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The new problems of scale and scope of defense analysis present a double bind. At

precisely the time when defense sectors are more difficult to manage, the demands for

effective performance have become a great deal more serious. The familiar parameters

of modern defense the widespread application of advanced technology, increasing

specialization in the labor force, the integrative effects of rapid communications, etc.

all serve to increase complexity in defense analysis. Defense analysts are now under

pressure to frame problems that they did not worry about twenty years ago, and many

of these problems seem decidedly greater in their inherent difficulty.

The most telling basis for judging the complexity of todays defense analysis is the

higher degree of uncertainty in the defense mission objective, defined in terms of a

varying political culture, evolving technological possibilities and resource allocation

priorities within the context of defense reviews. Nothing is more mistaken than to

assume that a defense review is a sort of autonomous movement with

an implacable will of its own, that the variable elements interact so as to

determine the outcome, that the participants are dominated by the system in such

a way that their moves are either mere responses to its dictates or exercises in irrel-

evance or self-defeat when they go against the systems logic.1

While the term defense review sounds to some like budget cutting, to others it

foreshadows an aggressive approach for achieving military superiority and an organiza-tional build-up. In the best sense of the term, it is neither; rather, it is simply an attempt

(often driven by necessity) to break out of a stagnant situation, generally reflecting the

recognition that one has fallen behind. In this case, the measure of behind is not

limited to ones neighbors. It can simply reflect the realization of ones inability to

Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 6778, March 2005

ISSN 1475-1798 print; 1475-1801 online/05/010067-12 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd 67

DOI: 10.1080/1475179042000305804

The Security and Defense Matrix:Concepts Matter in Defense Analysis?

*

Salvador G. Raza

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, U.S. Coast Guard

Headquarters Building, 2100 Second Street SW, Suite 4118, Washington, DC 20593-0001

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of

the National Defense University, the US Department of Defense, or the US Government.

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accomplish previously acknowledged goals or aims with respect to national defense in

light of todays technology and/or uncertainties.

The fledging power of the evidences for defense reviews confronts facts that defense

analysis everywhere are currently at a loss as to the best approach for regulating defensedemands against security assessment. There are few established assessment guidelines

from which agreement might be reached, and those are based on an insufficient

knowledge of what defense and security are.2

DEVELOPING THE MATRIX

The security environment is a socially built political reality. Transaction costs in this

environment vary according to the valuation of interests in the conflict and the plastic-

ity of its attributes (perceived threats and opportunities). These attributes are placed

into hierarchical order and prioritized in terms of the perceptions of the possibilities

and probabilities that indicate a given acceptable defense alternative threshold at each

stage of this hierarchy.

For policy formulation purposes, a state of security can be defined simply to mean a

perceived or intended state of equilibrium between the desired way of life of a society

and predicted threats to statecraft, organizations and means that afford the feasibility of

the maintenance of that desired way of life.3 Defense alternatives are the possible array

of human, material, organizational and information resources developed, sustained

and used by the state to maintain a desired state of security. In short, a state of security

exists when a state of equilibrium can be maintained for a desired way of life.

It must be recognized that any perceived or intended state of security is a transitory

condition about which there is a collectively agreed-upon recognition and expectation.The expression of a nationally intended state of security is arrived at in the political

arena and (generally) pertains monopolistically to the currently empowered govern-

ment. It is a matter of politics that some states of security are preferred (prioritized)

above others and it is also a matter of policy whether or not certain defense alternatives

are to be banned entirely in the context of the intended state of security. Alan K.

Simpson explains the nature of the politics, which informs policy formulation: In

politics there are no right answers, only a continuing series of compromises between

groups resulting in a changing, cloudy and ambiguous series of public decisions, where

appetite and ambition compete openly with knowledge and wisdom. Thats politics.4

The definition of defense alternatives in association with possible states of securityreflects a mutually complementary relationship: as each sought-after defense is

measured, it changes security goals, whereas each state of security exists in the present

and extends into the future, subject to the feasibility of capabilities and the acceptabil-

ity of risks5 derived from the selected defense alternative.

Defense analysis seeks to assess the extent to which defense alternatives are in accor-

dance with a states political goals and priorities, as reflected in its intended state of

security. The nature of the security goals and the instrumental effects of defense alter-

natives find a common denominator in the democratic political process, a process that

measures the coherence of purpose each time the populace makes a choicethat grass

roots assessment that ordains the defense.

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The range of states of security and associated defense alternatives establishes two

spectrums of possibilities, defined by their logical extremes. These spectrums, logically,

are not a hypothesis and therefore can be neither true nor false, but rather valid or

invalid depending on their utility for understanding reality.

6

This means that they havetheir own conditions for possibility; contains their own principle of constitution, encap-

sulating a conjunct of defined concepts created accordingly to the necessity of the

investigation, that can be used or not as an example with which to compare

empirical data drawn from reality.

Table 1: Security and defense spectrum

The typology expressed in Figure 1 provides a framework for plotting the choices

and actions of any state (or a range of states) with regard to defense alternatives and

political goals, based on measured estimates.

The following pages present notional charts that characterize the countries within

this hemisphere, circa 1970 and 2002. Security goals are plotted on the x-axis; defensealternatives are plotted on the y-axis. To facilitate discussion, it would be useful to

contrast the range of security and defense positions shown in the logical extremes found

within two of the four quadrants depicted in Figure 1.

Quadrants (1) and (4) are the logical extremes of security and defense, contrasting

the exclusiveness and inclusiveness criteria in their relationship.

Exclusiveness narrows the state of security to one qualifying criterion only, namely

the absence of war (hence the term narrow security). Inclusiveness broadens the state

of security to include a perhaps imprecisely defined and/or all-encompassing common

good(hence the term broad security).

THE SE C UR IT Y A ND DEFENSE MATRIX 69

Security states spectrum

This spectrum of possibilities is defined as

falling between the Broad Security and

Narrow Security states.

Broad Security

Describes a state of equilibrium where

individuals perceive themselves as having

the freedom to access information,

products and processes they consider

proper for fostering their development,

expressing their political preferences and

deciding about the social and economic

organization required to produce it, feeling

satisfied with the results.

Narrow SecurityDescribes a state of equilibrium not

menaced by the eminent possibility of

having to wage an external war or confront

an internal convolution for its mainte-

nance.

Defense alternatives spectrum

This spectrum of possibilities is defined as

falling between Broad Defense andNarrow

Defense.

Broad Defense

Encompasses all available human, material,

organizational and information resources,

everything that a state can use to protect itself

from external attacks and domestic insurrec-

tion, including but not limited to the Armed

Forces instrumentality.

Narrow DefenseRestrictively defines the instrumental capabil-

ity of the Armed Forces to conduct wars only

in the pursuance of the intended state of

security.

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Thus it can be seen that in Quadrant (1), Broad Defense alternatives are inclusive of

everything that contributes to obtaining security, whereas security is everything that

renders defense unnecessary. In contrast, within Quadrant (4), the Narrow Security

state is exclusive of any parametric variable other than war. The Narrow Defense

alternative is defined exclusively in terms of the armed forces required to provide an

understanding of the security with which it is associated.

It is particularly relevant to note an additional overriding aspect of these two extremepositions. Within both Quadrants (1) and (4), the distinction between military

functions and responsibilities becomes implicitly blurred into national governance,

despite the fact that they appear to be at polar opposites on the graph. That is, in

Quadrant (1), defense merges into security; and in Quadrant (4), security merges into

defense. The result is a surprising degree of socio-political similarity, despite different

choices made regarding states of security and defense alternatives.

By the same measure, the choices that move a state into either Quadrant (2) or

Quadrant (3) do not share a common socio-political consequence. In Quadrant (2), the

instrumental role of the military comes dangerously close to national governance,

which in the extreme, entails the military control of politics. Quadrant (3) produces the

opposite effect, distancing the military role in politics to meanness.

Despite marked differences, force design theories can be applied in every case (the

term force designrefers to the systematic and reflective process of translating defense-

specific goals into planning requirements for the composite of materials, skills,

activities and information resources that makes defense capabilities). On the left side of

the diagram (along they-axis), where Broad Security is the common denominator, force

design leans toward the role of support in military capabilities; on the right side (Narrow

Security), the combat role (making war and preventing war) is the dominant variable to

consider in force design. Similarly, within the upper portion of the diagram, where

Broad Defense is the common denominator, the tendency is to balance the functions of

70 SALVADOR G. RAZA

Figure 1: Security and defense matrix

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the armed forces along multiple axes. Within the lower portion of the chart, designated

as Narrow Defense (along the x-axis), restricted combat capabilities become the

defining factor in achieving the definitions of armed forcesroles and missions.

Inside these four quadrants, a spectrum of transitory states is defined. Each of thesestates gains its individuality and relative permanence through an assemblage of defense

objectives that translate political will into pragmatic intention (missions). The potential

tasking of defense missions, therefore, requires that force design integrates those objec-

tives representative of a states position as it defines and accepts a security and defense

matrix.

From this analysis, it becomes apparent that the social implications of a states

choices within the security and defense matrix have a far-reaching (and sometimes

unforeseen) impact. When the relationship between a defense alternative and an

intended security state is broadened into Quadrant (1), military capabilities become an

instrument of a national development toward the envisioned common good with the

perhaps unintended result of forcing military capabilities to carry the weight of social

goals, as in disaster relief or other tasks in which a combat role is generally not required.

When those objectives move relationships near Quadrant (4), military capabilities have

no alternative but to become oriented toward war.

It can be seen that the variety of possible relationships between defense alternatives

and states of security can be reduced to a single point that can be plotted on a two-

dimensional matrix. Equally, it can be seen that there are consequences both within and

without the politicalmilitary context from the choices that are made. Like a metal ball

attracted simultaneously by four pulsating electro-magnets drawing it toward the

various quadrants, a states security/defense posture follows the combined effect of

politico/military relations and interagency dynamics, as well as the national will. Themilitary is a political actor within the defense policy formulation process. However

limited, it has both political identity and prerogatives. Nonetheless, the interagency

process is the larger stage on which it is but a player.

The policy formulation arena is an organizational culture with interests that shape

the very process it is said to serve. Without the tools provided by the perspicacity

afforded through the policy-formulation process, the voice of the military can be lost or

muffled by interagency bureaucratic interplay that imposes redundant planning,

assessment and reporting requirements on regulated parties (occasionally in conflict,

thereby imposing uncertainties) and engage them in compliance enforcement in

isolation from one another.Civilmilitary relations and interagency co-operation are specific fields of study,

each with its own analytical framework and working hypotheses, intermingled with

various concepts of force designin terms of its ability to explain and predict defense

objectives, outcomes and trends. Civilmilitary relations and interagency co-operation

endeavor to explain and anticipate possible tendencies in defense policies in a web of

competitive priorities, alternatives, attitudes and preferences. In this context, the true

task of force design is to structure and manage itself so as to mesh with, reinforce and

enhance defense capabilities. It must have the capability to direct thought towards pri-

orities since, at any time, when resources are diverted to low-priority objectives, other,

necessary capabilities will be neglected.


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The political environment continually forces countries to re-evaluate their under-

standing of security and the concept of defense, and to adjust their priorities in force

design accordingly. Understanding national preferences and their implications for

decision patterns (and biases) in the formulation of defense objectives is a prerequisiteto realizing the full potential of the security and defense matrix.

APPLYING THE MODEL

Figure 2 shows two notional charts that plot the estimated position of Hemispheric

countries in this diagram in early 1970 and 20027.

Contrasting these two charts, it would be possible to correlate the position of those

countries in the early 1970s in reaction to the confluence of, inter alia, the Soviet threat,

border disputes and internal conflicts. These were primary forces shaping the concept

of security and defense toward the right side of the security and defense matrix, where

Narrow Security is dominant.

In early 2002, Colombia is isolated in the upper-right corner of the chart, struggling

to solve an internal conflict by using not only the military but also every other resource

available, as reflected in Plan Colombia. Costa Rica and Panama, formally without

armed forces, tend explicitly and emphatically toward a concept of wider defense.

Paraguay still has a strong perception of the influence of its armed forces in providing

security goals, although moving rapidly toward a wider concept of defense. Brazil s

declaratory posture of Do not directly involve the military in functions and roles other

than its professional combat orientation, keeps it in the lower part of the security and

defense matrix, whereNarrow Defense is the predominant theme.

Moving distinctly toward the Broad Security/Narrow Defense quadrant since the 1970

72 SALVADOR G. RAZA

Figure 2: Comparative charts, 19702002

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measure, the United States could be said (in terms of the analysis above) to have intro-

duced a greater degree of inclusiveness (broadening the state of intended security, i.e.,

Broadening Security) while restricting the capability of its armed forces (narrowing

defense alternatives toward that of conducting war, i.e., Narrowing Defense). (See thediscussion on the socio-political ramifications associated with quadrant (3), above.)

One can easily dispute the relative position of any two countries on either chart.

However, two aspects are indisputable: first, each states understanding of security and

concept of defense have evolved over the periods contrasted, pressed by, among other

things, its perception of the treaty environment and concomitant reassessment of

threat. Venezuela is a remarkable example, with its 1999 Constitution imposing upon

its armed forces a significant role in the development of the country. Second, there is a

marked clustering of countries that are widening their concept of defense to include

other roles and functions for the armed forces, adjusting the design of their military

capability, accordingly.

The latter aspect provides an indication of a possible convergence of a group of

countries toward the Broad Defense/Broad Security alternative. Whether or not this

implies the possibility of a more peaceful world may be arguable. Nonetheless, it can be

said that Broad Security shifts the emphasis of force design from a war-oriented role for

the armed forces to one of supporting functions and activities, such as disaster relief

and law enforcement (a constabulary role).

The 19 September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States presents an

excellent opportunity to illustrate an additional use of the security and defense matrix,

expanding it from a simple explicative (past-oriented) role to one of prediction. Figure

3 plots further US movement in the direction of Broad Security as it faces and meets

the challenges (and opportunities) of the twenty-first century. The US strategypromises to use every tool in our arsenal from better homeland defense and law

enforcement to intelligence and cutting off terrorist financing (Introduction,

paragraph 4) against terrorism, assuring that once the regional campaign localizes the

threat to a particular state, we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforce-


Figure 3: Plotting US movement in the security and defense matrix

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ment, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task(Part III, Strengthen

Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our

Friends, paragraph 5).

The US intention of transforming its military forces in order to ensure their ability toconduct rapid and precise operations capable of achieving decisive results can be

expected to guide the development of its defense capabilities in tune with its newly

defined overall security strategy goals. Nonetheless, a central theme of this paper is that

systems generally lack an institutional capacity to look at new ideas, assuring, therefore,

that past practices tend to maintain ownership and control over the mechanisms for

evaluating new goals. From a US perspective, success will depend on attaining a

common vocabulary and set of meanings about the specialized terms of defense and

security, both as the Executive stands before the Legislature in search of the resources

required for achieving its goals and as it announces the ranges of programs to its

Defense Department and its subparts. Success will take the form of adaptation, mod-

ernization and transformation if the power of effective communication is sufficient to

dislodge the inertial malaise of a bureaucratic structure. Ultimately, success will be

measured by the efficiency, efficacy and economy of defense resource allocation or, by

way of a negative alternative, the degree of withering of the national will regarding the

desired state of security of the nation that the White Paperdescribes.

EXPLORING THE MODEL: DEALING WITH THE

FORMULATION OF DEFENSE OBJECTIVES

The security and defense matrix looks beyond the traditional bounding-threat

scenarios in order to determine newly emerging trends that underscore heightened sen-sitivity for the need to have capabilities. The pay-off for using the security and defense

matrix is a recognition of the full dimension of uncertainties embedded in the changing

definition of security- and defense-practiced concepts, without being constrained by

the particular understanding embedded in previous defense policies.

With the diffusion of threat perception in a post-Cold War ambiance and in a glob-

alized world, however, defense policy development based upon a states geographic

positionwith the lingering inertia of past border disputesno longer rests upon a

valid criterion.

Because of this trend, it has become clear that the geographical/regional approach

increasingly becomes an inadequate criterion for defense policy formulation. Further-more, there are cases where the use of force for non-regional goals is ordained as an

acceptable defense/security alternative, such as in a potentially contradictory defense

alliance situation where the conflict is rooted beyond what was once considered a states

regional sphere. In such cases, it can be seen to threaten the national, indigenous per-

ception of a states desire for self-determination.

Whether or not goodor bad, the clustering tendency of countries on a plot

depicting their security and defense matrix imposes changes (and therefore challenges)

to defense policy formulation. It is not the clustering aspect, however, that is

paramount to a states force design. It reflects an evolution in the spectrum of desired

defense alternatives and states of security, an evolution that implies that country after

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country has transformed their concept of defense to reflect how they perceive the nexus

of threats surrounding their desired state of security.

Threats, therefore, are the parametric variable in force design. They are the antici-

pated relationship of possible events to the capabilities required so that an undesirableresult or consequence does not happen. Hence, force design begins by identifying and

assessing threats in order to find out whether or not they have sufficient significance to

warrant modifying military capabilities in order to preserve a states ability to attend to

defense objectives.

There are, of course, no abstract principles for designing defense objectives, and this

craft cannot be reduced to enforceable rules. This is historys warning to those practi-

tioners who search for objective-defining principles; it is a precaution to those who try

to conceptualize the relationships between their component processes.

The possibilities exist for transforming the rules for interaction and for the security

environment to change the context of choices, creating casual mechanisms that try to

relate defense alternatives that meet political preferences within this transformed envi-

ronment and reduce the costs of legitimization of these choices by using interaction

rules that are compatible with new perceptions of functionally excellent explanations

and vindications.

The developmental dynamics of defense objectives are characterized by an explicit

bargaining process in an ambiance dominated by inter-agency co-operation and

conflict. The same values, ideologies and interests that have created political pluralism

also create relatively independent and specialized agencies that make collaboration

difficult in the formulation of defense objectives. Actors in this process are aware that

the resulting defense objectives will convey decisions over resource allocation and

strategic choice. In short, this is a policy formulation process fleshed out from politicalbargaining.

Described in this way, bargaining and interagency co-operation are natural aspects

of the policy formulation process.8 In this context, the adequacy of the policy formula-

tion process can be judged according to its functional sufficiency for providing

guidelines for force design. This is a strong statement, yet reflective of the fundamental

fact that any policy formulation process that is not up to the task of providing adequate

guidelines for defense and security objectives leaves defense ministries as a rudderless

ship in rough waters, facing strong winds and an unfriendly shore. Unfortunately,

policy formulation seems forever destined to be driven by the legacy of past practices;

inertia orients its conceptions and this environment tends to direct its attention andpurpose.

These characteristics of the policy process show that preferences for defense objec-

tives are built as soon as the policy-making process for designing defense alternatives is

developed. Moreover, these alternatives incorporate implicit theories about how to

meet the goals they establish, thus are similar to conceptual systems involving priorities

and perceptions of casual relations, of the political environment, and of the possibilities

of transformation.

The development of these policies, in accordance with these characteristics,

demands a huge amount of co-ordination, and encourages the reformulation of

causality architecture between:


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1. Events external to the defense domain (changes in economic conditions, for

example).

2. Relatively stable parameters (a system of values) used in problem formulation,

building and evaluation of solution alternatives.3. Norms and procedures ruling the dynamics of operating processes developed in a

decision-making subsystem. These basically focus on changes in the system of

values of political decision-makers and their influence in the translation of national

policy guidelines into concrete decisions regarding budgetary programs and

demands.

This process calls for a critical review: of the nature of technical and operational infor-

mation; of processes and mechanisms; and of intra- and inter-institutional

co-ordination for the determination of the magnitude and form of the problem, its

causes and probable impact on various defense alternatives.

This is the case, for example, when reconsidering the relative importance of

economic development versus environmental protection, when reconsidering the per-

ception of attributes of problems (with the involvement or not of the armed forces in

fighting illicit drug trafficking), and when reconsidering the sharing of functional duties

and responsibilities and their causal relationship with the availability of other political

instruments. Along the same lines, one of the core aspects of these policies lies in the

definition of security and defense concepts and the relationship between them, keeping

in mind that these definitions imply a cutout of the scope of competence between

defense responsibilities.

FINAL COMMENTS

The Security and Defense Matrix provides a code that can be used to compare and

contrast defense objectives and provides the general elements that any defense analysis

methodology relevant to the same purpose would need to include. It thereby helps to

generate questions that need to be addressed in order to diagnose problems, explain its

processes and predict outcomes. It allows, therefore, precise assumptions to be made

about a limited set of parameters and variables that simplify the process of multiple,

interacting cycles involving numerous decisions at multiple organizational levels. They

also provide a stable conceptual environment in which stability and change coexist or

when alternated with either a number of modest adjustments having the same attrib-utes used in structuring a choice or major changes in choices, with a radical departure

from the past. They permit parallel processing within the defense system so that oper-

ational process can be conceptualized as being linked to outcomes, thus allowing the

decision-making process to move outward, from the crafting of a narrow list of alterna-

tives from which a choice is to be made, to the actual choice itself.

Bearing in mind that the task of policy formulation carries the bulk of the weight for

creating and prioritizing stable, viable defense objectives, those tasked with such a

responsibility must be able to capture the position and trend of each country in terms

of its understanding of security and the concept of defense. Whatever compromises this

process might entail, those charged with engineering defense objectives cannot fail to

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recognize that its practical achievement will run the gauntlet of civilmilitary relations

and the inter-agency bargaining process.

When policy formulation does not play its functional role in identifying adequate

defense objectives, the results are defective capabilities, inarticulate strategies and inad-equate organizational structures that not only do not provide the required jointness, but

also mirror its own lack of functionality in the defense structure it created and priori-

tized.

One hypothetical chain depicts a sequence of events when a defective defense policy

results from a lack of internal and external coherence and sufficiency when defense

purposes are not clearly defined and provoke vague and even conflicting objectives. The

following scenario unfolds: without clearly defined objectives, the responsibilities of the

states agencies become blurred. Inter-agency conflicts tend to stovepipe processes

according to their own operational procedures and institutional goals. The resulting

products of these stovepipe processes become inarticulate and even conflicting.

Democratic political institutions, however desirable, suffer similarly from a tendency

toward deficiency in the expression of their defense mission, because the more vague

the policy guidance, the more that autonomy flows to the armed forces. In the absence

of the benefit of being able to see threats to survivaldefined and prioritized through

the workings of political processes, defense ministries are left with only the broadest

definition of threat and must prepare accordingly. They then often misallocate

resources away from those needed to meet a states ideal perception of threat.

NOTES

1. Stanley Hoffman, Gullivers Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy, New York:MacGraw-Hill, 1968, p. 12, cited in R. Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social

Life, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 103. Jervis refers to

Hoffman in order to explain choices in the international relations arena. The structure of

these choices resembles defense reform decision-making key variables.

2. The epistemological question of what defense and security are is an ontological problem,

being outside the realm of this paper. The answer to this question would provide an expla-

nation for its nature. For the functional purposes of force design, the relevant idea is the

concept of defense as practiced by each country (each one being a particular manifestation

of a general phenomenon), how it evolves, and how this evolution influences the conceptu-

alization and development of military capabilities. Other disciplines deal with these

ontological questions, establishing a theoretical and practical relationship between force

design and other areas of study.3. Another common definition of security indicates the policing role of the provision of material

and individual safety, commonly referred to as public security. This restrictive and limited

meaning of security is specifically not addressed in this paper.

4. Alan K. Simpson, former US Senator from Wyoming, and Lombard Chair at the John F.

Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. http://globetrotter. Berkeley.edu/conversa-

tions/Simpson/simpson4.html (24/11/01).

5. For a discussion on the term state of security, see W. Lippman, US Foreign Policy, Boston:

John Hopkins Press, 1943, p. 51. Wolfers uses Lippmans concepts to review the Defense

Policy of the US, see A. Wolfers,American Defense Policy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,

1965, p. 3. For the application of the term in the context of policy formulation, see D.

Proena, and E. Diniz, Poltica de Defesa no Brasil: Uma Anlise Crtica, Braslia: UNB, 1998,

p. 55.


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6. P. Bruyne, J. Herman and M. Schoutheete,Dinmica da Pesquisa em Cincias Sociais: Os Polos

da Prtica Metodolgica, (ed. Ruth Joffily), Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, pp. 48, 182.

7. In developing these notional charts, the following aspects were considered: a) type of gov-

ernment; b) extent of military forces deployed abroad; c) degree of internal conflict involving

military forces or policy; d) presence of active and latent border disputes; e) theinclusion/exclusion of police forces within the structure of the armed forces; f) choice of a

civilian or a military ministry of defense; and g) the attribution of constabulary tasks to the

armed forces or police (federal police/gendarmerie/coast guard). All variables were equally

weighted from5 to +5 for defense and security (5 Narrow, +5 Broad). Aggregated results

were plotted, using the standard deviation (the center of the matrix = 0,0 defense 0,0

security). The analytical value of the results is circumscribed to its notional purpose only,

limited by the analytical limits of a single valuator and the arbitrary aggregation criteria used.

The longer two arrows represent varying forms of thought over the period from 19702002

that (over time) resolved themselves into the state of thought represented by the 2002 matrix.

The single, shorter arrow, of course, represents time.

8. To further explore interagency issues, see E. Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together: The

Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship, Washington DC: Brookings InstitutionPress, 1998. For the bargaining process see B. Mesquita, et al., An Institutional Explana-

tion of the Democratic Peace,American Political Science Review, Vol. 93 No. 4, 1999, pp.

791807. For an application of the bargainning model, see J. D. Fearon, Rationalist Expla-

nation for War, International Organizations, Vol. 49 No. 33, 1995, pp. 379414.

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the Security and Defense Matrix

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