The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Battle of Yalu in September 1894

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Battle of Yalu in

September 1894

Min Jung Kim

GOVT 451 Professor Karber November 27, 2012

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Table of Contents

Political Motivation of the War -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐5

Overview of the First Sino-‐Japanese War -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐ 9

First Phase of the Sino-‐Japanese War -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐14

Second Phase of the Sino-‐Japanese War -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐21

Third Phase of the War at Weihaiwei -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐29

The Battle of the Yalu -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐ 34

Conclusion -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐ 45

Illustrations

Overview Map of the Battles Categorized by Phases -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐ 9

Map of the battles of Pyongyang, Yalu, and Jiuliancheng -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐15

Map of the Invasion of Liaodong Peninsula -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐21

Chart of the Chinese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐36

Chart of the Japanese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐38

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There is always a lesson to learn from history, even if it is a war that

was fought over two centuries ago. The Sino-‐Japanese War of 1894-‐1895

started as a conflict over control of the Korean peninsula by China and Japan.

Among the wars that were fought in East Asia, this war is not one of the well

known. However, the war deserves more attention because it was a

significant turning point in the power balance of East Asia for Japan, China,

and Korea. Also, this war could serve as a lesson for China that is rising in its

power in the international arena once again. In the end of 1800s, even

though China was the dominant power, the lax attitude of China led to an

unexpected yet overwhelming loss of the war. Therefore, this discussion of

the war can remind China to be constantly aware of other countries without

naïve assumption while it maintains a dominant power status. Furthermore,

the Battle of Yalu, which was one of the most significant naval battles that

consolidated the naval supremacy of the Japanese, serves as an example of

the importance of supremacy of naval power in East Asia.

During this period, the Japanese Meiji government focused on

modernization and strengthened its military with equipments and trainings

from the Western powers. Meanwhile, after the First Opium War of 1839-‐

1842, the Qing dynasty had weakened drastically in its domestic politics and

foreign relations. The Chinese government did not appreciate the foreign

intervention, but could not resist their intrusion. Prior to the war, the

Western powers did not consider Japan as a rivaling power of China;

however, the successful demonstration of the Japanese forces’ capacity

caught the attention of them. Therefore, the Japanese became the first

successful developing country, and for the next two centuries, have

continued that reputation. On the other hand, the Chinese government, once

an indisputable dominant power, was deeply ashamed of the loss of the war,

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and had weakened further with its domestic turmoil. This war also

influenced the situation in Korea. As the Korean government was suffering

from instability with Tonghak Rebellion, the Japanese intensified its control

over Korea after the war, to solidify its power status in East Asia. The Sino-‐

Japanese War of 1894-‐1895 evidently served as a critical turning point in the

history of East Asia for all three countries.

China’s loss came as a shock to many observing countries. From the

objective perspective, it was obvious that the Chinese forces were better

prepared for the war. But China’s the most critical weakness in this war was

its lack of discipline and assumption that it will win the war because it was

the dominant power. This lackadaisical attitude could not fight against

determined Japanese forces. The Chinese forces lost their battles

continuously and sometimes, they retreated even without fighting. The

government and officials were not serious about this war as well. Even when

they were sending peace envoys after losing battles, the Chinese sent

government officials who were not high ranking and indicated that it did not

consider the peace negotiation important. Due to these attitudes, the China

had to give its dominant power status to Japan. Now, after two centuries had

passed, China has risen again in the international arena with its economy and

military capacity. At this time, the Sino-‐Japanese War could be a useful

reminder for the Chinese with the opportunity to maintain its dominant

power once again.

The vital importance of supreme naval power and maritime security

remain the same two centuries ago and even now. The Battle of Yalu was the

decisive naval battle that allowed the Japanese to gain the momentum of the

rest of the war. Also, this battle had received attention of the Western

powers because of the Japanese usage of original naval tactics and both

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countries’ modern European technologies. The Japanese knew in the early

phase of the war that the one country that dominates the sea route first

would gain huge advantage throughout the war. Therefore, the Japanese

fought with determination and gained a complete victory. Protecting the

maritime security still continue to be a top priority of East Asian countries. It

can be demonstrated through the current disputes regarding the South China

Sea and the East Sea/Sea of Japan. The Battle of Yalu indicates that the naval

supremacy was a concern for the countries’ security especially in East Asia

even two centuries ago.

This paper will first discuss the political motivation that sparked the

conflict between China and Japan. Then, it will describe the battles during

Sino-‐Japanese War in three phases, and then followed by the peace treaty.

Finally, the specific details of the Battle of Yalu will be mentioned. This paper

will conclude by analyzing the legacies of China, Japan, and Korea and

emphasizing the significance of the war.

Political motivation of the First Sino-Japanese War

Despite its miniature size of the territory, the Korean Peninsula served as

one of the most strategic locations in the Far East. At the end of 19th century,

the three major Far Eastern powers, China, Japan, and Russia, considered

Korea as a crucial strategic location for their national security. When the Far

Eastern powers were interested in securing the Korean Peninsula,

controlling the country and its people was not the primary purpose of the Far

Eastern powers; instead, it was to utilize this strategic region to protect its

own security interests.

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As an island nation, Japan sought Korea for the purpose of “debarkation

point” for access to the Asian mainland.1 The Korean Peninsula was perfect

for Japan to utilize it as its gateway to the mainland. Japan’s interest in Korea

was due to its goal of building “an outer defense perimeter.”2 Not only Korea

could have been a strategic location for Japanese offense, it was also suitable

for its defense. Additionally, the Yellow Sea provided the maritime access to

Peking, and through this route Korea sent its large rice tribute and other vital

food supplies.3 Furthermore, because the northern Korean Peninsula

bordered Manchuria, where the most industrialized part of China was

located, China’s control over this region was also significant to its national

security.4 Because of the intense competition over this tiny territory, most

countries desired to dominate the territory first, before the other took the

initiative. Because the strategic location of the Korean Peninsula was related

to the Far Eastern powers’ geostrategic interest, they were even willing to

risk a military confrontation to win the control over the region.

To prevent any one power dominating Korea, Japan and China signed the

Treaty of Tianjin on April 18, 1885.5 This convention, negotiated by Li

Hongzhang and Ito Hirobumi, resulted in two parties’ accord on bilateral

troop withdrawal, restriction on deploying military instructors, and

aforementioned notification of sending troops.6 On paper, this treaty seemed

fair, but tensions still remained. Despite the agreement between two parties,

1 S.C.M. Paine, The Sino-‐Japanese War of 1894-‐1895 Perceptions, Power, and Primacy (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 33. 2 Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-‐1989 (London: Routledge, 2001), 95. 3 G.A. Ballard, The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan(New York, NY: n.p., 1921), 125. 4 Paine, 34. 5 Paine, 59. 6 Ibid.

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the Treaty of Tianjin indicated implied tension regarding each country’s

desire to control the Korean territory.

This delicate situation within the Northeast Asia continued. Eventually,

ten years later, in 1894, two events exacerbated the relations between China

and Japan, and hastened the war. The first one was the murder of Kim Ok-‐

kyun. In 1884, Kim, a leader of pro-‐Japanese faction in Korea, led an uprising

against the government but failed. Ten years later, a Korean assassin in

Shanghai murdered him, and his corpse was publicly displayed in Korea to

warn the pro-‐Japanese faction. As a response, many Japanese considered this

act an insult against them by the Chinese. Nationalists groups in Japan

started to call for war with China since this incident.7

Another incident that led to the war was when the Korean government

asked for China’s intervention to suppress the Tonghak Insurrection in the

summer of the same year. Tonghaks not only organized the anti-‐foreign

activities, but also initiated both a religious and a social movement

concerned with the freedom of their religion, the improvement of peasantry

class, and reform of the corrupt government. Unable to control this rebellion,

the Korean King requested Li Hongzhang for Chinese military assistance. It

was granted promptly through China’s Resident-‐General Yuan Shikai in June

1894, and it was promptly given.8 Respecting the terms of the Treaty of

Tianjin, China immediately informed Japan and stated by stating that China

was sending troops to their “tributary states to assist them.”9 Japan was not

pleased by this phrase, and because Japan had concluded that China’s

proclamation of Korea as its tributary state violated the treaty, the Japanese

government also sent its troops to Korea. Later on, in accordance with the 7 Elleman, 96. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.

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treaty, China wanted both forces to withdraw simultaneously; however,

Japan was adamant to take this opportunity to increase its military presence

in Korea. Therefore, the Japanese government refused to withdraw until it

reformed the Korean government.10

A Sino-‐Japanese confrontation seemed difficult to be avoided, especially

as the Japanese troops attacked the Korean royal palace on July 23, 1894 to

enforce Japanese version of a governmental reorganization.11 In response,

threatened China chartered three British steamers: Kowshing, Irene, and the

Fei Ching. In an unexpected clash in the Bay of Asan, the Japanese force sunk

Kowshing, and this battle eventually led to the Battle of Seonghwan four days

later. Finally, Japan officially declared war on China on August 1, 1894.12 The

geographical position of Korea and the weak nature of the Korean

government, seen through the murder of Kim Ok-‐Kyun and the incidents of

the Tonghak Insurrection, made China and Japan’s exertion of influence

inevitable. As the two countries were adamant on securing the Korean

Peninsula, they were willing to sacrifice their troops. Additionally, such a

prompt escalation to the war and well-‐prepared military forces indicate that

China and Japan had considered the Sino-‐Japanese conflict unavoidable.

Moreover, the defeat of Kowshing alerted China, because the command of the

sea was critical in this conflict when the sea route offered the most efficient

way for communication and operations of the war. The First Sino-‐Japanese

War was fought officially from August 1, 1894 to April 17, 1895.

10 Allen Fung, "Testing the Self-‐Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-‐Japanese War of 1894-‐1895," Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (October 1996): 1010. 11 Elleman, 97. 12 W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-‐1945 (n.p.: Oxford University Press, 1991), 48.

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Overview of the First Sino-Japanese War Timeline of the war 1 August 1894: Official declaration of war 15 September 1894: The Battle of Pyongyang 17 September 1894: The Battle of Yalu 24 October 1894: The Battle of Jiuliancheng 21 November 1894: The Battle of Port Arthur 12 December 1894: The Japanese invasion of Ximucheng 13 December 1894: The Japanese invasion of Haicheng 19 December 1894: The Battle of Kangwasae 10 January 1895: The Battle of Kaiping 24 January – 23 February 1895: Battle of Weihai (Last major battle of the Sino-‐Japanese war) 2 February 1895: the Japanese controlled all the forts surrounding Weihaiwei 5 and 6 February 1895: Japanese torpedo damaged Ding Yuan and sunk Lai Yuan,

Wei Yuan, and Bao Hua 12 February 1895: Admiral Ding surrendered and committed suicide

4 March 1895: The Battle of Niuzhang 6 March 1895: The Battle of Yingkou 9 March 1895: The Battle of Tianzhuangtai (Final battle of the Liaodong Peninsula) 17 April 1895: Peace Negotiations

Map 1 Map of the battles categorized by three phases

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The Chinese Forces

When the Sino-‐Japanese War was officially declared in 1894, many,

especially the European powers, expected the Chinese military primacy over

Japan’s capability. In the late 1800s, Japan was radically strengthened by its

Meiji Restoration movement, while the Imperial Qing dynasty fought the

First Opium War of 1839-‐1842 and the French-‐Chinese War of 1884-‐1885.13

As a result, the Qing dynasty’s military force had become weak and was

continuously beaten in several battles. Eventually, by the last phase of the

war in March 1895, Beijing faced direct threat of the Japanese forces, and in

the following month, the Chinese government agreed for peace under

humiliating conditions.14 As it had been mentioned earlier in the political

motivation of the war, Japan far more determined to strengthen its military

influence within Korea. China, without previous recognition of Japan’s

ambition, was less prepared for the war.

Due to its deteriorating power, the Chinese military was poorly

trained and equipped. After the Taiping Rebellion of 1851, the Chinese army

was divided into four classes of troops: The Eight Banners (Machus, Mongols,

and Chinese army of about 250,000 men), The Green Standard (entirely

Chinese army of approximately 500,000 to 600,000 men), The Braves

(volunteers), and the Trained Army, which is estimated to be between 50,000

to 100,000 soldiers.15 The aims for the first two groups of troops were to

maintain peace and suppress small armies, and they were not ready to fight

13 Guangqiu Xu, "Sino-‐Japanese War (1894-‐1895)," in China at War: An Encyclopedia, ed. Xiaobing Li (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-‐CLIO, 2012), 11483. 14 Fung, 1010. 15 Zenone Volpicelli, The China-‐Japan War Complied from Japanese, Chinese, and Foreign Sources (New York, NY: C. Scribner's, 1896), 69-‐73.

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battles yet.16 While the Braves were completely voluntary system within the

provinces, the Trained Army received drills in the European style. However,

these divided armies lacked unity because of regional rivalry. Among the

forces, the Beiyang Army, which included the Huai and Xiang armies, was the

strongest at the time.

Fortunately, the Chinese navy was better disciplined than the Army,

with foreign instructors such as Captain Lang. Within the Chinese navy,

there were four squadrons: the Beiyang (also called Northern Squadron), the

Nanyang (also called Southern Squadron), the Foochow, and Canton

Flotillas.17 Among them the Beiyang Fleet was the most powerful not only

within China but also in East Asia prior to the first Sino-‐Japanese War. The

Beiyang Fleet, which was organized in 1888 with the total number of 25

ships, was led by Admiral Ding and mainly consisted of battleships imported

from Germany. Among them, the most notable ships were the Ding Yuan and

the Zhen Yuan, each weighing 7,430 tons.18 The Beiyang divisions were

equipped with the most modernized Western-‐style weapons with the strict

training program, and in 1893, the divisions had around 51 battalions

(25,000-‐30,000 soldiers).19 Despite the expectations of many, the Chinese

forces seemed strong only on paper, because many military divisions lacked

the equipment and training. Consequently, the Chinese military heavily

relied on the Beiyang division when going into the war.

16 Ibid., 72. 17 Ibid., 75. 18 Elleman, 102. 19 Fung, 1028.

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Weakness within the Chinese military

The Beiyang Army and Beiyang Fleet served as the best and the most

modernized military capability of China. However, there were several

weaknesses that hampered the capacity of the best equipment. Many

scholars argue for different reasons of China’s failure in the war. Some of the

reasons are the corrupt Qing government, lack of military training and the

discipline of the Chinese army, and surprisingly, the outnumbered Chinese

army. As the Qing government devoted more of its budget on building the

Summer Palace rather than training its military, the Beiyang force was not

maintained properly. After its foundation in 1888, the Beiyang Fleet did not

acquire any new warships. Because of a low budget for the military, the

Chinese soldiers were paid and treated poorly.20 The Chinese government

was too naïve and overly confident with its assumption of having the best

military capability in East Asian region. Another reason for China’s failure

accounts to the lack of military training of the Chinese army. There are

several testimonies telling that some soldiers did not know how to operate

their fort guns and the artillery.21 The lack of training can be traced back to

the lack of funding and the disunited Chinese army officers. Also, numerous

Chinese soldiers were opium addicts, which did not help strengthening the

military.22 For this reason, the Japanese troops outnumbered the Chinese

army several times because the actual number of soldiers with fighting

ability differed from the documentation.23 Because the Qing dynasty had

maintained a dominant position in East Asia for a long period of time, it must

have not much need to actually fight with strong determination to destroy

20 Xu, "Sino-‐Japanese War (1894-‐1895)," in China at War: An Encyclopedia,11485. 21 Fung, 1022. 22 Ibid. 23 Fung, 1027.

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enemies. One reason may be that in that region, there was no country that

could match China with its capacity and strength. When this period of

relaxation continued for a while, China did not expect Japan to rise so

suddenly with its advanced equipments and forces.

The Japanese Forces

During the Meiji Restoration, the emperor focused on building a

modern national army and navy. To achieve this, the government

established military schools and arsenals and supported Japanese military

officials to go to Europe and study the military strategy and tactics. In

addition, beginning from 1872, national conscription was imposed and

opportunities to join the professional army were given to the soldiers.24 The

Japanese army had six divisions, including the Imperial Body Guard. All of

them had two brigades or four regiments of infantry; however, the artillery,

cavalry, engineers and train assigned to the division differed to some

extent.25 Additionally, there were two special corps, one troop each

specifically for the Island of Yeso and the Tsushima.26 During peacetime,

each military unit of the Japanese army contained about 64,300 men.27

The Japanese Navy was organized similarly to that of the Chinese. It

also was equipped with numerous fast vessels, Yoshino being the fastest one

in the world. Japan had three military ports in Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo

with a squadron attached to each of them. During the war, the fleet was

divided into smaller squadron of four vessels.28 Furthermore, the Japanese

navy was heavily influenced by the West as the British Royal Navy trained 24 Xu, "Sino-‐Japanese War (1894-‐1895)," in China at War: An Encyclopedia,11490. 25 Volpicelli, 80. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., 81. 28 Ibid., 86.

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them with military skills. As a result, the Japanese eventually were able to

create its own cruisers and torpedo boats. Most of the Japanese fleets’ ships

were built after 1889, and the fastest one cruised at maximum speeds of over

twenty knots.29

The success of the Japanese Army during the war is not credited only

to the modernized equipments. The Japanese army was far more disciplined

and well trained. Most importantly, they were determined to win this war.

Even before the declaration of the war, Japan’s ambition was evident when it

sent approximately 5,000 Japanese soldiers to the Korean Peninsula in June

1894. On the other hand, the Chinese government had deployed 1,500

Chinese soldiers.30 Furthermore, for the Japanese forces, individual soldiers

goal matched that of the country’s ambition to win the war. According to

accounts of several writers such as F.W. Eastlake and Y.A. Yamada, Japanese

solders were very brave and were not afraid to risk their lives to win each

battle.31 In contrary to the Chinese forces, which were not motivated to face

the battle, the Japanese trained hard with systematic drills, patriotism, and

commitment for the victory of this war.

First Phase of the Sino-Japanese War

The Sino-‐Japanese War can be divided into three phases of battle,

followed by a period for peace negotiation. The first phase of the war is

when the Japanese drove out the Chinese forces from Korea, then the second

phase is when after the Japanese troops had gained access to the Chinese

territory through the Yalu River and invaded Manchuria. Finally, in the third

phase, the Japanese fought the Chinese at Weihaiwei, and this battle marks 29 Elleman, 103. 30 Fung, 1011. 31 Fung, 1024.

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the last major battle of the war. Then, in April 1985, after few more minor

battles, Treaty of Shimonoseki was ratified.

Map 2 Map of the battles of Pyongyang, Yalu, and Jiuliancheng32

The Battle of Pyongyang

During the first phase, which includes the Battle of Pyongyang, the

Battle of Yalu, and the Battle of Jiuliancheng, Japan gained complete control

over the Korean Peninsula. The first two battles that took place within a

three-‐day period in mid-‐September of 1894 carry more significance because

they determined the momentum of the entire war. Some consider the Battle

of Jiuliancheng as part of Japan’s invasion of China, but this battle, which took

place near the Yalu River, finally confirmed that the Chinese forces were no

longer capable to exert military forces in Korea. The Chinese forces’ failure to

32 Paine, "Battle of Pyongyang and Yalu," map, in The Sino-‐Japanese War of 1894-‐1895, 164.

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dominate Korea in this period opened the door to the Japanese invasion in

Manchuria.

Prior to the official declaration of the war, the two countries’ military

forces were already present in the Korean Peninsula. For the Chinese forces,

most of them were stationed near Pyongyang already, and they held the

objective advantage because the Chinese forces had ample time to reinforce

the existing walled stronghold, from early August to mid-‐September.33 To

prepare for the battle at Pyongyang, four Chinese generals represented

infantry, artillery, and Manchu cavalry, total of approximately 13,000 troops

dispersed to 27 forts.34 At the very beginning of the war, Pyongyang was a

strategic location because it was on the way to the Chinese mainland.

Conquering Pyongyang was necessary for the Japanese to gain land access to

China. Four Japanese columns arrived in Pyongyang in early September

1894. Under the overall command of General Yamagata, the Japanese drafted

a strategy to make the frontal attack from the south, as the Main Division

assaulted from the southwest at 4:30 A.M. on 15 September 1894.35 The

Wonson column, led by Colonel Tadashi, was responsible for intercepting the

enemy when it fled to the northeast. This strategy was very successful and

the Chinese surrendered later on the same day. 36

Even before the war, the Chinese army in Northern Korea was very ill

prepared. The four Chinese commanders only focused on his army and did

not coordinate with others, without a strategic plan to fight the Japanese. In

addition, because of the army’s lack of discipline and training, soldiers did

not even know how to properly handle the ammunition. It was reported that

33 Elleman, 99. 34 Paine, 166. 35 Ibid., 167. 36 Elleman, 100.

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total losses for the Chinese estimate around 2,000 while the Japanese lost

698.37 With the fatal defeat on its part, Chinese army retreated further to

Manchuria to defend its empire.

The Battle of Pyongyang, especially the defeat of the great Chinese

army in a day, was significant to the Sino-‐Japanese War because it was the

first major land war between the two powers. Through this battle, Japan

sparked the signal of its rise as a new power in East Asia, and demonstrated

its military supremacy over China. It was also the first battle that the

Japanese utilized its hard-‐trained and modernized weapons and troops, and

was very successful. Prior to the battle of Pyongyang, in Korea, the

resentment of the Koreas had intensified since the Japanese imposed forced

reforms on the Korean government and they sought support from other

countries, especially from China. However, this battle’s defeat implied that

the aid was not coming anymore to Korea. Furthermore, in order to utilize

easier access, the Japanese forces impeded the Korean Peninsula to furnish

supplies to the military facilities. For Koreans, the Chinese loss of this issue

signaled the deteriorated condition for the people. The Japanese forces were

not satisfied with the victory at Pyongyang; their ambition was greater than

what anyone else had expected.

For the Chinese, the loss of Pyongyang failed to alarm the army and

the government. They did lose Pyongyang, but still was able to retreat to

Manchuria. Therefore, the complacency continued in the next battles as well.

The Battle of Yalu

On September 17, 1894, the day after the Battle of Pyongyang, the

second major battle took place. As part of the first phase of the Sino-‐

37 Ibid., 101.

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Japanese War, the Battle of Yalu occurred at the strategic location at the river

that forms the boundary between the Chinese empire and Korea. It carries

significance as one of the first modern navy battles. In the early 1890s, the

capability of China’s navy was greater than that of the Japanese navy. While

the Chinese navy was ranked eighth in the world, with 65 ships, the Japanese

navy was ranked eleventh with only 32 ships.38 Furthermore, China’s

Beiyang fleet was one of the most advanced with the Ding Yuan and the Zhen

Yuan as the most notable ships.39 On the other hand, Japan did not have any

significant naval ships known. Therefore, it was easier to assume the Chinese

victory in this naval battle. However, the Battle of Yalu proved the

supremacy of Japanese navy and of its naval tactics. The battle only lasted

for about four and a half hours but by the end of this military encounter, the

Japanese fleet successfully sank four Chinese ships—the Zhao Yang, Yang

Wei, Zhi Yuan, and the Kong Yuan—and caused over 1000 Chinese

causalities.40 Further details of the battle will be described in the latter part

of the paper. As a result of this significant naval battle, the Chinese

experienced a crushing defeat and the Japanese took command of the sea,

which enabled the Japanese to facilitate all of their future operations by

allowing the Japanese army to land wherever they wished.41 Furthermore,

Japan, as an island-‐nation, it was important for it to command the sea to

achieve regional supremacy because preserving the sea routes for supplies

and trade routes were vital for Japan. During the course of the Sino-‐Japanese

War, because Japan had controlled the sea route, the troops could maneuver

more efficiently.

38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., 102. 40 Ibid., 104. 41 Volpicelli, 184-‐185.

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The Battle of Jiuliancheng

The Japanese forces still were not satisfied at the winning the two

major battles and they decided to attack the Chinese headquarters at

Jiuliancheng in late October 1894.42 This town guarded the Yalu River and it

also was the last defensive stand for the Chinese. Because the river defined

the border between Manchuria and Korea, the loss of this battle would signal

the final battle in the Korean Peninsula. The northern side of the river was

called the town of Jiuliancheng, and the southern side was Wi-‐ju.43 However,

instead of fighting to death to protect the fort, the Chinese army retreated to

defensive positions to Mukden and fairly easily allowed the Japanese to step

into Manchuria.

By the 20th of October, General Yamagata, who had received military

training from Germany, led the 3rd and 5th Division of the Japanese army to

Wi-‐ju, the Korean side of the Yalu River.44 On the Chinese side, General Song

Jiang commanded approximately 25,000 men, which were divided into 50

camps along the border at the river.45 On the evening of October 24th 1894,

Yamagata ordered Sato to lead a small flanking force across the Yalu; the

army planned to attack the Chinese force from the rear. The remaining army,

in the morning of October 25th, built a metal bridge across the river by 4 A.M.

Then, the troops positioned themselves on the north bank by the sunrise.

This battle was fought for a short period of time—by noon, the Chinese

forces called for retreat and the Japanese took control of the Chinese fort in

Jiuliancheng. 46 During this battle, the Japanese lost one officer and 32 men,

and three officers and 108 men were wounded; however, they killed 495 42 Elleman, 104. 43 Volpicelli, 188. 44 Volpicelli, 187. 45 Elleman, 104. 46 Ibid., 105.

20

Chinese for the record. Scholars assume that many more must have drowned

in the Yalu River.47 The Japanese also confiscated 66 cannon, 35,000 shells,

3,300 rifles, more than 3 million rounds of ammunition, and food supplies.48

This battle finalized the Japan’s control of the Korean Peninsula. After

the defeat at the previous two battles, the Chinese army was unlikely to gain

back the territory. However, when the Japanese won this battle, it was

evident that the influencing Korea was out of the question for the Chinese.

Protecting the mainland’s territory became the first priority. The Japanese

had gained access route to Manchuria, which further advantaged them in the

coming battles of the war.

The first phase of the Sino-‐Japanese War indicated several aspects in

the Northeast Asian region: significance of modernization and the beginning

of the rise of a new power in the region, which was represented by the

Japanese ambition and Chinese’ lackadaisical attitude. Prior to the war,

Japan seemed less modernized in its military and level of strategical

intelligence. However, only with few years of modernization period through

the Meiji government, the Japanese successfully equipped itself with high-‐

technology weapons and learned military tactics from the European

countries. The Battle of Yalu was especially noteworthy as the first modern

naval warfare in Asia. Additionally, the Chinese defeat at Pyongyang and

Yalu was not suspected by anyone around the world and several foreign

presses covered the war at the front pages.49 The Chinese loss at

Jiuliancheng opened the gate for the Japanese to continue to march and

threaten Beijing. With the surprise of the Japanese military supremacy, the

period of Chinese disgrace had begun. 47 Volpicelli, 194. 48 Elleman, 105. 49 Paine, 182.

21

Second Phase of the Sino-Japanese War—Invasion of Liaodong Peninsula

Map 3 Map of the campaign—Liaodong Peninsula (Jinzhou, Dalian), Port Arthur, Ximucheng and Haicheng50

The Japanese forces successfully crossed the Yalu River and advanced

to Manchuria, the northeastern region of China. The second phase of the

war’s main objective was the invasion of Liaodong Peninsula. To achieve

this, the Japanese and Chinese fought the battle at Jinzhou and Dalian, the

Battle of Port Arthur, and at further inland of the Liaodong Peninsula, which

includes the battles at Ximucheng, Haicheng, Kangwasae, Kaiping, Niuzhuang,

Yingkou, and Tianzhuangtai. Although the Chinese conducted major

offensive during few battles in this phase, their strength was incomparable to

50 Paine, "Battle of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei," map, in The Sino-‐Japanese War of 1894-‐1895, 196.

22

that of the Japanese. The Chinese troops’ weakness and dispirit still

continued in this phase and the Japanese forces, which were always overly

prepared, took over key strategic regions without many casualties.

Invasion of Southern Liaodong Peninsula (Jinzhou and Dalian)

The Japanese strategy’s primary focus was to take Jinzhou, which was

the most important fortified town in the region. The area commanded the

neck of the Liaodong Peninsula and was located at a major transportation

intersection. In order to take control of Port Arthur, located at south of

Liaodong, command of Jinzhou was vital. After the Battle of Jiuliancheng,

there were sporadic battles on both 4 and 5 November 1894.

The Japanese forces were systematically divided into three columns.

Part of the First Army was responsible for moving south through Manchuria

toward the Liaodong Peninsula, and the Second Army was to come by sea to

the Liaodong Peninsula to take Port Arthur. Finally, the rest of the First

Army was to impart from Korea toward Mukden.51 The Japanese army was

seriously determined to take control of the Chinese territory at a swift pace.

During that time, the Second Army under Major General Nogi Maresuke

attacked Jinzhou the next morning, on November 6th. By 9 A.M., thirty-‐six

Japanese artillery pieces shelled the city, and within one hour, the Chinese

forces retreated. By 10:30 A.M., the Japanese bombed the city gates of

Jinzhou and entered the city. Because the Chinese forces knew the

significance of this loss, General Song led an army of 8,000 to take the Jinzhou

fort back on November 21st, 1894. 52 However, his troops were defeated

once again. Part of the Japanese First Army achieved its mission successfully.

51 Paine, 198. 52 Elleman, 106.

23

They could have remarked that this battle was unparalleled in military

history, but the battle next days surpassed that.

Two days after the fall of Jinzhou, the Japanese Navy now joined the

effort of the Japanese army to invade the city of Dalian. Located further

south from Jinzhou, Dalian served as a strategic port in Liaodong Peninsula.

The Japanese made elaborate preparation with three detachments, each

consisting of a regiment of infantry, were ordered to advance to various

ports. Soldiers even swore that they would rather die than to go back

without taking this territory.53 However, the Japanese forces did not even

have to fight for the anchorage because the Chinese had already fled to Port

Arthur.54 While they were fleeing, the Chinese had left behind significant

amount of munitions and supplies. According to one report, the Japanese

captured “large stores of military supplies, including 621 rifles, 129 guns,

over 33 million rounds of small-‐arms ammunition, and nearly 2.5 million

rounds of cannon shells.”55 This incident at Dalian once again proved how

the Chinese military was still not prepared to fight the Japanese army and

rather prioritized individual’s gains than their country. The Japanese

invasion of Liaodong Peninsula was all geared to the takeover of Port Arthur,

and the fall of Dalian left Port Arthur completely surrounded.

The Battle of Port Arthur

At this point of the war, the Chinese troops’ lax attitude regarding the

war seemed pretty obvious. The harbormaster of Port Arthur, Captain

Calder, reported that Chinese soldiers were wandering in mobs and

destroying everything that was in their view. Apparently, Chinese troops 53 Volpicelli, 213. 54 Paine, 204. 55 Elleman, 107.

24

started looting Port Arthur even before the Japanese attack.56 While the

Chinese army was not prepared much, the attack began on November 21st.

Japanese Field Marshal Oyama led the attack had three goals in mind to

achieve at Port Arthur: first to take the forts located to the west of the main

fortress, to attack Songshushan stronghold, then to destroy seven

fortifications on two different hills. In a little bit more than a half-‐day, the

Japanese forces took over a total of eleven inland fortifications. To achieve

this, the Japanese only used 40 cannon, composed of mountain, siege, and

field guns.57 In terms of casualties, only 18 Japanese soldiers were killed

while the Chinese lost over a thousand.58

This tragic result for the Chinese can be traced back to their

fundamental error and weakness of only preparing with the first-‐class war

material, but without proper discipline and training of the soldiers. Although

the Chinese fired their guns willingly, they did not employ much infantry

fire.59 Also very oddly one of the China’s most modern battleships, the

Beiyang Squadron had arrived at Port Arthur in early November but was

ordered to return to Weihaiwei. Even worse situation occurred when the

Zhen Yuan, one of China’s large battleships that which Japan did not have any

counterpart, was damaged while entering the Weihaiwei harbor. Responsible

for this damage, Commodore Lin Taizeng took a lethal overdose of opium and

committed suicide.60

By the fall of the strategically important Port Arthur, the Japanese

gained the best dockyard in the Far East and a naval base at the enemy’s

front gate. Additionally, some foreigners were inclined to disbelieve the 56 Paine, 206. 57 Elleman, 107. 58 Volpicelli, 231. 59 Ibid. 60 Paine, 204.

25

Japanese accounts, but their surmises were refuted by the Japanese’ victory

at Port Arthur.61 On the Chinese side, Peking finally began to notice how

imminent the danger was and had tried to propose a peace mission. But

instead of sending the legitimate government officials, the Chinese

government sent Mr. Detring, the Commissioner of Customs at Tietsin, and

Viceroy Li-‐Hung-‐Chang with a letter that had some reference to an Imperial

edict about the peace. Of course, the Japanese government refused to start

peace negotiations with that envoy.62 This envoy represented how the Qing

dynasty regarded the Meiji government as a country that did not deserve the

Chinese government’s complete attention. Furthermore, this also indicated

the difference between the incumbent dominant power of China and a newly

rising power of Japan. While the attempt for peace treaty took place, the

Japanese forces rejected and were busy preparing to conquer the Northeast

China.

Further Advancement into the Liaodong Peninsula

An enormous victory at Port Arthur was celebrated by the Japanese

but only for a short period of time. They immediately began their

preparation for another campaign to make their way towards Peking through

Manchuria. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria took place from the battle of

Ximucheng on December 12, 1894 to the final battle at Tianzhuangtai on

March 1895.

The Japanese forces’ strategy was to split in early December, and the

northern wing being responsible for Ximucheng, Haicheng, and Niuzhang,

while the southern fought at Yingkou. If their plan had succeeded, then the

61 Volpicelli, 236. 62 Volpicelli, 236.

26

Japanese would consolidate their control in the Liaodong along with

Manchuria.63

The Chinese also divided their forces during the fights in Manchuria

into three armies. The northernmost army was stationed at Liaoyang to

defend Mukden from the east and from the south. Another army was

headquartered at the port of Niuzhuang and the town of Haicheng.

Niuzhuang was the only Manchurian port in the valley of Hun and Liao

Rivers. Finally, a third army was at Kaiping under General Song’s

command.64

While the Japanese set their first objective as Haicheng, they first

fought at Ximucheng on December 12, 1894. Ximucheng was a town that was

on the road to Haicheng, and about 10,000 Chinese forces fought the battle.

However, once again, the Japanese had taken the town without much

difficulty as well. Reported losses indicated 104 Chinese casualties and only

seven Japanese.65

Without challenge, the Japanese marched to Haicheng. It was very

significant to the Japanese because they could pressure the Chinese forces to

further west. Also, the Japanese could restore the land communications

between their First Army in eastern Manchuria and Second Army, which was

moving northward up the Liaodong Peninsula.66 Haicheng was fortified by

9,000 Chinese droops with 20-‐foot thick walls around the city. On December

13, the Japanese began to attack, and by noon, the Chinese retreated to

Niuzhuang. Again, the number of casualties emulated the previous pattern:

over a hundred Chinese casualties and only four minor injuries of the

63 Elleman, 109. 64 Paine, 223. 65 Elleman, 109. 66 Paine, 224.

27

Japanese. As a result, the Chinese’s line of defense was destroyed and

General Song was also separated from his troop. The Chinese forces

repeatedly attempted to retake the city, but they had failed with huge

losses.67

Throughout the course of the war, the Japanese forces repetitively

achieved a complete victory over the Chinese forces. However, there was one

battle that the Chinese was successful in inflicting on the Japanese First

Army. It was during the Battle of Kangwasae on December 18, 1894.68 At

this battle, the Japanese was advancing uphill that’s covered in two feet of

snow. During this time, the Chinese mercilessly fired upon them. By the end

of the battle, the Japanese reported over 200 casualties and 15 officers killed

or wounded.69 Nevertheless, the Japanese defeated the town at the end, and

prevented General Song from communicating with Liaoyang and other

armies in the north.70 This battle had been the only major Chinese offensive

of the war. However, they still succumbed to the Japanese army and

retreated further to the west, just as the Japanese intended.

The Japanese Second Army also made its way to Manchuria,

specifically to the town of Kaiping. This medium-‐sized town was equipped

with a large castle and 30-‐feet-‐high city walls. Additionally, Chinese

garrisons with ten guns, manned by 5,000 men with 500 cavalry were

defending the city. Under the command of Major-‐General Nogi Maresuke, the

Japanese forces advanced to Kaiping on January 10, 1895. During this battle,

the Chinese used a traditional strategical preparation using the stream next

to the city. They manipulated the water in the stream so that it would freeze 67 Elleman, 109. 68 F. Warrington Eastlake and Yamada Yoshiaki, Heroic Japan: A History of the War between China and Japan (London: S.Low,Marston & Co., 1897), 246. 69 Elleman, 109. 70 Paine, 224.

28

at a sharp angle to make it difficult for the Japanese to cross. This clever

strategy caused notable casualties to the Japanese with 53 killed and 296

wounded.71 Even though this ancient strategy might have increased Japanese

casualties, this might have been more effective in earlier days. Nonetheless

of the ice tactic, the Japanese conquered Kaiping.

Finally, the Japanese had conquered both Haicheng and Kaiping. Since

the Japanese forces had broken the continuous defense line of the Chinese,

they now had to connect the communication line among their armies. The

next target was Niuzhuang, Yingkou, and finally Tianzhuangtai. The Japanese

First Army fought the Battle of Niuzhuang on March 4, 1895. This battle was

one of the most difficult for the Japanese. The Chinese had formed double

line of breastworks. After the battle that lasted entire day, the Japanese

ended up with 242 casualties. However, the Chinese reported estimated

1,884 casualties. Furthermore, the Japanese took 700 Chinese prisoners,

confiscated 21 field and mountain guns, 2,138 rifles, and more than 1.5

million rounds of ammunition.72

While the First Army achieved a great success, although with some

damage, the Second Army conquered Yingkou without a single fight on

March 6, 1895. It was because the Chinese, again, retreated from the well-‐

fortified city during the night. As it happened previously, the Japanese again

gained what the Chinese had left behind: 45 cannon and 180 rifles, along

with ample supplies of food.73 After the two battles in early March, the First

and Second Japanese Army had joined each other. Fall of Jinzhou, Dalian,

Port Arthur, Ximucheng, Haicheng, Kangwasae, Kaiping, Niuzhuang, and

Yingkou allowed the Japanese to form their control over the western coast of 71 Elleman, 110. 72 Elleman, 111. 73 Ibid.

29

the Liaodong Peninsula that stretches to Haicheng. This major achievement

of the war advantaged Japan to threaten an attack on the Great Wall

eventually.

One last battle consolidated the Japanese control over the Liaodong

Peninsula: the Battle of Tianzhuangtai on March 9, 1895. Tianzhuangtai was

the port city on the Liao River and controlled river traffic to Yingkou and

Niuzhuang. During the short four-‐hour battle, the Japanese utilized 97 guns

against the Chinese defenders, who only had 20 guns.74 The loss of the geo-‐

strategic region of the Liaodong Peninsula, which used to station Chinese

naval bases and several ports that offered Manchuria sea routes, was

significant to the security of the mainland of China.

Most of the battles in this phase were fought in the harsh winter of

Manchuria. The Chinese forces and foreign observers both expected that the

Manchuria’s winter weather would deter the Japanese forces. However, that

kind of negligent attitude destined the major loss of the Chinese. The

Japanese always had a strategic plan, and on top of that, was equipped with

the strongest weapon of patriotism. On the other hand, the Chinese troops

always chose to retreat to save their lives, sometimes even without fighting,

as it happened in the Battle of Yingkou. Even with the continuous victories,

the Japanese army never loosened their discipline and always followed their

strategic plan with clear objectives. Very contrastingly, the Chinese army

lacked in discipline and training. Although they were equipped with modern

weapons, their mindsets and physical abilities were not prepared for the

battles. As the new rising power in the Asian Pacific region, the Japanese

forces did not cease even after the complete takeover of the Liaodong

74 Ibid.

30

Peninsula. Instead, they moved onto the third and final concluding phase of

the war at Weihaiwei.

Third Phase of the War at Weihaiwei

The final Japanese offensive of the war, the Battle of Weihaiwei, took

place in Shandong Province, and signaled the concluding remark of the First

Sino-‐Japanese War. Unlike many previous battles during this war, the Battle

of Weihaiwei occurred over a period of approximately thirty days. For the

Chinese, the defense of Weihaiwei was critical to their security, because if the

port fell, they would be opening two port gates to the enemy. If that happens,

the threat to Beijing would be seriously imminent.

The Japanese troops’ priority after the fall of Port Arthur was the

naval base at Weihaiwei. While the First and Second Army were fighting

their way through Manchuria, most of the Sixth Division under the command

of Marshal Oyama was deployed at the Yellow Sea to Shandong Province.

The main objective of the capture of Weihaiwei was to destroy the Chinese

fleet inside the Weihaiwei naval base.75 If the Japanese successfully achieve

that mission, then they would become the dominating navy in the Far East.

The Japanese realized the importance of sea power, and knew that without

command of the sea, Japan could not have deployed its troops freely.

There were several reasons that the Japanese forces aimed to conquer

Weihaiwei. As the second strongest naval base in China, it was conveniently

located near Dalian Bay. Also, the port sheltered the Beiyang fleet, which the

Japanese feared the most.76 It was obvious that the Japanese considered the

capture of Weihaiwei very significant.

75 Paine, 226. 76 Volpicelli, 271.

31

Marshal Count Oyama led the part of the Second and Sixth Division of

the Second Army to a port located on the eastern side of the Shandong

Peninsula on January 19, 1895. They planned to approach the Chinese base

at Weihaiwei from their back. On January 26, 1895, Oyama’s army was

divided into two columns and captured all the forts southeast of Weihaiwei.77

Even though the Chinese had thought that they were well prepared for the

defense of Weihaiwei, their forts fell in a relatively short time. That might

have been a reason for the Chinese troops’ retreat on February 2. When the

Japanese army entered Weihaiwei, they found none of the garrison in the

town.78 Therefore, the entire forts surrounding Weihaiwei came under the

Japanese control.

Meanwhile, on the sea, the British man-‐of-‐war Severn delivered a

letter from Admiral Ito to Chinese Admiral Ding to surrender before the

war.79 The Japanese fleet’s major goal was to demolish the Beiyang fleet,

which still consisted 15 ships, with 13 torpedo boats.80 Unlike most of the

army soldiers, the 4,000 sailors on the fleet were well disciplined and

considered a truly valuable force to the Chinese.81 Although the Japanese

fleet lingered around the outside of harbor for about a week, Chinese ships

did not come out to fight and chose to defend the port instead. Eventually, on

February 5th and 6th, the Japanese torpedo boats snuck into the harbor and

succeeded at damaging the Ding Yuan and sinking the Lai Yuan, the Wei Yuan,

and the Bao Hua.82 The major damage of the Beiyang fleet already indicated

77 Elleman, 111. 78 Ibid. 79 Volpicelli, 273. 80 Elleman, 112. 81 Volpicelli, 276. 82 Elleman, 112.

32

the outcome of this war and proved the Japanese navy’s supremacy over the

fleet that was once hailed as the most modern one in the Far East.

The final assault by the Japanese began on February 7, 1895. For the

next five days, the Japanese forces cruelly bombarded the remaining forts

and ships in the harbor. To fully crush the Beiyang fleet, the Japanese navy

did not let go of the fleeing thirteen torpedo boats. They hunted down to the

last minute and either destroyed or captured all except two of them. Finally

on February 12, 1895, Admiral Ding made a judgment that the situation at

Weihaiwei was not recoverable. He formally surrendered. Later that day, to

atone for their failure at the battle, Ding and two other officers committed

suicide. 83

Up until this point of Chinese surrender, the Japanese forces never

once relaxed despite the repeated victory in battles in the Sino-‐Japanese War

of 1894. The suicide of Admiral Ding must have left the Japanese a deep

impression. The Japanese considered his suicide an honorable ending and

they returned few ships with his body while they lowered their flags and

fired their guns to honor the Admiral.84

After the surrender of the Beiyang fleet and Admiral Ding’s suicide,

the Japanese concerned about what to do with the remaining Chinese fleets.

The Japanese forces did not want to leave any possibility that might threaten

Japanese naval supremacy in the future. Through the further military

campaign at Taiwan, Japan successfully acquired Taiwan as a result.85 Both

the Chinese and the Japanese realized that the time for a peace agreement

had come.

83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., 113.

33

This final battle was a repetition of what had happened throughout

the entire war between the Chinese and the Japanese. As always, the

Japanese were well prepared with high spirit while the Chinese were scared

and did not even dare to face the Japanese. Although the Chinese fully

realized the criticality of Weihaiwei, the undisciplined soldiers were busy

preserving their lives. Also, this battle proved the Japanese determination to

achieve and maintain the military supremacy. Furthermore, when the

Japanese completely destroyed the Beiyang fleet, it represented that Japan

knew of the importance of naval supremacy in the Far East. Japan’s

geographical characteristic as an island and the Yellow Sea that allowed

access to both Korea and Japan both provide reasons for why the Japan

valued the naval power very much. Even if they wanted to attack the

mainland of China or the Korean Peninsula, the most efficient way to supply

the necessary resources was the sea route. Therefore, uninterrupted sea

route for Japan was essential for it to be a leading power in that region.

Peace Negotiation: Treaty of Shimonoseki

After the war progressed with repeated Chinese defeat, officials in

China acknowledged that the country had to sue for peace. Otherwise, the

Japanese army would easily march into Beijing. Therefore, on March 20,

1895, Japanese Admiral Ito and Mutsu met with Viceroy Li at Shimonoseki. In

the draft treaty that was presented on April 1, China had to accept the Korean

independence and pay for reparation. In addition, China had to promise a

commercial treaty to let Japanese ships to conduct business on the Yangzi

River, open up four more ports for foreign trade, and to establish factories in

those ports.86 Finally, China was also required to cede the Liaodong

86 Xu, "Sino-‐Japanese War (1894-‐1895)," in China at War: An Encyclopedia,11492.

34

Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Pescadores islands. Viceroy Li strongly protested

against these terms. In response, Ito and Mutsu agreed to narrow down the

boundary of the Liaodong Peninsula and to reduce the reparation by a third.

Other than those slight changes, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was signed

on April 17, 1895, was not much different from the original draft.87

The treaty confirmed Japan as a definite new regional power in East

Asia, with almost equal terms with the Western powers. The consequences

also indicated the waning power of the Qing dynasty. For the imperial China

to accept its degradation was an unspeakable insult to them. For the

Western countries, they now had to acknowledge this reverse of powers in

East Asia. The supremacy of Japanese military tactics and training impressed

them. At the same time, because that supremacy came from Japan’s

acceptance of a Western-‐style military, it also implied that modernization

and industrialization were necessary for the advancement of a country.

The Battle of the Yalu Timeline of the battle 10:50 A.M.—the Japanese first reported smoke on the horizon 11:40 A.M.—the Chinese fleet came in sight and Admiral Ito ordered his vessels to prepare 12:05 P.M.—Vice Admiral Ito ordered the fleet to close with the Chinese 12:50 P.M.—The Japanese Principal Squadron crossed in front of the Chinese formation and began to maneuver around behind it. 1:00 P.M.—the Japanese First Flying Squadron swerved from its original plan to go through the center of Chinese fleet to pass by the right wing of the enemy; the Principal Squadron followed the First Flying Squadron 1:55 P.M.—Hiyei was in flames and Akagi went for assistance 2:23 P.M.—the Main Squadron passed the Zhao Yang and sank the vessel 3:30 P.M.—the Ze Yuan was sunk and the Japanese directed attention to the Zhi Yuan 4:48 P.M.—With the repeated attack of the Flying Squadron, Zhi Yuan sunk

87 Beasley, 57.

35

The Battle of the Yalu had received much attention from other

countries for its significance as the first major naval battle between ironclad

ships armed with quick fire guns and torpedoes. Additionally, the Japanese

navy’s very original naval tactics, which adapted the high speed and heavy

armament in quick-‐firing guns, were praised. In addition, the victory at this

battle allowed Japanese advantage throughout the war, and signaled the rise

of a new power. On September 17, 1894, two seemingly equal naval forces

encountered in the Yellow Sea. Admiral Ding was leading the Chinese fleet,

Vice-‐Admiral Ito, the Japanese fleet. The result of this naval battle greatly

influenced the future course of the war; this battle proved Japan’s military

superiority and China’s collapse overwhelmingly. At that point, the Japanese

were then able to land their armies whenever and wherever they wanted.

The Chinese Navy

In the Asia Pacific region in the late 1800s, the Chinese fleet was

considered to be equipped with the most modernized ships. The Ding Yuan

and the Zhen Yuan were the most notable ships; they were German-‐built

battleships, each weighing 7,430 tons. These ships had a 14-‐inch armored

belt and four 12-‐inch Krupp cannon apiece. Other than those two ships,

there also were the Lai Yuan, Bing Yuan, and Jing Yuan weighing 2,800 tons.

The Yang Wei and Zhao Yang were Armstrong ram cruisers, and the Zhi Yuan

was a 2,355 ton steel cruiser. Along with a large section of smaller and older

ships, the Chinese fleet’s tonnage was larger than the Japanese’s, but much

slower.88

The Chinese Navy adopted a unified formation. Admiral Ding decided

to arrange the ten ships into a wedge-‐shape formation. So, the two ironclad

88 Elleman, 102.

36

worships, the Ding Yuan and the Zhen Yuan were located in the center, while

the Lai Yuan, Jing Yuan, Yang Wei, and Zhao Yang were on the right, and the

Kong Yuan, Zhi Yuan, Guang Jia, and Ze Yuan were on the left. This formation

was strategically adopted to maximize firepower; however, it drastically

reduced the maneuverability of the fleet. 89

Chart of the Chinese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River90

The Japanese Navy

The Japanese took a different approach. Contrast to the Chinese, the

Japanese concentrated on faster speed and greater mobility of the fleet. The

Japanese fleet was divided into two groups at the Yellow Sea: the First Flying

89 Ibid., 103. 90 Hilary A. Herbert, Chinese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River, chart (n.p.: The North American Review, 1894).

37

Squadron under Rear-‐Admiral Tsuboi Kozo and the Principal Squadron

under Vice-‐Admiral Ito. As one may see from the chart, the First Flying

Squadron consisted of the Yoshino, Takachiho, Akitsushima, and the Naniwa.

Among them, the Yoshino was considered the best as it was not only the

4,140-‐ton steel cruiser, equipped with quick-‐firing guns and five fixed

torpedo boats, but also the fastest ship when it was built at twenty-‐three

knots. In the Principal Squadron were the Chiyoda, Itsukushima, Hashidate,

Hiyei, Fuso, and the Matshushima. The Matshushima, Itsukushima, and

Hashidate were the most modernized vessels. They were French-‐built

coastal defense ships. Each was 4,277 tons and carried thirty-‐two Canet

guns. In addition to these two squadrons, there were two other older

Japanese ships involved in the war. They were the gunboat Akagi and the

converted cruiser Saikyo Maru.91

When the two navies were compared, they seemed to have been

evenly matched. The Chinese’s advantage lied in armor and heavy guns, that

of the Japanese in speed and quick-‐firing guns. Moreover, majority of the

Chinese fleet were built before 1887, and the Japanese since 1890. The

difference also was in the formation of the ships. The Chinese placed weaker

ships on each side of the strongest ships. This kind of formation proved

vulnerable because the Japanese knew where the Chinese fleet’s weak point

was. Admiral Ito attacked that very weakness when he veered the Flying

Squadron to the right side of the formation and demolished the Chinese navy.

91 Elleman., 102.

38

Diagram 1 This diagram describes the formation of the Chinese and the Japanese navy. Darkened triangles represent the Chinese navy in a unified formation. White triangles represent the Japanese navy divided into two: Red lines are the course of the Flying Squadron and blue lines are the course of the Principal Squadron.92

Chart of the Japanese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River 93

92 Hilary A. Herbert, Battle of the Yalu Course, chart (n.p.: The North American Review, 1894). 93 Hilary A. Herbert, Japanese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River, chart (n.p.: The North American Review, 1894).

39

Description of the battle

During the battle of Pyongyang, the Japanese navy had been busy

preparing for a naval war in the Yellow Sea. On the 16th, the 1st Flying

Squadron advanced to Haiyang Island to keep an eye on the enemy’s

movements. The Chinese navy was also expecting the Japanese fleet. The

whole fleet was disembarked by the 16th near the Yalu River.94 On the

morning of the September 17th, the weather was clear but clouds of smoke

started to fill the air as both fleet were burning coal.95

Around 12 P.M., Vice Admiral Ito ordered the First Flying Squadron to

move closer to the Chinese at full speed toward the center of the Chinese

formation, where the strongest ships were located. But later on, the

squadron swerved to the right side of the Chinese formation to go behind it.

On the other hand, the Japanese Principal Squadron crossed the Chinese fleet

and followed the First Flying Squadron around 12:50 P.M. This kind of

maneuvering was possible due to the fast speed and mobility of the Japanese

ships. Admiral Ito’s objective for this move was to take a full advantage of the

fleet’s superior speed and to encircle the Chinese. During this course, the

Japanese ships maintained certain distance from the large vessels while

firing at smaller Chinese vessels.96 The Japanese navy first focused on the

right side of the Chinese formation. During the movement of the Japanese

vessels, the Chinese ship, Yang Wei caught fire.

94 Volpicelli, 165. 95 Richard N.J. Wright, The Chinese Steam Navy 1862-1945 (London: Chatham, 2000), 90. 96 Volpicelli, 169.

40

Diagram 2 This diagram describes the Japanese fleet’s movement towards the Chinese navy, skewed to the right of the Chinese unified formation. Because of the fast mobility of the Japanese ships, they were successful at setting Yang Wei on fire.97

Then, the Principal Squadron concentrated its artillery on the second

ship of the right wing, the Zhao Yang. The Japanese were successful at this as

well. While the fast vessels were contributing to the achievements of the

war, the slower ships suffered damage from the Chinese. For example, the

Hiyei could not keep up with the Main Squadron and was obliged to escape

the approaching Chinese fleet. This occurred around 1:55 P.M. Meanwhile,

the Flying Squadron was “starboarding” to catch up with the Main

Squadron.98 At the Hiyei’s danger, the Akagi went for assistance. However,

the Chinese ship, Lai Yuan pursued after it. Although the Akagi was a smaller

97 Hilary A. Herbert, Battle of the Yalu Course, chart. 98 Volpicelli., 172.

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ship, a shot from it damaged the Lai Yuan. Nonetheless, both Hiyei and the

Akagi were in distress.

Diagram 3 This diagram describes the attack on Zhao Yang by the Japanese and the attack on Hiyei by the Chinese.99

Admiral Ito altered the course of the Flying Squadron to the opposite

direction at the sight of the Hiyei and the Akagi to protect those ships.

Thankfully, those weaker vessels escaped from the battle due to the help of

the Flying Squadron. Meanwhile, the Principal Squadron approached the

rear of the Chinese fleet and made a full circle around the Chinese fleet. At

2:23 P.M., the Principal Squadron sank the Zhao Yang.100

99 Hilary A. Herbert, Battle of the Yalu Course, chart 100 Volpicelli., 173-‐174.

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Diagram 4 The loop in the red line represents the alteration of the Flying Squadron’s course to save the Hiyei and the Akagi. The diagram also shows the sinking of the Zhao Yang.101

Then came the most dramatic moment of the war, when the two

flagships exchanged fire: the Matsushima from the Japanese side and the

Zhen Yuan from the Chinese. At about 3 P.M., the Chinese ship fired at the

Matsushima from its 12-‐2 inch guns and caused extensive damage and many

casualties, up to 49 officers and men.102 This allowed the Chinese battleships

a temporary respire, and they were running low on ammunitions.103 While

the Principal Squadron withdrew from the scene, both the Ding Yuan and the

Zhen Yuan immediately followed after them and fired. Because of this

cooperation, both the flagships were not entirely destroyed. However, after

the Japanese had gone some distance, the Principal Squadron turned around

101 Hilary A. Herbert, Battle of the Yalu Course, chart. 102 Wright, 93. 103 Ibid., 94.

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and poured the most destructive fire of the battle. Later, at about 3:30P.M,

the Kong Yuan was sunk.104 Furthermore, when the Chinese vessels were in

the midst of great disorder, the Flying Squadron attacked the Zhi Yuan at

4:48 P.M. The battle finally came to a concluding point around 5 P.M.

As dusk was approaching, both sides were extremely exhausted from

the battle. Also, the Japanese did not want to fight In such a decisive

encounter of the Sino-‐Japanese War of 1894-‐1895, the Chinese lost four

battleships, the Yang Wei, Zhao Yang, Kong Yuan, and the Zhi Yuan, while the

Japanese only received damage for two vessels, the Matsushima and the

Hiyei. The damage on the Matsushima was the greatest due to the attack of

the 12-‐2 inch guns’ hit. In terms of casualties, the Chinese lost about 1000

men, the Japanese, about 300 men.105

Significance of the battle

There were several battles that occurred during the entire Sino-‐

Japanese War of 1894-‐1895. Among many of them, the battle of Yalu is

worth the attention for several reasons. First, it was the first naval that

introduced modified naval warfare with modern equipments and original

naval tactics. Then, it determined the overall advantage of the Japanese for

the entire war. Finally, it signified and consolidated the rise of a new power

in the Far East.

Not only this fight was one of the first naval battles using ironclad

ships equipped with quick-‐firing guns and torpedoes, it also provided the

example of an original naval tactics. Because of the battle at the Yalu, even

the Americans concluded that victory of the future naval battles would

104 Volpicelli, 177. 105 Ibid., 180, Wright, 94.

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depend on swift mobility of fleets with powerful guns that fire from long

range.106 The Japanese navy possessed those two features and successfully

won the fight against the Chinese navy, which ranked higher than the

Japanese prior to the war. The ancient form of naval battle had been series of

engagements between the opposing vessels firing at each other until the

other surrendered.107 However, Admiral Ito’s strategy of utilizing the modern

navies with high-‐speed ships and heavy armaments adapted new forms of

naval tactics.

When one looks at the map of the Northeast Asia, where China, Korea,

and Japan are located, it would be evident to notice the importance of sea

route for all three countries. Especially for Japan, the prior domination of the

Yellow Sea was vital for its strategies during the war. Therefore, the

Japanese fought with determination and this naval battle’s result impacted

the whole war. Without the victory at the Yalu, the Japanese campaign in

China might have faced severe difficulties. The swift delivery of resources

and movement of their military personnel were critical for facilitating the

battles the Japanese fought in a foreign land. The most efficient method was

through the sea route. Well aware of this significance, the Japanese attacked

the Yalu right after the battle at Pyongyang. This naval battle opened up the

gate for invasion of China in the future course of the war.

Japan’s uninterrupted string of victories on the land at the battle of

Pyongyang, in addition to the victory over the highly considered Beiyang

Squadron, turned heads in Europe.108 Because the Great Qing Empire had

been the dominant power in the Far East for several decades, the public

generally did not expect the loss of the Chinese navy. Even though the 106 Herbert, 513. 107 Volpicelli, 181. 108 Paine, 192.

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Japanese had been building its navy with foreign country’s ships and training

programs, it was the first time that the Japanese navy actually exercised its

power and compared the capacity with that of the Chinese. The victory at

this naval war at Yalu proved that the Qing dynasty was weakening

dramatically and the new power was prepared to replace the dominance.

Conclusion

This revolutionary war in East Asia reversed the order of power and

surprised all. Not only the war provided a turning point in the power balance

and a lesson to the once-‐again risen power of China, the war also left

significant footprints in the East Asian history. The consequences of the

war were very influential in different aspects within China, Japan, and Korea.

Eventually, the Sino-‐Japanese War of 1894-‐1895 left legacy in a territorial,

political, and military aspect.

Through the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan acquired Taiwan as its first

colony. Additionally, prior to and in the course of the war, Japan had gained

control of the Korean government. This acquirement had served as a

stepping-‐stone to the Japanese Imperialism. Therefore, in 1904, the Russo-‐

Japanese War occurred when the Japanese wanted to resist Russian presence

in northeast China.109 Because the Japanese had a chance to test and

demonstrate their superior capacity against the strongest nation in the Far

East, they now knew that they were capable of conquering other nations.

In China, the political consequence of the war was immense. The

defeat of the great Qing dynasty to a small island nation was a shameful

insult to the Chinese and the government focused on strengthening the

domestic situation. Because the result of the war proclaimed the corrupted

109 Xu, "Sino-‐Japanese War (1894-‐1895)," in China at War: An Encyclopedia,11572.

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Qing government’s weakness, many officials demanded reformation within

China as well. As a result, the government conducted the Hundred Days

Reform of 1898, led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. Ultimately, the

movement led to the fall of Qing dynasty and the establishment of a republic

in China in 1912.110 After the war, China realized that it was going to a wrong

direction due to corruption and complacency, and tried to revert the

direction of the power balance. However, it was not successful for the next

few centuries, as it had closed the door to foreign intervention. On the other

hand, Japan continued its growth in power in the international arena and

even shouldered with other western powers. This war of 1894 changed the

path for the two countries.

Korea’s situation even before the war was not favorable, but it

deteriorated after the war. One of the origins of the Sino-‐Japanese War

traces back to the Tonghak Rebellion led by a group of peasants against the

corrupted government. Because the government could not handle this

rebellion, it called for foreign assistant, and this sparked the war between

China and Japan. During the war for Japan, Korea was a necessary territory

to easily access the Mainland China. Furthermore, Japan needed Korea to

serve as both defensive and offensive territory. With the strengthening

Japanese power in the region, especially proven by its victory of the war, the

Korean government was heavily influenced by the Japanese for the next

several decades.

Finally in a militaristic sense, the foreign navies used the Battle of Yalu

to study the Japanese original naval tactics. The Battle of Yalu emphasized

the vital importance of naval powers especially in East Asia and introduced

the naval warfare with the most modern equipments provided by European

110 Ibid.

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powers. As a result, it proved that the mobility and speed were decisive

factors in modernized naval battles. The unified formation with heavy ships

and armaments, which was the tactic that the Chinese used during the Yalu

battle, was not efficient anymore.

It was a transitory period when the Sino-‐Japanese War took place in

1895. The war introduced a new dominant power and dismissed a previous

status-‐quo power. After two centuries had passed, another transitory period

had come. While Japan is facing standstill growth rate in economy, China is

progressing by expeditious rate that it is almost threatening to others. At

this critical period for China when it had become the dominant power in East

Asia again, it can be worthwhile for it refer back to the lesson of the Sino-‐

Japanese War. The most critical and reoccurring problems for the Chinese

forces during this critical moment was its complacent attitude as a status quo

power. Without proper discipline and training, the Chinese forces postulated

that victory would come just because of their current status and military

equipments. However, their hope completely shattered when the Japanese

fought with both state-‐of-‐art equipments and patriotism. As a result, Japan

succeeded at taking the place of Qing dynasty and reversed the power

balance in East Asia. The Sino-‐Japanese War of 1894-‐1895 carries its

significance not only in the East Asian history but also in current affairs.

48

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Elleman, Bruce A.. Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989. London: Routledge,

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Fung, Allen. "Testing the Self-‐Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-‐

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Paine, S.C.M. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 Perceptions, Power, and

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The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Battle of Yalu in September 1894

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Transcript of The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Battle of Yalu in September 1894