined by national traditions but by various transnational legal circles, whichhistoricallyhavefacilitatedandstructuredlearningbetweensocieties.

In this way, with respect to the social/welfare state and also, for instance, with respect tofreedomof information,multipleEuropeanmodelshavedeveloped,whichcompetewithoneanother,reciprocallyobserveoneanother,butneednotbeunified.Thesame is true for thestatusofreligion:Whydoweneedcommonstandardsfortheroleofreligioninpublic,inpublicschoolsinparticular?Whetherornot,forexample,acrucifixmaybedisplayedinclassroomsinEuropeshouldnotbeacommonEuropean issue:Thishasbeen ignored in the Italiancrucifixcase.53Evenmoresyptomatic istheECTHRsdecisionontheacceptabilityofastatereligion

(Norway)54: Ajudgmentbrought about by a 9:8 vote on a cultural issue can only be wrong

irrespectiveof theoutcome:Therespectforpluralismanddiversity inEurope isatstakeand

notastandardforEurope.

Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recognises differences in the

protection of fundamental rights where the concern is the diverse financial potential of the

50 L. Favoreu, Cours constitutionnelles nationales et Cour Europenne des droits de lHomme, in:Mlanges

CohenJonathan,Brussels:Bruylant2004,S.789

51 K. H. Ladeur, Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen, in: H. P. Gtting, et al (eds.), Handbuch des

Persnlichkeitsrechtsschutzes,Munich:Beck2008,22.

52 S. Oeter, Rechtsprechungskonkurrenz zwischen nationalen Verfassungsgerichten Europischem Gerichtshof

undEuropischem

Gerichtshof

fr

Menschenrechte,

in:

66

Verffentlichungen

der

Vereinigung

der

Deutschen

Staatsrechtslehrer2007,p.361.

53ECtHRNo.30814/06,3November2009.

54ECtHRNo.15472/02,26June2007.


13/23


memberstates,and in reference to the fittingoutofprisons. 55Thisseems tobe thoroughlyplausibleasanisolatedcase,buttheaccentuationofthedifferencesinperformanceshowsthatplurality is seen more as an emergency solution under financial pressure, whilst mutatis

mutandis, the insight that plurality, rather than posing a problem for the protection of

fundamental rights, iskey toweaving together the tapestryof societies,values, regimesand

developmentaltrajectories.

56

European

oversight

of

fundamental

rights

could

then

be

a

proceduralmechanismforreflectionondiversestandardsandifnecessaryforthefacilitationof

interventionswith thepurposeofunstoppingunpleasantblockages,whichcould impede the

developmentoftherelevantsocietyorcoulddisseminatenegativeeffectstoothersocieties.57An example of the diverse standards for the determination of the relationship of mediafreedom and privacy is found in the Caroline judgment of the ECtHR58: Why should this

relationship not be differently calibrated in different societies? 59 On this point, the ECtHRdeclaredtheFrenchvariantincomparisontotheEnglish60andtheGermanmodelaviamedia,andgenerallybinding.61Thismightbediverselyevaluatedbydifferentsocietiesbutwhoistosaythatsuchdiverseevaluationisnotsalutary?Thismightbediverselyevaluatedbydifferentsocieties but who is to say that such diverse evaluation is not salutary? Divergence andheterogeneity are, on the one hand, elements of the new types of embeddedness of themarkets in postmodern times, on the other hand, the internal legal rules inherent in legalsystems, such as rules of interpretation, argumentation, preservation of consistency aredifficulttosustainintransnationalandmultilevellegalsystems62,ifonlyforlackofasufficientnumberofcaseswhichallowfordevelopingexperienceandmetarulesonmethodology.Thisisalsoareasonwhyhorizontaltransformationamongtribunalsofdifferentnationallegalsystemsshouldnotbeoverestimated.The legalsystemofthepostmodernnationstate ismuchmore

loosely coupled than it used to be in the past: it is much less integrated by laws but by a

complexmanagementofnetworksofcases:themedialawofacountryisgovernedbyawhole

hubofcaseswhichareinterrelatedinadifferentiatedway.Andthesupremetribunalshaveto

keepthis

network

of

cases

and

decisions

over

which

patterns,

rules

of

argumentation,

of

proof

and presumption in cases of factual uncertainty are processed. Judgements delivered by

55Seecritically,Favoreu,supra,note50;cf.onthecaselawTh.Schilling, InternationalerMenschenrechtsschutz,

Tbingen:Mohr2004,No.109etseq.

56M.Rosenfeld,RethinkingConstitutionalOrderinginanEraofLegalandIdeologicalPluralism,CardozoSchoolof

Law.JacobBurnsInstituteforAdvancedLegalStudies,No.242(2008).

57Thisisthecaseinfinancialmarketsregulationinparticular,cf.D.Zaring,InformalProcedure,HardandSoft,5

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw2005,p.545,595.

5857NJW2004,p.2647.

59Cf.alsoforadifferentiationoftheneedforlegalhomogeneityL.R.Helfer&A.M.Slaughter,TowardaTheory

ofEffectiveSupranationalAdjudication,97YaleLawReview1997,p.273.

60However,thisisnottrueforlibelinthenarrowsense,cf.TheEconomist2ndJan.2010,p.29.

61Cf.CourdAppeldeVersailles, 24.11.2005,No.05/05739AlbertIIofMonaco.

62 W. Peter, J. Q. de Kuyper & B. de Candolle, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment

Agreements,TheHague/Boston:Kluwer1995,p.152etseq.


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15/23


coherencewheretheysodo.SomethingsimilarappliesalsotothedecisionsoftheECJontheindirect effect of market freedom in private law. 67 Here we are rather concerned with thecollisionofdiversesociolegalregimeswhere,inthisinstance,socialstateistobeunderstood

as societalstate68, thatcompriseawealthofsocialconventions,decisions,statenorms, in

which thecourt intervenes. 69Thismightwelloccur in thedevelopmentofaEuropean legal

space,but

it

is

necessary

70

to

see

the

complexity

of

the

problem

and

not

as

aquestion

of

the

implementationofEuropeanbasiclawsandnormsespeciallywhencomparedtotheprivate

lawthathasasitstouchstoneselforganisation.

IV. GLOBALADMINISTRATIVELAW

Beyond theclassicnation stateandon thenearsideof the formsofclassic international law(and the particular administrative law of international organisations), transnational, publicadministrative, global law has developed71, which can no longer be described in the classicsenseaspublic lawbut stands inacorresponding relationship to transnationalprivate law

(lexmercatoria

of

anew

sort

and

other

forms

of

neo

spontaneous

law).

72

It

is

hardly

surprisingthatalsothislaw,similartopostmodernnationallawhasdemonstratedclearformsofpluralityandheterogeneityoflawmakingprocesses.73

Transnationaladministrative lawhasnoeasily identifiablelegalsources; its institutionsandproceduresareunderdeveloped;therelationshipbetweenpublicandprivate isoftenopaque.

67ECJC438/05,Rep.2007,I1077 Viking;C341/05,Rep..2007,I11767Laval.

68H.K.J.Ridder,ZurverfassungsrechtlichenStellungderGewerkschaftenimSozialstaatnachdemGrundgesetzfr

die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Stuttgart: Fischer 1960; F. Hase, Helmut Ridders berlegungen zum

Sozialstaatsgebot,32KritischeJustiz1999,p.295.

69SimilarcanbesaidoftheMangoldcase,ECJ,NJW2005,p.3695.

70Joerges&Rdl,supra,note19.

71 B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch & R. B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law and

ContemporaryProblems2005p.15;C.Harlow,GlobalAdministrativeLaw:TheQuestforPrinciplesandValues,

17EJIL2006,p.187;J.B.Auby,J.B.,Laglobalisation.LedroitetlEtat,Paris:Montchrestien2003.

72G.Teubner,Privatrechtsregimes.NeospontanesRechtunddualeSozialverfassungen inderWeltgesellschaft,

FestschriftSpiros

Simitis,

Baden

Baden:

NOMOS

2000,

p.

437;

id.,

Breaking

Frames:

Economic

Globalisation

and

theEmergenceoflexmercatoria,5EuropeanJournalofSocialTheory 2002,p.199.

73P.Zumbansen,PiercingtheLegalVeil:CommercialArbitrationandTransnationalLaw,8EuropeanLawJournal

2002,p.400;C.P.Calliess&P.Zumbansen,RoughConsensusandRunningCode:ATheoryofTransnationalPrivate

Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), ch. 1; G. P. Calliess & M. Renner, From Soft Law to Hard Code: The

juridification of Global Governance, 22 Ratio Iuris 2009, p. 260; A. FischerLescano, 63 Transnationales

Verwaltungsrecht,Juristenzeitung2008,p.373;cf.alsoC.Mllers/A.Vokuhle/C.Walter (eds.), Internationales

Verwaltungsrecht,Tbingen:Mohr2007.


16/23


Whether or not it is law at all is a contentious issue. 74 The line of demarcation betweenpublicandprivate lawbeginstoblur.Conversely,thequestionisposed,whetherandtowhatextent and in what forms secondary rules (H. L. A. Hart) are necessary so law can be

distinguishedfromothernorms.Thepropositionthatwemustbeconcernedwithformalrules

about the making and altering of (primary) norms seems, in the context of a world law

markedby

plurality

to

lose

its

urgency.

It

is

apparent

that

also

private

transnational

environmentalstandardscouldprotectpublicinterests.75Inretrospectonehastobearinmind

thattheevolutionofgeneraladministrativelawwasbothincountrieslikeFranceandGermany

primarilyaprocessdrivenbytheadminstration itselfwhichhasdevelopedandexperimentedwithnew formsofdecisionmakingdrawingon theknowledgeofcivilsociety (insteadof thestate centred polizeywissenschaft).76 It is only in 1976 that basic rules of general

administrative lawhavebeen (partly)codified inGermany.Thenewnetworkbased formsoftheemergingglobaladministrative lawwill inthe longrunalsoallowfornewformsofpubliccontrol and accountability on the basis of a new logic of cooperative law making at thetransnational level but the development cannot follow a topdown model of a centralisedlegimationbyademocraticlegislator.Amoretransparentmodeofadministrativetransbordernetworkingmayevencontributetoanewandimprovedversionofaccountability,whichleavesaside the illusions of attributing a privileged position for the observation of society to thelegislator. Democratic legitimation77 alone may not be a sufficient basis for a new role oflegislation. Theproblemsoftheadequatedescriptionforthenewadministrative lawbeyondthenationstatecanalreadybejudgedby the terminologicaldifferences in theprocessof itsconceptualisation.78

74 B. Kingsbury, B., The Concept of Law in Global Administrative Law, International Law and Justice Working

Papers,GlobalAdministrativeLaw Series,NewYorkUniversity,2009/1;D.Dyzenhaus, TheConceptof (Global)

AdministrativeLaw,IILJWorkingPaper2008/7,www.iilj.org

75 G. Winter (ed.),MultilevelGovernance ofGlobal EnvironmentalChange, Cambridge: CUP 2006; M. Herberg,

GlobalisierungundprivateSelbstregulierung:UmweltschutzinmultinationalenUnternehmen,Frankfurt/NewYork:

Campus2007;O.Dilling,M.Herberg&G.Winter,ResponsibleBusiness.SelfGovernanceandLawinTransnational

EconomicTransactions,Oxford:Hart2008.

76 M. Bohlender, Metamorphosen des Gemeinwohls von der Herrschaft guter polizey zur Regierung durch

FreiheitundEigentum,in:GemeinwohlundGemeinsinnHistorischeSemantikenpolitischerLeitbegriffe,ed.byH.

Mnkler/H.Bluhm,Berlin:AkademieVerlag2001,p.247;fortheUScf.T.R.Powell,AdministrativeExerciseofthe

PolicePower,24Harvard LawReview1911,p.268; forFranceM.Senellart, Lesartsdegouverner.Du rgime

mdivalauconceptdegouvernement,Paris:Seuil1995.

77

D.

Dyzenhaus,

Accountability

and

the

Concept

of

(Global)

Administrative

law,

in:

Acta

Juridica:

Global

AdministrativeLaw,ed.byHughColber,Capetown:FacultyofLaw2009,p.3.

78 For a conceptual clarification cf. M.S. Kuo, Between Fragmentation and Unity: The Uneasy Relationship

betweenGlobalAdministrativeLawandConstitutionalism,10SanDiegoLawInternationalLawJournal2009,p.

437.


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Theconceptualaccentuationof internationalasopposedtoglobaladministrative law isdownto close guidance fromnationalpublic lawand its stateorientation, fromwhichperspectivedefinite materials of administrative law be they national or international can be

distinguished,whilstthequestionofglobalpubliclawneglectsthisstartingpremiseandasa

resultpaysmoreattentiontotheascentofprivateactorsintheglobalarena.Thestateisthusly

inthe

era

of

globalisation

fragmented

from

the

offset

into

amultiplicity

of

offices

and

agencies who maintain their orientation towards transnational networks79, which are

generatedtogetherwithotherpublicandprivateactorsinparticulararenas.

Globaladministrativelawcantherefore,againstthisbackdrop,beassociatedwiththeconceptof the disaggregated state80, which does not disintegrate but transforms itself through

regulatory tasks into related networks81, inwhich the issue is lessselectivedecisionmakingthan the achievement of relatively broadly conceived goals. 82 Surely, this constitutes asubstantialfeatureof internationaladministrative law,nevertheless, itwillbecomeapparentthatthecontextofthedisaggregatedstatecanberetainedonanabstractlevelandmustbecalled forth, only because state administration is still the subject of definite organisationalprinciplesandlegitimatingrequirements,whicharetiedfastlytothecentralityofthestate.Thisis,aboveall,thecasewhenitcomestolegitimationandaccountabilityforstateconduct.83Theglobalnetworkscannotavoidthequestionsraisedbythisdynamic.Theproblemisrecognisedin the debate about global administrative law and is discussed in the context ofaccountability of globalised public and private conduct. 84 International adminstrative lawemphasizesratherwhat is leftover fromtheunityofthestateand theprinciplesthatderivetherefrom.85

79Ontheresponsibilityoftransnationalgovernancenetworks,seeA.M.Slaughter,GlobalGovernmentNetworks,

GlobalInformation

Agencies,

and

Disaggregated

Democracy,

Harvard

Law

School,

Public

Law

WP

No.

18/2004;

for

thepermeabilityofthesovereigntycf.ead.&W.BurkeWhite, supra,note 35,p.117;ead./Zaring, supra,note

64,p.211.

80A.M.Slaughter,SovereigntyandPowerinaNetworkedWorld,40StanfordJournalofInternationalLaw2004,

p.283;generallyead.,ANewWorldOrder,Princeton:PUP2004;D.F.Kettl,TheTransformationofGovernance.

PublicAdministrationforTwentyFirstCenturyAmerica,Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUP2002.

81 Ladeur&Mllers, supra,note 63;generally I.Augsberg/L.Viellechner/T. Gostomzyk,Denken inNetzwerken,

Tbingen:Mohr2009.

82On the informationalaspectofadministrativeconduct,seeTh.Vesting,Nachbarwissenschaftlich informierte

undreflektierteVerwaltungsrechtswissenschaftVerkehrsregelnund Verkehrsstrme, in:W.HoffmannRiem

&E.

Schmidt

Amann

(eds.),

Methoden

der

Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft,

Baden

Baden:

NOMOS

2004,

p.

253.

83D.Held,TheTransformationofthePoliticalCommunity.RethinkingDemocracyintheContextofGlobalization,

in: I.Shapiro&HackerCordn (eds.),DemocracysEdges,Cambridge:CUP1999,p.84; J.Cohen&C.F. Sabel,

GlobalDemocracy?,37NewYorkUniversityJournalofInternationalLawandPolitics2004p.763.

84 K. Raustiala & A. M. Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, Princeton Law &

PublicAffairsPaper20022.

85Cf.thecontributionsinMllers/Vokuhle/Walter(eds.),supra,note72.

enquanto


18/23


Wemightaskwhatvantagepointcanbewonongeneral internationaladministrative law inthespecificfieldsofinternationaladministrativelaw(conceivedofasreferenceareas).Here,we face a methodological problem, which has not yet been sufficiently resolved within the

European Community. In Europeanised administrative law, rigid and simplified distinction is

drawn between three parts86: The law of the European administration, that of the national

administrationand

the

general

national

administrative

law

that

has

as

its

purpose

the

realisationoftheparticularEuropeanadministrativelaw.Equally,ontheinternationalplane,a

functional equivalent to this problem obtains: global administrative law is the law of self

administration,standingrelativelyindependentlytosupervisingregulatorynetworks,whereasinternationaladministrativelawdoesnotnecessarilyneglectthisrelation,butfocusesonthecooperative link with the ordering ideas of the national, and thereby national general

administrative law in so far as this is concerned with the participation of the state in thetransnationalinteractionsandnetworks.87WTOlawisestablishedasaselfsufficientsubjectofstudy88and,asenabledbyinternationaldelegation,increasinglytakesonthecharacteristicsofa selfadministration, which distinguishes itself from legal materials, from which theinstitutionaldifferentiationof international cooperationhaswonno comparable institutionalelaboration.89

This fragmentationof global administrative law and the consequent variablepermeabilityofthesurvivingterritorialcomponentsofthenew,plural legalorderfindsproceduralexpressioninthenecessity,throughjudicialdecisionscontrarytotheformerprincipleoflaw,parinparemnon habet iurisdictionem which proceeds from the sovereignty of states of ensuring forreasonsderivingfromtheruleoflaw,thatadministrativecooperationofstatescannotregress

into isolatedproceduralspheresofstate regulators.Thishas theconsequence thatacitizen,

affectedbyameasureinaprocedureintheadministrativeassociation(visagrantstothirdstate

citizens,whowishtoremainintheECandtravelbetweenmemberstates),forexampleagainst

anexternally

addressed

administrative

decision

of

one

state

as

well

as

against

internal

approval

orwarningsandsoforthofanotherstate,wouldhavetotakeintoaccountjudicialprotectionof

86Kadelbach,supra,note26.

87 Cf. for a vision of globalisation as a form of extension of state trade, D. W. Drezner,All Politics is Global.

ExplainingInternationalRegulatoryRegimes,Princeton:PUP2007:inparticular,p.32etseq.

88

Cf

on

the

development

of

new

context

and

efficacy

related

interpretive

rules

in

WTO

law,

I.Van

Damme,

Treaty

InterpretationbytheWTOAppellateBody,Oxford:OUP2009,especially,p.213etseq.,287etseq..

89B.Zangl,DieInternationalisierungderRechtsstaatlichkeit.StreitbeilegunginGattundWTO,Frankfurt/NewYork:

Campus 2007; id. (ed.),AufdemWeg zu internationalerRechtsherrschaft? Streitbeilegung zwischenPolitikund

Recht,Frankfurt/NewYork:Campus2009.


19/23


theirrights(seethejustifiablydistinctdecisionbytheFrenchConseildEtatof9June1999,No.198344,MmeHamssaoui.90

V.INTERNATIONALLAWINAGLOBALLEGALORDER

Inthe

international

law

context,

Koskenniemi91

has

complained

of

the

dominance

of

expert

knowledgeinfragmentedregimes,whichcouldnotbeintegratedbyahierarchicalsystemoflaw, as being a variant of legal decay. Indeed, we can observe a parallel between internal

domesticand internationalexternaldisbandmentof traditional statehoodand itsdissolution

throughnonterritorial regimes, neverthelessmerely to criticize thepredominanceofexpert

knowledgeisnottogofarenough,assuchacriticismlosessightofthechangeinthecognitiveinfrastructure of law in the transformation from society of individuals to society oforganisations to society of networks. It cannot be ruled out, on the domestic or on theinternational level, that the plurality of regimes cannot, through new procedural rules ofreflectionandevaluationofdevelopedexpertknowledge92,generateafunctionalequivalentof

theclassic

forms

of

legal

integration

through

internal

system

formation

of

the

second

order

(throughstabilitymonitoringmetanorms)intheformofmetarulesofanewlawofcollisions.

The plea in favour of a new formalism of inclusion of the excluded93 would have thecorresponding need for support, mediated by observation of the fundamental selftransformationofnationalandinternationallaw,inparticularthroughtheriseoforganisationsasactorsand thedecentringof law in thecontextof the societalknowledge and rulebase.

Therefore it seems hard to accept that pluralisation of regimes in recourse to a new

formalism can be compensated94, rather taking on the character of a quasireligious belief(faith,inclusionoftheexcluded),whichquestionsthedefactorulesofcommonpractice.

Internationallawfindsitselfconfrontedherewithanewformofdiscontemporaneity,whichisdetermined,aboveall, in that theperviousnessofnationaland international lawexternalisestheeffectsof the failureof internal tessellationof apluralityof rulesand rule systems intodeveloping countries and erects almost insurmountable barriers to the formulation of new

collisionslawsforvariouslegalorders.95Inanyeventtheseproblemscannotbeovercomewith

90Seethejustifiablydistinct,ConseildEtat,9June1999,No.198344,MmeHamssaoui;cf.alsofortherelationship

ofEuropeanCourtstoUNdecisionsBehramiandBehramivFrance,ECHR(GrandChamber),applicationnumber

71412/01,(2007)45EHRRSE10;approvinglyKingsbury,supranote74,p.25etseq..

91 M. Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law, 70 Modern Law Review 2007, p. 1; cf. also id.,

International

Law

Between

Fragmentation

and

Constitutionalism,

Canberra,

27.11.2006;

and

generally

id.,

From

ApologytoUtopia.TheStructureofInternationalLegalArgument,Cambridge:CUP2006.

92B.Wollenschlger,WissensgenerierungimVerfahren,Tbingen:Mohr2009.

93Koskenniemi,supra,note90.

94Koskenniemi,supra,note90; J.Beckett,ARebelWithoutaCause?MarttiKoskenniemiandtheCriticalLegal

Project,7GermanLawJournal2006,p.1045.

95Joerges,supra,note19;id./Rdl,supra,note19.

dissoluo

vista


20/23


redistributive demands or general demands for inclusion, which, in the light of increasingpluralisationofgovernanceprocesses couldbeappliedneither to individualsnor states.Theshortcomingsoftheinternalgovernancestructureofthedevelopingcountriestranslatesitself,

needs must, to their participation in transnational legal regimes; abstract appeals for the

chargingofaninternationalformalismwithsubstantialequalisingrightstoparticipationandthe

reflectionof

western

self

centredness

96

can

do

nothing

to

change

this.

The

more

precise

observationofpartial legalregimeswouldhowever invite the temptation towardsevermore

specific collisions norms, which, could partially compensate the disproportionate support

affordedtothelegalpositionoftransnationalundertakingsindevelopingcountries,throughaweakstate,neglectful inprotecting the interestsof itscitizens, in favourof the transnationalexpansion of the protection afforded by national fundamental rights to the benefit of

(indigenous)thirdparties.97

Above all, the fundamental right to human dignity (in Art. 1 of Germanys basic law and infunctionallyequivalentprovisionsinotherwesterncountries)alsoobligesprivateundertakings,toavoidviolatingtheelementaryrightsofotherprivateparties(employees,neighboursetc.).This duty is primarily implemented by means of private law; adjacent to this stands theprotection of rights from state interference itself as well as the legal triangular relation ofconcernstate thirdparty,whichcomplimentstheprotectivedutiesofthestatetowardsitscitizenswithpositiveobligations,inrespectofnewrisksorthosewhichcannotbesubsumedintheprivatelawemanatingfromprivateparties.98Aheterarchical,pluralunderstandingoflawcannottransferenmassethiscoordinationofvariouslegalnorms,whichpropupaproductivenetwork of relationships, e.g., between private companies, without reference to altered

functionalconditions,withtheresultthatprivateforeignconcernsmustfulfiltheirprivatelaw

duties (for instance with respect to inconsistent provisions of foreign law and journeying

domesticlaw)butcouldignoreunconstitutionalactsoromissionsofthestate.99

Conversely, this cannot be permitted to lead to a state of affairs whereby the functional

separationbetween stateandmarkets is ignored.More importantly, theaforesaid triangularrelationshipmust be so calibrated that private undertakings are encumbered by dintof thefundamental right tohumandignitywitha compensatoryobligation for violationsofhumandignitythatoccurwithintheprivatepublicnetworksinwhichtheundertakingisactivewiththe

goal of unburdening, so far as is possible, the state. This would be an example that the

96Koskenniemi,supra,note90(2006).

97K.H.Ladeur&L.Viellechner,DietransnationaleExpansionstaatlicherGrundrechte,46ArchivdesVlkerrechts

2008,p.

42

98G.Teubner,DieanonymeMatrix.ZuMenschenrechtsverletzungendurchprivatetransnationaleAkteure,45

DerStaat2006,p.161

99 Seeforexmplethecase:Shell/KenSaroWiwainNigeria,www.FAZ.net,June9,2009.

supracitado


21/23


independent rationality of the emerging heterarchical, plural legal order can vouchsafe newlawsof collisions,basedonduties of cooperation beyond the classic forms grounded in theseparationofnationallegalorders.100Theseobligationstocooperatearenottobethoughtof

as restricted to the lawmaking institutions in the classic sense (state, international

organisations); rather they extend to subjectless, spontaneous or privately aggregated

transnationalnorms.

101

Such

constructions

sit

more

comfortably

with

the

self

standing

rationalityof lawbetter than theabstractnew formalismwhichKoskenniemipostulates ina

thoroughlyambivalentwiseaccordingtoaquasireligiousprecept.

Other conceptions of the postmodern international law, which could, again, lead to aproductivecooperationbetween legalstudiesandsocialsciencesrelatetotheobservationof

different ways of reading constitutionalising processes. 102 One way of interpreting themconsiders the increasing density of international legal phenomena as the expression of anascent world statehood which attributes to a world society a new organisational legalformbeyondthatoftheinternationallawderivingfromthewillofthestate.103Fromanotherperspective, a new logic of the community of citizens has developed, which has utilises aprocessofjuridification forcingstatesso theformulationgoes,toapplythestatecentredpublicinterestfromtheoffsettoanopencommunity,understoodasanemergentcitizenryoftheworld.

Nuancing itslightlydifferently,Ch.Chwasczca104 liberatesstatehood from itsbondage inprelegalsocietiesanddeliversittoanewformofinstitutionalisationofdemocraticwillformationwhichpermitsofvarious references.Even theconceptofa globalconstitution,withhuman

rights at its fundament, searches for its reference point not in a (developing) world

sovereignty but in a row of functionspecific regimes, which harmonise and coordinate

throughcollisionsrules.105

100Ohler,supra,note21.

101G.Teubner&P.Korth,ZweiArtendesRechtspluralismus:Normkollisionen inderdoppeltenFragmentierung

derWeltgesellschaft,in:M.Ktter&G.F.Schuppert,(eds.),NormativePluralittordnen,inprint(2009).English

version:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1416041

102OnthattermseeR.Wahl,HerausforderungenundAntworten:DasffentlicheRechtderletztenfnfJahrzehnte,

Berlin/NewYork:DeGruyter2006,p.97etseq.

103 B. Fabender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 35 Columbia

JournalofTransnational Law1998,p.529; J.A.Frowein, KonstitutionalisierungdesVlkerrechts.Berichtder

Deutschen Gesellschaft frVlkerrecht,2000, p. 427; C. Mllers,Der vermisste Leviathan. Staatstheorie in der

Bundesrepublik,Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp

2008,

p.

92;

skeptically

as

to

social

scientific

observation

S.

Leibfried

&

M.

Zrn, Von der nationalen zur postnationalen Konstellation, in: dies. (eds.), Transformationen des Staates?,

Frankfurt:Suhrkamp2006,p.19,32etseq.

104C.Chwasczca,MoralResponsibilityandGlobalJustice,BadenBaden:Nomos2007.

105 A. FischerLescano, Globalverfassung. Die Geltungsbegrndung der Menschenrechte, Weilerswist: Velbrck

2005; cf. also id./Teubner, supra, note 5 (2006); G. Teubner, Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur

staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie, 2003 ZaR 63 2003, p. 1 English version:

http://ssrn.com/abstract=876941skeptically,duetoalackofsharedvalues,Koskenniemi,supranote90(2006);for

outorgar


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Theconceptofconstitutionalisationtooneedsadisciplinaryapproachthroughlegalstudiesandsocial sciences. Many forms of the concept proceed from a simple interpretation of thehierarchyof internationalnorms.Constitutionalisation inthesensegivento itby legalstudies

cannotbereducedtothehierarchyoflaws(andthetransferofthesestatebasedprinciplesto

internationalandtransnational law).Even ifarankingofrulescouldbesubordinated, itdoes

notfollow

therefrom

that

acorresponding

constitutionalising

process

arises,

which

(at

least

in

Germany)canbeobservedonthestate level.Constitutionalisationneednotalwaysmeanthe

same in the domestic legal sphere. Constitutionalisation refers always to an institutional

construct,whichleadstoamoreorlessfarreachingdensificationoflegalmaterial106,andbythismeans,correspondingtotheacceptanceofjuridificationalprocesses,withdrawingpolitical(decisionmaking)processesfrompoliticalcontroversythroughaconstitutionalcourtandalaw

centredpublic.107

Acollisionslegal interpretationof the relationshipbetween legalmaterials inaheterarchicaltrans and international network can and must, through different institutions andinterrelations, reflect the determinate selflimitation of the constitutionalisation process.Besides,juridification is not necessarily synonymous with constitutionalisation. 108 Anothervariant of the fortification of the internal connection within a fragmented network ofinternationalandtransnationalnormsisthesettlingofguidelinesforadministrativeprocedureon the basis of international covenants. This leads to the challenge of an internationaladministrative law109, which, given its orientation towards classic statehood, can bedistinguishedfromthemorepronouncedlydetachedvariantofglobaladministrativelaw.Nextto this, there is a further variant of hybridisation in the linkage of material bonds with

(difficult to implement) obligations of financial and technical assistance. 110 Here too, the

groundisfertilefortheinternalandexternalobservationoflawconstitutingprocessesinlegal

studiesandsocialsciences.

a critique see also C. Mllers, Transnational Governance Without a Public Law?, in: C. Joerges/I. J. Sand/G.

Teubner(eds.),TransnationalGovernanceandConstitutionalism,Oxford:Hart2004,p.329.

106 C. Mllers, C., Verfassunggebende Gewalt Verfassung Konstitutionalisierung, in A. v. Bogdandy (ed.),

EuropischesVerfassungsrecht:TheoretischeunddogmatischeGrundzge,Berlin/NewYork:Springer2003,p.1,

48.

107Cf.on thedependenceofconstitutional interpretation from the selfunderstandingandempathyofpolitical

institutions,A.Vermeule,JudgingunderUncertainty.An InstitutionalTheoryof Interpretation,Cambridge (MA):

HUP2006;id.,LawandtheLimitsofReason,Oxford:OUP2008.

108Mllers,supra,note102,p.92etseq.

109Mllers,

ibid.,

p.

94.

110V.Heyvaert,HybridNorms in InternationalLaw,LondonSchoolofEconomics,Law,SocietyandEconomyWP

6/2009.


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VI.OUTLOOK

The new phenomena of globalisation lead not the the generation of a further legal planebeyondthestatebuttheyaretheexpressionofafundamentalchangeinlaw,whichgraspsall

itsforms

and

sets

out

adifferential

logic

of

hybridisation,

which

permits

of

the

transcending

of

competences and perceived boundaries (public/private), the linkage of irreconcilablerationalitiesandthecoordinationofhithertoforeseparatedfunctions.Thisdoesnotentailthe

dissolutionofa legalorderbasedonunityandhierarchybut theemergenceofanother that

operateswithcollisions laws insettlingplural law,onewhichalters theroleof thestateand

intrastatallawinthatitmarriesapermeabilityfortheobservationofextrastatalinterestswiththeexpansionofitsexternalvalidityandefficacy.

The State in International Law

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