The Speed of China’s Economic Recoverynew.cf40.org.cn/uploads/2020054wg.pdf · 2020. 5. 13. ·...
Transcript of The Speed of China’s Economic Recoverynew.cf40.org.cn/uploads/2020054wg.pdf · 2020. 5. 13. ·...
The Speed of China’s Economic Recovery1
Wu Ge
CF40 Member;
Chief Economist and Assistant President, Changjiang Securities
Abstract: Many signs show that economic recovery is on the way in China, although
domestic demand is still low. The recovery will neither be explosive nor easy, but will
be unbalanced. Lack of demand is the most prominent contradiction facing economic
rehabilitation.
Ⅰ. Developed economies are experiencing what China did two months ago
No variable can now affect our lives and work more than the novel coronavirus
pandemic and lead our assessment of the economic situation. We have also come to be
fully aware of the complexity and cunningness of the virus as well as the possibility of
its co-existence with human beings.
Many developed countries appear to be experiencing what China did two months
ago, which is not only reflected in the evolvement of their outbreaks, but also in
the shift toward increasingly stringent anti-epidemic measures. Needless to say,
each country has different systems, and there is no need to judge whether their practices
are good or bad, but the evolution of the epidemics shows that each country has
experienced an epidemiological curve which peaked gradually before it began to fall.
Figure 1: Many developed countries are going through what China did two months
1 This article was published in Chinese on April 28, 2020.
ago
Source: WIND; compiled by author
Judging from the reaction of the capital market, it seems that investors are not so afraid
of the virus. What truly worries us is people’s dismissive attitude toward the pandemic
or the laws of nature, and their lack of humbleness in the face of the virus.
For China, there are also several concerns: first, whether the epidemic would recur
in fall and winter; second, the number of imported cases; third, asymptomatic
infected cases.
Not medical experts or virologists, we can only make judgment based on the conclusion
drawn in current literature: the novel coronavirus may coexist with human beings for a
long time before a vaccine is available, and the possibility of collective immunity
should not be ruled out. According to most medical analysis of the evolution of virus,
various local outbreaks will likely occur in the future. But in general, even if there is a
recurrence, it's unlikely to spike beyond the peaks we've already experienced.
However, the peak has not come yet in many countries, including India and many
African countries. Robert Redfield, Director of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention in the US, also warned in April that the second wave of Covid-19 could hit
the US this winter, possibly overlapping with the start of the flu season, thus making
the situation more severe.
From the perspective of economic analysis, what we can do at present are: first, find
future direction from historical comparisons; second, incorporate new information and
modify the judgment based on history.
Throughout human history, there were only a few epidemic outbreaks in the past 100
years, among which SARS was less severe and the Spanish flu is more comparable to
the Covid-19 pandemic. But one problem is that the Spanish flu broke out around 1918
when the situation was completely different from today’s in many aspects including the
extent of globalization and the macro policies.
In 1918, there were neither Keynesianism, nor fiscal and monetary policy instruments.
What's more, communication methods were quite different. Therefore, we didn't use
the Spanish flu as a very important benchmark, either.
There is no doubt that the epidemic is different from the Wenchuan earthquake or flood
disasters. The epidemic has a profound impact on people's physiological and
psychological life, as well as the supply and demand in the economy.
In the epidemic, many policies in the early stage were supply-oriented, focusing on
relief, promoting work and production resumption, and restoring the labor
market, because labor is the most important factor of production in the production
function. It is also the case with recent policies in the US, which may appear as
fiscal stimulus, but are in fact more about disaster relief as the money is directly
given to households, individuals as well as enterprises.
Ⅱ. Economic recovery is on the way in China
Many signs are showing that although China's domestic demand is still low after the
peak of the epidemic, spontaneous recovery is on the way.
First, services industry such as catering which has been greatly affected by the
epidemic, is still struggling. Catering orders are only about half of what they were
at the beginning of this year, but have seen some marginal recovery recently.
Figure 2: Services industry such as catering is on the way of spontaneous recovery
Source: WIND
Second, auto and real estate industries began to recover spontaneously. Growth
rate of auto sales are mostly back in positive territory, while that of real estate sales are
still in negative territory but has been picking up from a steep drop in the first quarter.
We haven’t seen a strong stimulus for auto and real estate industries, thus the recovery
is spontaneous, though limited.
We are more optimistic about the real estate industry. Although China did not cut
interest rate by 150 basis points at once as the Federal Reserve did in response to the
epidemic, the interbank lending rate in China has been falling continuously, which has
positive impact on and is a leading indicator of the real estate sector, according to
historical pattern.
Figure 3: Auto and real estate industries began to restore spontaneously
Source: WIND
There are now two driving forces in the real estate market: one is spontaneous
restoration; the other is the intensity of counter-cyclical policies. The consumption or
sale of real estates is not like that of the tourism or catering industry. Demand for
housing will not disappear, but only delayed. With the guidance of interest rate policy,
real estate sales are now rising after bottoming out. The whole second quarter will still
see negative growth but is heading toward zero growth.
Figure 4: Real estate sales are now rising after bottoming out
Source: WIND
Third, the manufacturing sector will remain under significant pressure because of
its high reliance on external demand.
Figure 5: Manufacturing will remain under significant pressure
Source: WIND
Ⅲ. Lack of aggregate demand is the most prominent contradiction facing
economic rehabilitation in China
China is the first country to enter and get out of the Covid-19 outbreak. Although still
confronted with imported cases and asymptomatic infections, China has largely brought
the virus under control domestically and is the first country to resume work, production
and school.
After the epidemic is controlled, China needs to prevent the recurrence of the virus,
and more importantly, to restore the economy.
What is the main contradiction in post-disaster reconstruction? The supply side of the
US economy restored quite fast after the 1957 Asian flu pandemic. This is quite similar
to the current situation of China, that is, relative to the demand side, the speed of work
and production resumption is very fast, indicating that the restoration of supply is fast.
Figure 6: Comparison of economic restoration in China and the US after the
Covid-19 epidemic and the 1957 Asian flu pandemic
Source: WIND; author’s calculation
Of course, supply is not fully restored right now, but in a relative sense, supply is
sufficient while demand is insufficient.
There are two indicators that could be used to measure whether supply or demand
is the main contradiction in the economy, that is, inventory and price. If inventories
are now passively accumulated while PPI and CPI are trending down, it indicates that
the main contradiction in the economy is insufficient aggregate demand, rather than
insufficient supply. This judgement is key for macro policy making.
Figure 7: Insufficient aggregate demand relative to supply is the main
contradiction
Source: WIND; local government portals; author’s calculation
Although there is a lack of demand, it can be seen from the high-frequency data that
many services industries including catering are actually seeing marginal restoration,
which is a spontaneous process rather than the outcome of policy stimulus. Because so
many people are returning to work and ordering take-outs, the food services industry is
recovering spontaneously. The congestion index is also going up.
However, such restoration is neither explosive nor easy. For instance, if the
consumption of haircut service was zero in February and delayed to March, of course
the number would jump in March. But what about in April or May when things are back
to normal? Such brief jump in consumption is limited, which is linked to the internal
mechanism of consumption.
Theoretically, there are two factors that influence consumption: disposable income
and marginal propensity to consume (MPC).
The restoration of MPC was very slow in the US after it went through major flu
pandemics. Figure 8 shows that it took nearly a year for MPC in the US to recover after
the outbreaks ended.
Assuming that the outbreak in China is mostly put under control in March or April,
MPC is likely to restore by April next year. In this sense, the recovery of willingness
to consume is not simple.
Figure 8: The recovery of willingness to consume will be slow after the pandemic
Source: Wind; author’s calculation
Second, the recovery of consumption is linked to disposable income. During economic
downturns brought on by epidemics, unemployment would rise, wages and bonuses
would fall sharply, and disposable income would also fall. The contribution of
consumption vouchers at the current order of magnitude to consumption and investment
in the whole economy is actually quite weak. It does have marginal effect, but the
magnitude of its effect is worth further measuring.
Figure 9: The driving effect of consumption vouchers is likely limited
Source: Wind; author’s calculation
In addition, the more troublesome issue for consumption in China is that unlike the
global financial crisis: while this time it is also facing external shocks, the
household leverage is not what it used to be.
According to BIS, during the subprime crisis when China implemented the subsidy
program for purchases of home appliances in countryside and auto stimulus, household
debt ratio was only about 15%, but now it has reached 60%, so marginal effect of these
policies can hardly drive consumption to the previous level.
Figure 10: Residents’ debt burden has risen sharply, making consumption
restoration even harder
Source: WIND; author’s calculation
Countries’ post-disaster or post-outbreak experiences show that the policy focus
during the outbreak is on relief, but once the outbreak is under control, investment
is also critical in addition to consumption.
Some people argue against investment as it can trigger problems such as
redundant construction and high leverage. But the purpose of investment could be
to strengthen the weak links, such as effective investments in the development of
metropolitan areas and inter-city rail services. This is an urgent issue considering
the current macro policy intensity.
Ⅳ. Economic recovery will be unbalanced
The speed of the current economic recovery largely depends on the strength of counter-
cyclical policies. Historical data show that when external demand falls sharply,
domestic monetary and fiscal policy space is usually opened to hedge against the severe
challenges of economic downturn, and credit will expand significantly.
Especially in the second quarter, external demand may fall off a cliff, and corporate
profits will fall sharply. In order to back government’s debt issuance, the inter-bank
market interest rate will likely be relaxed in a marginal sense in the future. In general,
some trends are simply irresistible. Under the current context when external demand
falls sharply, domestic monetary and fiscal policy space will be opened to hedge
against the severe challenges of economic downturn, and credit will tend to expand.
Figure 11: Credit expansion will be the trend
Source: WIND
Since employment is a lagging indicator, the second and third quarters, instead of
the first quarter, will experience the worst employment in China. The pressure to
rescue the labor market and create more jobs in the second and third quarters will be
enormous.
The Chinese economy is already on the way of recovering, but the characteristics of
the epidemic shock implies that the recovery will be unbalanced: recovery of
domestic demand will be faster than that of external demand; recovery of capital-
intensive industries will be faster than that of people-intensive industries; and
industries that rely on the global industrial chain and external demand may still
be constrained in the future. It seems that such market expectations are reflected by
the performance of various industries’ stock indexes after the peak of the epidemic in
China.
Figure 12: The speed of recovery varies among different economic sectors
Source: WIND